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Terrorism, Civil Liberties, and Political Rights: A Cross-National Analysis

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the effect terrorism has on civil liberties and political rights across a wide range of democracies and regions. This study includes an analysis of the influence domestic and international terrorist attacks have on civil liberties and political rights in 48 democratic states from 1971–2007. The results from a time series cross-national analysis reveal that terrorism weakens civil liberties and political rights. However, certain types of democracies are more affected by terrorism than others. These findings have important implications for democracy and counterterrorism strategies in democratic states.

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In 1972 there were 15 terrorist attacks in Argentina and 5 fatalities resulting from terrorism. After 1972, Argentina began to experience a significant increase in the number and severity of terrorist attacks by both right-wing and left-wing terrorist organizations. In 1973, the number of attacks increased to 73 with 16 fatalities. In 1974, Argentina experienced 71 attacks with 21 fatalities. In 1975, Argentina had 38 terrorist attacks and 123 fatalities.¹ Even though poor economic conditions and hyperinflation weighed heavily on the Peron presidency, the instability created by terrorism played a key role in the ability of the military to seize power in 1976 and usher in authoritarian rule.²

The chaos reached its peak in early 1976 at the hands of Maria Estela [“Isabelita”] Martinez de Peron, then the constitutional President of the Argentine Republic. Terrorist attacks by highly dedicated and efficient groups of both ultra-leftist and ultra-rightist persuasion became daily events. The increasing discontent of the Argentine people with the *status quo*, set the stage for a military take-over of civil institutions. When the military, promising “order,” finally removed ‘Isabelita’ Peron from the *Casa Rosada* in March of 1976 “the entire country, including the Peronists, breathed a sigh of relief... Instead of order what ensued was one of the most brutal regimes in a continent already noted for a long history of brutality.”³

While the Argentine case provides an extreme lesson regarding how terrorism can weaken democratic institutions and plunge a functioning democracy into authoritarianism, it does illustrate the point that terrorism’s effect on democracy is often not benign. Meaning, the instability associated with terrorism can affect the degree that civil liberties and political rights are protected within democracies.

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This study aims to examine the influence terrorism has on civil liberties and political rights in a large range of democracies worldwide. I contend that civil liberties and political rights are weakened as states experience a greater number of terrorist attacks as well as more severe terrorist attacks (i.e., more fatalities and injuries associated with terrorist attacks). I make this argument for two primary reasons. First, government leaders in democracies may inadvertently weaken civil liberties and political rights in an effort to increase the security of their states in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. More specifically, given that providing for security is a primary function of governance, political leaders may place security concerns over concerns regarding civil liberties and political rights if they perceive the issues of security and liberty are juxtapositioned against one another. Secondly, citizens are more willing to accept a degree of erosion of civil liberties and political rights as their security becomes increasingly threatened due to terrorism. However, not all types of democracies are affected similarly by terrorist attacks.

While I argue that terrorist attacks weaken political rights and civil liberties in democracies, the degree that democracies have consolidated their democratic institutions of government should also condition the effect that terrorism has on political rights and civil liberties. That is, terrorism's influence on political rights and civil liberties should also be affected by the extent that democracies are consolidated. Furthermore, consolidated democracies (i.e., more democratic states) should be less affected by terrorism because they have well-developed democratic institutions and stronger democratic norms that can insulate them to a greater degree from the weakening of political rights and civil liberties following terrorist attacks. Thus, democratic institutions and democratic norms interact in consolidated democracies to lessen the erosion of political rights and civil liberties in a postterrorism environment.

This article offers an important contribution to the literature on terrorism and democracy for four primary reasons. One, while scholars have considered the effect terrorism has on democracy researchers have yet to examine the influence terrorism has on political rights and civil liberties in a broad cross-national analysis. Secondly, I attempt to explain the rationale linking terrorism with changes in levels of political rights and civil liberties in democratic states. Third, this study considers how terrorism influences political rights and civil liberties in different types of democracies. That is, I examine the effect terrorism has on political rights and civil liberties in more consolidated versus less consolidated democracies and offer an explanation for the varying effects terrorism has on political rights and civil liberties in these states. Lastly, I analyze and discuss the varying effects domestic and international terrorist attacks have on political rights and civil liberties in democracies.

The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the conceptualization of political rights and civil liberties as it relates to democracy. Next, I examine the relationship between terrorism, political rights, and civil liberties in democratic states. I then move to the data and methods section of the article where I test the argument that terrorism weakens political rights and civil liberties in democracies. Finally, I offer a discussion regarding the implications of my findings.

Conceptualizing Political Rights and Civil Liberties

Throughout the course of this article the term democracy will be used to denote the extent that political rights and civil liberties are present within democratic states. Thus, the use of

democracy will be synonymous with the presence of political rights and civil liberties. While many factors other than political rights and civil liberties affect democracy, I contend that examining political rights and civil liberties is important because they are pivotal to democratic governance. Furthermore, previous scholars contend that political rights and civil liberties are key components of democracy. For example, Tsai conceptualizes political freedom as the degree political rights and civil liberties are present within states.⁴ As Tsai remarks: “Surely, both the freedom of speech, association, and movement, and the rights to due legal processes are two essential dimensions of a democracy but they do not exhaust all contents of democracy.”⁵

For the purposes of this study, political rights refer to the ability of individuals to participate in the political process in the form of voting for elected leaders (in free and fair elections), running for office, and joining political organizations. Civil liberties refer to the ability of individuals to openly express their political beliefs, belong to political and civil organizations, the protection of personal privacy and autonomy, and the rule of law.⁶ I base my conceptual definitions of civil liberties and political rights on the definitions provided by Freedom House.⁷ I expand on the measurement of these concepts in the data and methods section of the article. I now turn to examining previous research pertaining to security, terrorism and democracy while making the claim that terrorism weakens political rights and civil liberties in democratic states but has varying effects in consolidated versus less consolidated democracies.

Terrorism, Political Rights, and Civil Liberties

Terrorism poses unique security challenges to states that often requires swift and decisive responses by state leaders. The decisive action required by government leaders during this period can create an environment that is more conducive to the weakening of political rights and civil liberties. In surmising the effect a security crisis can have on democracy the political theorist Carl Schmitt states: “...when a democratic state confronts a crisis that threatens its very survival, it will deal with it by democratic means, if possible, and by non-democratic means, if necessary.”⁸

Numerous scholars have found that threats to a state’s security often increase the coercive power of government leaders in both democratic and authoritarian states which can undermine political rights and civil liberties. “In particular, normative and empirical political theorists have long recognized that critical events—war, civil unrest, economic and political crises, terrorist attacks and other external shocks—strengthen the power of the executive, disrupt and threaten constitutional politics and damage democratic institutions.”⁹ Furthermore, previous research finds support for the notion that emergencies within states may threaten traditional democratic practices and weaken institutional safeguards against authoritarianism such as: the erosion of legislative power, oversight of executive actions, government accountability and the guarantee of civil liberties and the rule of law.¹⁰

One reason that political rights and civil liberties are weakened following terrorist attacks is because the public is more willing to accept more authoritarian styles of governance when terrorism threatens their physical security. Numerous studies have found a strong relationship between security crises and calls by the public for a strong and decisive response by government leaders.¹¹ Other scholars have also found that threats to a state’s security increase the public’s support for authoritarian policies.¹² An explanation for this phenomenon is that

terrorism produces behavioral changes in individuals that causes them to be more accepting of coercive government policies that may restrict individual freedoms. For example, Sales finds that events that cause individuals to perceive their environments as being increasingly threatened produce behavioral and psychological changes in individuals that lead them to have a greater affinity for authoritarian practices.¹³ Individuals are also found to increase their support for cultural concepts of toughness, law and order, and attach greater value to sources of authority. However, an important question emerges when examining the relationship between terrorism and public support for more authoritarian style policies. If terrorism can increase citizens' support for coercive policies, what specific behavioral manifestations does terrorism produce that encourages citizens to be more supportive of authoritarian practices? It appears that two common behavioral effects of terrorism are increased anxiety and fear.

Terrorism by its definition is intended to affect a larger audience than simply the victims of terrorist attacks.¹⁴ Public opinion and survey data indicate that terrorism significantly increases anxiety and fear in individuals and the perception that their security is threatened.¹⁵ Scholars have also recognized that terrorist attacks can increase the extent by which individuals are made aware of their own mortality as well as becoming more conscious of threats to their physical safety.¹⁶

Maslow argues that physical safety and security are two of the most primitive and basic needs for humans.¹⁷ According to Maslow, the need for physical safety and security is greater than the need for individual freedom and self-actualization.¹⁸ Thus, if Maslow is accurate, in the aggregate, the public's need for security will frequently supplant the desire for individual freedom or self-actualization when these needs conflict with one another. In theory, one could argue that the needs of security and liberty need not contradict one another and governments can provide both security and liberty on all occasions. However, numerous studies find that many governments often dichotomize the choice between liberty and security when the security of their state is threatened, thus presenting a conflict between the need for security and the need for liberty from the public's perspective.¹⁹ As Davis and Silver remark: "as support for civil liberties increases, support for order and security decreases, and vice versa."²⁰ Furthermore, a large body of research in the area of conflict, security, and public opinion supports Maslow's arguments regarding the need for security taking precedence over the need for liberty when the security of the public is seemingly threatened.²¹

In examining the effect terrorism has on public perception, Davis and Silver find that as individuals perceive their environment as being increasingly threatened due to terrorism they are less likely to support civil liberties.²² Garcia and Geva provide experimental support for the notion that international terrorism increases support for government policies that increase security while abating civil liberties when counterterrorism policies are viewed as being effective and having a high probability of success.²³ Additional scholars have reached similar conclusions that threats to a state's security have been found to decrease public support for political rights and civil liberties.²⁴

I contend that terrorism decreases civil liberties and political rights in democratic states for two primary reasons. First, given the need to provide for national security, government leaders often react to severe terrorist attacks by increasing the coercive power of the state, which has the effect of weakening political rights and civil liberties. Secondly, citizens in democracies are often more willing to cede some of their political rights and civil liberties

following acts of terrorism. That is, based on previous research, terrorist attacks generally increase anxiety and fear in a given population and lead citizens to be more supportive of government practices that enhance security at the expense of political rights and civil liberties. Furthermore, I argue that civil liberties and political rights are increasingly weakened as terrorist attacks are more numerous and severe. The reason being is that a larger number of terrorist attacks, and more severe terrorist attacks, further magnify anxiety and fear in citizens as well as present a greater security threat to government leaders and citizens. This allows leaders to more easily rationalize government policies that strengthen security while subsequently abating political rights and civil liberties. Thus, my hypotheses related to terrorism and democracy are as follows:

- H1: An increase in the number and severity (i.e., deaths and wounded) of terrorist attacks will result in a decrease in civil liberties in democratic states.
- H2: An increase in the number and severity (i.e., deaths and wounded) of terrorist attacks will result in a decrease in political rights in democratic states.

Terrorism and Democratic Consolidation

I contend that terrorist attacks weaken the protection of political rights and civil liberties in democracies. However, the level of democratic consolidation (i.e., level of democracy) within democratic states should also influence the degree that terrorist attacks affect political rights and civil liberties. More specifically, terrorism's influence on political rights and civil liberties should be conditioned by the extent that democracies are consolidated.

The term democratic consolidation has been strongly debated by many democratization scholars. Researchers have engaged in extended debates regarding what constitutes a consolidated democracy.²⁵ I borrow from this scholarship and rely on the definition of democratic consolidation provided by Linz and Stephan²⁶ who contend that three conditions need to be met in order for a democracy to be defined as consolidated. First, a functioning state must exist that is able to carry out the basic functions of democratic governance. Second, a democratic transition must have taken place. That is, free and contested election must have occurred and executive, legislative, and judicial institutions should be allowed to govern without interference from authoritarian powers within the state (i.e., the military and authoritarian holdovers). Third, leaders must govern in a democratic manner. That is, elected leaders must protect minority rights and constitutional arrangements. Thus, based on prior scholarship, states can be democratic but also exist along a continuum of the consolidation scale; and states that score higher on multiple international measures of democracy (e.g., Freedom House and Polity IV) are considered to be more consolidated. Furthermore, I contend that more consolidated democracies should be less affected by terrorist attacks due to the nature of their polity.

I argue that institutional features and democratic norms interact in democracies to shape their responses to terrorism.²⁷ Two institutional features that often demarcate consolidated versus less consolidated democracies are the degree of constitutionalism within states and the nature of their party systems. Constitutionalism in consolidated democracies refers to the development of governmental procedures that protect the democratic process through the rule of law. As Linz and Stepan state: "Constitutionalism, which should not be confused with majoritarianism, entails a relatively strong consensus regarding the constitution, and especially a commitment to "self-binding" procedures of governance that can be altered only

by exceptional majorities.”²⁸ Constitutionalism, in this context, safeguards the democratic provisions of civil liberties and political rights to a greater extent than is present in less consolidated democracies due to the commitment citizens, government officials, judges, and elected leaders have to the protection and maintenance of political rights and civil liberties. Furthermore, consolidated democracies should be able to insulate themselves to a greater degree from potential threats to civil liberties and political rights following terrorist attacks due to the strong commitment citizens and state actors have to these constitutional provisions. In speaking to the resilience of consolidated democracies during periods of crises Linz and Stepan state: “even in the face of severe political and economic crises, the overwhelming majority of the people believe that any further political change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic procedures.”²⁹

Another important institutional feature of consolidated democracies is they generally have more institutionalized (i.e., stable) party systems in relation to less consolidated democracies.³⁰ Researchers have found that political parties are often more well-developed, more sophisticated, more predictable, and better organized in more consolidated democracies.³¹ In addition, the more consolidated democracies included in this study display a positive and statistically significant correlation with measures of party system stability. Thus, in this analysis, more consolidated democracies are significantly associated with having more stable party systems.³² Furthermore, many scholars claim that stable party systems are a hallmark of consolidated democracies.³³ As Mainwaring states: “Weakly institutionalized party systems function differently from well-established systems, with significant implications for democracy.”³⁴

Party systems that are stable are often more capable of insulating their states from constitutional disruptions that could weaken political rights and civil liberties. That is, stable party systems generally provide more predictability in democratic governance that can prevent government leaders from attempting to alter constitutional practices. As Mainwaring contends: “An institutionalized party system, then, is one in which actors develop expectations and behavior based on the premise that the fundamental contours and rules of party competition and behavior will prevail into the foreseeable future. In such a system, there is stability in who the main parties are and how they will behave. Institutionalization does not completely preclude change, but limits it.”³⁵ As political parties are stronger and more predictable, it may make it difficult for personalistic leaders and opportunistic political parties to alter constitutional practices (that protect political rights and civil liberties) following terrorist attacks. Thus, consolidated democracies may be less affected by severe terrorist attacks due to the strength, resilience and level of sophistication of political parties in consolidated democracies.

Lastly, the interaction between institutional features and strong democratic norms should protect civil liberties and political rights in consolidated democracies to a larger degree than in unconsolidated democracies. The reason is that the identities and norms of consolidated democracies become wedded to the preservation of political rights and civil liberties.³⁶ These identities, which shape and are a product of institutional development, condition state responses to terrorism.³⁷ Furthermore, consolidated democracies entail normative regulations that have strengthened over time that should work to moderate the erosion of political rights and civil liberties following acts of terrorism.³⁸ More specifically, the ideological commitment to the protection of political rights and civil liberties becomes an element of the state itself.³⁹ In this manner, constitutionalism, democratic institutions, and the norms and identities of democratic states interact to protect consolidated democracies from encroachments on political rights and civil liberties following terrorist attacks.

The notion that institutions and norms converge to influence state responses to terrorism has been supported by recent research as well.⁴⁰ For example, Katzenstein finds that Germany and Japan's counterterrorism policies are products of the institutions, identities and norms that are embedded in each democracy.⁴¹ As Katzenstein contends: "These differences in interpretation—war, crime, and crisis—reflect past institutionalized practices and different conceptions of self and other."⁴² In addition, Katzenstein states that: "Conceptions of self and other define the standards of appropriate behavior that govern Germany's and Japan's counterterrorist policies."⁴³ Furthermore, Perlinger examines eighty-three democracies from 1946–2008 and conducts case study analyses of Canada, Israel, Italy, and Germany to understand how democracies respond to terrorist attacks.⁴⁴ Perlinger finds that the two most important factors that affect state responses to terrorism are the nature of terrorist attacks as well as the level of institutionalization of democratic foundations within democracies. Strong democracies are found to be less likely to respond to terrorist attacks with hard-line measures that alter civil liberties and political rights compared with weaker democracies.⁴⁵ As Perlinger remarks: "while strong democracies are willing to escalate their legal measures to improve law enforcement effectiveness, they show a lesser desire to significantly manipulate or hamper due process or core civil liberties."⁴⁶

In review, even though citizens may experience greater anxiety and fear following terrorist attacks, the interaction between well-developed democratic institutions and strong democratic norms may moderate over-reactive responses by individualistic politicians and opportunistic political parties in a postterrorism environment in consolidated democracies. Conversely, in less consolidated democracies, where democratic institutions and democratic norms are generally less developed, individual government leaders and political parties may find it easier to upset existing constitutional practices while weakening political rights and civil liberties following terrorist attacks. Therefore, terrorism should have a minimal effect on the erosion of political rights and civil liberties in more consolidated democracies.

Research Design

The dataset used to test my argument is comprised of 48 democracies from Africa, Asia, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and North America from 1971–2007. The timeframe chosen is due to the data availability of the control variables needed for this analysis. The states included have a score of "6" or higher on the Polity2 measure found in the Polity IV database and a list of the states and years used in the study can be found in Table A1.⁴⁷ Many scholars, including the developers of the Polity IV database, contend that states that have scores below six fail to possess the appropriate institutions or procedures to be considered democratic.⁴⁸ Thus, states that fall below a score of "6" for a given year of observation are excluded from the analysis. The unit of analysis in this study is state-year. Please see Table 2 for a summary of the variables used in this analysis.

Dependent Variables: Political Rights and Civil Liberties

For this study I employ two primary measures of democracy: *political rights* and *civil liberties*. Both measures are taken from the Freedom House database.⁴⁹ In addition, as was previously mentioned, I base my conceptual definitions of political rights and civil liberties on the

definitions provided by Freedom House that are commonly used measures by scholars examining democratic governance.⁵⁰ Political rights refer to the ability of individuals to participate in the political process in the form of voting for elected leaders (in free and fair elections), running for office, and joining political organizations. The *Political rights* measure is coded on an ordinal seven point scale. The highest value (7) indicates that a state has few or no political rights, and (1) indicates a state enjoys a wide range of political rights. Thus, higher values equate to a state having fewer political rights.

Civil liberties refer to the ability of individuals to openly express their political beliefs, belong to political and civil organizations, the protection of personal privacy and autonomy, and the rule of law.⁵¹ The *civil rights* measure is coded on an ordinal seven point scale. The highest value (7) indicates that a state has few or no civil liberties, and (1) indicates a state enjoys a wide range of civil liberties. Thus, higher values equate to a state having fewer civil liberties. I offer an extended discussion of the measurement of *political liberties* and *civil rights* in Table 1.

Independent Variable: Terrorism

In order to assess the influence terrorism has on political rights and civil liberties, I employ three measures of terrorism. The data for the three measures of terrorism were collected from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) that is considered to be one of the most reliable and comprehensive terrorism databases in the world.⁵² The GTD includes data on domestic and international terrorist attacks. GTD defines a terrorist attack as “an intentional act of violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor” in which two of the following three criteria also have to be met:

1. the violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal;
2. the violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than the immediate victims; and
3. the violent act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law.⁵³

The first measure employed in this study is the number of terrorist attacks (*number of attacks*) that occur within each state for each year. Thus, *number of attacks* is a continuous level variable that specifies the number of terrorist attacks that occur for a given state-year. The variable ranges in values of “0” to “598.” The second terrorism variable (*number killed*) captures the number of individuals killed in terrorist attacks for each state. As with the *number of attacks* measure, *number killed* is a continuous level variable that specifies the number of individuals killed in terrorist attacks for each state-year. The variable ranges from “0” to “3,003.” The last terrorism measure, *number wounded*, is also a continuous level variable that specifies the number of individuals wounded in terrorist attacks for each state-year.⁵⁴ The *number wounded* variable ranges from “0” to “6,225.” The terrorism variables: the *number of attacks*, *number killed* and *number wounded* have been lagged one year. Furthermore, in additional models, the terrorism variables are lagged five years to provide for a more robust analysis.

The terrorism variables are lagged one year and five years for two primary reasons. First, in assessing the effect terrorism has on political rights and civil liberties we should expect a small delay between the time in which the terror attacks occur and any resulting changes in political rights and civil liberties. Meaning, it may take governments weeks, months, or

Table 1. Measures of political rights and civil liberties.

Variables	Value	Coding
Political Rights	1	Countries and territories with a rating of 1 enjoy a wide range of political rights, including free and fair elections. Candidates who are elected actually rule, political parties are competitive, the opposition plays an important role and enjoys real power, and minority groups have reasonable self-government or can participate in the government through informal consensus.
	2	Countries and territories with a rating of 2 have slightly weaker political rights than those with a rating of 1 because of such factors as some political corruption, limits on the functioning of political parties and opposition groups, and foreign or military influence on politics.
	3,4,5	Countries and territories with a rating of 3, 4, or 5 include those that moderately protect almost all political rights to those that more strongly protect some political rights while less strongly protecting others. The same factors that undermine freedom in countries with a rating of 2 may also weaken political rights in those with a rating of 3, 4, or 5, but to an increasingly greater extent at each successive rating.
	6	Countries and territories with a rating of 6 have very restricted political rights. They are ruled by one-party or military dictatorships, religious hierarchies, or autocrats. They may allow a few political rights, such as some representation or autonomy for minority groups, and a few are traditional monarchies that tolerate political discussion and accept public petitions.
	7	Countries and territories with a rating of 7 have few or no political rights because of severe government oppression, sometimes in combination with civil war. They may also lack an authoritative and functioning central government and suffer from extreme violence or warlord rule that dominates political power.
Civil Liberties	1	Countries and territories with a rating of 1 enjoy a wide range of civil liberties, including freedom of expression, assembly, association, education, and religion. They have an established and generally fair system of the rule of law (including an independent judiciary), allow free economic activity, and tend to strive for equality of opportunity for everyone, including women and minority groups.
	2	Countries and territories with a rating of 2 have slightly weaker civil liberties than those with a rating of 1 because of such factors as some limits on media independence, restrictions on trade union activities, and discrimination against minority groups and women.
	3,4,5	Countries and territories with a rating of 3, 4, or 5 include those that moderately protect almost all civil liberties to those that more strongly protect some civil liberties while less strongly protecting others. The same factors that undermine freedom in countries with a rating of 2 may also weaken civil liberties in those with a rating of 3, 4, or 5, but to an increasingly greater extent at each successive rating.
	6	Countries and territories with a rating of 6 have very restricted civil liberties. They strongly limit the rights of expression and association and frequently hold political prisoners. They may allow a few civil liberties, such as some religious and social freedoms, some highly restricted private business activity, and some open and free private discussion.
	7	Countries and territories with a rating of 7 have few or no civil liberties. They allow virtually no freedom of expression or association, do not protect the rights of detainees and prisoners, and often control or dominate most economic activity.

Source: Data adapted from Freedom House (2011)

longer to alter their institutions or political processes in response to terror attacks. Second, in order to ensure that the relationship between terror attacks and political rights and civil liberties is not endogenous, it is important to include lagged indicators of terrorism so we can ascertain that terrorist attacks are occurring prior to changes in political rights and civil liberties. Controlling for the potential endogeneity between terrorism and political rights and civil liberties is important in this study because observers could potentially argue that the number and severity of terrorist attacks are increasing in response to their governments becoming less democratic. However, by lagging the terrorism variables one period and five periods it can be surmised that changes in the observations of the independent variables (*number of attacks*, *number killed*, and *number wounded*) are occurring prior to changes in

the observations of the dependent variables (*political rights* and *civil liberties*). In addition, employing lagged explanatory variables is considered an appropriate method to deal with potential endogeneity in time-series estimations.⁵⁵

Control Variables

In examining the effects terrorism has on democracy it is important to control for a number of variables that can affect the presence of political rights and civil liberties within states. Thus, I include several economic, political, and institutional measures that are common control variables in research studies that examine the factors that influence political rights and civil liberties.⁵⁶ These variables include: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita (log), the extent that a state is integrated in the economic, social, and political community (i.e., Economic, Social and Political Globalization), the type of democracy (i.e., Presidential, Parliamentary, or Mixed), the age of the democratic regime, the age of the democratic executive structure, the type of electoral system, and the extent that an electoral system promotes proportionality.⁵⁷ A full list and description of the control variables used in this study can be found in the Appendix in Table A2.

Estimation Method

The data collected for this analysis are cross-sectional time series data, and my dependent variables are ordinal. Thus, in order to examine the effect terrorism has on political rights and civil liberties I use an ordered logistic regression. A lagged dependent variable is also employed in order to control for autocorrelation. In addition, Wooldridge tests were conducted for each model, and the results were statistically significant for each model, which indicates the lagged dependent variable is an appropriate control variable.

Findings

The results from the time-series, logistic analyses are displayed in the tables in this section. The analysis of the influence terrorist attacks have on democracy indicates strong support

Table 2. Summary statistics.

Variables	Mean	Standard dev.	Minimum	Maximum	Observations
Political Rights	2.61	2.52	1	7	1,368
Civil Liberties	2.97	2.49	1	7	1,368
FHOUSE	6.93	1.62	1	7	1,524
Num Attacks (t-1)	23.70	61.90	0	598	1,615
Num Kill (t-1)	34.11	150.88	0	3,003	1,615
Num Wounded (t-1)	49.68	222.44	0	6,225	1,615
Type of Democracy	1.64	.93	0	3	1,173
Age of Exec Structure	47.85	37.99	1	133	1,173
Age of Democracy	232.46	76.73	5	366	1,173
GDP (ln)	3.75	.53	2.06	4.75	1,290
Economic Globalization	63.42	17.52	14.60	98.54	1,284
Social Globalization	57.69	20.32	11.78	95.36	1,303
Political Globalization	63.57	25.17	1	99.00	1,303
Electoral System	2.45	.79	1	3	1,281
Index of Proportionality	90.36	5.69	75.5	99.3	1,264

Table 3. Logit results (DV: Political rights).

Variables	Model 1 (DV: Political rights)	Model 2 (DV: Political rights)	Model 3 (DV: Political rights)
Num Attacks (t-1)	.0030 (.0011)**		
Num Kill (t-1)		.0011 (.0004)**	
Num Wounded (t-1)			.0006 (.0003)**
Type of Democracy	-.1105 (.1236)	-.1170 (.1246)	-.0799 (.1228)
Age of Exec Structure	.0003 (.0040)	-.0005 (.0040)	-.0000 (.0040)
Age of Democracy	-.0041 (.0016)**	-.0041 (.0016)**	-.0041 (.0016)**
GDP (ln)	-2.2249 (.3968)***	-2.092 (.3913)***	-2.1763 (.3895)
Economic Globalization	.0082 (.0098)	.0068 (.0097)	.0073*** (.0098)
Social Globalization	-.0238 (.0096)**	-.0248 (.0095)***	-.0248 (.0095)***
Political Globalization	.0084 (.0056)	.0077 (.0056)	.0087 (.0055)
Electoral System	.5298 (.1830)***	.5422 (.1855)***	.5257 (.1853)***
Index of Proportionality	.0277 (.0253)	.0289 (.0255)	.0308 (.0254)
Political Rights Lag	3.1893 (.1870)***	3.2045 (.1866)***	3.2198 (.1861)***
Observations	1104	1104	1104
r ²	.62	.62	.62
Prob. > χ^2	.0000***	.0000***	.0000***

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; standard errors in parentheses.

for the argument that terrorism weakens political rights and civil liberties in democracies. However, in an interesting finding, it appears that certain types of democracies are more likely to experience a significant decrease in political rights and civil liberties following terrorist attacks compared to others.

As shown in Models 1, 2, and 3 (Table 3), the *number of attacks*, *number killed*, and *number wounded* variables (one year lag) all have a positive and statistically significant influence on the *political rights* measure. Given that the *political rights* measure is coded to where higher values indicate states have fewer political rights, these results show that democracies are more likely to experience a weakening of political rights as they have a larger number of terrorist attacks and more severe terrorist attacks. In addition, as displayed in Models 4, 5, and 6 (Table 4), the *number of attacks*, *number killed*, and *number wounded* variables all have a positive and statistically significant influence on the *political rights* measure when

Table 4. Logit results (DV: Political rights).

Variables	Model 4 (DV: Political rights)	Model 5 (DV: Political rights)	Model 6 (DV: Political rights)
Num Attacks (t-5)	.0034 (.0010)***		
Num Kill (t-5)		.0014 (.0004)***	
Num Wounded (t-5)			.0007 (.0002)**
Type of Democracy	-.1415 (.1259)	-.1377 (.1262)	-.0818 (.1235)
Age of Exec Structure	.0018 (.0040)	.0009 (.0040)	.0002 (.0040)
Age of Democracy	-.0036 (.0016)**	-.0038 (.0016)**	-.0040 (.0016)**
GDP (ln)	-2.2347 (.3934)***	-2.104 (.3914)***	-2.2024 (.3920)***
Economic Globalization	.0074 (.0098)	.0078 (.0098)	.0071 (.0098)
Social Globalization	-.0268 (.0096)***	.0275 (.0096)***	-.0251 (.0095)***
Political Globalization	.0085 (.0056)	.0085 (.0056)	.0089 (.0056)
Electoral System	.5359 (.1843)***	.5452 (.1862)***	.5243 (.1860)***
Index of Proportionality	.0239 (.0254)	.0220 (.0256)	.0312 (.0254)
Political Rights Lag	3.1684 (.1886)***	3.1931 (.1878)***	3.2186 (.1867)***
Observations	1101	1101	1101
r ²	.63	.63	.62
Prob. > χ^2	.0000***	.0000***	.0000***

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; standard errors in parentheses.

Table 5. Logit results (DV: Civil liberties).

Variables	Model 7 (DV: Civil liberties)	Model 8 (DV: Civil liberties)	Model 9 (DV: Civil liberties)
Num Attacks (t-1)	.0059 (.0014)***		
Num Kill (t-1)		.0013 (.0005)***	
Num Wounded (t-1)			.0006 (.0003)**
Type of Democracy	.0159 (.1238)	.0103 (.1245)	.0554 (.1233)
Age of Exec Structure	-.0062 (.0040)	-.0063 (.0040)	-.0052 (.0040)
Age of Democracy	-.0016 (.0015)	-.0012 (.0015)	-.0013 (.0015)
GDP (ln)	-.9579 (.3417)***	-.8361 (.3409)**	-.9571 (.3419)***
Economic Globalization	-.0068 (.0103)	-.0087 (.0102)	-.0075 (.0102)
Social Globalization	-.0033 (.0098)	-.0056 (.0097)	-.0058 (.0097)
Political Globalization	.0039 (.0053)	.0043 (.0053)	.0052 (.0053)
Electoral System	.0672 (.1645)	.0477 (.1653)	.0341 (.1645)
Index of Proportionality	-.0107 (.0219)	-.0141 (.0220)	-.0107 (.0219)
Civil Liberties Lag	4.5370 (.1980)***	4.5325 (.1955)***	4.5494 (.1954)***
Observations	1104	1104	1104
r ²	.70	.70	.70
Prob. > χ^2	.0000***	.0000***	.0000***

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; standard errors in parentheses.

lagged five years, which provides additional evidence that a greater number and more severe terrorist attacks are associated with an increased likelihood that political rights will be weakened.

In regards to the *civil liberties* measure, in examining Models 7, 8, and 9 (Table 5) we find that the *number of attacks*, *number killed*, and *number wounded* variables (one year lag) all have a positive and statistically significant influence on the *civil liberties* measure. This indicates that states are more likely to observe decreases in civil liberties as they experience a larger number of terrorist attacks that are more severe. In addition, in Models 10, 11, and 12 (Table 6) we see that the *number of attacks* and *number wounded* measures have a positive and statistically significant effect on *civil liberties* when lagged five years. However, the *number killed* variable did not reach statistical significance when lagged five years.

Table 6. Logit results (DV: Civil liberties).

Variables	Model 10 (DV: Civil liberties)	Model 11 (DV: Civil liberties)	Model 12 (DV: Civil liberties)
Num Attacks (t-5)	.0021 (.0011)*		
Num Kill (t-5)		.0009 (.0006)	
Num Wounded (t-5)			.0005 (.0003)*
Type of Democracy	.0328 (.1250)	.0345 (.1252)	.0584 (.1241)
Age of Exec Structure	-.0051 (.0040)	-.0052 (.0040)	-.0050 (.0040)
Age of Democracy	-.0011 (.0015)	-.0012 (.0015)	-.0012 (.0015)
GDP (ln)	-.9364 (.3406)***	-.8583 (.3404)**	-.9339 (.3411)***
Economic Globalization	-.0087 (.0101)	-.0086 (.0102)	-.0086 (.0102)
Social Globalization	-.0062 (.0097)	-.0067 (.0097)	-.0057 (.0097)
Political Globalization	.0049 (.0052)	.0051 (.0052)	.0049 (.0052)
Electoral System	.0144 (.1659)	.0135 (.1663)	.0165 (.1657)
Index of Proportionality	-.0101 (.0220)	-.0116 (.0221)	-.0096 (.0220)
Civil Liberties Lag	4.5084 (.1971)***	4.5280 (.1964)***	4.5541 (.1952)***
Observations	1101	1101	1101
r ²	.70	.70	.70
Prob. > χ^2	.0000***	.0000***	.0000***

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; standard errors in parentheses.

Table 7. Logit results: Change in predicted probabilities (DV: Political rights).

Variables	Model 23 (DV: Political rights)	Model 24 (DV: Political rights)	Model 25 (DV: Political rights)
Num Attacks (t-1)	.1656		
Num Kill (t-1)		.2747	
Num Wounded (t-1)			.2861
Type of Democracy	.0243	.0256	.0173
Age of Exec Structure	.0038	.0056	.0006
Age of Democracy	.1180	.1171	.1169
GDP (ln)	.3524	.3435	.3490
Economic Globalization	.0477	.0398	.0424
Social Globalization	.1485	.1540	.1532
Political Globalization	.0527	.0486	.0538
Electoral System	.0676	.0687	.0663
Index of Proportionality	.0460	.0477	.0502
Political Rights Lag	.3998	.3998	.3998

In employing a logistic regression, interpreting the coefficients is not as straightforward as it is in standard linear regression models. In addition, while the size of the coefficients in an ordered logistical regression model is often small, the predicted probabilities generally provide more useful information regarding the degree that the independent variables exert an effect on the dependent variables. Therefore, in order to demonstrate the substantive effects that the primary independent variables (*number of attacks*, *number killed*, and *number wounded*) have on the two primary dependent variables (*political rights* and *civil liberties*), I calculate and report the predicted probabilities. In examining Table 7, we see the effect the *number of attacks* variable has on *political rights* when moving the variable from its minimum to maximum value. The predicted probabilities indicate that states have a .1656 greater likelihood of receiving a higher *political rights* score (i.e., having fewer political rights) as the *number of attacks* measure moves from its minimum to maximum value. Furthermore, states have a .2747 greater likelihood of having a higher *political rights* score when moving the *number killed* measure from its minimum to maximum value, and states have a .2861 greater likelihood of having a higher *political rights* score when examining the substantive effects of the *number wounded* measure.

In examining the predicted probabilities regarding the *number of attacks* and *civil liberties* measure in Table 8, we find that states have a .1395 greater likelihood of having a higher *civil*

Table 8. Logit results: Change in predicted probabilities (DV: Civil liberties).

Variables	Model 26 (DV: Civil liberties)	Model 27 (DV: Civil liberties)	Model 28 (DV: Civil liberties)
Num Attacks (t-1)	.1395		
Num Kill (t-1)		.2007	
Num Wounded (t-1)			.2089
Type of Democracy	.0028	.0018	.0100
Age of Exec Structure	.0527	.0541	.0441
Age of Democracy	.0342	.0271	.0286
GDP (ln)	.1191	.1072	.1197
Economic Globalization	.0329	.0421	.0364
Social Globalization	.0165	.0285	.0291
Political Globalization	.0219	.0245	.0294
Electoral System	.0082	.0058	.0041
Index of Proportionality	.0150	.0199	.0151
Civil Liberties Lag	.3999	.3999	.3999

liberties score (i.e., having fewer civil liberties) when moving the *number of attacks* variable from its minimum to maximum value. In addition, states have a .2007 greater likelihood of receiving a higher *civil liberties* score when moving the *number killed* measure from its minimum to maximum value, and we see the substantive effect of the *number wounded* measure is .2089. These findings indicate that the number of terrorist attacks democracies sustain is significantly associated with democracies having a greater likelihood of experiencing a weakening of political rights and civil liberties in the future.

Additional Specifications

In order to ascertain that the results displayed above are not being driven primarily by the specification of my dependent variables, I include an additional dependent variable to test the relationship between terrorism and democracy. The measure is the Freedom House Democracy Score (DS) that is an index that combines an average of ratings for seven different components of governance including: Electoral Process (EP); Civil Society (CS); Independent Media (IM); National Democratic Governance (NGOV); Local Democratic Governance (LGOV); Judicial Framework and Independence (JFI); and Corruption (CO). The scale ranges in value from 1–7. Higher values indicate a state is more democratic based on the seven Freedom House components.⁵⁸

In examining the results in Models 13, 14, and 15 in Table 9, we see that the *number of attacks*, *number killed*, and *number wounded* variables all have a negative and statistically significant influence on the *Freedom House Democracy Score*. In addition, in Models 16, 17, and 18 in Table 10 we see that the *number of attacks*, *number killed*, and *number wounded* measures all have a negative and statistically significant effect on the *Freedom House Democracy Score* when lagged five years. These results indicate that states are more likely to observe decreases in overall levels of democratic governance as they experience a larger number of terrorist attacks that are more severe.

Table 9. Logit results (DV: FHOUSE).

Variables	Model 13 (DV: FHOUSE)	Model 14 (DV: FHOUSE)	Model 15 (DV: FHOUSE)
Num Attacks (t-1)	-.0033 (.0010)***		
Num Kill (t-1)		-.0008 (.0004)**	
Num Wounded (t-1)			-.0004 (.0002)*
Type of Democracy	.0782 (.0956)	.0675 (.0958)	.0449 (.0951)
Age of Exec Structure	.0082 (.0031)***	.0085 (.0031)***	.0081 (.0031)***
Age of Democracy	.0021 (.0011)*	.0019 (.0011)*	.0019 (.0011)*
GDP (ln)	.8748 (.2668)***	.7750 (.2666)***	.8492 (.2675)***
Economic Globalization	.0005 (.0074)	.0017 (.0074)	.0009 (.0074)
Social Globalization	.0106 (.0071)	.0115 (.0071)	.0117 (.0071)*
Political Globalization	-.0031 (.0040)	-.0031 (.0040)	-.0038 (.0040)
Electoral System	-.0859 (.1277)	-.0626 (.1278)	-.0552 (.1273)
Index of Proportionality	.0114 (.0168)	.0120 (.0169)	.0105 (.0168)
FHOUSE Lag	5.7269 (.2407)***	5.7612 (.2400)***	5.7672 (.2397)***
Observations	1104	1104	1104
r ²	.58	.58	.58
Prob. > χ^2	.0000***	.0000***	.0000***

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; standard errors in parentheses.

Table 10. Logit results (DV: FHOUSE).

Variables	Model 16 (DV: FHOUSE)	Model 17 (DV: FHOUSE)	Model 18 (DV: FHOUSE)
Num Attacks (t-5)	-.0026 (.0009)***		
Num Kill (t-5)		-.0009 (.0005)*	
Num Wounded (t-5)			-.0005 (.0002)*
Type of Democracy	.0832 (.0972)	.0682 (.0970)	.0425 (.0957)
Age of Exec Structure	.0073 (.0031)**	.0076 (.0031)*	.0079 (.0031)**
Age of Democracy	.0018 (.0011)	.0018 (.0011)	.0018 (.0011)
Economic Globalization	.0011 (.0074)	.0016 (.0073)	.0011 (.0074)
GDP (ln)	.8929 (.2678)***	.7934 (.2662)***	.8624 (.2676)***
Social Globalization	.0125 (.0071)*	.0124 (.0071)*	.0119 (.0071)*
Political Globalization	-.0037 (.0040)	-.0036 (.0040)	-.0037 (.0040)
Electoral System	-.0755 (.1289)	-.0602 (.1289)	-.0503 (.1281)
Index of Proportionality	.0125 (.0169)	.0125 (.0170)	.0100 (.0169)
FHOUSE Lag	5.7134 (.2410)***	5.7496 (.2406)***	5.7670 (.2396)***
Observations	1101	1101	1101
r ²	.58	.58	.58
Prob. > χ^2	.0000***	.0000***	.0000***

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; standard errors in parentheses.

Consolidated and Less Consolidated Democracies

An important finding emerges when analyzing the effect the terrorism variables have on *political rights* and *civil liberties* by category (i.e., ordinal category of political rights and civil liberties) in Tables 11 and 12. Meaning, we see that some types of democracies are more affected by terrorism than others when examining the influence the three terrorism variables have on democracies' *political rights* and *civil liberties* score by category. For example, democracies that score a one (most free) on the political rights measure actually show an increase in the extent that political rights are protected; and democracies with the greatest decrease in political rights are those in category two or higher (less free) of the *political rights* measure. In a similar finding, democracies with a score of one (most free) on the *civil liberties* measure display stronger civil liberties following terrorist attacks; and the greatest decrease in civil liberties is in states that score a three or higher (less free) on the *civil liberties* measure. These findings are similar when examining both the one year and five year lagged terrorism variables.

The distinction between category one (i.e., greatest amount of rights) of the *political rights* measure and category two is that states in category two have slightly weaker political rights due to the presence of one or more of the following factors: some degree of political corruption, limits placed on political parties and opposition groups, and influence by foreign governments or the military on domestic politics.⁵⁹ States with a *civil liberties* score of three

Table 11. Change in predicted probabilities by category.

IV = Num attacks (t-1) Displayed by DV category Change = Min–Max value	Model 19 (DV: Political rights)	Model 20 (DV: Civil liberties)
Average Change	.1656	.1395
Category 1 (Most Free)	-.4141	-.2047
Category 2	.4081	-.1440
Category 3	.0056	.3474
Category 4	.0003	.0013
Category 5 (Least Free)	.0000	.0000

Table 12. Change in predicted probabilities by category.

IV = Num attacks (t-5) Displayed by DV category Change = Min–Max value	Model 21 (DV: Political rights)	Model 22 (DV: Civil liberties)
Average Change	.2179	.0581
Category 1 (Most Free)	–.5449	–.1453
Category 2	.5333	.0839
Category 3	.0109	.0612
Category 4	.0005	.0002
Category 5 (Least Free)	.0000	.0000

have moderately weaker civil liberties than states in category one due to one or more of the following factors: limits placed on freedom of the press, union restrictions, and discrimination against minority groups and women.⁶⁰

It is important to note that states receiving scores of two on the *political rights* measure and three on the *civil liberties* measure are still considered democratic by most measures of democracy (e.g., Freedom House and Polity IV). However, these states do not possess the same amount of political rights and civil liberties as states with scores of one in both measures. Furthermore, many of the states that receive a score of two in the *political rights* measure also receive a score of three in the *civil liberties* measure. Twenty states in this analysis have scores of both two on the *political rights* measure and three on the *civil liberties* measure for the majority of state-years they are present in the dataset. This indicates that these specific states may be more prone to experiencing a weakening of their political rights and civil liberties following terrorist attacks. A few examples of states in the dataset that commonly receive scores of two on the *political rights* measure and three on the *civil liberties* measure are: Argentina, Brazil, India, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain.

One potential explanation for this finding is that these states have not consolidated their democratic institutions of government to the point where they can as easily withstand threats to their security as can consolidated democracies. That is, these states may be more susceptible to the influence of domestic leaders that increase the coercive power of the state following terrorist attacks compared with more consolidated democracies. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, well-developed democratic institutions and strong democratic norms found in more consolidated democracies may insulate them to a greater degree from politicians and political parties that seek to alter constitutional practices following terrorist attacks.

Domestic and International Terrorist Attacks

Some researchers have noted that that domestic and international terrorist attacks may have varying effects on support for political rights and civil liberties.⁶¹ Therefore, in additional models, I analyze the effect domestic and international terrorist attacks have on political rights and civil liberties in separate analyses. In the first set of models I rely on the *International-Logistical* measure found in the GTD that specifies whether a perpetrator or perpetrator group crosses a national border to carry out a terrorist attack. An important aspect of the measure to note is that attacks that are carried out by perpetrators from separatist regions are coding as being international.⁶² In examining the results for domestic terrorist attacks (i.e., where a perpetrator or perpetrator group carried out an attack within the border in

Table 13. Logit results (DV: Political rights) LOGISTICAL CLASSIFICATION.

Variables	Model 29 (DV: Political rights)	Model 30 (DV: Political rights)	Model 31 (DV: Political rights)
Domestic: Num Attacks (t-1)	.0053 (.0011)**		
Domestic: Num Kill (t-1)		.0019 (.0004)**	
Domestic: Num Wounded (t-1)			.0010 (.0005)*
Type of Democracy	-.0300 (.0775)	-.04237 (.0779)	-.0059 (.0772)
Age of Exec Structure	-.0125 (.0038)**	-.0137 (.0038)**	-.0118 (.0037)**
Age of Democracy	-.0005 (.0009)	-.0006 (.0009)	-.0006 (.0009)
GDP (ln)	-2.3179 (.2248)**	-2.2526 (.2240)**	-2.3223 (.2235)**
Economic Globalization	.0112 (.0065)	.0104 (.0065)	.0091 (.0065)
Social Globalization	-.03272 (.0068)**	-.0323 (.0068)**	-.0315 (.0068)**
Political Globalization	-.0004 (.0033)	-.0002 (.0033)	-.0004 (.0033)
Electoral System	.4984 (.1039)**	.5139 (.1044)**	.5106 (.1048)**
Index of Proportionality	-.0250 (.0097)**	-.0250 (.0097)**	-.0234 (.0097)**
Political Rights Lag	.0198 (.0151)	.0165 (.0143)	.0145 (.0139)
Observations	1233	1233	1233
r ²	.30	.30	.30
Prob. > χ^2	.0000**	.0000**	.0000**

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; standard errors in parentheses.

which they reside) in Tables 13, 14, and 15 we see that the *number of attacks*, *number killed* and *number wounded* variables all have a positive and statistically significant influence on the *political rights* and *civil liberties* measures, and each domestic terrorism measure has a negative and statistically significant effect on the *Freedom House Democracy Score*. In examining international terrorist attacks in Table 16 we find that the *number of attacks* measure has a positive and statistically significant effect on the *political rights* measure. However, the international *number killed* and *number wounded* variables have a positive but statistically insignificant relationship with the *political rights* measure. Furthermore, in Tables 17 and 18 we find that the international *number of attacks*, *number killed*, and *number wounded* variables all have a positive and statistically significant influence on the *civil liberties* measure,

Table 14. Logit results (DV: Civil liberties) LOGISTICAL CLASSIFICATION.

Variables	Model 32 (DV: Civil liberties)	Model 33 (DV: Civil liberties)	Model 34 (DV: Civil liberties)
Domestic: Num Attacks (t-1)	.0079 (.0012)**		
Domestic: Num Kill (t-1)		.0030 (.0005)**	
Domestic: Num Wounded (t-1)			.0024 (.0007)**
Type of Democracy	-.0555 (.0690)	-.0672 (.0692)	-.0228 (.0684)
Age of Exec Structure	-.0285 (.0031)**	-.0299 (.0031)**	-.0280 (.0030)**
Age of Democracy	.0006 (.0008)	.0006 (.0008)	.0006 (.0008)
GDP (ln)	-2.1119 (.1971)**	-2.0079 (.1970)**	-2.1112 (.1967)**
Economic Globalization	.0069 (.0058)	.0068 (.0058)	.0064 (.0058)
Social Globalization	-.0181 (.0059)**	-.0185 (.0059)**	-.0181 (.0059)**
Political Globalization	.0047 (.0029)	.0052 (.0029)*	.0051 (.0029)*
Electoral System	.1919 (.0900)	.1973 (.0901)**	.2045 (.0903)**
Index of Proportionality	-.0335 (.0090)**	-.0356 (.0090)**	-.0353 (.0090)**
Civil Liberties Lag	.0212 (.0146)	.0167 (.0141)	.0155 (.0139)
Observations	1233	1233	1233
r ²	.29	.29	.28
Prob. > χ^2	.0000**	.0000**	.0000**

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; standard errors in parentheses.

Table 15. Logit results (DV: FHOUSE) LOGISTICAL CLASSIFICATION.

Variables	Model 35 (DV: FHOUSE)	Model 36 (DV: FHOUSE)	Model 37 (DV: FHOUSE)
Domestic: Num Attacks (t-1)	-.0074 (.0011)**		
Domestic: Num Kill (t-1)		-.0026 (.0004)***	
Domestic: Num Wounded (t-1)			-.0025 (.0006)**
Type of Democracy	.0596 (.0643)	.0617 (.0644)	.0268 (.0639)
Age of Exec Structure	.0279 (.0029)**	.0289 (.0029)**	.0275 (.0029)**
Age of Democracy	.0000 (.0007)	-.0000 (.0007)	.0000 (.0007)
GDP (ln)	2.0640 (.1819)	1.9752 (.1813)**	2.0524 (.1813)**
Economic Globalization	-.0084 (.0054)	-.0081 (.0054)	-.0078 (.0054)
Social Globalization	.0266 (.0055)**	.0269 (.0055)**	.0262 (.0055)**
Political Globalization	-.0028 (.0027)	-.0032 (.0027)	-.0030 (.0027)
Electoral System	-.2197 (.0836)**	-.2222 (.0837)**	-.2350 (.0840)**
Index of Proportionality	.0300 (.0082)**	.0315 (.0082)**	.0314 (.0082)**
FHOUSE Lag	.0353 (.0203)**	.0270 (.0165)	.0263 (.0163)
Observations	1315	1315	1315
r ²	.25	.25	.25
Prob. > χ^2	.0000***	.0000***	.0000***

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .10$; *** $p < .01$; standard errors in parentheses.

and each international terrorism measure has a negative and statistically significant effect on the *Freedom House Democracy Score*. Thus, both domestic and international terrorist attacks appear to negatively affect civil liberties and overall levels of democracy, but domestic attacks appear to have a stronger negative effect on political rights than do international attacks. However, an interesting finding develops when examining the influence domestic and international attacks have on political rights and civil liberties when utilizing the *International-Ideological* measure from the GTD.

As with the *International-Logistical* variable, the *International-Ideological* measure also assesses if a terrorist attack is international or domestic in nature. However, in contrast to the *International-Logistical* variable, the *International-Ideological* measure codes a terrorist attack as being domestic if the perpetrators (from separatist regions) carry out attacks

Table 16. Logit results (DV: Political rights) LOGISTICAL CLASSIFICATION.

Variables	Model 38 (DV: Political rights)	Model 39 (DV: Political rights)	Model 40 (DV: Political rights)
International: Num Attacks (t-1)	.0144 (.0082)*		
International: Num Kill (t-1)		.0029 (.0051)	
International: Num Wounded (t-1)			.0013 (.0018)
Type of Democracy	-.0770 (.0780)	-.0787 (.0783)	-.0788 (.0782)
Age of Exec Structure	-.0119 (.0036)**	-.0114 (.0036)**	-.0113 (.0036)**
Age of Democracy	-.0010 (.0009)	-.0010 (.0009)	-.0010 (.0009)
GDP (ln)	-2.2087 (.2207)**	-2.1588 (.2188)**	-2.1725 (.2189)**
Economic Globalization	.0014 (.0066)	.0013 (.0066)	.0014 (.0066)
Social Globalization	-.0267 (.0068)**	-.0271 (.0068)**	-.0272 (.0068)**
Political Globalization	-.0013 (.0033)	-.0016 (.0033)	-.0014 (.0033)
Electoral System	.5515 (.1071)**	.5426 (.1071)**	.5430 (.1071)
Index of Proportionality	-.0191 (.0098)**	-.0184 (.0097)*	-.0185 (.0097)*
Political Rights Lag	.0206 (.0147)	.0183 (.0150)	.0185 (.0150)
Observations	1224	1224	1224
r ²	.29	.29	.29
Prob. > χ^2	.0000***	.0000***	.0000***

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; standard errors in parentheses.

Table 17. Logit results (DV: Civil liberties) LOGISTICAL CLASSIFICATION.

Variables	Model 41 (DV: Civil liberties)	Model 42 (DV: Civil liberties)	Model 43 (DV: Civil liberties)
International: Num Attacks (t-1)	.0261 (.0069)***		
International: Num Kill (t-1)		.0111 (.0046)**	
International: Num Wounded (t-1)			.0082 (.0015)***
Type of Democracy	-.0253 (.0693)	-.0118 (.0696)	-.0123 (.0698)
Age of Exec Structure	-.0275 (.0030)***	-.0271 (.0030)***	-.0275 (.0030)***
Age of Democracy	.0004 (.0008)	.0006 (.0008)	.0005 (.0008)
GDP (ln)	-2.035 (.1953)***	-1.9231 (.1933)***	-2.0163 (.1947)***
Economic Globalization	-.0013 (.0059)	-.0012 (.0059)	-.0014 (.0060)
Social Globalization	-.0167 (.0059)***	-.0177 (.0059)***	-.0178 (.0059)***
Political Globalization	.0048 (.0029)*	.0042 (.0029)	.0050 (.0029)*
Electoral System	.2381 (.0935)**	.2045 (.0927)**	.2203 (.0933)**
Index of Proportionality	-.0330 (.0091)***	-.0323 (.0091)***	-.0330 (.0092)***
Civil Liberties Lag	.0348 (.0139)**	.0307 (.0135)**	.0336 (.0138)**
Observations	1224	1224	1224
r ²	.28	.28	.29
Prob. > χ^2	.0000***	.0000***	.0000***

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; standard errors in parentheses.

against their home country. Thus, terrorist attacks carried out by perpetrators from areas such as: Puerto Rico, Corsica, Northern Ireland, West Bank, and the Gaza Strip are considered to be domestic.⁶³ Coding terrorist attacks with perpetrators from separatist regions as being domestic rather than international significantly alters the results. In examining the findings in Tables 19, 20, and 21 we see that the domestic measures *number of attacks*, *number killed*, and *number wounded* all have a positive and statistically significant effect on the *political rights* and *civil liberties* measures, and each domestic terrorism measure has a negative and statistically significant effect on the *Freedom House Democracy Score*. However, in analyzing the international terrorism variables in Tables 22, 23, and 24 we see that only one model (Model 61) is statistically significant. The remaining eight models lose their statistical

Table 18. Logit results (DV: FHOUSE) LOGISTICAL CLASSIFICATION.

Variables	Model 44 (DV: FHOUSE)	Model 45 (DV: FHOUSE)	Model 46 (DV: FHOUSE)
International: Num Attacks (t-1)	-.0262 (.0063)***		
International: Num Kill (t-1)		-.0105 (.0043)**	
International: Num Wounded (t-1)			-.0070 (.0015)***
Type of Democracy	.0206 (.0642)	.0071 (.0645)	.0079 (.0645)
Age of Exec Structure	.0289 (.0029)	.0284 (.0029)***	.0287 (.0029)***
Age of Democracy	.0002 (.0007)	.0000 (.0007)	.0001 (.0007)
GDP (ln)	2.0410 (.1814)***	1.9254 (.1793)***	2.0063 (.1802)***
Economic Globalization	-.0041 (.0054)	-.0039 (.0054)	-.0040 (.0054)
Social Globalization	.0234 (.0056)***	.0244 (.0056)***	.0246 (.0056)***
Political Globalization	-.0024 (.0027)	-.0018 (.0027)	-.0026 (.0027)
Electoral System	-.2275 (.0856)***	-.1933 (.0848)**	-.2035 (.0851)**
Index of Proportionality	.0280 (.0082)***	.0273 (.0082)***	.0279 (.0082)***
FHOUSE Lag	.0035 (.0182)	-.0025 (.0157)	.0007 (.0171)
Observations	1320	1320	1320
r ²	.25	.24	.25
Prob. > χ^2	.0000***	.0000***	.0000***

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; standard errors in parentheses.

Table 19. Logit results (DV: Political rights) IDEOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATION.

Variables	Model 47 (DV: Political rights)	Model 48 (DV: Political rights)	Model 49 (DV: Political rights)
Domestic: Num Attacks (t-1)	.0060 (.0012)***		
Domestic: Num Kill (t-1)		.0024 (.0005)***	
Domestic: Num Wounded (t-1)			.0010 (.0005)**
Type of Democracy	-.0523 (.0773)	-.0491 (.0773)	-.0129 (.0766)
Age of Exec Structure	-.0148 (.0038)***	-.0147 (.0038)***	-.0132 (.0037)***
Age of Democracy	-.0006 (.0009)	-.0006 (.0009)	-.0005 (.0009)
GDP (ln)	-2.2992 (.2238)***	-2.2146 (.2236)***	-2.3090 (.2226)***
Economic Globalization	.0086 (.0065)	.0081 (.0065)	.0064 (.0065)
Social Globalization	-.0292 (.0069)***	-.0293 (.0069)***	-.0283 (.0069)***
Political Globalization	-.0008 (.0033)	-.0012 (.0033)	-.0013 (.0033)
Electoral System	.4531 (.1025)***	.4550 (.1029)***	.4579 (.1034)***
Index of Proportionality	-.0157 (.0097)	-.0158 (.0097)	-.01405 (.0097)
Political Rights Lag	-.0004 (.0117)	-.0018 (.0116)	-.00461 (.0116)
Observations	1245	1245	1245
r ²	.30	.30	.30
Prob. > χ^2	.0000***	.0000***	.0000***

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .10$; *** $p < .01$; standard errors in parentheses.

significance and display no significant relationship between international terrorism and political rights, civil liberties, and overall levels of democracy. Thus, the inclusion of terrorist attacks carried out by perpetrators from separatist regions appears to increase the degree that domestic terrorist attacks weaken political rights and civil liberties while significantly lessening the effect international attacks have on political rights and civil liberties. Based on these results, it appears that terrorist attacks emanating from separatist regions have a noticeable effect on political rights, civil liberties, and overall levels of democracy.

The finding that terrorist attacks carried out by perpetrators from separatist regions has a significant effect on political rights and civil liberties is not surprising. Additional scholars

Table 20. Logit results (DV: Civil liberties) IDEOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATION.

Variables	Model 50 (DV: Civil liberties)	Model 51 (DV: Civil liberties)	Model 52 (DV: Civil liberties)
Domestic: Num Attacks (t-1)	.0087 (.0012)***		
Domestic: Num Kill (t-1)		.0040 (.0006)***	
Domestic: Num Wounded (t-1)			.0035 (.0007)***
Type of Democracy	-.0734 (.0690)	-.0676 (.0690)	-.0286 (.0683)
Age of Exec Structure	-.0293 (.0030)***	-.0295 (.0030)***	-.0285 (.0030)***
Age of Democracy	.0008 (.0008)	.0009 (.0008)	.0008 (.0008)
GDP (ln)	-2.0245 (.1959)***	-1.8904 (.1958)***	-2.0156 (.1954)***
Economic Globalization	.0031 (.0058)	.0039 (.0058)	.0031 (.0058)
Social Globalization	-.0169 (.0059)***	-.0181 (.0059)***	-.0172 (.0059)***
Political Globalization	.0033 (.0029)	.0031 (.0029)	.0033 (.0029)
Electoral System	.1165 (.0899)	.1010 (.0899)	.1279 (.0902)
Index of Proportionality	-.0247 (.0090)***	-.0272 (.0090)***	-.0272 (.0090)***
Civil Liberties Lag	.0014 (.0115)	-.0009 (.0115)	-.0021 (.0114)
Observations	1245	1245	1245
r ²	.29	.29	.28
Prob. > χ^2	.0000***	.0000***	.0000***

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; standard errors in parentheses.

Table 21. Logit results (DV: FHOUSE) IDEOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATION.

Variables	Model 53 (DV: FHOUSE)	Model 54 (DV: FHOUSE)	Model 55 (DV: FHOUSE)
Domestic: Num Attacks (t-1)	-.0087 (.0011)***		
Domestic: Num Kill (t-1)		-.0034 (.0005)***	
Domestic: Num Wounded (t-1)			-.0035 (.0006)***
Type of Democracy	.0781 (.0643)	.0636 (.0642)	.0329 (.0637)
Age of Exec Structure	.0309 (.0030)***	.0306 (.0029)***	.0302 (.0029)***
Age of Democracy	.0000 (.0007)	.0000 (.0007)	.0000 (.0007)
GDP (ln)	2.0176 (.1801)***	1.8925 (.1795)***	1.9955 (.1793)***
Economic Globalization	-.0069 (.0054)	-.0069 (.0054)	-.0063 (.0054)
Social Globalization	.0245 (.0056)***	.0254 (.0056)***	.0245 (.0055)***
Political Globalization	-.0024 (.0027)	-.0023 (.0027)	-.0025 (.0027)
Electoral System	-.1886 (.0834)**	-.1705 (.0834)**	-.1980 (.0839)**
Index of Proportionality	.0255 (.0082)***	.0273 (.0082)***	.0277 (.0082)***
FHOUSE Lag	.0179 (.0115)	.0146 (.0113)	.0150 (.0113)
Observations	1335	1335	1335
r ²	.26	.25	.25
Prob. > χ^2	.0000***	.0000***	.0000***

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; standard errors in parentheses.

have found that terrorist attacks by perpetrators from separatist areas produce more hard-line responses by democratic governments.⁶⁴ A possible explanation for this finding is that separatist terrorists represent threats to states' territorial integrity and subsequently produce harsher counterterrorism responses.⁶⁵ Also, another potential reason that domestic terrorist attacks may have a stronger effect on political rights and civil liberties is due to their number and severity. In this specific analysis, 18,427 attacks were domestic and 4,727 were international. Furthermore, 30,053 individuals were killed in domestic attacks versus 7,638 individuals that were killed in international attacks.⁶⁶ Therefore, the greater number and severity of domestic attacks may also influence the manner by which democratic states respond to terrorism.

Table 22. Logit results (DV: Political rights) IDEOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATION.

Variables	Model 56 (DV: Political rights)	Model 57 (DV: Political rights)	Model 58 (DV: Political rights)
International: Num Attacks (t-1)	.0000 (.0046)		
International: Num Kill (t-1)		.0011 (.0009)	
International: Num Wounded (t-1)			.0004 (.0024)
Type of Democracy	-.0446 (.0779)	-.0447 (.0772)	-.0434 (.0776)
Age of Exec Structure	-.0139 (.0038)**	-.0141 (.0038)***	-.0139 (.0037)***
Age of Democracy	-.0004 (.0009)	-.0004 (.0009)	-.0004 (.0009)
GDP (ln)	-2.2024 (.2257)***	-2.1989 (.2254)***	-2.2024 (.2254)***
Economic Globalization	.0019 (.0066)	.0019 (.0066)	.0019 (.0066)
Social Globalization	-.0286 (.0069)***	-.0287 (.0069)***	-.0287 (.0069)***
Political Globalization	-.0034 (.0034)	-.0035 (.0033)	-.0035 (.0034)
Electoral System	.4245 (.1040)***	.4273 (.1041)***	.4251 (.1041)***
Index of Proportionality	-.0079 (.0098)	-.0081 (.0098)	-.0080 (.0098)
Political Rights Lag	.0126 (.0101)	.0128 (.0100)	.0127 (.0100)
Observations	1241	1241	1241
r ²	.30	.30	.30
Prob. > χ^2	.0000***	.0000***	.0000***

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; standard errors in parentheses.

Table 23. Logit results (DV: Civil liberties) IDEOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATION.

Variables	Model 59 (DV: Civil liberties)	Model 60 (DV: Civil liberties)	Model 61 (DV: Civil liberties)
International: Num Attacks (t-1)	.0044 (.0041)		
International: Num Kill (t-1)		.0009 (.0007)	
International: Num Wounded (t-1)			.0031 (.0017)*
Type of Democracy	.0020 (.0688)	-.0067 (.0685)	-.0003 (.0684)
Age of Exec Structure	-.0290 (.0030)***	-.0296 (.0030)***	-.0293 (.0030)***
Age of Democracy	.0009 (.0008)	.0009 (.0008)	.0008 (.0008)
GDP (ln)	-2.0226 (.1987)***	-2.0049 (.1980)***	-2.0162 (.1983)***
Economic Globalization	.0009 (.0059)	.0006 (.0059)	.0010 (.0059)
Social Globalization	-.01742 (.0060)***	-.0172 (.0060)***	-.0174 (.0060)***
Political Globalization	.0032 (.0029)	.0035 (.0029)	.0030 (.0029)
Electoral System	.0769 (.0900)	.0803 (.0901)	.0858 (.0902)
Index of Proportionality	-.0206 (.0091)**	-.0204 (.0091)**	-.0210 (.0091)**
Civil Liberties Lag	.0100 (.0096)	.0093 (.0096)	.0102 (.0096)
Observations	1241	1241	1241
r ²	.28	.28	.28
Prob. > χ^2	.0000***	.0000***	.0000***

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; standard errors in parentheses.

Table 24. Logit results (DV: FHOUSE) IDEOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATION.

Variables	Model 62 (DV: FHOUSE)	Model 63 (DV: FHOUSE)	Model 64 (DV: FHOUSE)
International: Num Attacks (t-1)	-.0025 (.0039)		
International: Num Kill (t-1)		-.0009 (.0007)	
International: Num Wounded (t-1)			-.0027 (.0016)
Type of Democracy	.0139 (.0639)	.0184 (.0635)	.0130 (.0635)
Age of Exec Structure	.0272 (.0029)***	.0276 (.0028)***	.0273 (.0028)***
Age of Democracy	-.0000 (.0007)	-.0000 (.0007)	-.0000 (.0007)
GDP (ln)	1.9609 (.1793)***	1.9502 (.1787)***	1.9586 (.1788)***
Economic Globalization	-.0027 (.0054)	-.0026 (.0054)	-.0029 (.0054)
Social Globalization	.0244 (.0055)***	.0244 (.0055)***	.0245 (.0055)***
Political Globalization	-.0014 (.0027)	-.0015 (.0027)	-.0011 (.0027)
Electoral System	-.1803 (.0835)**	-.1827594 (.0836)**	-.1872 (.0836)**
Index of Proportionality	.0236 (.0082)***	.0236 (.0082)***	.0241 (.0082)***
FHOUSE Lag	.0012	.0010 (.0091)	.0014 (.0092)
Observations	1329	1329	1329
r ²	.24	.24	.24
Prob. > χ^2	.0000***	.0000***	.0000***

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; standard errors in parentheses.

Conclusion

Previous scholarship on political rights and civil liberties has tended to focus on how factors such as economic development, globalization, electoral systems, and regime type influence political rights and civil liberties. Much fewer works have examined the effect security threats such as military conflicts and terrorism have on political rights and civil liberties in democracies. The studies that have analyzed the relationship between terrorism and political rights and civil liberties have focused on single or regional case-study analyses.⁶⁷ These studies have produced value insights regarding how terrorism can impact political rights and civil

liberties in the context of the specific states being examined. However, we are left without a broader understanding of the influence terrorism has on political rights and civil liberties in democracies in other regions. This study is an attempt to address the limitation of prior research on the topic.

I find that terrorism weakens political rights and civil liberties in a wide range of democracies in multiple regions. Furthermore, as terrorist attacks become more numerous and severe, political rights and civil liberties are further weakened. However, I find that states that place a premium on the protection of political rights and civil liberties (i.e., more consolidated democracies) do not experience a weakening of political rights and civil liberties following terrorist attacks. Rather, these states are found to increase the degree that they protect political rights and civil liberties. It is less consolidated democracies that display the greatest erosion of political rights and civil liberties following terrorist attacks. Thus, terrorist attacks appear to have varying effects on the protection and maintenance of political rights and civil liberties in more consolidated versus less consolidated democracies.

These findings have important implications for democratic governance and counterterrorism strategies. First, less consolidated democracies should be cautious in implementing overarching counterterrorism policies following terrorist attacks. Doing so may decay the quality of democracy in their state while moving their government closer to authoritarianism. Second, citizens and policymakers in all democracies must continue to debate how to provide the proper balance between liberty in security in open and free societies. The discussion should move past the “security versus liberty” dichotomy in order to ensure that democratic leaders can work to maintain the bedrocks of their democracy (i.e., political rights and civil liberties) while developing pragmatic and effective counterterrorism strategies that will protect their populaces.

Notes

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18. *Ibid.*
19. Paul Sniderman, Joseph F. Fletcher, Peter H. Russell, and Philip E. Tetlock, *The Clash of Rights: Liberty, Equality and Legitimacy in the Pluralist Democracy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996).
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21. *Ibid.*; James Gibson, "A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to Tolerate," *American Journal of Political Science* 42(3) (1998), pp. 819–850; John Sullivan, James Piereson, and George E. Marcus, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
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26. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies," *Journal of Democracy* 7(2) (1996), pp. 14–33.
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28. Linz and Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies," p. 19.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
30. Scott Mainwaring, *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).
31. Sarah Birch, "Electoral Systems and Party System Stability in Post-Communist Europe," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 2001; Mainwaring, "Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization."
32. States that receive a score greater than "8" on the Polity2 scale from the Polity IV database show a statistically significant relationship between higher levels of democracy (as measured by the Polity2 measure and the aggregate Freedom House Democracy Scale) and lower levels of party system instability (as measured by two commonly used metrics of party system stability which are: electoral volatility and party replacement); Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Mainwaring, "Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization."
33. Mainwaring, "Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization."
34. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
36. Linz and Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies."
37. Peter J. Katzenstein, "Same War-Different Views: Germany, Japan and Counterterrorism," *International Organization* 57(4) (2003), pp. 731–760; Arie Perliger, "How Democracies Respond to Terrorism: Regime Characteristics, Symbolic Power and Counterterrorism," *Security Studies* 21(3) (2012), pp. 490–528.
38. Peter Chalk, "The Response to Terrorism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 44(3) (1998), pp. 373–388; Perliger, "How Democracies Respond to Terrorism."
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41. Katzenstein, "Same War-Different Views."
42. *Ibid.*, p. 733.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 736.
44. Perliger, "How Democracies Respond to Terrorism."
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Ibid.*, p. 503.
47. A small number of states included in the study fluctuate between being democratic and non-democratic as defined by the Polity2 measure in the Polity IV database. Thus, while these states are included in the study and are displayed in Table A1, the state-years in which these states fall below the threshold of "6" on the Polity2 measure are excluded from the statistical analyses because they are not considered democratic for the given state-year.
48. Monty Marshall, Keith Jagers, and Ted Gurr, "Data User's Manual. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2010," Center for Systemic Peace and Societal-Systems Research Inc., 2010.
49. Freedom House. While many scholars consider the Freedom House measures (political rights and civil liberties) to be accurate indicators of political rights and civil liberties, there are limitations to the data that should be noted (Freedom House). One point of note regarding the dataset, that is often present in time-series data with large numbers of observations, is that the methodology used to measure changes in political rights and civil liberties has been updated and modified over time. In addition, the time-series data have not been altered retrospectively to match the revised methodology. The data have not been altered retrospectively in an effort to preserve the comparability of the Freedom House ratings from year to year (Freedom House).
50. Freedom House; Tsai, "Macro-Structural Determinants of Political Freedom in Developing Countries."
51. Freedom House.

52. “The GTD is considered to be the most comprehensive dataset on terrorist activity and has codified over 104,000 cases of terrorism” (Institute for Economic and Peace: Global Terrorism Index Report, 2012), p. 6; Global Terrorism Database.

53. Global Terrorism Database. While many terrorism scholars consider the GTD to be one of the more reliable and comprehensive terrorism databases in the world two issues pertaining to the GTD should be discussed. One, terrorism data in the GTD were collected in three different waves entailing slightly different methodology in each wave. In addition, while uniform criteria was used in each wave to determine what acts should be included in the dataset, modest variations regarding levels of attacks and casualties may exist at different time points due to the three different waves of data collection. Second, a large number of terrorist attacks are carried out by unknown or anonymous perpetrators or groups. Therefore, a large number of data observations (pertaining to the nationality of suspected terrorists or terrorist groups) are coded as unknown. However, given these limitations, numerous researchers consider the GTD to be reliable and accurate (see note 53).

54. One should be cautious in interpreting the results from the number of wounded measure. While the data were collected from reliable sources by the creators of the GTD using systematic methodology, issues of missingness and imprecise reporting may be present in some data related to the number of individuals wounded in terrorist attacks.

55. Sergi Jimenez-Martin, “Controlling for Endogeneity of Strike Variables in the Estimation of Wage Equations,” *Journal of Labor Economics* 17(3) (1999), pp. 583–606.

56. R. Bendix “Introduction,” in R. Bendix, ed., *State and Society* (Boston: Little, 1986), pp. 1–13; Elina Cincea, “Proportionality or Majoritarianism? In Search of Electoral Equality,” *Revista de Filosofía* 8 (2013), pp. 175–190; David Cingranelli and Mikhail Filippov, “Electoral Rules and Incentives to Protect Human Rights,” *Journal of Politics* 72 (1) (2010), pp. 243–257; Paul W. Drake, “The International Causes of Democratization, 1974–1990,” in Paul W. Drake and Mathew D. McCubbins, eds., *The Origins of Liberty: Political and Economic Liberalization in the Modern World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 70–91; Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); Baeg Hyug, “Globalization and Democratization: Boon Companions or Strange Bedfellows?” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 50(3) (1996), pp. 279–291; Quan Li and Rafael Reuveny, “Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical Analysis,” *British Journal of Political Science* 33(1) (2003), pp. 29–54; Seymour Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Mark Peffley and Robert Rohrschneider, “Democratization and Political Tolerance in Seventeen Countries: A Multi-Level Model of Democratic Learning,” *Political Research Quarterly* 56(3) (2003), pp. 243–257; A. M. Przeworski, J. A. Cheibub, and F. Limongi, “What Makes Democracies Endure?,” in L. Diamond, M. F. Plattner, Y. Chu, and H. Tien, eds., *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 295–311; Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Harvey Starr, “Democratic Dominoes: Diffusion Approaches to the Spread of Democracy in the International System,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35(2) (1991), pp. 356–381; Alfred Stepana and Cindy Skacha, “Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism,” *World Politics* 46(1) (1993), pp. 1–22.

57. Some observers could contend that employing a metric that captures the type of electoral system a state has as well as including a metric that gauges the degree of proportionality within states is redundant. However, the two measures included in this analysis capture different aspects of the nature of electoral systems within democracies. More specifically, the measure of proportionality provides a more nuanced measure regarding the degree that a state incorporates proportional representation into its voting system where the electoral system measure is a broader indicator of the general type of electoral system found within democracies. In addition, numerous scholars contend that broad, categorical measures of electoral systems may fail to adequately capture the degree that an electoral system promotes proportionality. Furthermore, the two measures in this analysis are not strongly correlated; John Carey and Matthew Shugart, “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas,” *Electoral Studies* 14(4) (1995), pp. 417–440; Bernard Grofman, “Comparisons among Electoral Systems: Distinguishing between Localism and Candidate-Centered Politics,” *Electoral Studies* 24(4) (2005), pp. 735–740.

58. Freedom House.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Garcia and Geva, "Security Versus Liberty in the Context of Counterterrorism."
62. Global Terrorism Database.
63. Ibid.
64. Perlinger, "How Democracies Respond to Terrorism."
65. Ibid.
66. In this particular analysis 14,018 terrorist were classified as unknown or anonymous.
67. David Charters, *The Deadly Sin of Terrorism: Its Effect on Democracy and Civil Liberty in Six Countries* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994); Michael Freeman, *Freedom or Security: The Consequences for Democracies Using Emergency Powers to Fight Terror* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003); Owens and Pelizzo, "The War on Terror."

Appendix

Table A1. The States and Years Data were Collected for.

States (1971–2007)*	States (1971–2007)*
Albania	Italy
Argentina	Japan
Australia	Latvia
Austria	Lithuania
Belgium	Luxembourg
Bolivia	Mexico
Botswana	Namibia
Brazil	Netherlands
Bulgaria	New Zealand
Canada	Norway
Chile	Paraguay
Colombia	Philippines
Costa Rica	Poland
Czech Republic	Portugal
Denmark	Romania
Dominican Republic	Russia
Ecuador	Slovakia
El Salvador	Spain
Estonia	Sweden
Finland	Switzerland
France	United Kingdom
Germany	United States
Greece	
Hungary	
Iceland	
India	
Ireland	
Israel	

*State-Years were dropped from the analysis if their Polity2 score dropped below six in the Polity IV Database.


Table A2. Variables, data sources, and operationalization.

Variables	Data source	Operationalization
Dependent variables Political Rights and Civil Liberties	Freedom House (2011)	<p>The ratings process is based on a checklist of 10 political rights questions and 15 civil liberties questions. The political rights questions are grouped into three subcategories: Electoral Process (3 questions), Political Pluralism and Participation (4), and Functioning of Government (3). The civil liberties questions are grouped into four subcategories: Freedom of Expression and Belief (4 questions), Associational and Organizational Rights (3), Rule of Law (4), and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (4). Scores are awarded to each of these questions on a scale of 0 to 4, where a score of 0 represents the smallest degree and 4 the greatest degree of rights or liberties present. The total score awarded to the political rights and civil liberties checklist determines the political rights and civil liberties rating. Each rating of 1 through 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom, corresponds to a range of total scores (Freedom House 2011). For more information please see the Freedom House codebook at the following link: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2011/methodology#_VKVvYcVf9qV</p> <p>The Freedom House Democracy Score (DS) is an index that combines an average of ratings for seven different components of governance: Electoral Process (EP); Civil Society (CS); Independent Media (IM); National Democratic Governance (NGOV); Local Democratic Governance (LGOV); Judicial Framework and Independence (JFI); and Corruption (CO). The scale ranges in value from 1–7. Higher values indicate a state is more democratic based on the seven Freedom House components. Note: in the original version of the Freedom House Democracy Score lower values indicate a state is more democratic. However, the values have been reversed coded (where higher values indicate a state is more democratic) for the purposes of this analysis (Freedom House 2011).</p>
FHOUSE	Freedom House (2011)	
Independent variables Number of Attacks Number Killed (Sum)	Global Terrorism Database (GTD) Global Terrorism Database (GTD)	<p>Number of domestic and international terrorist attacks that occur within a state for a given year of observation. Total number of individuals killed in domestic and international terrorist attacks within a state for a given year of observation.</p>
Number Wounded (Sum)	Global Terrorism Database (GTD)	Total number of individuals wounded in domestic and international terrorist attacks within a state for a given year of observation.
Control variables GDP Per Capita (Log) Economic Globalization	United Nations (UN) KOF Index of Globalization (2014)	<p>Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (Log, Current Prices, US Dollars, units of thousand) The degree that a state is integrated into the global economy based on a 10 point scale in the KOF Index of Globalization (2014). Higher values indicate greater levels of integration in the global economy. For more details please see the codebook below: http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/media/filer_public/2014/04/15/variables_2014.pdf</p>
Social Globalization	KOF Index of Globalization (2014)	The degree that a state is socially integrated into the international system based on a 14 point scale in the KOF Index of Globalization (2014). Higher values indicate greater levels of social integration in the international system. For more details please see the codebook below: http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/media/filer_public/2014/04/15/variables_2014.pdf

Political Globalization	KOF Index of Globalization (2014)	The degree that a state is political integrated into the international system based on a 4 point in the KOF Index of Globalization (2014). Higher values indicate greater levels of political integration in the international system. For more details please see the codebook below: http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/media/filer_public/2014/04/15/variables_2014.pdf
Electoral System	IDEA	Type of Electoral System: 1 = Majoritarian, 2 = Combined, 3 = Proportional
Index of Proportionality	Richard Rose Encyclopedia of Elections (2000) Cheibub and Gandhi (2004)	Extent that an electoral system promotes proportionality in its electoral system. Higher values indicate a more proportionally based electoral system within a state.
Type of Democracy	Cheibub and Gandhi (2004)	Type of Democratic Institution: 1 = Parliamentary Democracy, 2 = Mixed Executive, 3 = Presidential Democracy
Age of Democracy	Cheibub and Gandhi (2004)	Number of Years Continuous Rule under Current Democratic Regime (Cheibub and Gandhi 2004)
Age of Executive Structure	Cheibub and Gandhi (2004)	Age of Years of Current Regime based on Executive Type (Cheibub and Gandhi 2004)
Additional variables	Polity IV Project (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011)	Level of democracy ranging from -10 to 10. Higher values indicate a state is more democratic. Lower values indicate a state is more autocratic. Polity2 is similar to the Polity measure in the Polity IV dataset with a primary difference being that the Polity2 variable converts periods of interregnum or regime transitions to standardized polity scores (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011).
Polity2		