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### Islamophobia in America?: September 11 and Islamophobic Hate Crime

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# Islamophobia in America?: September 11 and Islamophobic Hate Crime<sup>1</sup>

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*This article examines the sharp rise in hate crime directed at Muslims or those perceived to be Muslim following the September 11 attacks on the United States. The intense phase of these attacks comprised approximately nine weeks, after which the number of hate crimes fell sharply. The article attributes the abrupt fall in hate crime to four variables: 1) Leadership in the form of effective intervention by the U.S. President; 2) Decisive law enforcement intervention on the federal and local levels; 3) Grassroots outreach to Muslims by religious, civic and educational groups; and much more tentatively; 4) Moral ambiguity in the rapid dissolution of American consensus over the War on Terror following the invasion of Iraq. To illustrate these points, the paper compares the current situation to the treatment of Japanese Americans following Pearl Harbor and to the Red Scare of the 1950s. The impact of technology, especially the internet and the rise of al-Jazeera as alternative sources of information to the government or the major American media outlets, is examined as indirectly contributing to the rapid decline of hate crimes after the initial nine-week period. Finally, hate crime statistics from the FBI and the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee from the years 2000–2002 are examined to document the numbers and types of violent hate crimes directed at American Muslims and those perceived to be Muslim.*

## Introduction

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, there was a stunned silence in America. Within hours however, responsibility had been fixed on an unnamed Islamist group that was eventually tentatively identified as Al Qaeda. Few Americans knew the name of the group, and only a few more knew who Osama bin Laden might be. Predictably as these things go, the nation went from shock to rage without giving much pause for reflection. Such was the state of the American psyche that the question which was on everyone's lips was: "Why do they hate us?"<sup>2</sup> A few voices tried to answer thoughtfully, but the president saw the issue in theological terms as a struggle pitting absolute good against irredeemable evil and responded for the great majority with the comforting bromide: "Because they hate our freedom."<sup>3</sup> Put in this way, it was not a great jump to say that those who would hate us for our freedom must be hateful indeed, and if such is the case, that the knowledge that "they" might live among us was for many a cause for considerable alarm. For a few, this sense of dread served as a motivation

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for an unprecedented wave of anti-Islamic hate crime directed at targets of convenience in American cities: Muslims men, women wearing some form of hijab or traditional dress,<sup>4</sup> and the American Sikh community who because of their attire were mistaken by many for Muslims.<sup>5</sup>

This article will examine the spate of hate crime<sup>6</sup> which followed September 11 through both FBI statistics and through the statistics provided by the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), a public service group serving the American Islamic community. The article, however, will suggest that there are important changes taking place in U.S. culture which will illuminate the reasons why the surge in hate crime directed at Muslims in America was sharp, but brief. In so doing, the article will suggest a four-point model to attempt to explain how the wave of post-September 11 hate crime directed at those perceived by the perpetrators to be Muslims was diffused:

- Leadership in the form of effective intervention by the U.S. President
- Decisive law enforcement intervention on the federal and local levels
- Grassroots outreach to Muslims by religious, civic and educational groups

The article will also offer more tentatively a fourth factor:

- Moral ambiguity in the rapid dissolution of American consensus after the invasion of Iraq

By contrast to the first three elements of the model, it is as yet too early to offer the fragmenting of American consensus as more than a suggestion.<sup>7</sup> A definitive answer will have to await future research.

The first section of the article will offer some historical context through an examination of the treatment of Japanese Americans and resident Japanese nationals in the US during World War II<sup>8</sup> and the moral panic that took place in the so-called “McCarthy” period of the 1950s. Section II will offer a preliminary discussion of the structural changes in the U.S., and indeed, in the world, which might explain some of the reasons for the differences between these historical cases and the situation faced by American Muslims after September 11. The third section will focus on the hate crime statistics themselves, illustrating the surprising fact that the ADC and the FBI numbers are remarkably similar. Finally, the conclusion will argue that the wave of hate crime was successfully countered by a combination of presidential leadership, forceful federal law enforcement intervention, and a genuine grassroots outreach by religious, educational, and civic organizations throughout the country which had the unforeseen effect of making Muslims, America’s least visible minority, a major player in American public life for the first time. The conclusion will also suggest a possible fourth reason for the rapid curtailment of anti-Muslim hate crime: the fragmenting of national consensus over Operation Enduring Freedom (the U.S. invasion of Iraq). The model could well serve as an example in European nations (the Netherlands comes much to mind) who have been facing an upsurge in Islamophobic violence since the 1980s.<sup>9</sup>

## **I. Context: The Japanese Internment and the Red Scare**

Prior to September 11, the last time that the United States suffered a significant attack from a foreign source was on December 7, 1941—the day which is fixed in the American memory by President Franklin D. Roosevelt as “a date which will live

in infamy.”<sup>10</sup> On that day, the Japanese Imperial Air Force attacked and destroyed the American naval base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. Only two months later, on February 19, 1942, in another act that would live in infamy, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 which mandated the internment of America’s Japanese citizens and legal residents.<sup>11</sup>

Executive Order 9066 provided the authority for the detention of approximately 120,000 people. Roughly seventy-five percent of these were Japanese Americans. The rest were Japanese citizens, as well as a smaller number of German, Italian, and other nationals of Axis countries. They were relocated to ten camps in seven states.<sup>12</sup> Of this 120,000, only about 2,000 were ever charged with a crime, and these were confined separately in a camp in Montana.<sup>13</sup>

There were of course economic dimensions to the policy—especially from agricultural and fishing interests in the American West,<sup>14</sup> and there were voices raised at the time to protest the relocation.<sup>15</sup> But such was the state of confusion and fear at the time that these voices were few and far between.

The internment of Japanese Americans was little studied until recent years.<sup>16</sup> Much of the recent literature surrounding the event has emerged in the form of memoirs, with histories tending to focus on a particular camp or a particular group of internees. This memoir literature in fact forms the basis of much of what we know of the instances of “hate crime” against Japanese (or those perceived as Japanese) in the wake of Pearl Harbor.<sup>17</sup>

Hate crime as a distinct category of crime statistics is in fact a quite recent development. Congress mandated that hate crime statistics should be collected on a national basis only in 1990,<sup>18</sup> while the FBI’s national collection of statistics dates back only to 1995.<sup>19</sup> Of course, violence against racial, ethnic, sexual, or political minorities is of ancient vintage in America. Lynching is not new, nor are other forms of violence and intimidation against the perceived “other.” But the conception of these forms of violence as a distinct category of criminal intent—a category worthy of being sanctioned by enhanced sentencing guidelines—emerged from the consciousness of the 1960s and the increasing prominence of civil rights and ethnic interest organizations in that period of American history.<sup>20</sup>

Moreover, violence against Asian Americans is not a new phenomenon. In the nineteenth century, violence against Asian Americans in the American West—in particular in areas where large numbers of Asian railway workers came in contact with white communities—was so common that it no longer warranted note in the newspapers.<sup>21</sup> But after Pearl Harbor, no wave of violence against Asian Americans took place. The reasons for this lack of violence are impossible to posit with absolute certainty, but it would seem that Americans did not take to the streets in anger as some did after September 11 simply because they perceived no need to do so. The government, led by President Roosevelt, took a proactive stance reassuring Americans that it was in control, and with the declaration of Executive Order 9066 only a few months later, Americans were reassured that any potential Japanese “fifth columnists” were safely in custody and they could get on with the business of fighting the war on *foreign* rather than domestic shores. The strikingly racist stereotypes by which the Japanese were portrayed in U.S. government propaganda made even strident rhetorical attacks on Japanese by individual Americans superfluous.<sup>22</sup>

The importance of the public perception of resolute governmental action against internal enemies is brought home again by the case of the McCarthy years of the 1950s. Unlike the attacks on Pearl Harbor or the attacks of September 11, the

anti-communist hysteria of the period was amorphous; there was no particular racial or ethnic group to fear. Rather, the enemy could be anybody, and in such a situation, the enemy could be *everybody*. The facelessness of the enemy could have inhibited mob action or the eventuality of hate crime. But clearly, there was something deeper that served to keep any particular person or group from being singled out: the perception that the government was firmly in control of the situation.

There is no question that the government was proactive in projecting the image of being able and *willing* (a key difference) to protect the public from the communist menace. Thus, a few high profile names from the ranks of government, academe and popular culture, as well as several organizations, were named as “communists” or “fellow travelers.”<sup>23</sup> More radical organizations such as the John Birch Society,<sup>24</sup> dissatisfied with the federal government’s efforts to unmask and punish the enemy within, attempted at the grassroots level to conduct unofficial “investigations” and to take action against those they suspected of subversion. These actions could involve local unpleasantness, could result in lost jobs or lost social status, but rarely eventuated in violence.

Why that should have been the case is again speculative, but the very pervasiveness of the anti-communist mobilization of the period would have mitigated against individual vigilante action that could have resulted in hate crimes as we presently understand the term. Once again, popular culture may provide the best window into the time. A popular radio program, “This is Your FBI,” serves as a case in point. The program broadcast seventy-three episodes between 1945 and 1953. The program was endorsed by J. Edgar Hoover, and could be said to have been very much the product of Hoover’s genius at utilizing popular media to create a mystique around the FBI. Several of the programs dealt with various aspects of internal subversion, and these portrayed the FBI as being on the front lines in defending the nation from the threatening tide of communism. But at the same time, the stentorian voice of the omnipresent narrator would drive home the ideas that the Bureau played no favorites and had no political agenda, but of utmost importance, listeners were warned to take no action and to undertake no investigations on their own. Rather, suspicious activity should be reported to the FBI (whose phone number listeners were told could be found on the first page of their local directories). Once reported, listeners were assured that the Bureau could be relied upon to handle the problem.<sup>25</sup>

## II. A Brave New World of News and Views?

The use of the Internet as a tool for recruiting, for mutual support, and for secure communication among radical movements in the U.S. and Western Europe dates back to 1995. The radical right, for example, discovered the technology at this time and the facility of younger adherents to adapt to computer technology revolutionized the way the movement had traditionally conducted its recruiting and disseminated its propaganda.<sup>26</sup> By 1998, the alarm had been sounded in anti-racist circles, and what followed was a flood of academic and anti-racist activist studies which warned of the dangers of the Web as a vehicle for racist activism. The jury is still out on how accurate these rather dire prognostications would come to be. The number of hate “groups” (more often one person with a computer than a “group” in the traditional sense of the term) active on the Internet has grown markedly as the technology has become more widely available, especially in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, the Internet has proven to be a useful tool in targeting individuals and in mobilizing actions.<sup>28</sup>

What was unforeseen in any of these writings however, was how profound an impact the new communications technology would have in shaping how events are perceived by the world as a whole. A key front in the current War on Terrorism is the “virtual battlefield” of Islamist websites which popularize, mythologize, and recruit adherents for the battle in Iraq, and for the wider battle against Western (read “American/Israeli”) hegemony.<sup>29</sup> More, the global network of bloggers (individuals keeping Web logs) has proven remarkably adept at finding “secret and suppressed” information and bringing it to the attention of mainstream media outlets, who then pass the information—correct or incorrect as the case may be—to the outside world.<sup>30</sup>

Clearly, much has changed in the ways governments can manage news stories, and even more has changed in the world of terrorism and political violence. These changes must be taken into account if the sudden rise and fall of post-September 11 hate crime in the United States is to be fully understood. Recall that in World War II, the consensus on the basic rightness of the war, and the justness of the American cause, never broke down.<sup>31</sup> Indeed, the unity of purpose of the “good war” is recalled nostalgically to this day, and in an effort to mythologize the war in Iraq, no less than two national network news anchors used the term “the new greatest generation” to describe soldiers in Iraq on the same day.<sup>32</sup> That same consensus held through the Cold War years of the 1950s, with the great majority of Americans convinced that Soviet communism abroad, and communist subversion within, were existential threats to the very survival of the nation.<sup>33</sup> The Vietnam War bitterly divided the nation, and its echoes haunted the 2004 presidential campaign nearly forty years after the fact, but as long as American boots were on Vietnamese soil, the majority of Americans supported the war.<sup>34</sup> By contrast, the consensus over the War in Iraq lasted less than a year.<sup>35</sup> The resultant moral ambiguity over the American cause in the War on Terror may have contributed to the very limited duration of the wave of hate crimes that followed the September 11 attacks.

That this consensus lasted as long as it did might be posited to the media mobilization that took place after September 11, when there appears to have been a conscious moratorium on reporting news that did not fit with the American self-perception of victimization and its sense of righteous indignation. There was from the beginning a conscious decision in the mainstream media—born as much of the bitter experience of Vietnam as of the post-9/11 surge of patriotism—not to show suffering other than that of the Americans themselves. This self-censorship was reflected in the words of a memo from the CNN head of Standards and Practices, Walter Isaacson:

We’re entering a period in which there’s a lot more reporting and video from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan . . . You want to make sure people understand that when they see civilian suffering there, it’s in the context of a terrorist attack that caused enormous suffering in the United States.<sup>36</sup>

From there, it was but a short step again to not showing civilian casualties at all, to “embedding” reporters in Iraq with U.S. combat units which all but guaranteed that only one side of the war would get through to American viewers, and to the rather understandable reticence of reporters to leave the relative safety of the Green Zone to go out and look more deeply at the realities of Iraqi society under American occupation.<sup>37</sup>

In theory, controlling the story should have shaped the reality of the war for Americans. In terms of broadcast media, CNN had global reach, the European media had limited access to the events, and the fledgling al-Jazeera network was then small, monolingual, and truth be told, rather more centered on reporting what its Arabic-speaking audience wanted to hear than on news as a Western audience understands, or perhaps more appropriately, understood, the term to mean.<sup>38</sup> However, broadcast media has followed, and amplified, information unearthed and publicized via the new technology, which has made the story impossible for any state to manage.<sup>39</sup> Several recent examples demonstrate the deleterious impact of new communications technology on domestic consensus.

Every year, the U.S. State Department issues a report detailing human rights abuses around the world.<sup>40</sup> In normal times, the report is publicized in newspapers and on televised news broadcasts, and much tongue clucking over the shortcomings of other governments follows in the public airways—at least for a news cycle. In 2005, however, the pattern changed. In that year, the annual human rights report was delivered at the almost precise moment that revelations about the U.S. program of “renditions” was “revealed” in the *New York Times*.<sup>41</sup>

The *Times*’ revelations were, however, nothing new. The U.S. government made no secret of its policy of delivering suspects taken from various countries in the course of the American global War on Terror to their country of origin for interrogation. That “interrogation” in their own countries routinely involved torture, however, was resolutely denied by the Department of Defense, while at the same time the State Department was documenting the patterns of torture and abuse by those very states. Parenthetically, similar abuse of human rights at the U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay, and at other “off the books” prisons in Afghanistan and elsewhere around the world, is not noted in the report, and the U.S. neglected to criticize itself for these same abuses.

Hypocrisy, it might be argued, has long been the mother’s milk of American policy, but there was something deeper to be said for this public relations fiasco. First, that the U.S. was in effect operating a “torture taxi service” was hardly a secret. The European media had been writing about the program for months, and in several countries—Sweden and Canada for example—there were full-blown national controversies over the complicity of local governments in handing over prisoners to the Americans.<sup>42</sup> As a result, allied governments have begun to resist U.S. demands for passengers for its taxi service.<sup>43</sup>

The European press had been alerted, not through the usual process of government leaks or investigative journalism, but through the ideas bouncing in cyberspace between hobbyists, political junkies, and conspiracy theorists. It seems that in this netherworld of secret and suppressed knowledge, several intrepid plane spotters had noted the odd comings and goings of an unmarked aircraft which seemed to land at odd hours of the night and take off again almost immediately. It was such a curiosity that the sightings became something of a plane spotter sport—rather like bird watchers eager for a glimpse of a rare migratory fowl. Conspiracy theorists soon discovered the news, and took it up with gusto through the cross-fertilization of the bloggers’ art. Politics watchers discovered it, from whence it seems to have filtered to the mainstream European press. The rest, as they say, is history, leaving a deeply embarrassed State Department to hold to its list of human rights abusers—a list that included such popular “torture taxi” ports of call as Egypt and Uzbekistan<sup>44</sup>—while pressing the somewhat historically dubious point that the U.S. has always been a champion of human rights around the world.<sup>45</sup>

For world opinion, this seems to have all been another example of American hypocrisy. Indeed, in a telling reflection of the deterioration of American standing, Amnesty International's annual report named the United States, by virtue of its standing in the world and the deeds undertaken in its name in the War on Terror, as one of the primary human rights abusers in the world.<sup>46</sup> Less easily documented is the domestic effect of these revelations in a country already deeply divided over the War in Iraq, and puzzled by the War on Terror's (which the U.S. government has sought with some success to link in the public mind). But the polling data noted above suggests that if neither this individual example nor those to be discussed below is decisive in the process of fragmenting U.S. consensus on the War on Terror/the War in Iraq, the cumulative effect of negative reports on U.S. actions around the world has been extremely damaging to the national consensus that prevailed in the aftermath of September 11.<sup>47</sup>

Perhaps the most telling evidence of change is the failure of government-sponsored propaganda initiatives designed to provide the War on Terror with manufactured heroes through the creation of "instant hagiographies." The most visible of these failures were the cases of Jennifer Lynch and Pat Tillman.<sup>48</sup>

Pfc. Jennifer Lynch, a National Guard soldier captured during the initial phase of the Iraq invasion, was an unlikely hero, but a made-for-television media icon. Young, pretty, and from a rural West Virginia background, Lynch seemed a central casting character with whom everyday Americans could identify. Her capture was portrayed in heroic terms, reminiscent of something of a cross between the propaganda films of the Second World War and Rambo I; she was portrayed as being the last soldier standing after her tank unit had become separated and overwhelmed by the Iraqi army. A weapon in each hand, she held the enemy off valiantly until she ran out of bullets and then—in a wonderfully Hollywood touch—she lost consciousness and thus could not remember if anything untoward happened to her after her capture.

What followed *was* a made-for-TV movie. American Special Forces troops under the cover of night swooped down on the hospital and with bullets flying dramatically entered the facility and brought the gallant and grateful prisoner out on a stretcher to waiting choppers. All of this was captured in stark night vision film footage, and suitable dialog was attributed to the prisoner and to her rescuers. Replayed endlessly on CNN and the networks, it was the ultimate reality show. But it wasn't real.<sup>49</sup>

When finally allowed to give interviews,<sup>50</sup> Private Lynch informed the waiting nation that she was embarrassed by the coverage, that the story better fit a male—and frankly, a far less photogenic—soldier in her unit than it did her, that she passed out before the battle even began and remembered nothing of it, and that the Iraqi doctor treating her had actually tried to drive her to U.S. lines, but had turned back when his car was targeted by jumpy American soldiers at a checkpoint. The doctor finally got through to the Americans by phone and the rescue was on. However, the only flying bullets were those of the Americans themselves. The Iraqis had long since abandoned the hospital to the doctor and a group of nurses. The fiasco is recounted in her book, *I Am a Soldier, Too: The Jessica Lynch Story*, which shipped with an advance order of half a million copies.<sup>51</sup> The basic facts of the case though, had been noted long before the interviews in the world of Web blogs and discussion groups.<sup>52</sup>

More remarkable still is the unraveling of the Pat Tillman myth. Tillman was in fact a remarkable man. An all-pro defensive back with the St. Louis Cardinals, after

September 11 Tillman walked away from a multi-million dollar contract and the bright lights of the NFL to join the elite Green Berets and to fight terrorists in Afghanistan. There he died, and the U.S. Army propaganda machine shifted into high gear, issuing a statement on April 30, 2004 with the award of a posthumous Silver Star:

He ordered his team to dismount and then maneuvered the Rangers up a hill near the enemy's location . . . As they crested the hill, Tillman directed his team into firing positions and personally provided suppressive fire . . . Tillman's voice was heard issuing commands to take the fight to the enemy forces.<sup>53</sup>

Again, the model for the campaign was pure World War II home front propaganda, with the always unconventional hero portrayed as a cross between John Wayne and Rambo. In fact, at the time of the Tillman story the pictures from the infamous Abu Gharib prison scandal were fresh in the news and the U.S. military was desperate for some good news back home. There is no question that Pat Tillman was by any definition heroic, but the stirring story, like that of Jennifer Lynch, soon fell apart. A series of articles in the *Washington Post* in December 2004 confirmed what Internet bloggers had been suggesting all along: the story just wasn't true.

Tillman was killed by friendly fire while on an unnecessary and militarily ill-advised mission. Far from urging his comrades forward, Tillman's last words began with a doomed attempt to get the firing to stop and his last words were the deeply ambiguous phrase, as primly described by the *Washington Post*: "I am Pat [expletive] Tillman, damn it!" Following the *Post* series, the Army was forced to announce yet another internal investigation.<sup>54</sup>

To provide a sense of how dramatically the world of information management (or plain propaganda) by states has changed, compare these failed influence attempts for example with the report during the first Gulf War that the monstrous Iraqis were throwing babies out of incubators in Kuwait City. The report originated with Kuwaiti exiles testifying before Congress, after which it was broadcast on all U.S. media. For lack of other "eyes on the ground," the fanciful tale went largely unquestioned for several years after the conflict. At the time, it made little sense to anyone who had spent any time at all in the Middle East, where grown men will go all soft and gooey at the mere sight of a baby. Throw them out of incubators? They would sooner throw themselves out of the nearest window! The model for the report though, dates to the dawn of propaganda—and public opinion—in World War I, where monstrous German troops were reported to be skewering innocent Belgian babies on their bayonets. The report was no more true then than it was in the Gulf, but it was just as widely believed. Clearly, in the age of the Internet, war time myth-making is not what it used to be,<sup>55</sup> and a state's ability to preserve support for a foreign war is no easy task in the age of the Internet.

### III. Hate Crime Statistics: The Wave That Wasn't

As documented in Section II of this article, the U.S. has a history of proactive government action in response to attacks on the homeland or to perceived threats of subversion at home. In World War II this involved relocation camps and preventive detention. Less dramatic were the anti-communist witch hunts of the 1950s. In

response to the attacks of September 11, the U.S. has set up a series of secret prisons camps for “enemy fighters” around the globe, a much too public prison camp at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and has initiated a series of sometimes embarrassing investigations of Muslim immigrants at home.<sup>56</sup> Given this history, it is not surprising that in the wake of September 11 there was an intense spasm of violent hate crime against Muslims (or those perceived to be Muslims) throughout the U.S. What is surprising, though, was how brief—no more than roughly nine weeks—that episode of violent hate crime actually was. In the introduction to this paper, four theoretical explanations were posited. These were:

- Leadership in the form of effective intervention by the U.S. President;
- Decisive law enforcement intervention on the federal and local levels;
- Grassroots outreach to Muslims by religious, civic, and educational groups; and more tentatively
- Moral ambiguity in the rapid dissolution of American consensus after the invasion of Iraq.

These factors will now be examined in the context of the hate crime statistics themselves.

First though, it cannot be emphasized enough that the anger in America at the time was palpable, and anger needs to have an outlet. In the days after September 11, it appeared that, for the lawless few, anyone looking vaguely “Middle Eastern” might be a convenient target for this anger. Here, the term “vaguely Middle Eastern” is used quite deliberately. For many Americans, there is genuine confusion over what a Muslim might look like. Could it be a stereotypical Arab sheikh in flowing robes or a turbaned Turk?<sup>57</sup> Is an “Arab” black or white? Could a local doctor, lawyer, businessman, or cab driver perhaps be a terrorist? Or are the terms Middle Eastern, Arab, and terrorist synonymous? The United States might well be the major player in Middle Eastern power politics, but few Americans know anything at all about the Middle East save the Hollywood vision of Israel as the good guys and the “Arabs” as the bad guys. Thus the search for convenient targets was often badly misdirected, with a number of Sikhs being victimized by hate crimes in misguided retaliation for September 11,<sup>58</sup> despite the fact that Sikhs are not only not Muslim, but come from a faith community that was a historical opponent of Indian Islam.<sup>59</sup>

Before moving to the hate crime statistics themselves, it is important to note that the immediate reaction in the United States, far from violence directed at perceived Muslims in our midst, was one of outreach. Media-ready experts appeared as if from the ether ready to expound not only on the fine points of international terrorism, but also on the history, religion, and cultures of the Islamic world. Muslim organizations came into their own and for the first time took a high profile public role in American life. Local mosques were contacted by news organizations, and Muslims were invited to appear before church groups, in schools, and on television and radio talk shows. One of America’s least visible minorities was now making important inroads into the American public consciousness for the first time.

But as important as these grassroots activities were, the factor that most turned the tide of anger away from individual American Muslims was the leadership shown by President George W. Bush in the wake of the first reports of anti-Muslim violence. Within the first week following the attacks, President Bush, “in a gesture that surprised and gratified Islamic leaders,” made a high profile appearance at the Washington Islamic Center where he proclaimed: “The face of terror is not the true

faith of Islam . . . Islam is peace . . . [women who cover their heads should not fear leaving their homes] . . . That's not the America I know. That should not and that will not stand in America."<sup>60</sup> So effective was the visit that the President made an encore visit the following year on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr, the holiday marking the end of the Ramadan fast.<sup>61</sup> Significantly, the level of anti-Muslim hate crime had declined so markedly between the two visits that issue was not directly raised during the visit.

The mainstream media in the U.S. never appeared to register the importance of this exercise in presidential leadership, but it was not missed by American Muslims. In its otherwise bleak September 11, 2001–October 11, 2002 report, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee noted only four “instances of support, compassion and reassurance for Arab-Americans:

- Statements defending the community by many prominent persons, including President Bush and Secretary Powell, and institutions, including both houses of Congress.
- Fundraising for backlash victims.
- Volunteer escorts, especially for hijab-wearing Muslim women.
- Public relations efforts promoting tolerance.<sup>62</sup>

The public appears to have gotten the message as well, with the favorability rating of American Muslims actually rising after September 11 according to the Zogby Polling organization.<sup>63</sup>

### **The Numbers Speak**

The FBI has been collecting hate crime statistics since 1995, while the ADC's reports go back only to 1998.<sup>64</sup> By 2002,<sup>65</sup> forty-nine states participated in the FBI's collection of data,<sup>66</sup> with coverage extending to 85.7 percent of the population of the United States.<sup>67</sup> For the purposes of this paper, we will examine the data from 2000 through 2002. The FBI data goes into considerable depth looking at types of incidents, victims, perpetrators, and the geographic regions in which incidents occur. Conversely, while lacking the FBI's sophisticated presentation of the data, the ADC reports include considerable narrative, relating the words of the victims themselves. This article will focus on religiously or ethnically motivated violence primarily through an examination of the aggregate number of incidents and victim groups, and to a lesser degree, the forms which this violence has taken. Some narrative will be used when the text appears to illustrate a particular idea or trend. This section will occasionally reference violence directed at Jews and homosexuals as a kind of “control group” to allow readers to better gauge the relative levels of violence directed at Muslims as opposed to other target groups.

In aggregate terms, the FBI reported a total of 9,430 reported hate crimes in the U.S. in the year 2000. There were 9,924 victims of hate crime and 7,530 offenders were identified. The data points to racial prejudice as the overwhelming motivation for bias related incidents. Racial motivations were found in 53.8% of the cases reported. Religious bias came next, accounting for 18.3% of reported incidents, followed by sexual orientation bias at 16.1%. Unsurprisingly given America's self-perception as a nation of immigrants, ethnicity or national origin accounted for only 11.3% of incidents. Disability and other causes were detected in only 0.5% of cases.<sup>68</sup>

With this aggregate background, we move to the first table entitled “Incidents, Offenses, Victims, and Known Offenders by Bias Motivation, 2000.” The FBI documents only 28 individual instances of anti-Islamic hate crime in the year 2000. As Table 1 indicates, there were only 62 identified victims, and 20 cases in which the

**Table 1.**<sup>69</sup> Incidents, offenses, victims, and known offenders (by Bias Motivation, 2000)<sup>1</sup>

Bias motivation	Incidents	Offenses	Victims <sup>2</sup>	Known offenders <sup>3</sup>
Total	8,063	9,430	9,924	7,530
Single-bias incidents	8,055	9,413	9,906	7,520
Race	4,337	5,171	5,397	4,452
Anti-white	875	1,050	1,080	1,169
Anti-black	2,884	3,409	3,535	2,799
Anti-American Indian/ Alaskan native	57	62	64	58
Anti-Asian/Pacific Islander	281	317	339	273
Anti-multiracial group	240	333	379	153
Religion	1,472	1,556	1,699	577
Anti-Jewish	1,109	1,161	1,269	405
Anti-Catholic	56	61	63	33
Anti-Protestant	59	62	62	23
Anti-Islamic	28	33	36	20
Anti-other religious group	172	187	210	77
Anti-multireligious group	44	46	52	18
Anti-atheism/agnosticism/etc.	4	6	7	1
Sexual orientation	1,299	1,486	1,558	1,443
Anti-male homosexual	896	1,023	1,060	1,088
Anti-female homosexual	179	211	228	169
Anti-homosexual	182	210	226	153
Anti-heterosexual	22	22	24	18
Anti-bisexual	20	20	20	15
Ethnicity/national origin	911	1,164	1,216	1,012
Anti-Hispanic	557	735	763	694
Anti-other ethnicity/ national origin	354	429	453	318
Disability	36	36	36	36
Anti-physical	20	20	20	22
Anti-mental	16	16	16	14
Multiple-bias incidents <sup>4</sup>	8	17	18	10

<sup>1</sup>Because hate crime submissions have been updated, data in this table may differ from those published in *Crime in the United States, 2000*.

<sup>2</sup>The term *victim* may refer to a person, business, institution, or society as a whole.

<sup>3</sup>The term *known offender* does not imply that the identity of the suspect is known, but only that the race of the suspect is identified which distinguishes him/her from an unknown offender.

<sup>4</sup>A *multiple-bias incident* is a hate crime in which two or more offense types were committed as a result of two or more bias motivations.

**Table 2.**<sup>71</sup> Offenses, offense type (by Bias Motivation, 2000)

Bias motivation	Crimes against persons						
	Total offenses	Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter	Forcible rape	Aggravated assault	Simple assault	Intimidation	Other <sup>1</sup>
Total	9,430	19	4	1,184	1,615	3,292	16
Single-bias incidents	9,413	19	4	1,184	1,612	3,285	16
Race	5,171	10	4	738	947	1,955	7
Anti-white	1,050	5	1	215	280	278	6
Anti-black	3,409	3	1	462	577	1,391	1
Anti-American	62	0	0	9	12	18	0
Indian/Alaskan Native							
Anti-Asian/Pacific Islander	317	2	2	22	57	116	0
Anti-multiracial group	333	0	0	30	21	152	0
Religion	1,556	1	0	22	49	441	1
Anti-Jewish	1,161	1	0	12	23	376	1
Anti-Catholic	61	0	0	1	2	8	0
Anti-Protestant	62	0	0	0	1	7	0
Anti-Islamic	33	0	0	4	8	6	0
Anti-other religious group	187	0	0	4	14	37	0
Anti-multireligious group	46	0	0	1	1	7	0
Anti-atheism/agnosticism/etc.	6	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sexual orientation	1,486	2	0	216	391	435	6
Anti-male homosexual	1,023	2	0	159	298	293	4
Anti-female homosexual	211	0	0	24	51	82	1
Anti-Homosexual	210	0	0	31	38	49	0
Anti-Heterosexual	22	0	0	1	1	6	1
Anti-bisexual	20	0	0	1	3	5	0
Ethnicity/national origin	1,164	6	0	207	214	448	0
Anti-Hispanic	735	4	0	161	141	274	0
Anti-other ethnicity/national origin	429	2	0	46	73	174	0
Disability	36	0	0	1	11	6	2
Anti-physical	20	0	0	0	6	5	2
Anti-mental	16	0	0	1	5	1	0
Multiple-bias incidents <sup>2</sup>	17	0	0	0	3	7	0

<sup>1</sup> Includes, additional offenses collected in NIBRS.<sup>2</sup> A *multiple-bias incident* is a hate crime in which two or more offense types were committed

Crimes against property							
Robbery	Burglary	Larceny-theft	Motor vehicle theft	Arson	Destruction/damage/vandalism	Other <sup>1</sup>	Crimes against society <sup>1</sup>
139	138	114	11	52	2,765	22	59
139	138	114	11	52	2,758	22	59
66	74	65	9	22	1,223	15	36
37	13	39	3	5	140	11	17
27	46	15	3	15	853	1	14
0	6	4	2	0	10	0	1
1	4	4	1	2	104	1	1
1	5	3	0	0	116	2	3
6	30	24	0	17	959	3	3
5	16	9	0	5	713	0	0
0	3	5	0	3	37	1	1
0	3	2	0	0	49	0	0
0	0	2	0	0	12	1	0
1	5	3	0	7	114	0	2
0	2	1	0	1	32	1	0
0	1	2	0	1	2	0	0
48	21	16	1	8	335	3	4
43	14	3	0	8	197	1	1
3	1	4	0	0	44	0	1
2	5	2	0	0	82	0	1
0	0	2	1	0	9	1	0
0	1	5	0	0	3	1	1
18	12	8	1	4	230	1	15
14	6	3	1	2	124	1	4
4	6	5	0	2	106	0	11
1	1	1	0	1	11	0	1
0	0	0	0	1	6	0	0
1	1	1	0	0	5	0	1
0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0

as a result of two or more bias motivations.

identity of the offender was known. By comparison, there were 1,109 identified anti-Jewish incidents in the same year, or almost 40 times as many incidents. Indeed, double the number of incidents was reported victimizing Catholics or Protestants than those targeting Muslims.

The perception that American Jews or African Americans are far less reticent to report hate crimes than more recent immigrants is a truism that probably had some foundation in 2000. Recent immigrant groups have always been more mistrustful of authority, and doubtful immigration status increases this reticence. Complicating the problem is the fact that many Muslim immigrants come from countries where governments are less than solicitous of their citizens' legal rights, and crimes are thus left to be avenged by family, clan, or tribal relations of the victim. That said, it is very unlikely that these factors would account for anything like the magnitude of the gap between anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crimes.

Table 2 below examines the types of crimes committed against Muslims in 2000. In terms of crimes of violence against persons, the FBI documents four aggravated assaults, eight simple assaults, and six cases of intimidation. In terms of property crime, larceny/theft accounted for two crimes, there were twelve property crimes, and one case classified as "other," or thirty-three violent crimes in all.<sup>70</sup>

The ADC figures, which cover the 1998–2000 period, are exceedingly difficult to tease out. The ADC states in its "Executive Summary" that the greatest problems for the Arab American community come in the form of discrimination and racial profiling, and statistics for these are provided. Conversely, violent crimes against persons or property are mixed with what the organization refers to as "psychological crimes," or hate speech.<sup>72</sup> Also included are cases in which hate speech or physical threats were directed at a mixed ethnic group. The FBI keeps a separate statistic for these cases of indiscriminate discrimination and they will not be counted here. What follows then is at best an approximation based on the narratives provided by the ADC.

The ADC in this three-year period documents approximately six cases of physical assault clearly motivated by racial, ethnic, or religious animus, one case in which the FBI apparently derailed a plot to bomb a mosque in Aurora, Colorado (ending a spree of deadly hate crime violence by the perpetrator), and five cases of property damage.<sup>73</sup> The statistics include a plethora of hate speech, but little actual violence. The violence that did occur was noteworthy, and it comes much more to life in the ADC report than in the cold FBI statistics. The attempted terrorist violence in Colorado, for example, was described as follows:

May 1999—Aurora, CO: A 39-year-old man was arrested for allegedly planning to bomb the Islamic Center and "kill Iraqis," according to authorities. The man was arrested on May 12, 1999, following a car chase and a fight with police officers in his apartment. Authorities said that there were 30 gallons of gasoline in the car as well as other bomb components, four guns, two 22-inch machetes, and 850 rounds of ammunition. The man was investigated for possession of explosive devices, three counts of attempted vehicular assault, eluding the police, carrying concealed weapons and ethnic intimidation. Moreover, in separate attacks over 18 months, two immigrant men who prayed at the mosque were murdered. The police labeled the killings as "hate crimes."<sup>74</sup>

Similarly, physical attacks such as the one below on a Sudanese doctor forcefully bring home the reality of violent hate crime:

March 2001—Reno, NV: Dr. Eltag Mirghani, a 48-year-old Arab-American physician from Sudan, and Mr. Muhammad Sanad, a 46-year-old Arab-American electrical engineer, were approached by two young white men in the parking lot of the Northern Nevada Muslim Community Center. The suspects approached the victims and, without speaking, struck Mr. Sanad with a baseball bat. Mr. Sanad suffered a broken arm as he tried to shield his head. After Sanad ran into the Mosque, Mirghani was repeatedly struck in the head with the bat. After what officials believe was about 30 seconds, the suspects dropped the bat and fled when mosque members and a nearby resident ran to help Mirghani, who lay on the curb bleeding.

Dr. Mirghani remained in a coma having suffered severe head trauma. He underwent two operations at Washoe Medical Center where he was listed in critical condition. Officials were able to recover a baseball bat believed to be the one used in the attack. The attack followed a rash of harassment aimed at the Mosque, including a report from children about a man who had pointed a gun at them while they played in the Mosque's parking lot. All services at the Mosque were canceled while police continued their investigation. The incident is being investigated as a hate crime by the FBI, the Reno Police Department, and the Washoe County Sheriff's Department.<sup>75</sup>

But what is remarkable about these numbers is the fact that the FBI—much maligned in the Arab American community for racial profiling and other sins of commission and omission since September 11<sup>76</sup>—recorded more hate crimes in a single year (2000) than an advocacy group with infinitely greater access to the community notes in the three years before September 11! Moreover, by either account, the number of victims of violent crime against person or property before September 11 was quite small. As noted, this might have been a function of the reticence of victims to come forward to authorities due to fears of being deported as illegally in the country, or whose experiences with state authorities in their countries of origin were so negative that they did not trust the government in the U.S. to protect them. This reticence, however, probably did not extend as much to the Arab American advocacy organizations such as the ADC or CAIR as it did to the FBI. In any case, September 11, changed everything.

In 2001, the year of the attacks of September 11, the FBI recorded an aggregate total of 9,730 bias related crimes, of which 9,721 were single incident bias crimes and only 9 were multiple bias crimes.<sup>77</sup> On aggregate, 44.9% of the incidents were motivated by racial prejudice. Bias based on ethnicity/national origin was cited in 21.6% percent of the incidents, religious bias in another 18.8% of incidents and 14.3% of the crimes were motivated by bias against sexual orientation.<sup>78</sup>

The rise in incidents of anti-Muslim hate crime in 2001 is striking. From only 28 incidents and 33 actual crimes in 2000, the rate jumps to 481 incidents and 546 crimes—almost a 15-fold increase—on Table 3 below. Although the FBI does not provide a chronological distribution of violent incidents, the ADC's estimate of a nine-week crest in post-9/11 hate crime<sup>79</sup> accords with evidence from newspapers,

**Table 3.**<sup>82</sup> Incidents, offenses, victims, and known offenders (by Bias Motivation, 2001)<sup>1</sup>

Bias motivation	Incidents	Offenses	Victims <sup>2</sup>	Known offenders <sup>3</sup>
Total	9,730	11,451	12,020	9,239
Single-bias incidents	9,721	11,430	11,998	9,226
Race	4,367	5,290	5,545	4,494
Anti-white	891	1,034	1,065	1,148
Anti-black	2,899	3,529	3,700	2,818
Anti-American Indian/ Alaskan native	80	95	100	103
Anti-Asian/Pacific Islander	280	349	363	271
Anti-multiple races group	217	283	317	154
Religion	1,828	2,004	2,118	917
Anti-Jewish	1,043	1,117	1,196	389
Anti-Catholic	38	38	40	12
Anti-Protestant	35	36	36	45
Anti-Islamic	481	546	554	334
Anti-other religious group	181	211	235	102
Anti-multiple religions group	45	51	52	28
Anti-atheism/agnosticism/etc.	5	5	5	7
Sexual orientation	1,393	1,592	1,664	1,580
Anti-male homosexual	980	1,103	1,152	1,196
Anti-female homosexual	205	245	257	170
Anti-homosexual	173	207	217	179
Anti-heterosexual	18	20	21	17
Anti-bisexual	17	17	17	18
Ethnicity/national origin	2,098	2,507	2,634	2,193
Anti-Hispanic	597	755	812	941
Anti-other ethnicity/ national origin	1,501	1,752	1,822	1,252
Disability	35	37	37	42
Anti-physical	12	12	12	16
Anti-mental	23	25	25	26
Multiple-bias incidents <sup>4</sup>	9	21	22	13

<sup>1</sup>Because hate crime submissions have been updated, data in this table may differ from those published in *Crime in the United States, 2001*.

<sup>2</sup>The term *victim* may refer to a person, business, institution, or society as a whole.

<sup>3</sup>The term *known offender* does not imply that the identity of the suspect is known, but only that the race of the suspect has been identified, distinguishing him/her from an unknown offender.

<sup>4</sup>A *multiple-bias incident* is a hate crime in which two or more offense types were committed as a result of two or more bias motivations.

the various civil rights groups in the U.S. and the author's own observations in Alaska and Wisconsin over this period. Interestingly however, even with this sharp increase, Islamophobic crime remains only half the rate of hate crime directed at either Jews or homosexuals. Moreover, where under-reporting of hate crime was

probably the norm before September 11, the opposite was arguably the case after September 11. Adding to the difficulty in interpreting the statistics is the ambiguity surrounding the Sikh community as it relates to September 11. While the Sikhs, as noted previously, are not a Muslim community, they are often perceived as such by Americans, and so they too became targets for violent hate crime after the September 11 attacks. A Sikh civil rights organization, the Khalistan Affairs Center, estimates that there were more than 200 bias incidents of all types, from verbal harassment to physical violence against persons and property at that time.<sup>80</sup>

The first reports of bias incidents occurring across the U.S. brought a strong response from the Justice Department, and the President's visit to the Washington Islamic Center within a week of the event brought the issue front and center in media reports and with local police departments. With this encouragement, mosques across the country organized to support members who had experienced bias crime and many worked closely with authorities to both assure the government of Muslim loyalty and to assure the Muslims of government protection.<sup>81</sup>

In terms of the forms which this crime took, Table 4 below indicates the following according to the FBI: 93 assaults; 296 incidents of non-violent intimidation; 2 robberies; 5 burglaries; 7 thefts of various kinds; 18 acts of arson; and 123 other forms of crime against Muslim property. Interestingly, while the number of incidents has vastly increased, the distribution of incidents across categories of offenses remains largely unchanged.

The ADC's numbers evidence a new rigor with which they are collected and disseminated. The rise in hate crime brought about for the first time a working definition of "violent incidents" "as involving either physical violence or a direct threat of a specific act of violence."<sup>84</sup> According to the ADC:

In the first nine weeks following the September 11 attacks, ADC confirmed over 700 violent incidents directed at Arab Americans or those perceived to be Arab Americans. In the first nine months of 2002, by contrast, ADC had received 165 reports of violent incidents, 66% of reports received by the ADC legal department alleged physical and psychological attacks. Acts of vandalism and arson equaled 27% of claims; hate mail, threats and bomb threats 22%; beatings and physical attacks 16%; murders investigated as hate crimes 1%. Physical attacks include either battery or destruction of property. Many of the cases of physical attacks included in this report occurred the week of September 11–18, 2001 (54% of battery reports, 67% of vandalism and arson reports, and five of the suspected or confirmed hate crime murders). . . many of these incidents resulted in thousands of dollars worth of damage to mosques, businesses and homes. Others involved grievous bodily harm that resulted in hospitalization and maiming. ADC continues to receive cases of physical attacks, mostly reports of vandalism.<sup>85</sup>

The 2001 statistics thus have the FBI reporting 546 offenses to the ADC's 700. The difference would not seem great—especially when the ADC includes reports of attacks on perceived Muslims (i.e., Sikhs and others) which the FBI may categorize differently and, of greater import, victims could feel that their reports to the ADC would not jeopardize their immigration status. Moreover, although the ADC's

**Table 4.<sup>83</sup>** Offenses, offense type (by Bias motivation, 2001)

Bias motivation	Total offenses	Crimes against persons					
		Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter	Forcible rape	Aggravated assault	Simple assault	Intimidation	Other <sup>1</sup>
Total	11,451	10	4	1,241	2,154	4,339	20
Single-bias incidents	11,430	10	4	1,236	2,149	4,331	20
Race	5,290	4	2	703	1,076	1,959	8
Anti-white	1,034	0	2	168	289	263	4
Anti-black	3,529	3	0	448	664	1,440	4
Anti-American Indian/ Alaskan native	95	0	0	22	22	18	0
Anti-Asian/Pacific I slander	349	1	0	34	80	132	0
Anit-multiple races, group	283	0	0	31	21	106	0
Religion	2,004	0	0	51	128	791	0
Anti-Jewish	1,117	0	0	13	45	415	0
Anti-Catholic	38	0	0	1	2	4	0
Anti-Protestant	36	0	0	0	1	1	0
Anti-Islamic	546	0	0	27	66	296	0
Anti-other religious group	211	0	0	9	9	63	0
Anti-multiple religions, group	51	0	0	0	4	11	0
Anti-atheism/ agnosticism/etc.	5	0	0	1	1	1	0
Sexual orientation:	1,592	1	1	203	460	462	10
Anti-male homosexual	1,103	1	0	151	335	322	6
Anti-female homosexual	245	0	1	30	63	79	1
Anit-homosexual	207	0	0	18	55	54	1
Anti-heterosexual	20	0	0	1	5	5	1
Anti-bisexual	17	0	0	3	2	2	1
Ethnicity/national origin	2,507	5	1	276	478	1,107	0
Anti-Hispanic	755	2	0	133	198	261	0
Anti-other ethnicity/ national origin	1,752	3	1	143	280	846	0
Disability	37	0	0	3	7	12	2
Anti-physical	12	0	0	0	3	6	0
Anti-mental	25	0	0	3	4	6	2
Multiple-bias incidents <sup>2</sup>	21	0	0	5	5	8	0

<sup>1</sup> Includes additional offenses collected in NIBRS.<sup>2</sup> A *multiple-bias incident* is a hate crime in which two or more offense types were committed

Crimes against property							
Robbery	Burglary	Larceny- theft	Motor vehicle theft	Arson	Destruction/ damage/ vandalism	Other <sup>1</sup>	Crimes against society <sup>1</sup>
158	149	150	15	90	3,018	27	76
157	149	150	15	90	3,016	27	76
66	78	83	8	26	1,198	22	57
43	19	50	6	4	142	12	32
19	47	24	0	19	835	5	21
1	1	5	2	0	22	2	0
2	4	3	0	0	89	1	3
1	7	1	0	3	110	2	1
5	31	30	3	34	926	0	5
3	12	10	0	10	608	0	1
0	2	2	1	0	25	0	1
0	1	2	1	5	24	0	1
2	5	6	1	18	123	0	2
0	8	7	0	1	114	0	0
0	3	2	0	0	31	0	0
0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
48	15	17	2	8	357	1	7
44	8	2	0	5	227	1	1
2	5	4	1	2	55	0	2
2	1	5	0	1	69	0	1
0	0	3	1	0	3	0	1
0	1	3	0	0	3	0	2
36	23	16	2	22	531	4	6
17	10	5	0	5	123	0	1
19	13	11	2	17	408	4	5
2	2	4	0	0	4	0	1
1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
1	1	3	0	0	4	0	1
1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0

as a result of two or more bias motivations.

**Table 5.**<sup>87</sup> Incidents, offenses, victims, and known offenders (by Bias Motivation, 2002)

Bias motivation	Incidents	Offenses	Victims <sup>1</sup>	Known offenders <sup>2</sup>
Total	7,462	8,832	9,222	7,314
Single-bias incidents	7,459	8,825	9,211	7,311
Race	3,642	4,393	4,580	4,011
Anti-white	719	888	910	1,064
Anti-black	2,486	2,967	3,076	2,510
Anti-American Indian/Alaskan native	62	68	72	52
Anti-Asian/Pacific Islander	217	268	280	242
Anti-multiple races, group	158	202	242	143
Religion	1,426	1,576	1,659	568
Anti-Jewish	931	1,039	1,084	317
Anti-Catholic	53	58	71	21
Anti-Protestant	55	57	58	34
Anti-Islamic	155	170	174	103
Anti-other religion	198	217	237	73
Anti-multiple religions, group	31	32	32	18
Anti-atheism/agnosticism/etc.	3	3	3	2
Sexual orientation	1,244	1,464	1,513	1,438
Anti-male homosexual	825	957	984	1,022
Anti-female homosexual	172	207	221	172
Anti-homosexual	222	259	267	225
Anti-heterosexual	10	26	26	6
Anti-bisexual	15	15	15	13
Ethnicity/national origin	1,102	1,345	1,409	1,247
Anti-Hispanic	480	601	639	656
Anti-other ethnicity/national origin	622	744	770	591
Disability	45	47	50	47
Anti-physical	20	20	20	21
Anti-mental	25	27	30	26
Multiple-bias incidents <sup>3</sup>	3	7	11	3

<sup>1</sup> The term *victim* may refer to a person, business, institution, or society as a whole.

<sup>2</sup> The term *known offender* does not imply that the identity of the suspect is known, but only that an attribute of the suspect is identified, which distinguishes him/her from an unknown offender.

<sup>3</sup> A *multiple-bias incident* occurs only when two or more offense types are committed in a single incident. In a situation where there is more than one offense type, the agency can indicate a different bias for each offense. In the case of a single offense type, the only one bias can be indicated.

figures are reported in percentages rather than raw numbers per each category of crime, the patterns of attacks are not significantly at variance between the two sources.

In 2002, the FBI reported an aggregate total of 7,462 bias incidents, of which all but three were of the single bias type. Race was found to be a factor in 48.8% of the incidents, religion in 19.1% of cases, sexual orientation in 16.7% of cases, and

ethnicity/nationality in 14.8% of cases, with the remaining 0.6% relating to bias against the mentally disabled.<sup>86</sup> Table 5 below presents the broad number of incidents along with basic victim and perpetrator data, while Table 6 examines the pattern of bias related criminal offenses.

Table 5 above tells the impact of the campaign undertaken by the White House and U.S. Justice Department to end the wave of anti-Muslim violence before it could crest. This intervention was of course rhetorical,<sup>88</sup> but it also had a well-publicized substance. By July 23, 2003, the Justice Department boasted of having taken up 500 cases of bias crime against Muslims or perceived Muslims at the federal level, and of having won all eighteen cases that went to court:

Engaging in prosecutions and outreach activities in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th:

- **Prosecuting Backlash Discrimination:** The Division, FBI, and United States Attorneys' Offices Have Investigated Approximately 500 Incidents of Backlash Discrimination since September 11, 2001. There have been 13 federal prosecutions of 18 defendants to date—with a 100% conviction rate so far. In addition, the Justice Department has coordinated and/or provided assistance in approximately 100 additional state and local cases. All of these cases involve alleged discriminatory backlash crimes against individuals perceived to be of Middle-Eastern origin, including Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, Sikh Americans, and South-Asian Americans. . .
- **Bringing Communities Together:** In addition to the more than 250 town and community meetings conducted by the Department, Assistant Attorney General Boyd has spoken out against violence and threats against individuals perceived to be of a certain race, religion, or national origin, and he has met approximately 25 times with leaders of Arab-American, Muslim-American, Sikh-American, and South-Asian American organizations. He has also given several speeches to organizations representing the interests of these affected people and their communities.<sup>89</sup>

Under the moral pressure of the president, and the tough enforcement stance of the Justice Department, the wave of hate crime that began in the wake of the September 11 attacks crested and began to slowly recede. According to FBI statistics, reported hate crimes fell from 451 incidents in 2001 to 155 incidents in 2002 and down to 149 incidents in 2003. The ADC numbers are virtually identical, with 165 violent incidents listed from January 1 to October 11, 2002.<sup>90</sup> By comparison, anti-Jewish crimes in 2001 comprised 1,043 incidents—a figure which declined only slightly to 931 incidents in 2002. Similarly, crimes based on sexual orientation remained relatively stable, with 1,393 incidents in 2001 and 1,244 incidents in 2002. It would seem that bias related crimes against Muslims were the only hate crimes to fall significantly from 2001—the year of September 11—and 2002.

Table 6 below records the types of crimes committed as a result of anti-Muslim bias in 2002; of the 170 offenses, 34 were assaults in various degrees, 66 involved cases of intimidation, 17 involved theft in various forms, 55 were comprised of vandalism or other destruction of property, and one was in the all-encompassing category of “other”.

**Table 6.<sup>91</sup>** Offenses, offense type (by Bias Motivation, 2002)

Bias motivation	Total offenses	Crimes against persons					
		Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter	Forcible rape	Aggravated assault	Simple assault	Intimidation	Other <sup>1</sup>
Total	8,832	11	8	1,035	1,791	3,105	10
Single-bias incidents	8,825	11	8	1,035	1,789	3,104	10
Race	4,393	4	2	612	996	1,508	4
Anti-white	888	1	2	175	262	233	2
Anti-black	2,967	3	0	390	608	1,107	2
Anti-American Indian/ Alaskan native	68	0	0	7	21	14	0
Anti-Asian/Pacific Islander	268	0	0	26	70	90	0
Anti-multiple races, group	202	0	0	14	35	64	0
Religion	1,576	1	0	34	74	599	1
Anti-Jewish	1,039	0	0	17	35	433	0
Anti-Catholic	58	0	0	0	4	6	0
Anti-Protestant	57	0	0	0	4	7	1
Anti-Islamic	170	0	0	12	22	66	0
Anti-other religion	217	1	0	4	7	83	0
Anti-multiple religions group	32	0	0	1	2	4	0
Anti-atheism/ agnosticism/etc.	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sexual orientation	1,464	4	3	208	418	449	2
Anti-male homosexual	957	4	0	138	279	311	1
Anti-female homosexual	207	0	2	24	51	75	1
Anti-Homosexual	259	0	1	43	82	43	0
Anti-heterosexual	26	0	0	2	4	16	0
Anti-bisexual	15	0	0	1	2	4	0
Ethnicity/national origin	1,345	2	2	177	290	544	3
Anti-Hispanic	601	2	2	99	145	213	0
Anti-other ethnicity/ National origin	744	0	0	78	145	331	3
Disability	47	0	1	4	11	4	0
Anti-Physical	20	0	1	1	4	3	0
Anti-Mental	27	0	0	3	7	1	0
Multiple-Bias Incidents <sup>2</sup>	7	0	0	0	2	1	0

<sup>1</sup> Includes additional offenses collected in NIBRS.<sup>2</sup> A *multiple-bias incident* occurs only when two or more offense types are committed in a indicate a different bias for each offended. In the case of a single offense type, only one bias

Crimes against property							
Robbery	Burglary	Larceny-theft	Motor vehicle theft	Arson	Destruction/damage/vandalism	Other <sup>1</sup>	Crimes against society <sup>1</sup>
131	131	151	9	38	2,347	16	49
130	131	151	9	38	2,345	16	48
48	65	61	3	16	1,031	9	34
28	21	28	1	5	112	2	16
13	38	22	1	10	755	4	14
0	1	6	0	1	15	2	1
4	1	2	1	0	72	0	2
3	4	3	0	0	77	1	1
4	30	55	2	13	755	3	5
2	11	10	1	4	524	0	2
0	4	12	0	2	28	1	1
0	5	11	1	1	27	0	0
1	2	11	0	0	55	0	1
1	6	8	0	6	99	1	1
0	2	2	0	0	20	1	0
0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0
43	20	17	0	6	288	2	4
36	11	8	0	4	163	2	0
3	5	0	0	0	45	0	1
4	3	5	0	2	76	0	0
0	1	1	0	0	2	0	0
0	0	3	0	0	2	0	3
35	15	7	3	2	261	0	3
25	7	5	2	0	100	0	3
12	8	2	1	3	161	0	0
0	1	11	1	0	10	2	2
0	0	4	1	0	3	1	2
0	1	7	0	0	7	1	0
1	0	0	0	0	2	0	1

single incident. In a situation where there is more than one offense type, the agency can can be indicated.

## Conclusion

The United States and its law enforcement agencies, has come under withering global criticism as a result of its tactics—and its admitted mistakes—in pursuing the War on Terror. This paper opened with an examination of some aspects of this disconnect between the U.S. and the rest of the world which became acute after the invasion of Iraq. The Patriot Act, the pictures from Abu Ghraib, the destruction of Fallujah. . .the list of global grievances grows and grows. Too often lost in this cascade of bad news are the positive examples that America has to offer to the world. Of these, none is more significant than the way in which the tide of hate crimes against Muslims was stemmed by a combination of factors. First, there was a concerted effort on the part of President George W. Bush using the Presidency as a bully pulpit to unite Americans. This was followed by concrete actions of the Justice Department in concert with state and local law enforcement in vigorously investigating and prosecuting crimes that did occur. Law enforcement actions were made even more effective by the remarkable outpouring of support for the American Muslim community by grassroots civic, educational, and religious organizations across the country.<sup>92</sup> The findings of this paper strongly suggest that the American experience in combating Islamophobic crime could well be applied to European societies.

The paper goes further, however, in suggesting that a variable of some significance in slowing the rise of hate crime directed against Muslims may well have been influenced by the moral malaise of mainstream America with regard to the War on Terror/War in Iraq, and more generally, with the “credibility gap” that has surrounded virtually every aspect of these actions. The paper suggests that this lack of certainty and of confidence in America’s own moral rectitude may have served to alleviate crime directed at the perceived “Muslim other.” It is too early to tell if this hypothesis is accurate, but it is offered in the hope that future research will take up the question.

## Notes

1. I would like to thank David Rapoport, Yehonathan Brodski, and the anonymous readers whose comments were most helpful in the revision stages of this article.

2. For a popular examination of the question, see Fareed Zakaria, “Why Do They Hate Us? The Politics of Rage,” (cover story), *Newsweek* 138, no. 16 (2001). The question in fact became so ubiquitous that then National Security advisor Condoleezza Rice felt obliged to state:

Then, as now, the answer to that question depends on what one means by “they.” There is a small minority of extremists in the Muslim world who, indeed, hate America and will always hate America. They hate our policies, our values, our freedoms, our very way of life. When that hatred is expressed through terrorist violence, there is only one proper response. And that response is that we must find them and defeat them, defeat those who seek to kill our people and to harm our country.

See “Dr. Rice Addresses the War on Terror; Remarks by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice Followed by Question and Answer to the U.S. Institute of Peace,” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040819-5.html>. Parenthetically, while teaching the only terrorism class in the state while at the University of Alaska when September 11 occurred, I well recall the question, and at least among students, I recall as well a receptivity to answers that in the atmosphere of 2004 would be considered heretical.

3. This appears to have been the president’s first and last explanation for the September 11 attacks. It was, however, understood in 2001 that the theme would not travel well. Thus, when the U.S. State Department released its report, “The Global War on Terror.

The First 100 Days” in 2001, there were only three references to evil, and all were rhetorical or metaphorical. The document can be found at: <http://www.911investigations.net/document427.html>. By 2004 however, the president’s view was public knowledge in the U.S. and abroad, with apparently devastating public relations ramifications among the European allies. See for example “A Year After Iraq War: Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists,” The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 16 March 2004, <http://people-press.org/reports/print.php3?PageID=795>.

Indeed, such is the globalized state of communication technology that Osama bin Laden himself, in an election eve tape released in November 2004, offered the observation: “Before I begin, I say to you that security is an indispensable pillar of human life and that free men do not forfeit their security contrary to Bush’s claim that we hate freedom. If so, then let him explain to us why we didn’t strike—for example—Sweden. And we know that freedom haters don’t possess defiant spirits like those of the 19. May Allah have mercy upon them.” See “Transcript: Translation of Bin Laden’s Videotaped Message,” *Washington Post*, 1 November 2004, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16990-2004Nov1.html>. That the president’s first take on the event remains unchanged, see Barton Gellman and Dafna Linzer, “Afghanistan, Iraq: Two Wars Collide,” *Washington Post*, 22 October 2004, A1. The relevant quote is: “The president and his most influential advisers, many officials said, do not see those factors—or U.S. policy overseas—as primary contributors to the terrorism threat. Bush’s explanation, in private and public, is that terrorists hate America for its freedom.” The article can be accessed on line at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52673-2004Oct21.html>.

4. Traditional clothing styles vary widely among Islamic cultures, be it an all-covering burka as worn in Afghanistan or a simple head scarf and long dress. These subtleties however, are lost on most Americans.

5. “Sikh Americans Condemn Hate Crimes & Urge Nation to Unite; Demand Protection from Police & Public Officials,” *Amerasia Journal* 27, no. 3/28, no. 1 (2001/2002). Press release from the Sikh MediaWatch and Resource Taskforce condemning hate crimes against Muslims in the aftermath of September 11.

6. Hate crimes may involve non-violent actions such as racial slurs, insults, or other demeaning acts, as well as acts of vandalism or violence against persons. This article however, will focus primarily on acts of physical violence against persons.

7. This article will suggest a number of examples of the kind of disconnect between official portrayals of events and the unraveling of these portrayals, and will examine some of the reasons for the lack of resonance of tried and true propaganda methods in first linking the War in Iraq to the wider War on Terror, and in rallying public support for the war effort. The data, however, is not specific enough to measure the impact of any single one of these examples on support for the war. However, support has been in rapid decline. For a wide selection of poll data on the topic, see [PollingReport.com](http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm) at <http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm>.

8. For an interesting, if ideological, comparison of Japanese internment with the post-September 11 treatment of Muslims, see Natsu TaylorSaito, “Symbolism under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the ‘Racing’ of Arab Americans as ‘Terrorists’”, *Asian Law Journal* 8, no. 1 (2001): 12–29.

9. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, *Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells, *The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Craig S. Smith, “For Dutch, Anger Battles with Tolerance,” *International Herald Tribune*, 11 November 2004, <http://www.iht.com/bin/print.ipub.php?file=/articles/2004/11/10/news/dutch.html>; and “A Civil War on Terrorism: Islam in the Netherlands: Another Political Murder,” *The Economist* 373 (2004): 56. For the history of the Islamic presence in the contemporary Netherlands, see Jacques Waardenburg, “The Institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands, 1961–1986,” in Tomas Gerholm and Yngve Georg Lithman, eds., *The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe* (London: Manse, 1988), 8–31.

10. The short speech can be found at the University of Oklahoma Law School site: <http://www.law.ou.edu/hist/infamy.html> (Accessed 1 June 2004).

11. A number of recent books and articles have begun to re-examine this period of American history following the much-belated apology and restitution made to those

affected through the Civil Liberties Act of 1988. On the event, see U.S. House, *Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives*, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., H.R. 5499, June 2, 1980, U.S. G.P.O., 1980. For a brief overview, see Eric J. Sundquist, "The Japanese-American Internment," *American Scholar* 57, no. 4 (1988); and Robert Shaffer, "Opposition to Internment: Defending Japanese American Rights During World War II," *The Historian* 61, no. 3 (1999).

12. Ricco Villanueva Siasoco and Shmuel Ross, "Japanese Relocation Centers," <http://www.factmonster.com/spot/internment1.html> (Accessed 1 June 2005). For a flavor of how the issue was reported at the time, see "Japanese Relocation," *Encarta 2003*, which reprints the *Collier's Yearbook* entries from 1942–1945. Cf. for a passionate if less precise account, 529–47.

13. "1942: Japanese Relocation," *Encarta 2003*.

14. *Ibid.*

15. Shaffer, "Opposition to Internment: Defending Japanese American Rights During World War II."

16. This observation reflects the increasing importance of memorialization, survivorship, and victimization in shaping not only American historical memory, but policy formation. See for example, David Chidester and Edward Tabor Linenthal, *American Sacred Space, Religion in North America* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995); and Edward Tabor Linenthal, *Sacred Ground: Americans and Their Battlefields*, 2nd ed. (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1993).

17. For example Stephen Fugita and Marilyn Fernandez, *Altered Lives, Enduring Community: Japanese Americans Remember Their World War II Incarceration* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2004); Barry Denenberg, *The Journal of Ben Uchida, Citizen 13559, Mirror Lake Internment Camp*, 1st ed., *My Name Is America* (New York: Scholastic, 1999); Fern Harrington Miles, *Captive Community: Life in a Japanese Internment Camp, 1941–1945*, 1st ed. (Jefferson City, Tenn.: Mossy Creek Press, 1987); Jerry Stanley, *I Am an American: A True Story of Japanese Internment*, 1st ed. (New York: Crown, 1994); Gary Y. Okihiro and Joan Myers, *Whispered Silences: Japanese Americans and World War II* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1996); and Michi Weglyn, *Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps* (New York: Morrow, 1976). For a more historicist treatment, see Dillon S. Myer, *Uprooted Americans: The Japanese Americans and the War Relocation Authority During World War II* (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1971). None of these, however, has quite the impact of the U.S. government's own strained justifications for the unjustifiable. See the 1944 vintage government propaganda films: "A Challenge to Democracy," available at the Prelinger archive, <http://www.archive.org/movies/details-db.php?collection=prelinger&collectionid=19585>.

18. *Harvard Law Review*, "Racial Violence against Asian Americans," in Barbara Perry, ed., *Hate and Bias Crime: A Reader* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 223–34.

19. The FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting Program, which collected national crime statistics from local police departments, began in 1930. Hate Crime statistics were collected by the Agency for the first time in 1995. See <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm>.

20. Valerie Jenness and Ryken Grattet, *Making Hate a Crime: From Social Movement to Law Enforcement* (New York: Russell Sage, 2001). Jenness and Grattet provide a solid synthesis of the literature to argue that the concept of hate crime emerged from the convergence of civil rights groups (including such groups as the NAACP and the ADL), the women's movement and the gay and lesbian movement with the nascent crime victim movement. The synthesis began in the late 1960s and continues to develop today.

21. Carolyn Petrosino, "Connecting the Past to the Future: Hate Crime in America," in Barbara Perry, ed., *Hate and Bias Crime: A Reader*, 16–17.

22. Which is not to say that there was no violence involved. Clearly, this would be an unlikely claim given the emotions of the time, and some of this suspicion is born out to a degree in the memoir literature. But in a period when mainstream post-WW II representations of the Japanese were, by twenty-first century standards, appallingly racist, the lack of anti-Japanese violence is striking. For a taste of the virulence of the official portrayal of Japan and the Japanese, see the U.S. government propaganda film "My Japan" (1945) <http://www.archive.org/movies/details-db.php?collection=prelinger&collectionid=19296>.

23. For varying perspectives, see Richard Orr Curry and Thomas M. Brown, *Conspiracy: the Fear of Subversion in American History* (New York: Holt, 1972); Albert Fried, *McCarthyism: The Great American Red Scare: A Documentary History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Haynes Bonner Johnson, *The Age of Anxiety: McCarthyism to Terrorism* (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2005); Thomas C. Reeves, *McCarthyism* (Malabar, Fla.: R.E. Krieger, 1989); Ellen Schrecker, *The Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History with Documents* (New York: Palgrave, 2002); and Athan G. Theoharis, *The FBI and American Democracy: A Brief Critical History* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004).

24. On the self-view of the Birch Society, see its manual: John Birch Society, *The Blue Book* (Belmont, MA: Birch Society, n.d.); or also from the time, Gene Grove, *Inside the John Birch Society* (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1961). For an overview of the Birch Society in the constellation of far right groups, see John George and Laird M. Wilcox, *Nazis, Communists, Klansmen, and Others on the Fringe: Political Extremism in America* (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1992). The Birch Society went into steep decline in the 1970s, but has reemerged with a glossy magazine, *New American*, a new cause, anti-globalization rather than anti-communism, and a new lease on life. See the Birch Society homepage, <http://www.jbs.org/>, and the *New American* [http://www.thenewamerican.com/artman/publish/cat\\_index\\_63.shtml](http://www.thenewamerican.com/artman/publish/cat_index_63.shtml).

25. <http://www.otrcat.com/thisisyourfbi.htm>. Another popular radio program of the day, "The FBI In Peace and War," was not authorized by the FBI but nonetheless reinforced the invincible image of the organization. The series was based on a book: Frederick L. Collins and Lester Dember, *The FBI in Peace and War*, rev. and enl./ed. (New York: Putnam, 1963). For a decidedly different, but thoroughly enjoyable insider's view of Hoover's FBI, see Joseph L. Schott, *No Left Turns* (New York: Praeger, 1975).

26. Brian Levin, "Cyberhate: A Legal and Historical Analysis of Extremists' Use of Computer Networks in America," *American Behavioral Scientist* 45, no. 6 (2002): 958–88.

27. Les Back, Michael Keith and John Solomos, "Racism and the Internet: Mapping Neo-Fascist Cultures in Cyberspace," in Jeffrey Kaplan and Tore Bjørge, *Nation and Race: The Developing Euro-American Racist Subculture* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998). Cf., Jeffrey Kaplan, "Leaderless Resistance," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 3 (1997): 80–95; Milton John Kleim, "Internet Recruiting," in idem., Jeffrey Kaplan, *Encyclopedia of White Power: A Sourcebook on the Radical Racist Right* (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2000), 141–144; Anti-Defamation League, "Hate on the World Wide Web: A Brief Guide to Cyberspace Bigotry," <http://www.come-and-hear.com/editor/adl-hates-censorship/> (written 1998), accessed 3 June 2005; or the Simon Wiesenthal Center, "Digital Terrorism and Hate 2005," CD-ROM available at: <http://www.museumoftolerance.com/site/pp.asp?c=arLPK7PILqF&b=476425>. Significantly, the title of the Simon Wiesenthal Center CD-ROM has changed from its original "Digital Hate (2000)." Earlier CD-ROM concentrated on images associated with Nazism. The 2005 version, with the new name, features a picture of American hostage Nick Berg, who was beheaded in Iraq. The choice is not only significant in illustrating watchdog groups' need to expand their focus from domestic anti-Semitism to global terrorism, but for the fact that the Berg case brought home to observers the fact that in the new world of communications technology, terrorism has become interactive. Angered by widespread doubts that Berg was actually alive during the beheading (executed with extraordinary clumsiness by one of the hostage holders), future beheadings would feature live soundtracks, close-ups, and uninterrupted time stamps. On the doubts, see Ritt Goldstein, "Berg Beheading: No Way, Say Medical Experts," *Asia Times*, [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\\_East/FE22Ak03.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FE22Ak03.html). A quick search of blogs via the popular RSS reader site Bloglines turned up no less than 326 blogs that discuss the event. See for example, "The Staton Jones Report," <http://www.deltos.com/reference/SJR/archives/000330.html>; "Talk Left," [http://talkleft.com/new\\_archives/006610.html](http://talkleft.com/new_archives/006610.html); or "Paranoia: The Conspiracy Reader," <http://www.paranoiamagazine.com/paranotes2004.html>.

28. The Nuremberg Files website comes to mind in this regard, where the radical fringe of the pro-life rescue movement utilized the technology to target particular abortion doctors, resulting in the deaths of several of the men profiled on the site. The ISP eventually refused service to the Web page and no other host has been found, while a civil judgment in the amount of \$100 million effectively put the site out of business as a vehicle for targeting individuals. On the case, see <http://www-cse.stanford.edu/classes/cs201/projects/nuremberg-files/background.html#conclusion>. For the skeleton of the site, see the surviving top page

at <http://www.christiangallery.com/atrocity/>. For background on the cases, see Jeffrey Kaplan, "Absolute Rescue: Absolutism, Defensive Action and the Resort to Force," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 7, no. 3 (1995): 128–63.

29. For a fine overview of Islam on the Internet in both its jihadist and mainstream forms, see Gary R. Bunt, *Islam in the Digital Age* (London: Pluto Press, 2003). On security concerns, see for example, the special issue articles: "Netwar across the Spectrum of Conflict," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 22, no. 3 (1999). In particular in this issue, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "The Advent of Netwar: Analytic Background," 193–206, Michele Zanini, John Arquilla, and David Ronfeldt, "Netwar Across the Spectrum of Conflict: Middle Eastern Terrorism and Netwar" 247–56. Cf. Robert F. Worth, "Jihadists Take Stand on Web, and Some Say It's Defensive," *New York Times*, 13 March 2005, 22. The most advanced communications outreach is arguably that of the Lebanese Hizb'Allah, which operates state-of-the-art television and radio studios, sophisticated, interactive websites in Arabic, English and French, as well as Internet broadcasting. The Hizb'Allah URL changes frequently. As of 6 June, 2005 the Arabic site is <http://www.moqawama.net/index.php> and the English mirror is <http://www.moqawama.net/english/index.php>.

30. The model of seekers pursuing "secret and suppressed knowledge" was best presented by Colin Campbell in his 1960s vintage study of the cultic milieu. The cultic milieu model has proved durable enough in the age of the Internet, but what Campbell did not foresee was how the dreams, speculations, fears, and not infrequently, insights of denizens of the cultic milieu would be instantly available to other seekers as the expense and difficulty of producing and mailing newsletters or attending physical gatherings has been increasingly replaced by the computer screen. Campbell also could not have foreseen the rapid diffusion of ideas from the cultic milieu to the mainstream culture which the Internet has made possible. For Campbell's original article, "The Cult, the Cultic Milieu and Secularization," as well as a number of essays applying Campell's theory to a variety of global subcultures, see Jeffrey Kaplan and Heléne Lööw, eds., *The Cultic Milieu: Oppositional Subcultures in an Age of Globalization* (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2002).

31. Studs Terkel, *The Good War: An Oral History of World War Two* (New York: New Press, 1997). For a contrary view, arguing that polls indicated that a majority of the greatest generation saw WWII as a mistake, see Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: Is War a Mistake?" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 34, no. 1 (1970): 134–50.

32. The phrase came back into popular vogue to a degree through the book of the same name by NBC news anchor Tom Brokaw. See Tom Brokaw, *The Greatest Generation* (New York: Random House, 2004). Cf. Michael D. Gambone, *The Greatest Generation Comes Home: The Veteran in American Society* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2005); Craig Leake et al., *The Greatest Generation* (United States: New Video Group, 1999); and Tom Mathews, *Our Fathers' War: Growing up in the Shadow of the Greatest Generation* (New York: Broadway Books, 2005). The phrase is taken up by columnist Suzanne Fields, "The New Great Generation," *Washington Times*, 26 December 2004, <http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20041226-095825-3994r.htm>, and by Pat Hammond, "Citizen of the Year: Another Great Generation," *Manchester Union Leader*, 2 January 2005, [http://www.theunionleader.com/articles\\_showa.html?article=49079](http://www.theunionleader.com/articles_showa.html?article=49079), to name a few.

33. For a great overview of the 1950s, see David Halberstam, *The Fifties* (New York: Villard Books, 1993). On how not all of the paranoia of the era was fantasy (i.e., that real paranoids had real enemies), see John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). For an utterly biased, but rather enjoyable, demonology of the era as seen through the eyes of an unreconstructed leftist, see Joel Kovel, *Red Hunting in the Promised Land: Anticommunism and the Making of America* (New York: Basic Books, 1994). And for a still unsurpassed contemporaneous view, see Richard Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics, and Other Essays*, 1st Harvard University Press pbk. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996).

34. For a good historical overview of public opinion and recent wars, see Harry G. Summers, "The Vietnam Syndrome and the American People," *Journal of American Culture* 17 (1994). For an illuminating historical insight which is relevant to the current conflict in Iraq, see David F. Schmitz, *The Tet Offensive: Politics, War, and Public Opinion* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). On polling at the time, see Sidney Brody Verba, Richard A. Brody Verba, Edwin B. Parker, Norman H. Nie, Nelson W. Polsby, Paul Ekman,

and Gordon S. Black, "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam," *American Political Science Review* 61, no. 2 (1967); and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Polls and Protests," *Foreign Affairs* 49, no. 3 (1971).

35. When asked "considering the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the United States, do you think the war with Iraq was worth fighting, or not?" Americans 53%–43% said it was not worth it. "Washington Post-ABC News Poll: Social Security/Iraq," March 15, 2005, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/polltrend\\_031405.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/polltrend_031405.html).

36. Howard Kurtz, "CNN Chief Orders 'Balance' in War News: Reporters Are Told To Remind Viewers Why U.S. Is Bombing," *Washington Post*, 31 October 2001, C1.

37. For a telling example, see the very widely circulated "meant-to-be-private" E-mail from the *Wall Street Journal's* Middle East correspondent Farnaz Fassihi, who wrote: "Being a foreign correspondent in Baghdad these days is like being under virtual house arrest" due to restrictions placed on reporters and the dramatic poisoning of relations between Americans and Iraqis in the wake of the (largely unreported in the U.S.) civilian casualties and widespread destruction of the city of Fallujah by U.S. forces in September 2004. A copy of the E-mail is currently available at: <http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0930-15.htm>.

38. Three good books, two journalistic and the other academic, have been published recently on the al-Jazeera phenomenon. For an academic treatment of Arab news organizations as a whole, see Noha Mellor, *The Making of Arab News* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). This text, however, will be of limited interest to scholars outside of the communications field. For very accessible, and important, journalism, see Mohammed El-Nawawy and Adel Iskander, *Al-Jazeera: How the Free Arab News Network Scooped the World and Changed the Middle East* (Cambridge, Mass.: Westview Press, 2002); and Hugh Miles, *Al-Jazeera: The Inside Story of the Arab News Channel That Is Challenging the West* (New York: Grove Press, 2005). In 2005, al-Jazeera took a considerable step forward with its adoption of its first journalistic code of ethics. See <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/07256105-B2FC-439A-B255-D830BB238EA1.htm>. It is now poised to launch an English language cable service, which should be up and running by 2006.

39. Indeed, attempts to do so have proved so far counter-productive. Frustration with the failure of the U.S. media to document the level of civilian suffering in the invasion of Afghanistan which followed September 11, compounded by the frequency with which U.S. forces seem to "inadvertently" kill al-Jazeera journalists (no less than three journalists and one cameraman so far) led to the creation of its sophisticated English language website. For one example of targeting al-Jazeera journalists, see <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/64BEFBCA-210E-4E39-B8CD-A2EC8E0EB2F1.htm>.

40. <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/>.

41. Stephen Grey and Margot Williams, "C.I.A. Expanding Terror Battle Under Guise of Charter Flights," *New York Times*, 31 May 2005. <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/31/national/31planes.html?ei=5070&en=ba55cd837e6ccc92&ex=1118203200&pagewanted=all>.

42. For an even earlier news report, including a picture of the unmarked plane, see Dana Priest, "Jet Is an Open Secret in Terror War," *Washington Post*, 27 December 2004, 1. After the *Times* article, the *Washington Post* followed up with a reprise: Craig Whitlock, "New Swedish Documents Illuminate CIA Action: Probe Finds 'Rendition' Of Terror Suspects Illegal," *Washington Post*, 21 May 2005, A1. The news magazine program *60 Minutes* then jumped into the act. See the video "Flying Suspects to Torture," <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/04/60minutes/main678155.shtml>. For a taste of the bloggers taking on the *Post* news stories, see for example the well known MemoryBlog, "More Details About CIA's Torture Jet," <http://www.thememoryblog.org/archives/000405.html>. And for the in-depth description of the plane, its aliases and its comings and goings, see "Details of 'Torture by Proxy' Flights Emerge," <http://www.notinourname.net/restrictions/torture-flights-14nov04.htm>. And finally, for a selection of articles from world media on the topic, see [http://groups.yahoo.com/group/shobak\\_news/message/2349](http://groups.yahoo.com/group/shobak_news/message/2349).

43. "Allies Resist CIA Deportation Role," CNN, July 19, 2005, <http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/06/19/terror.spirited.away.ap/index.html>.

44. "Britain Accused Over CIA's Secret Torture Flights: UK Airports Are Believed to be Operational Bases for Two Executive Jets Used by the CIA to Carry Out 'renditions' of Terror Suspects." *Independent*, 10 February 2005, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/terrorwar/analysis/2005/0210britaccused.htm>.

45. This is not to say that American intentions are automatically held to be suspect. However, in the Cold War, realism dictated that American allies, however dire their human rights practices, were preferable to having these same countries in the Soviet camp. The contradiction was justified with the theory (or rationalization to those outside the Realist camp) that such was the redemptive power of democracy that these countries would gradually democratize by virtue of their inclusion in the world system on the side of the Western democracies. In retrospect, this appears to have been a rather too optimistic view.

46. <http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/index-eng>. The report describes the Guantanamo Bay prison facility as “the gulag of our times,” a phrase that was picked up by media outlets throughout the world. In fairness, however, it must be said that the U.S. has been the subject of an impassioned Amnesty International anti-capital punishment campaign for a number of years. There is little love lost between the organization and the U.S. government.

47. Unfortunately, this contention must remain speculative. Available survey data does not ask questions about particular policies or events. The best that can be done at this time is to examine the broad support for the War(s) and hypothesize on the reasons for the notable decline in public support.

48. This is not to deny the genuine heroism of U.S. soldiers, nor to diminish the impact of U.S. casualties on domestic politics. Note in this regard the practice of CBS news in leading into the first commercial break of its evening newscasts in 2005 with “Portraits of the Fallen”: pictures of an American casualty and a brief biography stressing that they were “regular people” with whom the viewers could identify.

49. The film of the official story of the rescue, complete with the claim that the rescue mobilized “every asset at the Pentagon” is still available at CBS news, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/04/03/iraq/main547492.shtml>. On a contemporary reaction wondering why the same mobilization did not take place for less photogenic POWs, see the fate of Keith Maupin on the website “A Collection of Thoughts,” <http://www.jenmartinez.com/mt/archives/000817.php>.

50. Edward Helmore, “Private Jessica Says President is Misusing Her ‘Heroism,’” *Guardian*, 9 November 2003, <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,1081186,00.html>. For the entire collection of Jessica Lynch articles, pictures (save the pre-fame nudes purchased by Larry Flynt of *Hustler* magazine which are also easily found on the Internet), and links to video footage, see <http://www.unitedjustice.com/jessica-lynch.html>.

51. Rick Bragg, *I Am a Soldier, Too: The Jessica Lynch Story* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), Mohammed Odeh Rehaief and Jeff Coplon, *Because Each Life Is Precious: Why an Iraqi Man Risked Everything for Private Jessica Lynch* (New York: HarperCollins, 2003).

52. See for example The American Prospect, <http://www.prospect.org/weblog/archives/2003/05/>; The Modern World by Tom Tomorrow, [http://www.thismodernworld.com/weblog/mtarchives/week\\_2003\\_05\\_18.html#000629](http://www.thismodernworld.com/weblog/mtarchives/week_2003_05_18.html#000629); or The Blog From Another Dimension, <http://www.blogd.com/archives/000090.html>, to name a few.

53. Steve Coll, “Army Spun Tale Around Ill-Fated Mission,” *Washington Post*, 6 December 2004, A1.

54. Steve Coll, “Barrage of Bullets Drowned Out Cries of Comrades,” *Washington Post*, 5 December 2004, A1. For the reaction of Tillman’s parents, see “Tillman’s Parents Rip Army in Separate Interviews,” 23 May 2005, <http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2066326>, and the letter from Pat Tillman’s father, “Failures and Blame in Pat Tillman’s Death,” *Washington Post*, 28 May 2005, A24.

55. For pictures of the hearings in which the tale was spun, see <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/3589/us-iraq-lie.html>. David Beresford, “Writes, and Wrongs, of War,” *Observer*, 26 January 2003, <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0,6903,882109,00.html>; To hear the story as it was broadcast, National Radio Project, <http://www.radioproject.org/archive/2000/0037.html>. And for a blog with historical memory, see <http://www.snopes.com/military/stamp.htm>. For these and similar stories, see Jan Harold Brunvand, *Encyclopedia of Urban Legends* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2001).

56. See for example the tactics employed against a sixteen-year-old Bangladeshi immigrant girl by the FBI. Nina Bernstein, “Questions, Bitterness and Exile for Queens Girl in Terror Case,” *New York Times*, 17 June 2005, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/17/>

nyregion/17suicide.html. Cf. Idem., “Girl Called Would-Be Bomber Was Drawn to Islam,” *New York Times*, 8 April 2005, <http://www.refuseandresist.org/detentions/art.php?aid=1872>.

57. For a graphic vision of this stereotypical “stuff of dreams” see the lavishly illustrated book by Holly Edwards and Brian T. Allen, *Noble Dreams, Wicked Pleasures: Orientalism in America, 1870–1930* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press in association with the Sterling And Francine Clark Art Institute, 2000). In academic terms, see the classic work by Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985). More recently, several good texts have appeared, including Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002) and Zachary Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

58. FBI statistics appear to assume that it is the intent of the perpetrator rather than the identity of the victim that is the decisive factor in calculating their racial, ethnic, or religious bias crime statistics. Sikhs are not included in a separate category and the FBI appears to conflate crimes against Sikhs in retaliation for 9/11 with crimes perpetrated against Muslims (with again no breakdown of the national origins of these Muslims). That this suspicion seems well founded finds some confirmation in the “Federal Bureau of Investigation Strategic Plan 2004–2009” <http://www.fbi.gov/publications/strategicplan/stategicpltext.htm>. The ADC also includes crimes against Sikhs under the category of anti-Muslim hate crime. See Hussein Ibish res., ed., and Anne Stewart’s *Report on Hate Crimes and Discrimination Against Arab Americans: The Post-September 11 Backlash’ September 11, 2001–October 11, 2002* (Washington, DC: American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 2003), 47.

59. “Hate crime reports up in wake of terrorist attacks,” *Cnn.com*, 17 September 2001. <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/gen.hate.crimes/>. The article notes one such attack in Mesa, Arizona, and uses the case to illustrate the wave of violence against Sikhs nationally in the mistaken belief that Sikhs are Muslim. On the history of Sikhs, still unsurpassed is W. H. McLeod, *Sikhs and Sikhism* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999). On Sikh terrorism in North America, see Maryam Razavy, “Sikh Militant Movements in Canada,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* (forthcoming).

60. Dana Milbank and Emily Wax, “Bush Visits Mosque to Forestall Hate Crimes. President Condemns an Increase in Violence Aimed at Arab Americans,” *Washington Post*, 18 September 2001, 1. The article recounts several high profile anti-Muslim hate crimes, the reporting of which was the background to the Islamic Center visit.

61. “President Commemorates Eid al-Fitr. Remarks by the President on Eid Al-Fitr The Islamic Center of Washington, D.C.,” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021205-5.html#>. This White House site also offers streaming video and audio of the address.

62. “Executive Summary,” *Report on Hate Crime and Discrimination Against Arab-Americans: The Post-September 11 Backlash, September 11, 2001–October 11, 2002* (Washington, D.C.: American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 2003), 8. All documents from the organization were obtained from its website at <http://www.adc.org/>.

63. <http://www.zogby.com/soundbites/ReadClips.dbm?ID=4103>. The author is indebted to Yehonathan Brodski at the University of Jerusalem for pointing out this important data.

64. Another important civil rights organization, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) tracks bias incidents against American Muslims as well. Its numbers, however, are not significantly different from those of the ADC, so in the interest of space, the author has elected to use the ADC’s reports in this section. Cf. “We Are Not the Enemy,” *Human Rights Watch* 14, no. 6 (2002), <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/usahate/>, for another source of statistics and some local case studies.

65. The 2003 FBI Hate Crime statistics were released as this article was in the revision stage. By 2003, hate crimes against Muslims stood at 149 incidents perpetrated against 171 individuals, a slight drop from 2002’s count of 170 crimes against 174 victims. This continues the downward trend noted in the discussion of the 2002 statistics below, and in the interest of space will not be discussed separately. The 2003 report can be accessed at <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/03hc.pdf>.

66. Only Alabama does not participate in the gathering of data.

67. FBI, *Hate Crime Statistics 2002*. This and all of the FBI’s statistical data is available at the FBI website <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm>.

68. FBI, *Hate Crime Statistics 2000*, 5. Specifically, there were 8,063 incidents, most of which were single incident reports. The discrepancy (1,367 incidents) between the figures is accounted for by the occurrence of multiple offenses in a single incident.

69. FBI, *Hate Crime Statistics 2000*, 7.

70. *Ibid.*, 10–11.

71. *Ibid.*, 11.

72. Hussein Ibish, ed., *1998–2000 Report on Hate Crimes and Discrimination Against Arab Americans* (Washington, D.C.: ADC, 2001) 10–11. A great deal of hate speech is recounted in the ADC narratives, and a clear pattern of hate speech replaying Arab-Israeli tensions in the Middle East may be found.

73. *Ibid.*, 10–15.

74. *Ibid.*, 12.

75. *Ibid.*, 13.

76. Barbara Perry, “Anti-Muslim Retaliatory Violence Following the 9/11 Attacks,” in Barbara Perry, ed., *Hate and Bias Crime: A Reader*, 183–201.

77. FBI, *Hate Crime Statistics 2001*, 5.

78. *Ibid.* Once again, a note of caution is in order with regard to these statistics. As we have seen with attacks on Sikhs in the mistaken belief that they were Muslim, Americans are not always the most discerning judges of religious or national backgrounds. These statistics therefore must be considered in the of the vastly different local police agencies who submit this data. It would probably not be greatly surprising if the data for ethnic and religiously based crime were not blurred together to a significant degree. For their part, police depend on reports of the utterances of the perpetrator and to a lesser degree the perceptions of the victim in determining the motivations for a crime.

79. Hussein Ibish and Anne Stewart, *Report on Hate Crimes and Discrimination Against Arab Americans: The Post-September 11 Backlash, September 11, 2001–October 11, 2002*, 47. Cf. “Anti-Muslim Crimes Peaked After Sept. 11 Attacks, Study Shows,” *Chicago Tribune*, 14 November 2002, [www.hrw.org/reports/2002/usahate](http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/usahate).

80. Barbara Perry, “Anti-Muslim Retaliatory Violence Following the 9/11 Attacks,” in Barbara Perry, ed., *Hate and Bias Crime: A Reader*, 199, no. 1. It should be noted that the use of the term Khalistan in the organization’s name suggests a strong political agenda with regard to internal Sikh politics. This would not necessarily impact the veracity of the numbers—which seem quite reasonable in the context—but it needs to be noted nonetheless. Another organization, the Sikh Coalition, has created a web page dedicated to documenting post-9/11 hate crime against Sikhs at <http://www.sikhcoalition.org/NewsletterQ0102.asp>. The organization listed as of 19 June 2005 370 such incidents, but all were self-reported on the website by alleged victims. There is no way to verify these reports, but again, they are suggestive of the degree of the problem.

81. The small mosque in my area, the Fox Valley Islamic Society, was typical in this regard. The mosque consists of families from a number of national, ethnic, linguistic, and sectarian backgrounds (notably, both Shi’ite and Sunni Muslims worship reasonably amicably together). Several members are American converts and several of these converts are connected with my university. One such, a professor of Political Science who had converted from Judaism to Islam in the 1960s, is today the regional representative of the liberal legal group, the American Civil Liberties Union. Wearing both hats, this member of the mosque has worked hard to create linkages with the FBI and with local authorities, as well as to assure members of the Muslim community that it is safe to come forward to report incidents. This role has become particularly valuable in the wake of the passage of the Patriot Act. For the text of this Act, see <http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr3162.html>.

82. FBI, *Hate Crime Statistics 2001*, 9.

83. *Ibid.*, 12–13.

84. Hussein Ibish and Anne Stewart, *Report on Hate Crimes and Discrimination Against Arab Americans: The Post-September 11 Backlash, September 11, 2001–October 11, 2002*, 47.

85. *Ibid.*

86. FBI, *Hate Crime Statistics 2002*, 5.

87. *Ibid.*, 9.

88. See for example, “Attorney General John Ashcroft Remarks, Press Briefing with FBI Director Robert Mueller, FBI Headquarters September 17, 2001.” <http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2001/0917pressbriefingfbi.htm>.

89. U.S. Department of Justice, “Fact Sheet: Civil Rights Accomplishments,” <http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/civilrights/fs072303.htm> (accessed 31 May 2005).

90. The report, however, does note, correctly, that 165 incidents represent a “significant increase over most years in the past decade.” Hussein Ibish and Anne Stewart, *Report on Hate Crimes and Discrimination Against Arab Americans: The Post-September 11 Backlash, September 11, 2001–October 11, 2002*, 7.

91. FBI, *Hate Crime Statistics 2002*, 12–13.

92. This outreach did not go unnoticed by Muslims. See for example “From Conversion to Conversation: Interfaith Dialogue in Post 9–11 America,” *Muslim World* 94, no. 3 (July 2004): 343–55, and Eloise Davis-Chopin, “Muslims Dispel Myths As Post-9/11 Investigation Details Emerge,” *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, 21, no. 1 (2002): 64–65. These sources focus specifically on hate crime. For a study of the deeper structure of anti-Muslim bias generally in American culture after September 11, see Kathleen M. More, “‘United we stand’: American attitudes toward (Muslim) immigration post-September 11th,” *Muslim World* 92, nos. 1/2 (2002): 39–57.