

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Truly Reforming or Just Responding to Failures? Lessons Learned from the Modernisation of the Greek National Intelligence Service

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Truly Reforming or Just Responding to Failures? Lessons Learned from the Modernisation of the Greek National Intelligence Service

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to highlight the challenges that the Greek Intelligence Community is facing and to stress the need for a genuine reform of the National Intelligence Service (NIS). Over the past years NIS has experienced several failures and so far the efforts to reform the Service have been inadequate. A closer look reveals that past efforts to reform NIS are basically a spasmodic reaction to failures and political pressure and not a result of an in-depth analysis of the new role that NIS is required to play. The analysis of the effort to reform NIS, and its comparison with other cases of intelligence reform in Europe, allows us to reach broader conclusions regarding the importance of reform in the intelligence services.

Introduction

The end of the Cold War has brought considerable changes to the international landscape, added new items to the global security agenda and altered old ones. Security today is defined in both military and non-military terms. The latter include ethnic and religious conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organised crime and illegal migration. It is no longer possible to draw a clear line between internal and external security (Buzan, 1983). In order to deal effectively with the new security threats, states have to transform their security apparatus. Intelligence

services are an important part of the security sector and the need to reorganise the intelligence community has gained great momentum over the past years (see Barger, 2005; Zegard, 2006; Hulnick, 2007).

It is in this context that the present article highlights the challenges that the Greek Intelligence Community is facing and stresses the need for a reform of the Greek National Intelligence Service (NIS). The aim is to contribute to the debate about the (mis)functioning of NIS and make a number of recommendations that could increase its effectiveness. In order to do this, we first review the concept of intelligence reform, define the rationale behind the reforms and examine the problems that are related to it. Having framed the intelligence reform concept, we will proceed with the case study of NIS. The article looks at key aspects of NIS's history, emphasising developments and failures that took place over the last decade. The way the Greek government responded to these failures and its efforts to modernize NIS, will be our main focus. We conclude that the effort to reform NIS should not be a spasmodic reaction to past failures and political pressure, but a result of an in-depth analysis of the new role that the Service is required to play. Finally, by comparing the Greek reform with those of Italy, Spain, Romania and Serbia, we highlight how the Greek case contributes to the broader intelligence reform debate.

Reforming the intelligence community

In the post 9/11 era, intelligence faces an unprecedented array of challenges. The international environment has been transformed and is more complex compared to the one that shaped the intelligence services during the second half of the twentieth century. In particular, whereas the Cold War provided a reasonably predictable and linear framework for the intelligence community, this is not the case for the security environment at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Requirements for providing intelligence support have changed greatly. There is greater complexity and a greater variety of enemies and threats. The linear understanding that characterised most of the intelligence issues during the Cold War is long gone (Treverton, 2001; Scott & Jackson, 2004).

Calls for intelligence reform that occasionally appeared after the end of the Cold War, have become imperative. The literature on intelligence reform varies widely in terms of focus and methodology. The main focus has been the organisation of the Intelligence Community, the analytic process, the utility of open sources, the policymaker-analyst relationship, covert operations, or the role of information technologies. Some scholars examine individual agencies, while others analyse specific intelligence disciplines like human intelligence or open source intelligence. In terms of methodology the literature also varies considerably. Some studies adopt a top-down or a bottom-up approach, whereas others identify historical patterns of change (Lahneman, 2007).

Regarding the degree of reform, William Lahneman (2007, p. 5), identifies three broad categories. The first group of intelligence scholars have a cautious view of

intelligence reform. They argue that efforts to significantly change the way that the intelligence community functions might ultimately cause more harm than good. Reorganisations usually generate new problems and new needs; creating a new agency or a specialised centre shifts the attention to another area and runs the risk of deemphasising old priorities and structures. They argue that intelligence failures are not only inevitable, they are also natural and the occurrence of a successful surprise attack now and then, should not undermine the substantial success of the intelligence community (Betts, 2007). A second group of intelligence experts believes that a revolution in intelligence affairs (RIA) is already underway and therefore a marginal change is not enough. Proponents of this view assert that traditional approaches to intelligence fall short today and they call for a radical transformation of the intelligence community (Berkowitz & Goodman, 2000). Finally, the third group, which is the majority, adopts a more balanced position between these two extremes. The decision to reform the intelligence community might be revolutionary, but the implementation is always incremental. Significant intelligence reform is required, but unlike the 'revolutionaries', they state that change should be evolutionary.

But when should the intelligence community reform and how? The modern intelligence community that evolved during the Cold War has acquired all the characteristics of a large Weberian bureaucracy (Herman, 1999, p. 324). Bureaucracies mainly reform after failure and they respond to failure by creating new units, fighting for a share of the budget and asking for more personnel. Intelligence agencies do not escape this reality, and the historical pattern is explicit.

Virtually every past intelligence failure has resulted in the creation of a new intelligence agency or a sub-organisation to coordinate the existing apparatus. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) came into existence because of the intelligence failure of Pearl Harbor. The National Security Act of 1947 called for the creation of a centralised intelligence agency to coordinate intelligence activities. Likewise, in 1986, in response to terrorist attacks against US targets through the early 1980s, the then Director of Central Intelligence, William Casey, created the Counterterrorism Center (CTC). In 1994 and in response to the Aldrich Ames case, the National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC) was established and after the Robert Hansen case in 2001, it was reorganised and renamed to the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) (Taylor & Goldman, 2004).

Following the same pattern, major changes have followed the 9/11 intelligence failure. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the posts of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Under-Secretary of Defense Intelligence (USDI) are just some. The various specialised sub-organisations like the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) within the DHS, the National Clandestine Service (NCS) within the CIA and the Open Source Center (OSC) which operates under the Director of National Intelligence, simply illustrate the magnitude and scope of change.

Restructuring the intelligence community is an inherently complex and difficult task which lacks straightforward solutions. Past experience demonstrates that large-scale structural reorganisation entails trade-offs among competing goals and

priorities. The trade-offs between centralisation and decentralisation, the need to keep secrets, but at the same time share information, the relationship between producers and consumers, the need to balance between the protection of sources and methods and the protection of civil liberties, are some of the dilemmas that the intelligence reformers have to face. Selecting among competing alternatives, deciding for a radical or incremental reorganisation depends on the kind of national security threats one envisions to confront. A new intelligence system might be appropriate for dealing with certain threats, but at the same time might prove inappropriate to counter other enemies.

Restructuring the intelligence community by creating new agencies and sub-organisations is popular as a political solution to the problem, it allows politicians to demonstrate that action has been taken, but it does not necessarily translate into better and more effective national intelligence. Nevertheless, the pattern persists and raises a number of important questions. Even if reform is needed, are new agencies always the right solution? Are intelligence reforms just a way for politicians to demonstrate that they are solving problems? Do intelligence reforms have a political agenda?

Having framed the debate on intelligence reform, it is time to shift our focus to the reform of the Greek intelligence community. Why did NIS decide to reform in the first place? Was it the new and complex security environment that emerged in the post Cold War era? Did certain failures serve as a trigger for reform? Were Greek policy-makers affected more by the post 9/11 political climate that demanded changes in the intelligence services or did domestic problems like internal terrorism and the conduct of the Olympic Games play a bigger role?

The legacy of the past: From KYP to NIS-EYP

The first attempt to construct an intelligence unit in Greece started in 1926 with the creation of the State Security Branch. This intelligence branch lasted only for one and a half years and reported directly to the president. Ten years later, a new intelligence branch, the Defense Intelligence Branch, was formed. In November 1936 it was renamed as General Directorate of Foreign Citizens and despite its limited resources it functioned effectively during the Second World War. In 1946, a new military intelligence unit was established, the Military Protection Department, which was in 1949 renamed the General Directorate of Information. The later laid the foundation for the establishment of the Central Intelligence Service (KYP) in 1953 (Nomikos, 2004, pp. 436-7).

The KYP was created according to western standards as a self-standing agency being subject to the Prime Minister and having the country's national security as its mission. As part of the Cold War confrontation, the KYP was asked to face the internal threat of Greek communism, deal with international communism and collect intelligence on its neighbouring states. The KYP cooperated with the western intelligence services, mainly those of France, the U.K and the U.S.A and reported movements of the Soviet fleet in the Aegean Sea and the capabilities of the Warsaw

Pact Armed Forces. As part of its internal responsibilities, the KYP was involved in the political developments in favour of the Right, by tracking down communists and antimonarchists. The Service was mainly staffed by rightwing army officers and some of them, like colonels George Papadopoulos and Nikolaos Makarezos, later became primary agents of the Greek junta of 1967-1974 (Apostolidis, 2007, p. 4). Although the KYP did not play a role in the coup itself, it was one of the key actors that supported the military junta and concentrated its efforts against the anti-dictatorship resistance organisations.

The restoration of democracy in 1974 changed the political scenery in Greece. The legalization of the Greek Communist Party and the assassination of the CIA Chief of Station in Athens, Richard Welch, altered the priorities of the KYP. Its main task was no longer local communism, but terrorism (Apostolidis, 2007, p. 5). In the 1980s, the Socialists took over the government and tried to bring the KYP under control by assigning party officials to it. The intelligence service was thereby paralyzed under the burden of political patronage (Nomikos, 2004, pp. 437-8). The KYP was reformed in 1986 with a new Presidential Decree 1645/1986 and changed its name into National Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP). Its mission as defined in Article 2 includes the collection, processing and dissemination, of information regarding national security, counterintelligence activities and the security of national communications. As was the case with the KYP, its successor the NIS remained an all-purpose service dealing with both internal (counterespionage, counterterrorism) and external threats (political and military). The political debate about what kind of intelligence service Greece needs, whether it should maintain the single service model or create new agencies, never took place during the drafting of the Presidential Decree 1645/1986 (Apostolidis, 2007, p. 18).

Responding to failures and realising the need to reform

In the post Cold War era intelligence agencies had to readdress their role and set new priorities. That was not the case with the NIS. The Greek Intelligence Community did not realise the need to modernise and adjust to the challenges that the new security environment imposed and kept focusing on its traditional agenda meaning the collection of intelligence on its neighbors, mainly Turkey, and on internal terrorist groups.

Several failures over the past years have vividly demonstrated that the NIS resembles a stiff organisation with limited resources and operational capabilities. In 1999 the NIS's credibility was seriously damaged by its role in the so-called Öcalan Affair. In January 1999 the leader of the Kurdish political movement Abdullah Öcalan, requested political asylum from Italy, Russia and finally Greece. All governments, including the Greek one did not grant political asylum to Öcalan. Despite that, Öcalan was transferred by a NIS agent to the Greek embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. In Nairobi he was captured in an operation by the Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MIT) on February 15 while being transferred from the Greek embassy to the Nairobi

international airport. The MIT received a continuous flow of information from US satellites, as well as by other technical means, and the assistance of US agents on the ground. Athens' choice of Kenya raised serious questions, given the strong US presence in Kenya after the bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi, a year before. Öcalan was flown back to Turkey for trial. His capture led thousands of protesting Kurds to besiege Greek embassies around the world (Kaminaris, 1999, pp. 41-2; Varouhakis, 2009, pp. 1-7).

In the aftermath of the Öcalan Affair, the Greek government was also criticised for its inability to combat terrorism at home and for showing no progress regarding the security preparations for the 2004 Olympic Games. It was only after 1999 that the Greek government demonstrated a dedication and an unprecedented sense of urgency to deal with the terrorist threat. Terrorism became securitized in Greece, leading to a reappraisal and re-evaluation of all policies and measures against it. The hosting of the Olympic Games in Athens moved the issue of terrorism very high on the security agenda. The government was aware that its inability of effectively dealing with terrorism was damaging the country's international image (Nomikos, 2007, pp. 70-1).

The terrorist incident that the Greek government feared could shatter Greece's international image occurred on June 8, 2000. Brigadier Stephen Saunders, a British defense attaché in Greece, was assassinated by members of the 17 November terrorist group (Nomikos, 2007, pp. 70-1). The attack on Saunders, coming at a time when the government was trying to persuade the international community of its commitment and ability to eradicate terrorism in Greece, shocked the country's political establishment. The killing of Brigadier Saunders was a landmark in the fight against terrorism, and a catalyst for dramatic changes at the operational level. The Saunders killing brought British intelligence into the picture. It got involved in the hunt for the 17 November group, and provided invaluable assistance. The British were very systematic and brought good know-how, developing relevant wiretaps and other technical evidence (Nomikos, 2007, pp. 70-1).

The failures of the Öcalan Affair in 1999, the assassination of the British defence attaché Stephen Saunders in 2000 and the pressure regarding the poor performance in the overall planning of security for the Olympic Games produced enormous political pressure to the Greek government. Reacting to both internal and external pressure, the government took a number of measures in an attempt to increase the effectiveness of its security apparatus.

Starting from 2001, NIS was brought under the Minister of Public Order in order to contribute to the anti-terrorist campaign and assist for the security of the Olympic Games. Prior to that, the Service was subjected to the Prime Minister. Genuine reform of the intelligence services requires more than just rewiring the organisational charts of the intelligence community. The most common response to intelligence failure is usually reorganisation. Nevertheless; when a new bureaucratic layer is added in the intelligence community, it can trigger turf wars with the already existing organisations, intense antagonism for a share of the intelligence budget and

demoralization of agencies that have been demoted by the insertion of the new layer (Posner, 2005, pp. 4-5).

That was much the case with the NIS. Simply by transferring the responsibilities from the Prime Minster to the Minister of Public Order did not necessarily benefit the Greek intelligence community. This new arrangement contributed to the increase and influence of the law enforcement element and thereby to the decrease of NIS's independence from the Greek Police. Furthermore, it exposed the antagonism in the field of terrorism between NIS and the Antiterrorist Branch of the Police. NIS always had a limited budget, but now it also had to compete with the Police for a share of the Ministry's budget (Apostolidis, 2007, p. 18). These turf wars and the antagonism may increase in the near future. Since the last national election on September 2007, the Ministry of Public Order has become fused with the Ministry of Interior. Yet whether the NIS's role as a part of the Ministry of Interior will be upgraded or not remains to be seen.

The next step taken towards the reform of the NIS was the Presidential decree that was passed on September 25, 2002 (Presidential Decree – N.D. 255/2002). The Decree came at a time when the Greek Police had been making great strides in countering domestic terrorism, whereas the NIS has been effectively sidelined because of weaknesses it had shown in this task in the past. In order to upgrade its role, the Decree assigned the NIS a broader agenda. The NIS would also now be responsible for organised crime, illegal immigration and drug trafficking, issues for which the Greek Police was responsible until then. The NIS's new operational framework was reinforced by strengthening its electronic surveillance capability. In an effort to weaken the military and police element within the Service, the civilian scientific personnel were increased. Another important innovation is that NIS would, from now on, be accountable to the Greek Parliament. Each year the Public Order minister, as the civilian head of NIS, would submit a report of the year's activities to Parliament, strengthening its institutional functioning in the context of the democratic system.

The Decree aimed to make the NIS a flexible and efficient service that would cooperate with the other ministries and agencies to safeguard the national security interests. Although it is too soon to reach any safe conclusions about the effectiveness of the above reform plan, certain points can be made. Strengthening the electronic surveillance capability and the intelligence oversight of the NIS definitely point to the right direction. On the other hand, expanding NIS's agenda without providing it with the necessary means and personnel is counterproductive. Asking from an ill-equipped and inflexible service to suddenly become an all-purpose service that deals with all external and internal threats is unreasonable. Not to mention that the broader agenda that was assigned to NIS, triggered turf wars with the existing units that exclusively dealt with these issues within the Greek Police (Apostolidis, 2007, pp. 18-20).

The past practice of staffing NIS with military officials and police officers has failed. It needs a new generation of highly skilled officers and intelligence analysts. Unfortunately the practice of patronage in the detachment of police and military officers, as well as in the appointment of civilian personnel is still exercised. According

to Pavlos Apostolidis, Director of NIS during the period 1999-2004, patronage is sought by officers because of the advantages of posting in Athens, office hours and extra pay. NIS offers the opportunity to reward officers that are faithful to a political party or an individual Minister. As a result, the Service rarely receives the personnel it actually needs. Furthermore, the officers that are transferred in NIS usually stay for a limited period, three to five years, and by the time they have acquired the necessary operational experience they are transferred back to their units (Apostolidis, 2007, p. 22). In light of the above, it is safe to argue that the modernisation of NIS has still a long way to go.

Those who oppose the reform of the intelligence community usually cite successes to demonstrate that the intelligence agencies perform effectively most of the time. It is necessary to give credit to the NIS for its significant role in the break-up of the 17 November terrorist group in 2002 and for ensuring the security of the Olympic Games in 2004. It is also necessary to point out that development of stronger intelligence infrastructure and proper co-ordination between government, police, and judiciary might have enabled 17 November to be identified and eliminated much earlier. For decades Greece lacked an intelligence strategy that would channel information effectively to the security forces engaged in anti-terrorism. The end result for the anti-terrorist campaign was diffusion of authority, bureaucratic squabbling, and poor intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination (Kassimeris, 2005, pp. 109-11). Successes should not obscure the fact that the NIS is not properly prepared to face the new challenges of the twenty-first century.

The failure of the 'telephone tapping' in 2004/5 (Bryan-Low, 2006) and the 'Pakistani Affair' in 2005 (Cowell, 2005), vividly demonstrate NIS's inability to adjust to new security threats and challenges. The Greek telephone tapping case was revealed at a press conference given by three government ministers (Minister of State, Theodoros Roussopoulos, Minister of Public Order, George Voulgarakis, and Minister of Justice, Anastasis Papaligouras) on February 2, 2006. More than 100 mobile phone numbers belonging mostly to members of the Greek government and top-ranking civil servants were found to have been illegally tapped for a period of at least one year. The phones tapped included those of the Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis and members of his family, most phones of the top officers at the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for Public Order, members of the ruling party, ranking members of the opposition Panhellenic Socialist Movement party (PASOK) and the Hellenic Navy General Staff. The software allowed eavesdropping on the personal phone calls of the Greek prime minister and numerous other political and military officials, including the head of NIS, during Greece's hosting of the Olympic Games. A subsequent government report discovered that the antennae facilitating the wiretaps were located in apartments near the United States Embassy in Athens. NIS was forced to take the blame for its inability to protect the privacy of the country's leadership.

NIS also received negative publicity when members of the Pakistani community in Greece accused Greek intelligence agents of abducting them and interrogating them in secret about potential extremist connections with Muslim fundamentalists

abroad. The abductions allegedly took place prior to, and were probably related to, security issues concerning Greece's hosting of the Olympic Games. The NIS has denied any participation in the abductions and has refused making further comments.

The brewing controversy involving the alleged abduction and interrogation of 28 Pakistani immigrants living in Greece raises a number of crucial questions. The law, of course, gives the intelligence services the power to interrogate terrorism suspects. Nevertheless the authorities apparently chose the illicit path. Such practices are not exclusive to Greece's intelligence services. Under pressure to combat international terrorism, many European governments have yielded to the temptation of tolerating – and in some cases giving the green light to – dubious practices (*Kathimerini News Paper*, 2005). As was the case with the Öcalan Affair and the assassination of the British defence attaché Stephen Saunders in the recent past, the telephone tapping case and the Pakistani Affair raised again the issue of NIS's reform.

As a result of all the above, a reform bill has been submitted to the Parliament in January 2008. The reform bill proposed the following (Interview with the Director of NIS-EYP, Mr. Ioannis Korantis on 16 April 2007, Athens, Greece):

- The creation of a Sub-Directorate for Organised Crime and Terrorism to permit the Greek Intelligence Service to meet the needs of a new era;
- An emphasis on training through the creation of a training Directorate, aimed at modern training, education, and the specialization of personnel;
- The creation of a special unit focused on combating cyber-attack in collaboration with the police;
- A permanent position for an Attorney inside the Greek Intelligence Service who will be in charge of permitting special missions undertaken by the staff of the Greek Intelligence Service;
- The creation of a "Mini-National Security Council" (inside the Greek Intelligence Service) which will evaluate information from the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, National Economy, National Defense, Health, Transportation and Communication, and Mercantile Marine;
- The construction of a modern website that will provide information to the public about the Greek Intelligence Service (history, mission, recruitment policies on line, electronic forum as a communication tool with the Greek citizens;
- The adoption of stricter legal rules for everyone in the Greek Intelligence Service who leeks information regarding the work as well as names of agents in the Service to the third party such as journalists or other individuals;
- For the first time there is an article in the Intelligence Bill, referring to the Cooperation with scientific organisations such as universities and specialised research institutes in Greece and abroad;
- An emphasis on international cooperation by improving further the exchange of information with allied services.

In sharp contrast to the previous bill, the present one has a more ambitious, even revolutionary, agenda. The reform bill lays the groundwork for true reform to begin. However, legislation and changes to organisational structure are only part of a successful reform effort. True reform may depend primarily upon the internal efforts of the intelligence community itself. Beyond structural, top-down changes, the degree of cooperation between agencies and ministries, changes in intelligence practices, and culture, alterations in the underlying supporting infrastructure, and the effectiveness of the community's leaders and personnel in instituting change are critically important elements of reform. The sheer complexity of the intelligence community and of the balances involved suggests that reform will not come easily and will not satisfy the advocates on either side of the competing balances. In the end, achieving the desired balances may require more art than science (Bansemer, 2005, p. 114).

The modernisation of the Greek National Intelligence Service and the lessons of intelligence reform in Europe

Intelligence organisations are complex, sophisticated entities with very specific operational, managerial, and administrative requirements. An intelligence organisation has a deeply layered job description that involves a large number of priorities. In Greece, national intelligence (NIS) has been addressed for the most part in bureaucratic, fragmented way heavily influenced by the surrounding environment of political instability and bitter partisan politics (*RIEAS Editorial*, no date).

Comparing the Greek Intelligence Service (NIS) reform debate with the Italian AISE (external secret service) and Spanish CNI (national intelligence center) intelligence agencies, one can observer that reform was stimulated by a small number of civilians who realised that democratic consolidation requires civilian control over intelligence. Unlike Greece, the reform law in the Italy and Spain tightened the parliamentary oversight over AISE and CNI. However, Spanish Intelligence Service (CNI) moved further and developed the Joint Center of the Counterterrorism (CNCA) as well as the Intelligence Center against Organised Crime (CICO) in order to coordinate various intelligence branches, improve intelligence sharing and combat effectively prospective terrorist acts.

A learning experience from the Greek Intelligence Service reform debate which similarly influences the reform process in the Italian and Spanish intelligence services is that the greatest impediment to creating an effective Intelligence Community (IC) is the bureaucratic infighting that arises when multiple intelligence organisations are at work.

Another serious impediment on the reform on the Greek Intelligence Service (NIS) similar to the Italian (AISE) and Spanish (CNI) agencies is that government does not insulate the Head of the National Intelligence Service from politics which

is critically more important to the National Security of the State than the personal relationship with the Prime Minister's national security adviser.

The Greek intelligence service (NIS) went through two critical reforms (1986 and 2008) and the biggest challenge faced for NIS, AISE and CNI was to draft and implement a strategic vision for their intelligence community by providing continuity as political administrations turn over, and strategically significant, foster the political independence from party pressures and impartiality the Intelligence Community (IC) needs to support national security.

In the end, the Greek Intelligence Service (NIS) was subordinated to cabinet ministries, instead of keeping intelligence separate, independent, and directly accountable to the highest authority of the State. At the same time, the Greek government brought under one umbrella all of Greece's law enforcement, civil defense and intelligence resources which created more trouble than solutions. On the other side, the Italian (AISE) and Spanish (CNI) kept their intelligence sources independent from the law enforcement and civil defense agencies, but created joint counterterrorism and intelligence centers in order to improve information sharing among them, something that Greece did not succeed to do.

An important factor that has been missed in the intelligence reform in Greece, Italy and Spain is that governments in these states have not had an informed public debate about the necessity of having reforms in their intelligence services. Nor have they encouraged open discussion of intelligence policy among members from the executive and legislative branches, police, military, the media and think tanks.

The cases of Bulgaria and Serbia are different, but there are still useful parallels to draw with the Greek situation. In sharp contrast to Western European countries that enjoyed a long period of democratization and institutional reform, Eastern European countries had to shift rapidly from an authoritarian regime system to a functioning democracy. This process inevitably affected the intelligence reform process. Structuring a working relationship between the intelligence services, the parliament, the executive and the public, in the post communist era, remains a priority (Martin, 2007).

In post Milosevic Serbia, the democratic transformation of the intelligence services has been slow. In an effort to reform the security apparatus, the two military agencies (the KOS, now renamed as the VBA or Military Security Agency, and the VOA, the Military Intelligence Agency) are now under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence and, indirectly, under the control of the President. In addition, in 2007, two smaller security agencies attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SB and SID) were disbanded, simplifying the system. As a result, Serbia now has only three security agencies: the BIA, VBA and VOA. Furthermore, in December 2007, the new Law on Oversight of Security Services passed through Parliament, giving more authority to the Parliamentary Security Board. The law also established a new state body, the National Security Council, in order to coordinate and control the above agencies. Whether these efforts will provide flexibility and better oversight of these agencies remains to be seen (Edmunds, 2008).

What is important though is that even Serbia with a powerful and unaccountable intelligence community is willing to reform, whereas Greece, with a strong democratic tradition is hesitant to proceed with a radical reform agenda. The element of reform is more evident in the case of Romania. Romania managed in less than two decades to reform its intelligence community and transform its intelligence apparatus, from a tool of communism, to an effective instrument that serves under democratic control. The Securitate has been replaced by six intelligence agencies. But the most impressive accomplishment is the fact that the new agencies soon surpassed the legacy of the past and managed to function within a legal framework that provided control and oversight (Matei, 2007). NATO and EU membership have been a strong motivating factor and major changes in the intelligence system happened due to Romania's preparation for accession to the above organisations. Greece lacks such an external motivating factor, so the only choice is to look for an internal one. The various security challenges that Greece is facing, both inside and outside its borders, should serve as a trigger for reform.

Conclusion

To conclude, the NIS's reform has been inefficient and weak. The so-called 'modernisation' of the NIS is basically a spasmodic reaction to failures and political pressure and not a result of an in-depth analysis of the new role that NIS is required to play. The need to react after a number of intelligence failures and to counter the domestic and international pressure triggered a sketchy modernisation effort and not a reform plan that would bring about structural changes in the Greek Intelligence Community. The modernisation effort aimed more to demonstrate that the authorities wanted to make some changes and less to actually implement these changes.

The world that the Intelligence Community is confronting requires intelligence to be dispersed, not concentrated; open to a variety of sources; not limited to secrets and sharing its information and analyses with a variety of would-be coalition partners (Treverton, 2001, p. 20). The last reform bill points to the right direction, but whatever measures are adopted, the NIS will not deliver timely and accurate intelligence unless the government decides on the type of intelligence service it really needs. A public debate on the new security challenges and foreign policy priorities that Greece is facing is a prerequisite in order to reassess the mission of the Greek National Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP).

Greece needs to realise that a professional, transparent and effective intelligence community can serve as a force-multiplier. Greece will only benefit by embracing some of the reforms that have taken place in both Eastern and Western Europe. The cases of Italy, Spain, Romania and even Serbia, demonstrate that Greece needs to abandon its conservative approach and implement a more ambitious reform agenda in the near future.

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