

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Exporting Iran's Islamic revolution: Steering a path between Pan-Islam and nationalism

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Exporting Iran's Islamic Revolution: Steering a Path between Pan-Islam and Nationalism

HAGGAY RAM

This article focuses on the question of whether Iran's foreign policy over the period 1979–94 was a pure reflection of the clerical regime's millenarian crusade and its stated doctrine of exporting the Islamic revolution worldwide. Taking, *inter alia*, the controversy surrounding Iran's takeover of the island of Abu Musa in 1992, the article argues that Iran's actions were determined by a persistent sense of nationalism which was not less potent than its pan-Islamic vision. Iran's nationalist tradition has been able to survive as a major force in Iranian political culture, its sometimes 'Islamicized' form notwithstanding.

In his classic work *The Anatomy of Revolution*, Crane Brinton postulates that revolutions, 'as gospels, as forms of religion...are all universalist in aspiration'.[1] This proposition certainly holds true in the case of the Iranian revolution. Exporting (*sodur)* the Islamic revolution is one of the chief pillars of Iran's revolutionary ideology – and to many of Ayatollah Khomeini's disciples, the principal goal of Iranian foreign policy. Indeed, Iran's leaders hold that their country has a special duty to propagate its message throughout the 'oppressed' Muslim world. In carrying out this responsibility, Iran pursues two objectives. First, it seeks to mobilize the revolutionary fervor of Muslims everywhere to overthrow their respective governments and establish Islamic republics similar to that of Iran. Second, Iran works to restore the unity of the Islamic community – the *umma* – so as to enable Islam to play its ordained role in history.

However, a closer examination of Iranian policy calculations since Khomeini's February 1979 ascent to power reveals a more complex picture. Despite their apparent emphasis on the primacy of Muslim unity over the preservation of the Iranian nation state, the Iranian *'ulama'* (clergy) have repeatedly acted to protect Iran's territorial and political integrity on the basis of *raison d'état.* An example of this was Khomeini's acceptance of the 1988 cease-fire with Iraq, which he justified as being 'in the interests of Islam and the Muslims'.[2]

This apparent contradiction between dogma and praxis raises a number of questions, including: was Iran's foreign policy over the period 1979–94 a reflection of its Islamic universalist vision? Or, was the Islamic regime

guided by genuine national interests relating, in the main, to *raison d'état*? In short, are the concepts of exporting the *Islamic* revolution and Iranian *nationalism* mutually exclusive, or can they exist concurrently? This article attempts to address these issues by examining the statements and policies of Iran's leaders since 1979. The takeover of the Persian Gulf island of Abu Musa in April 1992 by Iran will serve as a case study in this analysis.

Although this chapter excludes the 'voices from below', such voices do merit consideration. Indeed, I strongly believe that the official ideologies of states 'are *not* guides to what it is in the minds of even the most loyal citizens or supporters'.[3] Thus, Islam and nationalism in revolutionary Iran – to paraphrase Eric J. Hobsbawm – are 'dual phenomena, constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be understood unless also analyzed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people...'.[4] At any rate, I begin with an examination of the doctrinal foundations of Iran's Islamic vision, namely the Shi'i notion of *entezar*.

Entezar: Dynamic Expectation of the Hidden Imam

The concept of exporting the revolution is deeply rooted in the evolution of the Shi'i doctrine of *entezar* (the messianic 'expectation' of the Hidden Imam). Even though we find both quietist and activist groups and doctrines among the early Shi'is, it is commonly held that the Imami or 'twelver' sect of Islam first shunned political activism in the mid-eighth century CE.[5] The failure of successive Shi'i efforts to regain the sect's 'usurped' and 'rightful' leadership of the Islamic community drove the early Shi'is to submit to the powers that be. As a result, there emerged the doctrine of the Occultation (*ghaybah*) of the Twelfth Imam, promulgated in 873–874 CE. This concept encouraged the faithful to wait for the return (*raj'ah*) of the Twelfth Shi'i Imam – the messiah (*mahdi*) who would appear at the End of Time – without actively altering their state of existence, as painful as it may have been. 'Such messianic expectations', Abdulaziz Sachedina notes, 'did not require the Shi'is to oppose the [political] establishment actively'.[6] It is therefore safe to conclude, as does Hamid Enayat, that the doctrine of *entezar* was 'one of the main causes of the notorious passivity of its adherents during the greater part of their history'.[7]

The revolutionary character of Shi'i Islam in the second half of the twentieth century inevitably rendered the passive implications of *entezar* null and void. In the late 1960s the celebrated ideologue of the Islamic revolution, 'Ali Shari'ati (d.1977), was the first to reject the passive interpretation of *entezar*.[8] Adapting his understanding of this notion to his overall conception of Shi'ism as an ideology of social and political

revolution, Shari'ati held that 'true' *entezar* commands Muslims to take an active role in advancing the return of the Hidden Imam from occultation, and thus drawing nearer the Shi'ites' final redemption. He agreed that only the manifestation of the Imam would uproot oppression and bring justice to the earth, but in the interim, Shari'ati declared that the faithful 'must play a part' in bringing about the Imam's revolution, not with 'prayers . . . but with a banner and a sword, with true holy war involving all responsible believers'.[9] In short, he held that human beings are capable of hastening the coming of the *mahdi* by engaging in revolutionary action to eradicate oppression and tyranny and replace them with justice. According to Shari'ati's interpretation, the Hidden Imam will not reappear of his own accord; human intervention is required to pave the way for his return. People must strive for *universal* justice in order to occasion the *mahdi's* return.

The activist doctrine of *entezar* became the focal point of many official presentations and orations in post-Pahlavi Iran. Through the practice of *entezar*, it was claimed, the righteous make the environment favorable for the Imam's return. In June 1983, Hojjat al-Islam 'Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani explained, 'your child or spouse [went] away to the [war]front', and after a period of time he is expected to return home: 'You may consider these final moments as a state of *entezar*. Your ears are turned to the doorbell. You arrange the house for . . . the coming guest – in accordance with his desires, joy and opinion. Once you are in a state of *entezar*, you make conditions favorable [for the homecoming guest].'[10]

But what exactly is meant by making 'conditions favorable' for the return of the Hidden Imam? How does one arrange his 'house' (society) so as to make it habitable for the 'guest' (the Hidden Imam)? In June 1980, Hojjat al-Islam Sayyid 'Ali Khameneh'i clarified that society must approximate itself to the greatest possible extent to the conditions that will prevail upon the revolution of the *mahdi*. The Imam's society is built on the following foundations:

> First, on the elimination and eradication of the roots of injustice and overflowing tyranny (*toghyan*). I mean, in the society . . . [of] the *vali-ye 'asr* [the Lord of the Time; the Hidden Imam] there should be no oppression and injustice; not only in Iran . . . in the entire world. There should be no economic oppression, no political oppression, no cultural oppression, not any kind of oppression . . . [E]xploitation, inequality, unreasonable demands, and hooliganism . . . must be eradicated.[11]

Hence, making the environment favorable for the Hidden Imam means working to free the world from tyranny and oppression and creating a just social order, while 'Expectation' means taking concrete steps to implement at least part of the Imam's global justice.[12]

According to the Iranian ruling *'ulama'*, the Islamic revolution was in itself an act of dynamic *entezar*. It was, in the words of Rafsanjani, 'a drop of water in the vast ocean of the *mahdi*'.[13] And, according to Khameneh'i, it contained 'all the ingredients' of the *mahdi's* reappearance 'on a small scale' (*meqyas-e kuchak*).[14] For example, upon his return the Imam will 'confront all the great powers of the world'; likewise, the Islamic revolution 'has stood up against all great global powers'. Equally meaningful, insofar as the Imam is bound to introduce an eternal epoch of global justice, 'today . . . our revolution . . . is in the line of creating justice in the world arena'.[15] Lastly, the establishment by the Imam of a 'global Islamic government' (*hokumat-e jehan-e eslami*) was preceded by the revolution, which laid 'the ground for the global government of the *mahdi*'.[16] In short, inasmuch as the revolution was a manifestation of dynamic *entezar*, it was advancing the Imam's return from occultation:

> We, the nation of Iran, have . . . made a revolution. Our revolution was the necessary prelude and a great step in the path of that goal which the Imam of the Age (*emam-e zaman*; the Hidden Imam) was sent . . . to accomplish. If we had not taken this great step, surely the appearance of the *vali-ye 'asr* would be postponed. You, the people of Iran . . . [are] the cause of the advancement of the great human movement toward [its] destination in history, and the cause of hastening (*tasri'*) the appearance of the *vali-ye 'asr*.[17]

It was at this juncture that the Iranian *'ulama'* went a step further, claiming that the Islamic revolution was capable of 'drawing the return of the Imam . . . [even] nearer'.[18] By waging a victorious revolution, the Iranian people had 'drawn themselves one step closer' to the Hidden Imam; they 'are able, once again, to take a step, and another step, and another step, in bringing themselves closer to the Imam of the Age'.[19] That is to say, just as they had practiced *entezar* to rid their country of tyranny, they should free the entire world from oppression and injustice, because to do so will draw nearer the return of the Hidden Imam: 'Whichever of the perimeters of this Islamic zone [i.e., Iran] you are able . . . to expand and propagate in other locations, you have helped and have drawn near to the same extent the appearance of the [Hidden Imam]'.[20]

To sum up, through the practice of active *entezar*, the Iranian nation moved substantially closer to the promised revolution of the *mahdi*. However, Iran was also qualified to advance the return of the Imam further by extending its practice of *entezar* to other regions, eradicating oppression and tyranny from the entire world. Indeed, such was Iran's exclusive obligation. According to this view, Iran was the only country to have fully implemented the all-inclusive Islamic concept of justice and established the

government of the *mahdi*, even if 'on a small scale'. These were 'the special leadership qualifications that Iran alone enjoys as compared to all nations of the world'.[21]

Accordingly, Rouhollah K. Ramazani referred to Iran as a 'Redeemer Nation'.[22] Consider the following words of Khameneh'i:

> We must . . . strive to export our revolution throughout the world . . . . The Qur'an is not confined to the town of Mecca, it is not limited to the Quraysh infidels. [The Qur'an] is not satisfied with . . . guiding the people of one town or one country to happiness and salvation. It is for the inhabitants of the world (*'alamin*), for [all] people and for mankind . . . . [T]he message of Islam must hasten to deliver the people wherever there is poverty, wherever there is discrimination, wherever there is oppression.[23]

This universal 'redeeming' role of the Islamic revolution was heralded by the Iranian leadership time and again. In June 1985, one ayatollah stated that 'the grain of the universal Islamic government started from here, and we still have to strive hard until it reaches its lofty summit'.[24] Likewise, Prime Minister Mir-Husayn Musavi asserted in February 1987, 'the movement of the revolution is part of the universal movement of the oppressed, and it is indivisible from the destiny of the rest of the Muslims'.[25] Also in April 1988 Khameneh'i assured the assembly of the Tehran Friday prayers that 'exporting the revolution is like a glitter of the sun of which rays . . . brighten the entire world'.[26] Finally, in the wake of Khomeini's death in June 1989, Ayatollah 'Abdul-Karim Musavi Ardebili declared, 'we are continuing the way of the Imam [Khomeini]'—and so, Iran will persist in the endeavor to 'deliver the deprived people and Muslims throughout the world'.[27]

It may be said, consequently, that the chief instrument for the realization of this objective was the exporting of the revolution, thereby propelling Muslim and other deprived nations to carry out analogous revolutions on their own respective soils. Indeed, a host of scholarly studies of the Islamic Republic and its ideology have illustrated convincingly the practical subordination of Iranian foreign policy to this millenarian vision.[28] Mention should be made of Iran's long-standing logistic and moral support for the Shi'i Hizballah in Lebanon, for the *mujahidin* rebels in Afghanistan and for the Islamic government in the Sudan, as well as its active involvement in subversive activities in most of the Persian Gulf states. Still, the question remains, was Iran's pursuit of its national interests invariably overshadowed by this universal vision? Was the foreign policy of the Iranian regime truly a monolithic reflection of the millenarian Islamic crusade?

Nationalism and Islam: Mutually Exclusive or Intertwined?

A society with a common religion will likely be characterized by over-all cohesion and collective self-consciousness. Religion is capable of reinforcing the attachment of a people to its territory, or in modern times, to its nation state. Conversely, as two opposing – sacred and secular – value systems (or as competing collective identities), religion can also undermine the legitimacy of the modern nation, thereby eroding the allegiance of a people to the territory in which they dwell.[29]

In Iran, Shi'i Islam has been, on the whole, a pillar of modern territorial nationalism. Indeed, Iranian national identity has been affected profoundly by Shi'ism ever since the Safavid dynasty (1501–1722) made Shi'ism the state religion. 'Shi'ism emphasized the uniqueness of Iranians as it formally separated them from the vast majority of Sunni Muslims, especially those in the surrounding Arabic and Turkish speaking lands'.[30] Edward G. Browne was therefore correct in observing that, prior to the twentieth century, no one suspected that loyalty to the state of Iran and loyalty to Islam were two different loyalties.[31]

The Iranian revolution of 1978–79, however, *ostensibly* marked the end of this often troubled, but nonetheless enduring, co-existence between religion and nationalism in Iran. 'In part', Hamid Dabashi observes, 'the Islamic revolution ... can be seen as a direct (Shi'ite) Islamic reaction against the artificial over-Persianization of Iranian political culture at the expense of its Islamic component'.[32] The Islamic revolution thus seemed to corroborate Richard W. Cottam's estimation in the mid-1960s that 'if a conflict of the two sets of values is likely anywhere it should occur in Iran'.[33]

Ayatollah Khomeini's outlook serves as an expression of the seeming defeat of Iranian nationalism. Although Khomeini's stance in the beginning of his political career was clearly more nationalistic than Islamic or universalist,[34] by the end of the 1960s his views had undergone a radical transformation. Marked by pan-Islamic motifs, Khomeini's vision appeared to have extended far beyond the borders of Iran. He called for the realization of Islamic unity that would obliterate prior national, 'artificial' divisions among contemporary Islamic states.

Khomeini's supra-nationalist tendency was most conspicuous in his 1971 programmatic work, *Velayet-e Faqih* ('The Governorship of the Jurisprudent'; or as it is entitled in the Arabic version, *Al-Hukumah al-Islamiyah*, 'Islamic Government'). Here Khomeini renounced nationalism as an imperialist conspiracy designed to sow discord among Muslims, in order to facilitate the advances of the 'infidel' West in the Islamic lands. He claimed that in the wake of World War I, the imperialist powers divided the 'Islamic homeland' (i.e., the Ottoman Empire) into 'peoples' (*shu'ub*) and

'petty states' (*duwailat*), placing in each an 'agent of their own' to safeguard their economic and political interests.[35] Khomeini called on all Muslims to unite under the banner of Islam to repel the imperialist onslaught: Islamic unity, he argued, would enable the believers 'to crush the human and tyrannical gods and icons that have plundered the world'.[36]

This universal Islamic vision was formally adopted by the *'ulama'* upon their seizure of power in 1979. Indeed, the Khomeini regime's self-styled obligation to spearhead Muslim unity was enshrined in article 10 of the Islamic Republic's Constitution, which reads as follows:

> All Muslims form a single nation, and the government of the Islamic Republic has the duty of formulating its general policies with a view to merging and union of all Muslim peoples, and it must constantly strive to bring about the political, economic and cultural unity of the Islamic world.[37]

Yet it would be wrong to conclude from here that the ruling *'ulama'* forfeited Iran's nationalist tradition in favor of their pan-Islamic vision. For, as we shall see, nationalism has indeed survived – albeit in modified form – under clerical rule and has continued to be a major force in Iranian culture.

Most observers contend that the revival of Iranian nationalist sentiment in post-Pahlavi Iran was especially noticeable *after* the outbreak of the Iranian-Iraqi War in September 1980.[38] Yet, the sources at hand clearly show that the nationalist tradition was an integral part of the *'ulama'*'s discourse before the war, although introduced under the guise of Islamic universalism. Consider, for example, this August 1979 statement by Ayatollah Sayyid Mahmud Taleqani (d.1979) on the Iranian nation's obligation to export the revolution worldwide:

> You must be the torch-bearers of *tawhid* [monotheism] and Islam in the world of heresy, idolatry, and matter-worship, in order to deliver the world. Just as after the first century of Islam the Iranians were able to make Islam flourish (all these *'ulama'*, all these jurists [*fuqaha'*], all these transmitters of Tradition [*akhbariun*], all these philosophers, all these painters – most of them were . . . Iranians). . . for this reason, we must be attentive. We have a heavy responsibility, not just a social responsibility toward ourselves, but the responsibility of the world's leadership. 'And thus we have made you [Iran!!!] a medium nation that you may be the bearers of witness to the people and that the Apostle may be a bearer of witness to you' (the Qur'an, 2:143).[39]

We see, then, that there emerged out of Taleqani's universal vision a genuine sense of national pride in the Iranian people's service to Islam. Taleqani is speaking here as a true Iranian nationalist – proud of his nation's cultural contribution to and preeminence in Islamic civilization.

Other Iranian officials expressed their patriotism under the veil of universal Islam. Ayatollah Husayn 'Ali Montazeri observed in December 1979, 'from the advent of Islam to this day, Iran has rendered [much] service to Islam. Although the cradle of Islam is Arabia . . . the services of the nation of Iran to Islam have been numerous'. Montazeri also recalled that all six books of *hadith* (Tradition) that the Sunnah regards as the most reliable (the *sitt al-sihah*) were compiled by individuals of 'Iranian' origin; 'none of them was an Arab'.[40] One may therefore agree with Shireen Hunter's conclusion that 'even the present [Iranian] regime, despite its anti-nationalist feelings, at times exhibits ethnic pride and refers to Iran's role in the development of Islamic civilization'.[41]

When the Islamic revolution entered its eighth year, Khameneh'i explicitly proclaimed the Islamic Republic's allegiance to Iranian nationalism. On the occasion of 'Unity Week' in November 1987, Khameneh'i discussed the issue of bringing Iranian Sunnis and Shi'is closer together. Within this context, he distinguished between 'positive' and 'negative' nationalism. The latter, he said, is 'condemned', because it brings about a 'schism among Muslim brothers', the Persian-Shi'i majority and those Iranian ethnic groups that adhere to Sunni Islam. The former, however, is 'good', as it denotes the unity of all 'citizens' for the 'protection of the country's borders against foreigners'.[42] In short, the unification of Iranian Sunnis and Shi'is has little to do with the universalist Islamic vision. Instead, it stems from the narrower, more immediate (and nonetheless legitimate) issue of fortifying the pillars of the Iranian nation state.

As mentioned, the eight-year Iranian-Iraqi War offers ample evidence of Iran's genuine adherence to its nationalist tradition at the expense of the proclaimed universal vision. To be sure, the *'ulama'* repeatedly attempted to broaden (or 'Islamicize') the national confines of the conflict, portraying it as a war between Islam and disbelief, a sacred *jihad* that Iran had undertaken on behalf of *all* Muslims – Shi'is and Sunnis, Persians and Arabs.[43] Nevertheless, soon after Iraq launched its invasion of Iran in September 1980, the Islamic Republic of Iran found it expedient to draw on Iranian nationalist sentiment, couched in Islamic terms, in order to enlist mass support for the war effort.

In September 1981, seeking to bestow an Islamic aura on the ongoing Iran-Iraq conflict, Ardebili cited an excerpt from a sermon delivered by 'Ali ibn Abi Talib (the First Shi'i Imam and Fourth Muslim Caliph) to his subjects on the eve of the Battle of Siffin (657 CE): 'Do you not see . . . that the boundaries of your state are getting shorter and shorter daily and parts of your country are being snatched and usurped . . . and your cities are being invaded?'[44] Interestingly, although the citation reflects the tones of

universalist Islam, Ardebili's conclusions from the passage clearly support the view that the national tradition remains strong in the culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran:

> Do you not see Abadan? Do you not see Qasr-e Shireen? Do you not see other towns? . . . Do you not see [how the Iraqis] shed the blood of your youth on the soil of your country? You must resist the aggression committed by global oppression and imperialism against your independence and territorial integrity.[45]

Similarly, Hojjat al-Islam Hasan Ruhani disguised nationalist sentiment under the veil of Islamic universalism, asserting in July 1984 that Islam enjoins on all Muslims 'defense and *jihad*, so that they would be able to carry on their daily lives and observe their religion'. He then referred to Iran as the 'motherland' (*meyhan*), a term often used by the last Pahlavi shah. However, Ruhani (and others like him) was careful to add the term 'Islamic', turning Iran into the 'Islamic motherland'.[46] A year later Ruhani acknowledged that 'if defense in war is intended to preserve a piece of land or the life of a people, this defense is sacred'. Nevertheless, he continued, 'if defense takes the form of preserving religion, that defense is more sacred than everything'.[47]

If the Islamic Republic of Iran accepted the legitimacy of the separate Iranian entity, it also accepted, in principle, the existing international system based on congeries of territorial states. In other words, it appears that Iran actually recognized what James P. Piscatori calls the '*non*-universality of the Islamic community'.[48] Such a contention is further exemplified by the *'ulama"*s explanation of the exact meaning of Islamic unity. They repeatedly argued that unity among Muslims did not necessarily mean the obliteration of the national divisions of contemporary states, nor their respective customs and religious and cultural heritage. Rather, Islamic unity is a 'unity of goals' or 'unity of purpose'. Unity, Khameneh'i declared in September 1984, 'means not that the Shi'is renounce their beliefs. . . . Our Sunni brothers have their own beliefs, we, the Shi'is, our own beliefs'. He added the following:

> We have no intention of bringing the Sunni brothers to Shi'ism or the Shi'i brothers to Sunnism. Rather, the unity . . . of Muslim brothers should evolve around a common axis and common bases. . . . Experience has shown . . . that diversity of beliefs never prevented two brothers from praying [together], from launching Holy War, from performing the annual pilgrimage to Mecca (*hajj*), or from issuing collective declarations on Islamic issues. What is important is unity of purpose and unity of principles, and this exists between the Shi'i and

> Sunni brothers in all the Muslim lands. The best axis for the unity of the Islamic community is the [Prophet Muhammad]. . . . [A]ll the Muslim countries should lay aside their [petty] differences and strive to establish unity among all Muslim societies by creating one popular movement against the oppressors (*mostakbarin*).[49]

Islamic unity is thus defined as focusing on what all Muslims have in common – the Prophet of Islam, the Qur'an and the struggle against common enemies – *not* the merging of separate political entities or the nullification of all distinctions among Muslims. 'All Muslims', declared an Iranian official, 'should form one community with their different beliefs and with their different sects; a community governed by friendship, cordiality and cooperation, defending and supporting each other'.[50] In sum, the unity envisaged by the Islamic Republic of Iran was something of an alliance among the different Muslim states which safeguarded their territorial integrity and their national distinctive marks, rather than their actual political integration.

We see, then, that despite the *'ulama"*s millenarianism and commitment to an Islamic world order, nationalism has remained active in revolutionary Iran and continues as a major force in Iranian culture – its accommodation to religious teachings, notwithstanding. As Allesandro Bausani rightly observed, Iran and Islam were never antithetical to one another.[51]

The Abu Musa Affair: Iranian Nationalism and 'Reasons of State' at their Height

Iran's April 1992 takeover of Abu Musa – a strategic Persian Gulf island situated at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz – is evidence to the continued centrality of nationalism in Iranian culture. Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands were first occupied by Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's forces in October 1971, immediately following the British withdrawal from the Trucial Coast principalities. Since then, the island of Abu Musa has been subject to a power sharing agreement between Iran and Sharjah, one of the seven constituent shaykhdoms of the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[52] The accord, however, 'did not resolve the issue of sovereignty, which remained a subject of [dormant] dispute between Iran and the UAE . . . with nationals of both states coexisting uneasily on Abu Musa'.[53]

As we will see, Iran's 1992 landing on Abu Musa and its assertiveness on the issue since have had little to do with exporting the Islamic revolution or with the *'ulama"*s supra-nationalist vision. Rather, Iran's behavior and actions derived directly from its national-strategic interests. In fact, they

were almost a carbon copy of the Shah's policy toward the island in 1971–72, which was motivated in the main by national considerations and the Shah's concern for the security of the Persian Gulf region.

Indeed, the policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran – as that of the late Shah – seems to fall in line with a number of salient patterns that have determined Iran's role in the Persian Gulf since at least the sixteenth century. The first of these is steadfast nationalism, guided by the perception that the Gulf has been an Iranian possession, a 'Persian sea', since Cyrus the Great and the first Persian empire. (Repeated Iranian claims to Bahrain during both the Pahlavi and Khomeini eras attest to that as well.[54]) And, although 'the mists of history afford little gratifying evidence to support any [Iranian] claimants ... [t]he national memory is far more important and deeply rooted than any reality or legal brief ever could be'.[55]

It is thus not surprising that immediately after landing its Iranian forces on Abu Musa, the Islamic regime – like the Shah's government in 1971–72 – repeatedly spoke of Iran's 'historic' claims to the island. Later, Iran used the same 'historic' claim in negotiating with the UAE over the sovereignty of the Tunb islands. Iran's self-styled obligation to propagate its brand of Islam on foreign soil did not figure in at all.

Indeed, the resemblance between Pahlavi and revolutionary Iran's (nationally-motivated) rationalizations of their actions in the Persian Gulf is striking. In a statement issued in October 1992, following the collapse of the Iranian-UAE negotiations over the disputed islands, the Iranian National Council categorically affirmed that Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands were 'part of the Islamic Republic's territories'. 'These islands', the statement maintained, 'were occupied during the expansionist era of the aging British colonialism. In 1971, these islands were restored to Iranian sovereignty after nearly three years of talks.'[56] Likewise, responding in September 1992 to the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) statement in favor of the UAE's claim, the Islamic Republic of Iran explained that 'based on firm, legal and historic documents and evidence, the Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunbs belong to Iran'.[57]

Consider now the terminology with which the Shah's government rationalized Iran's initial occupation of the islands in 1971:

> For more than 80 years colonialism prevented us from restoring our sovereignty over the islands of Abu Musa and the T[u]nbs despite our incontestable historical rights. These islands are now under Iranian control again.[58]

Or in the words of the Shah (January 1972), 'historic facts and documents prove that these islands belong to us'.[59] Both Pahlavi and post-Pahlavi Iran thus justified their actions by drawing on Iran's national memory – a

dominion where the discrepancy between the image and the reality of Iran's historic role in the Gulf is rendered irrelevant.

The Islamic Republic used its national memory to discredit the UAE's counter-claims to the disputed islands. 'If geographical demarcation was due to be decided by historical claims', the daily *Jomhuri-ye Eslami* cautioned the Gulf states, 'Arabs in the region would be the main losers'.[60] Responding to a statement allegedly distributed by the UAE in October 1992, according to which the UAE has 'exercised for long its sovereignty' over the islands, the daily *Kayhan* mocked: 'One may ask, how long has the UAE existed that it can say "for a long time".... Where were the boundaries of this country "a long time ago?"'[61] In sum, by articulating its own version of the region's political history, Iran sought to drive home the point that, with the sole exception of Iran, all the countries of the Gulf littoral, and the UAE in particular, 'have no historical continuity or depth'.[62] In doing so, it was relying upon historical, rather than religious, claims. Thus, Muhammad Javad Larijani explained, 'Seventy years ago, when many of these countries did not exist geographically, Iran maintained its sovereignty'.[63]

Iranian national sentiment was in full swing when the Islamic government called on all Iranians to unite in the defense of the *vatan* (motherland) against the UAE's and its Arab allies' designs to 'snatch' the islands. It warned its Arab neighbors not to 'violate' Iran's 'national sovereignty and territorial integrity',[64] or else Iran would 'retaliate' with all its might.[65] Iran, Rafsanjani warned the UAE in September 1992, is 'seriously adhering to the policy of resistance and defending our land and will not give in to humiliation'.[66] Lastly, the daily *Salam* let it be known that all Iranians, young and old, were 'ready to defend [their] legal borders'. He who seeks to test the Iranian people 'will be responsible for the consequences of [his] insanity'.[67] In this context of safeguarding Iranian national sovereignty, Rafsanjani dared those challenging Iran's claims 'to cross a sea of blood (*darya-ye khun*)' if they wished to retake the islands.[68] Once again, revolutionary Iran's staunch nationalist sentiment conforms to Pahlavi Iran's 1971–72 discourse on the island dispute: 'Millions of Iranians of every class and age . . . are expressing their complete support for the government and their readiness for any type of sacrifice to preserve the nation's independence, integrity and legitimate rights'.[69]

An analysis of the Islamic Republic's steps to enforce its control over Abu Musa and the Tunbs clearly shows that its prime intention was to 'Persianize' the islands, rather than 'Islamicize' them. In August 1992 Iranian authorities on Abu Musa denied port entry to a ferry from Sharjah. This incident brought the UAE-Iranian dispute to a boiling point. The boat reportedly carried teachers, along with their dependents, to the island for the start of the school year; some 200 Arab pupils remained on the island.[70]

With this, the Persianization of Abu Musa became a vivid reality, with 'Iran reportedly extending control over all aspects of the UAE islanders' life'.[71]

Sharjah's nationals in Abu Musa were henceforth treated as temporary 'guests'[72] and were urged to accept Iranian nationality or leave the island.[73] (Reports about Iran's intention to expel the Arab residents of Abu Musa altogether were subsequently denied by Iranian officials.[74]) Beginning in September 1992 the Iranian media referred to Abu Musa as part of Iran's Hormuzgan Province, pledging that it 'will become one of the most beautiful islands of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the near future'.[75] The Islamic Republic also celebrated the beginning of the new academic year in Abu Musa, where 'Iran's national anthem was played during the ceremony'.[76] Finally, the Iranian parliament passed a law in April 1993 extending Iranian territorial waters to include the disputed islands,[77] in effect annexing them to Iran.

From 1988 and the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War, social and economic reconstruction became high priorities of the Iranian administration. To this end, Iran sought to enhance cooperation with the GCC states. However, Iran's actions in the Gulf strained Irano-GCC relations. The Iranian leadership therefore took pains to play down the islands dispute, claiming time and again that 'no [new] development had occurred on the island[s]'.[78] This 'business-as-usual' posture is worthy of a brief examination, for it too bears striking resemblance to Pahlavi Iran's handling of the islands affair, twenty years earlier.

In an obvious attempt to pacify the Gulf states, Iran's first deputy foreign minister 'Ali Muhammad Besharati explained in April 1992 that, by its actions, Iran was merely trying 'to infuse new life into the islands of the Persian Gulf', through a program of 'comprehensive construction' that had been under way 'for the last few years'. 'We abide', he concluded, 'by what Iran agreed with the UAE shortly after its creation in 1971'.[79] This statement represented an Iranian effort to allay the Gulf states' fears of a looming Iranian menace in the Persian Gulf. Iranian officials repeatedly explained that Iran's stance on the islands had not been altered, and that the islands' 'status [has] not changed'.[80] 'Nothing new has taken place', they pledged, and 'the islands' affairs are proceeding as before'. In short, 'the 1971 agreement . . . remains in force'; Sharjah nationals living on the island can continue their 'honorable life', as before, next to their 'Iranian brothers and sisters'.[81]

The 1971–72 islands imbroglio found the Shah in a similar circumstance. At that time he was seeking to accommodate the Middle Eastern Arab states with a view to winning their support for his ambitions in the Persian Gulf after British withdrawal.[82] Like the Rafsanjani administration in 1992, the Shah played down the depth of Arab resentment.

Consequently, his government hastened to explain that the shaykhdoms of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah (which claimed Abu Musa and the two Tunbs, respectively) were aware, in advance, of the landing of Iranian forces. The Iranian foreign ministry even went as far as to state that the 'landing of Iranian forces was in keeping with [Iran's] well-known intention to land forces there before the British withdrawal'.[83]

Iranian nationalism was among the guiding principles behind the Islamic Republic's assertiveness in the Gulf, although more concrete geopolitical considerations, quite similar to those of the Shah, were also at play. Writing in 1972, Ramazani finds that Iran's rulers have always 'aspired to playing a leading role in the Persian Gulf'.[84] He adds that external circumstances dictated whether or not Iran could in fact play a major role in the region. 'Most often adverse external circumstances limited Iran's freedom of action. . . . Conversely, when [a] favorable external environment coincided with the rise of powerful [Iranian] rulers, Iran played a more effective part in the Gulf'.[85] Certainly, the 1991 Gulf War (resulting in the severe weakening of Iraq), the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union were all favorable for Iran. They afforded it a golden opportunity to achieve its long-standing goal of playing a major role in the Gulf. Indeed, Iran's most recent actions in the Persian Gulf can (and should) be seen as the continuation of old themes in Iranian political history, with no relationship whatsoever to its millenarian ideological crusade.

Finally, strategic interests relating to reasons of state were also among the motivating factors behind Iran's 1992 Persian Gulf adventure, just as they had been behind the Shah's actions of twenty years earlier. The Shah and Iran's Islamic government recognized the strategic importance of the islands, located as they are at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz – through which the backbone of Iran's economy, oil, is transported. In the words of two specialists, 'The islands . . . are situated at a critical "choke point" near the strategic and easily blocked straits [*sic.*] of Hormoz'.[86] Their 'geographic position', the Shah explained in 1971, 'can make them issues of tremendous military value'.[87] On another occasion, in January 1972, the Shah offered the following scenario: 'if these islands are in the hands of irresponsible people, a small ship or even a motorboat armed with a bazooka . . . can cause trouble'.[88] The Shah's apparent lack of faith in the ability of the emerging Gulf Arab Federation to preserve the security of the Strait of Hormuz can in itself explain his decision to embark upon the islands adventure. It was perhaps because of a similar lack of faith that Iran's Supreme National Security Council stated in September 1992 that the 'security at Abu Musa is part of the undeniable responsibility of Iran'.[89]

Thus, Iran's long-term goal, both in the Pahlavi and post-Pahlavi eras, has been to shape decisively a security regime for the Gulf area, and it was

for this reason, among others, that they set out to 'regain' or 'occupy' (according to the varying interpretations) the islands. The Islamic Republic of Iran may have also sought to signal to its neighbors that no joint security apparatus in the region could be effective without Iran's participation. Indeed, Iran has been critical of plans by the GCC states to enlist Syria and Egypt into Gulf security arrangements, as envisaged by the yet-to-be-activated 'Damascus Declaration' alliance of 1991. Moreover, Iran has also opposed the Gulf states' new, more explicit willingness to conclude defense pacts with the West, insisting in both cases that regional security was the responsibility *solely* of the Gulf littoral states.[90] At any rate, whatever reasons may be cited for Iran's assertive policy in the Gulf, its pan-Islamic vision was certainly not one of them.

Conclusion

Revolutionary Iran has genuinely adhered to two visions – the nationalist and the pan-Islamic – which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A potent cultural asset in Iranian modern history, the nationalist vision has been able to survive as a major force in Iranian political culture, its sometimes 'Islamicized' form notwithstanding.

Tension, conflict, coexistence and reconciliation have frequently played important roles in the relationship between the Islamic and nationalist traditions in Iran. Indeed, in post-Pahlavi Iran, neither tradition has been pure or based completely on one element. Rather, elements from the other have contributed to the forces which have made one tradition dominant at a particular time; the ascendancy of one does not mean that the other has permanently disappeared from Iranian culture.[91] Thus, that the leadership of the Islamic Republic has, at times, given precedence to reasons of state over those of the millenarian ideological crusade, should not by any means be taken as an indication that Iranian foreign policy has taken on an outlook of 'new realism'.[92] Instead, such considerations should stand as clear indications that nationalism has retained its viability as a legitimate cultural and political force in Iran.

Governments come and go, but political cultures endure. Indeed, there is a high degree of continuity in Iranian culture. Revolutions obviously occur within a specific set of pre-existing cultural patterns and many of these are carried over from the old regime. In Iran, as in other countries, 'revolutionary crises are *not* total breakpoints in history that suddenly make anything at all possible if only it is envisaged by willful revolutionaries'.[93]

NOTES

1. Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (NY: Vintage Books 1965) p.196.
2. Cited in P. Chelkowski, 'In Ritual and Revolution: The Image in the Transformation of Iranian Culture', *Views: The Journal of Photography of New England* 10 (Spring 1989) p.11.
3. Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: CUP 1991) p.11.
4. Ibid., p.10.
5. See M. Bayat, 'The Iranian Revolution of 1978–79: Fundamentalist or Modern?' *Middle East Journal* 37/3 (Winter 1983) pp.30–42.
6. Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, *Islamic Messianism: The Idea of the Mahdi in Twelver Shi'ism* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press 1981) p.79.
7. Hamid Enayat, 'Khumayni's Concept of the "Guardianship of the Jurisconsult"', in James P. Piscatori (ed.), *Islam in the Political Process* (NY: Cambridge UP 1982) p.174.
8. For an analysis of Shari'ati's notion of *entezar*, see Mongol Bayat-Philipp, 'Shi'ism in Contemporary Iranian Politics: The Case of 'Ali Shari'ati', in Eli Kedourie and Sylvia G. Haim (eds.), *Towards a Modern Iran* (London: Frank Cass 1980) pp.161–2.
9. 'Ali Shari'ati, 'Entezar, the Religion of Protest', trans. by Mongol Bayat, in John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito (eds.), *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives* (NY: Oxford UP 1982) p.303.
10. *Ettala'at* (Tehran, daily), 4 June 1983.
11. *Dar Maktab-e Jom'eh: Majmu'ah-ye Khotbeh-ye Nemaz-e Jom'eh-ye Tehran* 2 (In the Ideology of Friday: A Collection of the Sermons of the Friday Prayers of Tehran) (Tehran: Entesharat-e Chapkhaneh-ye Vezarat-e Ershad-e Eslami, 1364 Sh.) June 1980, p.200 (hereafter, *Khotbeh*).
12. Emami-Kashani stated in this regard: '*entezar* cannot serve as a pretext for the lack of holy war (*jihad*) ...against oppression and tyranny'. See *Ettala'at*, 18 March 1989.
13. *Ettala'at*, 19 May 1984.
14. *Khotbeh* 3 (1365 Sh.) 19 June 1981, p.200.
15. Khameneh'i in ibid., p.200.
16. Emami-Kashani in *Ettala'at*, 21 June 1986.
17. *Khotbeh* 2, 27 June 1980, p.201.
18. Rafsanjani in *Ettala'at*, 19 May 1984.
19. Khameneh'i in *Khotbeh* 2, 27 June 1980, p.202. See also Mahdavi-Kani in *Ettala'at*, 23 July 1983.
20. Khameneh'i in *Khotbeh* 2, 27 June 1980, p.202. See also Rafsanjani in *Kayhan* (Tehran daily), 10 July 1982.
21. Rouhollah K. Ramazani, 'Khomeini's Islam in Iran's Foreign Policy', in Adeed Dawisha (ed.), *Islam in Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: CUP 1983) p.18.
22. Rouhollah K. Ramazani, 'Shi'ism in the Persian Gulf', in Juan R.I. Cole and Nikkie R. Keddie (eds.), *Shi'ism and Social Protest* (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1986) p.34.
23. *Khotbeh* 2, 28 March 1980. Also see Ayatollah Husayn 'Ali Montazeri in *Khotbeh* 1, 14 Sept. 1979, pp.54–5; Rafsanjani in *Khotbeh* 4 (1367 Sh.), 8 Jan. 1982, pp.186–8; and Khameneh'i in *Kayhan*, 4 Dec. 1982.
24. Ayatollah Jannati in *Ettala'at*, 22 June 1985.
25. *Ettala'at*, 7 Feb. 1987.
26. *Ettala'at*, 9 April 1988.
27. *Ettala'at*, 4 June 1989.
28. See John L. Esposito (ed.), *The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact* (Miami: Florida International UP 1990); David Menashri (ed.), *The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1990); and Ramazani (notes 21, 22). Also see Haggay Ram, *Myth and Mobilization in Revolutionary Iran* (Washington, DC: American UP 1994), especially chs. 6 and 7.
29. For a valuable discussion of this issue see Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 1986) pp.34–7.
30. Farhad Kazemi, *Politics and Culture in Iran* (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Political Studies,

Institute for Social Research, U. of Michigan 1988) p.3.
31. Edward G. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia* 4 (London: Cambridge UP 1930) p.14.
32. Hamid Dabashi, *Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundations of the Islamic Revolution in Iran* (NY: NYUP 1993) p.10.
33. Richard W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran*, updated through 1978 (Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh UP 1979) p.9.
34. See Ram (note 28) pp.196–7.
35. Ruhallah M. al-Khumayni, *Al-Hukumah al-Islamiyah* (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah 1979) pp.34–35.
36. Ibid.
37. Cited in Roger M. Savory, 'Ex Oriente Nebula: An Inquiry into the Nature of Khomeini's Ideology', in Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger (eds.), *Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski* (Durham, NC: Duke UP 1988) p.352.
38. Fred Halliday contended, for example, that 'Khomeini did talk, prior to Sept. 1980, of "the nation of Iran", but since the outbreak of war official propaganda...increased its stress upon this national element in appealing for support against the Iraqis'. See his 'Iranian Foreign Policy since 1979: Internationalism and Nationalism in the Islamic Revolution', in Cole and Keddie (note 22) p.106.
39. *Khotbeh* 1, 10 Aug. 1979, p.21.
40. Ibid., 7 Dec. 1979, pp.168–9. Also see Emami-Kashani in *Khotbeh* 4, 4 Dec. 1981, p.128.
41. Shireen T. Hunter, *Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade* (Bloomington: Indiana UP 1990) p.12.
42. *Ettala'at*, 7 Nov. 1987. For similar expressions see Khameneh'i in *Ettala'at*, 15 April 1989.
43. On the Iranian campaign of Islamicizing/universalizing its war with Iraq, see H. Ram, 'Islamic "Newspeak": Language and Change in Revolutionary Iran', *Middle Eastern Studies* 29/2 (April 1993) pp.208–16.
44. *Khotbeh* 3, 18 Sept. 1981, p.413.
45. Ibid., p.414. For similar expressions see Hojjat al-Islam Shaykh Muhammad Yazdi in *Khotbeh* 4, 9 Oct. 1981, pp.30–1.
46. *Ettala'at*, 14 July 1984.
47. *Ettala'at*, 18 May 1985. Also see Khameneh'i in *Ettala'at*, 15 March 1986.
48. James P. Piscatori, *Islam in a World of Nation-States* (Cambridge: CUP 1986) p.46.
49. *Ettala'at*, 15 Sept. 1984.
50. Hojjat al-Islam Motaqadi in *Ettala'at*, 14 Oct. 1989.
51. Allesandro Bausani, 'Muhammad or Darius? The Elements and Bases of Iranian Culture', in S. Vryonis, Jr. (ed.), *Islam and Cultural Change in the Middle Ages* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowithz 1975) p.47.
52. Under the terms of the 1971 agreement, Iranian forces were stationed on part of Abu Musa and the island's oil revenues were split in half, in exchange for an annual subsidy and continued control by Sharjah of the remainder of the island.
53. U. Rabi, 'United Arab Emirates', in Ami Ayalon (ed.), *Middle East Contemporary Survey* 16 (1992) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1994) p.778. For details on the origin of the Abu Musa dispute in 1971 and related documents, see Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role* (Charlottesville: UP of Virginia) pp.56–68; and Shahram Chubin and Salih Zabih, *The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Developing State in a Zone of Great-Power Conflict* (Berkeley: U. of California Press 1974) pp.217–30.
54. On Iran's claims to Bahrain during the Pahlavi era, see H. Ram, 'UAR-Iranian Propaganda War in the 1960s: Ethno-Cultural Antipathies and Geo-Political Strife', *Asian and African Studies* 26 (1992) pp.223–48.
55. Graham E. Fuller, *The 'Center of the Universe': The Geopolitics of Iran* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1991) p.58.
56. *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (*VIRI*), 4 Oct. – *FBIS-NES* (*DR*), 8 Oct. 1992. Also see *Tehran Times*, 26 Aug. – *DR*, 9 Sept. 1992.
57. *VIRI*, 10 Sept. – *DR*, 10 Sept. 1992. For similar expressions, see *VIRI*, 11 Sept. – *DR*, 11 Sept. 1992.
58. *Radio Tehran*, 13 Dec. – *DR*, 14 Dec. 1971.

59. *Ettala'at*, 22 Jan. 1972.
60. *Jomhuri-ye Eslami* (Tehran, daily), 17 Sept. 1992.
61. *Kayhan*, 30 Sept. 1992.
62. *VIRI*, 30 Sept. – *DR*, 1 Oct. 1992.
63. *Iran News Agency*, 2 Oct. – *DR*, 5 Oct. 1992.
64. *VIRI*, 10 Sept. – *DR*, 10 Sept. 1992.
65. *VIRI*, 16 Sept. – *DR*, 16 Sept. 1992.
66. *Ettala'at*, 19 Sept. 1992.
67. *Salam* (Tehran, daily), 1 Oct. 1992.
68. *Ettala'at*, 26 Dec. 1992.
69. *Radio Tehran*, 2 Dec. – *DR*, 6 Dec. 1971. Also see *Radio Tehran*, 1 Dec. – *DR*, 3 Dec. 1971.
70. Rabi (note 53) p.779.
71. Ibid.
72. *VIRI*, 9 Sept. – *DR*, 10 Sept. 1992.
73. *Sawt al-Kuwait al-Duwali*, 6 Sept. – *DR*, 10 Sept. 1992; *AFP*, 10 Sept. – *DR*, 11 Sept. 1992.
74. See, e.g., Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati's statement, *Iranian Television*, 22 April – *DR*, 23 April 1992.
75. *Iran News Agency*, 29 Sept. [*sic*] – *DR*, 21 Sept. 1992.
76. Ibid.
77. *VIRI*, 20 April – *DR*, 22 April 1993.
78. *Tehran Times* (Tehran, daily), 22 April 1992.
79. *Iran News Agency*, 21 April – *DR*, 22 April 1992. See also foreign minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati's statement, *Iranian Television*, 22 April – *DR*, 23 April 1992.
80. Rafsanjani in *Ettala'at*, 19 Sept. 1992.
81. See, e.g., *Tehran Times*, 26 Aug. 1992; foreign ministry statement in *VIRI*, 10 Sept. – *DR*, 10 Sept. 1992; Hojjat al-Islam Nateq Nuri in *Iran News Agency*, 13 Sept. – *DR*, 16 Sept. 1992; and Rafsanjani in *Ettala'at*, 19 Sept. 1992.
82. Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941–1973: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations* (Charlottesville: UP of Virginia 1975) pp.421–2.
83. Ramazani (note 53) p.61. Also see Chubin and Zabih (note 53) p.222.
84. Ramazani (note 53) p.26.
85. Ibid., p.27.
86. Chubin and Zabih (note 53) p.222.
87. Ibid., p.57.
88. *Ettala'at*, 22 Jan. 1972.
89. *Iran News Agency*, 12 Sept. – *DR*, 14 Sept. 1992. See also statement by Iran's envoy to the United Nations, Kamal Kharazi, in *Iran News Agency*, 3 Sept. – *DR*, 4 Sept. 1992.
90. For treatments of Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the UAE, see respective chapters by Haggay Ram, in Ami Ayalon (ed.), *Middle East Contemporary Survey* 17 (1993) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1995) pp.274–81, 556–7, 566–74, 697–707.
91. Kazemi (note 30) p.6.
92. Rouhollah K. Ramazani, 'Iran's Foreign Policy: Both North and South', *Middle East Journal* 46/13 (Summer 1992) p.395.
93. Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: CUP 1979) p.171.