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The Perils of Weak Organization: Explaining Loyalty and Defection of Militant Organizations Toward Pakistan

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Why do some militant groups defect against their sponsors, while others remain loyal? Pakistan's sponsorship of Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba offers a controlled case comparison as the former turned its guns against Islamabad, while the latter remained obedient despite a similar strength, ethnic ties to the regime, and the presence of alternative supporters. What explains Jaish's defection and Lashkar's loyalty? Drawing on organizational and principal-agent theory, I argue that militant organizations that are more decentralized and factionalized are more likely to turn on their sponsors, because their weak command and control as well as dispersed decision making limit the militant leaders' ability to follow through on their commitments to the sponsors and makes it more difficult for the sponsors to discipline the militant organization. When a sponsor attempts to coerce such organizations into submission by detaining militant leaders, freezing or confiscating their material assets the rank-and-file is likely to turn guns against the sponsor.

One of the most understudied phenomena in conflict studies is the relationship between state sponsors and militant movements. Foreign governments often intervene in civil conflicts by funding, hosting, and arming militant organizations.[1] Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham indicate that 159 of the 403 militant movements listed in their dataset had an explicit or acknowledged tie to a foreign government.[2] Scholars analyze why states provide support to militants,[3] under what conditions the militants may accept this support,[4] and how sponsors and their militant clients bargain over policies.[5] Conflict scholars suggest that sponsors channel money, arms, supplies, and other types of material support to their clients in return for militant cooperation over its organization, goals, and tactics.[6] Despite their support, sponsors may lose control over militants due to different preferences and information.[7]

However, we lack theories that help us explain when sponsors lose control over their agents and, more specifically, why militants turn against their benefactors. This omission is significant given that sponsored militants are arguably more ruthless toward civilians than non-sponsored armed groups,[8] and that external involvement tends to prolong wars.[9] Breaking sponsor-militant ties is, therefore, one of the most important goals of third

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parties in contemporary conflicts. This article is the first attempt to examine what drives militants to defect against their sponsors. Broadly speaking, defection is understood as militant actions against the explicit interest of their sponsors. In particular, some militants oppose their sponsor's policies, such as the refusal of Hizb-e-Islami and other *mujahideen* parties to enter a power-sharing deal with the Afghanistan government, which was backed by their sponsor, Pakistan, in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal.[10] Other militants desert their sponsors, such as when Laurent Kabila in the Democratic Republic of Congo abandoned his sponsor, Rwanda.[11] Finally, militants may turn guns against the sponsor as the showdown between the Palestinian militant outfits and Jordan illustrates.

In this article, I analyze only the last form of defection. Even though there might be a handful of cases of armed insurrection against sponsors,[12] the consequences of such a confrontation may be terrible for regional stability. The case of Jaish-e-Mohammad, discussed in this article, indicates that a rogue agent may bring the sponsor country to the brink of civil war. In return, these militants lose their support and often perish at the hands of their erstwhile sponsors. Given that defection is self-destructive, why then do some militant organizations ever turn against their sponsors?

I argue that militants are likely to defect against their sponsors as the delegation chain from a sponsor to a militant movement becomes longer. The longer the chain, the greater the distance between the sponsor and militants and higher the costs of monitoring their activities. Consequently, when the sponsor is unable to monitor its agent, the room for hidden action widens. The delegation chain becomes longer when the militant command and control is non-centralized. Command and control is understood as a distribution of decision-making power between the militant leadership and the rank-and-file (commanders and factions). In centralized organizations, few individuals hold a monopoly over decision making while the lower levels are in charge of implementation and report back to the leadership. Non-centralized movements nurture autonomous rank-and-file that can implement decisions in its own way, often modifying or vetoing the central dictate. Being the hostages of commanders and factions, non-centralized organizations lack internal control, accountability to their sponsors, and cannot credibly commit to change policies in response to the sponsor's demands. When introduced to a change in the sponsor's policy these non-centralized organizations are likely to defy orders. When a sponsor detains militant leaders, freezes or confiscates material assets and shuts down militant facilities the organization becomes internally divided over the loyalty to the sponsor. If the militant leadership cannot credibly commit to reign in this internal dissatisfaction, radical constitutive parts are likely to turn on the sponsor.

There are two potential alternative explanations. First, if a sponsor and agent share preferences, defection may be less likely. In particular, shared ethnic ties may buttress the relationship through a common understanding of beliefs, norms, and authority. By drawing on these common values, the sponsor can claim legitimacy to issue orders and receive compliance from their client. Therefore, common ethnicity should facilitate the sponsor's control over militants decreasing the chance of defection. The second explanation is alternative support. Having multiple principals may make the militants less sensitive to sanctions because they can compensate for the loss of support. Therefore, the militants with access to alternative sources of support are likely to defect against their sponsors.

To test these arguments, I draw on a within-conflict comparison of Kashmir, one of South Asia's longest and most intense conflicts. Using fieldwork and secondary literature, I examine the relationship between Pakistan, and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), respectively, in the post-2001 period. JeM and LeT are similar movements, in that they shared ethnic ties with Pakistan as the

majority of their fighters were allegedly Pakistanis from Punjab.[13] However, the two outfits recruited from different communities, and C. Christine Fair shows that LeT's cadres come from ten districts where being a "Punjabi" has different meanings.[14] Therefore, while JeM and LeT can generally be considered Pakistani outfits, the social and cultural diversity of their recruits does not allow for treating the two outfits as similar in terms of their membership.[15] Second, they both were insulated from the Indian insurgency given that their training camps and offices are based in Pakistan. Third, they both are very capable organizations, numbering between a hundred and a few thousand fighters. Finally, both groups have relied on alternative sources of support: JeM through its links with Al Qaeda[16] and LeT via its ties to private Saudi donors.[17] Despite these similarities, JeM had a decentralized organizational structure, while LeT exhibits a centralized, pyramidal command and control. When Pakistan moved to curtail militants' cross-border activities in Kashmir, JeM fragmented causing a number of factions to initiate a series of bombings across Pakistan targeting minorities and Pakistan's security forces. LeT, in contrast, preserved its internal stability and, despite some minor splits, stayed loyal to Pakistan. This article is organized in four parts. In the first, I develop my argument and discuss alternative explanations. In the succeeding two sections, I analyze why and how JeM turned against the Pakistani government while LeT remained loyal despite similar conditions. Finally, I draw some theoretical and policy conclusions.

Argument

I argue that as the delegation chain from a sponsor to militants becomes longer the probability of defection increases. The delegation chain usually starts from the sponsor government and its secret services, who delegate some authority to the militants to carry out violence on their behalf. In principle, the authority is delegated to militant leadership who becomes their agent. Within the militant organization, the command and control chain may extend to further principal–agent relationships. Depending on the militant configuration, local regiments may end up being an agent to their field commanders. In such a long chain, there is theoretically a greater room for defection at each stage in the chain, because the preferences of those at the bottom of the chain are much different from those of the sponsor.[18] Long delegation chains are likely to increase the distance between the sponsor and militants. The longer the distance between the sponsor and militants, the higher the costs of monitoring militant activity. If the sponsor is unable to efficiently control its agents, the room for a hidden action widens. Consequently, longer delegation chain is likely to lead to defection.

The fact that some sponsors create multistage and indirect chains increases the likelihood of defection. If sponsors could bypass some agents in the chain, then defection in that link would be less possible. This ideal scenario would mean that the militants execute all the sponsor's orders irrespective of the level of its material support. The sponsor's interests are recognized and broad directions how to meet them are given. The implementation of these directions smoothly runs through a top-down channel, from senior leaders to chief commanders, from chief commanders to district officers, all the way to foot soldiers. The performance of lower echelons is carefully monitored by their seniors and there is a feedback to the central leadership. In turn, the sponsor monitors the organization and its leadership; if there is any doubt about the loyalty of leadership, it is easily replaced. In this sense, there must be a chief executive or a team of individuals with an authority to select capable commanders and operatives, run an effective incentive system, monitor

actions of the rank-and-file, sanction the transgression of orders, receive a feedback from the lower levels and so forth.

The embodiment of these requirements is a centralized organization, where all decisions are usually made by the top leadership, while lower echelons—local leaders, field commanders, or heads of adjunct parties—can make decisions related to local matters, but they need to implement broader organizational decisions. In contrast, the decentralization of decision making entails more control over the creation of local and organizational strategies by the lower levels of power. The most unstable form of non-centralized organization is factionalized where certain segments operate autonomously from the leadership but do not collectively exit the organization nor formally establish a new organization. These three forms denote different levels of centralization within the militant organizational structure.

I argue that as organizational structure becomes less centralized, defection should be more likely. This argument extends Abdulkader Sinno's proposition that centralized militants are easier to control by their foreign backers because militant leaders can discipline the rank-and-file.[19] Contrary to non-centralized organizations, Sinno argues, centralized militants lack solid ties to their local communities and, thus, heavily depend on external supporters for resources.[20] I develop Sinno's proposition by transforming the problem of the sponsor's control into that of militant behavior toward their sponsors (i.e., defection). Although we both draw on militant organizational structure, I base my argument on the length of the delegation chain.

How does the organizational structure affect defection? Centralized organizations have a firm control of resources provided by sponsors. These resources are channeled to and through militant leaders together with private rewards. Private rewards motivate the militant leaders to keep or change their organizational policies in line with the sponsor's demands. Resources are delivered to obedient rank-and-file and denied to those who oppose the central dictate. This way, militant leaders make sure that the rank-and-file is dependent on them and, therefore, unlikely to voice serious concerns about the change of course. Given that the rank-and-file in centralized organizations lacks links to the local level and alternative allies, centralized organizations are unlikely to defect against their sponsor.

In contrast, non-centralized organizations cannot afford unity, much less blindly follow a rapid change of strategy, because they are dominated by autonomous commanders and factions whose multiple of goals dilute the organizational objective. These powerful actors have much stronger contacts with their communities and usually attract alternative sources of financing. Rebel commanders and constituent factions may often act independently from their leadership.[21] Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham suggests that the fragmentation of movements occurs because each faction appeals to its population base in the ways that frequently do not correspond (or clash) with that of the central leadership.[22] Sponsors can channel their support to the leadership or a favorite faction, but they cannot perfectly control the organization when the rank-and-file has incentives to exaggerate its demands and capabilities. Once the divisions develop, the transaction costs of maintaining organizational integrity sharply rise, and it becomes difficult to prevent future splits. Because the power is diffused within the organization, commanders may frequently undertake arbitrary decisions such as engaging in violence that the leadership—let alone a sponsor—did not sanction.[23] In conclusion, uncertainty pervades non-centralized organizations, making a defection more likely.

Defection may be a reaction to the sponsor's policies. As members of the international system, sponsors are exposed to external pressures regarding their interventionist

policies in armed conflicts. Through condemnation, economic sanctions or threat or use of force, third parties often pressure sponsors to terminate their involvement in a conflict. In this article, the U.S. government has pressured Pakistan to curtail militants' activities in Kashmir in the wake of 9/11. Such international pressure combined with war weariness may lead to serious civil discontent within the sponsor country endangering its political regime. As a result, the pressured sponsor may need to change its policy of support to the militants, usually by making concessions to other states that are directly opposed to the interests and goals of their clients. For instance, the sponsor may advocate the restraint in executing offensive operations against the target government, or support a cease-fire, peace talks, and proposals, all of which may threaten the agent's territorial gains or its survival. All these forms of reconciliatory policies are likely to gradually lead to divisions and tensions between the sponsor and militants because national concerns of sponsors are not shared by the narrow-focused militant movements. If the sponsor attempts to force its client to comply with a new course, the militants may resist, by taking up arms against their sponsor. But if the militants give in, this may create discontent among the commanders and factions, who may turn both against their leadership and sponsor. The impact of these external shocks on militant defection is filtered through the delegation chain, and, particularly, through the militant organizational structure. External shocks provide structural incentives to non-centralized militants to defect against their sponsors.

Alternative Explanations

I formulate alternative theories on the basis of the principal–agent framework. Principal–agent theory is chosen for several reasons. The first reason is that power asymmetry is incorporated into principal–agent models through the notion of delegation of authority. The delegation of authority involves the ability of principals, that is, sponsors, to oversee and discipline their agents. Sponsors can use selection mechanisms, strict sanctions, or hire third-parties to monitor militants and report back to them.[24] Second, agency models recognize that agents often behave against the interests of their principals. This behavior includes shirking, hiding information, opportunism, and the use of resources against the principal.[25] Finally, agency models suggest two explanations for the agent's disobedience: preference convergence and alternative resources.

First, defection may be more likely when militants' preferences differ from those of the principal. The most common proxy for shared preferences in civil war studies is ethnicity. The basic premise is that throughout civil wars, individuals tend to be loyal to organizations claiming to embody and protect their ethnic identities.[26] Shared ethnicity is thought to be stickier than other ideological forces.[27] Common norms may bring militant behavior in line with the preferences of sponsors as ethnic groups cherish primordial social and authority ties. Owing to these ties, sponsors can claim legitimacy—a belief that the ruler has the right to issue orders and militants have an obligation to comply with them. By setting up clear criteria of authority, shared ethnicity solidifies principal–agent relationships.[28] Consequently, common ethnic origin facilitates the sponsor's monitoring and control over militants, decreasing the chance of defection.

The second explanation suggests that defection is likely when militants have access to alternative support. Alternative support may break a sponsor's monopoly over strategic resources making militants less willing to follow its orders. If alternative support is available, the sponsor will have less leverage. When there are no alternatives sponsors will have greater leverage and militants will be more compliant. Principal–agent theories expect agents with multiple principals to have a greater

leeway in their behavior than those with a single sponsor. Defection arises due to collective action problems among principals, which complicates monitoring.[29] Salehyan argues that an increase in the number of principals multiplies the heterogeneity of preferences, creating tensions between them.[30] This structure is inherently unstable as principals tend to impose their own preferences on each other. Julia Adams shows that since multiple principals lack institutional remedies to the consequential power struggle, the threat of principal fragmentation is omnipresent.[31] If an agent is aware of this tension, it may pit multiple sponsors against one another to increase its freedom of action. To sanction such a behavior principals must synchronize their policies, which is ultimately very costly, and they often end up issuing contradictory directives to their agents. With alternative sources of funding and contradictory orders, militants are, therefore, less susceptible to sanctioning and threats from any specific principal increasing the probability of defection.

Loyalty and Defection of Pakistani-Sponsored Militants: Jaish Versus Lashkar

My argument and the two alternative explanations are not mutually exclusive, and they all may explain important dynamics. In this article, however, I only test whether these three mechanisms can explain militant defection of two major Pakistani militant outfits in Kashmir. The Kashmir conflict refers to an insurgency in the Indian-controlled province of Jammu and Kashmir in the wake of rigged state elections in 1987. In the early 1990s, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), comprised of indigenous and mostly secular Kashmiris who became the frontline of insurgency by carrying terrorist attacks against the Indian police and army. Pakistan supported the JKLF until the ascendance of an ideologically more proximate ally, Hizbul Mujahideen, in 1993. In 2000, a Hizbul faction led by Supreme Commander Abdul Majid Dar defied Pakistan's dictate by entering into negotiations with the Indian army and signing a so-called Ramzan cease-fire. Dissatisfied with the disobedience of the Hizbul and the inability of Kashmiris to defeat India, Pakistan introduced foreign militants to the insurgency in the late 1990s. The two largest and most organized outfits were Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba. I examine their behavior after 2001, because Pakistan slightly changed its policy in this period in response to U.S. pressures. In particular, Pakistan ordered the militants to lay low and act only if given permission by the intelligence services. Comparing the two groups against this context allows me to control for a number of factors that would have not been possible if I analyzed the entire conflict.

These factors are the following. First, both organizations share ethnic ties with their sponsors given that their leadership and followers originate from Pakistan's regions such as Punjab and North-Western Province. Some authors argue that LeT has proportionally more Pakistani fighters than any other outfit, which makes it more dedicated to Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and the government.[32] These recruits mostly come from various Punjab's districts, where identities and loyalties tremendously vary. Simultaneously, LeT has been a transnational movement with the most diverse ethnic composition (its cadres originate from places such as Central Asia, the Sudan, Afghanistan, and Bosnia) among the Pakistani-sponsored militant outfits. Although the majority of JeM's fighters come from Pakistan the scarcity of evidence about their local origins does not allow for comparing LeT and JeM in terms of the ethnic constitution of their cadre. For this reason, I do not claim that the two outfits have the similar, let alone an overlapping, membership. Rather I suggest that the majority of their leaders and members share common ethnic ties with the

Pakistani government. All in all, if the common ethnic ties argument holds, we should expect both movements to stay loyal to Pakistan.

Second, both groups have relied on alternative sources of support. In particular, they both have had links to external non-state actors usually through mutual assistance in the form of intelligence sharing, training or the provision of shelter.[33] JeM had close ties to Al Qaeda (involving the exchange of intelligence, training, and coordination) as they shared training camps in Afghanistan.[34] This connection implies that JeM militants also served Al Qaeda's interests in Pakistan.[35] LeT lacked such operational ties with Al Qaeda and operated its own training camps in Pakistan. On the other hand, LeT has received covert support from Saudi Arabia at its inception and from private donors in the Gulf countries.[36] If the alternative support argument holds, we should expect both movements to defect against Pakistan.

In addition, both outfits have been insulated from the Indian army's reprisals because their infrastructure is in Pakistan. LeT seems to be a more specialized organization, as it operates a huge complex in Muridke comprised of, among other facilities, schools and research institutes, ambulances and hospitals, and farms.[37] Finally, both JeM and LeT are capable organizations; they have between a couple of hundreds to a few thousand fighters under their command. Even though they are infiltrated in Jammu and Kashmir, their social network among the local population is weak.

Despite these similarities, there are two important differences between the two outfits that affect their ideology, organizational structure, and access to resources.[38] First, they belong to different religious schools—JeM belongs to Deobandis, while LeT is Ahl-e-Hadis.[39] Apart from their doctrinal differences, the adherence to either of the schools also constraints the outfits' access to resources. For example, Ahl-e-Hadis may account for only ten percent of the Pakistani population,[40] and LeT is even in dispute with the mainstream Ahl-e-Hadis ulema over the issue of *jihad*.[41] As a consequence, LeT has a restricted access to Ahl-e-Hadis for recruits and funds. In contrast, Deobandis have the most madrassas in Pakistan, and their *ulemas* are more supportive of militant *jihad*.[42] This allows JeM and other Deobandi groups (Harkat ul Mujahedeen, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Harkat-il-Jihad-Islam etc.) to draw on a wider social network in search for money and new cadres. As Stephen Tankel points out, the narrower social base makes LeT more dependent on the Pakistani state.[43]

Second, the difference in access to social capital affects the recruitment options of the two outfits. LeT rarely recruits its cadre from *madrassas* and its focus is on highly skilled individuals to carry out LeT's "*fidayeen*" (high-risk) missions in Kashmir.[44] JeM, on the other hand, is heavily reliant on *madrassas* for combatants.[45] Unlike LeT, JeM's main operational goal is to inflict as much damage as possible to the Indian security apparatus, conducting suicide missions. This difference is likely to affect how the two outfits organize their command structure.

In spite of these similarities and differences, LeT remained loyal, while Jaish turned guns against Islamabad. In the preceding section I first discuss how Jaish's decentralized command and control organization crumbled leading to defection against Pakistan. After that, I indicate why LeT never embraced Jaish's violent path.

How JeM Turned Against Pakistan

JeM was one of the deadliest Kashmiri militant groups that have ever been sponsored by Pakistan. Formed on the ruptures of Harkatul Ansar/Mujahideen (HuM), its leadership never managed to establish a cohesive and centralized organization.[46] Nominally, JeM

was headed by Maulana Azhar after he was freed from Indian prison in December 1999 in exchange for 185 passengers of the hijacked Indian Airlines Flight 814. In fact, JeM retained an overlapping membership with its former parent organization, HuM, and rather autonomous commanders. Since JeM was involved in the Afghan theater, the leadership established ties with the Taliban and Al Qaeda.[47]

Despite its decentralized nature and support from Al Qaeda, JeM quickly became one of Pakistan's favored proxies and some argue that the ISI sponsored JeM's creation in order to check LeT's growing power.[48] The ethnic composition of JeM was an additional reason for its preferential status. Approximately three quarters of JeM's members were Pakistanis from North Punjab, the region from which hails the core of Pakistan's military corps. The ISI believed that shared ethnicity would make JeM more obedient to the military's objectives in Kashmir than "foreign" *jihadi* groups with pan-Islamic agendas.[49]

However, it is precisely Pakistani outfits such as JeM that were most defiant of their sponsor's orders. JeM appeared to be hostile to any sort of Pakistani-supported negotiated settlement with India. Unlike LeT's ideological rigidity, JeM was less ideologically electrified, more decentralized and able to muster alternative material resources from Afghanistan and its Deobandi connections in Pakistan. Even if Azhar refrained from undermining the peace process, his rank-and-file was uneager to compromise. This situation intensified after Pakistan modified its policy toward Kashmir in the wake of 9/11. Musharraf's decision to align with Washington against the Taliban and Al Qaeda angered those organizations that had close ties to them such as HuM, JeM, and LeT. By October 2001, JeM was set on a collision course with the Musharraf regime. Apart from JeM's ties to Al Qaeda, the conflict between the outfit and the military regime was fueled by JeM's internal squabbles between a moderate leadership and the hawkish rank-and-file.

The hawks decided to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with Pakistan's new course. On 1 October 2001, a handful of JeM operatives carried out a suicide attack on the Kashmir legislative assembly in Srinagar, center of Indian-administered Kashmir, which killed thirty-one people. A Jaish operative drove a truck armed with explosives into the Legislative Assembly building in Srinagar, Indian-controlled Kashmir, killing himself and thirty-eight people. The attack undermined Pakistan's efforts to portray militants as freedom fighters and put the Musharraf government under a strong international pressure to shut down the militant organizations.

When ISI urged Azhar to rein in the rank-and-file there was little he reportedly expelled some of those activists who were involved in the attacks. But most of the members disliked Musharraf's U-turn and perceived the president as a traitor to their cause. Under these circumstances, a faction of JeM members decided to act in a more defiant fashion that would bring India and Pakistan to the brink of war. On 13 December 2001 five armed men entered the main gate of the Parliament House in New Delhi in a car with Home Ministry and Parliament labels, and opened fire as they got out of the vehicle. The security personnel shot back at the gunmen killing all of the infiltrators.

JeM claimed responsibility for the attack but removed it the next day after ISI put pressure on Azhar.[50] Even though Indian authorities put on trial four members of JeM and found them all guilty, there is no clear evidence that JeM's central leadership sanctioned the suicide operation. Quite to the contrary, some insider sources even claim that the leadership was caught off-guard when it happened as they allegedly sent no mission to New Delhi.[51] The former ISI chief Lt. Gen. (ret.) Javed Ashraf Qazi, however, alleges that JeM is behind the attack while denying any state involvement.[52] One journalist who investigated the attack suggests that the operation was given unilateral approval from an ISI general who managed militant organizations in India-controlled Kashmir. Musharraf was supposedly unaware of the operation and enraged by its consequences as he knew

that this move would give India casus belli and delegitimize the Kashmiri groups he was meticulously trying to shield from international criticism.[53]

Although Musharraf may not have authorized the operation directly, the go-ahead by an intelligence officer suggests that ISI was involved in its planning and execution.[54] Regrettably, whether this is the case of defection can be determined ex post. And, in this respect, the incident proved to be costly for Musharraf. Soon after the attack, India demanded that Islamabad stops supporting Kashmiri militants and the two countries mobilized their armies along the border. On December 20, India deployed its troops to Kashmir and Punjab in what was India's largest military mobilization since the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. Pakistan mobilized its troops as a response and the talk of war, even nuclear war, between Pakistan and India ensued.[55] Worried about a dangerous escalation, U.S. officials began pressuring the Musharraf regime to take concrete steps against JeM. On 12 October, the U.S. government froze JeM's accounts.

The Indo-Pakistani tension was de-escalated only after President Pervez Musharraf followed suit and prohibited all JeM's financial transactions in December. Azhar was shortly afterward placed under house arrest even though the Pakistani authorities refused to hand him over to India. On 1 January 2002, the organization was banned together with LeT, and three other groups. "No party in future will be allowed to be identified with words like Jaish, Lashkar or Sipah,"[56] warned Musharraf in a subsequent speech, which seemingly marked Pakistan's abandonment of its *jihadist* policy in Kashmir.

Indeed, President Musharraf stayed true to his promise and all of the banned militant groups were encouraged to continue their activities under new names. Lashkar-e-Taiba became Pasban-e-Ahl-e-Hadith, Jaish-e-Mohammad labeled itself Khuddam-ul-Islam, and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen changed its name to Jamiatul-Ansar. The financial and intelligence support to JeM was resumed only after a couple of months of official prohibition. Azhar was released by a court order just a few months after his arrest.

But Pakistan had already created a monster beyond its control. After JeM was officially banned and its financial assets seized,[57] the factionalism within the movement intensified. Masood Azhar was seemingly in favor of compliance with Pakistan's instructions.[58] However, by 2002 Azhar had lost support within the group as the majority of members of the JeM Supreme Council demanded his resignation. Particularly irritated by Pakistan's U-turn was a JeM faction led by Maulana Abdul Jabbar who decided to retaliate against the ban and the increasing U.S. influence on Islamabad by launching a series of terrorist attacks across Pakistan targeting western nationals, Christians and Shi'a Muslims. Backed by Osama bin Laden, the rank-and-file of financially impoverished JeM pressed for a *jihad* against the "slave" government of Pakistan.[59]

From March to September 2002 the first suicide missions were carried out in Islamabad, Karachi, Murree, Taxila, and Bahawalpur, targeting state officials. JeM activists returning from Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban stirred up sectarianism throughout Pakistan by targeting Christian temples, diplomatic missions, and Shi'a mosques.[60] The arrested JeM members later revealed that the suicide bombings were planned in November 2001 on the eve of the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. One of the factional leaders, Maulana Abdul Jabbar, convened a meeting at the Balakot training camp in Pakistan. The participants were gathered around a so-called Brigade 313 and were members of Pakistani-sponsored organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and Harkatul-Mujahideen.[61]

They decided to resist the increasing U.S. influence on Islamabad through militant means including suicide bombings within Pakistan. The ISI demanded Azhar to reign in JeM's rank-and-file and stop Jabbar. However, Azhar informed ISI that "the expelled

members were sectarian terrorists who should be arrested instead of being allowed to regroup."[62] Allegedly, by 2002 Azhar had lost the support within the group: seven out of ten members of the JeM Supreme Council had distanced from him. One of them was quoted saying:

> Our main difference with Azhar was that he deviated from the cause of jihad to liberate the occupied Kashmir. Unlike Azhar and his masters in the Pakistani intelligence agencies we are not ready to sacrifice jihad for the sake of funds.[63]

Consequently, JeM was engulfed in a turf war between various factions.[64] Rather than splitting into separate organizations, these factions continued to compete with their parent over authority, money, offices, and training grounds across Pakistan. On one hand, Masood Azhar caved in to ISI pressures and promised to do everything in his power to stop the targeting of U.S. personal in Pakistan.[65] On the other hand, this move angered the bulk of Azhar's commanders who saw his move as a betrayal of the *jihadi* cause. In late 2002, Jabbar launched a faction within JeM called Jamaat-ul-Furqaan, which became a launching pad for deadlier attacks against the Pakistani government.[66] Some Pakistani military sources assert that besides Jabbar's faction, JeM had become a battleground of many competing factions that violently opposed Azhar's adherence to Pakistan and the ISI.[67]

The organizational disarray was further exacerbated by the support to competing factions from some "rogue" members of the ISI. Together with a group of JeM's factional leaders and members from other militant organizations the renegade ISI officers provided logistical support to two failed assassination attempts against President Musharraf.[68] These assassination attempts were preceded by the second round of repression, which involved the arrest of militant leaders, seizure of offices, and freezing of bank accounts. On 15 November 2003, the Musharraf government banned JeM (alias Khudam-ul-Islam), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (alias Jamiat-ul-Ansar), Jamaat- ul-Furqan (sister organization of JeM), and Hizb-ul-Tehrir. Of all these groups, JeM received the harshest treatment by the security forces because Washington seemed to be concerned about the movement's "logistical support to fugitive Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders."[69] In contrast, LeT had managed to escape the government's wraith; it was only issued a warning and placed on the watch list.

Less than a month after the second ban a group of militants carried out two assassination attempts against President Musharraf. The first occurred on 14 December 2003, when a bomb exploded after President Musharraf's highly guarded motorcade crossed a bridge in Rawalpindi. Although the bridge is nearby Musharraf's residence and heavily guarded by the military, the hitmen were able to install explosives to the pylons below it. The second attack occurred on 25 December 2003, when two suicide bombers drove car bombs into Musharraf's convoy. Both attacks failed to kill the president.

The identities of the two suicide bombers were soon discovered. One was a member of the JeM from Azad Kashmir, who fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan. The other was from Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HUJI) who also fought with the Taliban. Existing evidence suggests that a number of Pakistani military officers were probably involved in the attack.[70] The investigation also revealed that "the explosives used in the attacks came from an Al Qaeda camp in the Pakistani tribal area of South Waziristan."[71]

Therefore, apart from the organizational turmoil, JeM's links to Al Qaeda significantly motivated its rank-and-file to turn guns against Pakistan.

As a result, the growing dissatisfaction of JeM's factions had brewed into a confrontation with the Musharraf regime. Many in JeM and other militant organizations were not eager to put their arms down, even if that meant war with Pakistan. As voiced by a militant leader in the aftermath of the assassination attempts: "The anger towards Musharraf and his policies is natural. We have lost so many friends, brothers and relatives in the Kashmir struggle. What was that for? We are not going to sit quietly."[72] The regime immediately took an action against JeM and interrogated its top circle. The officials claimed that there was enough evidence against the militant organization. However, Azhar repeated his earlier claim that those involved in the assassination attempts were renegades who had been expelled from the organization for misbehavior. As JeM spokesperson, Maulana Yousaf Hussain, said, "the expulsions of Maulana Abdul Jabbar and other leaders eventually led to a split in our group. The dissidents were adamant to carry out suicide missions against the US interests in Pakistan to avenge the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan."[73]

The government eventually clamped down on some militants and members of the security apparatus. More than a hundred military and intelligence employees had been apprehended and interrogated, and some were even found guilty and sentenced to death. However, the Musharraf government took no action against other militant groups whose members were involved in attempts on his life. There were no mass crackdowns similar to those in 2003, nor arrests of militant leaders. Even Azhar, who had publicly called for Musharraf's assassination, was not arrested.

As of 2004, JeM had largely fallen into obscurity. In 2009, it resurfaced with new suicide attacks and a more consolidated leadership under Azhar. The outfit may have between one and two thousand active fighters and several thousand personal.[74] It appears that JeM was allowed to resume operations against the Indian forces after the leadership has been purged from "problematic" cadres.

A Monster that Never Was: The Loyalty of LeT

In 1986 Markaz-Dawa-ul-Irshad (Center for Preaching, MDI) was founded by two Pakistani engineering professors, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and Zafar Iqbal, to participate in the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union and to spread the Wahhabi Ahl-e-Hadith school of thought in Pakistan, a puritanical version of Sunni Islam that forbids television, cinema, and pictures. Initially, both ISI and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provided support to MDI, but after the Soviet troops had been ousted the CIA cut its support to the organization. ISI continued to rely on the organization, sending its fighters and suicide squads to Jammu and Kashmir to target Hindu population and the Indian army. The attacks were carried out by MDI's technically militant wing, Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure, hereafter LeT), which had the identical leadership as its parent organization.

Ever since its introduction to Jammu and Kashmir in 1992,[75] LeT has meticulously executed ISI orders related to ethnic cleansing and targeting of the Indian police and army. The group also became notorious for its massacres of Hindus across Jammu and Kashmir in the early 2000s, which pitted it against Hizbul Mujahideen who allegedly refused to carry out such tasks.[76] LeT was also the first outfit to initiate *fidayeen* attacks in the valley—the specialty that made it the most respected and feared among other organizations. The organization claims to have executed nearly one hundred such missions in the period 1990–2000.[77] In December 2000, LeT even carried out a *fidayeen*

attack on an Indian barrack inside the Red Fort in Delhi.[78] Such a deadly specialization earned LeT the status of the most favorable outfit in the ISI circle. Some authors even suggest that ISI generals closely planned all LeT attacks together with its leadership and chief commanders.[79]

Given that "the Markaz and the Lashkar-e-Toiba are extremely secretive organizations,"[80] the claims I am making regarding the internal organization should be taken with a grain of salt. By and large, I draw on various pieces of information from books, articles, and newspapers, and triangulate them with interviews with Indian security officials to construct the image of the organization.

Despite the sea of information, one finding is common to all the sources—LeT's command and control is highly centralized and Hafiz Saeed rules the organization while his family members, and cronies occupy key positions in the hierarchy.[81] Family is a cornerstone of LeT's recruitment strategy and, unlike JeM, the outfit recruits the mothers of combatants.[82] This co-optation of combatants' mothers serves to tighten ISI's control over the rank-and-file and the outfit as a whole, using blackmail or threats to deter the cadre from disobedience.[83] JeM might not exercise the same practice.

Apart from the central leadership, there might be a Majlis-e-Shura (Council of Elders), similar to the advisory council in Hizbul Mujahideen (a Kashmiri militant organization), but even if such a political body exists it is most likely a consultative forum presided over by Saeed who makes all decisions. Moreover, LeT is compartmentalized into departments dealing with religious affairs; social welfare, education, and charity; and *jihad*.[84] Each of these departments is headed by Saeed's kinsmen or close associates who are responsible directly to him. The *jihadi* department is organized in a typical military fashion, with a supreme commander and his deputy, provisional commander, district commanders, and battalion commanders.

LeT's chain of command is a pyramidal and highly specialized structure responsible for recruitment, training, and execution of militant operations. Unlike JeM, whose commanders were quite autonomous from their leadership, Saeed controls most of the processes in LeT's operational command through the heads of sections who report to him.[85] This is the main reason why LeT stayed loyal to Pakistan after the government cracked down on the militancy in the wake of September 2001. The centralization of the command and control in LeT is the factor that makes it decisively different from other, similar organizations, such as Jaish, who turned against Pakistan owing to their decentralized and fractionalized organizational structure.

Apart from operational obedience, there is likewise no record of LeT attacks against the Pakistani state, nor against any other military or civilian target within Pakistan.[86] Remember how the fractioning of Jaish triggered a series of attacks against the Pakistani establishment, religious groups and foreigners after September 2001. The fractionalization of JeM was accelerated by Pakistan's closure of some camps, relocation of others and, most importantly, by the decision to confine the militants to their camps. The lack of control and accountability to leadership in JeM prompted the rank-and-file to start freelancing or join other outfits. This has accelerated the dissipation of JeM's command and control in the aftermath of 9/11 to the extent that the outfit evolved into a conglomerate of embattled factions.

In contrast, LeT accepted ISI's demand to lower its profile in Jammu and Kashmir and act only with the permission from the agency. Reportedly, in 2001 LeT decided to send small companies, between 10 and 15 fighters, across the Line of Control (LOC) instead of large formations to adjust to Musharraf's policy change.[87] In turn, LeT was allowed to preserve its large training camps in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir (PCK).[88]

Pakistan's tolerance of LeT's militant infrastructure enabled its rank-and-file to carry out, if limited, operations across the LOC under ISI's watchful eye. As a result, the leadership was able to maintain the cohesiveness of the organization and avoid mass defections. LeT complied to Pakistan's orders because its "command and control as well as hierarchical structure has remained intact over the years."[89]

Owing to its compliance, LeT mostly avoided the "witch-hunt" of 2001–2003, when Pakistan clamped down on JeM, HUJI, and other militant organizations in the country. Although Hafiz Saeed was arrested in December 2001 for his fiery speeches, the court ordered his release within a year time.[90] But even when Pakistan, under a significant U.S. pressure, formally banned LeT as a terrorist organization in 2002, the LeT leadership and organization came through unscathed. Despite the house arrest of some top members, Hafiz Saeed and his close circle continued to hold meetings, plan terrorist attacks, and keep in touch with other outfits. In 2003, LeT was sparred the second round of bans. In return for compliance on Pakistan's 2004 rapprochement with India—an episode that enraged many militant outfits—LeT was allowed to freely carry on with fund-raising, holding public rallies, and the recruitment and training of cadres.[91]

LeT did not change behavior toward Pakistan because it avoided intensive leadership crises and fractionalization that have plagued JeM. The preservation of organizational hierarchy meant that LeT's rank-and-file could not easily turn rogue as the central leadership controlled the key resources necessary for their activities. LeT avoided JeM's faith because Hafiz Saeed received the full support of ISI and Pakistan after he had accepted the change in Pakistan's policy toward the armed struggle in Jammu and Kashmir. This support was most visible in Pakistan's refusal to clamp down on LeT's militant activities.

While LeT preserved its command and control, it was not immune to individual and brief splits. For instance, in 2003 a LeT senior member and former Pakistani officer, Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed, left the outfit and joined the infamous Brigade 313 that was involved in the assassination attempt against Musharraf. Likewise, in 2004 there were reports indicating a power struggle within LeT's command and control, but over funds and not policies. Reportedly, some senior leaders opposed the leadership of Hafiz Saeed and established a breakaway group labeled Khair-un-Naas (KN).[92] The breakaway group was made up of former LeT senior members who had accused Saeed of nepotism, corruption, and violation of party goals. The split had no significant impact on LeT's organizational structure and is thought to be orchestrated by the ISI in response to pressures from the US to ban the LeT.[93] Some close associates of the LeT leader claim that ISI engineered the split as a warning to Saeed to tone down his speeches on *jihad* in Jammu and Kashmir.

Why Did Pakistan Manage LeT and JeM Differently?

Evidence in this article suggests that the organizational structure influenced the diametrically opposite behavior of LeT and JeM toward Pakistan. It also reveals that ISI was not a passive bystander in JeM's factionalism but rather took part in the outfit's internal dynamics. This means that the longer delegation chain to JeM was not only by organizational choice; the sponsor's strategies have also affected JeM's splitting. The obvious question is then: Why Pakistan managed LeT and JeM differently? And, why would Pakistan, possibly knowing that JeM is prone to splitting and defection, decide to sponsor it anyway?

Overall, there might be a general concern in the Pakistani military that propelling a single militant outfit would diminish Islamabad's control over the proxy war against India. Favoring an unstable organization by siding with different factions means that ISI

may perceive that the benefits of such a control outweigh any potential costs. Back in the 1990s, Pakistan supervised the rise and fall of various organizations, often pitting them against each other because it feared that a dominant Kashmiri organization could take on a life of its own and make a compromise with India.[94] At first, Pakistan trained and armed the secular JKLF, the organization struggling for a Kashmir independent of India and Pakistan. JKLF was soon sidelined in favor of a more ideologically proximate ally, Hizbul Mujahideen, which was created by ISI and Jamaat-e-Islami by merging several small outfits into a single organization.[95] By that time, it seemed that ISI was determined to create a united insurgency based on Hizbul's hegemony as it turned a blind eye to the outfit's decimation of JKLF and other groups. However, Pakistan balanced against Hizbul's hegemony by favoring Islamist outfits in missions (LeT, Harkatul Mujahideen, etc.), and by meddling into the organization's factional politics.[96] Fair provides an insightful account of how ISI later orchestrated similar splits in Deobandi outfits to ensure that no outfit becomes too powerful.[97]

On the other hand, Tankel suggests that Pakistan could not model JeM after LeT due to the different social bases of the two groups. While both outfits were considered to be "good jihadis," JeM was established as "organizationally fractious, with a weak ideological foundation."[98] Additionally, it had an overlapping membership with other Deobandi outfits and close transnational ties with Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, making its organizational structure even blurrier. LeT's social base, in contrast, comprised of "retired army and ISI officers (and) Lashkar members had family in the middle ranks of the army and various civilian security agencies."[99] Due to such social connections, Lashkar was a more "domesticated" movement, whose leadership and members mostly share Pakistan's view of proxy war against India as the priority.

Finally, Fair provides the third and most plausible argument about Pakistan's management of the two outfits. She argues that Pakistan benefits from depicting certain militants as rogue. This strategy gives Islamabad an alibi for failing to suppress domestic militancy and allows the government to ask for U.S. assistance.[100] Additionally, this approach strengthens Pakistan's "plausible deniability" when terrorist attacks occur in India. Therefore, supporting a number of fractionalized organizations such as JeM imposes certain costs that are seemingly marginal compared to the benefits. This argument also helps one understand why Pakistan is still supporting JeM despite their past armed confrontation.

Conclusion

Why do militants defect against their sponsors? What explains Jaish's defection and Lashkar's loyalty toward Pakistan? In this article I have argued that militant organizations that are more decentralized and factionalized are more likely to turn on their sponsors. Decentralized/factionalized organizations have weak command and control as well as dispersed decision making, which both limits the militant leaders' ability to follow through on their commitments to the sponsors and makes it more difficult for the sponsors to discipline the militant organization. If a sponsor attempts to coerce them into submission these militants will take arms against it. When a sponsor detains militant leaders, freezes or confiscates material assets, and shuts down militant facilities the organization becomes internally divided over the loyalty to the sponsor, leading the most radical parts to turn against the sponsor.

The argument I advance in this article engenders considerable explanatory power. My theory mostly explains why the two Pakistani outfits, Jaish-e-Mohammad and

Lashkar-e-Taiba, pursued different policies toward Pakistan. It accurately depicts how the change in Pakistan's policy toward the Kashmiri militancy in 2001—ushered in by the U.S. administration—led the fractious Jaish to turn against the state and centralized Lashkar to tone down its cross-border activities and synchronize its moves with the government. On the other hand, the alternative theories receive mixed support from the evidence. First, shared preferences cannot explain why Lashkar and Jaish, the two groups with predominantly Pakistani members, pursued completely different policies in relation to Pakistan. Second, the alternative resources helps explain Jaish's behavior, but it fails to account for Lashkar's loyalty. Even though both outfits have received alternative support from non-state sources (Jaish from Al Qaeda and Lashkar from Gulf sponsors), only Jaish turned against Pakistan.

My work has far-reaching policy ramifications for militant organizations today, such as ISIS and the Russian separatists in Ukraine, suggesting that decentralized/factionalized militant organizations are among the most dangerous and unpredictable for both the sponsoring state and global stability; sponsoring states searching for militant groups to destabilize a regime or tip the scales in favor of one side of a civil war would do well to stay away from such groups. How foreign governments manage their militant agents, and how these agents behave toward their sponsors is a topic that must be addressed if we are to understand the conditions for conflict resolution. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine, for example, shows that dealing with an externally backed insurgency requires disentangling the relationship between Russia and the Ukrainian separatists.

This study is limited to two militant organizations in South Asia. I recognize that generalizations to other groups may be difficult to make. It is possible that organizations operating in other conflicts might defect against their sponsors for other reasons. Future research should explore whether my results can be found in other contexts. In addition, future research should address other forms of defection such as defiance and desertion. To correct this limitation, I have elsewhere developed and tested a data set on militant defection (1968–2012), which includes organizations from regions such as the Middle East, Central Africa, or the Balkans.

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Notes

1. Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Idean Salehyan, *Rebels Without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).

2. Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and David Cunningham, "Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups," *International Organization* 65(4) (2011), pp. 709–744, at p. 722.

3. Navin Bapat, "The Strategy of the Weak: State Support for Terrorism and Bargaining Power." Manuscript, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill; Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham, "Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups."

4. David Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(4) (2009), pp. 570–597.

5. Navin Bapat and Kanisha D. Bond, "Alliances Between Militant Groups," *British Journal of Political Science* 42(4) (2012), pp. 793–824.

6. Idean Salehyan, "The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54(1) (2010), pp. 493–515.

7. Daniel Byman and Sarah E. Kreps, "Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism," *International Studies Perspectives* 11(1) (2010), pp. 1–18.

8. Jeremy Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

9. Patrick Regan, *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Interventions and Intrastate Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000).

10. "Afghan Rebels Reject Power Sharing in Kabul: Guerrillas React to Pakistani Statements," *The Washington Post*, 18 January 1988. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/01/18/afghan-rebels-reject-power-sharing-in-kabul/6afc2d8c-3e89-486e-9021-503378f952be/

11. Gerard Prunier, *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009).

12. For a more general study on rebel defection, see Milos Popovic, "Fragile Proxies: The Politics of Control and Defection in State Sponsorship of Rebel Organizations," Ph.D. Dissertation (Budapest: Central European University, 2014).

13. According to Zahid Hussain, Le T and Je M were "from the same source, had similar motivations and goals, and recruited from the same kind of people (often unemployed youth from Punjab and the North West Frontier Province)." I could not find more evidence supporting this argument. Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), p. 52.

14. See C. Christine Fair, "Insights from a Database of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Militants," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 37(2) (2014), pp. 259–290; Mariam Abou Zahab, "I Shall be Waiting at the Door of Paradise: The Pakistani Martyrs of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure)," in Aparna Rao et al., eds., *The Practice of War: Production, Reproduction and Communication of Armed Violence* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), pp. 133–158; C. Christine Fair, "Leader-Led Jihad in Pakistan: The Case of Lashkar-e-Taiba," in Bruce Hoffman and Fernando Reinares, eds., *The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat: From 9/11 to Osama bin Laden's Death* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), pp. 571–599.

15. I am thankful to the reviewer for pointing this out.

16. Praveen Swami, "Lashkar Chief's Release Cause of Global Concern," *The Hindu*, 13 October 2009. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/lashkar-chiefs-release-cause-of-global-concern/article161075.ece (accessed 1 December 2014). Whereas JeM's link to Al Qaeda are transparent, LeT's cooperation is not supported. See C. Christine Fair, "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al-Qa'ida and Other Organizations," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 27(6) (2004), pp. 489–504, at p. 497.

17. Stephen Tankel, *Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), p. 93.

18. Bertin Martens, Uwe Mummert, Peter Murrell, and Paul Seabright, *The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 46.

19. Abdulkader Sinno, *Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 78–80.

20. Ibid., p. 14.

21. Adria Lawrence, "Triggering Nationalist Violence: Competition and Conflict in Uprisings against Colonial Rule," *International Security* 35(2) (2010), pp. 88–122, at p. 90–91; Wendy Pearlman, "Spoiling Inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the Middle East Peace Process," *International Security* 33(3) (2008), pp. 79–109.

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23. Ernesto Zirakzadeh, "From Revolutionary Dreams to Organizational Fragmentation: Disputes over Violence within ETA and Sendero Luminoso," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14(4) (2002), pp. 66–92, at pp. 75–77.

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25. Susan Shapiro, "Agency Theory," *Annual Review of Sociology* 31 (2005), pp. 263–284, at p. 279.

26. Chaim D. Kaufmann, "Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars: Why One Can be Done and the Other Can't," *Security Studies* 6(1) (1996), pp. 62–100; Stephen Biddle, "Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon," *Foreign Affairs* 85(2) (1996), pp. 2–14.

27. Chaim D. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," *International Security* 20 (1996), pp. 136–175.

28. James D. Fearon, "Why Ethnic Politics and 'Pork' Tend to Go Together." Mimeo, Stanford University.

29. Edward Banfield, "Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization," *Journal of Law and Economics* 18 (1975), pp. 587–605, at p. 595.

30. Idean Salehyan, "The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54(1) (2010), pp. 493–515.

31. Julia Adams, "Principals and Agents, Colonialists and Company Men: The Decay of Colonial Control in the Dutch East Indies", *American Sociological Review* 61(1) (1996), pp. 12–28.

32. Amir Mir, *The True Face of Jehadis* (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004), p. 78; *Ashley J. Tellis*, "The Menace That Is Lashkar-e-Taiba," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (2012), pp. 10–11. Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/LeT_menace.pdf (accessed 15 February 2014).

33. Swami, "Lashkar Chief's Release Cause of Global Concern."

34. Tankel, *Storming the World Stage*; Tim McGirk, and Hanna Bloch, "Has Pakistan Tamed its Spies?," *Time Magazine*. Available at http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,233902,00.html (accessed on 3 June 2015).

35. Abou Zahab, "I Shall be Waiting at the Door of Paradise."

36. See note 12.

37. Mir, *The True Face of Jehadis*, p. 76.

38. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for bringing up this issue.

39. For more information on the Ahl-e-Hadith school of thought see, for example, Saeed Shafqat, "From Official Islam to Islamism: The Rise of Dawat-ul-Irshad and Lashkar-e- Taiba," in Christophe Jaffrelot, ed., *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation* (London: Zed Books, 2002), pp. 131–147, at pp. 142–145; Tankel, *Storming the World Stage*, pp. 25–28. For the main attributes of Deobandis please consult: Tankel, *Storming the World Stage*, pp. 21–25. For similarities and differences between the two schools, see, for example, C. Christine Fair, "The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan" (Washington, DC: Unitited States Institute of Peace, 2008), pp. 56–58; Husain Haqqani, "The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups," in Eric Brown, Hillel Fradkin, and Husain Haqqani, eds., *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2005), pp. 12–26.

40. Abou Zahab, "I Shall be Waiting at the Door of Paradise."

41. C. Christine Fair, "Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani State," *Survival* 53(4) (2011), pp. 1–23, at p. 6.

42. Fair, "The Madrassah Challenge."

43. Tankel, *Storming the World Stage*.

44. Fair, "The Madrassah Challenge."

45. Ibid.

46. In fact, the separation from HuM and the establishment of JeM had turned into a violent conflict over property. See Amir Muhammad Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan* (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004), pp. 220–221.

47. Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan*, p. 66.

48. Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, then Army, and America's War Terror* (London: M. E. Sharpe, 2005), p. 214.

49. Farzana Shaikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 175.

50. Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan*, p. 67.

51. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan*, p. 234.

52. B. Muralidhar Reddy, "Jaish Behind Parliament Attack: Ex-ISI Chief," *The Hindu*, 7 March 2004. Available at http://www.hindu.com/2004/03/07/stories/2004030703320900.htm (accessed 3 March 2014).

53. "Who Will Strike First?," *The Economist*, 22 December 2001. Available at http://www.economist.com/node/917228 (accessed 21 January 2014).

54. Personal interview with a former senior intelligence officer (name withheld), 18 October 2012, Delhi; Personal interview with Praveen Swami, 23 October 2012, Delhi.

55. Rorry McCarthy, "Dangerous Game of State-Sponsored Terror that Threatens Nuclear Conflict," *The Guardian*, 25 May 2002. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/may/25/pakistan.india (accessed 11 January 2014).

56. "UN Sanctions on Jamaatud Dawa," 12 December 2008, *Dawn*. Available at http://www.dawn.com/news/955287/un-sanctions-on-jamaatud-dawa (accessed 23 January 2014).

57. It appears that Pakistan opened Pandora's box with the seizure of JeM's financial assets because the lack of resources ignited quarrels over money. Jabbar, along with other members, accused Azhar of nepotism and personal enrichment to the detriment of the organization. Azmat Abbas, "Death Wish," *Herald (Karachi)*, July 2003.

58. Peter Chalk and C. Christine Fair, "The Re-Orientation of Kashmiri Extremism: A Threat to Regional and International Security," *Terrorism Monitor*, 17 November 2005, 3(22), pp. 8–10, at p. 9.

59. Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), p. 225.

60. Mariam Abou Zahab, and Olivier Roy, *Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection* (London: Hurst and Company, 2006), p. 31.

61. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan*, p. 20.

62. Ibid., p. 26.

63. Mir, *The True Face of Jehadis*.

64. Rohit Honawar, "Jaish-e-Mohammed," *IPCS Special Report*, 4 (2005), pp. 1–7, at p. 2.

65. Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism*, p. 60

66. By 2003, JeM had split into Khuddam ul-Islam (KuI), led by Azhar and Jamaat ul-Furqan (JUF), led by Abdul Jabbar. Despite the split, JeM continued to operate as a single organization and be associated with its original identity. Source: Honawar, "Jaish-e-Mohammed," p. 1.

67. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan*, p. 27.

68. Syed Shoaib Hasan, "Profile: Islamabad's Red Mosque," *BBC News*, 27 July 2007. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6503477.stm (accessed 11 January 2014).

69. Mir, *The True Face of Jehadis*, p. 47.

70. Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*: *The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia* (New York: Viking, 2008), p. 272.

71. Ibid., pp. 230–232.

72. Ibid.

73. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan*, p. 25.

74. Hassan Abbas, "Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network," *CTC Sentinel*, April 2009. Available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol2Iss4-Art1.pdf (accessed 3 February 2014).

75. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan*, p. 329.

76. Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 290.

77. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan*, p.337.

78. My Indian interviewees claim that ISI was behind this operation.

79. Tankel, *Storming the World Stage*, p. 61.

80. Amir Mir, "Hafiz Mohammad Saeed: Lashkar-e-Toiba," in Harinder Baweja, ed., *Most Wanted: Profiles of Terror* (New Delhi: Roli Books, 2002), p. 66.

81. Wilson John, *The Caliphate's Soldiers: The Lashkar-e-Tayyeba's Long War* (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2011), pp. 137–139.

82. Farhat Haq, "Militarism and Motherhood: The Women of the Lashkar-i-Tayyabia in Pakistan," *Signs* 32(4) (2007), pp. 1023–1046.

83. Stephen Tankel, "Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects." *New America Foundation,* National Security Studies Program Policy Paper. April 2011.

84. Tankel, *Storming the World Stage*, pp. 68–69.

85. Ibid., p. 142.

86. Fair, "Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani State," pp. 9–10; Ahmed Rashid, *Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West* (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), p. 53.

87. Mir, *The True Face of Jehadis*, p. 96.

88. Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam*, p. 53; Tankel, *Storming the World Stage*, p. 127; Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan*, p. 57.

89. Abbas, *Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network.*

90. Saeed's allies in the government might have played a crucial role in his release. Nicholas Howenstein, "The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir," *Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU)*, 5 February 2008, pp. 1–41, at p. 21.

91. Zaffar Abbas, "Endgame Begins," *The Herald*, February 2004, pp. 51–62, at p. 61.

92. "Lashkar Parent Unit Jamaat-ud-Dawa Splits," *Rediff.com*, 16 July 2004. Available at http://www.rediff.com///news/2004/jul/16let.htm (accessed 7 February 2014).

93. A senior KN member even stated that "Khairun Naas and Lashkar-e-Taiba are basically the same, but the LT is banned in Pakistan so we adopted the name Khairun Naas." Amir Rana, "Jamaatud Dawa Splits," 18 July 2004. Available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_18-7-2004_pg7_20 (accessed 9 February 2014).

94. This theme is recurring through the responses from my interviewees.

95. Arif Jamal, *Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir* (Brooklyn, NY: Melville Publishing House, 2009).

96. In one such instance, Mir speculates that ISI might have supported commander Sarfraz against its leader Syed Salahuddin for disassociating Hizbul from Jamaat-e-Islami, "an act that (also) infuriated Pakistan's ISI." Mir, *The True Face of Jehadis*, p. 107.

97. Fair, "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan."

98. Tankel, *Storming the World Stage*, p. 123.

99. Ibid.

100. Fair, "Leader-Led Jihad."