

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Karl Sörenson [a] & J. J. Widen [a]
[a] Department of War Studies , Swedish National Defence College , Stockholm , Sweden
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Irregular Warfare and Tactical Changes: The Case of Somali Piracy

KARL SÖRENSON AND J. J. WIDEN

Department of War Studies, Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm, Sweden

The aim of this article is to analyze the tactical behavior of Somali pirates, international naval forces, and the shipping community operating in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin. To what extent has tactical behavior changed over time and can this process be understood in more theoretical terms? Our theoretical framework centers around some concepts often used in naval doctrine, discussing tactical change in terms of command and control, force, mobility, protection, intelligence, and endurance. We also evaluate this change using two tactical concepts—tactical adaptation and tactical development. The empirical data is based on statistics from the International Criminal Court-International Maritime Bureau and the EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta, as well as interviews. We conclude that Somali piracy has unquestionably adapted their tactics to circumstances, while naval forces have increased their capacity to capture pirates and shipping to avoid pirates.

Keywords naval forces, piracy, shipping, Somalia, tactics

Piracy at sea may indeed be perceived as the origins of naval warfare and the navies of states.[1] The fights between traders and pirates often provided the context and cause for larger political entities, such as states, kingdoms, and empires, to organize larger naval forces capable of combating this criminal activity on the high seas. The reasons were simple. Ships have always been the most efficient way of transporting heavy cargoes over long distances. As a consequence ships often carry valuable goods in large quantities, which in turn make for attractive targets for hostile states, privateers, pirates, and common criminals. Often enough, pirates also traded and the roles tended in practice to be rather blurred.

Piracy is an ancient phenomenon and no continent or larger region was spared. When important political and commercial interests were threatened, powerful political entities would raise navies to suppress such activities. Only then would piracy be reduced and finally subdued. From the 16th century onwards, ocean trade expanded and became commercially important for states like Portugal, Spain, Holland, and Britain. These states established among themselves the principle of freedom of the seas and their interests naturally clashed with pirates preying on oceanic cargoes. As time wore on, the established naval forces soon began to fight each other rather

Researcher Karl Sörenson and Associate Professor J. J. Widen are affiliated with the Department of War Studies, Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm, Sweden.

Address correspondence to J. J. Widen, Department of War Studies, Swedish National Defence College, Drottning Kristinas väg 37, P.O. Box 27805, Stockholm 11593, Sweden. E-mail: jerker.widen@fhs.se

than the pirates. Command of the sea now developed as an important idea, and the states and nations that could control the sea could also harvest the riches of the world.[2]

British maritime strategist, Julian S. Corbett, defined command of the sea as control of maritime communications for military, diplomatic, or commercial purposes. Command of the sea, in a pure sense, only applied in a state of war, he claimed, since freedom of the seas was the guiding principle in peacetime. American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that the wealth of nations depended on sea power. This meant trade, commerce, and transportation by sea. Such trade routes and communications needed a naval force for protection and the origin of naval power was therefore, according to him, economical.[3] Thus, for Mahan economic power depended on a nation's sea power, and such sea power depended on naval power, i.e., a naval force capable of defeating any threat to these interests. Up to this day, naval theory is primarily concerned with command of the sea and naval warfare between states, rather than policing actions against pirates and seafaring criminals.[4]

Like the early 17th century Barbary Corsairs of Northern Africa, Somali pirates are today the most well-known and notorious actors in this regard. Ships passing through the Gulf of Aden and the Somalia Basin are attacked and captured, people are held for ransom, and great economic interests are potentially at stake. As in earlier times, the great powers concerned join together in their efforts to combat this menace and the perceived threat to national wealth and security.[5]

The aim of this article is to analyze the tactical behavior of Somali pirates, naval forces, and cargo ships operating in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin. To what extent has tactical behaviour changed over time and can this tactical process be understood in more theoretical terms? Does piracy and counter-piracy require new tactical concepts since they are primarily criminal or policing activities rather than military and combat activities?

To a large extent, this article depends on two things, namely our understanding of what is meant by "tactics" and the data that will help us comprehend tactical change. Since the understanding of the word "tactics" is central to the subject matter, the concept will be dealt with in more depth below. In order to describe the tactical evolvement of Somali pirates, this article will outline the interplay between three actors, namely Somali pirates, naval forces, and the shipping community. Given an accurate account of the development in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin, something about the Somali pirates' tactical development can be determined and in so doing the general behaviour of Somali pirates can begin to be established. As a rule, issues of strategic character are not discussed in this article unless they have tactical implications. One such exception, which has both tactical and strategic implications, is the concept of "deterrence." Issues relating to Somali piracy that are of primarily strategic importance have been dealt with elsewhere.

The arguments in this article rely to a large extent on statistical data. The two main sources are the International Criminal Court-International Maritime Bureau (ICC-IMB) piracy statistics report and the EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta. The choice of using two different datasets is one of necessity. The EU statistics on piracy are compiled by the Operation Force Head Quarter on station and the Operational Head Quarter in Northwood, England. The Atalanta statistics are broken down with reference to certain areas and periods—more importantly, they also cover action taken by the naval operation on station. However, as the Atalanta

database only covers the last three years, from the inception of the operation until the date of writing (June 2012), it gives quite a limited perspective on the frequency of piracy over time.

The part of this article's arguments which concerns the origins of Somali piracy therefore relies on ICC-IMB statistics as the longer time-series allow for better trend analysis. The ICC-IMB statistics may, however, suffer from both under-reporting as well as over-reporting. The alleged over-reporting of piracy incidents in the ICC-IMB statistics relates to the years 2008–2011 specifically, when piracy increased and ships became overly vigilant of suspected attacks. However, there is also a suspicion of underreporting in the ICC-IMB statistics, since some of the tuna-trawlers sailing in the Indian Ocean can be reluctant to give away their positions as this information is valuable to competitors. It is almost impossible to account for this alleged over/underreporting, but the reader should be aware of the potential shortcomings.[6]

Given the security situation in Somalia, reliable sources are notoriously difficult to come by. Hence, next to the statistics, some of this article's factual claims rely on newspaper articles and some have been collected by the authors by way of interviews during 2009–2011. The locations visited have been identified as relevant to the research presented in this article, such as UN World Food Program (UNWFP), UN Political Offices for Somalia (UNPOS), UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), African Union's Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), Institute for Strategic Studies in Africa (ISS) and European Union's (EU) delegation to Kenya all represented in Nairobi in Kenya, and EU Naval Force Somalia (EU NAVFOR) Atalanta's Operational Headquarter (OHQ) in Northwood, UK.

Tactics as Adaptation and Development

One way of coming to grips with the tactics or modus operandi of modern piracy, and the efforts to combat such activities, is to categorize these actions into different elements or capabilities. Together such capabilities form a coherent tactical approach. Swedish naval doctrine, for example, describes six "fundamental capabilities" as a means of providing an intellectual model for how to command naval forces towards the chosen objectives. These six—command and control, force, mobility, protection, intelligence, and endurance—are considered the capabilities required to carry out an operation with naval or maritime means to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical aims. In essence, these capabilities help the naval commander, whether pirate or officer, to determine how the naval means can be combined, coordinated, and used to achieve maximum effect.[7]

Combat and war-like situations take place in very complex environments for the individuals involved, regardless of whether they are soldiers, sailors, or civilians. Intellectually, this complexity can be somewhat reduced if these situations are categorized and dealt with along the lines of the six fundamental capabilities just described. Complicated situations are thus made more manageable. These capabilities are no doubt closely interrelated in practice but it makes sense analytically to separate them and assess them separately, and also to view them as a holistic whole. Changes in one of these categories often affect the requirements and contents of the others.[8]

The commander in chief of a naval or maritime operation, be it a pirate or a naval officer, coordinates different weapons, platforms, communications, and logistical support, as well as handling personnel, technical systems, and making tactical choices. Collectively these make up the capabilities which form a tactical approach.

The creation and formation of these capabilities are ideally guided by the chosen objective, the war-fighting concept, and the actions of the opposing forces (the opponent). The character and need of these capabilities will naturally vary over time and differences may occur in different phases of the operation. The relative importance of an individual capability may also differ and change over time.[9]

Before we describe the six fundamental capabilities individually, it is crucial to present a few tactical concepts relevant to our discussion. Tactics, first of all, can best be understood as the method of using armed forces in combat or combat-like situations. This description is closely related to the classical definition put forth by Clausewitz, who determined the phenomenon to be "the use of armed forces in the engagement."[10] To simply use armed forces in combat constitutes little in the way of tactical thinking. It is the effective use of such forces, to achieve a determined objective, with a variety of means and in the face of the enemy, which is the task of the tactician. Only with an objective and an opponent in mind can the tactical activity and combination of different means be truly assessed and evaluated. In essence, tactics is the method used to attain one's goal in the face of the enemy in combat or in a combat-like situation. Tactics can also be conceived as the activity to combine the fundamental capabilities in the most efficient way possible, to reach the stated objective in the face of an enemy trying to obstruct, impede, and hinder such attempts.

Tactics change over time, both in the short and long term. This is due to many factors. In the short term, the immediate actions of the opponent are perhaps the most important factor. Such short-term alterations are commonly understood as *tactical adaptation*. Tactical adaptation can be both of a conscious and unconscious kind, since changes are not always due to mindful and planned actions and reactions by the belligerents but sometimes by accident or happy coincidence.

The more long-term alteration of tactical behavior is caused or prompted by a wider array of factors, not only changes in modus operandi of the enemy but also technological, social, and organizational factors. More importantly, as the objectives change so do the tactics employed to achieve them. This process is regularly understood as *tactical development*. Unlike tactical adaptation, tactical development is neither conscious nor unconscious as it is under the influence of several factors. These two concepts are central to the reasoning of this article as it tries to understand how the tactics have evolved. Finally, we need to differentiate between tactics and combat. While tactics are, as stated previously, the method of using military forces effectively in combat or combat-like situations, combat is the armed struggle between hostile forces aimed to subdue one's opponent. Tactics are the use of armed forces in battle or battle-like situations, while combat is the clash that results from such activities.

Six Fundamental Capabilities

Below, the six fundamental capabilities will be described and discussed. These capabilities can be viewed as the central elements of tactics and they are always present in some form or another.

Command and control. Command and control is a crucial aspect of operating naval forces at sea. This holds good also for the tactical maneuvering of naval units. In general terms, command and control is often understood as the process in which

operations are directed and coordinated in order to achieve a certain purpose.[11] In more specific terms, the U.S. Department of Defense defines it as:

> ...the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designed commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.[12]

In essence, this latter definition applies equally to small-scale piracy and larger counter-piracy efforts. The mission at hand requires a commander and assigned forces to accomplish the task. Personnel and equipment are chosen, communications are established, and the proper facilities and procedures are used by the commander to plan, direct, coordinate, and control the operation. Naturally, Somali pirates are much less sophisticated in all aspects mentioned. On the other hand, they have fewer and simpler units to coordinate and to direct.

Force. Force is the sharp end of all tactical units. In a narrow sense it is concerned with the amount and concentration of force, commonly kinetic, which may be delivered towards an objective. The aim is to destroy and harm but it can also be to threaten. In a broader sense this capability can be understood as the effect, intended or unintended, created by the use of weapons and platforms.

Mobility. Naval forces are inherently mobile. The ocean's surface and subsurface often require less logistical support than other kinds of forces. The U.S. Department of Defense defines mobility as "a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission."[13] Hence, moving forces around has little value in itself if the objective at hand is not fulfilled. Mobility is therefore an important means for the commander and used to accomplish the assigned military task more efficiently.

Protection. Naval forces in general all seek to protect themselves from dangers and unforeseen events. Naval commanders always seek to protect their own units or platforms, but frequently also the object or activity they are assigned to protect. In this regard, protection can be active or passive, as well as defensive or offensive. Firepower and mobility are often used as a form of protection.[14] In essence, protection is an activity or device that the commander uses to prevent harmful effects by both expected and unforeseen events. This is mainly related to the hostile activities of the opponent.

Intelligence. Naval forces are excellent platforms for intelligence-gathering. They are also in great need of intelligence themselves to perform their tasks. Important information needs to be disseminated to the right unit and in proper time for action. Intelligence should be accurate and useful for the task at hand. Information in a more general sense is the facts, data, opinions, or instructions acquired in different forms and from different mediums, for example TV, radio, internet, newspapers, or surveillance. Intelligence, on the other hand, is a rather specialized kind of information. The U.S. Department of Defense defines it as "the product resulting from

the collection, processing, integrating, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas." It is also understood as the "information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding."[15] Intelligence is certainly information but also a (often secretive) process aimed to better understand an adversary and his capabilities, and to predict his actions and intentions.

Endurance. Naval forces usually have great endurance and this is a vital aspect of their capabilities. Endurance creates many benefits in naval operations. To remain on station for as long as the operational tasks require is crucial. If the need for replenishment and reparations are great, operational capability is restricted. The radius of action is important when carrying out naval operations, and endurance creates operational independence. Endurance can be understood as the time and distance a military force or platform can continue to operate under specific spatial conditions, depending on for example the amount of fuel, the quality of the materials, the character of the personnel, and the environment.

This article seeks to investigate the different phases or periods for the evolvement of Somali piracy based on the underlying idea of tactical adaptation and development. The periods are defined as:

(a) *Engagement:* tracing Somali piracy from 1992 to 2010, when the naval operations had been on station for a year (commenced in 2009),
(b) *First iteration:* 2010 to the second half of 2011, and
(c) *Second iteration:* the second half of 2011 into early 2012.

Throughout the article, the fundamental capabilities are discussed in order to qualify what the different adaptation/development consists of in connection to the different iterations. Finally, we analyze some of the major findings with regard to the capabilities.

Engagement

This section considers the first phase of the interaction among pirates, shipping, and the naval operation. Hence it treats a time period running from 1992 (which is when ICC-IMB started to record piracy incidents around the globe) until the first year with a naval operation present, i.e., 2009. But when is a move a first move, in terms of tactical interaction between combatants? Somali piracy has been recorded as long as ICC-IMB has kept track of it, so when did it start? For our concerns, it commences when Somali piracy becomes such a peril that it prompts a counter-move from the navies. This is not to say, however, that the actions of Somali pirates were of no interest before they were engaged by the navies, but from a tactical point of view the interaction between the stakeholders is of lesser importance. Nevertheless pirates, navies, as well as shipping, need to be understood in context and in this section we will spend some time sketching the background and conditions for the engagement.

Somali Piracy Begins

During the 1990s, the intensity of Somali piracy seems to have varied from none to around a dozen reported incidents per year. In 2002, the incidents gradually changed

from being "mere" attacks to also encompass hijackings. The practise of hijacking the ships slowly increased, first cautiously, to then spike in 2005. There are different views concerning the origin of Somalia piracy and how it developed into the business that exists today. One view which is somewhat ad hoc, but held by many, is that Somali piracy developed from disgruntled Somali fishermen. The perceived trespassing of international trawlers fishing in Somali waters is, according to this view, to have prompted the Somali fishers to board foreign fishing vessels. These boardings eventually evolved into a "taxation" of the trespassing foreign fishers, a trend which changed into an inclusion of other types of vessels passing through the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Once it was clear that money stood to be made, more and more actors were drawn to pirating passing ships. Eventually this practise became the more general phenomenon that Somali piracy is today.[16] See Figure 1.

There is, however, an alternative explanation which is of interest. The Norwegian researcher S. J. Hansen puts forth the idea that Somali piracy is not so much a question of a tendency evolving into a practice, but rather a practice designed by a small group of Somalis. After having interviewed Somalis in the Diaspora, Hansen argued that the current business model of Somali piracy was developed by the Hoboyo-Haradhere cartel, which in 2003 found investors and trained the current board-and-hijack technique.[17] In 2005, the cartel started to put this technique into regular practice, which also corresponds to hijackings occurring more frequently and systematically. However, there was a breach in this practise in 2006, which had long-lasting effects on Somali piracy. In 2006, the Union of the Islamic Court (UIC) took control of much of the southern parts of Somalia and challenged the authority of the then sitting Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG). The UIC quickly banned piracy, a ban which they also enforced, with the effect that the pirate groups split up and retreated from their strongholds.[18]

Still, the UIC attitude to piracy was to be short-lived. The TFG asked for help from Ethiopia, which in late 2006 intervened and pushed back the UIC. The Ethiopian occupation did not focus on suppressing or even maintaining control in areas known to be pirate strongholds and the piracy resumed. However, whereas



Figure 1. Total number of attacks with number of hijacked represented in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin. *Note*: All statistics from the ICC International Maritime Bureau; hijacked according to the definition of the ICC-IMB. Attacked = Every category except "Hijacked"; see ICC-IMB piracy statistics for details.

the groups had been fragmented during the UIC period, now piracy occurred in geographically new places. This brief period in 2006, during the UIC's time in power, could possibly explain the corresponding sharp drop in piracy activity.[19]

This explanation offered by Hansen is of interest as it would not only explain the sharp increase in 2005, but also put the decline in 2006 in perspective. Hansen's theory is corroborated by the fact that known pirate groups during this time, i.e., 2004–2007, were dominated by the Majerteen and Saaid clans. Due to the Ethiopian intervention, the piracy practise spread and soon came to transcend the clan pattern in Somalia. During this period there was no specific naval task force operating to counter the piracy, although warships occasionally did patrol the area. Hence, to the degree that the pirates were adapting their tactics at this stage, they were primed to better identify and hijack ships of high value, relying chiefly on the use of force and mobility to reach their target.

One popular method of operating, which might be termed the *Littoral Small Boat-Approach* and seems to have gained in popularity around 2004, is to attack ships passing through the Gulf of Aden. The basics of this tactic seem to be that the pirates put out in smaller types of boats, called "skiffs," and if the moment is deemed opportune, to attack a ship. Such an attack group commonly consist of two to four skiffs, with a crew of three to six individuals on each boat. Often one skiff takes the lead and acts as a spotter. The pirates then attempt a boarding (often by the use of ladders to scale the freeboards) and, if successful, more pirates are picked up while underway to better control the hostages on board the hijacked ship. The hijacked ship is then taken to a safe harbour on the Puntland shore, beyond the control or reach of international naval forces. Some of the known villages which have been used by the pirates are Eyl, El-hur, Haradhare, Hobyo, and Bosasso. A ransom for ship, cargo, and crew is eventually negotiated and finally exchanged. The pirate attacks which occur in the Gulf of Aden typically happen very quickly. Consequently, it is difficult for the ships to take evasive action in time and for naval forces to intercept the attackers as incidents happen so swiftly and in relatively close quarters.[20]

This type of tactic seems to have been dominant among the northern pirate groups based in Puntland. On occasion the Puntland groups have commandeered larger vessels, such as fishing boats, to increase their endurance, but this seems to be the exception. The Puntland pirates, are, or at least were, seafarers who had other reasons to sail in the Gulf of Aden. The business connection to Yemen is important to Puntland and both legal and illegal actors travel between Puntland and Yemen on a regular basis. Hence, an actor working in the Gulf of Aden may not primarily be searching for a potential piracy target but rather be open to seize the opportunity when it presents itself.

In this setting, Somali pirates primarily rely on mobility and force. The skiffs' maneuverability and speed make them ideal platforms to sneak up on, and catch up with, many of the ships transiting the Gulf of Aden. The force employed takes the shape of warning shots against the ship and if the potential prey resists, the fire is directed at the bridge and/or against the resistance. A serious tactical drawback for Somali pirates seems to be the lack of intelligence. The hijacking of the weapon-transport *Faina*, for example, was probably a miscalculation by the pirates, given the massive and quick naval response it later prompted.[21]

Returning to our discussion on tactics, a couple of things can be noted: Firstly, and most importantly, this is a clear case of a tactical change on the part of the

pirates. If Hansen's assertion holds true, that the ongoing hijacking was the designed move to increase gains, this means that the goals of Somali pirates had changed. If previously the goal mainly was to rob the crew and take such commodities that were available, the new goal was to hijack the ship in order to extort money from the ship-owner. Of course, the final goal for all pirates remains the riches, but the goal in an operational sense changed in this case from robbing to hijacking. Turning to capabilities, it is clear that for such a designed change the pirates who participated in this more advanced form of piracy were in need of a command and control system, the very same system that had caused this new approach to the piracy. Coupled with this more coordinated tactic, resulting from the command and control system, was the overarching concept to rely on mobility and force.

Shipping

Every year an estimated 20,000 ships pass through the Gulf of Aden. In an attempt to avoid the increasing number of pirate attacks, which spiked after the UIC fell in December 2006, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) issued a recommendation that ships should keep a distance of 200 nautical miles (nm) from the coast of Somalia. The warning seems only to have slightly improved the situation, as the number of attempted boardings continued to increase.[22] At this time the countermeasures taken by ships passing through the Gulf of Aden were scattered and there was no clear idea what the best deterrent against the Somali pirates was; water hoses, flashlights, and increased watch were some of the more frequent countermeasures attempted. But the recommendations were also mixed; while some felt that the Automatic Identification System (AIS) should be turned off when passing through the Gulf to avoid being identified by Somali pirates, most kept it on. Seen in the light of the period 2004–2008, and not from today's vantage point (2012), with naval forces present and more knowledge on the Somali pirates' behaviour, this confusion regarding the AIS might seem less strange. At the time, most of the major shipping companies also entertain a non-violence policy, to reduce the risk of violent responses and long-term escalation. While exceptions existed, the majority of the attacked ships refrained from returning fire.[23]

During 2004, more and more ships were being attacked by Somali pirates and when the hijacking increased as a phenomenon in 2005, to spike in 2008 with 47 hijacked ships during the course of one year, the shipping industry managed to bring it to the public's attention. Up until 2008, commercial shipping was left more or less on their own with regard to security. Many also seem to have partly neglected or underestimated the threat posed by Somali pirates.

From a tactical point of view, it is clear that the majority of the ships passing through the Gulf of Aden relied on the idea of protection, but as the phenomenon was new, what constituted good protection was not always clear. To the extent possible, mobility, i.e., to pass the dangerous waters as quickly as possible, seems to have been used, but this was not readily possible for all of the ships that were passing through the Greater Gulf of Aden area. Two capabilities stick out as sorely missing: command and control, and intelligence. The difficulty of which recommendations to issue and how to engage the very heterogeneous shipping community was something that the IMO was grappling with at this time. Much of the confusion seems to come from the lack of knowledge of who the Somali pirates were and how they where operating, i.e., intelligence.

Naval Deployment

As a result of several attacks on the United Nations World Food Program (UNWFP) ships designated for Somalia, among them *MV Rozen*, France took the initiative to implement Operation Alycon. Together with the Netherlands, Denmark, and later also Canada, France formed what was the embryo to Operation Atalanta. With the continuous increase of piracy, Alcyon was dismantled and the lead of the operation transferred to the EU.[24] EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta, or Task Force 465 (TF-465) was launched in December 2008, with the first ships on station 2009.[25] There was, however, another task force present, known as Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150). CTF-150 is not a counter-piracy operation, but a part of Enduring Freedom, and, hence, has a different focus. Operation Atalanta was tasked with establishing the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC), which at the inception of the task force also became its key focus. Nevertheless, one ship from the operation was always made available to provide close escorts for the UNWFP, on its delivery rounds to Somalia, and to the United Nations Support Operation to AMISOM (UNSOA), which is a logistical operation in support of the African Union's Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). See Figure 2.

Initially the force-flow to the different task forces was uneven and focus lay on surveying the IRTC, and for Operation Atalanta, to provide the WFP ships with close escort.[26] It was during this period that Somali piracy was mostly contained to the Gulf of Aden and the coast of Somalia. Due to the continuous increase in piracy incidents during 2009, despite the naval build-up, the different task forces



Figure 2. Anti-piracy planning chart for the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and the Gulf of Aden, including the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) located in the latter. *Source*: EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta Operations Headquarters (color figure available online).

intensified their efforts to combat piracy. During 2009, focus lay mostly on the Gulf of Aden. For the operations on station, the operational concept has from the beginning been to detect, disrupt, and deter piracy. Given the extent of the operation, these concepts might be of interest to discuss since they might bring clarity to how the task forces operate.

Detecting piracy in the area of operation was, and remains, a daunting task for the international navies. During 2009, the area of operation extended in the north from Bab el Mandeb through the Gulf of Aden down to the Seychelles and from the Kenyan coast to 55° E. Hence, locating small boats such as the skiff is challenging. In addition, the skiff is also used by many of the local fishermen and is therefore indistinguishable from other civilian boats in the area, unless specifically reviewed. The naval operations were therefore dependent on good surveillance and intelligence. Satellite imaging, surveillance aeroplanes, sensors on the ships and helicopters, all play an important role to maximise the operations' possibility to effectively detect the targets. Just as with the other operational assets, the surveillance platforms have had an uneven availability.

During this first period, the disruption of pirates focused on pirates during attack, i.e., when the pirates were on the verge of boarding a ship. This presented difficulties for the naval assets as the required response time from a pirate alarm to an already successful boarding could be as short as 20 minutes. Given the distances, also in the Gulf of Aden, the time was often not enough to successfully intercept the attacking pirates. The disruption task involved several difficulties for naval operations, especially with regard to identification. It is not always easy to single out who might be a pirate with clear and unambiguous evidence so as to stop, board, and destroy pirate equipment. In part, this might explain why only 21 disruptions were made during the course of 2009 (see statistics below). The practice of disrupting pirates is also related to the prosecution of suspected pirates as this concept entails the actual capture of suspected pirates. This meant that during the first year when disruptions were targeted to intercept pirates on the verge of boarding a ship, the frequency of disruptions was low for the naval operations. In addition, once a pirate skiff was taken the lengthy process of due process was initiated, which meant that the ship captain responsible for the disruption had to temporarily leave the operation to centre his attention on the legal aspects of the handover.[27]

During the first year of naval presence in the area, 2009, the naval forces' primary tactical focus was force projection in the IRTC and providing protection to ships transiting the Gulf of Aden, as well as the UNWFP and UNSOA deliveries to Somalia. The establishment of the IRTC, in combination with patrolling and quick response to pirate alarms, meant the naval operations tried to build up a situation where pirate attacks were met by force. The shortcomings were clear however, since naval mobility was insufficient to respond effectively and quickly enough to pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden. Moreover, the intelligence of the whereabouts of Somali pirates was insufficient to help the command and control aspects of the operation. Force was hence the overarching tactical concept.[28]

First Iteration

While the first period or phase described above is quite long, stretching from 1992 to the end of 2009, the second phase, here called the first iteration, must be said to be relatively short, spanning from the beginning of 2010 to the first half of 2011, i.e.,

one and a half years. Two factors underscore that this is a period in its own right. Although this first iteration can perhaps best be characterised as a period of adaptation, as no major shifts were done by the stakeholders, the dynamics of the situation altered. As piracy continued to increase and it partly changed location, naval forces increased in numbers and followed pirates out into the Somali Basin, while shipping started to coordinate its approach to piracy more consistently.

Piracy in the Somali Basin

Until the year 2008, most of the more southern attacks occurred along the Somali coast, i.e., seldom more than 200 nautical miles out from the Somali coast, and often perpetrated by the same groups as the ones attacking the ships in the Gulf of Aden. However, since 2009, there is a trend that pirates have been deploying further out into the Indian Ocean using larger boats. This tactic typically consists of a larger boat, called a "whaler," in which the pirates load fuel, ladders, ammunition, water, and khat (an amphetamine-like stimulant). Behind the whaler the pirates tow two or three skiffs, in which they deploy when coming upon a potential prey. This more complex and distributed formation is commonly referred to as the *pirate action group-approach* (PAG).[29]

The employment of the PAGs was a rather new phenomenon. Other pirate groups had also used motherships to enable further endurance, but the occurrence of this specific set-up with one whaler and a couple of skiffs can only be traced back to the latter part of 2009. This tactic seems to be a more popular approach among the pirate groups operating from the south of Somalia. The phenomenon of the PAGs, coupled with the fact that pirates caught in the Somali Basin by naval forces to a large degree belong to different Somali clans, indicates that new groups started to turn to piracy. These groups were (and are still) not necessarily seafarers by trade but took to piracy as it presented them with a possible and often generous income.[30] Some of these so-called PAG-pirates have also been found shipwrecked and it is believed that several PAGs' efforts have succumbed to the sea. Hence, these newer brand of pirates seem to spend more time in preparation, but are perhaps even more dependent upon luck than the older groups from Puntland as they can occur anywhere in the eastern parts of the Indian Ocean. As some of these attacks took place more than 600 nautical miles from the Somali coast, they seem likely to have been committed as much in desperation as by design.[31]

The distributions of attacks between the Gulf of Aden area and the Somali coast/Somali Basin are important to note (see statistics in Figure 3, below). During 2003–2007, the Somali coast was the usual area where attacks took place. In 2008, there was a sharp rise in the attacks taking place in the Gulf of Aden. During 2009, the attacks in the Gulf of Aden continued and also increased, but in addition, the Somali Basin went from a relatively low number of attacks in 2008, to account for more than a third of the total number of attacks in 2009. Hence, there are two clearly distinguishable changes. First, into the Gulf of Aden in 2008, then a second change into the Somali Basin in 2009. Lastly, in 2010 the trend changed again, when the attacks in the Gulf of Aden made a marked drop (which continued into 2011), while the attacks in the Somali Basin continued to increase, dominating the area of attack in 2010 and into 2011.

The proportion of incidents between the Somali Basin and the Gulf of Aden has varied greatly over time. This also shows that the pirates have been quite adaptive in



Figure 3. Relations between pirate incidents in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin per quarter. *Source:* ICC-IMB.

their behaviour. In the next section, these changes in distribution of attack location will be considered. Later on in this article, naval operations' impact on piracy will also be discussed, which may shed light on some of the drivers behind the changing behaviour of the pirates.

Unlike piracy in the north, the PAG set-ups in the south use temporary bases along the southern Somali shore. These temporary bases are due to a lack of safe harbours in the southern parts of Somalia. However, it can also be seen as an indication of the need for a stationary place to muster crews, unlike in the north where able men are more readily available, because of its stronger connection to the maritime domain. What mainly distinguishes these pirates from the ones operating from northern Somalia (Puntland) is their use of motherships, which increases endurance and an ability to operate further out at sea. Their command and control system is similar, although more planning is required to prepare for long journeys at sea and for training new crews. The cargo ships attacked are primarily targets of opportunity and require little in terms of intelligence. Motherships, with several skiffs in tow, result in easier targets for naval forces to detect. On the other hand, the vast areas in which they operate earn them a certain amount of protection. Difficulties also arise for the pirates when cargo ships are caught and hijacked far from their local bases and ports.

Naval Adaptation and Development in 2010 and 2011

During 2009, two other naval operations joined forces with EU NAVFOR Atalanta—the NATO Operation Ocean Shield, known as Task Force 508 (TF-508), and the Combined Maritime Forces Operation Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151). Just as in the case with operation Atalanta, the size of each of these forces varied over time. During the monsoon season the number of ships can be reduced due to harsh weather conditions that make it difficult to operate far out into the Indian Ocean, for pirates and navies alike. In addition, the force-flows to the different task forces have showed to be uneven; however, a minimal number is always kept to ensure that each of these forces can keep at least two ships in the IRTC in the Gulf of Aden. In addition, there are bilateral responses, e.g., from India, China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Russia, etc., which sometimes liaise with Atalanta, Ocean Shield, or Combined Maritime Forces Operation (CMF).

When PAGs started to operate from the southern coast of Somalia, the three task groups partly regrouped to better cover the Somali Basin areas as well, although still remaining in the IRTC. With the increase of naval components on station and the ever increasing piracy during 2009, the naval task forces began to disrupt suspected pirate vessels at an earlier stage, i.e., when pirates were scouting for potential prey. Once a suspected pirate vessel was deemed to carry equipment meant to be used for piracy, the PAG was stopped and equipment such as ladders, weapons, and extra fuel destroyed, and the suspected pirates instructed to go back to where they put out from. This tactical adaptation presupposed earlier detection since pirate groups now deployed further into the Somali Basin. Since naval operations are basically constabulary operations, the law-enforcement element of the operations is greatly helped by good surveillance. This furnishes the piracy prosecutors with evidence, which might facilitate a quicker return to the operation for the naval components making the disruption. See Figure 4.

As indicated by the statistics, the disruptions of suspected pirate vessels increased during 2010. This increase is due to the change in tactics by naval operations to target suspected piracy vessels at an early stage. The effectiveness of this practice can be debated, as piracy during 2010 was more or less constant in comparison to 2009. However, a reverse argument could also be made, i.e., that if this change in tactics had not been put in place, Somali piracy would have increased even further during 2010.

For naval forces engaged in counter-piracy in 2010, this meant an adaptation of tactics. Whereas in 2009 force had been the primary focus, in 2010 and 2011 intelligence, mobility, and endurance were now the capabilities that naval operations increasingly seemed to rely on. Apparently, this also resulted in effects that were absent during the operations conducted in 2009. The capability of force was still essentially the basic element of the operations but with a new interpretation of the operations' rules of engagement, the disruptions went from disrupting pirates during an attack to also encompassing disruptions of suspected pirates. This had two advantages. Firstly, it prevented potential pirate attacks and secondly it did not tie up naval assets as the pirates were released once equipment and materials deemed as potentially useful to instigate an attack had been confiscated.



Figure 4. Number of naval disruptions in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin. *Source:* EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta Operations Headquarter.

Shipping Boosts Security

With increasing piracy during 2008–2010 in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, the ship owners and ship merchants increasingly came to review their own security. Up until 2008, commercial shipping was left more or less on their own with regard to security. Many also seem to have partly neglected or underestimated the threat posed by Somali pirates. Increasingly during 2009 many ship owners started to turn to commercial security service providers for help with voyage planning, protection of the vessels and, if needed, payment of ransoms. As the security service providers is a very heterogeneous group, both with regard to type of service provided as well as type of response, it is difficult to account in a general way for how the various security providers tried to boost security for their respective clients.

The trend of increasing ship security is not only something that ship owners have initiated by themselves. The IMO has for some time issued recommendations to seafarers travelling the waters of the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin. The increasing piracy has, however, prompted the IMO to issue stronger policies regarding Somali piracy. One such important document is the Best Management Practice sponsored by the IMO, entitled *BMP4—Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and Arabian Sea*, released in 2009, relating best practices for vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden and the coast of Somalia. The BMP4 issues recommendations regarding company planning, master's planning, and voyage planning, for ships travelling the piracy waters.[32] The idea is that an adherence to the IMO recommendations, which include that ships liaise with naval operations in the area, will provide for a more secure passage through the piracy-infested waters.

As mentioned, the commercial security services provide different sorts of solutions, but many of them offer management on how to implement some of the IMO recommendations from voyage planning, to protection of cargo, crew, and the vessel itself. The levels of service vary from general consulting to advisory directly on board ships transiting dangerous zones. In connection to these services, some of the security providers also offer technical solutions such as specially made water hoses, acoustic devices, barbed wire, night-vision equipment, construction of safe-rooms (so-called citadels), etc. Other services provide hostage negotiation management up to safe ransom payments, when a ship has been hijacked. Some ship merchants now also offer security consultancy for their clients, as there is increasing demand from the shipping community to know how to best protect their investments.[33]

A risk-aware behaviour from ship owners has the added benefit of allowing naval forces in the area to focus on enduring operations, such as patrolling the IRTC and performing focused operations to intercept pirates setting out from the Somali coast, rather than ad hoc distress responses.[34] Although active security awareness, and adherence to the IMO recommendations, certainly seems to lessen the risk of falling prey to a pirate attack, it is no guarantee.

In terms of tactical adaptation, private security companies have quickly come to establish themselves as important actors in regard to the Somali piracy problem. To a large degree the focus remains on various ways to protect the ship, but it also involves attempts at increasing mobility. An alternative way, however, is to incorporate weapons in one's overall security tactic as well.

Second Iteration

We now turn to the third phase, here called the second iteration, which incorporates the latest development of the piracy situation in and around the Greater Gulf of Aden from the latter part of 2011 and into early 2012.

Piracy and Motherships

During the latter part of 2011, Somali pirates also began to employ a third tactic, which may be termed the "*hijacked mothership*" *approach*. Increasingly, they relied on hijacked ships to attack and attempt hijacking of other ships. This method has been used before, but then mostly by hijacking fishing vessels which are essentially larger than skiffs and whalers, but significantly smaller than a bulk carrier or tanker. This development has enabled pirates to operate over an extended time and space, thus gaining in endurance. With a commandeered mothership, Somali pirates also have the added advantage of being difficult to intercept by international navies as they are in control of a ship with both crew and cargo as hostage. Hence, these platforms are a valuable platform for longer range piracy and increase their protection from naval forces.

The drawback for the pirates when operating hijacked ships as mother vessels is that they are dependent upon the ship's skipper, who will manoeuvre the ships for them as the Somali pirates generally lack the necessary skills to do that. This makes operations harder to command and control. The problem with this technique for the Somali pirates is also that the hijacked ship is only possible to use as a mother vessel with a significant number of skiffs intact as the ships themselves are too slow to be used in direct attacks on other ships. This decreases their mobility as well as their relative advantage in speed and manoeuvrability. Nevertheless, pirate attacks conducted in the Somali Basin have tactically more facets than those in the Gulf of Aden as they rely not only on force and mobility, but also on endurance to get their prey. This latter capability is a tactical adaptation, making these pirates able to strike over greater distances. In addition, mobility also relates to how Somali pirates work their bases along the coast.

The most pertinent question is to what extent Somali pirates operating in the Basin have a command and control system. Given how they repeatedly build up, supply, and move their provisory land-bases before setting out to sea, this indicates that there is a viable structure ashore for coordinating, investing, and dispatching their PAGs. It is, however, less certain that the pirates, once they have set out, have sufficient means to command and control the PAGs in an operative sense.

Navies Going on Land

There are several United Nations' Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) which stipulate the legal framework for the counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin. One key resolution is UNSCR 1851, passed in 2008, which opened up for pursuing counter-piracy operations on the Somali shoreline. It was, however, not until March 23, 2012 that the EU Council, with the consent of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, approved of Operation Atalanta to explore this option. A couple of months later, on May 15, Atalanta conducted an operation against a suspicious pirate base with the purpose of destroying equipment

and fuel. The suspected pirate base had been under observation for an extended period and when the moment was deemed opportune the naval force launched its attack. The assault took place in the morning and the planners of the operations intended to make sure only equipment and fuel were destroyed, and that at no time any individuals came to harm, something which seems to also have been achieved.[35] The sensitivity of this sort of operation is reflected in the care that was taken not to put any personnel on the ground and, perhaps more importantly, to communicate the fact that "At no point did EU naval forces 'boots' go ashore."[36]

If this sort of attack at pirate bases will become a standard practice of counter-piracy operations, it constitutes a tactical change. Given the tactical terminology introduced earlier, the question is whether it can be deemed as an adaptation or a development. In one sense the tactical change may be viewed as a tactical adaptation to the circumstances as the pirates have used forward bases along the Somali shoreline since late 2009. To locate and strike against these known targets is simply a delayed tactical reaction to a known pirate logistical practise. On the other hand, to directly target pirate bases constitutes an alteration in targeting logistical hubs instead of pirate boats. The question is whether this change is strong enough to be viewed as a tactical development, i.e., a major long-term shift. Nevertheless, it does mean that the operation, in order to sustain this more advanced tactical approach, needs to increase its mobility (to reach the bases), and to improve intelligence capabilities (to target these bases with precision).

Shipping and the Use of Weapons

While many ship owners and skippers do adhere to most of the IMO recommendations, some choose to deliberately ignore certain recommendations. One such example is the commercial tuna trawlers, which often do not report their location to the naval operation and switch off their Automated Information System, both in breach of IMO recommendations.[37] This is mainly due to the fact that public knowledge of a fishing vessel's position might reveal to other fishermen where fish can be found, thus leaving competitors with important information regarding a shoal's location. However, since the fishermen feel that they cannot reveal their position, it also leaves them more vulnerable to pirate attacks. As a consequence, many of them place armed guards on board their vessels to provide a stronger level of protection.[38]

Perhaps the most controversial issue pertaining to enhanced ship security is the question of armed guards. Some commercial security providers do offer armed guards to the shipping community, but far from all ship owners choose to place such guards on board their ships. For some owners it is a question of policy, as they feel that the legal and insurance issues associated with weapons on board their ships have not been sufficiently investigated, whereas others seem to have more practical reasons for not placing such guards on board.[39]

The armed guards just mentioned raise the question of force in relation to protection. This increased firepower on board the ships tends, on the one hand, to increase protection if handled correctly, due to a greater level of deterrence and the new means of responsive fire. On the other hand, it also potentially decreases protection if the level of violence escalates and lethal firefights ensue. If armed guards are used as a last line of defense, however, and employed together with other external countermeasures, it should help the general protection of the ship, its cargo, and crew.

Some Tactical Conclusions

Given our discussion above, it is clear that there has been quite a substantial tactical change in the interplay between pirates, navies, and shipping. The most major shift, which set Somali pirates apart from other contemporary pirates, is the change from "merely" attacking ships to also hijacking them. According to our definition, this is the clearest case of a tactical development. Somali piracy has also adapted to the tactical circumstances. From using only skiffs, they have evolved to employ whalers to tow skiffs further out to sea and to sometimes use hijacked ships as "motherships." The Somali pirates have primarily adapted their tactic regarding the platforms used, in order to increase their endurance. While the use of force and mobility seems to have been deemed sufficient, and protection is of secondary value to someone venturing into such a risky business as piracy, endurance appears to have been the quality most desired.

Moreover, contrasted with naval forces and shipping, it appears as though pirates are the drivers of most tactical changes. While naval forces are optimized to increase their capacity to capture pirates, and the shipping community to avoid pirates, the pirates' sole goal is the bounty they can collect from a hijacked ship. But over time this incentive has also made the Somali pirates prone to develop tactically. From operations close to shore, into the Gulf of Aden and further out into the Somali Basin and the Indian Ocean, using mobile bases along the Southern coast of Somalia, Somali piracy has showed its willingness to constantly develop.

If pirates could be viewed as the "first movers" of many of the tactical changes, naval forces have been mostly reactive. The initial tactical set-up for naval operations shows a clear emphasis on force. The IRTC was established and enforced, and pirate attacks were to be disrupted. With hindsight it appears that the value of the use of force, or threat of force, was overestimated. Consequently, the lack of sufficient mobility to intervene effectively, in combination with an increasing piracy in the Somali Basin, prompted tactical adaptation on the part of naval forces. The first and second iterations consequently saw an emphasis on other capabilities for naval operations. Intelligence was developed with better surveillance platforms, such as drones and MPRAs. Meanwhile, command and control developed to better conduct operations, both within the respective operations and between the operations, and in contact with the IMO and shipping community. A clear case of tactical development is less distinguishable with regard to naval operations, except that the initiative to attack pirate bases ashore and the reinterpretations of the operations' rules of engagement changed how disruptions could be carried out. From a relative few disruptions, which in most cases involved disruptions of ongoing pirate attacks, to pre-emptive disruptions which engaged suspected pirates, naval operations increased their disruptions eight-fold.

If today's naval operations (June 2012) rely to a lesser extent on force than was the case in 2009, the opposite is true of the shipping community's attempts to come to grips with its security. From treating the waters off the coast of Somalia as just another part of the open sea, the shipping community has come to adapt its tactical behaviour. Early on, the stress was put on preventative methods, i.e., relying chiefly on protection and to some extent mobility, while presently the shipping community has increasingly come to rely on force to protect themselves from pirate attacks. The increasing demand for more security has also prompted tactical adaptations as in the case with integrating command and control with the IMO, naval operations, and the international community in general, as well as the Contact Group on Piracy.

Going back to the introduction, the main concern of this article has been the tactical behavior of Somali pirates, naval forces, and shipping operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin and to what extent tactical behaviour has changed. The six fundamental capabilities were presented as an intellectual model to better understand how naval forces conduct their operations in a tactical manner and in order to achieve their chosen objectives. As seen from this discussion, changes from one party in a conflict can at times prompt many adaptations from another actor, whereas the very same action which also affects a third party will not lead to any changes at all. A case in point is when Somali pirates expanded their area of operation to the entire Somali Basin, shifting to rely more on endurance and more command and control, rather than merely mobility and force. This, in turn, led to much activity by the naval forces, who needed to meet this expansion by the pirates by planning their operations more carefully to cover this expanded area of operation (command and control) and increase their surveillance capability (intelligence). Meanwhile the pirates' prey, shipping, was not affected other than to increasing their vigilance (intelligence) also in the Indian Ocean.

The capabilities presented in this paper help identify these different tactical changes more readily, which facilitates the analysis of the behavior of those involved in a conflict situation on a lower level other than strategic. The differentiation between tactical development and adaptation, in turn, enables classifying how crucial these changes are, if they involve a change in goals or mere adaptation of means. Hence, these two rather simple tools can be quite instrumental when analyzing and categorizing a tactical situation or scenario. Taken together with other methods such as the incentives analysis, in-depth intelligence regarding the parties to the conflict and operational research, these tools may further promote a more detailed understanding of tactical situations.

Notes

1. John Keegan, *Battle at Sea: From Man-of-War to Submarine* (London: Pimlico, 2004), 3. For an important study on the origins of navies in the Western state-system, see Jan Glete, *Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500–1860*, Vols. 1–2 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1993).

2. Keegan, *Battle at Sea* (see note 1 above), 4–5.

3. Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), originally published in 1911, 91–106; and Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660–1783* (Cambridge: John Wilson and Son, 1890).

4. For a comprehensive overview of naval theory, see J. J. Widen, *Theorist of Maritime Strategy: Sir Julian Corbett and His Contribution to Military and Naval Thought* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012). For theories on naval diplomacy see J. J. Widen, "Naval Diplomacy: A Theoretical Approach," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 22, no. 4 (2011): 715–733.

5. Current literature on piracy in general and Somali piracy in particular include: James Kraska, *Contemporary Maritime Piracy: International Law, Strategy and Diplomacy at Sea* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011); Benerson Little, *Pirate Hunting: The Fight Against Pirates, Privateers, and Sea Raiders from Antiquity to the Present* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2010); Peter Lehr, ed., *Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 2007); David F. Marley, *Modern Piracy: A Reference Handbook* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 2011); John C. Payne, *Piracy Today: Fighting Villainy on the High Seas* (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Sheridan House, 2010); Peter Eichstaedt, *Piracy State: Inside Somalia's Terrorism at Sea* (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2010); Martin N. Murphy, *Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World* (London: Hurst & Company, 2010); and Martin N. Murphy, *Somalia: The New Barbary?—Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

6. The data used in this article stems in part from Karl Sörenson, *Wrong Hands on Deck? Combating Piracy and Building Maritime Security in Eastern Africa,* 2011, FOI-R–3228—SE, http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir3228.pdf.

7. Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, *Doctrine for Maritime Operations* (Stockholm, 2005), 43–44.

8. Ibid., 44. Also compare with Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), Book 1, Chap. 1, 75 (translation by Michael Howard and Peter Paret).

9. Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, *Doctrine for Maritime Operations* (see note 7 above), 44.

10. Clausewitz, *On War* (see note 8 above), Book 2, Chap. 1, 128.

11. See Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Stockholm, 2005), 36; and definitions of "Command and Control" formulated at the Command and Control Studies Division, Swedish National Defence College, https://www.fhs.se/en/about-the-sndc/organisation/department-of-military-studies/organisation/command-control-studies-division-lva/.

12. U.S. Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military Terms* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999).

13. Ibid.

14. Compare with Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, *Doctrine for Maritime Operations* (see note 7 above), 45–46.

15. U.S. Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military Terms* (see note 12 above).

16. This view has no clear advocate, but is widely spread, both in the media and within the international community.

17. S. J. Hansen, *Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden*, NIBR Report 29 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Urban Regional Research, 2009), 23.

18. Ibid., 27.

19. Ibid.

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26. Interview: Operational Headquarter Operation Atalanta, Northwood, December 2010.

27. Interview: Force Headquarter Operation Atalanta, HSweMS Carlskrona, July 2010.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Interview: United Nation Office against Drugs and Crime, Victoria, June 9, 2010.

31. Ibid.

32. See BMP4 for details regarding recommendations, http://www.gard.no/webdocs/BMP4.pdf.

33. Interview: Operational Headquarter Operation Atalanta, Northwood, December 2010.

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36. Ibid.

37. Interview: Seychelles Police Authority, Victoria, June 8, 2010.

38. Interview: French Embassy and UK High Commissioner, Victoria, June 7, 2010.

39. Interview: Seychelles Port Authority, June 7, 2010.