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Endgames: Improving Our Understanding of Homegrown Terrorism

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This article examines how the phenomenon of homegrown terrorism has evolved over the past decade. It argues that there have been significant developments that impact how we conceptualize and study it and offers two suggestions moving forward. It argues that re-branding it Islamist-inspired homegrown terrorism (IIHGT) better captures the nuances of this phenomenon and that sub-dividing it by “endgame,” the action the radicalized individual pursues creates the opportunity for a more robust analysis and provides a better way to compare incidents and identify traits that our current efforts overlook. Focusing on the action component may also provide a new way to investigate radicalization as the different endgames represent an escalation in violence, suggesting different degrees of radicalization might also be present.

This article examines our conceptions of homegrown terrorism (HGT) and asks whether it accurately reflects the phenomenon first identified approximately ten years ago. It argues there have been significant developments since that time and it is therefore incumbent on scholars to re-visit these ideas. In an effort to further investigate, stimulate new discussions and improve our understanding of HGT we must revisit issues identified by Sam Mullins, who in 2007 highlighted theoretical challenges in defining this term. It also addresses more recent assertions from individuals such as Thomas Hegghammer that the term is “fuzzy” at best.¹

This article offers some preliminary thoughts on this challenge and suggests a theoretical reset, a reflection of how we have understood this phenomenon to date and how we might improve or refine our knowledge today. It will do this from two general perspectives. The first targets HGT as “what it is,” how we understand it and its place more broadly in the field of terrorism studies. The second focuses on how “we understand it” and argues that a reset will enable a better analytic framework. It is important we avoid stagnation and recognize that as terrorism evolves we must be open to shifting our focus if it offers greater potential to capture and explain the phenomenon.

The first section investigates what we currently know about the term HGT. It examines the roots of the term, the rationale for its definition and conceptualization at that time, and why it has become increasingly problematic. First, the majority of our

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definitions overlap with our conceptions of domestic terrorism and can also include elements we associate with international terrorism as well. Recent events such as those taken by Dylann Roof in Charleston, North Carolina and numbers recently released in a recent Canadian Senate report remind us that domestic terrorism remains a reality that must be clearly differentiated from HGT.² Second, the HGT phenomenon has increased significantly suggesting it will remain a concern for the foreseeable future. We can also no longer deny that it is directly inspired by an Islamist ideology which has existed for a long time and has been adopted by *jihadi* groups including Al Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The West needs to accept that beneath the violence exists a larger social movement that transcends these groups and will continue long after they have been defeated. There will likely be others who assume the mantle moving forward suggesting that this phenomenon is a generational one. Ensuring our definitions and conceptualizations are accurate allows us to meet the challenges it poses. The section closes by suggesting that a more appropriate way to define and conceptualize HGT is to re-brand it Islamist-inspired homegrown terrorism (IIHGT).

In the second section, the article refines and operationalizes the phenomenon of IIHGT. It briefly investigates how we have thus far studied HGT and argues that these efforts, which focused on degrees of belonging/autonomy or on the geographical location of an individual's radicalization, are no longer adequate. IIHGT has evolved and it no longer simply describes radicalized Westerners attacking their own states but now manifests itself in many different ways. To this end, the article introduces the concept of "endgames," arguing we can improve our efforts to analyze IIHGT by investigating what action the radicalized individual takes pursuant to their newfound ideology. This approach separates ideas of cognitive radicalization (the thought component) from behavioral radicalization (the action component) while simultaneously integrating these components in a novel way helping create a fuller picture of the phenomenon. In addition, dividing homegrown terrorism into categories will more accurately capture the nuances refining our knowledge and creating the conditions for a more manageable analysis. This article hypothesizes that there are multiple possible "endgames" that might arise from an individual's radicalization. Investigating this observation offers a new approach to better understand IIHGT and should apply to radicalization studies as well.

The third section ties together the previous two sections and introduces a new approach based on the refined conceptualization from the first section and the discussion from section two. IIHGT should no longer be viewed as a monolithic phenomenon but an umbrella under which several different variants might exist. It will introduce this typology and identify these categories as "support or facilitative" IIHGT, "foreign fighter" IIHGT, and "domestic" IIHGT. This represents a stark departure from current methodological efforts. Our current efforts lump these categories together, skewing details or observations which might emerge from compartmentalizing and studying them independently. This section closes by addressing an issue which will no doubt emerge in the near future: questions surrounding how we categorize or understand foreign fighters who return home following involvement in conflicts abroad.

The fourth section introduces additional research applications that arise from this new conceptualization of IIHGT. It argues that insights may emerge that we can apply to better understand radicalization and the radicalization process. It asks whether these different types of IIHGT represent different degrees of radicalization. The shortcomings that arise from our current efforts to understand radicalization is that they neglect to investigate the outcome of that radicalization. Too much emphasis has been placed on cognitive radicalization (the thought component) which downplays or neglects to account for the

behavioral radicalization (the action component). It might also allow us to investigate whether there is any link between the different types and whether progression or regression can occur.

Defining Homegrown Terrorism

Crone and Harrow are generally credited with identifying the academic origins of the term “homegrown” following the 2005 7/7 attack in London. This early definition continues to serve as the basis for many of our definitions today and focuses on two points. First, it involves individuals plotting or perpetrating attacks who were born and raised in the West or have a strong attachment to the West. Second, these individuals (or groups) are acting on their own behalf and not taking orders from a group abroad.³ These core ideas are also found in more recent definitions. For example, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman describe “home-grown” individuals as those who “either spent a significant portion of their formative years in the West, or their radicalization bears a significant connection to the West.”⁴ For Tomas Precht, homegrown terrorism is defined as “acts of violence against targets primarily, but not always, in Western countries in which the terrorists themselves have been born or raised.”⁵ From an American perspective, Jerome Bjelopera argues that “homegrown is a term that describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents or visitors largely radicalized within the United States.”⁶ Echoing Bjelopera, Peter Nesser studies homegrown terrorism perpetrated by individuals “born and raised in Europe.”⁷

Governments and their agencies have also wrestled with how to best understand homegrown terrorism. Over the past several years, the European Union has evolved its understanding of this phenomenon. Examining annual terrorist reports indicates a shift in their conceptualization. In 2009, reports focused on the general threat posed by Islamist terrorism, which it defines as “terrorism perpetrated by individuals, groups, networks or organizations which evoke a certain interpretation of Islam to justify their action.”⁸ By 2011, reports identified a growing distinction between international Islamist terrorism and terrorist groups, and “something else,” suggesting that the threat was “increasingly likely to originate from self radicalized individuals who may not necessarily be linked to al-Qaida senior leadership.”⁹ In 2013, the annual report mentions the term “homegrown terrorist groups” for the first time, but does not elaborate or provide a clear definition.¹⁰

In Canada, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) uses the term *homegrown extremism*, defined as “the indoctrination and radicalization of individuals into the ideology espoused and propagated by al-Qaida.”¹¹ CSIS further acknowledges that one of the main catalysts is “the adoption of significant grievances against Western governments, their societies and way of life, as well as the conviction that the Muslim world is under attack and needs defending through the use of violence.”¹² This is not a definition of homegrown terrorism *per se*; it focuses less on actual outcomes and instead places the emphasis on indoctrination by Al Qaeda. Similarly, Australia has yet to provide a definition for homegrown terrorism, instead relying on its current definition of terrorism and adding that it recognizes “a number of Australians are known to subscribe to violent *jihadist* messages, and some are radicalized to a point of being willing to engage in violence to advance their political aims.”¹³

The similarities found among these definitions concern individuals born and raised, or who have been in Western states for an extended period of time and who are not acting

on behalf of a foreign group abroad. The focus also increasingly emphasizes the location where these individuals were radicalized or adopted this Islamist ideology.

It is, however, important to acknowledge that as far back as 2007, Sam Mullins was questioning the basis on which the majority of our current definitions would come to be based. For him, homegrown Islamist terrorism as a term “seem[ed] to be largely taken for granted as being self-evident without being specifically defined,” with usage focused on “where perpetrators are from and whether they receive international organisational support.”¹⁴ His definition at that time focused on those who: were born and/or spent most of their lives in the West; were radicalized within their Western home countries; have trained and achieved attack-capability in their Western home countries; have planned/carried out attacks in their Western home countries; and are lacking direct foreign (non-Western) international support or control.¹⁵ This was a fairly accurate representation for that time period, considering the types of attacks and disrupted plots from this time such as Madrid 2004, London 2005, and disrupted plots in Sydney and Melbourne 2005 and Toronto 2006.

However, homegrown terrorism has changed and taken on additional observable actions or endgames. To adapt Mullins’s original definition, one might say: individuals born and raised or who have spent most of their lives in the West, radicalized in the West (Mullins’s original contribution) *but* who now in addition to conducting attacks in their states may go abroad to fight in *jihadist* hotspots or may also be acting in nonviolent support capacities in their Western home countries. Based on our current legal definitions, providing material support to terrorism is akin to violent terrorist acts.

This article takes Mullins’s closing remarks to heart, which emphasizes that it may not be prudent to think of this as a homogenous phenomenon, but instead a continuum encompassing a whole spectrum of realities.

Islamist terrorism is a diverse and dynamic phenomenon. Researchers must remain sensitive to change and development but also continuity in order to be able to accurately capture and understand the progression of its various manifestations.¹⁶

Recently, homegrown terrorism has no longer been limited to individuals radicalized in the West and plotting or attacking their own states. Instead, these radicalized individuals are increasingly pursuing other courses of action. Some still choose to pursue plots or attacks against their home state. However, others provide support, post materials and propaganda, and travel abroad to *jihadist* hotspots to pursue terrorism against foreign targets and join *jihadist* groups like ISIS. Accepting this reality creates a potential problem in how we understand, define, and conceptualize homegrown terrorism.

As currently defined, homegrown terrorism straddles a fine line between our conceptions of domestic terrorism and international terrorism and in some cases, simultaneously demonstrates characteristics of both depending on those aspects one chooses to emphasize. We must not forget that until mid-2005 the United States reserved the term homegrown terrorism for domestic organizations including antigovernment militias, White supremacists, and eco-terrorists. The United States did this purposefully to distinguish them from *jihadist* terrorist networks because the *jihadist* cause was always perceived to be foreign.¹⁷ Today, the term homegrown is more regularly being applied to individuals inspired by the global *jihadist* narrative, but the term does not indicate that many individuals radicalized in the West travel abroad for the action component. This prevents us from constructing a stand-alone definition for homegrown terrorism based on Islamist

motivations. Homegrown is simply understood as radicalization of individuals in the West but can also refer to what we understand as domestic terrorism. In a recent report Jerome Bjelopera defined domestic terrorists in the United States as “people who commit crimes within the homeland and draw inspiration from US based extremist ideologies and movements.”¹⁸ This follows the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)’s definition of domestic terrorism: “Americans attacking Americans based on U.S.-based extremist ideologies.”¹⁹ Wilkinson suggests that domestic—or what he termed “internal”—terrorism was characterized as terrorist attacks occurring within one state or province, and that this description was used to specifically differentiate it from international terrorism because it had a domestic agenda, not an international one.²⁰ Conversely, terrorism is considered to be international when: more than one country is involved in the attack, including if the nationality of the perpetrator is different from the nationality of the victims; an attack is also international if the terrorists are outside their national boundaries, or if terrorists of different nationalities act together.²¹

The type of “homegrown” terrorism that has preoccupied Western states more recently muddies this distinction. The plots and attacks against Western states are being perpetrated by citizens or long-standing residents of those very same countries, but the motivation for these attacks is international. The current wave of so-called homegrown terrorism and radicalization is being driven by the global *jihadi* narrative and its motivations stem from an international Islamist ideology attributed generally to Al Qaeda’s motivations and grievances articulated in the late 1990s and early 2000s,²² and continued today by groups including AQAP and ISIS. Therefore this type of “homegrown” incident implies that individuals of a country are carrying out attacks in that country *with* an international agenda. However, investigation also uncovers other examples that are designated as “homegrown” terrorism, where individuals have been crossing borders, or assisting foreign groups across borders.

When compared with current definitions, this description does not fit. This is because the language involved in defining homegrown terrorism outlined in legislation such as *The Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act 2007* also applies to domestic terrorists:

the use, planned use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a large group or individual born, raised, or operating primarily within the United States . . . to intimidate or coerce the United States government, the civilian population of the United States, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.²³

In essence, there is little offered here that allows a clear distinction to be made between domestic terrorists, acting on behalf of a domestic ideology, and “domestic” individuals acting on behalf of an international motivation such as the global *jihadi* narrative. Rick Nelson and Ben Bodurian in their report examining homegrown extremism go another step backward with their definition: “extremist violence perpetrated by US legal residents and citizens,”²⁴ which seems to be the very definition of domestic terrorism.

Now compare these to the definition of a homegrown violent extremist offered by the Department of Homeland Security:

a person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically motivated terrorist activities (including providing

support for terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization.²⁵

This definition addresses some earlier concerns but downplays the truly unique aspect of this current “homegrown” terrorism. Individuals are more often than not born and raised, or have lived extensively, in the country that they attack. The citizenship aspect is an important component of the phenomenon and the term “operated primarily” fails to clearly identify and separate an individual’s radicalization from their planning, or from the actual execution of an attack. This places it at odds with many definitions in the literature which offer as their primary feature the fact that the radicalization occurred in the Western state in question. One advantage however is that the Department of Homeland Security’s definition does highlight that the motivation is based on objectives promoted by a foreign group.

The fact that none of these definitions clearly capture this phenomenon coupled with the presence of multiple definitions creates confusion and ambiguity. Consider the following: In August 2010, Misbahuddin Ahmed, Hiva Alizadeh, and Khurram Sher, were arrested and accused of planning a terrorist attack in Canada. During a search of an Ottawa residence, police seized more than 50 electronic circuit boards that were to be used to develop remote detonators as well as terrorist literature, videos and manuals and plans, materials, and a list of potential targets.²⁶ The target list is alleged to have included the Parliament buildings and Montreal subway system. Authorities were fairly certain that Alizadeh was in contact with someone in Afghanistan but could not confirm whether this contact was anything more than superficial (not directly tied to a specific terrorist group). This included suspicions that the group was also attempting to provide support to Afghani groups and assist their efforts to attack troops and targets overseas as well.²⁷ Based on this account the group meets the definition of homegrown but appears to have simultaneously had both domestic intentions and international aspirations as well, making it possible to categorize it as international terrorism. Similar incidents also add to the confusion.²⁸

To alleviate this ambiguity, this article suggests re-branding homegrown terrorism by adding “Islamist-inspired” thus creating the concept of IIHGT. Recognizing that the primary driver behind this type of terrorism is the global *jihadi* narrative allows us to clearly differentiate between homegrown extremists who are born and raised and act based on a domestic motivation and those who are homegrown, used in the context of individuals born and raised or long-time residents who act motivated by an international ideology. An investigation of Islamist-inspired terrorist plots or attacks has yet to identify incidents where individuals targeting Western governments were doing so in an effort to affect any significant domestic changes or concessions.²⁹ This provides a solid first step clarifying what this phenomenon represents. It conveys the homegrown aspect—individuals born and raised or longstanding residents—but further communicates that the motivation is an Islamist-inspired one, not a domestic one, nor one limited to any one specific Western state. It is therefore possible to keep definitions of domestic terrorism and international terrorism narrow (as narrow as the field itself can succeed), intact and compartmentalized by introducing this IIHGT category, which allows us to account for the unique characteristics this terrorism demonstrates.

Moreover, as the phenomenon of IIHGT has evolved, the manner by which we analyze it must change as well. The next section addresses this point in greater detail and argues that examining IIHGT by endgame offers some potentially interesting opportunities.

Challenges Studying Homegrown Terrorism

Clarifying the definitional issue highlights a second challenge. We have not kept pace with how the phenomenon has evolved and the developments that have occurred, specifically the fact that we now observe multiple endgames or actions radicalized individuals might pursue. Our current approaches to studying IHHGT are narrow in that they emphasize the location where the individuals involved were radicalized, and to a lesser degree measures of “belonging” or “autonomy.”³⁰ Considering that the majority of definitions center on the fact that IHHGT is perpetrated by individuals born and raised in the West or, individuals who have spent considerable time or their formative years in the West, scholars have focused their efforts on measuring this aspect. Crone and Harrow were among the first to emphasize ideas of “belonging,” the degree to which an individual belongs or is integrated into their society, and “autonomy,” the degree of connection an individual might have to an actual foreign group. Based on these two criteria, a matrix could be created and it would be possible to categorize individuals or groups as being closer to the definition of homegrown terrorism.³¹

As time has passed and IHHGT has continued to evolve, new methods must be investigated because ideas of belonging and autonomy are subjective and very difficult to measure, ensuring difficulties categorizing groups, individuals, or incidents based on these criteria. What exactly is meant by the term “belonging?” Nira Yuval-Davis discusses three separate levels on which belonging is constructed; the social location, the individual’s identification and emotional attachments to various collectivities and groupings, and the ethical and political value systems with which people judge their own and others’ belonging.³² Which of these would be the most appropriate to use as the basis for measuring belonging in the context of IHHGT? “Belonging” might also be different from state to state, thus making larger comparisons and categorizations difficult. Bloemraad points out that belonging has very different meanings in different states based on a state’s policies. One perspective will exist in a multicultural state, where group rights are protected and multiple identities are encouraged which might impede or impact belonging. A second perspective will exist in a state that pursues a more assimilationist policy, one where individual rights are important and one common identity is encouraged.³³

A further challenge in emphasizing belonging is whether we are referring to individuals who once belonged and then disassociated themselves from a society, or those who never felt any sense of belonging to begin with. Richard Parent and James Ellis in a report on radicalization suggest: “Homegrown terrorism covers both classic domestic terrorists and a more nebulous set of individuals that are newly arrived, or from the first, second, or even third generation of immigrants within a diaspora community.”³⁴ Again, if one focuses on the “newly arrived” aspect, a term used broadly and poorly explained, this might be more in line with radicalization having primarily occurred elsewhere, aligning it with our understandings of international terrorism. By suggesting that IHHGT has been attributed to individuals more recently arrived in Canada as well as second and third generation individuals they highlight a methodological challenge surrounding whether, or how well, these groups were integrated to begin with. Supposedly, at one point they were integrated but they “have become disenchanted with [Canadian] society”³⁵ Belonging becomes subjective in terms of how long one must have lived in a state before they can be said to identify and be a part of that society. This would be opposed to the idea that there are those who immigrate to states but continue to retain strong linkages to family in their countries of origin that “they still perceive their host country [Canada] as foreign.”³⁶ Michael Taarnby also recognized the challenges in categorizing different groups in a

society that might be susceptible to radicalization. He suggested that those who had newly arrived in the West, those who were second-generation immigrants, and those who converted to Islam would essentially all display different degrees of belonging or attachment.³⁷

The idea of citizenship also appears quite prominently in definitions of IIHGT. Definitions of citizenship are generally understood as helping us understand the extent people incorporate into a society.³⁸ Michael Genkin and Alexander Gutfraind suggest that IIHGT represents terrorist acts which are committed by “groups whose membership is composed entirely or predominantly of the native-born citizens of the country that is being attacked.”³⁹ The most pressing problem with this approach is that again, absent clarification, this is also representative of domestic terrorism. Second, like belonging, citizenship can be viewed differently. In liberal theories of citizenship it is viewed as the reciprocal relationship of rights and responsibilities between individuals and the state, or the social contract. Conversely, republican theories of citizenship believe the political community mediates between the individual citizen and the state, and loyalty to that political community, the nation, and its preservation and promotion are the primary duties of the citizen.⁴⁰

Rogers Brubaker argues for a distinction between citizenship in a nation-state and belonging to the nation-state. He argues that one can have formal state membership but this can be different from the substantive membership or citizen status—access to, enjoyment of the substantive rights of citizenship or about their substantive acceptance as full members of a “society,”⁴¹ being a member of the nation before a member of the state (assimilation). This poses the question whether social integration is more important than political or civic integration and how this might apply to our discussions here.

Belonging from an abstract perspective potentially creates problems. This, however, does not preclude us from taking a different approach to incorporate belonging into an analysis of IIHGT. Insofar as different “endgames” may also represent a greater commitment to the ideology itself, belonging, or lack thereof, may help us understand why some individuals choose one endgame over another. This will be examined further below and examines how individuals see themselves compared to other members of their society: a new twist on the “us versus them” dichotomy.

While belonging may still have something to contribute to this discussion, the same cannot be said for autonomy. Autonomy according to Crone and Harrow was about degrees of independence or connectedness of those perpetrating IIHGT and links to foreign terrorist groups abroad.⁴² This creates measurement problems, which would also require an in-depth analysis and discussion. What does connectedness imply? Is it corresponding or communicating with a foreign group? To what extent: Is one time sufficient or does it require multiple discussions? Over how long a time period would this correspondence need to occur? Do specific topics need to be covered during these discussions? Perhaps it refers specifically to individuals leaving a Western state and traveling to training camps abroad. This has been a point of contention as early as the first waves of what would today be understood as IIHGT. Analysis of the 2004 Madrid attack, the 2005 London 7/7 attack and disrupted plots in Sydney and Toronto reveals that there are conflicting accounts and conclusions regarding whether individuals responsible for those incidents were instructed, trained or provided with support from foreign groups, and to what degree.⁴³ In fact, studies done on these earlier incidents have concluded that very rarely did we see individuals who had been recruited, trained abroad and sent home specifically to carry out an attack.⁴⁴ Lorenzo Vidino suggested that it was possible to observe links to foreign groups based on whether members had any form of training. Analyzing case studies from this perspective revealed that groups existed along a continuum or spectrum: in

some cases, groups had obvious links and connections and in other cases it is clear that groups were completely autonomous. However, twelve of twenty-one groups analyzed by Vidino could not be placed in either category.⁴⁵

This measurement has become increasingly complicated as the War on Terror has dramatically affected terrorist groups' abilities to operate training camps and the likelihood individuals from Western states can attend these camps and return home undetected.⁴⁶ This sentiment has been echoed among *ihadists* who organize these training camps. They refer to "reduced opportunities," and the increased challenges and dangers as the War on Terror began and the United States and its allies actively began locating and destroying/disrupting these camps,⁴⁷ which previously operated unabated. Abu Masab al-Suri has stated "it is no longer possible for countries to open safe havens or camps for the Islamists and the *ihadis*." The result has been smaller camps in more remote places.⁴⁸

Whereas trips to terrorist camps seemingly lasted weeks if not months and multiple techniques were taught, in more recent times, it is increasingly difficult to say with any certainty what the quality or duration of these camps might be. Because of the strategy to disrupt these camps individuals attending them might actually receive a rudimentary and brief camp where they are unable to apply trial and error and might be forced to leave abruptly if the camp is detected. Increased use of drones for surveillance (and their ability to attack) has severely disrupted terrorist groups' ability to openly train operatives over an extended period of time. Whereas at one point practical training on bomb making would be one month plus the potential for an additional graduate course, in many instances it has been reduced to as little as five days.⁴⁹

We must also think about how we will measure autonomy in the long run when Western individuals fighting in conflict zones such as Syria and Iraq start returning home. Our earlier discussion identified there are varying degrees of autonomy, from directly trained and ordered, to trained and acting independently, to suggestive advice and financing. It becomes increasingly problematic to view these returning individuals as purely autonomous in any sense of the word because they would have been trained, directly or indirectly simply by observation, coupled with their hands-on experience. The fact that they are immersed in that environment subjects them to further radicalization, even if inadvertently, by those around them. Should individuals return home and conduct terrorist attacks it will be nearly impossible to determine their degree of autonomy, whether they are acting on their own volition or whether they were dispatched with "suggestions" or actual plots or plans. A suggestion on how we might start to categorize these individuals will be introduced in the third section.

Instead of simply looking at where an individual was radicalized or relying on subjective efforts to determine degrees of belonging to the country where they are located, or degrees of autonomy from foreign groups, a better approach would be to focus on the endgame: what an individual who is radicalized in the West does with this newfound ideology. This approach allows for the possibility that several different types of IIHGT can be identified. Refining the definition and creating separate subtypes of IIHGT based on endgame may result in a much clearer and concise understanding of what it is, and has the potential to provide newer and more robust approaches to analyzing and understanding it because it will take into account not only the thought component but the transition to action as well.

Different Subtypes of IIHGT

In this context, "endgame" refers to the course of action or behavioral radicalization an individual pursues once they have been radicalized and adopted aspects of the global

jihadist narrative. From here, three different types of IIHGT can be identified: “logistical/support” IIHGT, “foreign fighter” IIGHT, and “domestic” IIHGT. These categories represent ideal types and they must also be viewed as a snapshot of the IIHGT phenomenon at this current point in time. It is therefore entirely possible that these distinctions may change, whereby some become obsolete and others may need to be created as it evolves moving forward.

One additional thought emerges based on categorizing IIHGT in this manner. In addition to creating categories that will provide some clarity on this ever-evolving phenomenon, it potentially offers a new approach to understanding and studying issues related to radicalization. Each one of these types of IIHGT arguably represents an escalation in one’s dedication or commitment to the global *jihadist* narrative. Returning to earlier work in terrorism studies such as Moghahham’s staircase model and more general ideas about demonization and its role in facilitating moral disengagement, these discussions fit within these parameters and perhaps offer some new insight into the link between radicalization and IIHGT.

“Support” or “Logistical” IIHGT

This iteration applies to individuals in Western states who are radicalized and become involved in a supportive role. The supportive role may take many forms but the key is that it represents a nonviolent manifestation of their radicalization. For example, some activities that would fit in this category include individuals who post or upload material to the Internet, engage in discussions in online forums, serve a more traditional recruiting role, and who raise or solicit resources to further the cause. This type of IIHGT has become a greater concern of late as studies tracing *jihadists’* use of social media have revealed the existence of large numbers of what have been termed “disseminators.” These are individuals, often located in the West, who collect large amounts of data, posts, photos and tweets and flood social media. These individuals for the most part do not champion any one group but actively seek to sow the seeds of distrust and confrontation between the West and Islam in furtherance of the larger Islamist agenda.⁵⁰ These types of support would be akin to “providing material support,” which has also been identified by other authors as “actions unrelated to specific violent plots.”⁵¹ One of the challenges in identifying these individuals is that they are able to work and connect with others anonymously and they often use methods to disguise their IP addresses or operate multiple sites and accounts simultaneously.

Some examples illustrating this type of IIHGT include Canadians Said Namouth, arrested in 2007 and Tahawwur Rana, arrested in 2009. Born in Morocco, but a permanent Canadian resident since 2002, Namouth was accused of being involved with the Global Islamic Media Front, a group linked to Al Qaeda. Namouth was responsible for uploading and maintaining propaganda videos, and literature as well tools for recruitment.⁵² Rana arrived in Canada from Pakistan in 1997 and received Canadian citizenship in 2001. He later moved to the United States but retained a residence in Ottawa. He was arrested alongside U.S. citizen David Headley, also known as Daood Gialni, a childhood acquaintance from Pakistan, and accused of providing material support to the Pakistani terrorist group *Lashkar-e-taiba*. In 2013, Rana was found guilty of contributing resources toward a plot to bomb Jyllands-Postens in Denmark in retaliation for their publishing cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad and sentenced to 14 years in prison.⁵³ More recently Canada has identified Othman Ayed Hamden. Located in Northern British Columbia, it is

alleged he was connecting with and counseling individuals to commit terrorist acts.⁵⁴ It is still unknown the locations of those with whom he was speaking.

In 2004 Australian officials arrested Belal Khazaal. A dual Lebanese-Australian, Khazaal obtained Australian citizenship in 1986. He was charged with inciting others to commit *jihad* and publishing and posting a “do-it-yourself” terrorist manual. He had previously been convicted in 2003 by a court in Beirut in absentia for his role in helping fund a bombing campaign in Lebanon.⁵⁵

Some prominent cases from the United States include Wesam El-Hanafi and Sabiran Hasanoff’s efforts to provide material support to Al Qaeda in Yemen. Between 2007 and their arrest in 2010 they provided “financial support, equipment and technical support (computer related) to the group.”⁵⁶ Barry Bujol’s efforts to support AQAP led to his arrest in 2010 and he was charged with transferring money and other objects such as pre-paid phone cards.⁵⁷ In 2011 Hafiz, Izhar, and Irfan Khan were arrested and accused of providing support to the Pakistani Taliban.⁵⁸ Finally, Syaed Talha Ahsan from Britain was arrested in 2006, and charged with operating Azzam Publications, a series of websites that provided extensive material support to a variety of terrorist groups. He was extradited to the United States in 2011 and recently sent back to the United Kingdom in 2014.⁵⁹

“Foreign Fighting” IIHGT

The number of individuals born and raised in Western democratic states who have chosen to travel abroad and join foreign *jihadist* conflicts has been increasing at an alarming rate. While this is not a new phenomenon (previous destinations included individuals traveling to Somalia to fight with al-Shabaab), the current trend is travel to Syria and Iraq. There has been an increase in individuals from Western states now joining groups such as the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS or Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant [ISIL]) and Jabhat al-Nusra. In Canada, intelligence agencies estimate around 130 individuals⁶⁰ have left to fight abroad. The United States offers no concrete numbers but concedes that “dozens of their citizens” are fighting in places like Syria.⁶¹ European countries are not immune. Britain estimates 500 individuals have joined the ranks of ISIS,⁶² and in a recent interview, Peter Neumann suggests that this number is generally applicable to other European countries as well. His estimates suggest as many as 700 individuals from France, 400 individuals from Germany, 300 from Belgium, and approximately 50–100 individuals from each of the Scandinavian countries such as Denmark, Sweden, and Norway.⁶³ We are uncertain how up-to-date or accurate these estimates might be and that they may in fact be lower than actual figures.

This category of individuals would represent a second type of IIHGT where individuals are radicalized in their home state and then choose to travel abroad to fight in foreign *jihadist*-motivated conflicts. One point that might require further investigation is whether additional subtypes might exist within this type of IIHGT. This would hinge on whether individuals have traveled with the clear intention of committing terrorism or targeting civilians purposefully and those who join groups that could conceivably be deemed as insurgent groups. For example, there are dozens of armed groups operating in the Syrian theater and in the early months of the conflict many groups such as the Free Syrian Army were directly fighting and targeting Assad’s forces and supporters. Some such as Richard Barrett have identified these groups as “rebel groups” which are notably different from “extremist groups” including ISIS, who are less discriminating in their targets and whose motivation transcends the boundaries of Syria and the future of that state or government.⁶⁴ It is however also possible that this divide, especially more recently, is redundant

as the extremist groups such as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra have come to dominate the landscape which would result in one conceptualization of this type of IIHGT.⁶⁵

In addition to those who travel to join extremist groups fighting abroad, there are also numerous individuals who travel to directly participate in terror activities. In 2007, the international media reported that five Australians had been detained in Lebanon and accused of funneling weapons and plotting terrorist attacks. Two men, Omar El Hadba and Irahim Sabouh were charged.⁶⁶ A third man Bassem al-Sayyed, a dual Lebanese-Australian citizen, was acquitted of those charges but died several months later in a gun battle with the Lebanese military.⁶⁷

Canadians Xristos Katsiroubas and Ali Medlej traveled to Algeria and in January 2013, were part of the *Al-Mulathameen* brigade, also known as “Those Who Sign with Blood,” which attacked the Tigantouine Gas Plant in Amenas, Algeria. This group, an offshoot of AQAP was led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar. There is every indication that these two Canadians were fully a part of the militant group responsible for launching the terrorist attack.⁶⁸ Finally, the Somali community in Minnesota has seen an estimated twenty-three young men travel to Somalia and join al-Shabaab. There are some reports that Americans might have been involved in the 2013 Westgate Mall terrorist attack in Nairobi.⁶⁹

One further point regarding foreign fighters needs to be investigated. When examining foreign fighters, should we be making a distinction between Western individuals who might be former nationals of countries where conflict zones have emerged? What if any role does cultural or familial or ancestral ties impact their decision to become involved in a conflict? From this perspective, why would an individual like Canadian Mohamed Ali Dirie, a Somali-Canadian convicted in 2009 as part of the disrupted Toronto 18 plot, travel to Syria in 2011 upon his release from prison? Why would this individual not be more inclined to travel to Somalia and join al-Shabaab?⁷⁰

Domestic Homegrown IIHGT

This final type of IIHGT would apply to individuals who have been radicalized in a Western state and then choose to conduct a terrorist attack against their state. In the mid 2000s there were several large-scale attacks and plots including the 2004 Madrid train attack, the 2005 7/7 attack in London, the 2005 plots disrupted in Sydney and Melbourne, the 2006 plot disrupted in Toronto, and the 2009 plot, again disrupted by Australian agencies, where five men plotted to attack the Holsworthy military base in Sydney. These individuals tried reaching out to *al-Shabaab* seeking religious sanction or *fatwa* for their attack.⁷¹ Again, the defining characteristics of these attacks and plots were those involved were born and raised or had lived extensively in the states they attacked.

More recent incidents include the October 2014 attacks in Canada conducted by Martin Couture-Rouleau and Michel Zehaf-Bibeau. Rouleau used his car to run down two members of the Canadian Armed Forces, killing one.⁷² Two days later in a separate attack Bibeau shot an unarmed soldier at the Ottawa War Monument and then proceeded to try and storm Canada's Parliament building located nearby.⁷³ These more recent incidents might also be an indicator of the potential for an increase in domestic IIHGT. As Western engagement with ISIS began in the summer of 2014, ISIS began releasing videos encouraging those loyal to the group to start conducting attacks against Western targets including the United States, Canada, and Europe.⁷⁴

Additional Thoughts

One methodological advantage of this approach would be its ability to provide an introductory framework to better refine our data. Our current efforts searching for commonalities or trends among IIHGT incidents focus on a more abstract approach to data analysis and case study investigation. It lumps them all together. Taking this same data and filtering it through the different categories suggested in this article might refine our understanding to some degree. Perhaps examining cases of those who pursue support/logistical IIHGT in isolation might reveal additional observations and offer additional research questions or direction. Should analysis reveal that they tend to be older or wealthier or practice certain types of employment, we might deduce that these factors influence their decision to undertake this endgame as opposed to other types which obviously carry a greater risk of injury, death, or even detention. Perhaps examining those who travel abroad will also reveal some interesting observations which were lost among their inclusion with other endgames. It might be revealed that these individuals are more likely to have been converts to Islam, have a criminal past or were un- or underemployed, influenced by their own ennui and dissatisfaction with their life's direction. These represent some examples which this type of categorization might tease out. "Lumping" together all incidents of IIHGT, and all radicalized individuals regardless of their course of action, has yet to identify any discernible trends or profile. This newer approach should help us understand why radicalized individuals choose the course of action they do and help us extrapolate from these indicators what type of action an individual who is radicalized is more likely pursue. For example, if it were revealed that the majority of those categorized in a support or logistical IIHGT category make for money than those who are in other categories, are increasingly married or have children, or are on average are older, it might indicate that these impact an individual's decision to take on a passive or nonviolent role. It would allow us to expand our investigation in an effort to how or why these factors might influence or limit their actions.

There is one final issue regarding the different typologies identified above: how to categorize those involved in foreign fighter IIHGT who eventually return home. While we recognize that many of the foreign fighters will be killed or have little intention to return home the question remains: how would we characterize these individuals especially if they plot attacks? Would these individuals fit into the category of domestic IIHGT, or if they chose to simply recruit or raise money are they re-slotted into support/logistical IIHGT? The characterization of domestic IIHGT outlined above represents individuals who are radicalized in their home state and then plot or attack that state, with a key point the fact that they never left that state at any time in connection to their attack. Although it has not yet proven to be a significant problem to date, we are beginning to see incidents suggesting it may become a possibility. The two most prominent examples include the individual who attacked the Jewish Museum in Brussels in May 2014 and a shootout between police and returning foreign fighters in the Belgian town of Verviers in January 2015.⁷⁵ Early estimates from Europe suggest that between 2012 and 2014 somewhere between 1,500–2,500 Sunni extremists left Europe and traveled to Syria. Estimates today are that 300–400 have left Syria and returned to Europe.⁷⁶

Clearly, not everyone who returns from Syria and Iraq would necessarily represent a threat. Some who have traveled abroad might actually choose to leave and return home based on the realization that they made a mistake. Hypothetically however, the very concept of re-branding homegrown terrorism and applying the Islamist-inspired moniker is designed to recognize that it is motivated by a larger ideology and one that transcends

any one group. Those traveling from Western countries to Syria and Iraq are predominantly doing so of their own volition. They are not necessarily in contact with leadership or recruiters from specific groups who assist them or facilitate their travel and assimilation. While some have the advantage of guidance from those connected to these groups, increasingly the stories involve Western individuals who become radicalized traveling to Turkey and then attempting to identify or make contact with someone who can help them across the border and provide them access to the group.⁷⁷ From this perspective the obvious prescription would be to argue that once an individual has joined a group, they are no longer simply inspired by the ideology but become inspired and motivated by a group itself. In part they serve an apprenticeship surrounded by members of that group and are more likely to identify and adopt the specific nuances of that group, its goals and agenda in essence becoming a representative or agent of that group. Based on this logic, such an individual returning to their home country would arguably remain an agent of that group and any action they take upon their return would be on behalf of that group in pursuit of its specific goals and agenda. Any action, be it supportive such as recruiting or raising money, would most likely be directed or funneled to the group that they are familiar with and have established connections. The commission of an attack or assistance to others to this end would more readily fit into our conceptualization of international terrorism. The individual, directly (by order) or indirectly (as a member of that group), is acting as a member of an international terrorist group and should be categorized as such.

Future Research Applications

Identifying different variants of IHHGT based on endgame provides the methodological advantage of differentiating what radicalized individuals do with their newfound ideology. Instead of viewing them through one lens, dividing radicalized individuals along the lines suggested above may help reveal traits or commonalities among the specific types that are not observed when they are lumped all together. There is another potential avenue of inquiry which arises from categorizing IHHGT based on endgames worth investigating further. If we look at these varying endgames from the perspective of well established ideas in the terrorism literature such as demonization and the “us versus them” dichotomy, there is growing evidence that suggests this more robust analysis will be useful. Examining the different endgames seemingly reveals different degrees of violence, especially toward one’s own state and society. Might this suggest differing degrees of radicalization or commitment?

The majority of our previous efforts to understand radicalization and deconstruct the radicalization process focus on the cognitive or thought component. These include well-known models by individuals such as Randy Borum, Fathali Moghaddam, Silber and Bhatt, and Tomas Precht.⁷⁸ But the endpoint of each of these models, their final stages, is simply the identification that action might occur.⁷⁹ There is no discussion or investigation beyond that point. This leaves the “action” component completely untouched and under-researched.

According to Peter Neumann there needs to be a holistic understanding of both cognitive and behavioral processes, of how ideas and actions are related.⁸⁰ This article argues that including and investigating the endgames or action component might add to these earlier efforts and that it might contribute to this under-studied aspect and help us understand radicalization and the radicalization process in greater depth. Examining this second part of the equation, the action, and specifically what individuals do with the newfound radical ideology will help inform us about how far their radical ideas may have gone. It

suggests looking at their actions through the lens of several well-founded concepts from the terrorism literature such as demonization, moral disengagement, and the “us” versus “them” dichotomy that could reveal different degrees of radicalization.

The terrorism literature identifies demonization as an outcome, the end result of which assists in allowing terrorism to occur. Because terrorism represents one of the most extreme forms of violence we witness, in part because its goal is to instil fear in a wider audience than the immediate victims, it ensures more often than not targeting civilians, whether intentionally or accidentally. The act of perpetrating violence is one thing, but killing people, especially people who are average citizens, requires an intense hatred and disregard for life. People do not ordinarily engage in reprehensible conduct until they have justified to themselves the morality of their actions.⁸¹ Thus, the level of violence we generally associate with terrorism requires a detachment from the ethical and moral principles most people have, namely, that one should not kill. According to Bandura it is much easier for people to undertake “political violence,” in which political figures are personally targeted. However, it is much more difficult to “cold-bloodedly slaughter innocent women and children.” This will require a more powerful form of what he terms “moral disengagement.”⁸² To this end, the different types of IIHGT identified in this article demonstrate different levels of violence. Intuitively this suggests a possibility that there exists differing degrees of a willingness to commit violence, and that these different types of IIHGT involve differing degrees of radicalization.

The literature accepts the notion that there is a process of radicalization whereby individuals intensify their extreme positions. Moghaddam spoke of a staircase concept of demonization where “feelings of discontent are a platform for stepping initially onto the path to terrorism.”⁸³ Moghaddam’s premise fits into this discussion because it is possible that each of these different types of IIHGT might represent a similar escalation or progression. An individual who is sympathetic to an ideology and acts passively by supporting or propagating is not yet sufficiently radicalized to contemplate killing others. The individual who decides to travel abroad and pursue *jihadist*/foreign fighter IIHGT has attained a level whereby they are capable of fighting and killing others but this may not yet be sufficient to target, attack, and kill others that they might have or still partially identify with such as those in their country of origin. The ability to completely dissociate oneself from society and attack and kill one’s fellow citizens would represent the highest degree of radicalization on this spectrum. One of the most fundamental questions surrounding domestic IIHGT is how individuals who are born and raised, or who have lived extensively in Western democratic states, are able to so quickly turn against their own states and societies.⁸⁴ Part of the answer may rest in a re-formulation of the “us versus them” dichotomy.

Demonization represents the most extreme variation of the ingroup/outgroup dynamic. A simple explanation of the ingroup/outgroup dynamic suggests that people tend to identify with those they deem most similar to themselves. Spillman and Spillman identify how this syndrome of viewing “others” as an enemy may take hold,⁸⁵ and in this framework it applies to the first two types of IIHGT. Discussions regarding domestic IIHGT however are an interesting new twist on this dynamic. In a case where an individual who is born and raised in a Western society becomes radicalized and is capable of turning on their own population, it presents a scenario whereby these individuals simultaneously represent elements of both “us” and “them.” Tying this back to radicalization, something akin to Moghaddam’s staircase where each type of IIHGT represents a higher degree of radicalization resulting in an equal increase in the degree of violence, another step or level to encompass domestic IIHGT should be investigated.

Conclusion

This article offers a new framework for analyzing and understanding incidents of what it has now termed IIHGT. This phenomenon has grown and evolved over the past several years and shows little signs of abating in the near future. The term IIHGT clearly conveys exactly what this type of terrorism represents and clearly distinguishes it from other categories of terrorism avoiding confusion that arises from the abstract use of “homegrown” that currently can be applied to a myriad of different possible scenarios. It has also outlined a different approach for refining our understanding of IIHGT, categorizing it by endgame, thus including the action component as a potential focal point. Current efforts and models focused on cognitive radicalization or the thought component have only taken us so far; this new approach offers an additional path worth investigating. What is being suggested here simply adds another step—current models *plus* a more detailed analysis and examination of the action taken. The result of these efforts provides a potentially new and interesting way to study IIHGT and additionally influence our analysis of radicalization.

In addition to providing a new way to analyze our current data on IIHGT, this approach sheds light on what, if any, relationships might exist between the various endgames. Does a trajectory exist where individuals progress through these different types of actions? Will the individual posting propaganda today become the foreign fighter tomorrow? Do individuals prevented from traveling abroad immediately become an increased risk to pursue domestic IIHGT? Perhaps no progression exists, and individuals categorized in one type of IIHGT may never shift or progress to another type. More data needs to be collected because currently there are few explanations which might indicate how or why individuals might move from one type to another. Australians Khaled Sharrouf and Mohamed Elomar, arrested and jailed in 2005 for their role plotting a domestic IIHGT attack are reportedly fighting with ISIS in Syria and Iraq.⁸⁶ In this case it appears as if certain individuals simply pursue which ever endgame they are able to pursue at any given time and it may not necessarily be a purposeful or conscious choice.

The core characteristic of this phenomenon remains the fact that those perpetrating or pursuing this type of terrorism are radicalized in Western states. Understanding how and why individuals choose their endgame, the result of their radicalization, might be tied to differing degrees of radicalization or commitment to the global *jihadist* narrative and efforts to filter data through this lens might offer some interesting insights we have yet to uncover.

Notes

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2. In the report, the chief of the Surete du Quebec Division of Investigations on Extremist Threats suggests that only 25 percent of the files on his desk refer to Islamist Extremists the larger number focus on right-wing extremists. Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, “Countering the Terrorist Threat in Canada: An Interim Report” (Canadian Senate: Ottawa, July 2015).

3. Manni Crone and Martin Harrow, “Homegrown Terrorism in the West,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23(4) (2011), p. 522.

4. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, *Homegrown Terrorists in the US and UK: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process* (Washington, DC: FDD Center for Terrorism Research, 2009), p. 11. Also see Brian Jenkins, *Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist*

Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11 2001 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), p. 1.

5. Tomas Precht, *Home-Grown Terrorism and Islamist Radicalization in Europe* (Danish Ministry of Justice, 2007), p. 15.

6. Jerome Bjelopera, *American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), pp. 1, 10.

7. Petter Nesser, "How Did Europe's Global Jihadis Obtain Training for their Militant Causes?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20(2) (2008).

8. Europol, "TE-SAT 2010: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report," European Police Office (2011), p. 9. By way of comparison, the definition has slightly changed and by the 2013 report the TE-SAT is using religious inspired terrorism and not Islamic terrorism as the category. See Europol, "TE-SAT 2013: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report," European Police Office (2013), p. 49.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

10. Europol, 2013, "TE-SAT 2013: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report," European Police Office, p. 16.

11. CSIS, *Public Report 2010–2011* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2012), p. 13.

12. *Ibid.*

13. Australia Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), 2012, "ASIO Annual Report to Parliament 2011–12," p. 3. Also see Australian Government, 2010, "Counter-Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia," Commonwealth of Australia, p. 8.

14. Sam Mullins, "Homegrown Terrorism: Issues and Implications," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 1(3) (2007). Available at <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/12/html> (accessed 8 October 2012).

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Ibid.*

17. Lorenzo Vidino, *The Homegrown Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland*, Real Instituto Elcano (2009). Available at http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/riecano_eng (accessed 14 February 2012).

18. Jerome Bjelopera, *The Domestic Terrorist Threat: Background and Issues for Congress* (2013). Available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R42536.pdf> (accessed 29 July 2013), p. 1.

19. Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Domestic Terrorism in the Post-9/11 Era* (2009). Available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2009/september/domterror_09070 (accessed 30 July 2013).

20. Paul Wilkinson, "The Strategic Implications of Terrorism," in M. Sondhi, ed., *Terrorism and Political Violence: A Sourcebook* (Delhi, India: Har-anand, 2000).

21. Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca and Luis de la Calle, "Domestic Terrorism: The Hidden Side of Political Violence," *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (2009), pp. 31–49. Also see Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Terrorism 2002–2005* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2006) whose definition of international terrorism stipulates that "International terrorist acts occur outside the US, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum."

22. Osama bin Laden referred to the invasion of Afghanistan as an extension of "the Crusades" and directed many post Afghanistan invasion statements toward both the American people (6 October 2002) and their allies (12 November 2002), outlining plans to avenge what he perceived as hostile actions by the Western world against Muslims. "Just as you kill, so you shall be killed; just as you bomb, so you shall be bombed. And there will be more to come." In his statements, bin Laden named certain countries that he considered to be allied with the United States. These included Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Germany, and Australia. Taken from Bruce Lawrence, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden* (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 135–136, 173, 174.

23. US Congress, *H.R. 1955: The Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act 2007* (2007). Available at <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr1955rfs/pdf/BILLS-110hr1955rfs.pdf> (accessed 7 May 2014).

24. Rick Nelson and Ben Bodurian, "A Growing Terrorist Threat? Assessing Homegrown Extremism in the United States" (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2010). Available at http://csis.org/files/publication/100304_Nelson_GrowingTerroristThreat_Web.pdf (accessed 3 June 2013).

25. DHS and FBI Joint Intelligence Bulletin, *Use of Small Arms: Examining Lone Shooters and Small Unit Tactics* (2001). Available at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/JIB_Use_of_Small_Arms_Examining_Lone_Shooters.pdf (accessed 3 July 2013).

26. Stewart Bell, "RCMP Dismantle Alleged Terror Cell in Ottawa" (25 August 2010). Available at <http://www.nationalpost.com/RCMP+dismantle+alleged+terrorist+cell.html> (accessed 3 June 2011). Also see CTVNews, "Terror Plot Reaches to Afghanistan, Middle East" (28 August 2010). Available at <http://www.wottawa.ctv.ca/servlet/an/local/CTVNews/20100828/terror-arrests-ottawa.html> (accessed 3 June 2011) and CBCNews (27 August 2010) "Alleged Terrorism Plot Targeted Canada." Available at <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/story/2010/08/26> (accessed 3 June 2011).

27. Ibid.

28. In December 2010, three men were arrested planning to attack the Jyllands-Posten newspaper in Copenhagen in what authorities described as a "Mumbai style attack." The group, two Swedish citizens and a third longstanding resident, were radicalized in Sweden. Despite only traveling a very short distance to their target, this travel involved their crossing international borders. Thus, while it does meet the criteria to be defined as homegrown, the fact that they traveled from Sweden into Denmark, crossing state borders in order to conduct their attack, allows for an international label to fit as well. See Christina Anderson and David Goodman, "Terror Suspects Appear in Danish Court," 30 December 2010. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/31/world/europe/31-denmark.html> (accessed 23 March 2012).

29. We have seen incidents where domestic considerations are mentioned, but they are clearly secondary to the larger motivation. Instead, the incidents are a direct result of more international or global efforts such as involvement in foreign wars or "occupations," or perceived persecution of the larger Islamic community or *umma* as a whole. We have not observed calls for policy changes such as shifts to *Sharia* law or increased rights or protections for Muslims living in Western states.

30. Crone and Harrow, "Homegrown Terrorism in the West," p. 522.

31. Ibid.

32. Nira Yuval-Davis, "Belonging and the Politics of Belonging," *Patterns of Prejudice* 40(3) (2006), pp. 197–214.

33. Irene Bloemraad et al., "Citizenship and Immigration: Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Challenges to the Nation-State," *The Annual Review of Sociology* 34 (2008), pp. 154–155.

34. Richard Parent and James Ellis, *Countering Radicalization of Diaspora Communities in Canada* (Vancouver: Metropolis British Columbia Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Diversity, 2011).

35. Reuters, "Over 200 Canada Terror Suspects Tracked" (12 May 2010). Available at <http://tvnz.co.nz/world-news/over-200-canada-terror-suspects-tracked-3538154> (accessed 6 May 2014).

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37. Michael Taarnby, "Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe: Trends and Perspectives" (Danish Ministry of Justice, 2005), pp. 32–33.

38. Bloemraad et al., "Citizenship and Immigration," pp. 154–155.

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40. Yuval-Davis, "Belonging and the Politics of Belonging," pp. 205–206; also see Bloemraad et al., "Citizenship and Immigration."

41. Rogers Brubaker, "Migration, Membership, and the Modern Nation-State: Internal and External Dimensions of the Politics of Belonging," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* XLI (1) (2010), pp. 61–78.

42. Crone and Harrow, "Homegrown Terrorism in the West."

43. Michael Zekulin, *A Growing Disconnect: Can the Contemporary Terrorism Literature Explain Domestic Homegrown Terrorism?* PhD Dissertation (University of Calgary: Calgary, Alberta, Canada, 2012).

44. Crone and Harrow, "Homegrown Terrorism in the West," p. 534.

45. Lorenzo Vidino, *Radicalization, Linkage and Diversity: Current Trends in Terrorism Europe* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010).

46. Anne Stenersen, "The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp?," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20(2) (2008), pp. 215–233.

47. Brynjar Lia, "Doctrines for Jihadi Terrorist Training," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20(4) (2008), p. 520.

48. Ibid. Lia cites the original source as Umar Abd al-Hakim (Abu Mus'ab al-Suri), *The Global Islamic Resistance Call. Part I: The Roots, History, and Experiences Part II: The Call, Program and Method* [in Arabic].

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51. Jerome Bjelopera, *American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), p. 29.

52. CBCNews, "Quebecer in Bomb Plot gets Life Sentence" (17 February 2010). Available at <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/story/2010/02/17> (accessed 14 March 2011). Also see Zoe McKnight, *Factbox: Key Terror Cases in Canada* (25 August 2010). Available at <http://www.nationalpost.com/related/topics/Factbox+terror+cases+Canada.ca> (accessed 14 March 2011).

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59. Edmund Mahoney, "Brit Tied to Terrorist Groups Sentenced to 12 Years" (16 July 2004). Available at http://articles.courant.com/2014-07-16/news/hc-terror-support-0717-20140716_1_babar-ahmad-terror-groups-azzam-network (accessed 4 September 2014). Also see Imperial Valley News, "ICE Removes Convicted Terrorism Supporter" (26 August 2014). Available at <http://www.imperialvalleynews.com/index.php/news/latest-news/10718-ice-removes-convicted-terrorism-supporter-to-the-united-kingdom.html> (accessed 2 September 2014).

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61. Reuters, "US Foreign Fighters in Syria Pose very Serious Threat to US" (31 August 2014). Available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/31/us-syria-crisis-usa-lawmakers-idUSKBN0GV0KR20140831> (accessed 2 September 2014).

62. *The Economist*, "European Jihadists" (30 August 2014). Available at <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21614226-why-and-how-westerners-go-fight-syria-and-iraq-it-aint-half-hot-here-mum> (accessed 2 September 2014). This article provides an excellent chart estimating the number of foreign fighters from over 12 Western countries.

63. Independent IE, “12,000 Foreign Fighters in Syria Expert Says” (9 September 2014). Available at <http://www.independent.ie/world-news/middle-east/12000-foreign-fighters-in-syria-expert-said-30572979.html> (accessed 12 September 2014).

64. Richard Barrett, “Foreign Fighters in Syria” (The Soufan Group: New York, June 2014). Available at <http://soufangroup.com/foreign-fighters-in-syria> (accessed 6 June 2015).

65. If one were interested in entertaining this type of distinction it would apply to individuals who travel abroad to join foreign conflicts that are not clearly, at least initially, focused on terrorism. Defining this sub-type is the most problematic due to the grey area recognized to exist when targets are predominantly military and a non-state group engages in a somewhat conventional manner during conflict. Despite this subjectivity, groups such as ISIS and *Jabhat al-Nusra* currently operating in Iraq and Syria can be labeled terrorist groups for two reasons. The first reason is a political one: governments in Western states have identified and added these groups to their list of designated terrorist organizations. The second reason is that as these conflicts have expanded civilians are being increasingly targeted and the brutality of their tactics is indeed meant to send a larger message to others. CBC News, “ISIS Name Added to Canada’s List of Terrorist Entities” (24 September 2014). Available at <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/isis-name-added-to-canada-s-list-of-terrorist-entities-1.2776607> (24 September 2014), ISIS was listed as Al Qaeda in Iraq and designated since 2012. The United States has had ISIS designated since 2004, also when it was previously known as Al Qaeda in Iraq.

66. Jamie Pandaram and Ed O’Loughlin, “Boxer among Australians Held” (27 June 2007). Available at <http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/boxer-among-aussies-arrested-in-lebanon/2007/06/26/1182623909208.html?page=fullpage> (accessed 8 August 2013).

67. Sarah Smiles, “Australian Islamist Killed in Lebanon” (26 June 2007). Available at <http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/australian-islamist-killed-in-lebanon/2007/06/25/1182623823209.html> (accessed 5 August 2013).

68. Katherine Blaze et al., “How Three London Teens Ended Up Dead or Jailed, Accused of Terrorism” (6 April 2013). Available at <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/how-three-london-teens-ended-up-dead-or-jailed-accused-of-terrorism/article10825822/?page=all> (accessed 31 July 2013). Also see Greg Weston, “Canadians in Algerian Gas Plant Attack Identified” (2 April 2013). Available at <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2013/04/01/f-algeria-canadians-militants-hostages.html> (accessed 31 July 2013).

69. Faith Karimi, “Kenya Mall Attack” (23 September 2013). Available at <http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/22/world/africa/kenya-mall-attack/index> (accessed 27 August 2014). Also see Jon Swaine, “Al-Shabaab’s American Recruitment Drive” (25 September 2013). Available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/kenya/10335139/Al-Shabaabs-American-recruitment-drive-Betray-the-US-and-join-the-real-Disneyland-of-African-jihad.htm> (30 August 2014).

70. Michelle Shephard, “Toronto 18: Ali Dirie, Convicted in Plot Dies in Syria” (25 September 2013). Available at http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2013/09/25/toronto_18_ali_mohamed_dirie_convicted_in_plot_dies_in_syria.html (14 September 2014).

71. Michael Zekulin, “Islamic-Inspired Homegrown Terrorism: What We Know and What it Means Moving Forward,” *Occasional Research Paper #8* (Calgary: Calgary Center for Military and Strategic Studies, 2013).

72. CBC News, “Martin Couture-Rouleau, Hit-an-Run Driver Arrested by RCMP in July” (22 October 2014). Available at <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/martin-couture-rouleau-hit-and-run-driver-arrested-by-rcmp-in-july-1.2807078> (accessed 2 November 2014).

73. CBS News, “Ottawa Gunman Spoke of Religion, Canadian Foreign Policy in Video” (27 October 2014). Available at <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ottawa-gunman-spoke-of-religion-canadian-foreign-policy-in-video> (accessed 2 November 2014).

74. Michael Georgy and Mariam Karouney, “ISIS is Now Directly Threatening to Attack American and European Targets” (20 August 2014). Available at <http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-now-openly-threatening-attacking-us-targets-2014-8> (12 September 2014); Josh Levs and Holly Yan, “Western Allies Reject ISIS Leader’s Threats against Their Civilians” (22 September 2014). Available at <http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/22/world/meast/isis-threatens-west> (23 September 2014).

75. Alistair Reed et al., “Pathways of Foreign Fighters: Policy Options and Their (un)Intended Consequences” (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism: The Hague, April 2015), p. 5.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

77. Evan Kohlmann and Laith Alkhouri, "Profiles of Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq," *CTC Sentinel* 7(9) (2014), p. 3.

78. Michael King and Donald Taylor, "The Radicalization of HomeGrown Jihadists: A Review of Theoretical Models and Socio Psychological Evidence," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23(4) (2011); Randy Borum, "Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research," *Journal of Strategic Security* 4(4) (2011).

79. For example, Randy Borum's model includes four stages where the final stage is "you're evil," and the catalyst for action. Randy Borum, "Understanding the Terrorist Mindset," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* 72(7) (2003), pp. 7–10. For Moghaddam there are five stages where the final stage is "the terrorist act." Fathali Moghaddam, "The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration," *American Psychologist* 60(2) (2005), pp. 161–169. For Silber and Bhatt there are four stages where the final stage is "jihadization." Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat* (New York: Police Department Intelligence Division, 2007). For Tomas Precht he identifies the final step as "the actual act of terrorism or planned plot." See Tomas Precht, "Homegrown Terrorism and Islamist Radicalization in Europe: From Conversion to Terrorism," Danish Ministry of Defense (2007).

80. Peter Neumann, "The Trouble with Radicalization," *International Affairs* 89(4) (2013), p. 885.

81. Albert Bandura, "Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement," in Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 161–191; Albert Bandura, "The Role of Selective Moral Engagement in Terrorism and Counterterrorism," in F. Moghaddam and A. Marsella (eds.), *Understanding Terrorism: Psychological Roots, Consequences and Interventions* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Press, 2004), pp. 121–150.

82. *Ibid.*, pp. 123–124.

83. Moghaddam identified several steps. During the first step, an individual's attempts to alleviate adversity and improve his or her situation have been unsuccessful, leading to feelings of frustration and aggression that are displaced onto some perceived causal agent (enemy). As anger builds, the individual becomes more sympathetic toward justification for violence. Some sympathizers eventually join an extremist group that advocates or engages in the violence. At the final step, the individual overcomes the last barrier and commits a terrorist act. Moghaddam acknowledges that fewer and fewer people ascend to each successive level, which explains the limited number of terrorists. Fathali Moghaddam, "The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration," *American Psychologist* 60(2) (2005), pp. 161–169; Randy Borum, "Understanding Terrorist Psychology," in Andrew Silke, ed., *The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism* (Forthcoming) (London: Routledge, 2010). Available at http://works.bepress.com/randy_borum/45 (accessed 12 April 2010).

84. Zekulin, "Islamic-Inspired Homegrown Terrorism."

85. First, negative anticipation whereby all acts of the enemy, in the past, present, and future become attributable to destructive intentions toward one's own group. Second, putting the blame on the enemy, whereby the enemy is thought to be the source of any stress on a group. Third, identification with evil, whereby the values of the enemy represent the negation of one's own value system and the enemy is intent on destroying the dominant value system as well. Fourth, zero-sum thinking whereby what is good for the enemy is bad for us and vice-versa. Fifth, stereotyping and de-individualization, whereby anyone who belongs to the enemy group is therefore our enemy. And sixth, refusal to show empathy, whereby consideration for anyone in the enemy group is repressed due to perceived threat and feelings of opposition. Spillman and Spillman in D. Merskin, "Making Enemies in George W. Bush's Post 9/11 Speeches," *A Journal of Social Justice* 17 (2005), p. 374. Also see Randy Borum, *The Psychology of Terrorism* (Tampa: University of South Florida, 2004) and L. Miller, "The Terrorist Mind," *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology* 50 (2006), pp. 121–138.

86. CBCNews, "Jihadist Khalef Sharrouf Tweets Photo of Son Holding Head," 10 August 2014. Available at <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/jihadist-khaled-sharrouf-tweets-photo-of-son-holding-soldier-s-severed-head-1.2732838> (accessed 13 September 2014).