

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Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976–80: A Retrospective Analysis

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During the late 1970s, Turkey experienced a major campaign of political terrorism that was waged by a multiplicity of leftist, ultranationalist, and separatist groups. Between 1976 and 1980, more than 5000 people lost their lives in hundreds of terrorist incidents. The steady escalation of violence amidst a major political and economic crisis undermined the country's fragile democratic system and paved the way for a military coup in September 1980. This study examines the origins and growth of the terrorist movement in Turkey, the main characteristics of political violence, and the causes of the dramatic escalation of terrorism in the late 1970s. The study suggests that although state-sponsored terrorism against Turkey facilitated the rapid proliferation of leftist, rightist, and separatist armed extremist groups, the drift into total terrorism was largely the product of domestic political and social developments.

Keywords breakdown of democracy, causes of terrorism, ideological and separatist terror, student radicalism

During the second half of the 1970s, Turkey experienced one of the deadliest episodes of political violence and terrorism in its modern history. The country's bout with *anarsi* (anarchy)—the term that was commonly used by the authorities and the media with reference to political violence—expanded rapidly from Istanbul and Ankara to the small provincial towns in Anatolia. The failure of the state to bring the killing spree to an end eventually led to the breakdown of the country's fragile democracy through a military coup. By the time the armed forces overthrew the elected civilian government of Prime Minister Demirel on September 12, 1980 and suspended democratic politics, the spiraling terrorist violence had claimed nearly 5000 lives and also caused thousands of serious injuries between 1976 and 1980. During the latter part of the 1970s, several European countries, such as Italy and West Germany, also faced the problem of political terrorism. However, the Turkish case was far more deadly: Terrorism caused more fatalities in one week during the early months of 1980 in Turkey than it did in Italy in an entire year or in West Germany during the entire decade.[1]

What were the principal reasons for this massive wave of political terrorism? How did violence expand and intensify to become a major source of political

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instability, large-scale social dislocation, and drain on the country's economy? Why did Turkey become one of the few countries where organized terrorism led to the transfer of power from a democratically elected government to a military junta which justified the coup largely by blaming the civilian authorities for their "failure" to halt political violence? What has been the legacy of the "anarchy" for Turkey's continued problems with political violence and terrorism since then?

The purpose of this article is to address these questions and provide an analysis of the origins, development, and causes of political violence and terrorism in Turkey during the late 1970s. It argues that while the campaign of state-sponsored terrorism against Turkey contributed to the escalation of violence, domestic political and social factors were primarily responsible for the rapid growth of the leftist, rightist, and ethnic separatist terrorist organizations between 1976 and 1980. After examining the origins of political terrorism which emerged from the 1968 student protest movement on the campuses, the article analyzes the main characteristics and the principal causes of the country's drift into total terrorism a decade later. It suggests that several developments, including the espousal of revolutionary ideologies and strategies by disaffected leftist students and intellectuals, the emergence of factionalism and divisions within the leftist movement, the protection and support provided to the rightist terrorist groups by a political party that was represented in the parliament, and the failure of the centrist political forces to take a united stand against terrorism were primarily responsible for one of the deadliest episodes of political violence in the world during the 1970s.

The Origins of Political Terrorism

The massive terrorist wave that hit Turkey between 1976 and 1980 had its origins in the campus radicalism of the late 1960s.[2] At a time when student protests against the Vietnam War swept the American and European campuses, Turkish universities also witnessed a sharp rise in student political activism.[3] Led by young leftist activists, students organized strikes and sit-ins in 1968 initially to protest the problems of the higher education system. However, student activism soon escalated into street demonstrations against the center-right Justice Party (JP) government, the Vietnam War, and Turkey's close political and military ties with the United States. Within a few months after the beginning of the strikes and sit-ins, the student protest movement witnessed the rise of clashes and fights between the leftist "revolutionaries" (*devrimciler*) and far-right ultranationalists who were commonly referred to as the "idealists" (*ulkuculer*). The 1968 student protest movement in the U.S. and Europe was mostly peaceful, although it did involve violent clashes between the students and the police in several instances. In Turkey, however, campus political activism took a far more deadly turn with the introduction of guns, automatic weapons, and explosives as the militants on each side of the ideological extremes sought to establish and control their own turf on and near the campuses. In the escalating armed clashes between the ideologically rival groups, several student militants from both sides lost their lives.[4]

Between 1968 and 1970, campus violence in Istanbul and Ankara steadily increased along with the rising number of murdered or seriously injured students. Surprisingly, university administrations failed to take effective measures against the ideologically motivated student militants who regularly interrupted classes, threatened those faculty members who they perceived to be hostile to their views,

and used the dormitories as safe houses and places of recruitment of new members into their groups. Towards the end of 1970, some of the prominent radical leftist students in the Federation of the Revolutionary Youth of Turkey, known as DEV-GENC, decided to escalate the level of violence and embark on the path of political terrorism.[5]

In retrospect, several factors appear to have contributed to this critical decision.[6] First, when Turkey's first legal Marxist political organization, the Turkish Labor Party (TLP), began to compete in the parliamentary elections, many young leftists expected that workers, peasants, and the urban poor would lend their political support to the TLP in large numbers. However, the TLP received only 3.0 percent of the total national vote in 1965, which came largely from the middle and upper class neighborhoods of the major cities. Four years later, the TLP's votes declined to 2.7 percent. The TLP's meager popular support convinced the leftist radical student leaders to abandon their hope for social and economic transformation through the ballot box and parliamentary politics. Instead, they were increasingly drawn to the strategy of using terrorism to create the conditions for a major regime crisis which, they hoped, would facilitate the replacement of Turkey's "bourgeois democracy" with a socialist regime. More specifically, they expected that political instability resulting from terrorism would provoke a military coup by the "progressive" army officers who, once in power, would implement radical economic and social changes. In this respect, their model was the Baathist takeovers of the governments in neighboring Iraq and Syria during the 1960s. To pursue their goal, the Turkish "revolutionaries" established contacts with a number of like-minded military officers.[7] Second, the tactics and strategies used by radical groups around the world strongly influenced Turkey's leftist radicals who were impressed by the actions of the Latin American urban guerrilla groups such as the Tupamoros in Uruguay. More importantly, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) provided them with the know-how about the use of explosives and weapons. Beginning in 1970, scores of left-wing militants from Turkey went to the PLO's camps in Syria and Jordan where they received training in the manufacture of bombs as well as in the use of small arms.[8] Third, factional divisions and rivalries among the leftist groups became an important reason for the escalation of political violence. Factionalism in DEV-GENC led to the formation of two organizations, Turkish People's Liberation Army (THKO) and Turkish People's Liberation Army-Front (THKO-C). Later, there were also further splits from these two groups. Each new factional conflict pushed the militants toward greater activism in their efforts to receive more media attention than the other groups. For example, the decision of the THKO-C to kidnap the Israeli Consul General in Istanbul was largely due to the group's concern that THKO had begun to receive greater media publicity because of its actions.[9]

During 1971–72, Turkey witnessed a series of terrorist incidents which included bank robberies, bombings, and political kidnappings. The more sensational of these actions were the political kidnapping of American servicemen guarding the U.S. Embassy in Ankara (they were found unharmed after a few days in captivity), the hostage taking of several Canadian and British citizens serving at a NATO base (they were killed, along with all but one of their captors, when the security forces stormed the farm house where they were kept), and the political kidnapping of the Israeli Consul General in Istanbul by THKO-C (he was murdered after being held and tortured in a terrorist safe house for nearly a month).[10] The efforts of the leftist terrorist groups to disseminate revolutionary ideas in the countryside failed when

they were either killed or captured after the peasants informed the security forces about their whereabouts.[11] The activities of Turkey's self-styled urban and rural guerrillas came to an end in 1972, nearly a year after the military intervention in politics in March 1971. Following the declaration of martial law, the armed forces had little difficulty in suppressing terrorism. Most members of THKO and THKO-C were either killed in clashes with the soldiers or they were arrested and put on trial. A number of them managed to escape from Turkey to the Middle East and Europe.

Turkey's encounter with terrorism during 1971–72 had several important consequences for the political violence that took place in the latter part of the decade. First, THKO and THKO-C established a tradition, legacy, and organizational network for political terrorism. Once terrorism became part of the Turkish political landscape, it displayed a remarkable capacity for survival. Second, the state's inconsistent policy responses to terrorism proved to be important in its reemergence later. The policies of the Turkish authorities concerning the punishment of the captured leftist militants vacillated between extremely harsh measures followed by unwarranted leniency. For example, three captured leaders of the urban guerrilla movement were given the capital punishment and summarily hanged.[12] The capital sentence which they received from a military court was vastly disproportionate to their crimes. Moreover, their deaths failed to have the deterrent effect which it was supposed to create. Instead, capital punishment only served to create "heroes" and "martyrs" of such prominent radicals as Deniz Gezmis for future generations of leftist militants. Only two years after the three THKO leaders were punished with the death penalty, the government declared a general political amnesty in 1974. This enabled some of the convicted armed extremists—along with many who had been imprisoned simply because of their sympathy for leftist causes during the army's crackdown on terrorism—to get out of jail and participate in the founding of new terrorist groups after 1975. Third, the military intervention of 1971, which came in the wake of the political kidnapping incidents, showed that terrorism could play a role in destabilizing Turkey's fragile democracy. Although the army's decision to intervene resulted from a factional dispute among the top military commanders, the activities of the THKO and THKO-C contributed to the breakdown of democracy by heightening political tensions, undermining the military's corporate unity, and exposing the weakness of the civilian authorities to suppress terrorist incidents.[13]

The Drift Into Total Terrorism

After the military interregnum in politics (1971–73), Turkey enjoyed a brief respite from political violence. However, beginning in late 1974, the country was once again hit by another, and far more deadly, wave of political terrorism. While the terrorist incidents during 1971–72 had led to 60 deaths, 5042 people lost their lives from political violence between 1976 and 1980.[14] The armed extremism of 1970–72 was largely the work of two leftist groups whose ranks included no more than several dozen young militants. The "anarchy" of the late 1970s, on the other hand, involved a staggeringly large number of terrorist organizations which commanded the loyalties of thousands of militants.

As had been the case in 1968, ideological battles between leftist and rightist students on the university campuses in Ankara and Istanbul set the stage for the reemergence of political terrorism. The start of the 1974–75 academic year in October witnessed the rise of violence on or near the university campuses.[15] Fist fights and

brawls between members of the rival ideological groups soon turned into armed clashes where knives and guns were used. These bloody confrontations resulted in the deaths of 37 students in 1975. The pace of ideologically motivated incidents rose rapidly in 1976, leading to a three-fold increase in the number of politically related killings. As the death toll over turf battles among the student militants mounted, the scope of violence expanded, first from the universities to the larger urban environment of the metropolitan areas in Istanbul and Ankara, and then to other cities and small towns in many parts of the country.[16] The rapid escalation of political violence during the 1976–80 period was reflected in the dramatic rise in the number of people who lost their lives in terrorist incidents: 108 in 1976, 319 in 1997, 1,095 in 1978, 1,362 in 1979, and 1,928 during the first nine months in 1980.[17] In addition to fatalities, hundreds of people were seriously injured and there was extensive property damage. The escalation of political violence and fatalities was accompanied by the proliferation of terrorist organizations along with a vast increase of militants who took part in their activities. Even by very conservative estimates, more than 10,000 young men and women joined the ranks of the leftist, rightist, and Kurdish separatist terrorist organizations.[18]

By far, the largest number of terrorists belonged to various left-wing groups.[19] According to the data published by the Turkish authorities, they were responsible for 33 percent of the terrorist incidents during the height of political violence between December 1978 and September 1980.[20] The scope of leftist militancy was also reflected in the number of suspected terrorists who were arrested after the military coup in 1980. 21,864 of these individuals, or 73 percent of the total, were members of the leftist organizations. The suspected ultranationalist and Kurdish separatist terrorists numbered 5,953 and 2,034, or 20 percent and 7 percent of the total, respectively.[21] In addition to its size and propensity for violence, the leftist terrorist movement displayed a remarkable tendency for factionalism. New clandestine groups, each carrying different acronyms and slogans, proliferated throughout the late 1970s. The initial broad division between the pro-Soviet and Maoist factions later came to include the followers of Albania's Enver Hoxha and "independent" Marxists as well. The existence of nearly 35 different leftist terrorist groups, some of which displayed as much hostility to their fellow revolutionaries as they did to far-right militants, was an important characteristic of leftist terrorism in Turkey during the late 1970s.

Most of the Marxist underground organizations that emerged on the terrorist scene after 1975 claimed to be the descendants of either THKO or THKO-C. In particular, THKO-C and its leader Mahir Cayan, who was shot by the security forces in a standoff in March 1972, were the main sources of motivation for some of the newly-formed leftist terrorist organizations.[22] The linkages between the first and the second waves of revolutionary extremism were not only confined to ideology and strategy. Some members of THKO and THKO-C, who were arrested following the 1971 military intervention, played a pivotal role in the restructuring of the leftist terrorist organizations after their release from prison through a general amnesty in 1974. Among the nearly three dozen leftist groups which were active in the late 1970s, the major ones were the Revolutionary Way (DEV-YOL), the Revolutionary Left (DEV-SOL), the Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Union (MLSPB), and the Turkish Worker Peasant Liberation Army (TIKKO).[23]

The earlier wave of organized terrorism in Turkey during 1971–72 was confined to the activities of the leftist urban guerrilla groups. When political violence

reemerged a few years later, ultranationalist and ethnic separatist terrorist organizations joined in the fray. The radical nationalist terrorists were fewer in number than their leftist counterparts but no less deadly. Many right-wing militants were implicated in numerous terrorist incidents during the period from 1976 to 1980.[24] The principal far-right terrorist groups were the Idealist Clubs Association (*Ulku Ocaklari Dernegi*), the Idealist Path Organization (*Ulku Yolu Birligi*), and the Idealist Youth Organization (*Ulku Genc Dernegi*). Collectively, the "idealists" were also known as the Grey Wolves (*bozkurtlar*). As noted earlier, right-wing student militants had been active during the campus violence of the late 1960s. An important characteristic of the right-wing armed extremist organizations was their close ties with a political party which competed in the elections and gained seats in the parliament. Under the leadership of the veteran ultranationalist former military officer Alpaslan Turkes, the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) had organized training camps for the far-right student militants when armed clashes began on the university grounds in 1968.[25] These camps were closed down by the military in 1971. Nevertheless, the NAP continued to have close organizational ties with the "idealists" and provided them with logistical support during the late 1970s. The NAP's ideological orientation and strategies bore a striking resemblance to the neo-fascist parties which emerged in several European democracies in the post-World War II era.[26] It won 3.4 percent and 6.4 percent of the votes in the 1973 and 1977 parliamentary elections, respectively. More importantly, the NAP served as the junior partner of the "Nationalist Front" governments composed of center-right and far-right parties from 1975 to 1978 when it controlled several ministries, including the ministry responsible for overseeing the activities of the intelligence services.

In addition to the leftist and rightist terrorist groups, Kurdish ethnic separatist organizations also became part of the "anarchy" in Turkey. Kurdish student militants had participated in the activities of the leftist groups during the campus violence of the late 1960s. The leadership ranks of DEV-GENC, as well as those of THKO and THKO-C, included several radical Kurdish students.[27] However, during the second wave of terrorism, most Kurdish radicals chose to join groups whose ideology gave primacy to Kurdish nationalism over class warfare. While the majority of the terrorist incidents during the 1976–80 period were carried out by the leftist and rightist groups, Kurdish armed extremists also contributed to the spiraling of political violence, particularly during 1979–80. The most active among the ethnic separatist terrorist organizations was the Kurdish Worker's Party (*Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan*, or PKK) which was responsible for the escalation of violence in the predominantly Kurdish regions in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey.[28] The PKK's main targets were the security forces and those Kurdish notables or tribal leaders who opposed radical Kurdish nationalism and supported the Turkish state. Intra-Kurdish tribal conflicts and family feuds also contributed to the escalation of political violence since some of the influential Kurdish notables enlisted the aid of the young Kurdish militants to defend themselves against their rivals. From 1978 to 1980, the PKK's violence claimed the lives of 354 people, most of whom were ethnic Kurds.[29]

Armed clashes between the leftist and rightist groups accounted for the greatest number of terrorist incidents between 1976 and 1980.[30] The attacks and counter-attacks between the revolutionary left and the ultranationalist right followed a predictable pattern of escalation: The murder of a leftist terrorist—who was immediately declared a "martyr" by his comrades and given a political funeral—triggered

the revenge killing of a right-wing terrorist. This, in turn, prompted the rightists to respond in a similar fashion: A political funeral for their "martyr" was followed by the assassination of a leftist militant. The great majority of the victims of left-right violence were members of one of the numerous terrorist groups, individuals with known far-left or far-right affiliations, and innocent bystanders who were caught in the crossfire between rival groups. Some of the armed attacks against prominent public figures also followed a predictable sequence of the vengeance killings: The assassination of a journalist working for a right-wing newspaper would lead to the murder of a professor suspected of sympathizing with leftist political causes. This intense left-right ideological political violence, whose origins rested in the earlier days of student radicalism, meant, in effect, that leftist and rightist terrorism literally fed off each other. The dialectical process of mutual escalation was the most distinguishing characteristic of the "anarchy" in Turkey. It also proved to be difficult to contain since the number of the "martyrs" on each side grew at an accelerated pace, thereby perpetuating the vicious cycles of violence.

Communal violence based on sectarian divisions between Turkey's majority Sunni Muslims and the minority Alevi Muslims accounted for the second largest number of fatalities. The eruption of violence between the Sunnis and the Alevis resulted from the calculated provocations by the armed extremist groups which sought to create political and social instability through terrorist acts. Their strategies of destabilization proved to be highly effective since a number of cities in Central Anatolia with mixed Sunni and Alevi populations such as Kahramanmaras, Sivas, Corum, and Yozgat witnessed large-scale violence.[31] Bloody conflicts between the country's majority and minority Muslim communities led to dramatic rises in the number of fatalities, serious injuries, and property damage. The most deadly of these incidents took place in the southeastern city of Kahramanmaras in December 1978. The violence was sparked-off by a bomb explosion in a movie theatre during the showing of an "anti-communist" film. It was alleged that the explosive was thrown by a leftist militant. The following day two leftist high school teachers were found murdered. During the next three days, the town's Sunni and Alevi communities, aided by the rightist and leftist militants, respectively, launched attacks against each other. By the time the army moved in to restore order, 109 people, the majority of whom were from the Alevi community, were killed and more than 170 were seriously wounded.[32] In Kahramanmaras and elsewhere, the leftist terrorist groups sided with the Alevis while the ultranationalists were on the side of the Sunnis. The strategy of the terrorist groups on both ideological extremes was similar: After igniting religious sectarian hostilities, they sought to position themselves as the "protectors" of the embattled communities to gain political support and manpower for their organizations.

Turkey's drift into spiraling political violence after 1976 claimed the lives of numerous prominent politicians, journalists, professors, mayors, magistrates, and trade union leaders. Abdi Ipekci, the respected editor of *Milliyet*, a leading Istanbul daily, was gunned down in his car in February 1979. His assassin was Mehmet Ali Agca, an ultranationalist terrorist who later attempted to kill Pope John Paul II in Rome. Another prominent victim of political terrorism was Nihat Erim. A long-time politician, Erim had served as Prime Minister following the 1971 military intervention. He was assassinated near his home in Istanbul by members of the leftist terrorist group DEV-SOL in July 1980. DEV-SOL was also responsible for the murder of Gun Sazak in May of the same year. Sazak was the deputy chairman of the NAP, and the most prominent rightist politician after the party's leader,

Turkes. Ultranationalist terrorists retaliated to Sazak's murder by assassinating Kemal Turkler, a former leader of the leftist trade union organization DISK. Other prominent victims of terrorist incidents included parliamentary deputies, local party officials, university professors, journalists, and writers. A number of civil servants, judges, and public prosecutors were also murdered by the terrorists. However, the violence against the representatives of the state was primarily directed at the security forces. Attacks against the officers and policemen increased sharply during 1979–80. While the Kurdish separatists mounted a campaign against army officers and gendarmerie, leftist terrorist groups launched frequent attacks on the police stations in Turkey's major cities with explosives and automatic weapons. In 1979, left-wing terrorists also began a systematic campaign of assassinations directed at those security officials whom they held responsible for the deaths of their "heroes" and "martyrs" who were involved in the terrorism of the early 1970s. The victims of Turkey's spiraling terrorist violence also included several U.S. military personnel and civilians who were assassinated by leftist terrorist groups.

Violence that took place within the terrorist organizations was also responsible for many deaths.[33] Intra-group violence had two main sources. First, factions within the same ideological bloc clashed with one another. Factional attacks and killings were especially widespread among the left-wing groups. The fragmentation of the Marxist-Leninist movement gave rise to bitter hostilities and rivalries which stemmed partly from ideological differences and conflicting international sympathies. More importantly, violence among them resulted from the struggle for the leadership of the leftist militancy. The second source of intra-organizational violence concerned the use of physical force by the leaders of the terrorist groups on their followers to enforce discipline, authority, and solidarity. Internal terror through physical violence was practiced widely within the terrorist groups of all ideological shades. In several cases, the terrorists who were initially reported to have been killed by ideologically rival groups or by the security forces later turned out to be the victims of execution style murders at the hands of their comrades.

The Causes of Terrorism

What were the primary causes of political terrorism and violence in Turkey? Why did terrorism reach such major proportions in the late 1970s? These questions have been the source of much debate, controversy, and discussion. Both the practitioners and the analysts of Turkish politics have offered various, and often conflicting, explanations. There were intensive debates and discussions about the causes of terrorism, especially during the height of the violence between 1978 and 1980. However, the commentaries on terrorism generally failed to shed much light on the reasons for its emergence and growth. The journalistic coverage tended to be highly sensational. It focused more on the gory aspects of violence than in-depth analysis. Furthermore, the reporting of terrorist incidents often followed partisan and ideological lines. While the right-wing newspapers held the leftist terrorist groups responsible for many incidents, the left-wing publications placed most of the blame on the rightist armed extremists.

The views of the political party elites concerning the causes of terrorism in Turkey similarly reflected their ideological and partisan outlook. The problem of terrorism and violence became a major issue in party politics during the late 1970s. However, the parliamentary and electoral debates between the political

parties often degenerated into polemical exchanges and accusations without shedding much light on the sources of rapidly increasing terrorist incidents.[34] The two major parties on the center-left and center-right, the Republican People's Party (RPP) and the Justice Party (JP), respectively, which alternated in power through coalition or minority governments between 1973 and 1980, offered different reasons for Turkey's prolonged drift into terrorist violence. For the center-right JP, the main causes of organized terrorism were political and ideological: political terrorism was precipitated by Marxist-Leninist groups which sought to dismantle Turkish democracy and replace it with a socialist regime. The JP's spokesmen frequently alluded to the indoctrination of the university students in radical leftist ideologies as the principal reason for their involvement in political violence.[35] The center-left RPP saw the causes of terrorism in Turkey quite differently. According to the RPP, the failure of the successive Turkish governments to remedy the country's social and economic problems had sown the seeds of rebellious extremism among the youth. Student political violence, in turn, was used by the "neo-Fascists," working in tandem with the NAP, to embark on a strategy of violence to replace democracy with authoritarian rule. Terrorism then grew rapidly as right-wing violence was met by leftist counter violence.[36]

Following the 1980 coup, the military regime which ruled Turkey for the next three years gave extensive publicity to the reasons for the "anarchy" since the officers justified their intervention in politics primarily as a last-ditch effort to end political terrorism and restore law and order. Explicit in much of the rhetoric, and underlying the measures adopted by the military junta, was a particular theory concerning the causes of terrorism in Turkey.[37] Briefly, it held that organized terrorism flourished as a result of one major and several secondary reasons. For the five-man governing National Security Council, led by General Kenan Evren, the principal cause of Turkey's terrorism problem was an international conspiracy.[38] Terrorist groups of different and even rival ideological persuasion had received extensive training, logistical, and financial support from "certain neighboring states," a euphemism used with reference primarily to the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Syria. According to the Turkish military, terrorists were trained in neighboring Arab countries and Bulgaria under the overall aegis of the Soviets. In addition to the leftist and rightist groups, Kurdish and Armenian terrorists were also trained and supported by the patrons of this massive state-sponsored terrorism. Turkish and foreign narcotics traffickers, who directed the flow of arms into Turkey from Bulgaria and Syria in exchange for drugs, were believed to have played a key role in the expansion of terrorist networks. This conspiratorial interpretation of terrorism, which was also shared by a number of foreign observers, centered on the argument that Turkey had become a target of a state-sponsored terrorist campaign by the Soviet Union which wanted to destabilize the country to a point where its viability as an ally would be questioned by NATO and the United States. In addition to state-sponsored terrorism, the military also identified several secondary causes of political violence. These included the "irresponsible behavior" of the political parties for their failure to take a common stand against all terrorist activities, the permeation of partisan and ideological interests into the state machinery and the police force, and the dissemination of extremist views and ideologies in the universities.

The proposition that political terrorism in Turkey was essentially the outcome of an international plot in which the Soviet Union played a central role received considerable support in Turkey and abroad.[39] Basing their arguments on the testimonies

of the captured militants, the discovery of large stocks of weaponry in terrorist hideouts following the 1980 coup, and estimates of the financial support received by terrorist organizations, the proponents of this view have tended to emphasize the international links of Turkey's terrorist groups. Available evidence suggests that organized terrorism in Turkey did receive support from external sources. In particular, the training provided by Syria and the PLO to members of various terrorist groups in Turkey has been well documented. They reveal that ideology played no role in the training offered by the PLO and the Syrian secret services. Right-wing terrorists, such as Agca, were trained in camps in Syria and Lebanon along with the leftist and Kurdish militants.[40] There is also considerable evidence regarding the smuggling of weapons from Bulgaria into Turkey in exchange for drugs. The Turkish end of narco-terrorism included several prominent figures from Turkey's underground world who had close ties with the ultranationalist terrorist groups.[41] However, despite the emphasis given by the Turkish military and various observers about the central role of the Soviet Union in state-sponsored terrorism against Turkey, the Turkish authorities did not provide any concrete proof pointing to Moscow's involvement beyond indirect and circumstantial evidence.

The social scientific analyses of political violence and terrorism in Turkey have tended to emphasize social, economic, and political factors rather than international conspiracies. Implicit in most of these interpretations is the assumption that political terrorism and violence were the products of rapid but uneven social changes which Turkey witnessed after 1950. More specifically, the massive influx of people from the rural areas into the cities was identified as a primary source of violence. According to Mardin, for example, the eruption of armed clashes between ideologically rival students in 1968 was basically due to the cultural dislocations experienced by the university youth.[42] Student extremists who took up arms were the products of a clash between traditional rural social behavior and modern extremist ideologies. The former provided them with a cultural world view which emphasized the role of the epic hero, group solidarity, and violent resolution of social conflicts. As the salience of Kemalism, the Republic's founding ideology, declined as an "identity anchoring mechanism" for the educated youth, it was replaced by the extremist ideologies of the radical left and far-right. The combination of rural cultural values with radical thinking and action proved to be a potent formula for political violence. Mardin's interpretation was largely supported by Harris who argued that "by far the largest cause of violence ... has been more sociological than political in the form of traditional feuds imported from the countryside to the city and only subsequently garbed in ideological trappings."[43]

Other observers have similarly emphasized the impact of large-scale migration to the cities as a major reason for the growth of terrorist movements.[44] Their explanation focused more specifically on the rapid growth of the population of Turkey's major cities, especially Istanbul and Ankara. The massive migration from the countryside led to the establishment of the *gecekondu* (squatter site) settlements around the metropolitan centers where the urban poor lived. According to this view, rapid urbanization and the growth of the *gecekondu* districts surrounding Istanbul, Ankara, and other major Turkish cities facilitated the escalation of political violence for two main reasons. First, the rapidly increasing populations of the cities offered the terrorists anonymity, hiding places and safehouses, and choice of targets. Second, the *gecekondu* districts became the principal sources for the recruitment of young extremists into the leftist, rightist, and separatist terrorist organizations.

While some observers have argued that the urban poor living in the *gecekondu* districts were drawn into cycles of political violence as a reaction to perceived social and economic inequalities, others have emphasized the role of cultural dislocation, the loss of traditional authority relations in families, and the radicalization of the second and third generations of *gecekondu* youth by the leaders of terrorist groups.[45]

Crenshaw's seminal study on the causes of terrorism in which she distinguished between the long-term, or preconditions of terrorism, from its more immediate causes, or precipitants, offers a useful approach to explaining the causes of Turkey's experience with political violence.[46] Rapid social change may be viewed as a precondition which contributed to the creation of a favorable setting for the rise of political terrorism. However, the birth of leftist terrorist organizations in the early 1970s and the massive political violence of 1976–80 were more directly influenced by a number of specific factors that acted as the precipitants of armed extremism. First, among these was the espousal of revolutionary ideologies and strategies by disaffected leftist intellectuals, journalists, writers, and students.[47] The dissemination of radical Marxist theories of social transformation not only led to the polarization of political life but it also socialized an entire generation of student activists into channels of political action against the state. The disaffected intellectuals, who viewed Turkish democracy as a sham, who toyed around with notions of "extraparliamentary opposition," and who offered glowing accounts of the national liberation struggles in Third World countries, had a powerful influence on the leftist student militants. Combined with youthful idealism, which made them especially sensitive to Turkey's economic and social problems, the revolutionary theories of radical political action provided the young militants with ample justification to use violence.

A second major precipitant of political terrorism stemmed from the divisions within the leftist movement. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 created deep splits in the Marxist TLP. The party's domination of the leftist student activists faced a strong challenge from the newly-emerging Maoist groups on the university campuses. More importantly, the TLP's parliamentary representation was almost eliminated following the 1969 elections. Despite its worsening electoral fortunes, the TLP maintained its commitment to building socialism in Turkey through the democratic processes. The TLP's stand infuriated the young militants. Many felt betrayed by its "moderation" and its determination to continue participating in the politics of a "bourgeois democracy." Their search for an alternative to the TLP was seized upon by some of the former members of the underground Turkish Communist Party (TKP). Led by the veteran communist Mihri Belli, this group of the so-called "old rifles," who had been outflanked by the TLP's leadership in the early 1960s, wanted to establish a new political base for themselves.[48] They found it among the TLP's disaffected young militant cadres. Belli's "National Democratic Revolution" (NDR) movement emphasized the need for student militancy independent of the existing leftist parties. Belli's credentials as a veteran communist, his emphasis on building a coalition composed of leftist students, intelligentsia, and military officers, and his calls for militancy appealed to the student activists. In their eyes, the NDR was an antidote for TLP's defense of legalism and parliamentary politics. The formation of DEV-GENC in 1969 represented a major step away from the TLP and toward radical political action. Belli was instrumental in this development and became "the spiritual father of DEV-GENC."[49] The separation of the militant leftist students from the TLP played a critical role in the rise of organized terrorism.

The emergence of the right-wing extremist groups, first during the radicalization of the university campuses in the late 1960s, and later when total terrorism engulfed Turkish society, was the third important precipitant of political violence. The tendency of the Grey Wolves belonging to the "idealists" organizations to use arms in their battles with the "revolutionaries" claimed the lives of several students between 1968 and 1971. The protection and support that was extended to them by the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) during that period was a significant factor in the development of their organizational strength. With the reemergence of terrorism in 1975, the ultranationalist militants began to use the tactics which were established earlier. However, this time the ranks of various "idealists" organizations included many more young terrorists than in 1968–70. As noted earlier, the efforts of the right-wing and radical leftist terrorist groups to provoke communal conflicts between the Alevis and Sunnis played a major role in the rising number of victims from terrorism during the height of the "anarchy." Equally important was the fact that a political party which was represented in the parliament and which also controlled several ministries in the coalition governments continued to have close organizational ties with the right-wing terrorist groups during the late 1970s.[50] The indictment against the NAP that was prepared by the military prosecutors after the 1980 coup provided considerable evidence about the funds and weapons that were passed on to the ultranationalist terrorists by the NAP.[51]

The failures and problems of Turkey's political system were the fourth major precipitant of political violence and terrorism. For most of the 1970s, and especially towards the end of the decade, Turkey displayed the familiar signs of a country whose political system was ridden with crises: increasing ideological polarization in party politics, short-lived coalition and minority governments amidst frequent lapses into parliamentary deadlock and policy immobilism, growing militancy of anti-democratic forces at both extremes of the ideological spectrum, and a severe economic crisis which led to major shortages of petroleum, electricity, and staple consumer goods.[52] The behavior of the party elites did little to ease the political and economic crises since the leaders of the two major parties, the center-left RPP's Ecevit and the center-right JP's Demirel, chose to pursue conflictive rather than accommodative strategies in party competition. Despite the fact that terrorism and violence posed a major threat to the survival of democracy, the centrist parties failed to close ranks and take a unified stand against the armed extremists.[53] Instead, Turkey's two major parties chose to respond to violence in a partisan way: The JP adopted a more lenient posture toward rightist terrorism than it did toward the leftists while the RPP put more blame on the right-wing extremists than it did on the leftist terrorism. As one political weekly succinctly put it, "According to Ecevit, the danger to Turkey's regime was fascism, Demirel believed it was communism."[54]

Studies by Powell, Linz, Valenzuela, and others have emphasized the importance of the reactions to political violence by party leaders in undermining the strategies of the extremist forces.[55] The Turkish case provides strong evidence in support of their arguments. By failing to close ranks against the specter of terrorism, the centrist parties in Turkey contributed to the escalation of violence in several ways. First, they prevented the formulation of specific legislation concerning various anti-terrorist measures which were urgently needed. Second, the acrimonious polemics between the two major parties and their efforts to blame each other for failing to stop terrorism contributed to the creation of a highly polarized political environment. Extremist groups capitalized on growing political polarization in parliamentary and electoral

politics to provoke ideological, sectarian, and ethnic conflicts. Third, weak governments and divided elites led to a general institutional breakdown. The work of most state institutions and agencies was seriously undermined as a result of the ideological divisions within their ranks. The most telling examples concerned the problems of the police force and the judiciary—two state agencies which were critically important for fighting terrorism. After 1975, the Turkish police force was severely crippled by the emergence of political and ideological conflicts within its ranks. These internal conflicts, culminating in the establishment of rival leftist and rightist police officers' unions called Pol-Der and Pol-Bir, caused enormous authority and discipline problems. They also made it difficult for the police to carry out normal law enforcement functions, let alone operations requiring quality intelligence and investigative work. The division of the police force into ideologically hostile camps seriously undermined its ability to prevent terrorist incidents. The judiciary was also beset by left-right divisions. Judges reportedly gave lenient sentences to the captured terrorists for whom they felt an ideological affinity and passed out heavy sentences to the militants of rival political affiliations. Many trials lingered on for months without reaching a verdict since the judges were intimidated by the possibility of reprisals from the terrorists.

Conclusions

By the summer of 1980, the activities of the numerous leftist, rightist, and separatist terrorist groups had severely undermined law and order throughout Turkey. As the media continued to report the mounting toll of daily fatalities and gave graphic accounts of the victims of the terrorist incidents, there was a partial collapse of the state's authority in various parts of the country. Capitalizing on the rising religious-sectarian and ethnic tensions they had helped to ignite, the armed extremists sought to establish themselves as the "protectors" of rival communities, and proceeded to impose their own rules and demands on the citizens. Press reports indicated that several Anatolian towns such as Corum, Yozgat, Elazig, Kars, and Fatsa had fallen under the virtual control of terrorist organizations. Similar processes appeared to be under way even in Istanbul and Ankara where terrorist groups established their own "liberated zones" in the *gecekondu* areas.

The massive campaign of political terrorism which hit Turkey in the late 1970s played a major role in the collapse of the country's fragile democratic system through a military coup on September 12, 1980. By provoking an authoritarian response, Turkey's terrorists achieved one of their important political objectives, namely, the dismantling of democracy and the creation of a militarized environment. However, the expectations of the leftist and rightist terrorist groups that the replacement of democracy with authoritarian rule would help their ideological objectives turned out only to be a costly fantasy. Once in power, the military used draconian measures to bring an end to political violence. Thousands of leftist, rightist, and Kurdish separatist armed extremists were rounded up in a massive crackdown on their organizations. By mid-1981, more than 20,000 suspected terrorists were in jail awaiting trial while several thousands of others had escaped to various European and Middle Eastern countries. The military's anti-terrorism campaign, which involved serious human rights violations, proved to be highly effective in controlling political violence. Within a year after the coup, terrorist incidents had declined by about 90 percent.

In retrospect, Turkey's encounter with terrorism during the 1970s is instructive in several respects. First, under favorable political, economic, and social conditions, terrorist violence can cause large-scale instability and disorder. In the Turkish case, the political and economic crises which the country experienced between 1976 and 1980 contributed to the success of the destabilization strategies of the terrorists. Second, how political parties respond to terrorism plays a critical role in controlling the escalation of political violence. The tendency of Turkey's two major centrist parties to use terrorist incidents to score political points against one another, their inclination to treat some of the terrorist groups more leniently than others, and their unwillingness to close ranks against political violence facilitated the escalation of violence. Third, political terrorism and violence can play a major role in the breakdown of fragile or unconsolidated democracies, especially those with a history of military interventions in politics. However, the strategy of violence to undermine regime stability can be costly to the terrorists since they are likely to face a strong response from the military regime that they help come to power. This is amply demonstrated by the fact that Turkey's two waves of political terrorism during the 1970s both ended with a crackdown on terrorist organizations and led to the deaths or arrests of most of their members. Fourth, the Turkish experience has shown that separatist terrorism tends to have greater staying power than that of the extreme left and the right. Following the 1980 military coup, far-right terrorism ceased to be a problem in Turkey. Leftist terrorism was substantially reduced although one group, the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C), which is the latest mutation of the two former leftist terrorist organizations, the THKO-C of 1971–73 and DEV-SOL of 1976–80, has remained active in Turkey and Europe. Its terrorist activities have claimed the lives of more than 50 people since the late 1980s, including two U.S. citizens.[56]

However, separatist terrorism has continued to pose a serious problem in Turkey during the past three decades. In this respect, the PKK represents the principal organizational continuity with the political violence and terrorism of the late 1970s. Although scores of PKK militants were arrested following the 1980 military coup, the group's leader, Abdullah Ocalan, together with a few of his top aides, evaded capture by escaping to Syria before the military takeover. Between 1980 and 1984, the PKK managed to recruit new militants and expand its organizational network in Turkey, in neighboring Syria, Iraq, and Iran, and in the Kurdish migrant worker diaspora in Western Europe. Beginning with its first major attack against a small military post in southeastern Turkey in August 1984, the PKK has grown from a small band of several dozen people into an organization that commands the loyalty of several thousand militants who are based in Turkey as well as in the camps and hideouts in northern Iraq. The main characteristics of the PKK include a fetish for violence, an authoritarian organizational structure in which single-minded obedience to Ocalan is enforced through ideological indoctrination, strong-armed tactics, a personality cult, and espousal of an ideology which combines crude Marxism with radical Kurdish nationalism. Along with the indiscriminate murder of civilians, the PKK has also used violence against selected targets including government-paid village guards and their families, school teachers (for teaching loyalty to the state), and dissenters from Ocalan's views in the PKK. At the same time, the PKK has also waged a guerrilla warfare campaign against the Turkish armed forces mostly in the mountainous terrain near Turkey's borders with Iraq and Iran. Turkey's bout with separatist terrorism has exacted a huge toll in terms of fatalities: Between 1984 and

2008, 32,000 PKK militants, 6481 members of the security forces, and 5660 civilians lost their lives in terrorist incidents and in the counterterrorism operations launched by the Turkish authorities.[57]

Separatist terrorism in the world has generally tended to display more staying power than leftist and rightist political violence since it usually finds more popular support than the terrorism of the ideological extremes. The Turkish case is not an exception to this trend. Despite the fact that its fetish for violence has been anathema for the vast majority of the public in Turkey, the PKK has managed to gain considerable popular support from the country's Kurdish citizens by establishing itself as the main representative of radical Kurdish nationalism. The PKK has also benefited from the active sponsorship which it has received from outside Turkey. In this respect, the PKK's Syrian connection has proved to be especially important for its survival. For nearly two decades, the Syrian government, in an effort to pressure Turkey over its claims for territory and water, provided the PKK with logistical and financial help.[58] Until he was forced out of Syria under threat of Turkish military action in 1998, Ocalan lived in Damascus where he enjoyed the protection of the Syrian authorities. Moreover, at various times, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Greece, and the Greek Cypriot administration have provided the PKK with assistance ranging from sanctuary and training facilities to financial aid and diplomatic support. The PKK's financial resources have made a significant contribution to its staying power as well. Since the early 1980s, the PKK has collected large sums of money through trafficking drugs from the Middle East to Europe. Additionally, the Kurdish migrant workers from Turkey in Germany and other European countries have contributed to the PKK's coffers in significant amounts either voluntarily or through extortion. The group has used its rich financial resources to establish and operate numerous camps near or in Turkey, purchase sophisticated and expensive weapons, acquire various media outlets, including a television station that currently airs its programs to Turkey from Denmark, and donate money to the families of some of its young militants.

Notes

1. Sabri Sayari and Bruce Hoffman, "Urbanisation and Insurgency: The Turkish Case, 1976–1980," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 5, no. 2 (Autumn 1994), 162.

2. For an overview of Turkey's experience with terrorism since the early 1970s, see Andrew Mango, *Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years We Fought Alone* (London: Routledge, 2005). See also C. H. Dodd, "The Containment of Terrorism: Violence in Turkish Politics," in Noel D. Sullivan, ed., *Terrorism, Ideology, and Revolution* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986), 132–149, and Nur Bilge Criss,"Mercenaries of Ideology: Turkey's Terrorism War," in Barry Rubin, ed., *Terrorism and Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 123–150.

3. For an analysis of the 1968 student movement in Turkey, see Joseph Szyliowicz, *A Political Analysis of Student Activism: The Turkish Case* (London: Sage Publications, 1972). For the recollections and reflections of the student activists about the 1968 events four decades later, see Nadire Mater, *Sokak Güzeldir: 68'de Ne Oldu*? [The Street is Beautiful: What Happened in '68?] (Istanbul: Metis, 2009). The 1968 student protest movement in Turkey and its radicalization has been the topic of a growing number of autobiographical accounts by its participants. See, e.g., Harun Karadeniz, *Olayli Yillar ve Genclik* [Eventful Years and the Youth] (Istanbul, May Yayinlari, 1975), Cuneyt Akalin, *Dusler ve Gercekler: Taniklariyla Dunya'da ve Turkiye'de 68* [Dreams and Realities: Witnesses to 1968 in the World and Turkey] (Istanbul: Sarmal: 1995), Yuksel Bastunc, *Su 68 Kusagi* [That 68 Generation] (Istanbul: Yilmaz, 1992), Alev Er, *Bir Uzun Yuruyustu '68* [68 Was a Long Walk] (Istanbul: AFA, 1988), and Oral Calislar, *'68 Anilarim* [My Recollections of '68] (Istanbul: Gendas, 2003).

4. See Metin Toker, *Sağda ve Solda Vuruşanlar* [Fighters on the left and right] (Ankara: Akis Yayinlari, 1971) for a journalistic account of the student militant groups during the late 1960s.

5. See *Dev-Genc Dosyasi* [The Dev-Genc File] (Ankara: Tore-Devlet Yayinlari, 1973).

6. For a perceptive analysis, see Ahmet Samim, "The Tragedy of the Turkish Left," *New Left Review* 126 (March–April 1981), 60–71. See also Jacob M. Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), 29–43, and John Hinde McFadden, *Regime Sanction and Political Instability: An Analysis of Turkish Violence* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The George Washington University, 1986), 206–251.

7. On the ties between the leftist terrorists and military officers, see, e.g., Mater (see note 3 above), 56–57, 132–134, and 278–279. One of the principal activists among the officers was Air Force Lieutenant Saffet Alp who joined the THKP-C and was killed along with 10 other its in a shoot-out with the security forces. Air Force Captain Orhan Savasci, the brother-in-law of the THKP-C's leader, Mahir Cayan, was also a member of the group.

8. See Robert W. Olson, "Al-Fatah in Turkey: Its Influence on the March 12 Coup," *Middle Eastern Studies* 9, no. 2 (March 1973), 197–206. For a personal account, see Cengiz Candar, "A Turk in Palestinian Resistance," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 1 (Autumn 2000), 68–82.

9. The Turkish case confirms Crenshaw's observation that "acts of terrorism may be motivated by the imperative of organizational survival or requirements of competition with rival groups." Martha Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism," *Orbis* 29, no. 3 (Fall 1985), 473.

10. For a detailed analysis of these incidents, see Margaret Krahenbuhl, *Political Kidnappings in Turkey*, *1971–1972* (Santa Monica, RAND, July 1977). The government's report also contains information about the activities of the two main leftist terrorist groups. See *Beyaz Kitap: Türkiye Gercekleri ve Terörizm* [The White Book: Turkey's Realities and Terrorism] (Ankara, 1973).

11. The young radicals had expected support from the peasants for their cause. However, this turned out to be a costly fantasy. The traditional respect for (and fear of) the authorities led the peasants to inform the security forces about the activities of the militant students who had come to a rural area in the Malatya province from Ankara.

12. 25 members of the THKO were tried in a military court in Ankara in 1971. 18 of them received the death penalty but the military appeals court approved only those of Deniz Gezmis, Huseyin Inan, and Yusuf Aslan. Their death sentences were also approved by the Turkish parliament as required by the constitution. The three THKO leaders were put to death in May 1972 by hanging which was the way capital punishment in Turkey was carried out until its abolishment in 2002.

13. On the 1971 military intervention, see William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (London: Routledge, 1994), 153–214.

14. For the number of fatalities during 1970–72, see *Hurriyet* (Istanbul daily), September 11, 1981. For the number of deaths from terrorist incidents during the late 1970s, see *Terror ve Teror'le Mucadele Durum Degerlendirmesi* [Terrorism and Assessment of the Situation in the Fight Against Terrorism] (Ankara: Basbakanlik Basimevi, 1983), 121.

15. "Olaylar: Ve Olumler Basladi," [Events: And Deaths Began] *Yanki* (Ankara bi-weekly) (December 30, 1974–January 5, 1975), and "Gencler Vurusuyor" [The Young People Are Fighting], *Yanki* (Feb. 3–9, 1975).

16. The escalation of political violence received extensive press coverage. See, e.g., "Kanli Kavga: Tedhis Savas Alani Universite" [Bloody Feuds: Terrorism at the Universities] *Yanki* (Dec. 20–26, 1976), "Anarsi: Soygunlar, Baskinlar, Operasyonlar" [Anarchy: Robberies, Raids, and Operations], *Yanki* (Aug. 29–Sept. 4, 1977), "Anarsi: Tirmanma Suruyor" [Anarchy: The Escalation Continues], *Yanki* (Aug. 22–28, 1977), "A big increase in political violence," *Financial Times: Survey on Turkey* (Nov. 13, 1978), and "When will the guns fall silent?" *Briefing* (Ankara bi-weekly), (Sept. 8, 1980).

17. Rusen Keles and Artun Unsal, *Kent ve Siyasal Siddet* [The City and Political Violence] (Ankara: SBF Basimevi, 1982), 35.

18. According to an official government report published in English, 43,140 individuals suspected of involvement in terrorist activities were arrested following the 1980 military coup. Of these, 13,749 were convicted and received sentences ranging from 1 year to more than

20 years imprisonment. 47 of those convicted received the death sentence. *Anarchy and Terrorism in Turkey* (Ankara: Basari Matbaacilik, n.d.), 72–73.

19. For information about the various leftist groups based on translations from the Turkish press, see *Translations on Western Europe No. 1433*: *Factions of the Turkish Left* (Springfield, VA: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 14 June, 1979), and Ihsan Bal and Sedat Laciner, "The Challenge of Revolutionary Terrorism to Turkish Democracy 1960–80," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 4 (2001), 90–115. The public prosecutor's case in the trials of various leftist terrorist groups after the 1980 coup include detailed descriptions of many incidents that were committed by the leftist militants. See, e.g., "Dev-Yol Iddianamesi" [Indictment against Dev-Yol] *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul daily) (Nov. 27–Oct. 8, 1982).

20. *Teror ve Terorle Mucadelede Durum Degerlendirmesi* (see note 14 above), 113.

21. Ibid., 131.

22. Samim (see note 6 above), 62–63.

23. See *Translations on Western Europe No. 1433: Factions of the Turkish Left*. For extensive information about the various leftist groups and their activities, see also Emin Demirel, *Teror* (Istanbul: ALFA, 1999), 215–592.

24. The terrorist actions of the "idealists" were detailed in the public prosecutor's case against the Nationalist Action Party after the 1980 coup. See *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul daily), Aug. 21–25, 1981. For the English summary and translation, see *West Europe Report No. 1771 Turkey: Proceedings Against the National Action Party* (Springfield, VA: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 26 June 1981).

25. In an interview with the journalist Cuneyt Arcayurek in 1969, the NAP's leader Turkes admitted that his party had helped organize "five or six youth centers where they received training in martial arts and learned about the tactics and goals of the communists." *Hurriyet* (January 10, 1969).

26. On the NAP's origins and development, see Jacob M. Landau, *Radical Politics in Turkey*, and Landau, "The Nationalist Action Party in Turkey," *Journal of Contemporary History* 17 (1982), 587–606.

27. Mater (see note 3 above), 31–39 and 105–113.

28. On the origins and growth of the PKK, see Mango (see note 2 above), 31–57.

29. Ibid., 34.

30. Marvine Howe, "A Day in Political Life of Turkey: Shootings and Reprisals by Left and Right," *New York Times* (Dec. 30, 1979).

31. On the Alevi-Sunni clashes triggered by the leftist and rightist terrorists, see, e.g., "The Corum tragedy . . . more polarization less compromise," *Briefing* (July 14, 1980).

32. Mango (see note 2 above), 18. The English language Ankara daily, *Turkish Daily News* headlined the incident as "Mini Civil War in Kahramanmaras." *Turkish Daily News*, December 25, 1978.

33. See, e.g., Demirel (note 23 above), 295–297.

34. Marvine Howe, "Turks' War on Terrorism is Bogged Down in Politics," *New York Times* (July 30, 1980).

35. For the JP's outlook on the causes of political violence, see, e.g., the statement by one of the party's leading members and former foreign minister Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, "Caglayangil: Uluslararasi Gerila Savasinin Ikinci Merhalesindeyiz" [We are in the Second Phase of an International Guerrilla Warfare], *Milliyet* (Istanbul daily) (October 10, 1978).

36. On the views of the CHP's leader Bulent Ecevit about the causes of terrorism, see "Siyasi Bunalim" [Political Crisis] in Bulent Ecevit, *Turkiye 1965–1975* (Ankara, n.d.), 175–193, and "Ecevit: Rejimde Anlaşamazsak Kargasaliktan Kurtulamayiz" [Ecevit: If We Can't Agree on the (Nature of) Political Regime, We Can't Get out of the Mayhem] *Milliyet* (October 9, 1978).

37. The military's explanations about the causes of terrorism were presented in several reports that were published after the 1980 coup. See, e.g., *12 September in Turkey: Before and After* (Ankara: General Secretariat of the National Security Council, July 1982), *Turkiye' deki Anarsi ve Terorun Gelismesi, Sonuclari ve Guvenlik Kuvvetleri ile Onlenmesi* [The Development of Anarchy and Terrorism in Turkey and Its Prevention by the Security Forces] (Ankara, n.d.), and *Turkiye'de Anarsi ve Terorun Sebepleri ve Hedefleri* [The Causes and Goals of Anarchy and Terrorism in Turkey] (Ankara: 1985).

38. For a summary of Gen. Evren's views on this topic, see *Yanki* (Sept. 21, 1981).

39. Paul B. Henze was the strongest proponent of the view that the Soviet Union was behind the terrorist campaign in Turkey. See Paul B. Henze, *Goal: Destabilization, Soviet Agitational Propaganda, Instability, and Terrorism in NATO South* (Marina del Ray, CA: European American Institute for Security Research, 1981), and Henze, *The Plot to Kill the Pope* (New York: Scribners, 1983). For a similar explanation, see Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), 228–246. For the Turkish press reports about the training of the militants by the PLO, see "FKO: Turk Tedhiscilerini Egitiyor" [The PLO is Training Turkish Terrorists], *Yanki* (August 17–23, 1981), and "Filistin Kamplarinda Turkler" [Turks in the Palestinian Camps] *Yanki* (July 12–18, 1982).

40. Mango (see note 2 above), 19–20.

41. See "Document 8: DEA Report on Bulgarian Involvement in Drug Trafficking" in U. Ra'anan et al., eds., *Hydra of Carnage* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985), 470–475, and *Turkiye'deki Anarsi ve Terorun Gelismesi, Sonuclari ve Guvenlik Kuvvetleri ile Onlenmesi*, 77–88.

42. Serif Mardin, "Youth and Violence in Turkey," *Archives Europeennes de Sociologie* 19 (1978), 229–254.

43. George S. Harris, "The Left in Turkey," *Problems of Communism* 29 (July-August 1980), 26–37.

44. Sayari and Hoffman (see note 1 above), and Keles and Unsal (see note 17 above).

45. For example, Karpat has argued that no other factor "contributed as much to social and political change, and indirectly, to political unrest in Turkey as the agglomeration of rural migrant settlements around the major cities of Turkey." Kemal Karpat, "Turkish Democracy at Impasse: Ideology, Party Politics, and the Third Military Intervention," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 2 (Summer–Spring 1981), 18.

46. Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics* 13, no. 4 (July 1981), 379–399.

47. See David Barchard, "The Intellectual Background to Radical Protest in Turkey in the 1960s," in William Hale, ed., *Aspects of Modern Turkey* (London: Bowker, 1976), 21–38.

48. Samim (see above note 6), 70–71. See also Igor Lipovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Turkey* (Leiden: Brill, 1992). For Belli's own account, see Mihri Belli, *Milli Demokratik Devrim* [National Democratic Revolution] (Ankara: Sark, 1970).

49. Samim (see above note 6), 71.

50. On the support provided by political parties to terrorist organizations, see Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur, *Political Parties and Terrorist Groups* (London: Routledge, 2003), 37–60.

51. See *West Europe Report No. 1771 Turkey: Proceedings Against the National Action Party*.

52. Ilkay Sunar and Sabri Sayari, "Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects," in Guillarmo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 165–186.

53. See Marvine Howe, "Turks' War on Terrorism is Bogged Down in Politics," *New York Times* (July 30, 1980), and "Little Hope for National Reconciliation," *Briefing* (July 28, 1980).

54. "Cagriya Cagriyla Cevap" [Response as Answer to Call] *Yanki* (Dec. 15–21, 1975), 7.

55. G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 154–174, Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibrium* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 56–58, and Arturo Valenzuela, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press: 1978), 68–70.

56. Mango (see note 2 above), 25.

57. Figures cited by the Chief of General Staff Basbug in his press conference on September 16, 2008. *Radikal* (Istanbul daily), Sept. 17, 2008.

58. The Syrian government has refused to recognize the annexation of Alexandrietta—Turkey's present province of Hatay—by Turkey in 1938 following a plebiscite when France decided to abandon its control of the region. The water dispute concerns the issue of sharing the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq.