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Terrorism-Free Zone in East Central Europe? Strategic Environment, Risk Tendencies, and Causes of Limited Terrorist Activities in the Visegrad Group Countries

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The aim of this article is to analyse terrorism and the phenomena linked to it in East Central Europe. In comparison with a number of other regions of today's world, this area can currently seem to be a relatively "terrorism-free zone." Although the number of terrorist attacks committed in this territory is insignificant, this does not mean that the risk of terrorism is entirely negligible in the region. This text explains some historical determinants of the current situation and describes the consequences both of regime change in the countries in question and of their foreign policy decisions after 1989. I also analyse the importance of East Central Europe as a logistical space for international terrorism (weapons procurement, stays of terrorists, etc.). I characterise the threats of Islamic and Middle Eastern terrorism in connection with the pro-American and pro-Israeli policies of East Central European countries, especially after 9/11, assess the risks posed by the domestic extremist scenes in those countries that have a relationship with terrorism, and take notice of the accusations of terrorism that have been voiced in international politics. On the basis of this data, I then provide an overview of the importance of East Central Europe for the contemporary study of terrorism.

Keywords East Central Europe, terrorism, terrorism free zone

Introduction

Studies of terrorism that view their object geographically or geopolitically focus mainly on areas where strong terrorist groups appear or where a large number of terrorist attacks are committed. But this does not mean that areas where the scope of terrorist activities is limited should be ignored, if only to understand the causes

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of divergent evolutions. One of the areas where only a very limited number of real terrorist attacks have been carried out recently is the territory of East Central Europe (ECE). The goal of this article is to identify the main manifestations of terrorism in ECE during the post-communist era and to evaluate the importance of this area for the contemporary study of terrorism.

In this article, East Central Europe is narrowly defined as an area comprising the countries of the Visegrád Group (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary). These countries have a similar historical experience, political culture, and direction of foreign policies. They have also been exposed to similar terrorist threats.

The concept of terrorism used in this article is based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution S-RES-1566 (2004), which defines terrorism as "criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act."[1]

The article will focus on activities directly related to the committing of terrorist acts, or the preparation thereof, in the territory of East Central Europe, but also on activities related to this space's capacity to provide logistical support for international terrorism, as well as on activities connected with the stay and transit of terrorists from other areas. The part concerned with domestic extremist terrorism will also take into account some non-terrorist forms of violence which are nevertheless connected with discussions about terrorism in the extremist scene, and with the support this scene provides to terrorism abroad. Non-terrorist violence forming part of transnational campaigns combining terrorist and non-terrorist violence will also be taken into consideration.

Terrorist activities in East Central Europe have been carried out by various actors—non-state actors on the one hand and by state secret services or other governmental institutions on the other hand. In the communist era the hidden official support of non-state foreign terrorist groups aimed against Western democracies and Israel was typical of this area. It was replaced by illegal operations of foreign non-state actors (partially logistic, partially subversive actions) and by the rise of homegrown extremist violence, partially with terrorist character, after the fall of communism. In an analysis of foreign terrorism in this area it is important to take into account tension between sanctuary on the one hand and target area on the other hand.

Historical Determinants of Terrorism in East Central Europe

The first manifestations of modern terrorism appeared in the area of ECE at the turn of the twentieth century. The forms it took at that period have almost no impact on the contemporary security situation, however. This is true for the isolated acts of anarchist[2] and communist terrorism from the turn of the twentieth century,[3] for the nationalist terrorism of the first half of the twentieth century,[4] and for the fascist terrorism of the inter-war period.[5] Although contemporary right-wing and left-wing extremists occasionally do refer to these traditions, their contemporary violent activities are different both in strategy and organization. At the end of the 1930s, Nazi organisations of the German minority in Czechoslovakia, controlled by the secret services and armed forces of Nazi Germany, unleashed violence and terror.[6]

The Second World War brought manifold brutal war terrorism to East Central Europe. Some resistance movements and guerrilla groups endorsed terrorism as one of the methods of expressing their struggle.[7] Terrorism was also employed in the fighting between anti-communist and communist resistance movements which continued for a short period after the end of the war. Between 1945 and 1946, post-Nazi Werwolf and similar groups were involved in terrorist attacks on the Czech and Polish territories,[8] but their activities soon ceased, mainly due to the removal of German inhabitants from these areas.

In the communist takeover of power in East Central Europe in the late 1940s terrorism did not play a significant role.[9] At the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s, terrorism was an auxiliary method employed by some national anti-communist guerrilla and resistance groups.[10] However, by the middle of the decade such opposition was quenched. In the 1950s, the term terrorism was often used by ruling communist regimes with the purpose of discrediting various activities of domestic opposition and anti-communist activities of Western secret services.[11]

Even after the communist regimes consolidated themselves, their domestic opponents[12] and allies of the latter in diasporas[13] attempted to commit acts of terrorism against objects symbolizing the various regimes with the aim of bringing them down. Many attempts were made, both successful and unsuccessful, to emigrate from the communist bloc by hijacking cars and other means of transport, but it is questionable whether those were acts of political terrorism[14] (they had a single goal and did not constitute a campaign with obvious subversive purpose).

In the final years of communism, even regimes that attempted to democratise themselves came under the pressure of international terrorism. Abroad, the citizens and buildings of communist states sometimes found themselves under terrorist pressure from opponents of communist engagement in the world.[15]

Although the communist regimes were targets of some terrorist activities during their reigns, they themselves were involved in terrorism or at least supported it, either directly through their secret services, or by supporting allied groups[16] and regimes. The secret services were engaged in terrorism against enemy countries of the Western Bloc[17] and against anti-communist emigrants.

Through their secret services and arms supplies, the communist regimes also supported guerrilla groups in the Third World that used terrorist methods, as well as purely terrorist groups in Western Europe[18] and the Middle East. But equally, they supported Arab regimes that themselves supported terrorism (cf. the supplies of the Czechoslovak plastic explosive Semtex to Libya, which then used it for its terrorist activities but also redistributed it to terrorist groups, including the IRA. This has assumed symbolic significance).[19] One of the reasons for this was the anti-Israel policy which intensified after the Six Day War in 1967.

Communist regimes tried to support national-liberation movements (some of which employed terrorist means) and secular regimes in the Arab world rather than Islamism, as they considered the latter to be a reactionary element. Members of Arab and Western European terrorist groups often found temporary homes in the territory of the communist bloc (typically, Carlos's gangs stayed in several communist countries, Abu Nidal's stayed in Poland, Abu Daoud's sojourned in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, members of the Japanese Red Army temporarily stayed in Hungary in the second half of the 1980s,[20] etc.). Some terrorists underwent special training in these countries, while others studied "ordinary" disciplines in secondary schools and in universities.

However, the communist secret services attempted to prevent violent solutions to factional disputes in the Middle Eastern diasporas. Despite this, an assassination attempt on the Palestinian Abu Daoud by the organization *Black September* was made in Poland in 1981, either by Israelis or by hostile Palestinian groups.[21] Similarly, the secret services tried to limit some terrorist activities abroad and prevent them at home, so that their inhabitants were not harmed and the communist countries not discredited in the international community. For example, in 1987 the Czechoslovak secret police carried out measures preventing the Palestinian extremists of *Force 17*, who were studying in Czechoslovakia, from carrying out an attack at the Davis Cup tennis match between Czechoslovakia and Israel.[22]

Communist security forces only tolerated the activities of "friendly" organizations on communist territory, above all the Ba'ath and Marxist groups. This was the reason they interrupted the activities of the Islamists from the *Muslim Brotherhood* who were studying in the countries of the communist bloc, or weighed in to stop the propaganda of Pakistan and post-revolutionary Iran among Muslim students.[23]

In terms of international terrorism, countries of the Communist bloc essentially supported subversive activities of the extreme left, as well as ethnic terrorism targeting Western democracies, because these activities weakened the Communist bloc's adversaries in the global Cold War. Although these countries verbally condemned terrorism, they allowed terrorists wanted by Western countries to stay in their territories. Nevertheless, they sought to keep their support of terrorism secret and to prevent terrorist acts in their own territory (and this includes settling accounts within the various factions of Palestinian terrorism, for instance).

From the point of view of the future development of terrorism in the post-communist space, the period of communism has brought the following determinants: first, the fact that under the rubric of "international aid," the territories of communist countries have become the "rear area" for a number of Middle Eastern terrorist groups; and second, the strong militarization of communist societies, together with their moral decay, has led to a strong increase in organized crime and the arms trade after the fall of communism, which in itself attracted various terrorists.

Fall of Communism, Transformation of Strategic Direction, and a New Dimension of Terrorist Threat

In East Central Europe the fall of communism was not accompanied by significant violence caused by clashes between the advocates of the old and new regimes. After the fall of the communist regimes, there was anxiety in some countries that former secret service structures would try to reverse the regime change by terrorist means. But that did not happen.[24]

Neither were the countries of the Visegrad Group affected by armed ethnic conflicts such as those witnessed in the post-Yugoslav or post-Soviet space. Nor were there significant manifestations of ethnic terrorism which prefigured future wars elsewhere. The one exception was recorded in 1992, when, in the context of increasing disputes between Czechs and Slovaks, letter threats signed by the *Slovak Liberation Army* (SOA) appeared. The threats were not carried out, however. This small group probably only counted a few members; also recorded were small-scale bomb attacks.[25] Although in the context of the events unfolding in the contemporary post-communist space these events raised some fears, the splitting of Czechoslovakia was non-violent.

Members of foreign terrorist groups undergoing training in the territories of the countries of the ECE resented the fall of communism, however. This was mostly linked to the transformation of the foreign policies in these countries, both globally and in their relationships to the sides of the Middle Eastern conflict. For instance, eleven members of the Palestinian group *Force 17*, who were training in Czechoslovakia at the Institute for Foreign Students of the University of the National Security Corps (Ústav zahraničního studia Vysoké školy Sboru národní bezpečnosti) in Zastávka u Brna, expressed in December 1989 their disenchantment about the potential preference of Czechoslovakia for Israel.[26] Their training was ended halfway through the year 1990. Some of them stayed in the territory of Czechoslovakia (and later, the independent Czech Republic) and were perceived as a terrorist threat.

The first (and, to this day also essentially the last) substantial wave of terrorism that hit the countries of the ECE shortly after their regime changes was also connected with the conflict in the Middle East. With the gradual easing of the circumstances in the Soviet Union, the authorities opened to Soviet Jews the possibility of emigrating to Israel. Almost 200,000 people used this option, and some have settled in the occupied territories. This incited a protest campaign of Arab countries and groups, including activities of terrorist organizations.

Some of the emigrants travelled through East Central Europe and used the services of the airlines of this region. In March 1990, *Palestinian Islamic Jihad* shelled the Polish embassy in Lebanon and threatened more attacks, including some on Polish soil.[27] The Hungarian airline Malév stopped the air passage of Soviet Jews after receiving threats from the same group.[28]

The main manifestation of this terror wave was the attack by the *Movement for the Protection of Jerusalem* (MFJ), on a bus with Jewish emigrants on their way from the Soviet Union to Israel, carried out in Budapest on 23 December 1991.[29] A bomb of about 25 kg was planted in a car parked at the edge of the road to the airport; the bulk of the impact hit the escort vehicle of the police.[30] Six people were injured in the attacks: two policemen suffered heavy injuries, and four passengers on the bus were lightly injured. The MFJ was created ad hoc for this bombing. It was probably composed of Palestinian Marxist terrorists and German extreme left terrorists, the latter probably designated to carry out the act as they could employ their knowledge of the local area gained during the communist era. Full details about the organization are yet to be established, however.[31]

Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union to Israel also influenced the newly-created ECE-based extremist organizations and their violent activities. Some of these organizations displayed terrorist leanings. The Polish anarchist *Group of 13th December* (*Oddział 13 Grudnia – O13 G),* founded at the end of 1989 in Grudziądz, committed several bomb and arson attacks on 7 June 1990 (with no loss of life). One of those attacks targeted the Soviet consulate in Gdańsk, the reason being the already mentioned emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel, authorised by the Soviet authorities. Another attack targeted the office of the LOT Polish Airlines, a carrier used by Jewish emigrants. O13 G subsequently renamed itself *Popular Front For Liberation* (*Ludowy Front Wyzwolenia* – LFW). It was composed of about ten people under the leadership of Piotr Ratynski and was soon uncovered by the security forces.[32] Still, in 1990 it committed a grenade attack on a synagogue in Warsaw (the attack was unsuccessful, because the grenade bounced off a window), and in early 1991 it bombed the Israeli consulate in Gdańsk. Soon afterwards, the group

was uncovered and its core composed of four leading members arrested.[33] LFW was strongly inspired by Marxist Palestinian terrorism and its leadership maintained contacts with Arab students in Poland. However, the groups belonged to the anarchist spectrum.[34] Although its propaganda materials remain popular among the Polish extreme left, the group did not have any successors.

With the end of the wave of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union to Israel, the threat of terrorist attacks on the territory of the ECE decreased, but was not completely eliminated. Given the problems of keeping security at the time, some groups involved in international terrorism chose the territory of the ECE to settle accounts with their traditional enemies. On 19 December 1991, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) committed an unsuccessful assassination attempt on the Turkish ambassador in Budapest, shooting at his car.[35] It was the final act of the group before its disbandment.

The issues caused by events dating to the period of communism or prompted by the subsequent transformation of the strategic direction of the countries of ECE had long-term repercussions. For example, the Czech security forces were worried in the 1990s about possible Libyan assassination attempts against potential witnesses in the Lockerbie case, as Semtex was ultimately procured from Czechoslovakia.[36]

The 1990s: El-Dorado for the Logistical Operations of International Terrorism

During the 1990s, Central Europe initially found itself in a temporary strategic vacuum. Gradually its countries focused themselves on gaining admission into NATO and the EU. At the same time, a social and economic transformation was underway during which the influence of the state decreased, while corruption and crime increased. In the mid-1990s, even features of an authoritarian system could be found in Slovakia. Europeanization of politics, consolidation of state structures, and establishment of democratic political culture were only gradual. Structures of international terrorism used the just-mentioned period of chaos to secure weapons and logistics. Terrorism did not represent an immediate threat to East Central Europe itself,[37] but terrorism in other regions was supported owing to the events unfolding here.

International terrorist groups did not primarily attack their host countries, but rather, targets connected with other countries present in the territories of those host countries. Some terrorist groups used the post-communist space for arms procurement or for funding originating from organized crime,[38] employing their contacts and experiences from the communist period. They also kept contacts with local extremists to foster ideological support and cooperation; this was assisted by the growth of the anti-globalization movement.

Northern Ireland terrorist organizations, both loyalist and republican, have obtained (or at least tried to obtain) arms in the countries active in the Balkans wars, but also in East Central Europe. In 1993, the Ulster Volunteer Force bought submachine guns, grenades, ammunition, and the explosive Semtex in Poland. The container with the weapons was seized by the British customs officers, however.[39] Information about procurement of weapons for the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) in the Czech city of Plzeň (Pilsen) in 1994 is unconfirmed.[40] In 2001, members of the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) attempted to buy weapons in Slovakia, but their activities were monitored by MI5. The three RIRA buyers were arrested in Piešťany and extradited to the United Kingdom, where they were convicted.[41]

Russian ammunition was smuggled into Poland, where RIRA bought it in 2001.[42] In 2002, Michael Dickson, member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), was arrested in the Czech Republic. He was accused of an attack on British barracks in Osnabrück (Germany) in 1996, and was also involved in cigarette smuggling in Central Europe.[43]

Structures of Albanian organized crime have established a strong footing in East Central Europe, notably in drug trafficking.[44] For the whole of the 1990s, these sources funded the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), as well as its successor and splinter organizations, some of them designated as terrorist; these groups are also involved in organized crime.[45]

Palestinians with links to secular organizations (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Al Fatah), but also to Hamas, were involved in drug crimes in Central Europe at the turn of the twenty-first century. According to sources within the Czech police force, after these individuals were uncovered they were allegedly worried that they would be extradited to Arab countries where they would have to face draconian charges.[46]

The networks of the *Kurdistan Workers' Party* (PKK) and its successors were also active in Eastern Europe and are participating in organized crime. A centre of their activities was in Romania (people smuggling, drugs),[47] but they also have branches in other countries, such as Eastern Slovakia (diamond trafficking).[48] In the last couple of years these activities have ceased, however.[49] PKK enjoys long-term support from part of the Kurdish community[50] and the extreme left in the post-communist countries.

Some of the members of *Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam* (LTTE), as well as Sikh militants, were involved in people-smuggling in East Central Europe.[51] Turkish extreme left organizations, especially the *Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front* (DHKP/C), were active in several post-communist countries. The Basque youth organization Segi, which enjoys close links to ETA, had ties to the Czech extreme left spectrum at the beginning of the new century.[52]

Nuclei of religious cultic terrorism have also been observed in post-communist Europe. In 1990s Russia, the sect Aum Shinrikyo, originally hailing from Japan, gained a strong footing and attempted to obtain weapons of mass destruction.[53] The meetings of the Russian and Japanese sections were held in Prague in 2000, among other places. The Czech Security Information Service (Bezpečnostní informační služba – BIS) was worried that the sect members could attack the demonstrations held during the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 2000, but these worries proved unfounded.[54] The sect did not carry out any attacks in the territory of East Central Europe.

International terrorists' need for weapons has been met by organized crime. A number of deals with weapons and explosives were thwarted before organized crime could even contact potential customers. During the 1990s, several other important incidents where radioactive material was smuggled (with the involvement of local crime structures) were revealed in the territory of Central Europe.[55]

The Threat of Islamic Terrorism in East Central Europe: From the "Rear" to the "Front"?

Islamist terrorist groups also used the area of East Central Europe as their logistical "rear" during the 1990s. Furthermore, they attempted to create new cells in this region, possibly also for future use as bases for attacks in Western Europe. The

Algerian *Armed Islamic Group* (GIA) was especially active in this regard; it even published an illegal magazine in Poland in the mid-1990s.[56] In 1995, the Czech Ministry of Internal Affairs published information that certain companies—with the involvement of citizens of Arab countries and also of former Czech State Security agents (i.e., the secret police)—organized the settlement of Algerians connected with the GIA in the Czech Republic.[57] Individuals with links to the GIA were also involved in the drug and arms trade in the territory of the Czech Republic.[58]

Further attempts to buy weapons are linked to the 1998 visits of Taliban members and unspecified Islamist groups from Kashmir to the Czech Republic.[59] Information about alleged procurement of Botulinum toxin by al-Qaeda in the Czech Republic during the mid-1990s remains unconfirmed.[60] It was also alleged that other individuals, reportedly connected to the Taliban, were involved in structures organizing illegal migration through Central Europe around 2001. In 2007 a network supplying counterfeit documents to Islamist terrorists was broken in Poland.[61]

When studying the strategic thinking of terrorists, the case of Mustapha Labsi is interesting. This Algerian citizen is suspected of being a member of the *Salafist Group for Call and Combat* (GSPC, split group and de facto successor of the GIA) and of planning terrorist attacks in Western Europe and the USA, in cooperation with al-Qaeda. Labsi married in Slovakia and has a child there. In 2007, he was detained during a family visit and was to be extradited to Algeria; however, the Slovak Constitutional Court has refused extradition on the grounds that he could be tortured in Algeria. In April 2010 Labsi was extradited from Slovakia to Algeria—despite an order of the European Court of Human Rights.[62]

His case could indicate an interesting strategy employed by the Islamists: speculations have appeared as to whether members of Islamist networks have used relationships with local women (and the potential legalization of their stay) to create a logistical background in future EU member countries, and thus potential members of the Schengen space.[63] These speculations remain unconfirmed, however.

A member of the Palestinian group al Tawhid used the territory of the Czech Republic as his base in 2001, working there as a money dealer. He was later tried in Germany for preparing acts of terrorism.[64] Some terrorist organizations, including Hamas, have conducted their financial operations in the territory of East Central Europe.[65] Also active in the region are foundations which are suspected to be linked with terrorism, such as the Third World Relief Agency, al-Haramain, and the missionary movement Tablighi Jamaat. No direct link between their activities and terrorism in East Central Europe has been proved, however.[66]

A number of individuals connected with terrorism use the area of ECE for transit, with the airports in Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw being the most important transport junctions. On the basis of a U.S. arrest warrant, Oussama Kassir, a Swedish citizen of Lebanese origin, was detained at the Prague airport in 2005 when transferring to a flight to Beirut. He was accused of being connected to al-Qaeda and organising a training camp in Oregon. In 2007, he was extradited to the USA, where he was given a life sentence in 2009.[67]

Members of some Islamist organizations stay in the territory of East Central Europe without being politically active outside the limits of their community (typically, Hamas sympathisers in the Palestinian community, which only number several dozen in all of the four countries). Other organizations have been involved in propaganda in the region; for example, a Czech web page of Hizballah existed from 2001 to 2003.[68]

But East Central Europe's usefulness for Islamist terrorism did not end with its use as a base. Some Islamists intended to exploit shortcomings in the security measures of post-communist Europe in order to perpetrate attacks. For example, in 2003 they planned to hijack civil planes from airports in various post-communist countries (including the Czech Republic), as they believed the security there would be less strict. The planes would then have been used to attack targets in Western Europe. However, the plan was thwarted thanks to the cooperation of Asian, Western European, and Eastern European security forces.[69]

But the territory of East Central Europe could have been (and indeed may still become) a target of terrorist attacks by Islamist extremists. As far as reasons for the attack are concerned, only a few years ago the close alliance with the USA in the war on terror had been an important risk. In 2004, Poland had the second largest contingent in Iraq. In June 2004, al-Tawhid and al-Qaeda demanded in their threatening statements that Polish and Bulgarian troops be withdrawn; otherwise Poland and Bulgaria would become targets of terrorist attacks similar to those perpetrated in Madrid.[70] In April 2004, al-Qaeda voiced threats to Hungary as well, citing the country's army involvement in the conflict.[71] Poland and Hungary were among the countries designated as "enemies of Muslims" in a statement issued by Ayman al-Zawahiri in the same year, and Poland was again cited among the enemies the next year.[72]

Given the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, the Islamist threat is no longer acute, but it remains due to the involvement of East Central European soldiers in Afghanistan. It is apparently less intense now, as the role of soldiers from Central and Eastern Europe in Afghanistan is less conspicuous than it used to be during the main phase of the Iraq conflict. The situation in Poland was possibly also influenced by the information about secret CIA detention facilities in the country's territory. The situation at the time was specific: the countries of East Central Europe offered relatively strong support for Bush's policies, but the relationships with the Obama administration are less warm (especially after the plan to build a radar in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles in Poland as part of the U.S. missile defense shield was scrapped in 2009). Only Slovakia agreed with the request of the USA and accepted at the beginning of 2010 three prisoners released from Guantanamo Bay.

The countries of the Visegrad group are de facto part of the block of states against which Islamist terrorism (including Bin Laden's fatwas) directs its threats (allies of the USA and Israel, "crusaders," European Union, Europe, etc.). The direct consequences of these wide-ranging threats for the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, or Hungary must not be overestimated, however.

In the context of Islamist terrorist attacks, the presence of important monuments of Jewish history in the countries of ECE (and the visits by American and Jewish tourists that are related to those monuments), can present security risks in the long-term, especially in light of these countries' alliances with Israel. In 2004, a planned attack by a group of Palestinians on Jewish targets in Hungary (probably on a synagogue in Budapest) during the visit of Israel's president Moshe Katsav was thwarted.[73] In 2006, an Islamist attack on the Prague Jewish Quarter was prevented in the Czech Republic.[74]

Since 1994, the Czech Republic has been facing a specific risk due to the fact that the seat of Radio Free Europe and its offshoots was moved to Prague. These stations now broadcast into a number of countries in the Middle East. The one reported event involving terrorism and East Central Europe, one that probably attracted

the most attention, and was supposedly linked with a planned attack on Radio Free Europe, is paradoxically apparently untrue.

The issue at hand is the alleged connection between the Hamburg cell of Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. One of the 9/11 attackers, Mohamed Atta, allegedly met Iraqi consul Ahmad al Ani in Prague on 8 April 2001. Linked with the Iraqi secret service, they were supposedly planning, among other things, an attack on the Prague building of Radio Free Europe.[75] This information originated in the Czech security services and was widely cited after the attacks on the WTC and Pentagon; it probably played some role in the justification of the U.S. attack on Iraq in 2003. The 9/11 Commission Report found it to be unsubstantiated, however. (According to the investigators, Atta was in the USA at the time, and when al Ani was questioned in Iraq, he likewise denied that the meeting took place.)[76] Interestingly, some members of the Czech Security Information Service (Bezpečnostní informační služba – BIS) continue to insist that the information is true, although that is not the official statement.[77]

Atta travelled through Prague in 1994 and again in June 2000, but he only stayed for one day and there is no proven information about activities directly related to terrorism. According to BIS, the Iraqi secret service DGI had been planning an attack on the building of Radio Free Europe on the order of Saddam Hussein since 1999. For this reason, al Ani was expelled from the Czech Republic in 2001, but the preparations of the attack continued. It was to be executed by firing an RPG 7 missile from a flat opposite the building of Radio Free Europe, aiming at the office where broadcasts for Iraq were prepared. The attack was not carried out, however. After the fall of Saddam's regime, the weapons intended for the attack (RPG-7, submachine guns, and ammunition) stored at the Iraqi embassy were given over to the Czech security forces on 29 April 2003.[78] Islamist groups and non-democratic regimes continue to view the broadcasting of Radio Free Europe and its offshoots in a negative fashion, however; this is especially true of Radio Farda broadcasts targeting Iranian audiences.

Several attacks in East Central Europe that did not proceed past the planning stage or were foiled have been reported, but thus far are supported only by unconfirmed speculations, and detailed information about them is still confidential (in some cases it is questionable whether these acts had an Islamist motivation). In October 2001, a RPG-75 anti-tank missile was found close to the Prague–Ruzyně airport; Shimon Peres, the Israeli foreign minister, flew out of the airport two days before. The press linked this to Israeli airplanes coming under fire in Mombasa (Kenya), but these speculations were unconfirmed.[79] Two more RPG-75 were found in the Czech Republic in 2004.[80] The threat of attacks against Slovakia in 2004 remains unclear (the information allegedly coming from Arab internet chat rooms), and the seriousness of another piece of information from the same year, namely that Islamists planned attacks in Poland using "small airplanes," is likewise questionable. In 2007 the U.S. intelligence services reportedly warned the Czech security services that there was a risk of attack against airport infrastructure and actual airplanes similar to the attack on Glasgow airport[81] (where terrorists had driven a burning car loaded with gas cylinders into the airport terminal).[82] In the Czech Republic, such an attack was not realized, however.

The risk of Islamist terrorism in East Central Europe is decreased by the fact that the region's Muslim communities are generally moderate, small, and not concentrated.[83] This remains true despite sectional attempts to radicalise, especially

among some young converts and foreign students. Islamophobia among the traditional inhabitants of post-communist spaces could present a future risk, as it could potentially provoke a counter-reaction from the Muslim communities.

Terrorism and Domestic Extremism: From the Dreams of Youngsters to a Real Threat?

After the fall of communism extremist forces attempting to alter democratic development became part of the political spectrum in East Central European countries. Some extremists, from both the left and the right, tried to impose their interests by violent means. Only some of the violent activities can be subsumed under the rubric of terrorism, however. It is also necessary to distinguish propaganda from potential and real activities of some extreme right and left groups, especially those arising from youth subcultures.

In the words of Cas Mudde, "it seems justified to postulate that the level of racist extremist violence in Central and Eastern Europe is on average higher than in Western Europe."[84] The majority of the attacks fall under the categories of ad hoc or situational violence; only a small percentage of the violent acts of the extreme right can be considered terrorist. Although the racist part of skinhead subculture has disseminated terrorist propaganda in its publications from the beginning of the 1990s (and later on the Internet), and branches of the international network Combat 18 were established in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, there was no real terrorist activity behind it.

In several cases manuals for terrorist activities were found among the possessions of nationalists and neo-Nazis (e.g., in 2006 with the Polish members of Blood & Honour/Combat 18[85]), or even real explosives and arms (as in the case of one Slovak soldier with neo-Nazi leanings in 2005).[86] The concepts of "leaderless resistance," taken over from the American extreme right, and of "free nationalism," adopted from Germany, are also popular, and contain terrorist elements. A number of groups promoting terrorism, or organizing paramilitary training, exist on the national level[87] (in the 1990s, Western European neo-Nazis used the post-communist space for obtaining firearms and for paramilitary training[88]). The extreme right has also attacked human rights activists and their offices.[89]

Part of the extreme right in post-communist Europe, and in the Czech Republic in particular, supports Islamist forces in their fight against the USA and Israel. This is based on the German example and rooted in anti-Semitism (however, the bulk of the Eastern European extreme right—mostly in Poland and in Slovakia—remains Islamophobic). In 2006 the Czech neo-Nazi group *National Resistance (Národní odpor)* offered volunteers to Iran's armed forces and voiced vague threats that would supposedly be carried out should Israel attack Iran.[90]

The international links of the Central European neo-Nazi scene are also demonstrated by this scene's support for extreme right terrorism in other parts of the World. They promote the so-called "Russian Way," which is a synonym for terrorist struggle referring to the violent activities of the Russian neo-Nazis. Central European neo-Nazis also support terrorists who are prosecuted abroad. A significant example of this connection dates from 2007, when a Serbian member of Blood & Honour organized a collection in Prague for the detained members of the Flemish neo-Nazi organization *Blood, Soil and Honour* (BBET), which is suspected of planning terrorist attacks in Belgium in 2006.[91]

Threats and acts of extreme right terrorism appeared in Central Europe at the end of the first decade of the new millennium in Hungary. The events took place during heightened political controversy and anti-government protests, and in an environment in which strong prejudices exist against the Roma minority. In 2008 Krisztián Tölgyesi, Hungary's representative in judo at the 2000 Olympics, was arrested in Budapest. He carried bombs in his vehicle and planned attacks in public spaces. According to the Hungarian police he had links with the neo-Nazi group *Conscience 88* (*Lelkiismeret 88*).[92] The group *Hungarian Arrows National Liberation Army* (*Magyarok Nyilai Nemzeti Felszabadító Hadsereg* – MNNFH) was broken after three of its members were arrested by the Hungarian police in 2009. The group committed firebomb attacks on homes of Hungarian politicians and planned a further terrorist campaign.[93]

According to the Hungarian police, a group of four men, aged 28 to 42 and arrested in August 2009 (and adherents of the extreme right), is responsible for the most serious systematic attacks against the Roma. Combining arson and shooting in their assaults, they murdered six Roma in nine attacks during the years 2008–2009. Among the victims were a father and his five-year-old son, shot when escaping from a burning house, and a mother shot in bed next to her 13-year-old daughter, who suffered heavy injuries.[94]

Extreme right violence has stimulated violent defensive tendencies among the groups attacked, including Roma people. The most common form of Roma militancy is the creation of a militia against extreme right-wing attackers, and individual violent incidents cannot be ruled out. These home-defences have always had a limited life span (for a short period of time, they have appeared on the local level in all of the Visegrad Group countries). Roma's armed struggle is supported by the extreme left, both at home and abroad.[95]

Recently, speculations have appeared about the possibility of an emergence of Roma terrorism in East Central Europe, whether on a national or a trans-national level. Few isolated incidents aside, such as the threats voiced by Roma leaders or secret organizations (for example, the Roma *Black Panthers* militants in the Czech Republic in 1993–1998[96]), this terrorism has yet to appear. It is unlikely to erupt on a large scale. Large-scale race riots not employing terrorist methods are more likely.

Attempts at separatist terrorism in the image of the IRA and ETA were more of a curiosity in East Central Europe. Since 1992, Moravian anti-Czech terrorism has not progressed beyond the stage of threatening letters, Internet messages, and paramilitary training of the *Moravian Liberation Army* (MOA) or similar Moravian "phantom groups." Internet threats against Poland in 2005 represent the sole activities of the *Silesian Republican Army* (SAR).[97]

Fairly soon after the fall of communism, the militant extreme left scene in post-communist Europe became influenced by earlier Latin American and Western European extreme left terrorism and its symbols. This was also apparent in the post-communist anarchist scene, though here more as a cultural form rather than in actual terrorism. On top of that, there was lively discussion on the anarchist scene as to whether one should be inspired by groups adhering to Marxism, an ideology that was too authoritarian for anarchists.[98]

Generally, it can be said that the extreme left has a relatively strong footing and a potential for violence in post-communist Europe. Its terrorist activities have hitherto been limited, however. Violence in demonstrations and street clashes with

political opponents—rather than terrorist attacks—are the most likely future activities of the extreme left. Nevertheless, it is possible that limited terrorist structures will be created.

Although there were also terrorist tendencies in Czech Anarchism, they remained for a long time at the level of threats and proclamations by inactive groups.[99] A bomb attack on the Peruvian Embassy in Prague was committed in 1997 in support of the commando *Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement* (MRTA). Although the perpetrator was never found, it is highly probable that he originated from the Prague anarchist scene.[100]

As in Western Europe, instances of "single-issue" extreme left terrorism have appeared in post-communist Europe. The most important examples are those of the so-called eco-terrorism (in fact mostly limited to "small scale" terrorism), ideologically rooted in eco-anarchism. A local branch of *Animal Liberation Front* (ALF) has been active in Poland since the end of the 1980s. Later branches of ALF were established in the Czech Republic[101] and Slovakia. In Poland, *Earth Liberation Front* (ELF) has also gained a foothold. The activities of those groups usually made use of only small-scale violence, such as freeing animals, petty sabotages of property, etc.[102]

Given that attacks against the gay and lesbian community by the extreme right are common in post-communist Europe, it is possible that self-defence structures will be created by gays and lesbians, who enjoy the support of the extreme left. The *Gay Power Brigade* (GPB) group even deployed dummy bombs in Warsaw, Poland in 2005.[103] These attacks did not recur and it is therefore unclear how strong the group was. Nevertheless, the appearance of larger-scale gay and lesbian terrorism remains improbable.

Elements of social protest with a certain amount of leftist ideological background could be detected in acts of individuals that exhibited some characteristics of terrorism. In the Czech Republic between 1999 and 2003, certain manifestations of leftist nationalism, including bomb attacks on monuments linked with anti-communist traditions and relating to attempts at reconciliation between Czechs and Germans, resulted from the campaign of a lone bomber, Vladimír Štěpánek (who signed himself as the "*Cripples*–Mrzáci" group).[104] However, Štěpánek's campaign bore strong traits of psychopathological activity (especially his bomb attacks on trains, which fortunately did not have tragic consequences). Some other psychopathological attacks were partly politically rationalised—at the very least, in the form of "revenge on the society."[105]

Some attacks remain unclear. In the Czech town of Přerov and its environs, several booby-trapped bombs exploded during the years 1998–1999 (one of the explosions killed a policeman). Mutual blame was laid by the local dogmatist communists on the one side, and Vladimír Hučín, a member of the secret services (who was a dissident during the communist era and committed similar attacks against the regime at that time), on the other. The real culprit was not established.[106] The background of two bomb attacks on the seats of two political parties in Hungary in 1997 is likewise unclear, but evidence points to the criminal underworld.

A bomb attack in the Slovak capital of Bratislava in 2004 is also among the unexplained cases. A day before the planned session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in the city, a bag with explosives was found nearby, but the bombs were not fully functional. Given that some of the components allegedly originated in the

former Yugoslavia, a "Serbian trail" was considered[107] (the explosives themselves were from Czechoslovakia). Speculations were also raised that this was a provocation by the Slovak Intelligence Service with the goal of obtaining more resources to fight terrorism.[108] The real culprit was not uncovered.

Neighbourly Slanders

Accusations of support for terrorism have appeared in East Central Europe several times on the international level, but they were provoked by disputes between the states rather than by a real threat. In the context of the heightened tension between Slovakia and Hungary in 1997, information was published in the Hungarian press that an alleged "commando" of the then prime minister of Slovakia, Vladimír Mečiar, was responsible for the series of bomb explosions in Budapest (Mečiar understandably denied these allegations).[109] The attacks were probably motivated by the settling of scores within the criminal underworld, and it is possible that individuals of Slovak nationality were among the culprits.[110] In 2008, speculations rose in Hungary that the Slovak security service was behind the attack against Roma in the country. Robert Fico, the Slovak prime minister, has denied this claim.[111]

Poland and Belarus, the latter ruled by the authoritarian regime of president Lukashenko, also have disputes around terrorism. Links between the regime in Belarus and terrorism are ambivalent. On the one hand, opponents of the regime both at home and in the diasporas abroad (including those in the Czech Republic and in Poland) are afraid of the activities of Lukashenko's secret service commandos, the so-called "Death Squads."[112] On the other hand, the activities of *Belarussian National Liberation Army* (BNOA) in 1997 represent a specific nucleus of territorial terrorism aimed against the annexation of one country to another, namely of Belarus to Russia,[113] and in 2008, this organisation employed terrorist methods against the regime;[114] the latter "army" probably consisted of only one person. Lukashenko's regime also accuses Poland of supporting terrorism in its territory,[115] designating as "terrorists" members of democratic organizations in opposition. Nevertheless, it is highly probable that these accusations are untrue.

Russia accused the Czech Republic of supporting Chechen terrorism, both in terms of propaganda (when the Czech Television broadcast a document about the situation in Chechnya in 2002, at the same time when a Chechen commando executed an act of terrorism in Moscow), and its direct support in Chechnya through the NGO Člověk v tísni (People in need) in 2004–2005. The Czech Republic has refuted these allegations.[116] Sympathies towards Chechnya were strong in East Central Europe, especially in Poland and the Czech Republic during the mid-1990s, though the increasing brutality of Chechen attacks with Islamic background has weakened those sympathies.[117] The few rare attempts by Chechen terrorists to obtain funding and recruit fighters in Czech territory were monitored and eliminated by the country's security services.[118]

Politics in East Central Europe is determined by a number of historical disputes and great powers, including Russia, traditionally have interests in the area. Democratic forces of the new democracies intensively participate in the human rights area of international politics and this has led to conflicts with authoritarian forces, especially in the post-Soviet space. Consequences of this include disputes in which the questions of terrorism played an important role.

Conclusion

East Central Europe cannot be called a fully ''terrorism free zone'' as activities of various terrorist groups are manifest in the region. It is true, however, that the number of realized terrorist attacks and foiled plans is clearly much lower than in Western Europe, the Middle East, or the Caucasus. Strategically, East Central Europe was from the end of the 1940s to the end of the 1980s part of the Communist bloc, which was not significantly affected by domestic political terrorism. A number of experts believe that terrorism is linked with democracy and free media which are exploited by terrorists to spread their message.[119] Sporadic instances of terrorism in the countries of the former Communist bloc show that terrorism may nevertheless appear in totalitarian and authoritarian regimes.

The post-communist situation in ECE is more comparable to Northern Europe or Northeast Asia. The most serious attack was perpetrated in Budapest in 1991, and it was an interplay of several historical determinants (Palestinian and Western extreme left terrorists had prior knowledge of the transit of Soviet Jews to Israel). During the 1990s, ECE became a place for terrorist groups to conclude trading deals, as several uncovered cases testify (it is reasonable to assume that there were other deals which were not foiled).

The threat of terrorist attacks by Islamist terrorism was relatively limited during the 1990s, as it was more advantageous for the Islamists to use East Central Europe as a ''rear area'' for the operations on the main ''fronts.'' To a certain degree, this situation probably remains to this day. Due to the ECE countries pro-U.S. and pro-Israeli politics, and also because some Islamists subjectively believed the attacks would be easier to carry out in this space, several plans of attack have appeared; hitherto, they were always uncovered and eliminated in time.

The domestic extremist spectrum in these countries exhibits various violent forms but its terrorism mostly remains on the level of propaganda. A substantial rise of extreme right violence with elements of terrorism could be observed in Hungary in 2008–2009, in connection with the country's political and economic crisis, which had its consequences for the coexistence of the majority with the Roma minority. Some other directions of domestic extremism in the countries of ECE have tended towards activities that could be labelled ''small scale'' terrorism. The accusations of support for terrorism that have been voiced in the context of the disputes between the countries of the ECE proved to be unsubstantiated.

As for the future, one can assume that the present trends will continue, i.e., that the space of East Central Europe will be used mostly for logistical operations. Isolated Islamist attacks cannot be ruled out, especially against targets linked with the USA or Jewishness. It is possible that the domestic extreme right scene will resort to terrorism as one element in the repertory of violence it uses in its inter-ethnic clashes, especially with the Roma minority. The attacked groups have been attempting to mount adequate counteractions. Other types of extremism have very limited terrorist potential, but sporadic acts cannot be ruled out (among other factors, one has to take into account the experience with some militant activities of the post-1989 era). In the medium-term, one can say that there is a high probability that East Central Europe will not become a space with a high degree of terrorist risk.

Notes

1. *United Nations Security Council Resolution S-RES-1566 (2004)*, http://www.undemocracy.com/S-RES-1566(2004).pdf

2. Anarchist terrorism in ECE was connected with the anarcho-terrorist scene in Western Europe and Northern America, and one of the factors in this connection was the significant emigration of the socially disadvantaged strata of society, susceptible to radicalism, from Central Europe. Anarchist terrorism appeared in the territory of Poland, the bulk of which was, up to the end of World War I, part of Russia. Anarchist terrorism was extremely well developed in Russia and anarchist cells also operated in the territory of today's Poland. Michal Klapek Sadowski, *Anarchizm na Ziemiach Polskich do 1918r. I Jego Zagraniczne Powiązania* [Anarchism and Polish Terrorism to the Year 1918, and Polish Foreign Relations], http://klapek.host.sk/prlictxt.htm. In Czech territory (which was up to 1918 part of the Habsburg monarchy), the anarchists have likewise considered terrorist methods, but real attacks on politicians were only carried out after the creation of independent Czechoslovakia. The most important cases include the assassination attempt on the prime minister Karel Kramář in 1919 (who survived the attempt) and the successful assassination of Alois Rašín, the minister of finance, in 1923. Both of these acts were committed by individual anarcho-communists. Miroslav Mareš, *Terorismus v ČR* [Terrorism in the Czech Republic] (Brno: Centrum strategických studií, 2005), 74–75.

3. Communist attack on 13 October 1923 in Warsaw killed several dozen people. See Agnieszka Gogolewska, *Polish War on Terror, External Roots, Internal Dynamics and Ambitions to become a Global Player*. Paper presented at the conference, "Security sector governance and the war on terror," held in Moscow, 9 April 2005 (Geneva: Geneva Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005), 3.

4. For example, terrorist activity of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in Poland. Milan Syruček, *Banderovci. Hrdinové nebo bandité* [Bandera Groups. Heroes or Bandits?] (Praha: Pražská vydavatelská společnost: Vydavatelství Epocha, 2008), 58–59.

5. For example, the Czech extreme right organization *Vlajka (Flag)* carried out a series of terrorist attacks against Jewish buildings in Czechoslovakia in early 1939. Milan Nakonečný, *Vlajka – K historii a ideologii českého nacionalismu* [Flag—On History and Ideology of Czech Nationalism] (Praha: Chvojkovo nakladatelství 2001), 92–94.

6. Václav Kural and František Vašek, *Hitlerova odložená válka za zničení ČSR* [Hitler's Postponed War for Destruction of Czechoslovakia] (Praha: Academia): 81.

7. Theoretical literature on terrorism discusses the Czech resistance's assassination of Reinhard Heydrich, carried out by Czech members of the Special Operation Executive (SOE) in 1942, and several assassinations conducted by the Polish resistance movement. Guerrilla units in East Central Europe sometimes described their activities as "terrorist acts." Walter Laqueur, *Terrorismus* (Kronberg: Athäneum Verlag, 1977), 18.

8. Paul Biddiscombe, *Werwolf – The history of National Socialist Guerilla Movement 1944–1946* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1998), 206–251.

9. Though in Czechoslovakia in 1947, for example, the communists tried to discredit their opponents by staging a series of assassinations by means of letter bombs, which they sought to blame on democratic forces (so called "Packages affair"). Mareš (see note 2 above), 118.

10. For example, the group *Black Lion 777 (Černý Lev 777)*. See Tomáš Bursík, *Osud organizace Černý lev 777* [Fate of the Organization Black Lion 777] (Praha: OABS ČR, 2007).

11. See V. Minajev, *Tajná zbraň* [Secret Weapon] (Praha: Mladá fronta, 1954), 222–232.

12. For example, the attack against a communist demonstration in Prague's Staroměstské náměstí in 1962. See Jan Frolík, "Výbuch na Staroměstském náměstí 7. listopadu 1962" [Explosion in Old Town Square in Prague on November 7, 1962] in *Sborník archivu Ministerstva vnitra* [Proceedings of the Archives of the Ministry of the Interior] 4, no. 4 (2006): 43–62. Armed Forces of Underground Poland killed policeman in 1982 in Warsaw. Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories & Literature* (Amsterdam: Transaction Books, 1988), 651.

13. For example, in 1982 a small Polish exile anti-communist group *Polish Home Army of Resistance* (*Powstańcza Armia Krajowa - PAK*) occupied the Polish Embassy in Switzerland.

Robert Rybacki, *Zajęcie polskiej ambasady w Bernie w 1982* [Attack on the Polish Embassy in Bern in 1982] (terroryzm.com, 2010), http://www.terroryzm.com/article/340/Zajecie-polskiej-ambasady-w-Bernie-w-1982.html

14. Keith Suter, "Terrorism and International Law," *Contemporary Review* 287, no. 1677 (October 2005): 217.

15. For example, the kidnapping of Czechoslovak citizens in Angola by the organization UNITA in 1983.

16. The support for Carlos's group in the attack on Radio Free Europe in Munich in 1981 can be cited as an example.

17. For example, in 1957 the Czechoslovak secret service – *State Security (Státní bezpečnost, StB)* committed a letter bomb attack against the Strasbourg prefect which killed his wife. A fictitious neo-Nazi organization, *Fighting Group for an Independent Germany (Kampfverband für unabhängiges Deutschland)* claimed responsibility for the attack in a letter. The goal of the communist secret service was to seed discord between Germany and France and thus to thwart the process of Western European integration. Mareš (see note 2 above), 119–121.

18. Possible Czechoslovak support for the Italian Red Brigades is surrounded by speculation. Information about training the organization's members in a camp in Karlovy Vary, or about the direct involvement of the Czechoslovak secret police, *Státní bezpečnost (StB)* in the kidnapping of Aldo Moro in 1978 (including his alleged hiding at the Czechoslovak embassy in Rome), remains unconfirmed. Contacts of the first generation of Brigadists with Italian communist immigrants in Prague at the beginning of the 1970s are proven, however. Renato Curcio also visited Czechoslovakia at the time. Important documents related to this topic were destroyed already during the communist era. Source: former officer of the Czech Foreign Intelligence Service.

19. Petr Zídek and Karel Sieber, *Československo a Blízký východ v letech 1948–1989* [Czechoslovakia and the Near East, 1948–1989] (Praha: Institute of International Relations, 2009), 216.

20. Nemzetbiztonsági Hivatalt, *Nemzetbiztonsági Hivatal Évkönyv 2001* [Yearbook of the National Security Office 2001] (Budapest: NHV, 2002), http://www.nbh.hu/oldpage/evk2001/terror.htm

21. Tomasz Trela, "Polska wita terrorystów" [Poland Welcomes Terrorists], iThink, 2006, http://www.ithink.pl/artykuly/swiat/konflikty/polska-wita-terrorystow/print

22. Mareš (see note 2 above), 238.

23. Mareš (see note 2 above), 272–274.

24. In Czechoslovakia, some people concluded that this scenario was the most likely explanation of the bomb attacks in Staroměstské náměstí in Prague and at the Hostivař dam in 1990, but the exact culprit(s) and their motives were never uncovered.

25. Specifically, these were the attacks on a bookshop in Kolín, Czech Republic, where authors had been signing a book about the war pilots of the Slovak state between 1939 and 1945. The background of an attack on a Slovak custom house, committed during the night of 31 December 1992, is unclear, as it could be either the work of Czech nationalists, or a provocation of Slovak nationalists, aiming to discredit the Czechs. (Mareš, see note 2 above: 212–213.) The information that a bomb was deposited at the Czech consulate in Kraków (Poland) in July 1993, supposedly claimed by *National Front of Slovakia (Národný front Slovenska,* NFS), is untrue. In fact, this was a media hoax and it was disclaimed the same day. The act was mistakenly taken for real by Terrorism Knowledge Base, *Other Group Attacked Diplomatic Target (July 2, 1993, Poland)*, http://www.tkb.org/Incident.jsp?incID=5106

26. Federální ministerstvo vnitra, *Denní situační zpráva č. 202* [Daily Situation Report No. 202]. (Praha: Archives of Security Forces, 1989), http://www.ustrcr.cz/data/pdf/svodky/dsz202-12-1989.pdf

27. Tomasz Trela (see note 21 above).

28. Česká tisková kancelář, *Společnost Malév zastavila přepravu sovětských Židů* [Malév Company Stopped Transport of Soviet Jews] (Databanka ČTK, 21. 3.1990), http://ib.ctk.czl

29. United States Department of State, *The Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1991* (Washington, DC: Author 1992), http://www.mipt.org

30. United States Department of State, *The Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1991* (Washington DC: Author, 1992), http://fas.org/irp/threat/terror_91/europe.html

31. One of the terrorists, Andrea Klump, a former member of Red Army Faction, was condemned for this act in Germany to twelve years in prison in 2004. Her act was also criticised in German circles of the militant extreme left as anti-Semitic, directed against innocent civilians who attempted to flee the prejudices, and not against the makers of the "Great Israel." "Erst abgestritten – dann Mitwissen zugegeben" [Firts rejected—then more trust] *So oder So* 14 (2004): 10.

32. Pawel Malendowicz, *Polski ruch anarchystyczny wobec wspolczesnych wyzwan politicznych* [Polish Anarchist Movement in Common Political Challenges] (Pila: Panstwowa Wyzsa Szkola Zawodowa Im. St. Staszica, 2007), 40–41.

33. Bartłomiej Kozłowski, *Zamachy Ludowego Frontu Wyzwolenia – polskiej organizacji terrorystycznej* [Attacks of the People's Liberation Front—The Polish Terrorist Organization] (Kalednarium.polska.pl. 2008), http://kalendarium.polska.pl/wydarzenia/article.htm?id=323838 (accessed on 3 Janury 2010).

34. Forum Anarchistyczne: *Ludowy Front Wyzwolenia* [People's Liberation Front] (2005), http://www.forum.ibw.com.pl/index.php?showtopic=1565 (accessed on 17 August 2007).

35. United States Department of State, *The Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1991* (Washington, DC: Author, 1992), http://fas.org/irp/threat/terror_91/europe.html (accessed on 3 January 2010).

36. Mareš (see note 2 above), 276.

37. In the 1990s, the use of explosives and assassinations of politicians, journalists, and above all of rivals from organized crime has been designated as "terrorism," both by security forces and the media. Most of the explosions in post-communist countries recorded in the database Terrorism Knowledge Base under the rubric of "unknown group" would fall into this category. It was in fact organized crime activity.

38. Tatiana Busuncian, "Terrorist Routes in South Eastern Europe," *The Quarterly Journal* 6, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 85–102.

39. Centrum Studiów i Prognoz Strategicznych, *Zagrożenie atakami terrorystycznymi w Polsce 2006 RAPORT CSiPS* [Threat of Terrorist Attacks in Poland in 2006] (Łodz: Wyższa Szkoła Studiów Międzynarodowych w Łodzi, 2005), 5. http://www.specops.com.pl/CSiPS/artykuly_CSiPS/RAPORT%20CSiPS%20Zagrozenie%20atakami%20terrorystycznymi%20w%20Polsce%202006%20WERSJA%20PDF.pdf

40. Mareš (see note 2 above), 226.

41. Richard Northon Taylor, "30 years in jail for Real IRA trio," *The Guardian*, 8 May 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2002/may/08/northernireland.richardnortontaylor

42. Centrum Studiów i Prognoz Strategicznych (see note 39 above), 23.

43. Centrum Studiów i Prognoz Strategicznych (see note 39 above), 23–24; Mareš (see note 2 above), 241.

44. Stephen Barnthart, *International Terrorism and Political Violence* (Victoria: Trafford Publishing, 2002), 184–185.

45. Věra Stojarová, *Současné bezpečnostní hrozby západního Balkánu* [Contemporary Security Threats in Western Balkan] (Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury), 108–109.

46. Miroslav Nožina, *Mezinárodní organizovaný zločin v České republice* [International Organized Crime in the Czech Republic] (Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů), 294.

47. Barnthart (see note 44 above), 184–189.

48. Source: Officer of Police Corps of the Slovak Republic (PZ SR), Interview with author, 2007.

49. Source: Officer of Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), Interview with author, 2009.

50. *Nemzetbiztonsági Hivatal Évkönyv 2002* (see note 20 above).

51. Útvar pro odhalování organizovaného zločinu SKPV PČR, *Zpráva o bezpečnostní situaci za rok 2001* [Report on Security Situation in 2001] (Praha, 2002), 36.

52. Mareš (see note 2 above), 226–227.

53. Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (London: Phoenix Press, 1999), 264.

54. Mareš (see note 2 above), 269.

55. *IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB),* http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/RadSources/PDF/itdb_31122003.pdf

56. Rafał Pleśniak, Ryszard Kamiński, Violetta Krasnowska, and Marcin Kowalski, "Szkoła zbrodni" [Weapons School], *Wprost* 24, no 39 (2001), http://www.wprost.pl/ar/?O=11165

57. Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, *Problematika organizovaného zločinu a účinného postupu proti tomuto typu trestné činnosti* [Problems of Organized Crime and Effective Countering] (Praha: Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, 1996), 25.

58. Zdeněk Macháček and Tomáš Rumpl, "Zahraniční skupiny organizovaného zločinu a jejich aktivity na našem území" [Foreign groups of organized crime and their activities on Czech territory]. In Miroslav Nožina (ed.), *Mezinárodní organizovaný zločin v ČR* [International Organized Crime in the CR] (Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, 1997), 72.

59. Mareš (see note 2 above), 257.

60. Sammy Salama and Lydia Hansell, "Does intent equal Capability? Al-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Nonproliferation Review* 12, no. 3 (November 2005), 615–653.

61. Daniel Walczak, "Terroryści kupowali w Polsce lewe dokumenty." *Dziennik.pl* (2007), http://www.dziennik.pl/Default.aspx?TabId=96&ShowArticleId=50267

62. Michaela Stanková, "Slovakia ignores court, deports Labsi to Slovakia." *The Slovak Spectacor*, 3 May 2010, http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/38726/2/slovakia_ignores_court_deports_labsi_to_algeria.html

63. Source: Officer of Police Corps of Slovak Republic, Interview with author, 2007.

64. Mareš (see note 2 above), 256.

65. Mareš (see note 2 above), 256.

66. Ibid., 260–261.

67. Evan Kohlmann, *NEFA Foundation: Oussama Kassir Expert Report and Powerpoint* (Counterterrorism Blog, 2009), http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/05/nefa_foundation_oussama_kassir.php

68. Mareš (see note 2 above), 254–255.

69. Bezpečnostní informační služba, *O plánech na únosy letadel BIS věděla a okamžitě reagovala* [BIS was informed of hijacking and reacted immediately] (Praha: BIS, 2006), http://www.bis.cz/n/2006-09-27-o-planech-na-unosy-letadel-bis-vedela-a-policie-okamzite-reagovala.html

70. Centrum Studiów i Prognoz Strategicznych (see note 39 above), 5.

71. Česká tisková kancelář, *Údajná Akční skupina al-Kajdy hrozí v Maďarsku útoky* [Alleged Al Qaeda action group threatens with attacks in Hungary] (Databanka ČTK, 8. 4. 2004), http://ib.ctk.czl

72. Centrum Studiów i Prognoz Strategicznych (see note 35 above), 5.

73. *Hungary foils attack against Israeli President*, ABC News April 13, 2004, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2004/04/13/1086669.htm

74. Bezpečnostní informační služba, *Výroční zpráva za rok 2006* [Annual Report 2006] (Prague: Author, 2007), http://www.bis.cz/n/2007-11-21-vyrocni-zprava-2006.html

75. Mareš (see note 2 above), 258.

76. *The 9/11 Commision Report*, 228–229, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf

77. Mareš (see note 2 above), 258.

78. Jan Šubert, *Raketový útok na Svobodnou Evropu nevyšel* [Missile Attack on Radio Free Europe Ended in Failure] (Praha: Bezpečnostní informační služba, 2009), http://www.bis.cz/n/2009-11-30-raketovy-utok-na-svobodnou-evropu-nevysel.htm

79. Mareš (see note 2 above), 260.

80. Ibid.

81. Brian Ross, Ronda Schwartz, and Richard Esposito, *Secret Document: U.S. Fears Terror "Spectacular" Planned*, ABC News, 1 July 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=3336148

82. TE-SAT 2008, *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report* (The Hague: Europol, 2008), 17.

83. György Lederer, "Countering Islamist Radicals in Eastern Europe," in Anne Aldis/Graeme P. Herd (eds.), *The Ideological War on Terror: Worldwide Strategies for Counter Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2007), 213–227.

84. Cas Mudde, "Central and Eastern Europe," in Cas Mudde (ed.), *Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe* (London: Routledge, 2005), 275.

85. TE-SAT 2007, *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report* (The Hague: Europol, 2007), 17.

86. Miroslav Mareš, "Länderporträt Slowakei" [Country profile—Slovakia] in Uwe Backes and Jesse Eckhard (eds.), *Jahrbuch Extremismus & Demokratie* 19 [Yearbook 19] Jahrgang (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2008), 252.

87. In 2009, the Czech police uncovered *White Justice*, a group of young neo-Nazis. According to the police, the group organized paramilitary training and planned terrorist bomb attacks on anti-Fascists and on power plants. Pavel Hanták, *Tři v jednom* [Three in One], Policie ČR; http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/articles/roma.pdf

88. Examples include an Austrian group of neo-Nazis in the Czech Republic or the German group *Skinheads Sächsische Schweiz* (SSS) in the same country.

89. Among others incidents, the office of the non-governmental organization *People Against Racism (Ludia proti rasizmu)* in Slovakia was attacked in 2004.

90. Bezpečnostní informační služba, *Výroční zpráva za rok 2006* [Annual Report 2006] (Prague: 2007), http://www.bis.cz/n/2007-11-21-vyrocni-zprava-2006.html

91. Jan Martínek, Peníze pro kamarády z Flander [Money for Friends from Flanders], *Lidové noviny,* 18 April 2007, http://www.lidovky.cz/penize-pro-kamarady-z-flander-djs-/ln_domov.asp?c=A070418_075748_ln_domov_fho

92. Robert Hodgson, "Olympian arrested in bomb plot scare," *The Budapest Times*, 4 November 2008, http://www.budapesttimes.hu/content/view/9827/27/

93. Hungary Around the Clock, *Three radical nationalists "arrows" arrested on terrorism charges*, Politics.Hu, 15 July 2009, http://www.politics.hu/20090715/three-radical-nationalists-arrows-arrested-on-terrorism-charges

94. European Roma Rights Centre, *Attacks against Roma in Hungary January 2008-June 2009* (Budapest: ERRC, 2009), http://www.errc.org/db/04/2C/m0000042C.pdf

95. At times the extreme left terrorists and militants "promote" the interests of Roma on their own without a connection to Roma structures. For example, in Germany the feminist group *Rote Zora* committed a bomb attack in 1989 against a state institution, because from their point of view this institution refused to help the Roma women of Eastern Europe. See Rote Zora, *Aktion gegen die A + B- Stelle für Roma + Sinti* [Action Against A + B Office for Roma and Sinti], Köln (November 89). Uneingeschränktes Bleiberecht für Sinti und Roma! [Unlimited Right of Abode for Sinti and Roma], in *Die Früchte des Zorns* [Fruits of Wrath] (Berlin: ID Archiv in IISG, 1992), http://www.freilassung.de/div/texte/rz/zorn/Zorn47l.htm

96. Mareš (see note 2 above), 221.

97. Jaroslaw Tomasiewicz, Euroterroryzm—perspektiwy [Euroterrorism—Perspectives], *Kommandos*, 9 (151, 2005), 31.

98. See, for example, the discussion on the pages of the Polish anarchist magazine Podaj Dalej. See Owca, Polemika s tekstem A. Kudlatej "Terroryzm i anarchia" [Dispute with the article by A. Kudlata, "Terrorism and Anarchy"] *Podaj Dalej*, No. 7 (1997): 16–17.

99. Mareš (see note 2 above), 301–302.

100. Mareš (see note 2 above), 81.

101. Most serious action was the bomb attack of the Czech ALF on the control room of the cableway in the Protected Landscape Area Moravian Karst (Moravský kras) on 20 February 1995.

102. See Miroslav Mareš, "Environmental Radicalism and Extremism in Postcommunist Europe," *Journal for the Study of Radicalism* 2, no. 1 (Spring 2008), 91–107.

103. Centrum Studiów i Prognoz Strategicznych (see note 39 above), 32.

104. Mareš (see note 2 above), 98–100.

105. An interesting case was the suicide of a former expert of the Synthesia company (which manufactured the SEMTEX explosive) who killed himself in 1997 by detonating a suitcase with explosives in a spa building in Jeseník, Czech Republic. During the 1980s, Šolle experimented with using explosives against civil airplanes. In Poland, a series of attacks was carried out by the 18-year-old Mariusz S., who enjoyed being called "Rurabomber" by the media. Andrzej Mroczek, Warszawski "Rurabomber" – psychopat czy terrorysta? *Terroryzm.com, 2005* http://www.terroryzm.com/article/303/Warszawski-Rurabomber-psychopata-czy-terrorysta.html. In 2003, Alexander Krucinin, a Russian worker and former soldier, attempted a grenade attack on the Prague subway (intended as a "revenge" on society).

Thanks to the police, his attack was thwarted; Krucinin killed one policeman using a special knife, however.

106. Mareš (see note 2 above), 125.

107. Mareš (see note 86 above), 258.

108. Oldřich Krulík, "Opatření České republiky v boji proti terorismu. Pohled zevnitř" [Measures of the Czech Republic in the War Against Terrorism: Insider's Look], in Emil Souleimanov, ed., *Terorismus. Válka proti státu* [Terrorism: War Against the State] (Praha: Eurolex Bohemia, 2006), 363–364.

109. Adrián Bobok, *Premiér SR: Existence "Mečiarova komanda" je nesmysl* [Slovak Prime Minister: The Existence of Meciar's Squad is Nonsense]. Česká tisková kancelář, 1998, http://ib.ctk.cz

110. Josef Roháč is the main suspect. He is an interesting case, as in 1985 he attempted to leave Czechoslovakia through the Iron Curtain after kidnapping a communist functionary with an accomplice. He was arrested at the border. Later, he became involved in organized crime. Ivo Pejčoch, *Útěky za železnou oponu* [Escapes from Behind the Iron Curtain] (Cheb: Svět křídel, 2009), 68.

111. Ivan Vilček, *Fico odmítl odpovědnost za útoky na Romy v Maďarsku* [Fico has refuted responsibility for the attacks on Roma in Hungary], Novinky.cz, 17. 3. 2009, http://www.novinky.cz/zahranicni/evropa/164090-fico-odmitl-odpovednost-za-utoky-na-romy-v-madarsku.html

112. *Radoslaw Sikorski about "death squads" in Belarus*. Charter 97, 2009, http://charter97.org/en/news/2009/12/10/24483/

113. Konstantin Zharinov, *Terrorizm i teroristy* [Terrorism and Terrorists] (Minsk, Charvest, 1999), 129.

114. Bomb Explosion In Belarus Injures 50. *Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty*, http://www.rferl.org/content/Bomb_Explosion_In_Belarus_Injures_Up_To_50/1181616.html

115. Pawel, Wisocki, *Mińsk: Terroryści z Polski chcą uderzyć na Białoruś,* Dziennik.pl, 2007, http://www.dziennik.pl/Default.aspx?TabId=14& ShowArticleId=50003

116. Mareš (see note 2 above), 257.

117. Ondrej Ditrych/Emil Souleimanov, Czech Reflections on the Chechen Conflict. From Morality to Mainstream? *Problems of Post-Communism*, 54, no. 3 (2007), 27.

118. Mareš (see note 2 above), 257.

119. James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz, "Democracy and Terrorism," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 4, no. 1 (March 2010): 63, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/articles/issues/PTv4i1.pdf