


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### Contesting and Preventing Terrorism: On the Development of UK Strategic Policy on Radicalisation and Community Resilience

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# Contesting and Preventing Terrorism: On the Development of UK Strategic Policy on Radicalisation and Community Resilience

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## ABSTRACT

This paper gives a polemical insight and broad overview to the need for a critical review of key concepts in security strategy, appertaining to current policies in the United Kingdom associated with radicalisation and more specifically counter-radicalisation. In order to plan out a coherent discussion the first section of the paper links the concept of resilience to security and IEM as a broad framework within which counter-radicalisation policy is emerging. The second section unpacks the form, content and emphasis of narrative underpinning the 'CONTEST' strategy for countering terrorism in the UK; this descriptive review flows into the third section, offering a critical analysis of the content and emphasis of narrative underpinning the 'PREVENT' strategy in the UK as the evolution of this strategic programme for counter-radicalisation. The descriptive review of policies allows for the fourth section to position the structure and reorganisation of government capabilities alongside this emergent narrative of counter-radicalisation before in the final summative section of the paper pulling out key concerns and potential problems for the ideal of democracy at the core of this programme of reform. The suggestion is that by using a new strategic approach, counter-radicalisation, that emphasises narrative realignment and 'good' or 'proper' ways to be free, the very freedoms at the core of the democratic ideal are being significantly undermined – not by explicit intent of government actors but by the implicit realignment of how we talk about, discuss and enact the freedoms at the core of democracy as a way of life – through the political mileage of being seen to counter the terrorist threat, the broader realignment of neo-liberalism into an orthodox governmentality itself legitimised by an amorphous sense of impending danger, described by some as a 'state of siege' or a 'state of exception'.

## Introduction

Little needs to be said in order to set the context for a broad discussion of security and government policy. However, the raft of publications on these themes in recent times requires that any discussion of security aphoristically outlines its purpose and aims at the outset, in order to position the debate that follows with regard to the dominant trends of security studies as a whole.

The recurring themes in government narrative surrounding security are becoming highly influential in the wider reform of strategy and policy. Increasingly both concept and narrative have begun to play key roles. What is investigated here are the connections now emerging between security, Integrated Emergency Management (IEM), social cohesion and socio-economic stability in the protection of a ‘whole way of life’ – that being the organisational principles and Western ideals of modernity and neo-liberal democratic freedom.

This paper gives a critical insight and broad overview to the need for a critical review of key concepts in security strategy, appertaining to current policies in the United Kingdom associated with radicalisation and more specifically *counter-radicalisation*. In order to plan out a coherent discussion the *first* section of the paper links the concept of resilience to security and IEM as a broad framework within which counter-radicalisation policy is emerging. The *second* section unpacks the form, content and emphasis of narrative underpinning the ‘CONTEST’<sup>1</sup> strategy for countering terrorism in the UK; this descriptive review flows into the *third* section, offering a critical analysis of the content and emphasis of narrative underpinning the ‘PREVENT’ strategy in the UK as the evolution of this strategic programme for counter-radicalisation. The descriptive review of policies allows for the *fourth* section to position the structure and reorganisation of government capabilities alongside this emergent narrative of counter-radicalisation before in the final summative section of the paper pulling out key concerns and potential problems for the ideal of democracy at the core of this programme of reform. The suggestion is that by using a new strategic approach, counter-radicalisation, that emphasises narrative realignment and ‘good’ or ‘proper’ ways to be free, the very freedoms at the core of the democratic ideal are being significantly undermined – not by explicit intent of government actors but by the implicit realignment of how we talk about, discuss and enact the freedoms at the core of democracy as a way of life – through the political mileage of being seen to counter the terrorist threat, the broader realignment of neo-liberalism into an orthodox governmentality itself legitimised by an amorphous sense of impending danger, described by some as a ‘state of siege’ or a ‘state of exception’ (Agamben, 2005).<sup>2</sup>

The principle aim of the paper is to develop the links between emerging trends in counter-radicalisation activities; thus assessing how narrative is becoming a key issue of contestation. It is not the intention here to critique the politically marketed necessity for increased security, or to show how such necessity is linked to the exceptional circumstances that legitimise this activity. The aim is to harness the

broad policy metaphor of resilience to better understand how *resilience strategy* feeds into *counter-radicalisation policy and practice*. This requires an approach that brings together: (a) a critique of the need to amend existing strategic, policy or public narratives; (b) the need to counter potential radicalising influences of ‘extremists’ on those seen as vulnerable to such rhetoric, (c) the construction of an approach that harnesses concepts of sovereignty, citizenship and the nature of foreign and domestic security threats to *both*, but shows in an even-handed fashion the difficult challenges posed by distinctly different cultural values and the mode of expression which thus incorporates the core concepts underpinning ideology and, in particular the narrative adjustment, thus constructed.

Perhaps one of the more telling statements of the conceptual approach to these complex problems can be found in a statement by the outgoing American President George W. Bush, in weeks following the collapse of the Twin Towers in New York:

“... we’ll fight terrorism on all fronts. We will not be terrorized so that their hearts are hardened. Nobody can threaten this country. Oh, they may be able to bomb buildings and obviously disrupt lives. But we’re too great a nation to allow the evil-doers to affect our soul and our spirit”<sup>3</sup>

What is telling in this statement is that there is a key focus on the claim to a traditional narrative of the collective identity, national sovereignty, the values of patriotism and the ability to remain unperturbed in the face of dangerous events. More so that the notion implied and since developed widely in the discourse of security has become one of resilience against the perturbation to everyday life caused by a counter-narrative, that of an amorphous and ill-defined global ‘terrorism’. Some commentators have referred to this as realisation of ‘risk society’ (Beck, 2002) others as a constant ‘state of exception’ (Agamben, 2005), but beyond the meta-narrative key themes remain the perpetual presence of risk and danger created by the global competition between orthodoxies, be they the religious fundamentalism of faith exhibited in violent Islamic splinter groups or the rational fundamentalism of finance exhibited in neo-liberal democracy. Thus resilience needs to be understood in a broader context of competing ideological narratives; an approach that drives the current policy associated with processes of radicalisation and is situated within the broader activities of security services and integrated emergency management (IEM).

## What is resilience to security and integrated emergency management (IEM)

Whilst this is a useful concept it is far from universally used in security studies, and has a long history of use as a concept in a range of other studies from psychology to ecology and beyond (see Coaffee et al, 2008). Among the most developed examples of *rhetorics of resilience* in security and IEM can be found at the home of UKResilience,<sup>4</sup> as a service of the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat. This source offers open access to a range of online public information on the general

actions in emergency preparedness as a series of coordinated work streams seeking to embed in the everyday ethos and actions of government the ability to bounce-back from any emergency event.

In the UK such dangers have been grounded in the actual priorities posed by serious incidents, these have been referred to as the '3 Fs' – flooding, foot and mouth, and the fuel crisis – as particular reoccurring themes in the challenges faced by government in recent years (Coaffee & Rogers, 2008); but such considerations must also account for both realised attacks (such as the 2005 London bombings) and unrealised attacks (such as the fertiliser bomb plans and Glasgow airport bombing attempt) which have highlighted the blurring boundaries of foreign and domestic cellular terrorism.

Whilst the focus of UK Resilience is representative of the IEM approach that is now emerging – as a focus on comprehensive control over 'all hazards' – it has been made clear in recent research that the influence and impact of this approach to resilience has much wider impact on areas of security and social cohesion as related work-streams within the broader capabilities of the government to effect change across all elements of the disaster management cycle. The concept "disaster cycle" has now come to incorporate not just (1) preparedness and (2) response and (3) recovery but also (4) anticipation, (5) assessment and (6) prevention. This represents a significantly enlarged remit for emergency planners and security operatives requiring integration of expertise and extensive collaborative arrangements between diverse interests and agencies into new governance arrangements, themselves capable of operating consistently under extreme upheaval, hence resilient to perturbation.

Embedding resilience must not be limited to attempts to control and direct the disaster cycle after the event has occurred, nor simply strategic guidance for practitioners. The embedding of resilience as a metaphor for change has come to include the citizenry, and now incorporates a better understanding of how the citizen can become a part of the system of preparation for the preservation of the way of life under threat. The citizen can be seen as a problem throughout all aspects of security, as well as resilient activity. The inclusion of anticipation, assessment and prevention in the disaster cycle has opened up more scope for government interventions into the everyday lives of citizens than ever before, particularly relating to issues of security. It is argued here that these interventions are increasingly moving beyond the realm of managing the impact of a specific event into the deeper, more conceptual understanding of sovereignty, citizenship and the relationship between citizens and the state, with repercussions for the balance of power in the social contract to the core of democratic values. It is in these shadowy areas, or the darker side of security, that the spectre of state control is undergoing sustained critique in the press (BBC, 2001), 3<sup>rd</sup> sector<sup>5</sup> and academy (Heymann, 2003) with regard to erosion of core values underpinning the freedoms being protected and maintained by new practices of resilient security and IEM. It is here that the debate yields the most enticing glimpses of change in better understanding the nature of the flexible relationships between citizen and state in the context of heightened risk, perceived anxiety and legitimate danger (be it foreign, domestic, anthropogenic, or a product of the natural environment).

The resilience of citizens can, in this context, be framed as a discreet area of policy in its own right. Citizens' need for a more developed community resilience can be framed as twofold (a) resilience to the ideological rhetoric of radicalised Islam, and (b) a pragmatic awareness of the actual dangers of the modern world – be they natural and biological hazards, anthropogenic risks or security threats. These distinctions are now becoming integrated into the capabilities of government at a number of levels, beyond the initial limited involvement of the citizenry in decision-making on either security or IEM; which has been substantially oriented towards a passive model, whereby the public accept information from experts on the risks, hazards and threats they may need to 'be prepared' for. It is important to assess the potential impact of a widening *governmentality*<sup>6</sup> of resilience and security as it becomes a feature of community resilience to better understand the legitimacy of intent underpinning interventions in relation to the attempt to broaden meaningful participation amongst the most 'at risk' communities in the embedding of resilient practices, ideology, ways of thinking and doing. Of particular importance here is the rhetorical parlance in policy for reframing the challenges of contesting the values and ideas – as embedded in hearts and minds – that is emerging in the broader political culture of community intervention and engagement within the rhetoric of resilience and security.

Whilst security agencies can comfortably take the lead in the management of international terrorism, as both an intelligence and military concern, the problem of ensuring robust policing of domestic terrorism and maintaining community cohesion alongside the reduction of radicalisation, occurring amongst an ethnically distinct (and increasingly negatively labelled) demographic, is a complex issue. Many critical civil libertarian lobbies are focused on the minutiae of terrorism legislation and the legitimacy of particular police actions (see for example Liberty), whilst civil agencies (such as local authorities, city and borough councils, community and 3<sup>rd</sup> sector organisations) have been identified as key actors in understanding tensions and challenges to community cohesion (see below). Until recently it has been difficult to reconcile the rhetoric of secular pluralism, multi-cultural inclusion and social cohesion with the security dialogue occurring between intelligence, military, judicial and political areas of influence without leaving the door open for a critical concern of manufactured consent<sup>7</sup> and inculcating restrictions on fundamental freedoms of speech (Werbner, 2005). The government response, in the UK particularly, has been a comprehensive review of strategies across all areas and all affected agencies which had started even before September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001, and is currently ongoing in a perpetual reconstitution of the debate to find 'the right narrative' balance for addressing new security challenges. This has affected a wide range of agencies – from the 'blue lights' (police, fire and ambulance), local and regional actors (from emergency planners to newly established local and regional resilience teams) and broader aspects of the civil service and 3<sup>rd</sup> sector agencies, as well as having widespread repercussions on public confidence in government and social cohesion in local communities. There is a step-change underway in Great Britain towards a new model of resilience government, governance and governmentality which is occurring in stages. The main focus of this article is on unpacking the implication of the strategic narratological<sup>8</sup> realignment underpinning how democratic government agencies are capable of dealing with

threats, and the challenges posed by emerging strategic guidance. These challenges at once address the problems of new security challenges and threaten the very freedoms they are designed to protect. As such it is useful to connect the strategic documents that guide policy and practice to these broader issues (outlined above) and see how they have shifted the goalposts for ‘countering’ radical narratives through the initial development of the ‘CONTEST’ strategy for counter-terrorism since 2003<sup>9</sup> to the current PREVENT(ative) approach.

## ‘CONTEST’ - A strategic approach to countering terrorism

The Home Office Security website suggested (at the time of writing) that:

‘The key aim of the counter-terrorism strategy is to reduce the risk we face from international terrorism so that people can go about their business freely and safely’.<sup>10</sup>

Whilst it is easy for the social scientist to pull this apart critically suggesting that the emphasis on ‘business’ symbolically extends beyond the colloquial and generic sense to imply that it is in fact business and the ‘orderly flow of commerce’ that is being protected, this cynicism does not do justice to the framework of policy and the careful balance between security and liberty that is an underpinning element of the broader discourse of developing new and constructive approaches to the challenges of national (and renationalising) security policies. The strategy itself was first developed in 2003 as a platform for longer term strategic planning in response to the perception of a serious and growing threat of international terrorist actions targeting the UK; it is under constant review in the light of new and emerging threats to the United Kingdom and is a guiding strategy for the development of legislation and accompanying plans within the broader focus of anti-terrorism activity.

The ‘CONTEST’ strategy proclaims:

1. The United Kingdom faces a continuing threat from extremists who believe they can advance their aims by committing acts of terrorism here in the UK and against our citizens and interests abroad. To combat this threat the Government has developed a counter-terrorism strategy and set up programmes and plans to give effect to it (2003, p. 3).

It can be argued that whilst this set the framework for a comprehensive approach to security and terrorism it was never intended to be the finished product, and would be subject to ongoing review in the face of changing circumstance and understanding of risk, danger, hazards and threat. CONTEST as a strategy thus acted as a springboard from which the generic and general framework of activities by law enforcement agencies, judiciary and related support agencies (both civil and military, including the intelligence community) can be focused onto the main aims prioritised by the incumbent government and security community.

The strategy is split across four work streams that focus the principal aims on the following themes: *Prevent*, *Pursue*, *Protect* and *Prepare*.<sup>11</sup> Whilst all of these strands of activity have wide ranging repercussions for the treatment and development of

security policy within the UK this paper will deal primarily with unpacking the first of these four strands of activity. The first stream of the four (i.e. Prevent) was the most wide ranging and potentially vague in orientation to a broad range of activities (Pantucci, 2008) and shall now be unpacked further.

## 'PREVENT' WITHIN THE 'CONTEST' STRATEGY AS COUNTER-RADICALISATION

The Prevent strand emerged amidst concerns of growing radicalisation amongst minority youth groups and vulnerable members of the Islamic and British Muslim community to a rhetoric of hate focused around British foreign policy following the emergence of a War on terror and British engagement in the 'alliance of the willing'. Furthermore in the light of realisation that the July 7<sup>th</sup> bombers were not foreign radicals but 'home-grown extremists' the concern with 'tackling the radicalisation of individuals, both in the UK and elsewhere'<sup>12</sup> became a central aspect of the new plans for countering not just the act of terror but the ideology underpinning it writ large.

The Government sought to advance these concerns by:

- tackling disadvantage and supporting reform by addressing structural problems in the UK and overseas that may contribute to radicalisation, such as inequalities and discrimination
- deterring those who facilitate terrorism and those who encourage others to become terrorists by changing the environment in which the extremists and those radicalising others can operate
- engaging in the battle of ideas by challenging the ideologies that extremists believe can justify the use of violence, primarily by helping Muslims who wish to dispute these ideas to do so (2003, pp. 1-2).

This represented one of the first significant attempts in policy to address the potential *causes* of conflict between the different world views of Islamic fundamentalism and the neo-liberal democratic project pulling out several key issues in what has been called 'radicalisation'.<sup>13</sup> First and foremost the potential for ameliorative activities targeting the source and basis of structural inequality saw a causal link made between poverty, economic disadvantage and a sense of negative distinction between demographics as a contributing factor to the generation of a sense of difference, from which more extreme views could then begin to evolve. This takes into account some of the ramifications of the globalising influence of neo-liberalism, depicted here as the unavoidable '*consequence[s], for good and ill, of modernisation*' (ibid, p. 10); significantly a causal connection is also established between the disenfranchisement of individuals and groups as a result of '*socioeconomic factors such as discrimination, social exclusion, and lack of opportunity*' (ibid, p. 10).<sup>14</sup> Also a feature here is the production and distribution of literature and 'propaganda' through extremist religious actors and figures with high credibility in the community (more on this below).

It should be noted that in the broad focus on ‘tackling disadvantage and supporting reform’ the emphasis is placed on intervention related activities from a top-down governance approach to the problems. Such endeavours focused particularly on:

- *Improving Opportunities & Strengthening Society* – linked to the Home Office programme for community cohesion and the reduction of race related inequalities in education, housing, labour market, health and across policing and the criminal justice system (Home Office, 2005).
- *Commission on Integration and Cohesion, Supporting reform and modernisation* – established in 2006 at the recommendation of the ‘CONTEST’ strategy as a fixed term advisory body the Commission presented a final report in June 2007 (CIC, 2007a). The report was expansive in addressing a wide range of related issues but summarized the need for *a new definition of integration* that allowed for a more developed sense of the *communal shared future* (a focus on similarity not difference), an emphasis on a *new model of rights and responsibilities* more ‘fit for purpose in the 21st century’ (both national and local, tied to integrating moral values), *a new emphasis on mutual respect and civility* (local interventions to address community problems), *delivery of visible social justice* (where evidencing fairness is key to winning hearts and minds) (ibid, p. 7).<sup>15</sup>
- *Supporting reform and modernisation* – a strong emphasis on interventions currently underway in the geo-political region of the Middle-east and Africa, highlighting the media, education, civil society, education and criminal justice reform, and installation wholesale of democratic governance structures. Activity by groups such as Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development receive special mention in terms of the financial contribution but less is developed about future trends or the impact of these activities in real terms on the ground (Home Office, 2006, pp. 11-12).

Another point, that is far more general and potentially vague in its focus, highlights the need to ‘change the environment’ of operation by those responsible for encouraging dissent. This focuses on the counter radicalisation activities that aim to deter those who may engage in advocating extremism and terrorism. In particular the legislation advanced since this time, noted in ‘CONTEST’ was the Terrorism Act of 2006 but this also includes subsequent and continuing legislative programmes related to ‘speech’ and ‘word’ crimes under debate in the UK to this day. Particularly evocative of the potentially punitive ‘battle for ideas’ are the ‘unacceptable behaviours’ which can lead to potential detention and deportation in relation to foment dissent and/or advocate the use of violence for political and/or religious ends. These include:

- writing, producing, publishing or distributing material;
- public speaking including preaching;
- running a website; or
- using a position of responsibility such as teacher, community or youth leader;

to express views which:

- foment, justify or glorify terrorist violence in furtherance of particular beliefs;

- seek to provoke others to terrorist acts;
- foment other serious criminal activity or seek to provoke others to serious criminal acts; or
- foster hatred which might lead to inter-community violence in the UK (Home Office, 2006, p. 12).

A commitment to address the vulnerability of prisoners has since also been developed<sup>16</sup> as has a commitment to work with communities, which formed a strong contributing stimulus to subsequent development of the more comprehensive 'PREVENT' strategy (Home Office, 2008). Such endeavours also targeted meeting and reporting back from a wide range of engagements with minority communities; most significant of which were the 'Preventing Extremism Together' (PET) working groups with recommendations for the development of a national grassroots-led campaign targeted at Muslim youth (the Scholars' Roadshow); Muslim Forums on Extremism and Islamophobia, and a Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board. A brief overview of these initiatives is not enough to do justice to the wealth of work undertaken by these groups. Suffice here to suggest that the broad focus of this work-stream has been to promote a tolerant understanding of difference in the community and engage key actors from within the relevant minorities in meaningful ways. Such efforts have sought to demonstrate that participation in the process of governance, as an act taken in partnership with the representatives of the state, is fruitful (i.e. for vulnerable individuals to feel that working within the democratic system is more beneficial to the amelioration of their grievances than attacking it). A sense of influencing change and improving conditions – principally in the UK – shows that feedback on foreign policy which affects the extended international faith community is a key issue (Home Office, 2006, pp. 16-17)<sup>17</sup> as well as understanding amongst the Anglo and Muslim communities. Particularly, building bridges of understanding between diverse viewpoints requires a more open discussion on the legitimacy of actions taken by the sovereign state on 'behalf' of its citizens. This is even more important when culture and faith form layers of the bricolage construction of a multi-cultural identity, such as 'British-Muslim'. In order to build this dialogue there must be visible results emerging from open communication with the potential gatekeepers (e.g. amongst Imams) towards developing a more nuanced appreciation of religious pluralism and tolerance on both sides (ibid, pp. 13-15).

There is, across the policies described above, a clearly defined programme of engagement, but the core of this approach is directive and top-down. The 'CONTEST' strategy at its heart is indicative of a more controlled traditional approach to community consultation. There is evidence of the sensitivity of these issues understood in the vast investment in these activities; over £775 million since 2001 and annual spending is expected to increase to a level exceeding £2b per annum in 2008 (ibid, p. 3), furthermore, investment in emergency planning and responses has also been increased in line with the broader agenda of civil contingencies and resilience, in which these activities play a significant part of the broader capabilities programme (Coaffee et al, 2008). Investment in the security aspect of activity in the NHS has risen to £85.5 million (countering bio-terrorism); £56 million to the UK Fire

Service in relation to decontamination programmes and equipment, as well as £132 million for search and rescue equipment; and £49 million for the Metropolitan Police, a further £12 million to national police forces.<sup>18</sup>

This shows a significant investment in the broader counter-terrorism agenda but in terms of enabling the community the focus of ‘CONTEST’ was on both intervention and countering the threat. This is a key and potentially significant aspect of the language, where this subtle but important distinction emerges from within the ‘Prevent’ strand of the ‘CONTEST’ strategy. The rhetoric can be seen critically as a potentially alienating approach to the more extreme elements of a community, whilst preaching to the converted and more moderate elements of British Islamic community. In order to develop a holistic strategy, active engagement with the community must focus on *enabling not intervening*. Equally when a language of *prevention* is used to elaborate the *countering* of radicalisation the counter intuitive result is the same in effect as a bully pushing the victim, whilst shouting “come here!”

Whilst these are connected it is useful to unpack the language here further by separating these issues. First the implicit suggestion that there is little or no reality to the ‘perceived grievances’ (Home Office, 2006, p. 9) of radicalising or radicalised individuals is ill-advised, and secondly the language associated with the ‘battle of ideas’ that underpins much of the actual activity and engagement from central government suggests that underneath this discursive approach there is an ultimate right and an ultimate wrong side to be on, and that victory will eventually prove one side in the right and the ultimate victor. Such an approach to any major collective of ideas, such as an established faith, ignores the multiplicity of voices within the broader ideology, none of which can be seen as a monolithic entity – be they Christian, Islamic, Monetarist, Communist or any other. Furthermore, blurring the distinction between *ideology* and *religiosity* is complex and fraught with difficulties. This smacks of a naive ‘cultural relativism’ in an age where ‘cultural pluralism’ must be appreciated if the very real grievances against Western capitalism are to be ameliorated in any meaningful way.<sup>19</sup>

Alongside this overly simplistic view of the dynamics of ideology there is an uncritical gap in the political awareness of impact of the globalising neo-liberal project as a contributing factor to the attempts at ‘tackling disadvantage and supporting reform’ in the ‘CONTEST’ strategy. The implicit assumption is that globalisation is inevitable and that the best form of this is neo-liberalism, a negative impact on other global communities is a necessary consequence of modernisation. What is not spoken is that monetarism and democracy are not pre-requisites of modernisation but of a particular mode of modernisation that supports the franchise of neo-liberal economics and the institution of class hierarchies (Harvey, 2005) that may not be compatible with the traditional cultural hierarchies, or blurred boundaries of church-driven values and state governmentality typical to many Islamic states. Such factors are contradictions embedded in the intellectual make-up of poly-variant identities of many British Muslims and as such inform their opinions on foreign and domestic policies much more directly than a fundamentalist Islamic interpretation of geo-politics. This misunderstanding on behalf of the broader strategic aims of ‘CONTEST’ implies a

fundamentalism of finance which critically underpins the rhetoric of communication as a one-way street, i.e. an arrogant attempt to convince the international community of Islam that ‘our way’ (the Western democratic and neo-liberal form) of governing is a necessary form of ‘progress’, where this is by no means either a certain or desirable global future.

Further criticism of the ‘CONTEST’ strategy was leaked to the British media in 2005 claiming the ‘CONTEST’ strategy as a whole showed:

“little effective coordination and no clear leadership ... [There was] little confidence in the ability of the security apparatus to tackle the problem and difficult to demonstrate that progress has been made ... [Key policies were] unrelated to the real world and showed no signs of making progress” (Leppard, 2005).

Following a further review of the case for change the then Home Secretary had ‘expressed concerns’ at the state of readiness in much of the broader planning and the need for more comprehensive strategic emphasis on IEM that was part and parcel of the wider resilience agenda born out through civil contingencies. It was expressed that:

“We have to have an integrated response ... with political oversight, which in my view has been sadly lacking for the past few years ... [and a] delivery department ... with strategic functions, [with] the capacity to deal with the central issue, which is a battle for ideals and values. If we do not have that in an integrated fashion, we will not be stepping up [to] the mark”.<sup>20</sup>

The need for a more clearly defined and cohesive approach required supplementary extension of the existing policies, refinement of the counter radicalisation strategy and called for a new body within government to better focus and coordinate strategic policy and broader activity. Such calls are resonant with the broader discussions over the importance of IEM to the successful embedding of resilience into broader security related practices, as should be tied to the emergence of the broader strategy under the title of ‘PREVENT’.

## ‘PREVENT’ - A guide for local partners and a delivery framework

The reforms called for in the *‘Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report of 2006-2007’* emerged in two ways; on one side, further structural reform of governance agencies – as the Home Office split into the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) (for generating coordinated implementation of counter-terrorism strategy) and the Ministry of Justice (with a broad criminal justice remit) – and on the other hand the emergence from within the new OSCT of the reformed and amended ‘PREVENT’ strategic policy; as a more holistic appraisal of the conditions and requirements of government activity regarding the increased potential for the spread of an extreme and potentially violent version of Islam in the UK. Within the new OSCT there have been a number of shifts, among these was the emergence of

the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) which has a focused remit on the battle of ideology, and played a key role in the emergence of the new 'PREVENT' strategy for counter-radicalisation:

“Actions during 2007-08 include ... establishing the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU), a unit managed trilaterally by the Home Office, CLG [Communities & Local Government] and the FCO, which works to counteract the messages put out by violent extremists and to strengthen the Government's communication with communities and organisations that are our key partners in tackling terrorism ...” (Home Office, 2008, p. 42).

The emergence of this body has given an explicit voice to the need for a more nuanced approach and understanding of both Islamic identity and values as well as the process of consultation and engagement. Where previous success has been garnered in community consultation is through the empowerment of community by allowing them a participatory role in the initiatives themselves, rather than the government directed programmes.<sup>21</sup> This has begun now to emerge in counter-radicalisation in the development of the more holistic and engaging 'PREVENT' strategy for engagement with the Islamic community. As exhibited in the adjustment of the language used to eulogise these ideas:

“They say the term “war on terror” will no longer be heard from ministers. Instead, they will use less emotive language, emphasizing the criminal nature of the plots and conspiracies. The government in future, they add, will talk of a “struggle” against extremist ideology, rather than a “battle”” (Norton-Taylor, 2007).

The 'PREVENT' strategy itself is more than a political marketing exercise, though the softening of the language around the nature and purpose of interventions shows that it does play a role in reorienting the understanding of extremism. The shift towards an ameliorative language and an approach which emphasises the need ‘to enhance the resilience of communities to violent extremism and identify and support individuals vulnerable to recruitment to the cause of violent extremism’<sup>22</sup> shows that the conceptual orientation of the narratives is now at the core of the interventions, an attempt to minimise the alienating effects of radicalisation (as outlined in Annex I of the strategy).<sup>23</sup>

O'Shaughnessy has highlighted the role of these narrative approaches to the marketing of ideas as an ethics of communication grounded in the 'social contract' and the need to emphasise 'communitarian virtues' (O'Shaughnessy, 2002) in this case not for an electoral end but for guiding local partners within a national strategic framework in order to enhance the active meaningfulness of participation for groups noted as 'vulnerable' and 'high risk'.

These reoriented themes are much in evidence in the development of the key objectives of the 'PREVENT' strategy which is offered both as a *strategy for delivery* (HM Gov, 2008a) and as a *guide for local partners* (HM Gov, 2008b), emphasising the importance of local means, methods and expertise in ensuring the effectiveness of successful delivery of the broader objectives across a number of agenda setting

documents. For the sake of clarity the assessment that follows is split into two sections, the first looking at the emphasis of the language and the focus of the themes running through the main objectives of the 'PREVENT' strategy, and the second looking at the structure of partnerships working between a wide range of agencies in the delivery of these objectives, with interesting implications for the scope of government influence in the practice of everyday life.

## 'PREVENT' - THE NARRATIVE AND THE OBJECTIVES

The original four strands of 'CONTEST' (see above) have been expanded upon to develop a more intricate and focused set of five 'strands' of strategy with two cross-cutting 'work-streams' which aim to enable the functional delivery of the first five priorities as primary targets of the overall agenda. These are:

- OBJECTIVE 1 – challenging the violent extremist ideology and supporting mainstream voices;
- OBJECTIVE 2 – disrupting those who promote violent extremism and supporting the institutions where they are active;
- OBJECTIVE 3 – supporting individuals who are being targeted and recruited to the cause of violent extremism;
- OBJECTIVE 4 – increasing the resilience of communities to violent extremism;
- OBJECTIVE 5 – addressing the grievances that ideologues are exploiting;
- OBJECTIVE 6 – developing understanding, analysis and information;
- OBJECTIVE 7 – strategic communications (HM Gov, 2008b, p. 6).

The language of deterrence in 'CONTEST' (see above) has clearly been softened to talk of 'challenging' and 'developing understanding' as has 'the battle of ideas' been subsumed by a gentler rhetoric of 'disruption' of the promoters, and 'supporting' the high risk 'individuals'. A far more subtle distinction is being drawn around the specific aspects of ideological discord between neo-liberal pluralism and fundamentalist or 'Jihadist' Islam with a focus on 'community empowerment',<sup>24</sup> again a much softer language than previously at the heart of the 'CONTEST' strategy. It is also an approach that resonates more with the values of Islam, which suggest that disputation is detestable unless it is conducted with kindness (Yusuf, 2008). It is also noted however that whilst engaging with the community is amongst foremost strategic concerns, the strategy does not propose opening a dialogue with radicals – no funding or support should inadvertently go to proscribed radical elements, nor should their opinions be given a platform for expression and debate – only those groups who *'uphold our shared values of tolerance, respect and equality and who reject and condemn violent extremism'* (HM Gov, 2008b, p. 14, original emphasis). This seems to run contrary to the need to encourage open dialogue through partner agencies and raises questions on the viability of engagement with educational institutions, at least to the extent that it must be ensured that 'PREVENT' activities do not result in a

propaganda war between competing ideologies or state sanctions on free speech in education and research environments.<sup>25</sup>

Objective 1 shows the softer side of the emerging anti-radicalisation narrative in more depth, framing the radical extreme elements of Islam as misguided in their misrepresentation of the Islamic faith, and focusing on the need to bring support to the refutation of 'the extremist narrative' through community voices; in particular exposing the 'false theological and historical arguments'; supporting British Muslim identity, as well as active female and youth/adolescent voices<sup>26</sup> to:

'... convey a deeper understanding of faith, history and culture ... working particularly with Muslim communities to undermine the myths and half-truths being peddled by violent extremists and to equip communities with a counter narrative' (HM Gov, 2008b, p. 18).

Coordinating the enabling of a new rhetoric more compatible with a British Muslim identity, based on similarity rather than difference, is tied to an element more consistent with 'CONTEST' values in the second objective; with a focus on pre-emptive policing to disrupt potential radicalisation. This can be seen as a softer tactical draconianism that, whilst enabling a communitarian ethic of collaboration, has potential to symbolically, and rhetorically, undermine the basis of free speech as a fundamental right of liberal society. To avoid accusations of being an alarmist, there are likely safeguards in place to prevent such a legislative drift in the connections between oversight in Comprehensive Area Assessments (CAA), the National Indicators (NI35) and Assessments of Policing and Community Safety Indicators (APACS63) as well as Local Strategic Partnerships (LSP) checks and balances, where collaboration with local and regional resilience agencies is likely to be rolled out; but this approach highlights a worrying precedent with regard to freedom of expression (after all even if we don't agree with destructive extremist narratives – of any group – such circumscription of expression is unconstitutional in democratic society) the control of extremist narrative through circumscribing availability or access to extremist materials appears a logical (if technically unconstitutional) action. Doing so by reducing access to internet sources, for example, appears laudable but in other guidance associated with this implicitly augment the 'PREVENT' objectives with more controlling emphasis on the flow of information. There are also guidance documents for Higher Education Institutions – alongside harnessing centres of excellence and enquiry for developing understanding, analysis and information (objective 6) and strategic communications (objective 7), broader links into the coordination of community cohesion, fostering links into existing faith groups, and most worryingly guidance now on the control of access to controversial publications forthcoming for libraries (HM Gov, 2008b, p. 25),<sup>27</sup> where draft guidance has noted:

'3.2. Libraries operate within the law to provide free access to a diversity of information, opinion and ideas in a neutral and hospitable environment. In exceptional circumstances they manage access to material regarded as culturally or morally extreme. Each library must be able to justify such action to their communities and local authority within the principles of free access' (MLA, 2008).

The outreach to those highlighted as most vulnerable individuals is implicitly sanctioning state driven interventions in areas of everyday life where the state has traditionally been at most a passive presence. The enfolding of authority into everyday life (e.g. narratives of religion, faith, belief) implicit in the augmentation of broader governmental ethos of inclusion with a managed ideological narrative shows the significant drift implicit in such strategies for the overarching *telos* of government (Dean, 1996, p. 224), reflecting the dominant ethos of the political nation-state through emergent strategic policy and community driven engagement for intervention in the ‘conduct of life’ (ibid.). It is useful then to turn briefly to the structure and organisation through which these strategic goals are to be driven.

## ‘PREVENT’ - THE STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION


Whilst this is a national strategy the initiatives that fall under the umbrella of ‘PREVENT’ are intended to be focused through ‘Local Authorities, the police, Community Safety Partnerships and other partners and partnerships in the devolved administrations’ to allow communities of the cities and regions an active role in delivery. The emphasis at national level is on strategic coordination and statutory obligations at national, regional and local levels for the development of a partnership drawing together key agencies (see figure 1). Partnership working forms a central pillar of delivery for the ‘PREVENT’ strategy,<sup>28</sup> embedding resilience across multiple scales of integrated activity, expanding beyond the traditional realm of emergency planning and response. This demonstrates the emergence of resilience into the public sphere, expanding beyond the core capabilities (security and emergency) to address more complex issues of community, integration and cohesion *through the lens* of security. Security becomes everyone’s concern, and everyone is active in participating towards the development of a broad consensus-based preservation of collective ‘shared values’. In this context ‘Security’ is treated less as an objective condition and much more as the outcome of ‘securitizing speech acts’ (Neocleous, 2007)<sup>29</sup> that draw on these ‘shared values’ (such as tolerance of cultural pluralism). As such partnership working draws together an unprecedented range of institutions, including:

- police forces;
- police authorities;
- county, district and unitary local authorities, including:
  - social services;
  - cultural services, including libraries;
  - sports and leisure services;
  - children’s services;
  - youth services/Youth Offending Teams/youth inclusion programmes;
  - community safety leads;
  - equalities and cohesion leads;
- community representatives;

- further education colleges;
- universities;
- schools (maintained and independent);
- probation services;
- local prisons;
- strategic health authorities;
- local primary care trusts;
- local public health agencies;
- voluntary services (including youth clubs, associations and community groups);
- UK Border Agency regional offices; and
- Government Offices (HM Gov, 2008b, p. 9).<sup>30</sup>

This represents a significant shift in the emphasis of embedding capabilities, and the focus of security-related strategic policy to underpin an emergent governmentality, that seeks to realign ideological thinking and thus citizens' conduct across the breadth of activities that are being generated. Whilst the ethos of strategic governmentality can be questioned here it is apparent that by allowing local areas to address the issues in their own way, creative local developments are emerging in response to the broader problems from new alliances between key agencies (e.g. Western London Alliance), to study circles and interaction with faith school curricula and local mentoring and youth development schemes and more. The 'Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Funds' show examples of the extent to which harnessing local organisations can yield coordinated results in the promotion of 'shared values'; the support of civic leadership and strengthening the role of faith institutions as well as theological leaders; increasing the resilience of key organisations and institutions and supporting early interventions where required; as well as capacity and skills development across all agencies and individuals involved (DCLG, 2007a; 2007b). What is less clear – though it will be interesting to see the outcomes assessed in CAA – is if these efforts are effective in countering radicalisation amongst the marginal and disaffected or if they simply strengthen the toleration of secular values amongst moderates.

In developing these delivery mechanisms there needs to be careful assessment that whilst efforts are made to 'strike the right balance between targeted interventions with individuals and community-wide longer-term work to build resilience in communities' (Home Office, 2006, p. 13) that there is also effort made to ensure that by focusing on fringe groups and vulnerable youth – through the inculcation of anti-radicalisation rhetoric into youth schemes – the British State does not resort to a campaign of propaganda in its own terms. This is most important when understanding the conceptual distinction between the prerogative of state agencies acting under legislative direction to protect the people from the actions of radicalised and dangerous extremists, and contractual accountability,<sup>31</sup> in terms of actions undertaken to amend, adjust or streamline and ideological rhetoric (extremism or otherwise) for the protection of the abstract body politic or an ephemeral 'whole way of life'.



**Figure 1 – The Public Service agreement and governance arrangements.**

**Governance Structure (HM Gov, 2008, p. 68)**

The directive influence underpinning the correct form of public engagement is critical – it is important for developing meaningful communication not to treat the public as ‘community resources and expertise’ (ibid, p. 13) to be harnessed for governments ends, but to significantly and not just symbolically engage in dialogue on the blurring of theological and political issues, with a view to reorienting foreign and domestic policies as a result. However this is not fully or clearly indicated in the

strategy, and whilst steps have been taken to soften the language, the approach of the 'PREVENT' strategy still appears to emphasise an 'us and them' approach; rather 'us' has been symbolically expanded to encompass the *entrare*<sup>32</sup> or broad cultural pluralism of the UK; but *not* the global pluralism of the conflict, a fact noted by the uncomfortable sense of personal grievance wrapped up in a notion of British identity, Muslim morality and confronted with the assertion of neo-liberal ethics in foreign relations with the Islamic sovereign regions incompatible with the ethics of war, misconceptions of Jihad in much rhetoric (from all antagonists) and the history of tolerance central to the Islamic faith.<sup>33</sup> However the distinction between British Muslim identity and grievances is one that is now finally beginning to be a focus of the narrative as understanding develops from the 'PREVENT' agenda amongst government decision-makers; though this understanding does little to arrest the creeping authoritarianism implicit in the *techniques of security* (Dean, 1991, p. 196) emerging from the liberal democratic tradition, which itself seems to suggest:

'The real problem is that the commitment to security leaves liberalism with no defence against authoritarian or absolutist encroachments on liberty, so long as these are conducted in the name of security' (Ibid, p. 143).

The potential for this strategy, therefore, to act as a directive arm of information control for governing the conduct of 'valid' citizens appears strong, and pervasive – though not as a disciplining bio-politics but as an ameliorative persuasion through realignment of discursive narratives; engagement seeks to be a means of 'encouraging safe spaces for debate and *lawful freedom of expression* [which] is an important part of work to prevent violent extremism' (HM Gov, 2008b, p. 61, emphasis added). It has been argued that in the reformed security politics of the post-cold war era there is an increasing emphasis on the local scale, as evidenced in this policy discussion and outline of the structures of partnership embedded in 'PREVENT' activities; it is easy to make the links through this to a reflection of 'third way' political rhetoric in operational implementation of governmentality, whereby the state becomes a facilitator of people 'doing democracy' for themselves, and enthusiastically encouraging at once the responsabilization of the citizenry (both at home and abroad) and the stakeholders (both public and private) that appears to unintentionally position the 'apolitical expert' at the nexus of influence. This is now itself becoming a condition of some concern given the neo-liberal juxtaposition of expertise with privatisation (and the use of private sector assets for contract delivery in security industry)<sup>34</sup> and the moral ambiguity of the rational choice driven economy in areas of endeavour with little constitutional 'wriggle room'.

## Conclusion

The analysis of approaches undertaken here shows that the British government is refuting and rejecting the popularised 'clash of civilisations' (Huntington, 1996) approach that had dominated much of the dialogue over the best way in which to 'deal with' militant Islam in favour of a more nuanced 'bunch of guys' (Sageman,

2008) analysis of the fringe ideological misinterpretation of disgruntled minorities. By stigmatising the radicalisation process as well as the radicalised groups and using a campaign that seeks not to overtly criminalise the terrorist but identify them as confused and ill-informed, even in need of help from wiser community leaders, the debate is repositioned. The 'PREVENT' strategy is the lynchpin of this reorientation of the debate, essentially moving the goal posts and adding an ameliorative undercarriage to the wider legislative programme, which continues apace with the highly unpopular I.D. cards, stricter control orders (as seen used in Australia with variable success) and longer detention periods still central aspects of the legislation currently under debate. What may be useful to aligning this approach – privileging the realignment of narrative to correct 'fallacies' of radical rubric might be notions of 'narrative therapy' (Besley, 2002) developed in line with creative approaches to unpacking the subject themselves, a form of applied practice that draws on these debates without using the heavy hand of state power to control the debate itself, or to realign perceptions, but on the narrative exploration of the subject BY the subject (creating even more rational consuming individuals for the free-markets) for a more holistic reappraisal of given truths in concert with the neo-liberal project of globalised democracy. Such an approach would certainly echo the pragmatic pessimism of Berlin, in his statement that:

'For those who embrace this romantically tinged individualism ... the regeneration of mankind by recovery of a lost innocence and harmony, the return from a fragmented existence to the all embracing whole – is an infantile and dangerous delusion: to crush all diversity and even conflict in the interest of uniformity is, for them, to crush life itself' (Berlin, 1990, p. 46).

He goes on to note that perhaps, the best that one can do is to try and 'promote some kind of equilibrium' (ibid, p. 47) which whilst not a cause worth waving a flag, or even dying for, is by that fact alone a more useful cause than any sovereign patriotism, or fundamental beliefs in the rightness or righteousness of a cause bound by an orthodoxy of concepts and an (in)flexible narrative.

It should be noted that the intention here is not to suggest that the 'PREVENT' stream within 'CONTEST' was the only theme with which there has been a direct crossover into wider areas of community engagement, or that this is a singular area of policy where confusion has occurred. There have been a wide range of developments (structural reforms, new legislative agendas and powers etc) emerging from the discussions of how to best approach terrorism; but it is in this refinement of language and rhetoric surrounding the ideologies of extremism that we are beginning to see trends of conciliation enter into the discussion over terrorism, through the back door of ameliorating countering and preventing radicalisation it may be, but this is still a significant shift in the awareness of the issues that promises a more fruitful discursive potential for reconciling competing views, and finding a more holistic equilibrium. That a discussion of 'real or perceived' grievances is now a part of the strategic narrative shows that there is hope, a hope tempered with risks – as seen in the inculcating rhetoric of a creeping realignment towards authoritarian or constitutionally dictated appropriate 'ways of thinking' about 'being a citizen' which are seemingly hidden in

the shadows of pre-emption and prevention. The 'PREVENT' strategy for counter-radicalisation allows for a critical view of how the broader rhetoric has developed to create a more engaged and bottom-up emphasis that has now come to underpin the evolution of policies for interventions in radicalisation in the future; but concerns still remain over the finessing of constitutional fine print to legitimate aspects of narrative realignment implicit in the techniques of governmentality now emerging at the local level, through diverse initiatives and programmes of engagement and at the regional level and at (inter)national levels through strategic and legislative expansion of the meaning, model and metaphor of resilience writ large.

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## Notes

- 1 For the purposes of clarity the strategic document titles are referred to here in capital as 'CONTEST' and 'PREVENT', the work-streams relating to or bearing similar names are lower case, for example the 'Prevent' work-stream within the 'CONTEST' strategy. This allows for a distinction between iterations of the work-stream in its evolution into a full fledged strategic policy in the form of the 'PREVENT' strategy.
- 2 A good insight into how this can be critically unpacked in theory is too large a project for this paper. For some interesting insight into the links between exception, neo-liberalism, governmentality as indicators of serious problems for citizens of democracy see Ong (2007).
- 3 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010918-1.html>
- 4 <http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/>
- 5 See for example: <http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/issues/2-terrorism/index.shtml> (UK) and <http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/10/13/austra11863.htm> (Australia).
- 6 This draws on the Foucauldian discourse of governmentality as 'the conduct of conduct', and the shift from governance towards governmentality as a discrete focus of neo-liberal governmental influence. See for example Mitchell (2007).
- 7 Some interesting commentary on these issues can be found in J. Mummery & D. Rodan (2003).
- 8 Narratology refers to the study of the structure and function of narrative. This is a common tool in

structuralist and post-structuralist theory, but has fallen somewhat into disuse with the rise of economic determinism, the primacy of process over experience in political ‘theology’ (see Schmitt, 1922), and dominance of a Cartesian mathematical deductive logic underpinning method and knowledge generation in the human sciences. Often analogous to linguistic structures; the examination and classification of the traditional themes, conventions, and symbols of the narrated story. Here we use the term to refer to both the rhetorical construction of an extremist ‘other’ but also the program by which the conceptual narrative framework of ‘democracy’ is potentially undermined by a new creeping authoritarianism.

- 9 The current version of this document was updated as of 2006, and always included PREVENT as a stream of work, however this shift shows an increased importance to the preventative measures underpinning anti-radicalisation and de-radicalisation narratives (HM Gov, 2006).
- 10 <http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy/>
- 11 It has been noted that this influential ‘four-pillared approach’ has informed the American National Strategy for Homeland Security (2007) as well as the emerging European approach (Pantucci, 2008), putting British strategic policy generation at the forefront of the Western governance responses to managing terrorism.
- 12 <http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy/about-the-strategy/>
- 13 It is notable that the term radical has as a part of this rhetoric ceased to have ANY sense of a positive connotation as it was mobilised by Tony Blair in support of the neo-liberal cause during the first electoral period of his premiership. Associations with ‘new radicals’ of a New Labour party have been forgotten; whether this is significant to the treatment for radical viewpoints – as opposed to the fundamentalism on both sides of the divide, be it neo-liberal monetarism or Islamic faith – writ large remains to be seen.
- 14 It has since been suggested that the link between radicalisation and poverty in the Middle-East is distinct but unclear, education and amelioration of the economic crisis in many of these states has much to do with the strategic abandonment of the geo-political areas in the post-cold war era as it does with the growth of underemployed graduates from the lower middle classes – who are ripe with dissatisfactions at the inequality of global neo-liberalism and educated enough to understand the ramifications of global colonialism underpinning the spread of geographically unequal economic policies of the Western block (Lieven, 2008).
- 15 A good summary of the broader issues can be found in ‘THEMES, MESSAGES AND CHALLENGES’ (CIC, 2007b).
- 16 Through initiatives such as the The Prison Service Race Equality Scheme 2005-2008 (RES – see for example HMPS, 2007).
- 17 It is important to note that the rhetoric here emphasises explaining and building understanding amongst the Islamic community for the legitimisation of current policies as opposed to the alteration of those policies in response to a better understanding of Islam amongst decision-makers.
- 18 <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/protecting-the-uk/?version=1>. NOTE this also does not fully encompass other law enforcement agencies such as the British Transport police who were not drawn into the restructure given the uniqueness of their remit for transport only.
- 19 See for the importance of this distinction Isaiah Berlin’s essay on ‘the pursuit of the ideal’ (Berlin, 1997: pp.10-11).
- 20 *Oral evidence – Home Secretary, 13 March 2007* – Intelligence and Security Committee. Annual Report 2006-2007: p. 28.
- 21 See for example Rogers (2006) on skateboarding, Fuller et al on graffiti (2006).
- 22 National Indicator 35 – Building Resilience to Violent Extremism (HM Gov, 2008, p. 52).
- 23 Including the role of radicalisers, the power of a global extremist narrative supported by extremist materials, strong group identities, personal crisis triggered by changed situations or circumstances, underemployment in the new situation for new immigrants, links to criminal groups, expansion of identity and exploration of fringe group values amongst youths and adolescents, negative impact of social exclusion, the real or perceived grievances linked to government policy and a concurrent lack of trust in the political structures of civil society (HM Gov, 2008, pp. 69-70).
- 24 See the Local Government White Paper (DCLG, 2006) also see: <http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/communityempowerment/aboutcommunityempowerment/>
- 25 As in high-profile debate over the German ‘gentrification’ case. See for example: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/aug/21/highereducation.internationaleducationnews>
- 26 These themes are consistently returned to in themes 2-5 throughout the document.
- 27 See also [www.dius.gov.uk/publications/extremismhe.pdf](http://www.dius.gov.uk/publications/extremismhe.pdf)
- 28 This appears consistent with the discussion of resilience as a new reiteration of the 3<sup>rd</sup> way security policy ethos underpinning New Labor’s tenure in parliamentary majority (see Coaffee et al, 2008).

- 29 Note that Neocleous makes this point in descriptive reference to broader emphasis of securitisation debates. It is not the purpose here to privilege this approach but to highlight the tendencies towards a citizen complicity in developing a state controlled ideological narrative, and the means by which this is embedded in the protective rhetoric of engagement.
- 30 This alongside the aforementioned DCLG white paper (DCLG, 2006) draws on a range of institutions from Primary Care Trusts, Local Strategic Partnerships, Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships and strategies including the National Community Safety plan 2006-2009 (Home Office, 2005) and the Children's Plan (DCSF, 2007).
- 31 In terms of a social contract of classical understanding at its most basic irrespective of Hobbsian or Rousseau influenced political imperative.
- 32 This notion is drawn from Isaiah Berlin's reading of Giambattista Vico and Johann Gottfried Herder; in understanding the distinction between cultural pluralism and cultural relativism I suggest looking at Berlin's 'Proper study of Mankind' (1997, pp. 7-11).
- 33 See for example O'Leary (1923).
- 34 See for example de Waard (1999), Avant (2005).