


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Social Identity Group and Human (In)Security:

The Case of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)

By

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Abstract: The paper uses social identity group theory and human insecurity to examine the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). After first defining social group identity and its characteristics, the paper reviews the Al-Qaeda ideology that serves as the foundation of ISIL, before turning attention to the message and legacy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and their profound influence on ISIL. The paper concludes by arguing that only by ending the marketplace of identities can stability be restored to Iraq and Syria.

The emergence of Al-Qaeda in the late 1980s has had a profound effect on world affairs, leading to two major wars, radical legislative, judicial, and policy changes, and the recognition that terrorism can serve as an existential threat to international society.¹ For several reasons, Al-Qaeda signified a new type terrorist group with an agenda and tools that were all encompassing:² First, Al-Qaeda treats the entire planet as a battlefield, rejecting national borders while advocating operations throughout the globe.³ Second, Al-Qaeda rejects distinctions between combatants and non-combatants, seeing all who oppose its ideology and its implementation as apostates and infidels who are by definition relegated to death.⁴ Third, Al-Qaeda also came to promote franchises, aimed at instill its ideology and agenda.⁵ Over time, and mainly because of actions taken by the international community, which has put major limitations on Core Al-Qaeda,⁶ the organization has become more identified with an ideology rather than operating as a traditional, hierarchical terrorist organization, committing acts of terror,⁷ especially once the international community exhibited a determination to close down its training facilities.⁸ This metamorphose underlines the fact that Al-Qaeda is a social identity group, drawing on an ability to foster social identities, a process by which an individual's sense of self emerges from real or perceived membership in a group.⁹ Thus, examining the current generation of Al-Qaedaists, some of whom may not even have the official support of Core Al-Qaeda,¹⁰ reveals an ideology and strategy based on the beliefs that Core Al-Qaeda postulated,¹¹ but that draws on other elements to bring members together, such as geography, animosity, disillusionment, among other items.¹²

Al-Qaeda's commitment to promote its message and violent action led to two consequences. First, its leadership has been hunted and decimated, with many others driven deep underground. Second, new leaders and groups emerged, several of which appeared even more radical and

dangerous than Core Al-Qaeda. The new actors, whose experience was shaped by different types of conflicts, offer a new threat; constantly learning from Core Al-Qaeda's experience as after all, "...bin Laden and his followers have left a written corpus that is likely to motivate the faithful for years to come."¹³ Accordingly, the Al-Qaeda ideology is constantly re-energized, leading new actors to approach their campaigns with devastating consequences.¹⁴ In sum, Core Al-Qaeda may reject the tactics and even elements of the message of the new groups, but a clear-cut disavowal of the ideology of the new groups remains elusive, possibly because the ideological underpinnings of the new groups lie in Core Al-Qaeda.

Using a broad range of sources, the article has several aims: first, to argue that social identity theory serves to explain what led to the emergence of ISIL. ISIL uses a confluence of conditions: grievance, insecurity, and a narrowing of the market place of religion to recruit and grew. A second aim is to highlight how ISIL, building on the ideas of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, exploits grievance, insecurity, and religion to become arguably the most dangerous brand of Al-Qaedaism,¹⁵ especially if unable to control or direct its progenies.¹⁶ The paper therefore reinforces the judgment that it is not religion that lies at Al-Qaeda's ideological base, but grievance and insecurity, with religious mores employed to justify the use of extreme violence. Thus, ISIL is but the latest manifestation of Al Qaedaists who seek to create turbulent and violent environments that lead to the narrowing of the marketplace of religion, ideas, and identities. Consequently, people who remain in the areas that these groups manage to control face the simple choice of joining or at least accepting the new groups or death, as these are the only options that the groups provide.¹⁷ The paper lies on three pillars, the first section examines the conditions that facilitate the emergence of social identity groups that engage in political violence; the second reviews the

ideology of Al-Qaeda; and the third underlines how ISIL draws on the condition social identity groups and Al-Qaeda's ideology to promote its own version of Al-Qaedism. The paper concludes that the way to engage with groups such as ISIL is by adopting policies that undermine the reasons why people turn to these groups for security.

The evolution of Jihadi terrorist groups: the role of environment, religion and self-interest

Recognizing that no person is an island, social identity theory holds that people ascertain who they are and to which social group¹⁸ they belong by engaging in a process of categorization (putting people, including oneself, into groups), identification (a subjective association), and comparison (a bias towards one's own group and its importance).¹⁹ These components require an understanding of "belonging," which is developed by looking at traits, ideas, and views, including cultural norms and personally-ascribed goals.²⁰ With these in mind, the individual who feels that the state is not responsive to their needs, especially basic security, understood as freedom from want and fear,²¹ seeks out an alternate community.²² In other words, once people combine knowledge of their lives, their environments, and themselves, on the one hand, and the group or movement they wish to join on the other, they develop the social characteristics that would allow them to join the group officially.²³

A social group, thus, relies on three interconnected pillars: an insecure environment, which enables the group to exhibit specific social characteristics and to which the disgruntled, aggrieved individual can relate; a tool to bond the targeted audience with the group; and self-interest. In terms of the environment, the social group has to underline the fact that the state cannot provide the individual with the basic security that they want and deserve. Moreover, the

state may even play a part in undermining security by not only failing to deliver it, but engaging in activity that is harmful to all or part of the population, thus creating the need to find an alternative provider of security.

The group exploits a pervasive sense of insecurity by portraying troubling events in a particular light as a way to appeal to those who may already share some of its views and by promoting the group's ability to deal with those concerns, thus underlining the group's strength and value.²⁴ The challenge for competing social groups is demonstrating to current and potential supporters that the group is sufficiently powerful enough to extract concessions from established political actors, who would only offer concessions as part of a bargaining process with those who pose a threat to them and to the state itself.²⁵ Accordingly, a social group needs a bond to tie its members together and ensure a steady supply of new recruits, as the group will engage in activities that could thin its ranks in one way or another.

Religion is a highly effective bond, especially in times of social crisis that often take place when insecurity abounds, enabling the promoter of the religion (the religious producer) to offer a radical interpretation that underlines people's feelings of alienation. That is, religion, as defined by Max Weber, is a political institution, carrying a normative order.²⁶ Thus, religious identities in the words of one commentator "are not fungible, or easily altered, and conversion costs do not simply follow from the distance traveled."²⁷ In other words, religion helps cement identities by providing a uniform base for a message that addresses the spiritual and physical worlds, making enormous demands, as a way to explain its salvific message.²⁸ Notably, from the basic message, radical interpretations, often used by sects, emerge. The threat that these pose is more significant because sects by definition are less tolerant, and their leaders often not only reject the state, but

seek to overthrow it.²⁹ Additionally, religion, specifically when it develops a sect-like mentality has the ability to weed out individuals not fully committed to the cause and, more importantly, the group. Accordingly, those individuals prompting an unconventional, radical interpretation of the religion engage in a process that not only provides reasons for suffering, but includes the categorization and identification of the worthy and unworthy, with rewards that need not be tangible.³⁰

The third element in the process is the group's self-interest – the absolute necessity to act to attract support – and underlining the group's distinctiveness from actual or possible competitors. Interspersed within this element is the fact that terrorist organizations are no different from other groups in that they also seek to survive.³¹ It is thus precisely not the case that religious extremism feeds religiously-inspired terrorism out of ignorance; it is instead a deeply rational choice, and violence plays a key role in establishing the conditions that facilitate the rise of social groups.³²

Combining the three pillars above with the concept of the economics of religion provides insight into the religious-based social group. The economics of religion recognizes the presence of two groups: religious producers and religious consumers, with the former wanting to sell a product (religion or more specifically a worldview) that they hope the latter will accept. For this effort to succeed, however, the religious producers require conditions that underscore their usefulness and even necessity for individuals. The emphasis is on offering a good or a service, while at the same time underlining that individuals residing in a particular area have no real choice but to accept it. Furthermore, it is also important to have a message that is broadly acceptable or at least will find a receptive audience.³³ Ultimately, religion has an organizational structure that adherents can use to recruit in that the religious message serves to attract recruits

by offering them both tangible and intangible benefits – in this case the promise of desperately-needed security and stability– which are then used to mobilize adherents.³⁴

In sum, when applying the social group identity paradigm to Al-Qaeda (as will be shown in the next section) it becomes clear that the organization, whether in Afghanistan or through its affiliates, seeks to create an insecure environment, either through its own violent actions or in fostering strife with state powers. By narrowing the marketplace of religion, ideas and most importantly, identities, Al-Qaeda then exploits the situation by claiming that if one follows its agenda, security – physical, economic, social, cultural, and religious – will surely follow. ISIL seems to encapsulate this approach as seen with its 16-point communiqué, published soon after it took over Mosul which declared, “People tried secular forms of government: republic, Baathist, Safavids ... It pained you. Now is time for an Islamic state.”³⁵

Al-Qaeda’s Ideology: Balancing Grievances with Insecurity

Al-Qaeda propagates a radical, uncompromising ideology aimed at appealing to people as opposed to states, leading one commentator to conclude, “...it is difficult to define the political community that al-Qaeda aims to affect, because of the radical contrast, even contradiction, between regional and pan-Islamic themes.”³⁶ In other words, the message is for all people, as long as they accept Al-Qaeda’s religious monoglot. Notably, though there are ways to read Core Al-Qaeda’s message, allowing Abu Musab al-Suri to argue in his infamous “Call to Global Islamic Resistance” that for the jihadi movement to continue and thrive, it has to adapt, which often means taking indigenous characteristics so as to appeal to locals.³⁷ In other words, take the

overall message and apply it to one's setting, with the ultimate goal being defeating the enemies.³⁸

Bin Laden's infamous Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders articulated the essence of Al-Qaeda's unique view of world history. The Declaration and other texts identify three key, interconnected grievances, all of which relate to individual insecurity and power.³⁹ What is important about the grievances is that they allow bin Laden to categorize, identify, and compare the "true" Muslims with those who seek always and everywhere to undermine them. Thus, the grievances are broad, aimed at motivating actions, understood as responding to provocation, against those that seek to harm or weaken the true *umma*. The first grievance, which is primarily religious in orientation, focuses on the occupation of Muslim lands, allowing bin Laden to distinguish between Muslims and non-Muslims, with non-Muslims corrupting and exploiting the Arabian Peninsula, the spiritual base of the Muslim nation (*umma*). Interfused with this message is a subjective, even capricious, value: bin Laden and the Al-Qaedaists decide who is a good Muslim and who has strayed.⁴⁰ A second grievance, which is economic, centers on the sanctions and destruction wrought on Iraq and its people. Under this rubric, the non-Muslims not only entice Muslims away from the right path, but also inflict catastrophic tangible harms on them, creating insecure environments that allow criminals, warlords, and other nefarious actors to prosper.⁴¹ The third grievance links the religious with the economic by identifying a sinister force whom bin Laden and Al-Qaeda can claim stands behind the horrors that Muslims suffer. The sinister force is the West, seen mainly as the United States (the far enemy) and materialism, which draws Muslims from their obligations.⁴² In other words,

if seen as an eschatological movement, Al-Qaeda promotes a view where the fixation with materialism by contemporary society undermines the *umma*, leading it to abandon true Islam.⁴³

An important element in Al-Qaeda's ideology is its tactics, designed to extract heavy casualties from those identified as enemies, so as to legitimize the violence,⁴⁴ provoke a response and creates a pervasive sense of insecurity. In the words of Mark Sedgwick, Al-Qaeda primary objective in committing the 9/11 atrocity, "was not its direct impact on America but rather its indirect propaganda impact on al-Qaeda's potential supporters." Thus, in committing the attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon Al Qaeda sought a response (action) from the United States "that would alienate al-Qaeda's potential supporters from America, thus turning more of them into actual supporters."⁴⁵ Second, Al-Qaeda also wanted to create a sense of pervasive insecurity among Americans,⁴⁶ which is why the tools that it used to carry out the attacks are as important as the targets, as after all terrorists seeks to "create unbridled fear, dark insecurity, and reverberating panic."⁴⁷ And, if they can do this by using everyday equipment, all the better. Accordingly, Al-Qaeda's promotes its unique social status with the Al-Qaedaists widely glorified as martyrs, willing to sacrifice themselves for the greater good of reestablishing the Caliphate, even if it means killing those that might initially be innocent bystanders.⁴⁸ Thus, the killings are part of a self-interested goal, for by terrorizing communities Al-Qaeda attracts the attention of the infidel state,⁴⁹ which Al-Qaeda has previously insisted may act disproportionately or in a manner that the al-Qaedaists could characterize as unjust.⁵⁰ The state's escalated responses are then used by Al-Qaeda to buttress its own importance and power (a faithful non-state underdog fighting a brutal, infidel state), which ensures that new symbols of injustice emerge.

In sum, in the Declaration and in other texts, speeches, and comments, bin Laden and his acolytes categorize the people of the world bluntly into Muslim and non-Muslim, or as individuals living in the House of Islam (*Dar al-Islam*) or the House of War (*Dar al-Harb*), with the subtext being that bin Laden and his ilk are the Muslims that shed the veil of ignorance (and therefore live in the House of Islam). Bin Laden also clearly identifies those responsible for the plight in which contemporary Muslims find themselves: the West, especially the United States, by far the biggest enemy; and Muslim leaders who allow themselves to be seduced by the West. Al-Qaedaists can thus compare themselves favorably not only with the obvious infidel, non-Muslims but also with so-called Muslims who have strayed from the path that is represented by, and only by, Al-Qaeda.

Post-2003 Iraq, Exogenous & Endogenous Factors that facilitated the rise of ISIL

The story of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is intimately linked to the American occupation of Iraq and the civil war in Syria. Iraq laid down the initial conditions: heightened sectarianism caused by inadequate appreciation of the need to engage in social balancing to prevent grievances, the use of violent tactics to project power, and the ability to attract a flood of foreign fighters. Moreover, the decades-long Saddam regime relied not only on fear to sustain itself but also on an elaborate patronage system, instilled a culture in which Iraqis instinctively associated having a connection to someone in power as the only thing remotely close to a guarantee of security of all kinds. The Syrian civil war helped shape ISIL's tactics (seizing territory, controlling smuggling routes, and working with local actors),⁵¹ but more importantly it linked the conflict in Iraq, where Sunnis clashed with the Maliki regime, with that of Syria,

providing the Iraqi Sunni minority with more support and also something to strive for, an Islamic State of Sunnistan.⁵²

To understand the rise of ISIL, whose exact numbers remain unknown but are believed to be at least 10,000 fighters, it is essential to examine first the situation in Iraq between 2003 and 2010. The two phases of this timespan combine to define the Iraq of mid-2014. Initially, Iraq experienced bouts of optimism, growth, insecurity, and division, culminating in sectarian civil war. The second period, defined very much by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, has seen heightened insecurity and rising sectarian tensions.⁵³

In retrospect, defeating the Iraqi army and toppling Saddam Hussein proved relatively easy for the coalition. Thus, the key challenge of post-Saddam Iraq was how to rebuild not only what was destroyed in the fighting but what Saddam and over a decade of sanctions had ruined, particularly any notion of a neoliberal political system.⁵⁴ Disentangling the political, social, and economic dynamics in Iraq is arduous at best, in that without a clear political settlement, engaging in durable economic or social reconstruction remains effectively impossible. Nevertheless, because of the role that politics play in shaping society, the focus will be on the political and economic because of the enormous sums of money that were poured into the reconstruction efforts, even if they often amounted to naught.⁵⁵ Two key factors shaped Iraq's political system: the first was acceptance that it was not possible to establish a government of exiles sympathetic to the US, which required Washington to take direct charge of the reconstruction effort, especially once it became clear that the Iraqi state had completely collapsed.⁵⁶ Embedded within this realization was the second factor; the external powerbrokers that held Iraq's future in their hands would place their own interests first, even though much of

their knowledge and understanding of Iraq was faulty, stemming from a weak understanding of the country, its people, and its history. Thus, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) followed traditional post-conflict reconstruction models like Germany, Kosovo, and East Timor, which included dissolution of Iraqi security institutions and a policy of removing members of the regime from position of power and authority (de-Ba'athification).⁵⁷ In July 2003, the CPA oversaw the formation of the Iraqi Governing Council, whose members were chosen along ethnic and religious lines. The decision heightened sectarianism, as representation was based on quotas that only reinforced the simmering age-old divisions, instead of being meritocratic. In 2005, Iraq had its first post-Saddam national elections, judged by international observers as relatively free and fair, albeit ones based on primordial loyalties.⁵⁸ However, because the parties were divided along sectarian and ethnic lines, there was a need to find a prime minister whom the party bosses did not see as a threat, leading to the appointment of Nuri al-Maliki as Prime Minister.⁵⁹ Ali Khedery who served as special assistant to five U.S. ambassadors to Iraq and as a senior adviser to three heads of U.S. Central Command writes,

“Prone to conspiracy theories after decades of being hunted by Hussein’s intelligence services, he was convinced that his Shiite Islamist rival Moqtada al-Sadr was seeking to undermine him. So in March 2008, Maliki hopped into his motorcade and led an Iraqi army charge against Sadr’s Mahdi Army in Basra. With no planning, logistics, intelligence, air cover or political support from Iraq’s other leaders, Maliki picked a fight with an Iranian-backed militia that had stymied the U.S. military since 2003.”⁶⁰

A former functionary who at least in 2005 had no power base, Maliki quickly recognized that he had to develop a following – a social group – if he hoped to remain in authority. To secure his

position he appointed family members and supporters of his party, *Dawa*, to key positions in his administration, including the military;⁶¹ they were all loyal to him rather than party ideals. The political and security situation remained dire for the next several years as Iraq descended into a sectarian-based civil war. In 2008, with American support, Maliki responded to the deteriorating security situation in Iraq by coaxing Sunni tribes away from Al-Qaeda through various financial and security arrangements. In engaging in such a program Maliki was able to direct the Iraqi security apparatus against the Shi'a irregulars of Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army, culminating with Iraqi forces joining British and American troops in taking over Sadr City in 2008.⁶² However, the methods used by Maliki to attain Sunni support also meant that they could withdraw support once they determined that it was more profitable to oppose him; there was no allegiance, but an alliance of convenience. Thus, the operations against al-Sadr and others (after the Mahdi army was weakened, Maliki turned his attention towards other potential threats such as *Sahwa*, the Sons of Iraq⁶³), helped accentuate social identities, especially sectarian ones. In the post-2010 period, Maliki's Shi'a credentials have intensified, as he adopted policies that drew Iraq closer to Iran,⁶⁴ and pursued an increasingly sectarian line which often meant engaging in heavy-handed tactics such as arrests and military against Sunni opponents.⁶⁵

The political situation had a direct impact on economic reconstruction, which was undermined by widespread corruption among the ruling elite, with contracts "won" by companies and individuals with close ties to senior Iraqi politicians. Today, Iraq's economic system is largely a product of the successive orders issued by the CPA, whose policies furthered the conditions for corruption that had long been rampant. For decades, Iraqis relied on a system of patronage that saw millions – as long as they were members of the Ba'ath Party – working for

the state, giving them enormous power. The CPA policies, especially the decentralization program, served to accentuate social identities, which meant that the patronage system changed only in so far as the main identities replaced the Ba'athists as the "connected" class. Instead of bridging social capital, which is the promotion of trust and cooperation between groups and an absolute necessity given Iraq's ethnic and cultural divisions, a system that promoted bonded social capital or the promotion of trust and cooperation within groups evolved.⁶⁶ It is therefore no surprise that post-2003 Iraq displayed a near-total lack of trust across every facet of society and an ever-changing relationship between tribes, gangs, and the insurgency of the day, which encouraged a thriving informal economy. As reconstruction gathered momentum, those who had been excluded from the economic system under Saddam seized the opportunity that came with de-Ba'athification and the flawed reconstruction process to demand their share. However, what distinguished these new actors from their predecessors was their willingness to engage in widespread violence.⁶⁷ Robert Looney captures the sad state of Iraq's economic situation by describing the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior as follows: "rather than enforcing the law in an impartial manner, the ministry is driven by political faction. It houses a myriad of competing police and intelligence agencies that pursue various political or sectarian agendas." Looney adds that such accusations could be leveled equally plausible at other ministries.⁶⁸

ISIL, building on Zarqawi's ideas

The origins of ISIL are mired in controversy and dispute, but it appears to be a product of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), which was established in 2006 by several Iraqi Al-Qaeda-based or affiliated groups such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the Mujahedeen Shura Council in Iraq, and *Jund al-Sahhaha* (Soldiers of the Prophet's Companions). Unsurprisingly, ISI had many Zarqawi

followers among its membership.⁶⁹ ISI's first leader was Hamed Dawood Mohammed Khalil al-Zawi, better known as Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, although after he was killed in April 2010⁷⁰ Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was instrumental in forming *Jabhat al-Nusra*, an Al-Qaeda-based group in Syria committed to the toppling of the Assad regime and establishing an Islamic state in Syria, assumed leadership of ISI and has taken the Al-Qaeda mantra in Iraq and Syria.

The current leader of ISIL is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi whose tactics and ideas led to a public schism between him and Ayman al-Zawahiri.⁷¹ To understand ISIL requires looking at Zarqawi and his message, which ISIL embodies even though Zarqawi began his jihadi career as a virtual nobody.⁷² It is somewhat odd that Zarqawi a high-school dropouts and a petty criminal would come to “embolden the [Iraqi] insurgency and instilled a renewed sense of confidence in the larger global jihadist movement at a time when it nearly faltered in the wake of massive retaliation by the United States and its allies.”⁷³ Nevertheless, once Zarqawi had the ideological foundation provided by bin Laden and others, he and his successors at ISIL, innovate by creating a message that resonates with Iraqi Sunnis who are resenting their loss of power, the empowerment of the Shi'a and Kurds at their expense, and Maliki's growing authoritarianism and closeness with first Iran and later to the Assad regime.⁷⁴ Additionally, the message is also meant to appeal to Sunnis across the world, just as bin Laden hoped with his *Declaration*. Accordingly, there are three core, interconnected, elements of Zarqawi's message found in ISIL: ideology understood through tactics; anti-Shi'aism; and, foreign recruitment. The strategy also demanded publicity, which led to an influx of recruits, whom Oliver Roy described as suffering from “deterritorialization,”⁷⁵ who find Zarqawi's messages appealing because it allows them to identify, categorize and compare.⁷⁶

First, ISIL seems to have built on Zarqawi's brand of Islam based in general on how Core Al-Qaeda understands, interprets and promote Islam, not only because of the relationship between Zarqawi and al-Baghdadi, but because ISIL like Zarqawi emphasizes action, defined as Islamic Action, rather than pontification. In concrete terms, Islamic action means focusing on the establishment of an Islamic state from which Al-Qaeda ideology can spread as opposed to targeting a distant enemy at the outset.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, ISIL's brand of activism has come at the cost of a rift with Core Al Qaeda,⁷⁸ which is what occurred between Zarqawi and Zawahiri.⁷⁹ Arguably, the need for the shift comes from an acceptance that initial tactics of Al-Qaeda have not worked, as the United States remains strong and has continued to support the corrupt, materialistic, Arab regimes, seen most clearly with the role played by Washington in setting up the post-Saddam government. Accordingly, the first aspect of the Zarqawi Islamic mission is to remove infidels, generally understood as anyone who is not a Sunni Muslim, through violence.⁸⁰ This message is found in Core Al-Qaeda, which decries the occupation of Iraq by infidels and demands personal sacrifice,⁸¹ while emphasizing the grievances articulated in the *Declaration* regarding crusaders plundering Muslim lands, and which the invasion of Iraq proved.⁸² The long presence of US forces in Iraq, coupled with the support Washington gave Maliki only served to highlight the way the 'crusaders' undermined Iraq. ISIL however seems to have adopted the general ethos of Core Al-Qaeda by emphasizing foreign presence, decriing its influence but directing its hatred towards the Iraqi security services and the need to establish an Islamic state in Iraq from which it can promote its agenda.⁸³ Where it innovates is in decision to, at least in the early stages, to empower people in shaping the Islamic State, by enlisting local powerbrokers, such as tribal elders, to assert power: ideally against the Shi'a.⁸⁴ In other words, recognizing that

western conception of national identity has not worked in the region, ISIL is appealing to tribal and religious, creating a new form of citizenship in which individuals can have security – physical, economic, social and religious – as long as it accepts ISIL’s message.⁸⁵

Second, Zarqawi advocated a relentless anti-Shi’a ideology that has become only become more popular because of the conflict in Syria and because of rising sectarian tensions across much of the Muslim world. Zarqawi’s denunciation of the Shi’a is total, validating and encouraging extreme violence against them. It begins with the Shi’a viewed as being at least bad as if not worse than the crusaders. Notably, the message draws on early activities of bin Laden, who reportedly in 1988 led a group of fighters to suppress a Shi’a-based revolt in Gilit, Pakistan that saw the massacre of hundreds of civilians.⁸⁶ Where Zarqawi differed from Core Al-Qaeda was that he made anti-Shi’ism an integral part of his campaign, defending actions against Shi’a by claiming, “they initiated hostilities by taking over Sunni homes and mosques and attacking Sunnis in the streets”.⁸⁷ Zarqawi’s unyielding opposition to Iraqi Shi’a has played a major part in pushing the country towards sectarian civil war, which itself accentuated social identities, as Sunnis and Shi’a established militias to defend their respective communities and attack each other.⁸⁸ ISIS has continued to promote this message, referring to the Maliki government as the “Safavid government” and the Iraqi army as the “Safavid Army.”⁸⁹ In doing so, ISIL allows individuals (Sunnis that feel discriminate) to identify with it, while also drawing reference to religion and Muslim history. Second, the language allows ISIS to categorize its enemies (Shi’a and foreigners in genera) and compare itself to other movements who are portrayed as not doing enough to defend the Sunni *umma*.

Third, Zarqawi was a major proponent of the indiscriminate use of violence as a recruitment tool. ISIL has taken this approach, infusing a secondary element in its use of violence, the need to ensure pervasive insecurity to win territory through the use of fear and wealth.⁹⁰ In other words, whereas with Zarqawi the principle aim was to use terror to terrorize people to accept his mantra and rule, ISIL uses terror to underlie the inability of the Iraqi state to provide protection, showing that in reality it is the power, especially as it has the financial means to provide for its supporters.⁹¹

In regard to Iraq, ISIL concentrates its criticism on the policies of the Iraqi government, which it sees and portrays as essentially a western-friendly, Shi'a-dominated entity. Thus, the first message propagated by ISIL is a rejection of non-Islamic territorial division, with the border between Syria and Iraq characterized as a western-imposed relic of the Sykes-Picot Agreement.⁹² In insisting that the division between Iraq and Syria is unnatural and western-creation,⁹³ ISIL makes the claim that the demarcation was aimed at weakening Iraq's Sunni community by keeping it a minority, while Syria has a Sunni majority governed by an Alawite minority.⁹⁴ Such claims build on key Al-Qaeda claims that the contemporary world was shaped by the European colonials whose agenda was to exploit the wealth that belongs to Muslims.

Information, especially from open sources, on Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is sparse, although the image that has emerge is of a ruthless, prolific fundraiser and shrewd strategist, who clearly understands the environment he operates in and knows how to appeal to his audience.⁹⁵ Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has shown an uncanny ability to learn from Zarqawi, including the need for secrecy,⁹⁶ which Zarqawi's eschewed. Nonetheless, like Zarqawi al-Baghdadi made his reputation on the basis of being brutally violent, though in his latest position he does not seem to

engage in the type of slaughter and violence that made Zarqawi anathema to many Iraqi Sunnis.⁹⁷ This is not to say that al-Baghdadi preaches non-violence or surgical attacks, as he does. However, his anti-Shi'ism is more focused, designed in part to create a new cycle of violence,⁹⁸ but also to draw Iraqis Sunnis to identify with his brand of Sunnism. This policy explains why tribal sheiks such as Zaydan Aljabri from Anbar province support al-Baghdadi, declaring “If al-Baghdadi asked for my allegiance, I would give it to him, because what he is doing is what I want... Right now, my priority is liberating the Sunnis, and that’s why he has been fighting for these last six months.”⁹⁹ In other words, al-Baghdadi’s agenda seems to be first, create the environment, pervasive insecurity coupled with a sense that the war in Syria is a war against Sunni Islam. The second part of the strategy is to wrack up military victories, as they are the best indicators that ISIL can protect its own members and advance its agenda, as after all ISIL is no different from other groups in that it too wants to survive.¹⁰⁰

Second, ISIL draws local and foreign recruits¹⁰¹ by emphasizing that Sunni Muslims, whether in Iraq or Syria are being slaughtered by an identifiable enemy, Shi’ites who have the support of the West, either because they support the Maliki government or because they are not intervening in Syria.¹⁰² That is, An additional reason for the violence is the desire to attract support, which ISIL has managed, encouraging recruits from Britain,¹⁰³ Finland,¹⁰⁴ Spain,¹⁰⁵ Australia,¹⁰⁶ and countless more countries¹⁰⁷ because its message focuses on the suffering of ordinary (mainly Sunni) Syrians through traditional and more importantly online delivery systems. Peter Nuemann argues persuasively that the ideology of ISIL is transnational in that “if you are a Brit or a French guy who has no family connection to Syria, you’re not wanting to fight for the Syrian people ... The reason you’re going there is because you see Syria as essentially the

centre of gravity or the potential birthplace for that Islamic state that you're hoping to create.”¹⁰⁸ Evidently, this outlook resonates with many, especially in areas where there is little or no security, which allows ISIL to sweep in with a message that the corruption and insecurity are caused by the failure to follow a pure form of Islam that brings tangible and intangible rewards.¹⁰⁹

Third, leave the end product (for al-Baghdadi it is the creation of an Islamic state) somewhat vague so as not to alienate potential allies, but also to enable the group to focus on fighting, which is where its strength lie, especially if the fighting is against the Iraqi security services. In other words, the brand of Islam promoted by ISIL is shown to be not only the true Islam, but an Islamic system that brings security to those that accept it. Ceylan Yeginsu for example who investigated the reason why Turkish men from Hacibayram, a small poor neighborhood in Ankara that has produced many ISIL recruits refers to Arif Akbas, the neighborhood's elected headman had pointed out that following a visit by a bearded stranger “all the drug addicts started going to the mosque.” Yeginsu added that one poor resident in the same neighborhood had said to her “The diluted form of Islam practiced in Turkey is an insult to the religion,” the person than added “In the Islamic State you lead a life of discipline as dictated by God, and then you are rewarded. Children there have parks and swimming pools. Here, my children play in the dirt.”¹¹⁰

Conclusion

Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda is but a shadow of its former self, its numbers dwindling and its influence and especially its ability to impose its will dramatically weakened. However, it gave birth to an even more dangerous phenomenon, creating a new brand of groups committed to the

general ideas of Al-Qaeda but tailoring their tactics to fit the conditions that they face. The key tools at the disposal of these groups are: an uncompromising, unforgiving religious interpretation that does not merely permit but actively encourages extreme acts of violence; a turbulent environment that the warriors exploit, exacerbate, or create through acts of violence; existing social identities that the group preys upon; and a government that cannot begin to provide anything like adequate security. A retrospective examination of the current Iraqi-Syrian situation reveals first that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was the central proponent of this new approach, as his unswervingly anti-Shi'a rhetoric appealed to many Sunnis and others weary of the policies of Nuri al-Maliki and the Assad family.¹¹¹ Therefore a key response to Zarqawi's message is to remove the conditions that allowed sectarianism to assert itself in Iraq. Moreover, the increased willingness of Sunnis and Shi'a citizen groups to counter the ISIL threat raises the prospects of a national unity government without Maliki at the helm.¹¹² Nevertheless, even in a post-Maliki Iraq, any serious attempt to challenge ISIL requires a major political, social and economic change in contemporary Iraq so as to ensure that ordinary people feel that they have a stake in the state, which at the moment does not seem to offer much, especially in the realm of basic security.

Second, Zarqawi carried out, supported, and defended extreme acts of violence, even if it cost him the support of Core Al-Qaeda. Obviously, Zarqawi never lived to see the implementation of his message, as he was killed in a U.S. airstrike in June 2006. His shield was taken up by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the founder of ISIL, who has used the Syrian civil war to attract recruits and win territory from which ISIL could launch further attacks, cement its authority, and offer to many Sunnis fed up with their own tribal leaders and the Iraqi and Syrian

governments with an alternative made more palatable because ISIL can offer immediate physical and at least the promise of eventual economic security. Thus, a key way to weaken ISIL is by finding a solution to the Syrian conflict, which would require making tough concessions, as Syria is increasingly becoming the Afghanistan of the 1980s and the Iraq of the 2000s.¹¹³

Recognizing the aims and purpose of ISIL, which seems intent on re-igniting a sectarian civil war in Iraq, and possibly in the rest of the region, as a way to withdraw old boundaries, emphasizes how dangerous ISIL is, especially as it manipulates identities, leading to contrived social grouping. Post-2003 Iraq saw religiously-based social identities come to the fore, so that only real or subjective kinship gave individuals security, which is what Core Al-Qaeda and specifically Zarqawi wanted. Thus, to challenge ISIL requires a policy of empowerment that eschews social identities to the greatest extent possible. In other words, Iraqis must find ways first defeat ISIL by marshalling identities¹¹⁴ and also recall that incessant war-making leads to dysfunctionality and weak state.¹¹⁵ Any serious effort to stem and eventually end the violence descending on Iraq would require Iraqis to reject divisive politics and ideologies and to view ISIL as the rest of the world does, a violent movement holding to a perverse image of Islam and the Caliphate.¹¹⁶

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¹ Don Chipman noted in 2003, “Bin Laden’s stated political goals and his attacks were the obvious signs of an organized war effort. Similar to other military campaigns, his Al-Qaeda combatants received orders, planned their tactics, and carried out their attacks, all within a designated guerrilla strategy. The initial shots of this war were fired in 1996 against the Americans in Khobar Towers, then against the U.S. embassies in Africa, and later against the USS *Cole*. The second round came on September 11. This guerrilla war is being organized and run by a cold blooded strategist, Osama bin Laden, who in the fall of 2001 was using Afghanistan as a sanctuary.” Don D. Chipman, “Osama bin Laden and Guerilla War,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2003), p. 167.

² In August 2013, the State Department closed 19 embassies across the Middle East and North Africa because of concerns over a potential Al-Qaeda attack. Lori Montgomery, “Embassy, Consulate Closure Applauded on both Sides of the Aisle,” *Washington Post*, August 4, 2013. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/embassy-consulate-closures-applauded-on-both-sides-of-the-aisle/2013/08/04/671aabb6-fd30-11e2-9711-3708310f6f4d_story.html. Bruce Hoffman, “Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism since 9/11,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 25, No. 5 (2002), pp. 303-316; Bruce Hoffman, “Al

Qaeda, Trends in terrorism, and Future Potentialities: An Assessment,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 26, No. 6 (2003), pp. 429-442.

³ In its first few years, Al-Qaeda was either directly responsible or it assisted in carrying out operations for operation in Europe, North Africa, the Middle East and the United States. However, by 2007, Al-Qaeda ability to directly carry out or even finance an operation greatly diminished.

⁴ Quintan Wiktorowicz, and John Kaltner, “Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's Justification for September 11,” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2003), pp. 76-92.

⁵ Bruce Hoffman, “The Changing Face of Al-Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 27, No. 6 (2004), pp. 549-560; Assaf Moghadam, “How Al-Qaeda Innovates,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2013), pp. 466-497.

⁶ The term is used by Bruce Hoffman, “Al-Qaeda's Uncertain Future,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 36, No. 8 (2013), pp. 635-653.

⁷ Marc Lynch, “Al-Qaeda’s Media Strategies,” *The National Interest*, Vol. 83, No. 1 (2006), pp. 56-56; Gabriel Weimann, “Terror on Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube,” *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2010), pp. 45-54.

⁸ Brynjar Lia, “Doctrines for Jihadi Terrorist Training,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2008), pp. 518-542.

⁹ Henri Tajfel and John Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,” Stephen Worchel and William Austin (ed.), *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, (Monterey: Brooks/Cole, 1979), pp. 33-47.

¹⁰ The term is used by Bruce Hoffman, "Al-Qaeda's Uncertain Future," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 36, No. 8 (2013), pp. 635-653.

¹¹ On the ideological roots of Al-Qaeda and radical Islam see for example, Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology And Modern Politics* (Yale University Press, 1990); Quintan Wiktorowicz, "A Genealogy of Radical Islam," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2005), pp. 75-97; Brynjar Lia, *Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus' ab al-Suri* (London: Hurst, 2007); John C. Zimmerman, "Sayyid Qutb's Influence on the 11 September Attacks," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2004), pp. 222-252.

¹² Jean-Luc Marret, "Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb: A "Glocal" Organization," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 31, No. 6 (2008), pp. 541-552; Bruce Hoffman, "Radicalization and Subversion: Al Qaeda and the 7 July 2005 Bombings and the 2006 Airline bombing Plot," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 32, No. 12 (2009), pp. 1100-1116.

¹³ Reuel Marc Gerecht, "The Gospel According to Osama Bin Laden," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 289 No. 1 (January 2002), p. 46; Pete Lentini and Muhammad Bakashmar, "Jihadist Beheading: A Convergence of Technology, Theology, and Teleology?" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (2007), pp. 303-325.

¹⁴ Nelly Lahoud and Muhammad al-`Ubayd emphasis that in the schism between ISIL and Core Al-Qaeda, the former challenges the idea that an Islamic State was created, which is why in the statement in which Core Al-Qaeda disavows ISIL it refers to it as a group. Nelly Lahoud and Muhammad al-`Ubayd, "The War of Jihadists against Jihadists in Syria," *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (March 2014), p. 2.

¹⁵ It is reported that 25,000 Indian Shi'ite has volunteered to go fight in Iraq against ISIL, with the President of *Anjuman-e-Haideri*, Ali Naqvi hoping to send more than 100,000 volunteers to fight ISIL. Baba Umar, "Indian Shia Sign Up to Fight in Iraq," *Al-Jazeera*, Jul. 1, 2014. Available at <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2014/07/indian-shias-sign-up-fight-iraq-20147110924262541.html>.

¹⁶ Daniel Byman has argued that Al-Qaeda's affiliates are often a net-loss for the organization as differing priorities not to mention tactics may have an adverse effect on Core Al-Qaeda. Daniel Byman, "Buddies or Burdens? Understanding the Al Qaeda Relationship with Its Affiliate Organizations," *Security Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2014), pp. 431-470

¹⁷ David Blair, "ISIL's Yazidi 'mass conversion' video fails to hide brutal duress," *Daily Telegraph*, Aug. 21, 2014. Available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/11049393/Isils-Yazidi-mass-conversion-video-fails-to-hide-brutal-duress.html>; Imran Khan, "Iraq Christians get Islamic State's warning," *Al-Jazeera*, Jul. 19, 2014. Available at <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/iraq-christians-told-convert-face-death-2014718111040982432.html>

¹⁸ The phrase social group also includes social movements, which generally refers to a grouping of individuals that focus on political or social issues, with the aim of effecting change.

¹⁹ Henri Tajfel and John Turner, "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict," Stephen Worchel and William Austin (ed.) *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, (Monterey:

Brooks/Cole, 1979), pp. 33-47; Yan Chen and Sherry Xin Li, "Group Identity and Social Preferences," *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 99, No. 1 (2009), pp. 431-433.

²⁰ Jan E. Stets and Peter J. Burke, "Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory," *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Vol. 63, No. 3 (2000), pp. 224-226; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983); Asef Bayat, "Islamism and Social Movement Theory," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 6 (2005), pp. 891-908; Seth J. Schwartz, Curtis S. Dunkel and Alan S. Waterman, "Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 32, No. 6, (2009), pp. 537-559; Allison G. Smith, "From Words to Action: Exploring the Relationship between a Group's Value References and Its Likelihood of Engaging in Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 27, No. 5 (2004), pp. 409-437.

²¹ At its most basic, human security refers to freedom from want and freedom from fear. Lloyd Axworthy, "Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First," *Global Governance*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2001), pp. 19-23; Sadako Ogata and Johan Cels, "Human Security – Protecting and Empowering the People," *Global Governance*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2003), pp. 273-282.

²² Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). See also, Ted Robert Gurr, "Economic Factors That Contribute to Terrorism in Social and Political Context." Working Group Report, "International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security." March 8–11, 2005. Available at <http://safe-democracy.org/docs/CdM-Series-on-Terrorism-Vol-1.pdf>; Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa, "Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative

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²³ Jan E. Stets and Peter J. Burke, “Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory,” *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Vol. 63, No. 3 (2000), p. 225; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983); Asef Bayat, “Islamism and Social Movement Theory,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 6 (2005), pp. 891–908.

²⁴ The rising sectarianism in Pakistan has led many Shi’a Pakistanis to claim that the government is not doing enough to protect them. Richard Galpin, “Pakistan Grapples with Rising Tide of Extremist Violence,” *BBC News*, 15 Jul. 2013. Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-23319254>.

²⁵ John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory,” *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 82, No. 6 (1977), pp. 1212-1241; Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, “Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede: How Do States Respond to Internally Divided Separatists,” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 105, No. 2 (2011), pp. 275-297; Isaac Kfir, “Sectarian Violence and Social Group Identity in Pakistan,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 37, No. 6 (2014), pp. 457-472.

²⁶ Peter L. Berger, “The Sociological Study of Sectarianism,” *Social Research*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1954), pp. 467-85.

²⁷ Anna Grzymala-Busse, “Why Comparative Politics should Take Religion (More) Seriously,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 15 (2012), p. 422.

²⁸ All religions place restrictions. Thus for example Judaism has 613 commandments.

²⁹ Max Weber argued that a sect as predominately voluntary, aimed at bringing together those that accept an interpretation promoted by a charismatic leader. Peter L. Berger, "The Sociological Study of Sectarianism," *Social Research*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1954), pp. 467-485; Anthony Gill, "Religion and Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vo. 4, No. 1 (2001), p. 120.

³⁰ Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 148-154; Mark Juergensmeyer, *Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian Militias to Al-Qaeda*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); Heather S. Gregg, "Fighting Cosmic Warriors: Lessons from the First Seven Years of the Global War on Terror," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2009), pp. 188-208.

³¹ Martha Crenshaw argues that when using organizational process theory to explain the rise and longevity of terrorist groups will engage in a host of measures from internal acts of violence to rewards to ensure that members remain loyal. Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1987), pp. 19-24.

³² See for example, Ehud Sprinzak, "Rational Choice," *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 120 (September/October 2000), pp. 66-73; Laurence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman, "Religious Extremism: The Good, the Bad and the Deadly," *Public Choice*, Vol. 128, No. 1-2 (2006), pp. 109-129.

³³ Zaydan Aljabri, an Iraqi tribal sheik from Anbar province when speaking about ISIL underlines its appeal but also emphasizes ISIL's limitation claiming "We are an Islamic country, but we want to be a developed country, to be part of the world, ... Al-Baghdadi will not dare try to impose [sharia] law in Iraq, because he knows the tribes will not tolerate it." Joby Warrick, "ISIS, with gains in Iraq, closes in on founder Zaraqawi's violent vision," *The Washington Post*, Jun. 14, 2014. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/isiss-gains-in-iraq-fulfill-founders-violent-vision/2014/06/14/921ff6d2-f3b5-11e3-914c-1fbd0614e2d4_story.html.

³⁴ Laurence R. Iannaccone, "Sacrifice and Stigman: Reducing Free-riding in Cults, Communes and Deadly," *Journal of Economy*, Vol. 100, No. 2 (1992), pp. 271-292; Laurence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman, "Religious Extremism: The Good, the Bad and the Deadly," *Public Choice*, Vol. 128, No. 1-2 (2006), pp. 109-129; Bueno Ethan de Mesquita, "The Political Economy of Terrorism: A Selective Overview of Recent Works," *The Political Economist*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2008), pp. 3-4.

³⁵ Thanassis Cambanis, "The surprising appeal of ISIS," *Boston Globe*, Jun. 29, 2014. Available at <http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/06/28/the-surprising-appeal-isis/19YwC0GVPQ3i4eBXt1o0hI/story.html>.

³⁶ Denis McAuley, "The Ideology of Osama Bin Laden: Nation, Tribe and World Economy," *Journal of Political Ideologies*, No. 10, No. 3(2005), p. 271.

³⁷ Notably Abu Musab al-Suri was born in Syria and much of his writing were shaped by his experience as a member of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, who fought the Assad regime. Paul

Cruickshank and Mohannad Hage Ali, "Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2007), pp. 1-14; Jarret M. Brachman and William F. McCants, "Stealing al Qaeda's Playbook," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2006), pp. 309-321.

³⁸ Jim Lacey, *A Terrorist's Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab al-Suri's Islamic Jihad Manifesto* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008).

³⁹ Developed from, Bernard Lewis, "License to kill: Usama bin Ladin's declaration of Jihad," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 6 (1998), pp. 14-19. Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, *Al-Qaeda in Its Own Words*, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008); Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* (NY: Simon and Schuster, 2002); Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al-Qaeda's Leader* (NY: Simon and Schuster, 2006).

⁴⁰ A Muslim that is deemed no longer a true Muslim is castigated as a *takfir*, which could carry the ultimate punishment – death. Notably, Quintan Wiktorowicz, and John Kaltner note that for jihadi salafi group un-Islamic action is no different than un-Islamic belief, which mean that those who do not act as Muslims, as understood by Al-Qaeda for example, are guilty of apostasy. Quintan Wiktorowicz, and John Kaltner, "Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's Justification for September 11," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2003), p. 79.

⁴¹ A key claim as to the rise of the Taliban was that with the end of the Afghan Jihad, the country fell into civil war that made life intolerable for ordinary Afghans, leading Omar and the Taliban to move from the madrasas to restore order. The same thing took place in Somalia with

the Islamic Court Union, whose initial function was to restore law and order. Maley, William, ed. *Fundamentalism reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban* (New York: NYU Press, 1998); Ken Menkhaus, "Somalia: what went wrong?." *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 154, No. 4 (2009), pp. 6-12.

⁴² Zawahiri for example in a speech following bin Laden's death quotes him, "Luxury is the enemy of jihad and if the mujahideen [sic.] were brought to live in asceticism they would tolerate the burden of jihad." AP, "Al-Qaeda leader: Bin Laden spent wealth on jihad," *USA Today*, Jun. 3, 2012. Available at <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-06-03/al-qaeda-video/55355986/1>

⁴³ Thomas R. Mockaitis, *Osama bin Laden: A Biography*, (Santa Barbara: Greenwood, 2010); Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of bin Laden*, (New York: Free Press, 2000); Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al-Qaeda's Leader*, (New York: Free Press, 2006); Steve Coll, *The Bin Ladens: A Arabian Family in the American Century*, (New York: Penguin Press, 2008).

⁴⁴ Assaf Moghadam, a leading expert on Al-Qaeda writes, "In al-Qaida's tactical arsenal, suicide attacks play a pivotal role. No other tactic symbolizes al-Qaida's tenaciousness and ability to inspire a large number of Muslims worldwide as much as "martyrdom operations," to use the group's euphemistic labeling. Al-Qaida has all but perfected this tactic and institutionalized it to an extent not seen in other terrorist groups. It instilled the spirit of self-sacrifice in the collective psyche of virtually all of its fighters, thus creating a cult of martyrdom that far exceeds the Palestinian and Lebanese cult of death in both scope and depth." Assaf

Moghadam, "Motives for Martyrdom: Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide Attacks," *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2009), p. 59.

⁴⁵ Mark Sedgwick, "Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (2004), p. 800.

⁴⁶ See for example, Mark A. Schuster, et al., "A National Survey of Stress Reactions after the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks," *New England Journal of Medicine*, Vol. 345, No. 20 (2001), pp. 1507-1512; Alice F. Healy, et. al, "Terrorism after 9/11: Reactions to Simulated News Reports," *The American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 122, No. 2 (2009), pp. 153-165.

⁴⁷ Bruce Hoffman, "Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism since 9/11," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 25, No. 5 (2002), pp. 313-314.

⁴⁸ Heather S. Gregg, "Fighting Cosmic Warriors: Lessons from the First Seven Years of the Global War on Terror," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2009), pp. 188-208.

⁴⁹ Boaz Ganor writes "Modern terrorism is essentially indiscriminate. The identities of the victims are irrelevant to the perpetrators, so long as they belong to a group singled out for attack, and the attack conveys the intended message to the target population." Ganor adds, "...modern terrorism aims to inflict the greatest possible number of casualties and damage. The goal is to undermine the government, to spread panic and anxiety among the targeted population and demoralize the public." Boaz Ganor "Terrorism as a Strategy of Psychological Warfare," *Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma*, Vol. 9, No. 1-2 (2004), p. 34.

⁵⁰ Christopher Allen, "Justifying Islamophobia: a Post-9/11 Consideration of the European Union and British Contexts," *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, Vol. 21, No. 3

(2004), pp. 1-25; Thomas Olesen, “Transnational Injustice Symbols and Communities: The Case of al-Qaeda and the Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp,” *Current Sociology*, Vol. 59, No. 6 (2011), pp. 717-734 Göran Larsson, “The Impact of Global Conflicts on Local Contexts: Muslims in Sweden after 9/11—the Rise of Islamophobia, or New Possibilities?,” *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2005), pp. 29-42.

⁵¹ For example, ISIL’s presence in northeast Syria assisted it in the battle for Mosul, as the fighters could traverse across the border.

⁵² Robin Wright, “Imagining a remapped Middle East,” *New York Times*, Sept. 8, 2013. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/opinion/sunday/imagining-a-remapped-middle-east.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

⁵³ Martin Kobler, the UN’s envoy to Iraq noted that a main cause for the increase in sectarianism in Iraq was “a perception of “marginalization” by Sunnis in the region.” Edith M. Lederer, “UN envoy: Iraq and Syrian conflicts are merging,” *Associated Press*, Jul. 16, 2013. Available at, <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/un-envoy-iraq-and-syrian-conflicts-are-merging>.

⁵⁴ George W. Bush, ‘President discusses the future of Iraq at the American Enterprise Institute’, 26 Feb. 2003. Available at <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226-11.html>.

⁵⁵ Philippe Le Billon, “Corruption, Reconstruction and Oil Governance in Iraq, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4-5 (2005), pp. 685-703; Robert E. Looney, “Reconstruction and Peacebuilding under Extreme Adversity: The Problem of Pervasive Corruption in Iraq,”

International Peacekeeping, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2008), pp. 424-440; Phil Williams, "Organized Crime and Corruption in Iraq," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2009), pp. 115-135.

⁵⁶ Wolfram Lacher, "Iraq: Exception to, or Epitome of Contemporary Post-conflict Reconstruction?," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2007), pp. 242-243.

⁵⁷ Nora Bensahel notes that the US operated on two assumptions in respect to Iraq's reconstruction. First that Iraqis would welcomed US troops as liberators and nit occupiers and therefore helped the US in its mission. Second that the ministries were relatively efficient and only needed a replacement at the upper echelons, meaning that the US would only need to assist functioning ministries for a short while, the reconstruction would only be a minor task for incoming forces. On the face of it, these were not unreasonable assumptions to make, or at least they were no less reasonable than any other set of assumptions that senior US policymakers might have held. Nora Bensahel, "Mission not Accomplished: What went Wrong with Iraqi Reconstruction," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2006), pp. 453-460.

⁵⁸ In the December 15, 2005 elections for the National Assembly more than 12 million Iraqis voted. The largest group was the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), a Shi'a based coalition secured 70 of the 81 district seats. The two Kurdish lists (one of whom was secular and the other Islamic) together won all 35 seats in Kurdistan. The Sunni lists won 15 of the 17 seats in the predominantly Sunni Anbar and Salah al-Din provinces. A. I. Dawisha, Larry Jay Diamond, "Iraq's Year of Voting Dangerously," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2006), pp. 99-100.

⁵⁹ For an insightful albeit partisan view of Maliki from someone that had known him and had campaign from him in 2006, only to argue against Maliki's alleviation see, Ali Khedery, "Why

we are stuck with Maliki – and lots Iraq,” *Washington Post*, Jul. 3, 2014. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-we-stuck-with-maliki--and-lost-iraq/2014/07/03/0dd6a8a4-f7ec-11e3-a606-946fd632f9f1_story.html?hpid=z3

⁶⁰ Ali Khedery, “Why we are stuck with Maliki – and lots Iraq,” *Washington Post*, Jul. 3, 2014. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-we-stuck-with-maliki--and-lost-iraq/2014/07/03/0dd6a8a4-f7ec-11e3-a606-946fd632f9f1_story.html?hpid=z3.

⁶¹ Toby Dodge writes “From 2007, Maliki set about circumventing the military's chain of command, appointing senior generals for their loyalty to him – not their skill or influence over their men. He then set about purging Iraq's intelligence services of those who were not aligned to his party. The result is an army with little information, no esprit de corps, run by political appointees who fled the battlefield in Mosul leaving their men to fend for themselves.” Toby Dodge, “PM who Led the Isis fightback to Blame for Extremists' Rise,” *Guardian*, Jun. 21, 2014. Available at <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/22/nouri-al-maliki-iraq-isis>. Toby Dodge, “State and Society in Iraq Ten Years after Regime Change: The Rise of New Authoritarianism,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 2 (2013), p. 244.

⁶² The success against al-Sadr created the perception that Maliki was a strong, secular nationalist, and not merely a representative of the Shi'a community. Adeed Dawisha, “Iraq: A Vote against Sectarianism,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 21, No. 3, (2010), pp. 28-29.

⁶³ Myriam Benraad, “Iraq's Tribal “Sahwa”: Its Rise and Fall,” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2011), pp. 121-131.

⁶⁴ Joost Hiltermann, the International Crisis Group's deputy program director for the Middle East, noted "Maliki is very reliant on Iran for his power and Iran is backing Syria all the way. The Iranians and the Syrians were all critical to bringing him to power a year ago and keeping him in power so he finds himself in a difficult position." Michael E. Schmidt, "Iraqi leader backs Syria, with a nudge from Iran," *New York Times*, Aug. 12, 2011. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/world/middleeast/13iraq.html>.

⁶⁵ In April 2013 Iraqi security forces shot countless Sunni protesters dead at a peaceful sit-in in the city of Hawija. Tim Arango, "Rising Violence in Iraq Spurs Fears of New Sectarian War," *New York Times*, Apr. 24, 2013. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/world/middleeast/with-air-attacks-sectarian-strife-intensifies-in-iraq.html>. Fawaz Gerges, "Al-Maliki's divisive leadership has opened a window for al-Qaida in Iraq," *Guardian*, Jan. 8, 2014. Available at <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/08/almaliki-divisive-leadership-window-alqaida-iraq>

⁶⁶ Irene Costantini concludes, "Instead of grounding these relations in the principles of sustainability and equity, the reforms implemented in Iraq have unleashed dynamics prone to social, political, and economic instability." Irene Costantini, "Statebuilding and Foreign Direct Investment: The Case of Post-2003 Iraq," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2013), p. 276, p. 267.

⁶⁷ Toby Lodge, “Back to the Future: The Failure to Reform the Post-war Political Economy,” Mats Berdal, Dominik Zaum (ed.), *Political Economy of Statebuilding: Power after Peace*, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p. 197.

⁶⁸ Robert E. Looney, “Reconstruction and Peacebuilding under Extreme Adversity: The Problem of Pervasive Corruption in Iraq,” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2008), p. 427.

⁶⁹ Noman Benotman and Roisin Blake, “Jabhat al-Nusra: Strategic Briefing,” *Quilliam Foundation*, [undated]. Available at <http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/jabhat-al-nusra-a-strategic-briefing.pdf>.

⁷⁰ Patrick Cockburn, “Who are Isis? The rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant,” *The Independent*, Jun, 16, 2014. Available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/who-are-isis-the-rise-of-the-islamic-state-in-iraq-and-the-levant-9541421.html>; Suhaib Anjarini, “The Evolution of ISIS,” *Al-Monitor*, 2013. Available at <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/security/2013/11/syria-islamic-state-iraq-sham-growth.html#>.

⁷¹ Nelly Lahoud and Muhammad al-`Ubayd, “The War of Jihadists against Jihadists in Syria,” *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (March 2014), p. 2.

⁷² Nibras Kazimi, “A Virulent Ideology in Mutation: Zarqawi Upstages Maqdisi,” *Current Trends in Islamist ideology*, Vol. 2 (2005), p. 60.

⁷³ George Michael “The Legend and Legacy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” *Defence Studies*, Vol., 7, No. 3 (2007), p. 338. In developing this section, I drew on the following sources, Loretta Napoleoni, *Insurgent Iraq: Al Zarqawi and the new generation*. (New York: Seven Stories Press,

2005); Jean-Charles Brisard, and Damien Martinez. *Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda*. (Cambridge: Polity, 2005); Brynjar Lia, *Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri*, (London: Hurst, 2007).

⁷⁴ “How did it come to this?” *The Economist*, Jun. 21, 2014. Available at <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21604627-crisis-iraq-has-roots-going-far-back-history-recently-foolly>.

⁷⁵ The interesting thing about Roy’s concept is his emphasis on what Muslims say about the Qur’an and the way they interpret the Qur’an as opposed to what the Qur’an states. Oliver Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

⁷⁶ Richard Barrett for example argues that the Syrian war is a sectarian war, serving as the center of gravity for those wanting to defend Sunni Islam and create a Sunni Islamic State. Richard Barrett, “Foreign Fighters in Syria,” *The Soufan Group*, June 2014. Available at <http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf>.

⁷⁷ Richard Barrett, a former counter-terrorism chief at MI6, helps to explain the attraction of men such as al Baghdadi in comparison to Zawahiri who has for over a decade “has been holed up in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area and hasn’t really done very much more than issue a few statements and videos, ... Whereas Baghdadi has done an amazing amount – he has captured cities, he has mobilised huge amounts of people, he is killing ruthlessly throughout Iraq and Syria.” Barrett adds, “If you were a guy who wanted action, you would go with Baghdadi.” “ISIL chief poised to become world’s most influential militant?” *The National*, Jun. 5 2014.

Available at <http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/isil-chief-poised-to-become-worlds-most-influential-militant>.

⁷⁸ Ayman al-Zawahiri, "Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi," (2005). Available at <http://triceratops.brynmawr.edu:8080/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/4798/ZAW20050709.pdf?sequence=3>.

⁷⁹ One could argue that Core Al-Qaeda opposed his indiscriminate violence most as it believed that it alienated potential recruits, which in effect meant that it was Core Al-Qaeda and not Zarqawi that changes the message. In other words, Zarqawi was motivated by a Core Al-Qaeda initial aim and method of causing pervasive insecurity to create categorizing of them and us, and also to create insecurity so as to encourage or even demand social group identity as a way to attain both individual and group security. The criticism itself seems somewhat odd, considering how Core Al Qaeda began is in relation to violence and suicide attacks.

⁸⁰ George Mitchell used Zarqawi's infamous beheading of Nicholas Berg, a young American businessman, as a defining moment as it not only underlined Zarqawi's commitment to lead from the front, but also to emphasis the commitment of the group to remove foreigners from Iraq. George Michael "The Legend and Legacy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi," *Defence Studies*, Vol., 7, No. 3 (2007), pp. 342-343.

⁸¹ George Michael for example notes that in 2005 the number of suicide attacks rose to 411 from 133 the year before, with the majority of the attacks being carried out by foreign fighters. Notably, what also heightened Zarqawi's appeal was that he used family members to commit such as attacks, with his father-in-law reportedly carrying out the infamous attack on the Imam

Ali Mosque in which almost 100 people died and which arguably served as the catalyst for the intensification of sectarian violence in Iraq. George Michael, "The Legend and Legacy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi," *Defence Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2007), p. 343, p. 346.

⁸² Peter Bergen is undoubtedly correct when he claims that the US invasion of Iraq "fulfilled Osama Bin Laden's wildest dreams.", confirming his claim that the "crusaders" were determined to exploit the resources of Iraq, a Muslim county located in the Arabian Peninsula. c/f, George Michael "The Legend and Legacy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi," *Defence Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2007), p. 341.

⁸³ See for example, "Storming are more painful: a speech by Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, Official Spokesman for the Islamic State of Iraq," *Fursan Al-Balagh Media*, November 2012. Available at <http://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/shaykh-abc5ab-mue1b8a5ammad-al-adnc481nc4ab-22the-incursions-are-deadlier22-en.pdf>

⁸⁴ Thanassis Cambanis, "The surprising appeal of ISIS," *Boston Globe*, Jun. 29, 2014. Available at <http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/06/28/the-surprising-appeal-isis/19YwC0GVPQ3i4eBXt1o0hI/story.html>,

⁸⁵ Thanassis Cambanis, "The surprising appeal of ISIS," *Boston Globe*, Jun. 29, 2014. Available at <http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/06/28/the-surprising-appeal-isis/19YwC0GVPQ3i4eBXt1o0hI/story.html>; Ceylan Yeginsu, "ISIS draws a steady stream of recruits from Turkey," *New York Times*, Sept. 15, 2014. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/world/europe/turkey-is-a-steady-source-of-isis-recruits.html>.

⁸⁶ Emily Hunt, “Zarqawi's 'Total War' on Iraqi Shiites Exposes a Divide among Sunni Jihadists,” *The Washington Near East Institute*, Policy #149, Nov. 15, 2005. Available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/zarqawis-total-war-on-iraqi-shiites-exposes-a-divide-among-sunni-jihadists>.

⁸⁷ Steven Brooks, “The Preacher and the Jihadi,” *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, Vol. 3 (2006), p. 62. This relates to the idea of provocation in that Zarqawi, like bin Laden, wanted to underline that his action against the Shi’a stems from the need to defend Sunnis.

⁸⁸ James D. Fearon, “Iraq's Civil War,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 2 (2007), pp. 2-15; Michael J. Boyle, “Bargaining, Fear, and Denial: Explaining Violence against Civilians in Iraq 2004–2007,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2009), pp. 261-287; Myriam Benraad, “Iraq's Tribal “Sahwa”: Its Rise and Fall.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2011), pp. 121-131.

⁸⁹ Bill Chappell, “ISIS Declares Caliphate As Iraq Fights To Retake Tikrit,” *NPR*, Jun. 30, 2014. Available at <http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/06/30/326905464/isis-declares-caliphate-as-iraq-fights-to-retake-tikrit>.

⁹⁰ This section is developed from a host of general news report and other studies including, Daniel Milton, Bryan Price and Muhammad al-`Ubaydi, “The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant: More than Just a June Surprise,” *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 7, No. 6 (2014), pp. 1-5; Alex Bilger, “ISIS Annual Reports Reveal A Metrics-Driven Military Command,” Institute for the Study of War, May 22, 2014. Available at http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISWBackgrounder_ISIS_Annual_Reports_0

.pdf; Scott Helfstein, Nassir Abdullah and Muhammad al-Obaidi, *Deadly Vanguard: A Study of al-Qa'ida's Violence against Muslims*, (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2009). Available at https://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/deadly-vanguards_complete_1.pdf at.

⁹¹ It is believed that the capture of Mosul netted ISIS around \$1.5 billion. Martin Chulov, "How an arrest in Iraq revealed ISIS's \$2bn jihadist network," *Guardian*, Jun 15, 2014. Available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/15/iraq-isis-arrest-jihadists-wealth-power>. For a similar story, but this time about Core Al-Qaeda see, Allan Cullison, "Inside Al-Qaeda's Hard Drive," *The Atlantic*, Sep. 1, 2004. Available at <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/09/inside-al-qaeda-s-hard-drive/303428/>

⁹² Martin Kobler, the UN envoy to Iraq informed the Security Council in 2013 "Iraq is the fault line between the Shia and the Sunni world and everything which happens in Syria, of course, has repercussions on the political landscape in Iraq." Edith M. Lederer, "UN envoy: Iraq and Syrian conflicts are merging," *Associated Press*, Jul. 16, 2013. Available at, <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/un-envoy-iraq-and-syrian-conflicts-are-merging>.

⁹³ Jennifer Gordon warns against accepting the claim that Sykes-Picot imposed an artificial demarcation, noting that for many years prior to 1916 Syria and Iraq were distinct entities. Jennifer Thea Gordon, "ISIS' desire to erase Sykes-Picot is rooted in fiction, not history," *The National Interest*, Sept. 17, 2014. Available at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/isis%E2%80%99-desire-erase-sykes-picot-rooted-fiction-not-history-11293>.

⁹⁴ Robin Wright points out for example, “Over time, Iraq’s Sunni minority — notably in western Anbar Province, site of anti-government protests — may feel more commonality with eastern Syria’s Sunni majority. Tribal ties and smuggling span the border. Together, they could form a de facto or formal Sunnistan.” Robin Wright, “Imagining a remapped Middle East,” *New York Times*, Sept. 8, 2013. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/opinion/sunday/imagining-a-remapped-middle-east.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

⁹⁵ Terrence McCoy, “How ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became the world's most powerful jihadist leader: How ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became the world's most powerful jihadist leader,” *The Washington Post*, Jun 13, 2014. Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/06/11/how-isis-leader-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-became-the-worlds-most-powerful-jihadi-leader/>; Richard Spencer, “Iraq crisis: What is ISIS?,” *Telegraph*, Jun. 11, 2014. Available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10891387/Iraq-crisis-what-is-ISIS.html>.

⁹⁶ Reports suggest that when he meets prisoners he wear a mask. Patrick Cockburn, “Mosul: Who is the ISIS jihadi leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi?,” *The Independent*, Jun. 10, 2014. Available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/mosul-emergency-who-is-abu-bakr-albaghdadi-9523070.html>.

⁹⁷ Mushreq Abbas, “ISIS leader al-Baghdadi proves formidable enemy,” *al-Monitor*, Feb. 5, 2014 (translated by Rani Geha). Available at <http://www.al->

monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/02/iraq-isis-baghdadi-mystery.html#; Peter Beaumont, "Iraq: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: Low-profile leader with violent reputation," *Guardian*, Jun, 13, 2014, p. 7.

⁹⁸ Alisa J. Rubin and Rod Nordland, "As Sunnis Die in Iraq, A Cycle is Restarting," *New York Times*, Jun. 17, 2014. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/world/middleeast/sectarian-violence-appears-to-spread-to-streets-of-baghdad.html?_r=0.

⁹⁹ Joby Warrick, "ISIS, with gains in Iraq, closes in on founder Zarqawi's violent vision," *The Washington Post*, Jun. 14, 2014. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/isiss-gains-in-iraq-fulfill-founders-violent-vision/2014/06/14/921ff6d2-f3b5-11e3-914c-1fbd0614e2d4_story.html.

¹⁰⁰ Greg Miller points to a U.S. official with access to classified intelligence assessments who has pointed out that "Small groups from a number of al-Qaeda affiliates have defected to ISIS," adding "And this problem will probably become more acute as ISIS continues to rack up victories." Greg Miller, "Fighters abandoning al-Qaeda affiliates to join Islamic State, U.S. officials say," *Washington Post*, Aug. 9, 2014. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fighters-abandoning-al-qaeda-affiliates-to-join-islamic-state-us-officials-say/2014/08/09/c5321d10-1f08-11e4-ae54-0cfe1f974f8a_story.html.

¹⁰¹ A notably element in the recruitment of foreigners is the high number of young girls and women, who for some reason seems attracted to the ISIL message. Reportedly, women and girls

seem to make up approximately 10% of those leaving Europe, North America and Australia to join such groups as ISIL. Harriet Sherwood et. al. "Schoolgirl jihadis: the female Islamists leaving home to join Isis fighters," *Guardian*, Sept. 29, 2014. Available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/29/schoolgirl-jihadis-female-islamists-leaving-home-join-isis-iraq-syria>.

¹⁰² Patrick Cockburn, "Isis leader preaches holy war: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi puts persecution of Shias at heart of his ideology ahead of push on Baghdad," *Daily Telegraph*, Jul. 7, 2014. Available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-leader-preaches-holy-war-abu-bakr-albaghdadi-puts-persecution-of-shias-at-heart-of-his-ideology-ahead-of-push-on-baghdad-9590571.html>.

¹⁰³ In the first three months of 2014, British authorities have arrested more than 40 individuals connected with Syria. Moreover, the British contingent in Syria seems to have established in December 2013 a media outlet, *Rayat al-Tawid* to help propagate their message. Raffaello Pantucci, "The British Foreign Fighter Contingent in Syria," *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 7, No. 5 (May 2014), pp. 17-21.

¹⁰⁴ Juha Saarinen, "The Finnish Foreign Fighter Contingent in Syria," *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (May 2014), pp. 6-10.

¹⁰⁵ Fernando Reinares and Carola García-Calvo, "The Spanish Foreign Fighter Contingent in Syria," *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January 2014), pp. 12-14.

¹⁰⁶ Andrew Zammit, "Tracking Australian Foreign Fighters in Syria," *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 6, No. 11-12 (November 2013), pp. 5-8.

¹⁰⁷ Zelin writes that as late March 2014, approximately 1200 Saudi nationals have travelled to participate in the conflict in Syria with around 300 dying between 2011 and February 2014. Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Saudi Foreign Fighter Presence in Syria,” *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (April 2014), pp. 10-14.

¹⁰⁸ “ISIL chief poised to become world’s most influential militant?” *The National*, Jun. 5 2014. Available at <http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/isil-chief-poised-to-become-worlds-most-influential-militant>.

¹⁰⁹ ISIL according to some reports provides its fighters with \$150 a day. Ceylan Yeginsu, “ISIS draws a steady stream of recruits from Turkey,” *New York Times*, Sept. 15, 2014. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/world/europe/turkey-is-a-steady-source-of-isis-recruits.html>.

¹¹⁰ Ceylan Yeginsu, “ISIS draws a steady stream of recruits from Turkey,” *New York Times*, Sept. 15, 2014. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/world/europe/turkey-is-a-steady-source-of-isis-recruits.html>.

¹¹¹ It is claimed for example that by 2009 Maliki was using the Obama administration decision to withdraw from Iraq as an opportunity to engage “in a systematic campaign to destroy the Iraqi state and replace it with his private office and his political party.” Ali Khedery, “Why we are stuck with Maliki – and lots Iraq,” *Washington Post*, Jul. 3, 2014. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-we-stuck-with-maliki--and-lost-iraq/2014/07/03/Odd6a8a4-f7ec-11e3-a606-946fd632f9f1_story.html?hpid=z3.

¹¹² Martin Chulov, “New alliances bring old enemies together as ISIS advances in Iraq,” *Guardian*, Jun. 29, 2014. Available at, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/29/iraq-isis-new-alliances-old-enemies-advance>.

¹¹³ Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon identified six key steps to help end the conflict in Syria: ending the violence, which necessitates the imposition an arms embargo; protection of people, including the possibility of proscriptive measures against those that prevent the distribution of humanitarian aid; initiating dialogue, with regional actors playing a key role in the process; demanding accountability for crimes; completing the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons; and, addressing regional issues including foreign fighters and sectarian competition. Ban Ki-moon, “Six steps to peace in Syria,” *Guardian*, Jun. 26, 2014. Available at <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/26/six-steps-to-peace-syria-united-nations-ban-ki-moon>.

¹¹⁴ Zaid Al-Ali, a former legal adviser to the UN on reform in Iraq, writes that it is up to tribal forces who has a vested interest in defeating ISIS. Zaid Al-Ali, “Iraq is too broken for Obama’s advisers but tribal fighters can put back pieces,” *Guardian*, Jun. 27, 2014. Available at <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/27/iraq-obama-advisers-tribal-fighters>.

¹¹⁵ For the clearest articulation of Tilly’s war made the state and the state made war in a non-European context see, T.V. Paul, *The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).