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INTRODUCTION

Political Resilience to Terrorism in Europe: Introduction to the Special Issue

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The idea of "resilience" features in many counterterrorism strategies that have been written in recent years and it is a term that has been employed by political leaders in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. After the Boston Marathon bombing attack in May 2013, Boston has been repeatedly hailed as a resilient city that was not only well prepared to face the attack but that also gained new strength from it.[1] Resilience is commonly seen as something inherently positive, something to strive for. The British CONTEST strategy envisions a resilient society as being "able to recover from shocks and to maintain essential services"[2]; it will facilitate an efficient crisis response, which in turn "will save lives, reduce harm and aid recovery." It has even been claimed that "the R-word provides a conceptual framework for designing a better tomorrow"[3] and that the way it is discussed makes it look like the superhero of our times.[4]

The popularity of the concept in policymaking and the social sciences leaves little room for doubt that something in the term makes it attractive for describing some existing or desired qualities of communities and infrastructure. A much more complicated question, however, is what resilience actually means (let alone how it can be measured). What makes the definition issue all the more complicated is that the term itself has shown some remarkable flexibility: while its origins can be traced to the field of ecology, it has been adopted by various other disciplines. It is quite a recent arrival in the political science field and academic theorizing and debate about its definition has only started within the last few years.[5]

In the field of international relations, political science, and security studies, it is possible to identify two broad lines of theorizing about resilience. The first line of theorizing approaches *resilience as discourse*. It focuses on how resilience has been constructed in the public debate, how it links to other issues such as security, governance and risk, and what kind of (links between) temporalities and subjects it creates. A large part of these studies derive from the tradition of critical (security) studies. The "resilience turn" has been interpreted as indicative of changes in how risks are perceived and managed and how deeply they are connected with changes in techniques of government. Its connections with neoliberal forms of governance in particular have been explored.[6]

The second line of theorizing approaches *resilience as concept*, which can be used in scientific research. It aims to develop its conceptual and theoretical bases in more detail, finding

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ways to measure resilience and improve our understanding of what makes societies, systems, and/or individuals resilient.[7] While some studies seem to accept the prevailing discourses and claims about resilience quite uncritically, there are also those that attempt to distance themselves from the public debate and treat resilience as a neutral concept.

While this special issue has contributions that represent both lines of theorizing, the discussion in this introduction mainly follows the second line. Like Sandra Walklate et al., we also believe that "resilience needs to be broken down" if we want it to have any explanatory power as a concept.[8] The focus of this special issue is on *political* resilience. While several other aspects of resilience, such as resilience of infrastructure or resilience of (local) communities, have received a disproportionately large amount of attention in research and policy documents, political resilience has remained largely unaddressed.

This introduction to the special issue is dedicated to discussing resilience and political resilience as a concept. We will start by shortly summarizing how the term "political resilience" has been used in previous literature and then move on to outline how we see the concept and why we think it would be a useful tool for understanding the political effects of terrorism (threat) and counterterrorist action. Along the way, we will also discuss how the individual contributions in the issue are tied to the question of political resilience. We should point out already that we have not required the individual contributors to follow our conceptualization, rather we have encouraged them to provide contrasting and complementing interpretations of politics and resilience.

Political Resilience in Previous Literature

Perhaps the most common way to understand resilience is to see it as the ability of a system to "bounce back" after disruption. This everyday understanding on the concept is closely aligned with the etymology of the word resilience: the concept is derived from the word *resile*, which was drawn from the Latin verb *resilire*, meaning "to jump back, recoil."

Political resilience, in those rare cases when it has been used in the previous literature, is often understood in these terms. It has typically been used to refer to the staying power of a particular government, ruling elite or the stability of a political system in the face of challenges.[9] For example, in her study on the agrarian elite in a Philippine province, Leonora C. Angeles defines political resilience as "the concurrent abilities of landed oligarchs to change political circumstances and adapt to changing situations by modifying, altering, or replacing existing strategies. It also refers to a capacity for employing new strategies of political entrepreneurship in order to re-enter the political scene after a period of hibernation or electoral failure."[10] Reuven Gal, when separating it from social resilience, associates political resilience with government stability and public support.[11] Sometimes the concept of state resilience is also used, meaning the ability of a polity to maintain political order and avoid large-scale violence,[12] or more generally used as a synonym for political stability and the peaceful management of conflict.[13]

The concept of political resilience has rarely been employed explicitly in relation to terrorism and counterterrorism. The only elaborated use of the term we have come across is by Clark McCauley, who uses the term quite differently from the previously mentioned authors. To him, political resilience essentially means "citizens who have heard and understood what every terrorism expert has agreed: the next big terrorist attack in the United States is a question of when, not if."[14] Accepting the inevitability of attacks means that every new attack

does not give rise to strong reactions, costly investigations, new security measures, pressure to play the blame game, and eventually lead to giving the attackers the sense of power they long for.

The aforementioned texts are exceptional in the sense that they include an explicit definition of political resilience. In most cases we are aware of, the words "political resilience" are only mentioned in passing and rarely employ any significant role in the conceptual framework of the author.

How should we then define political resilience? A simple solution would be to combine the "bounce-back" meaning of resilience with an understanding of "political" as the political system. According to this, political resilience would be understood as the ability of the political system to recover from disturbances. Although this would agree with some of the earlier uses of the term in the literature, we do not find this solution satisfactory because it is unnecessarily simplistic and does not resonate well with the recent debate about resilience in political science and IR, or the social sciences more generally. Neither does it reflect the multiple ways in which "political" is understood in the field of political science. In the following, we explain our line of reasoning and propose an alternative way to understand the term.

Key Questions in Conceptualizing Resilience

The history and meanings of resilience in different disciplines has been covered extensively in several previous contributions,[15] so there is no need to go into it in detail here. It is sufficient to say that it originates from the field of natural sciences and has since spread to the field of social sciences, including criminology, psychology, and urban geography.

Even though resilience has proven to be a remarkably flexible concept, it is still possible to identify some key questions that are central to how it has been conceptualized. The first deals with how the *system and its recovery from disturbance* are imagined. In this context, regarding how resilience has been imagined, it is typical to refer to three broad traditions.[16]

The first of these, engineering resilience, starts by imagining a system in a state of equilibrium and focuses on how quickly it returns to this state in the wake of a disturbance. A resilient system, when confronted with a disturbance that destabilizes, will return to its original shape after a given amount of time. The traditional idea of "bouncing back" in its most simple form follows this logic. Ecological resilience is also based on the idea of equilibrium, but it "rejects the existence of a single, stable equilibrium, and instead acknowledges the existence of multiple equilibria and the possibility of systems to flip into alternative stability domains."[17] While engineering resilience focuses on the time it takes for the system to recover, ecological resilience is interested in the magnitude of disturbance that a system can deal with before switching to another equilibrium. In a sense, these two conceptions of resilience focus on different aspects of stability— engineering resilience on maintaining the efficiency of function and ecological resilience on maintaining the existence of function.[18]

While resilience is often imagined along these lines in policy papers and debates, as well as research, defining resilience like this is not without its problems in the field of social sciences. The social and political worlds are not as mechanistic and deterministic as these models suggest, and as Simin Davoudi argues, these equilibristic views of resilience emphasise "the return to 'normal' without questioning what normality entails."[19] Conceptualizing resilience like this easily leads to thinking that resilience is something inherently good and disturbance is something bad. This leap does not seem warranted in the social sciences as not all social

structures and policies are necessarily worth preserving, and returning to "normal" does not always equal resilience.

A third alternative way to conceptualize resilience that departs considerably from the previous two is called social–ecological or evolutionary resilience. It imagines the world as "chaotic, complex, uncertain and unpredictable" and systems as "complex, non-linear and self-organising."[20] Resilience refers to the capability of systems to "change, adapt, and, crucially, transform in response to stresses and strains."[21] There is no "normal state," neither any stable state of equilibrium. Rather, there is a constantly evolving complex process which is just as much about stability as it is about adaptation and transformation. This line of thinking also includes the idea that the "disturbance" is not necessarily sudden and exogenous, neither is the relationship between cause and effect necessarily proportional or linear. The systems also sometimes change as a result of endogenous and slowly developing strains.

This way of conceptualizing resilience comes closest to how it has been conceptualized in political science and IR. It is less problematic for the social sciences than the first two because it is more open to accepting that disturbance and change are not negative but rather a permanent feature of all systems.[22] For example, Bourbeau defines resilience "as the process of patterned adjustments adopted by a society or an individual in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks"[23] and sees resilience, or resiliencism, as "a conceptual framework for understanding how continuity and transformation take place."[24] In this case, resilience is decidedly not about returning to a previous equilibrium or creating a new one, and it is not anchored to a concept of "normality." Rather, it is a dynamic and complex process of adaptation and transformation. Bourbeau further distinguishes three types of resilience according to what the adjustment entails: resilience as maintenance, resilience as change at the margins and resilience as renewal.[25] Bourbeau's take on resilience outlines our general approach to the concept.

The second key question regarding resilience deals with its *normativity*. As mentioned before, resilience is widely seen as something good. It may be that of all the individual characteristics attached to resilience, this is the one with the strongest consensus. While this view is perhaps understandable when it is expressed in a political context, it is a difficult starting point for academic conceptualization and it can easily lead to a situation that is very similar to the terrorism versus freedom fighter problem. As has been widely pointed out, the thing that makes terrorism difficult to define is its negative connotation: finding a consensus on the definition and how it is applied becomes extremely difficult because actors have differing opinions on what kinds of attacks and campaigns should be condemned.[26]

Researchers differ in how they have dealt with the normative connotations of the term. Some researchers simply accept that resilience is something positive,[27] while others find such a value-loaded term more problematic. Bourbeau, who represents the latter point of view, has pointed out that, in societal terms, resilience can also have its dark side: sometimes it can stand in the way of positive changes. Therefore, Bourbeau proposes that the understanding of resilience should be left normatively open and the research should explore cases in which resilience can be seen as negative or positive.[28] Similarly, for Zolli and Healy, there is no underlying expectancy on the good or bad quality of maintaining integrity.

Conceptualizing resilience along the lines we have outlined above leaves us with the question of how to determine what kind of continuity and transformation can be seen as a sign of resilience. We think the concept of resilience is left without any specific meaning if this question is not answered because it would then be reduced to a very general term referring

to continuity and transformation. It makes sense to look broadly into the dynamics of transformation and continuity in the social and political world when discussing resilience, but we feel that the concept of resilience is more useful if a more specific meaning is applied to it. Regardless of whether one considers resilience as a normative concept or not, the core of the concept is always the idea of persistence. Without anchoring the concept by defining "what is persisting," the concept makes little sense to us, but ways of "anchoring" the concept have rarely been discussed explicitly in political science or IR literature.

Related to this question, we think it would be constructive to avoid seeing resilience as a monolithic concept. In the field of social–ecological resilience, some researchers have talked about *general and specified resilience*. In the case of specified resilience, the focus is on "problems relating to particular aspects of a system that might arise from a particular set of sources or shocks."[29] In other words, resilience is further defined by answers to the questions "of what" and "to what." General resilience, on the other hand, refers to resilience to all kinds of shocks. While some authors warn about the danger of losing touch with the big picture when focusing on specified resilience, we still think that advancing the social scientific conceptualization requires that we acknowledge that there are several types or dimensions of resilience and that we explore them in more detail. One such way has been provided by Walklate et al., who have developed a typology based on different levels: individual, familial, communal, institutional, national, regional, and global.[30] These levels are, in other words, specific systems that are related to each other but have different qualities and priorities when it comes to surviving shocks.

Moreover, as, for example, Philippe Bourbeau points out, resilience is not an either–or question; rather it is always a *matter of degree*. No system is immune to crises and recovery is hardly ever perfect, but some aspects of the system may be more fragile than others. Neither does a society's resilience to one adversity mean that it is generally resilient to all other adversities. Even resilience to terrorism can be dependent on the type of terrorism, as the terrorist attack in Madrid 2004 demonstrated: people appeared to be mentally more prepared for terrorist acts perpetrated by the Basque group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) than they were for Islamist terrorism, and the origin of the perpetrators of the atrocity played a big role the in the ensuing social and political repercussions.[31]

This means that measures taken to improve resilience in one area, or level, may weaken it in others. For example, in response to the threat of home-grown Islamist terrorism, security systems have been developed, critical infrastructure has been built and "communities at risk" have been targeted with social programs, but while this can increase resilience in some respects, those very same measures may single out religious groups and draw lines between "good" and "bad" Islam, which can in the end lead to the fragmentation of society and decreased social cohesion.[32]

Another aspect in need of further definition concerns the *moment* of resilience—is it before, during, or after the "disturbance"? In some discussions, for instance in disaster studies, resilience is usually associated with the aftermath of a disturbance, that is, how well a city or country is able to recover from the shock. Others, in, for example, organization studies, see resilience as a more permanent feature of an organization (i.e., how it monitors its environment and is able to "negotiate flux without succumbing to it").[33] In this case we follow Boin et al. and Bourbeau and adopt a wide definition of resilience in terms of its temporal element, including the whole timeline from preparing to possible future disturbance to the aftermath of an already-manifested disturbance. This is not least because, as, for

example, Cavelty et al. have argued, one specific feature of the concept of resilience is that it connects different temporalities.[34]

Another important point raised by Bourbeau is that "disturbance" is a matter of interpretation in the social world. Different conceptualizations of resilience employ a somewhat different terminology to describe the intervening factor or process challenging the prevailing state of affairs. For instance Zolli and Healy use the term when referring to "the capacity of a system, enterprise or person to maintain its core purpose and integrity in the face of dramatically changed circumstances," whereas Boin et al. have defined resilience more specifically as the "capacity of a social system (organisation, city, society etc.) to proactively adapt to and recover from disturbances that are perceived within the system to fall outside the range of normal and expected disturbances."

Death, injuries, and destruction are all "real," but the events that cause them do not acquire their meaning automatically. From a constructivist point of view, "endogenous or exogenous shocks rarely speak for themselves"[35] and only become significant after they have been interpreted as serious challenges. On the other hand, it could be seen that systems are not challenged in the same way by adversities that only affect some individuals or groups in the society compared to crises that are interpreted as relevant and having an impact on the entire society or community.

With regards to the specific viewpoint of this special issue, another question of interpretation is whether or not an incident is perceived as terrorism. A lot has been written about the changing definitions and perceptions of terrorism, and it seems that the propensity to construct violent attacks as terrorism depends on the context. A good example of changing perceptions is the phenomenon constructed under another buzzword, "lone-wolf terrorism"—while attacks committed by lone actors are nowadays considered the number one terrorist threat, a couple of decades ago terrorism was by definition perceived as a group phenomenon.[36] Furthermore, some governments have been more inclined to employ the "t-word" than others. One example of a reluctant country is Finland, as discussed by Leena Malkki in her article in this issue.

Resilience and Politics

Drawing a connection between resilience and politics is hardly a new idea. Building resilience is by no means a simple win–win project, and as Dadoudi points out, while it might be possible to say that there are no rewards or punishments in nature—only consequences—this is not the case in social and political life. There are always costs, side effects, winners and losers, and the costs and benefits are not automatically divided equally.[37] Therefore, analyzing the politics of resilience should play a central role in social scientific research on resilience. The politics of resilience has been the focus of a growing number of studies and the first broad line of resilience research, resilience as discourse, deals intimately with these questions.

Although other articles in this issue also deal with the politics of resilience, we have something a little different in mind when we speak of the concept of political resilience: we mean the resilience of political life, in this case to terrorism. Our understanding builds on the previous discussion on the term resilience and it also answers the question: the resilience of what? In other words, for us, *political resilience means the way that continuity and*

transformation take place in the face of (specific) endogenous or exogenous shocks in all aspects of political life.

As "political life" is still a very vague concept, there needs to be further elaboration on what it entails. Just as political life has many dimensions, so does political resilience.

One dimension of political resilience deals with the resilience of *political actors* and refers to the staying power of individual politicians or political parties. This aspect manifests itself strongly after major terrorist attacks as they often have a direct effect on the popular support of the ruling parties and political leaders. The so-called rally-round-the-flag effect, which means that support for political leaders rises temporarily in the aftermath of a national crisis, is often seen after major terrorist attacks, and they can also contribute to changes in government.[38] The case of Spain after the Madrid attacks in 2004 is an example of this. As Teemu Sinkkonen argues in his article in this issue, the way that the political leaders decided to handle the crisis was a reason for the consequent electoral defeat of the ruling party. His article deals more generally with how political leaders can influence the political effects of terrorist attacks by comparing the Madrid case to the aftermath of the attacks in Norway in 2011. Other questions related to this dimension of political resilience deal more broadly with the influence of terrorism on electoral results, cabinet duration and formation. These questions have been explored in numerous previous studies, albeit overwhelmingly without explicit reference to (political) resilience.[39]

Political resilience can also be understood as the resilience of *the political system*, which refers to "the mechanisms of government and institutions of the state, but also the structures and processes through which these interact with the larger society."[40] The most dramatic effect of terrorism on a political system can be a revolution, although this has been very rare. Terrorist attacks, and attempts to prevent them, can have more subtle effects on the power relations between different institutions and may affect the stability of the political system.

Alternatively, and more fundamentally, political resilience can also be interpreted as the resilience of the *underlying values and norms* of political life, or the *social contract* between the state and its citizens. This interpretation of resilience comes closest to the definitions of resilience in other fields of study which talk about facing and adapting to the disturbance without losing the core identities and purpose of the system. This kind of understanding of political resilience has actually been suggested by Jeroen Warner:

> Terms and flexibility of the "social contract" influence whether or not a perceived crisis situation is declared a national security issue, a local security issue or none at all—in other words, what is considered "normal" and what is "exceptional." If the social contract survives, this attests to what may be called the "political resilience" of a social system … after a shock. If not, regime instability ensues … that may tip into revolution or authoritarianism.[41]

The underlying values and norms of political life are discussed in Phil Edwards's article in this issue. He writes about the PREVENT strategy in the United Kingdom, arguing that the vulnerability of contemporary British society to disruption is exemplified by the ways in which PREVENT frames terrorism in fundamentally ideological terms. The article by Charlotte Heath-Kelly also deal with this aspect of political resilience by looking at the aftermath of the July 2011 attacks in Norway. Literature that analyzes the effects of counterterrorism policies on civil liberties often touches on issues that are relevant in this context.

The above dimensions of political resilience relate to the definition of politics as an arena or location in which politicians act and policies are made. Another approach to politics is to

see it as a process: in this case politics is not seen as a sphere but rather an activity. From this perspective, political resilience also includes continuity and transformation in what is considered to be the realm of politics and the political arena.

We use conceptualization developed by Kari Palonen to map this aspect of politics. He has conceptualized politics as activity through two pairs of concepts: polity–politicization and policy–politicking. The first pair concerns the realm of politics. In his terminology, polity refers to "a temporalized space that has been politicised and commonly accepted as political, and that demarcates activity from that which is not accepted as political."[42] Politicization is the process by which something becomes named as political and thus part of polity. The dynamics of these processes are discussed by Javier Argomaniz and Peter Lehr in this issue with regard to the development of the European common policy on aviation security.

Furthermore, the concept of politicization also includes all controversies related to this process. Especially considering the topic of this particular special issue, this aspect should also include securitization. As Waever and Buzan claim, when an issue is securitized, politics are taken "beyond the established rules of the game and the issue is framed either as a special kind of politics or as above politics."[43]

Even though Palonen does not discuss it explicitly in his conceptualization, it is also logical to include depolitizisation, and the process by which something is excluded from the realm of politics should be seen as one aspect of these processes. This seems particularly relevant in the light of claims made by Mathieu Deflem, among others, about the increased role of "bureaucraticized" police in countering terrorism. Part of this argument is that when counterterrorism is (partly) delegated to bureaucraticized police organizations, terrorism becomes depoliticized and treated as a crime. This depoliticization has facilitated cooperation between states that do not agree on normative and political issues.[44]

The other pair of concepts, policy and politicking, describes another dimension of politics as an activity. Policy refers to "a complex inclusion and coordination of measures into a project unified with a name."[45] It also entails a decision regarding which of the possible futures should be realized. For Palonen, politicking means performatives through which politics are conducted. In politicking, the aims of policies "serve as instruments in the struggle for power."[46] It is not only the content of politicking that matters, it is just as much a question of style. In the context of counterterrorism, we can see that many countries, including Finland, have started to draft national counterterrorism policies for the first time. The counterterrorism policy development in Finland is analyzed in this issue by Leena Malkki. The threat of terrorism may also have affected the anatomy of policies in other areas such as immigration and integration policies. The term politicking is helpful, for example, in analyzing how political leaders have governed terrorism crises and with what kind of results. This aspect of the political is further discussed in Sinkkonen's contribution to this issue.

The aforementioned dimensions of political resilience certainly do not provide a comprehensive list of all the possible angles on the issue, but they will hopefully provide some ideas and a way forward with regard to thinking about these dimensions of resilience. The articles in this issue provide further theoretical and empirical elaborations on various aspects of political resilience. They originate from presentations held in a seminar that was organized by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in November 2013.

Why Political Resilience?

Having dedicated several pages to conceptual debate, it is legitimate to ask why such a concept as political resilience is needed in the first place. At the beginning of the article, we connected our endeavor to the need to break the concept of resilience down into smaller elements as a step toward more sophisticated theorizing about resilience. While there has been more theorizing on some other aspects of resilience, political resilience has so far been left conceptually almost untouched.

More specifically related to resilience to terrorism, we think that the concept offers us a good window to think about the effects (and threat) of terrorism and counterterrorist measures in political life in Europe. These topics are not new for research, although it can be argued that the consequences of counterterrorism is an understudied topic. [47] It caught our attention that the studies that address these aspects are currently not very well linked with the debate on resilience, but conceptualizing political dimensions of resilience can make these aspects of resilience more visible.

We also think that addressing the impact of terrorism and counterterrorism on political life through the prism of political resilience provides us with a potentially more holistic perspective than addressing the issue within the "consequences" frame. It not only includes the consequences of individual attacks or 3explicit counterterrorist policies but also more generally how the entire spectrum of terrorism-related actions, from early prevention to dealing with the aftermath of attacks, influences political life. It can also provide us with a framework for thinking about how counterterrorism, and more generally attempts to increase resilience to terrorism, really helps to protect the "values of our democratic societies and … the rights and freedoms of our citizens,"[48] which terrorism is often perceived to threaten.

Notes

1. See, for example, Judith Rodin, "The Boston Marathon Bombing: How the City Coped with its Deadly Terror Attack," *The Guardian*, 12 January 2015.
2. "CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism." Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97995/strategy-contest.pdf (Accessed date 17 September 2013).
3. New America Foundation "Defining Resilience." Available at http://www.newamerica.net/events/2012/defining_resilience. Cited in Sandra Walklate, Ross McGarry, and Gabe Mythen, "Searching for Resilience: A Conceptual Excavation," *Armed Forces & Society* 40(3) (2014), p. 410.
4. Myrian Dunn Cavelty, Mareile Kaufmann, and Kristian Søby Kristensen, "Resilience and (In)security: Practices, Subjects, Temporalities," *Security Dialogue* 46(1) (2015), pp. 3–4.
5. For example, Philippe Bourbeau, "Resiliencism: Premises and Promises in Securitisation Research," *Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses* 1(1) (2013), pp. 3–17.
6. For example, Jonathan Joseph, "Resilience as Embedded Form of Neoliberalism: A Governmentality Approach, *Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses* 1(1) (2013).
7. For example, Richard J. Chasdi, "A Continuum of Nation-State Resiliency to Watershed Terrorist Events," *Armed Forces and Society* 40(3) (2014); Reuven Gal, "Social Resilience in Times of Protracted Crises: An Israeli Case Study," *Armed Forces and Society* 40(3) (2014); Louise K. Comfort, Arjen Boin, and Chris C. Demchak, eds., *Designing Resilience: Preparing for Extreme Events* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010).
8. Walklate et al., "Searching for Resilience," p. 412.
9. For example, Xie Yue, "Collective Actions and the Continuation of Political Resilience: An Explanation of the Languishing Political Transition in China," *Modern China Studies* 21(1) (2014);

Leonora C. Angeles, "The Political Dimension in the Agrarian Question: Strategies of Resilience and Political Entrepreneurship of Agrarian Elite Families in a Philippine Province," *Rural Sociology* 64(4) (1999); Mark Harrison, "The Soviet Union After 1945: Economic Recovery and Political Repression," *Past and Present* 210(6) (2011).

10. Angeles, "The Political Dimension in the Agrarian Question," pp. 669–670.
11. Gal, "Social Resilience in Times of Protracted Crises," p. 456.
12. See, for example, Jonathan DiJohn "State Resilience Against All Odds: An Analytical Narrative on the Construction and Maintenance of Political Order in Zambia Since 1960," 2010. Available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28393/1/WP75.2.pdf (Accessed 26 February 2015).
13. Stephan Lindemann and James Putzel, "State Resilience in Tanzania: Draft Analytical Narrative." Available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/seminars/PutzelLindemannTanzaniaApr30.pdf (Accessed 25 February 2015).
14. Clark McCauley, "Discussion Point: Introducing 'Political Resilience.'" Available at http://www.start.umd.edu/news/discussion-point-introducing-political-resilience (Accessed 7 November 2014).
15. Carl Folke, "Resilience: The Emergence of a Perspective for Social-Ecological Systems Analyses," *Global Environmental Change* 16(3) (2006), pp. 253–267; Fridolin S. Brand and Kurt Jax, "Focusing the Meaning(s) of Resilience: Resilience as a Descriptive Concept and a Boundary Object," *Ecology and Society* 12(1) (2007); Arjen Boin, Louise K. Comfort, and Chris C. Demchak, "The Rise of Resilience," and Mark de Bruijne, Arjen Boin, and Michel van Eeten, "Resilience: Exploring the Concept and Its Meanings," in Comfort et al., eds., *Designing Resilience*; Bourbeau, "Resiliencism."
16. The description of different lines is based mainly on Simin Davoudi, "Resilience: A Bridging Concept of a Dead End?," *Planning Theory & Practice* 13(2) (2012). Also, the following contributions were particularly helpful: Bourbeau, "Resiliencism" and Brand and Jax, "Focusing the Meaning(s) of Resilience."
17. Davoudi, "Resilience: A Bridging Concept of a Dead End?," pp. 300–301. See also Brian Walker and Jacqueline A. Meyers, "Tresholds in Ecological and Social-Ecological Systems: A Developing Database," *Ecology and Society* 9(2) (2004).
18. Lance Gunderson, C. S. Holling, L. Pritchard, and G. D. Peterson, "Resilience," in Harold A. Mooney and Josep G. Canadell, eds., *Encyclopedia of Global Environmental Change*, vol. 2 The Earth System: Biological and Ecological Dimensions of Global Environmental Change (SCOPE, 2002), pp. 530–531.
19. Davoudi, "Resilience: A Bridging Concept of a Dead End?," p. 302.
20. Ibid. See also Carl Folke, Stephen R. Carpenter, Brian Walker, Marten Scheffer, Terry Chaplin, and Johan Rockström, "Resilience Thinking: Integrating Resilience, Adaptability and Transformability," *Ecology and Society* 15(4) (2010).
21. Davoudi, "Resilience: A Bridging Concept of a Dead End?," p. 302.
22. It should be added here that despite this, the theoretization of adaptability, transformation, and stability within social–ecological resilience has not been widely adopted in the social sciences. Some authors argue that this meaning of resilience has been "lost" in translation into the social sciences (e.g., Walklate et al., "Searching for Resilience," p. 419). Even though many authors indeed share many of the key premises of social–ecological resilience and are aware of the existence of this tradition, when situating themselves to earlier treatises of resilience, the reference point and object of criticism appears to be more often rather engineering and ecological resilience.
23. Bourbeau, "Resiliencism," p. 10.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., p. 12. See also Bruijne et al., "Resilience: Exploring the Concept and Its Meanings," pp. 26–30.
26. Similarly, Håkan Wiberg has written about security: "At least one thing about security seems to be agreed on by most authors—it is something good. In other words, the very term 'security' is value-loaded. And precisely for this reason much less agreement exists on what clear meaning to attach to that word." Håkan Wiberg, "The Security of Small Nations: Challenges and Defences," *Journal of Peace Research* 24(4) (1987), p. 340.
27. Such as Boin et al., "The Rise of Resilience."

28. Bourbeau, "Resiliencism," pp. 8–9.
29. Folke et al., "Resilience Thinking."
30. Walklate et al., "Searching for Resilience."
31. For example, Jose Olmeda, "Fear or Falsehood? Framing the 3/11 Terrorist Attacks in Madrid and Electoral Accountability," *Real Instituto Elcano Working Paper* 24 (2005); Teemu Sinkkonen, *Political Responses to Terrorism: Case Study on the Madrid Terrorist Attack on March 11, 2004, and Its Aftermath* (Tampere: Tampere University Press, 2009).
32. Social cohesion reflects normally divisions based on social class and economic position, but it can also be used when referring to similar divisions based on ethnic distinctions. Sometimes concept *community cohesion* is used when referring more specifically to ethnic divisions, but in this text there is no need to make a distinction between these two types of cohesion. About the terminology see, for example, Ted Cantle, *Community Cohesion: A New Framework for Race and Diversity* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 54–55; Charles Husband and Yunis Alam, *Social Cohesion and Counter-Terrorism: A Policy Contradiction?* (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2011), pp. 19–23. Criticism toward counterterrorism strategies and marginalization, for example, Anne Aly, "The Policy Response to Home-Grown Terrorism: Reconceptualising Prevent and Resilience as Collective Resistance," *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 8(1) (2013), pp. 2–18.
33. Arjen Boin, Louise K. Comfort, and Chris C. Demchak, "The Rise of Resilience," in Louise K. Comfort, Arjen Boin, and Chris C. Demchak, eds., *Designing Resilience: Preparing for Extreme Events* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), pp. 7–8.
34. Cavelty et al., "Resilience and (In)security."
35. Bourbeau, "Resiliencism," p. 11.
36. See, for example, Jeffrey Kaplan, Heléne Lööw, and Leena Malkki, "Introduction to the Special Issue on Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26(1) (2014).
37. Davoudi, "Resilience: A Bridging Concept of a Dead End?," p. 306.
38. On the dynamics of social responses to terrorist attacks, see Sinkkonen, *Political Responses to Terrorism*.
39. For example, Indridi H. Indridason, "Does Terrorism Influence Domestic Politics? Coalition Formation and Terrorist Incidents," *Journal of Peace Research* 45(2) (2008); Laron K. Williams, Michael T. Koch, and Jason M. Smith, "The Political Consequences of Terrorism: Terror Events, Casualties and Government Duration," *International Studies Perspectives* 14 (2013); Martin Gassebner, Richard Jong-A-Pin, and Jochen O. Mierau, "Terrorism and Cabinet Duration," *International Economic Review* 52(4) (2011).
40. Andrew Heywood, *Politics* (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 266.
41. Jeroen Warner, "The Politics of 'Catastrophization,'" in Dorothea Hilhorst, ed., *Disaster, Conflict and Society in Crises. Everyday Politics of Crisis Response* (Routledge, 2013), p. 86. The concept of social contract is also used in Dirk Haubrich, "The Social Contract and the Three Types of Terrorism: Democratic Society in the United Kingdom After 9/11 and 7/7," in Martha Crenshaw (ed.), *Consequences of Counterterrorism* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2009).
42. Kari Palonen, "Four Times of Politics: Policy, Polity, Politicking, and Politicization," *Alternatives* 28 (2003), p. 179.
43. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 23.
44. See, for example, Mathieu Deflem, "International Police Cooperation Against Terrorism: Interpol and Europol in Comparison," Huseyin Durmaz et al., eds., *Understanding and Responding to Terrorism* (IOS Press, 2007).
45. Palonen, "Four Times of Politics," p. 175.
46. Ibid., p. 178.
47. Martha Crenshaw, "Introduction," in Martha Crenshaw (ed.), *The Consequences of Counterterrorism*, p. 1.
48. European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 14469/4/05 REV 04 (2005), p. 6.