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To cite this article: Annette Ranko & Justyna Nedza (2015): Crossing the Ideological Divide? Egypt's Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, DOI: [10.1080/1057610X.2015.1116274](https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1116274)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1116274>



Published online: 11 Dec 2015.



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## Crossing the Ideological Divide? Egypt's *Salafists* and the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring

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### ABSTRACT

An important strand in the literature has stressed the analytical distinction between the Muslim Brotherhood's brand of Islamism and the *Salafist* movement. This article examines the shifts that have occurred within these two movements in Egypt since the Arab Spring. It specifically asks whether approximations between them in terms of strategies of actions have been paralleled by ideological approximations. The article argues that both movements have seen increased diversification which has—especially at the fringes—involved a reshaping of identities and ideological approximations that may facilitate cooperation between segments of these movements in the future.

### ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 3 August 2015

Accepted 1 November 2015

The rapid changes in the Islamist spectrum since the 2011 Arab uprising pose significant challenges to the study of political Islam and prompt scholars to rethink prevailing analytical categories and concepts.<sup>1</sup> An important strand in the literature on Islamist movements has stressed the distinction between the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) brand of Islamism and the *Salafist* movement in terms of ideology and action strategy.<sup>2</sup> In Egypt prior to 2011, the division between these two strands seemed especially clear: The fact that the Egyptian MB had renounced the use of violence and had entered electoral politics in the early 1980s set it apart from the *Salafists*, who largely rejected participation in formal politics and adopted an either apolitical or militant position. However, after the Arab uprising two major shifts occurred within the Islamist spectrum. First, the ousting of Mubarak in 2011 was followed by the sudden formation of a number of *Salafist* political parties that have stripped the Muslim Brotherhood of its monopoly as the sole Islamist actor in formal politics.<sup>3</sup> Second, the ousting of Mursi in 2013 and the subsequent repression of the MB sent shockwaves through the group. As the organization restructures it has seen the empowerment of a youth that has openly called into question the organization's principle of nonviolence.<sup>4</sup>

While moderate segments within the leadership remain unwilling to curb the group's commitment to a peaceful strategy, the group's official discourse increasingly yields to the youth's pressure.<sup>5</sup> In an official MB declaration from May 2015, the group's leadership now

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casts the organization no longer as an *evolutionary* movement committed to long-term change from below, but as a *revolutionary* movement.<sup>6</sup> While its position toward violence is not yet set in stone, the MB leadership has become increasingly ambivalent as it—for the first time in several decades—has invoked, in its declaration from May 2015, a *fatwa* that provides *Sharia*-based legitimation for the potential use of violence against the incumbent regime.<sup>7</sup>

Moments of major change or crisis as in 2011 and 2013 have thus led to an approximation concerning the strategies of action that the *Salafists* and at least segments of the MB deem appropriate to further their goals. This article asks whether this trend is paralleled by a substantial approximation in each movement's thought and ideology,<sup>8</sup> thus blurring the analytical divide between these two large Islamist trends. If this is indeed the case, does the *Salafist*–MB distinction still offer leverage for the understanding of the dynamics within the Islamist spectrum in the post–Arab Spring era?<sup>9</sup>

In light of these questions, this article (1) analyzes the political programs and programmatic writings of four Egyptian *Salafist* parties and parses how their political thought overlaps with or diverges from that of the MB and its party. While the authors primarily examined official party lines, they are aware of internal debates within the parties and have therefore also included unofficial media statements of the respective parties' members into the analysis. This article (2) surveys calls for militant action made by five Egyptian militant *Salafist* groups as well as statements by the MB concerning its position on violence, and discusses how each group's goals and legitimation of militant action differ and where they converge. In the case of the militant *Salafist* groups, the authors analyzed each one's founding statements, claims of responsibility, and member statements published on Facebook and Twitter. With regard to the MB, the authors studied statements on the group's official Arabic and English websites, *ikhwanonline* and *ikhwanweb*, and supplemented these with member statements published on Facebook and Twitter as well as statements and contributions on MB-affiliated TV channels. The authors also conducted interviews in Egypt and Turkey.

The article argues that while the MB and *Salafist* identities clearly continue to gain traction in the post–Arab Spring era—and thus make sense as analytical categories—an important diversification of positions within these two camps has occurred. Especially at the fringes of these movements, identities are reshaping in a way that potentially facilitates further cooperation between segments of these movements in the future.

### **Approximation of political thought? *Salafist* political parties and the Muslim Brotherhood**

In order to analyze in how far there is ideological overlap between the political thought of *Salafist* parties and the MB in Egypt, the authors have studied the thought of the MB and its political party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), and have selected four *Salafist* parties founded after the ousting of Mubarak in 2011:<sup>10</sup> (1) Hizb al-Nur, by far the largest *Salafist* party, that was founded in May 2011 by the informal religious organization al-Dàwa al-Salafiyya, which is considered the major *Salafist* network in Egypt. While al-Dàwa's stronghold is Alexandria, it has expanded to almost all governorates in Egypt<sup>11</sup>; (2) al-Watan, which was founded in January 2013 by the popular ex-president of the al-Nur party, 'Abd al-Ghafur, after he split off from al-Nur party<sup>12</sup>; (3) al-Fadila, which was the first *Salafist* party in Egypt and was founded in March 2011. It is one of the small Cairo-based *Salafist* parties,

which were born out of previous informal *Salafist* networks in the Cairene district of Shubra<sup>13</sup>; (4) al-Raya, which was founded by the popular *Salafist* Hazim Salah Abu Ismàil who sought to run as *the Salafist* presidential candidate in 2012 before being disqualified. He is particularly popular among the revolutionary youth within *Salafist* circles.<sup>14</sup>

### **The political thought of the MB and its political party**

The MB was founded in 1928 as an anti-colonial movement that set up a network of social service institutions and missionary activities. Its structural participation in formal politics, that is, in parliamentary elections and professional syndicates, began with Mubarak's presidency in the early 1980s.<sup>15</sup> In the early 1990s and 2000s the MB advanced to become a significant opposition force in Egypt, and in the 2005 parliamentary elections the group won the by far largest share of opposition seats.<sup>16</sup> As the MB grew into a strong political force it increasingly lined out its political thought and published political programs. While the group's thought had been relatively sceptical of democracy during the early and mid-1980s, this changed from the 1990s onward, when the group increasingly sought to reconcile its Islamist agenda with several democratic elements such as party pluralism, separation of powers or the rotation of power through regular elections. However, many contradictions or "grey areas" remained regarding the MB's position toward several democratic concepts.<sup>17</sup> From roughly 2007 onward the group's leadership, however, had formulated its political thought to such an extent that the group presented its own vision of a state, which it termed a "democratic, civil state with an Islamic frame of reference."

The MB's ideal state consists of a "democratic" and an "Islamic" component. In the former, several democratic mechanisms are adopted: Popular sovereignty is established and realized through power rotation resulting from regular free and fair elections, the separation of powers, and the granting of political rights, such as the right to form parties or to demonstrate. However, the "Islamic" component of the MB's ideal state, the "Islamic frame of reference," has two important implications and functions within the state: (1) The MB presents it as integral and necessary to achieve true popular sovereignty and (2) the Islamic frame of reference curtails some of the political—as well as the personal and civil—rights granted to individuals in Western, liberal democracies by making these rights contingent on the *Sharia*, which is to function as the main source of legislation.

Thus the MB's specific understanding of the *Sharia* becomes the linchpin for which rights are granted and which are curtailed. The organization distinguishes between three groups of *Sharia* regulations:

1. The first group are *prescriptions (ahkam)* to be followed literally. This refers to those prescriptions related to dogma and ritus.<sup>18</sup>
2. The second group of *Sharia* regulations consists merely of general and guiding *principles (mabadi')*—rather than strict *prescriptions*. They relate to the realm of relations between individuals in the political and social sphere. Here the MB believes that God has granted men the freedom to regulate their own affairs and that God has only offered the *Sharia's* ethical principles (justice, equality, and freedom) and the *Sharia's* general goals (*maqasid*) (e.g., to protect a person's life, property or dignity)<sup>19</sup> as guidelines for men. As the *Sharia* is understood as being rather flexible in this regard, the

MB argues that several Western, democratic mechanisms or freedoms can be adopted as long as they are in general accordance with these broad principles of the *Sharia*.<sup>20</sup>

3. The third group of *Sharia* regulations, however, exempts certain democratic freedoms from that. As the MB perceives the *Sharia* regulations that relate specifically to (public) morality and culture as almost unflexible *prescriptions* to be applied literally in almost all cases, it seeks to apply conservative Islamic norms in the public sphere. This particularly affects gender relations in the public sphere and potentially curtails the rights of women.<sup>21</sup>

As the MB views the realm of morality and culture as the core of Egyptian society's identity, the group believes that it is the state's obligation—and the marker for true popular sovereignty—to keep this realm regulated by conservative Islamic norms.<sup>22</sup> Thus the MB attaches major religious duties to the state, which potentially affect the political rights of non-Muslim citizens. Although the MB uses the formula “same rights and duties” for Christians and for Muslims, stressing that it would grant the Christian minority full equality before the law, this *de facto* refers only to those political rights that have no religious connotation attached to them, such as active and passive voting rights for parliament.<sup>23</sup> For example, however, the position of head of state might not be open to Christians if the state is deemed to have central religious duties.<sup>24</sup>

Yet although the MB produces *one* political thought in its official political programs, the group is clearly not a homogenous bloc. Instead, the organization consists of different generations,<sup>25</sup> or of more religiously modernist and more religiously conservative strands.<sup>26</sup> While the more modernist segments in the group have spearheaded the MB's adoption of several democratic principles since the 1990s,<sup>27</sup> (ex)members of the group and authors have stressed that deeply conservative forces in the group that are influenced by *Salafist* thought have grown more influential within approximately the past decade.<sup>28</sup> In 2010 these conservative forces even assumed key positions in a reshuffle of the MB's Guidance Council (*maktab al-irshad*) and in the election of the Supreme Guide (*murshid*). One of this conservative strand's major areas of influence has been to designate the realm of public morality as one that must be regulated by strict Islamic norms.<sup>29</sup>

Prior to Mubarak's fall, the MB had thus been influenced by the growing weight of the politically quietist *Salafists* that grew increasingly popular in society and were bolstered by the Mubarak regime as a counterweight to the politicized MB. However, these *Salafists* quickly formed several parties after Mubarak's fall in 2011 and have thus shifted from political quietism to a political outlook. The newly founded *Salafist* parties found themselves under strong pressure to produce political programs and a political vision because they had to compete first with the MB and later also with the militant *Salafist* Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) that surfaced in Syria and Iraq and began to administer a state-like entity. To garner and convince supporters, the new *Salafist* parties would also have to present a political vision.

### **The political thought of Salafist political parties**

*Salafist* parties have not yet presented coherent visions of a state; however, they are only in the initial stages of laying out a political vision.<sup>30</sup> Quite some variation exists in the political thought of *Salafist* parties—and certainly there are different strands and important internal debates within these parties.<sup>31</sup> However, one can discern commonalities. All of the *Salafist*

parties studied here seek to protect Egypt's "Islamic identity" from influences of Westernization and secularization by calling for an application of the *Sharia*. Yet at the same time all *Salafist* parties also address the major social realities in Egypt: They emphasize their support of the "Revolution of the 25th of January," or they reject corruption, dictatorship, and social inequality that have led to the popular uprising. All parties also engage with the widespread popular demand following the "Arab Spring" for popular sovereignty, at least in the sense of a rotation of power via regular elections and a separation of powers to forestall autocracy.<sup>32</sup> *Salafists*, like the MB, have thus started to engage with *some* democratic principles.

In doing so, *Salafist* parties have set themselves apart from conventional notions of politically quietist and militant *Salafists* known for their anti-democratic outlook. Anani has thus talked of a "paradigm shift" within segments of the *Salafist* spectrum.<sup>33</sup> Militant *Salafists* in particular call for a state in which the power of the ruler (*vis-à-vis* the people) is emphasized and in which modern and democratic state institutions are deemed un-Islamic and are thus rejected. They predominantly reject parliaments and call instead for non-binding and only temporary *shura* councils that are not to be elected but designated by the ruler.<sup>34</sup>

While the *Salafist* political parties studied here now seek to reconcile some democratic principles with their religious thought, they might to a certain extent draw on the example of the MB and follow similar logics of argumentations, and develop similar political visions. Indeed, authors have stressed that *Salafist* parties draw on some of the formulas and vocabulary that the MB has used in the past, calling not for a theocratic state but for a "modern" state with an "Islamic frame of reference."<sup>35</sup> In addition, *Salafist* parties have argued that adopting some *mechanisms* of democracy would be permissible while the *spirit* of the state would be Islamist.<sup>36</sup> However, this article's analysis will show that beyond this use of MB catchwords, important *Salafist* parties have been eager to set their political thought clearly apart from that of the MB. This is evident in both the al-Nur and al-Raya parties.

### ***Al-Nur and al-Raya: Setting political thought apart from Muslim Brotherhood thought***

In their quest to set themselves apart from the MB, the al-Nur and al-Raya parties have sought to present a genuinely *Salafist* vision of a state. It is important to note that al-Nur has undergone significant transformation since its formation in 2011.

At the outset of the party's foundation, party leadership under 'Abd al-Ghafur was rather pragmatic and sought to be relatively independent in its actions and outlook from the religious leadership of al-Nur's mother organization, the religious group al-Dàwa al-Salafiyya. This, however, led to tensions with leading sheikhs of al-Dàwa and ultimately to al-Ghafur's exit from al-Nur and to his formation of the al-Watan party in 2013. While al-Ghafur had sought to appeal to a broader *Salafist* clientel, the new leadership of al-Nur now considers the party to be the political arm of al-Dàwa and is, thus, more closely tied to the outlook of al-Dàwa's religious leadership and in this sense to its *Salafist* theological-legal concepts and discourse.<sup>37</sup>

Most starkly, al-Nur and its mother organization differ from the MB as they attach an eschatological function to its envisioned state. This state is understood as a vehicle to practice *tawhid* (meaning "the oneness" of God or the concept of monotheism)—a central theological concept *Salafists* often refer to—and to thus safeguard an individual's salvation in the afterlife.<sup>38</sup> This has two important implications: First, citizenship in this state is set sharply apart from Western notions of citizenship and is instead linked to a person's quality and quantity of creed (various

*Salafis* argue that a Muslim's faith decreases or increases according to his deeds). Accordingly, there is no equality before the law for all individuals, especially not for non-Muslims, despite al-Nur's use of the formula that non-Muslims would be granted the "same rights and same duties" as Muslims.<sup>39</sup> Thus in contrast to the MB, al-Nur and al-Dàwa not only limit the rights of Christians but also of Muslims, should their creed be deemed insufficient.

The second important implication that the designation of the state as a vehicle to practice and realise *tawhid* is that this requires the implementation of the *Sharia's prescriptions*, which are to be understood (to the greatest extent possible) literally.<sup>40</sup> Thus parliament is mainly an organ that deducts laws from these prescriptions. While al-Nur describes the people as sovereign in the sense that they select their rulers and representatives within parliament, as a separation of power is to be guaranteed,<sup>41</sup> the people are to be empowered vis-à-vis the ruler but not necessarily vis-à-vis God.<sup>42</sup> This differs from the MB, which understands the *Sharia*—in some important areas, as outlined above—as more flexible, leaving parliament quite some freedom to formulate the laws that regulate daily life and empower the people to an extent even vis-à-vis God. This should not imply that the MB follows a somewhat lax understanding of the *Sharia*. The difference of the MB and the *Salafist* approach is instead based on their different hermeneutics.<sup>43</sup> Nonetheless, broader discussions have also taken place within al-Nur and its base, for example regarding the scope of human reasoning in legislation.<sup>44</sup>

Finally al-Nur, in contrast to the MB, remains more sceptical and hesitant in its use of the concept of "democracy." While the MB promotes its envisioned state as a form of "Islamic democracy," al-Nur emphasizes that it adopts only a few democratic mechanisms, while it rejects certain elements of democracy that it describes as unbelief (*kufur*).<sup>45</sup>

The al-Raya party also sets itself clearly apart from the MB and is distinctly grounded within a *Salafist* discourse. Al-Raya's notion of the application of the *Sharia* is unequivocally clear: Al-Raya stresses men's servitude to God.<sup>46</sup> No laws are to be passed that contradict God's will as expressed in the *Sharia*. According to al-Raya's understanding, the *Sharia* is an all encompassing law and *Sharia* prescriptions are to be (merely) deducted by parliament.<sup>47</sup> All rights and freedoms are thus defined by a strict and literal understanding of the *Sharia*. Al-Raya even avoids the word democracy more than al-Nur. And the party's call for empowerment of the people (by making the people the source of authority)<sup>48</sup> is quickly unmasked as mere lip service, as the freedom and rights of men are clearly subjected to men's servitude to God. Al-Raya is also clear about the fact that, in contrast to the MB,<sup>49</sup> it does not regard the nation-state as the primary framework for politics but seeks to establish a political and economic union of Arab-Islamic states. Al-Raya argues that establishing such a union is a necessity (*darura*) of God's will that can even supersede other prescriptions of the *Sharia*.<sup>50</sup> Here al-Raya is even more hard-line than al-Nur, which is more pragmatic in that it accepts the Egyptian nation-state as the legitimate political framework. Yet al-Nur still seeks to strengthen the Islamist outlook of the country's foreign policy by for example attributing the religious institution al-Azhar to play a prominent role in foreign policy.

### ***Al-Watan and al-Fadila: Moving closer to Muslim Brotherhood thought***

Still, differences exist within the *Salafist* party spectrum regarding the extent to which they differ or converge with the MB: These differences become particularly clear between al-Nur and al-Raya on the one hand and al-Watan and al-Fadila on the other hand.

Al-Watan is a splinter party from al-Nur, but is keen to emphasize that it views all *Salafist* parties as the legitimate parts of *one Salafist* trend.<sup>51</sup> However, it has sought to clearly set itself apart from al-Nur in three ways, in the process moving—voluntarily or involuntarily—closer to the MB. First, al-Watan portrays itself as more inclusive and open towards Christians as well as other (non-*Salafist*) strands of Muslims.<sup>52</sup> This was also one of the MB's strategies at its inception, when it sought to “stress what unites us rather than on what we differ” in the quest to garner broad societal support.<sup>53</sup> Second, al-Watan seeks to set itself apart from al-Nur by presenting itself as a pragmatic political party of the political center.<sup>54</sup> The party's leaders, for example, have voiced their desire to relegate religious scholars out of politics<sup>55</sup>—a position close to that of the MB, which has almost no religious scholars among its rank and file (Azhar scholar al-Birr being one of the rare exceptions) and explicitly argues that everything related to rite and dogma should not pertain to politics or the political order.<sup>56</sup> This has an important programmatic implication: It implies that al-Watan—in contrast to other *Salafist* parties—has moved away from attaching an eschatological function to the state. Such a shift further strengthens the group's move towards the political center. Third, al-Watan uses the term “democracy” more frequently than al-Nur and al-Raya, and officially embraces the call for a “constitutional, democratic state” with an Islamic reference.<sup>57</sup> While this certainly does not imply that the party automatically allows more democratic rights and freedoms for individuals, it underlines al-Watan's at least symbolic move closer to the political center, opening up opportunities for cooperation with other political parties beyond the *Salafist* spectrum.

While al-Watan especially seems to follow a tactic similar to that which the MB has pursued since the 1980s (i.e., seeking cooperation with other political forces by moving closer to the political center), al-Fadila is closer to the MB in its understanding of the *Sharia*. Like the MB, it clearly—and in distinction from other *Salafist* parties—does not call for the implementation of the (literal) prescriptions (*ahkam*) of the *Sharia* but of its more flexible principles (*mabadi'*). Al-Fadila has been keen to move the discussion away from the application of *hudud*, which *Salafists* view as a marker of *Sharia* prescriptions (*ahkam*) and which they thus call to be applied, and has instead taken strong recourse to the concept of *maqasid al-shari'a* as an important constituent of what the party considers the principles of the *Sharia*.<sup>58</sup> Thus in contrast to the other *Salafist* parties studied here, al-Fadila's understanding of *Sharia* has become more flexible and has in this way moved closer to the relatively more modernist MB. This is important because a more flexible view of the *Sharia* allows a party to adopt more democratic mechanisms and rights into its political thought. However, it remains to be seen whether this will be the case with al-Fadila, especially as the party is said to have recruited ex-militants into its rank and file.<sup>59</sup>

### **An approximation concerning the legitimization of violence? Militant *Salafists* and the Muslim Brotherhood**

It is clear that a significant amount of ideological development and diversification has occurred within the *Salafist* spectrum since the Arab Spring, especially with regard to political thought. However, ideological development and diversification within the MB has also taken place, not necessarily concerning political thought, but concerning violence. While the MB had adopted a nonviolent position for 30 years, a shift occurred in the group's outlook toward violence, triggered by the ousting of Mursi in 2013 and the repression that followed.

However, there have also been important ideological changes concerning violence within the militant *Salafist* spectrum. In order to analyze the extent to which these shifts might represent an ideological approximation of the MB with militant *Salafists*, the authors have compared in how far their discourses on militant action overlap and where they differ.<sup>60</sup>

Concerning the militant *Salafists* this article focuses on five groups: (1) Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, which was formed in 2011. The group operates primarily in North Sinai and swore allegiance to ISIS in November 2014. It is now called Wilayat Sina'i. It has so far committed the by far largest-scale attacks, using advanced weaponry and has claimed the life of over 200 persons.<sup>61</sup> In addition, the following four smaller groups have been studied: (2) Sinai-based Jund al-Khilafa fi l-Ard al-Kinana, which originally derives its name from Algeria's Jund al-Khilafa organization and in September 2014 swore allegiance to ISIS;<sup>62</sup> (3) Ansar al-Jihad, founded in 2011 by Ramzi Mahmud al-Muwafi, the former personal physician of Osama bin Ladin (also known as the "Chemist"). The group considers itself the military wing of Al Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula;<sup>63</sup> (4) Ansar al-Shari'a, formed in November 2012 by a supporter of Al Qaeda,<sup>64</sup> and (5) Ajnad Misr, a Cairo-based group that was formed in January 2014 and that has so far carried out its attacks—mainly with improvised explosive devices—in Greater Cairo.<sup>65</sup>

### **Militant Salafist thought**

Egypt has a long history of organized militant *Salafist* groups that have targeted state institutions and representatives, religious minorities, and tourists alike. Militant *Salafist* thought—within and outside Egypt—can be considered an amalgamate of several ideological and theological influences.

A central thinker was Sayyid Qutb (executed in 1966), whose writings have served as an inspiration for militant *Salafists*.<sup>66</sup> Inspired by the writings of the Indo-Muslim thinker Abu 'l-A'la Mawdudi (d. 1979), Qutb described Muslim rulers as infidel (*kafir*) and the state of Muslim societies as one of religious ignorance (*jahiliyya*). He based this verdict on the fact that the rulers did not rule according to the *Sharia* and therefore denied God's attribute as sole legislator (*hakimiyya*). By referring to the Muslims rulers as apostates, Qutb—practicing *takfir*—legitimized their ousting, described as *jihād*. After Qutb's execution in 1966, his ideology was adopted by militant groups both within and outside Egypt, which used it as legitimation for militant action in their fight against incumbent regimes.<sup>67</sup>

In the subsequent decades, militant *Salafists* merged Qutb's thought with ideas formulated by Wahhabite scholars such as Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792) and medieval Hanbalite scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350) in particular.<sup>68</sup> In the process, *takfir* was not only legitimized with the alleged un-Islamic rule of a political authority—as Qutb had argued—but also with the violation of the Wahhabite principle of *al-wala' wa-l-bara'* (loyalty and dissociation). This concept prescribes that to be considered a true believer, a Muslim must be loyal to fellow Muslims and dissociate from non-Muslims. The alleged loyalty of a Muslim ruler to a non-Muslim (e.g., Jewish Israel) was considered a violation of the principle of *al-wala' wa-l-bara'* and an act of apostasy by militant *Salafists*, thus necessitating violent action against such a ruler, which they labeled *jihād*.<sup>69</sup>

In the 1980s, militant *Salafism* as a distinct ideology was also refined in the numerous training camps at the Pakistan–Afghanistan border—in which militant *Salafists* from all

over the Arab world, including Egypt, participated and fought against the Soviets (from these camps Al Qaeda later emerged). Here the concept of *jihad* saw an important transformation as an explicitly global strategy was added to the militant *Salafist* outlook.<sup>70</sup> By the end of the 1990s, groups such as Al Qaeda had shifted their focus from the *near* to the *far* enemy: Muslim regimes, with their alleged lapse in faith, were no longer considered as the main threat for the Muslim community. Instead, the United States and Israel as non-Muslim countries were considered illegitimate military aggressors against Muslims and occupiers of Muslim territory.<sup>71</sup>

In Egypt, militant Islamism has a long history. Violent groups had been especially active in the 1980s and 1990s. However, after the state's security forces proved superior in the fight against Islamists, Islamist violence had begun to ebb away after the late 1990s.<sup>72</sup> However, this changed after the overthrow of Mubarak in 2011, when the ensuing decrease of state control (especially over the Sinai) and the releasing of prominent Islamist figures such as Tariq and 'Abbud al-Zumar from prison gave a new impetus for Egyptian militants.<sup>73</sup> Various new militant *Salafist* groups emerged. This trend further increased after the military coup in 2013, the state-repression of Islamists that followed, and with the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq.

### **Militant Salafist groups since the Arab Spring**

Militant *Salafist* groups in the Sinai (founded in 2011 after Mubarak's ousting) have focused on the far enemy and since the 2013 military coup these groups have developed an increased interest in the near enemy (i.e., the Egyptian state) as a target. Militant *Salafists* have cited Israel as the epitome of the far enemy and have thus attacked, for example, border posts and gas pipelines.<sup>74</sup> They also name the United States as a far enemy and thus target facilities representing U.S. interests within Egypt. In so doing they frame their call for violence as a defensive *jihad* against non-Islamic aggressions. Ahmad 'Ashush, founder of Ansar al-Shari'a, for instance calls for *jihad* against the United States and Israel, describing it as a fight against colonialism and Christianization, and for the liberation of Muslim states from foreign influence.<sup>75</sup> Ansar al-Jihad uses a similar rhetoric, referring to the United States as a central enemy of Islam.<sup>76</sup> Yet one should keep in mind that although these groups may "talk globally," they often "act locally" and target the near enemy.<sup>77</sup> In so doing these groups also frame their fight against the near enemy as a defensive *jihad* against an infidel power. They claim that the Egyptian regime has lapsed from faith, thus they are practicing *takfir* and call for *jihad* as an individual duty for every Muslim (*al-fard al-'ayn*). Their target is thus the Egyptian army and police, which are said to violate the legal principle of "loyalty with fellow Muslims and dissociation from the infidels" (*al-wala' wa-l-bara'*), as the army and police side with the allegedly infidel ruler against fellow Muslims.<sup>78</sup> The ultimate objective of these groups is to topple the current state and to ultimately establish a global Islamic state, or a caliphate. Whereas ISIS-affiliated groups such as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis and Jund al-Khilafa acknowledge the existence of a present caliphate and al-Baghdadi as its legitimate caliph striving for the territorial extension of his caliphate, Al Qaeda-affiliated groups such as Ansar al-Shari'a and Ansar al-Jihad have not pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi but claim that a caliphate still needs to be established, starting from the Sinai as an Islamic Emirate.<sup>79</sup>

Finally, some militant *Salafist* groups target not only Israeli border guards and infrastructure or the Egyptian army or police, but also religious minorities. Formed in 2014, the group

Jund al-Khilafa fi l-Ard al-Kinana calls explicitly for *jihad* against all “cross-worshippers.”<sup>80</sup> By targeting religious minorities, *Salafists* also target civilians. Ansar al-Shari’a and Ansar al-Jihad, for example, explicitly consider civil targets legitimate.<sup>81</sup> According to ‘Ashush, Islamic law does not distinguish between civil and military, only between combatant and non-combatant, while he has a very wide definition of whom is classified as combatant.<sup>82</sup> However, the targeting of civilians is not limited to non-Muslims. In a statement issued in January 2015, the Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis/Wilayat Sina’i warned Muslim civilians in Sinai of collaborating with the Egyptian or Israeli armies, an act deemed in breach of the principle of *al-wala’ wa-l-bara’* and therefore an act of apostasy.<sup>83</sup> In this context, the method of beheading—particularly preferred by ISIS—is now in use by Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis/Wilayat Sina’i.<sup>84</sup>

### **The Muslim Brotherhood and its “traditional” rejection of violence**

For the past three to four decades, the MB’s official position has been marked by the rejection of the use of violence. Although Sayyid Qutb was originally an MB member, since the 1970s the group has officially distanced itself from the radicalized elements of his thought and especially from his use of *takfir*. Hasan al-Hudaybi, the then Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, was a central figure in this development. In his famous work, *Preachers not Judges*,<sup>85</sup> Hasan al-Hudaybi responded to the ideas of Sayyid Qutb by addressing them indirectly through a critique of Mawdudi’s ideology. Apart from rejecting the practice of *jihad* against a Muslim state, Hudaybi focused on the legitimation for *jihad* in militant thought, namely *takfir*.<sup>86</sup> He redefined the concept of unbeliever (*kafir*) and apostate (*murtadd*) by disconnecting human deeds from inner belief. The deeds that Sayyid Qutb considered to be apostasy (i.e., the rule according to manmade and not *Sharia* law) Hudaybi interpreted as acts of minor unbelief (*kufr asghar*) and therefore merely a sin.<sup>87</sup>

After Hudaybi’s rejection of *jihad* and *takfir* not as legitimate legal concepts but as applicable mechanisms for the present circumstances, the MB advocated only nonviolent strategies of political and social change. From the 1980s onward the MB chose—next to its traditional social and proselytizing activities—to also enter formal electoral politics as a way to further its goals. This strategy thrust the MB to the top of Egypt’s opposition under Mubarak.<sup>88</sup> After Mubarak’s fall in 2011, the MB even briefly came to power via elections, winning the biggest share of seats in the 2011/2012 parliamentary elections and with its candidate Muhammad Mursi winning the 2012 presidential elections.<sup>89</sup>

### **Changes within the Muslim Brotherhood since Mursi’s ousting**

Since Mursi’s ousting in 2013, a shift has occurred in the MB’s discourse on violence. The wave of repression and the mass arrests of the group’s leadership that followed the ousting of Mursi, Egypt’s first democratically elected president, has sent the group into an ideological and identity crisis<sup>90</sup> and has prompted a process of organizational restructuring within the MB.<sup>91</sup> This restructuring process has largely brought with it an increase of the power of the MB’s youth, which has lost faith in the MB’s former strategy of peaceful political participation and is intent on escalating the conflict with al-Sisi, and is even prone to consider using violence as legitimate.<sup>92</sup> The empowerment of the youth has brought with it tensions within the organization: between the youth and the more moderate, older segments within MB leadership. These older segments adhere instead to the group’s traditional evolutionary

approach: To achieve gradual social and political change via nonviolent means from below.<sup>93</sup> Nevertheless, since 2015 MB leadership has increasingly tilted toward the youth's outlook.<sup>94</sup>

The most outspoken statement of the younger generation that no longer categorically rejects violence in its struggle against the al-Sisi regime has been a call published by the MB's "Committee to Manage Crisis and Mobilisation"<sup>95</sup> on the MB's official Arabic website, *ikhwanonline*, in January 2015.<sup>96</sup> This statement, entitled "Prepare," drew on the example of MB founder Hasan al-Banna. Over the past 30 years, MB leadership had drawn on al-Banna to legitimize the group's peaceful participation in formal politics.<sup>97</sup> However, the January 2015 statement drew a different picture of al-Banna's legacy: It hailed al-Banna's establishment of the *Jihad Brigades* and the *Secret Apparatus*, both founded in the 1940s to fight against the Jewish settlers in Palestine and against the British in Egypt. It also hailed al-Banna's foundation of the *MB rovers* in which individuals were trained not only to acquire the ideal mindset to become a "better Muslim" but also to acquire the physical discipline and strength necessary to obtain that goal. The statement called on the MB to prepare—with mind and body—to fight a new enemy [the al-Sisi-regime].<sup>98</sup> The extent to which this statement represents an explicit call for militant action has been discussed in the literature.<sup>99</sup> The text is indeed explicit in some instances. For example, it closes with "We must prepare ourselves ... for a lengthy, uncompromising *jihad*, in which we seek to become martyrs."<sup>100</sup> Although this could be interpreted as referring not to a *jihad* through violence but to a peaceful form of *jihad* instead,<sup>101</sup> MB approval of al-Banna's founding of the *Secret Apparatus* is a clear reference toward violence. Youth leaders have stressed that they indeed have an understanding of al-Banna's legacy that differs from the understanding of the MB's old guard. According to them, al-Banna had not presented only *one* method (i.e., one of peaceful work and of gradual change via missionary work or work in formal politics). Instead they argue that al-Banna's method had been dynamic and contingent on the political context and that it had involved militancy as an instrument for practicing resistance (*muqawama*) in times of oppression.<sup>102</sup>

As moderate segments within MB leadership were reluctant to curb the organization's avowal to nonviolence, the controversial statement "Prepare" was immediately followed by a declaration of the group's continued adherence to a strategy of nonviolence on the group's English website *ikhwanweb*.<sup>103</sup> However, in the following months, the leadership began to increasingly tilt toward the youth's outlook. This shift in attitude can be attributed to an important change within the group's executive office (the guidance council). In February 2015, elections were held to fill in those leadership positions that had become vacant as a result of the state's crackdown on the organization. Especially these newly elected members—and importantly the group's new official spokesperson, known under the pseudonym Muhammad Muntassir<sup>104</sup>—are open to the youth's outlook, whereas several old guard leaders reject that perspective and instead hold on to the Brotherhood's traditional commitment to nonviolence. While this has created considerable tension within the leadership, the group's official media outlets—and with it the Brotherhood's "official discourse"—has since been under the control of the new leadership segments.<sup>105</sup>

As a consequence, the group's "official discourse" began to sharpen considerably toward the Sisi-regime in the following months. In his statements, Muntassir has repeatedly called for vengeance for those Muslims killed during and after the raid of the protesters' camp in Rabi'a al-'Adawiyya Square by Egyptian security forces in August 2013, and has decried al-Sisi and members of the security apparatus as "butchers."<sup>106</sup> But while MB leadership

originally refrained from using *religious* terminology, for example, by calling for *jihād*, and refrained from explicitly calling for violence,<sup>107</sup> this recently seems to have changed, especially after an Egyptian court sentenced ex-president Mursi to death in May 2015.

In an official statement published on 28 May in Arabic and on 29 May on the English website, MB leadership affirmed that it had “reached a final decision, after consulting [with] its popular base”<sup>108</sup> and declared that effective immediately, “the revolutionary option with all its means and mechanisms is [the group’s] strategy from which there will be no retreat.”<sup>109</sup> To further elaborate on the means and mechanisms deemed legitimate, the MB in its statement invokes a *fatwa*, issued by 150 Islamic scholars from 20 countries.<sup>110</sup> In the *fatwa* “The call of Egypt,” the resistance to injustice (*zulm*) and the overthrow of al-Sisi’s regime is described as a legal duty. According to the *fatwa*: “Rulers, judges, officers, soldiers, muftis, media representatives, politicians and any other party proven beyond any doubt to be involved in the crimes of violating honor, bloodshed and illegal killing, even if through inciting such acts, are considered, from Islamic perspective, murderers to whom all rulings related to the crime of murder are applicable.”<sup>111</sup> Redress for murder according to Islamic law can be financial compensation in form of blood money (*diyya*).<sup>112</sup> But if the killing was intentional and the status—and therefore monetary value—of the person killed is the same as or higher than that of the perpetrator, retaliation (i.e., the death sentence is permitted).<sup>113</sup> While in earlier official statements the MB called al-Sisi and other members of the regime “murderers” or “butchers,” it now explicitly referred to a *fatwa* that offers a *Sharia*-based justification for violent acts and potentially even the killing of al-Sisi and members of his regime, including personnel of the security apparatus. However, this legitimization is not derived from the principle of *takfir*, which militant *Salafists* use to legitimate their violent actions and that Sayyid Qutb had introduced to fight regimes.<sup>114</sup>

By eclipsing the notion of *takfir* from its discourse and by instead framing members of the al-Sisi-regime as murderers, the MB aligns its discourse with that of those militant groups that do not use a religious rhetoric, such as Popular Resistance and Revolutionary Punishment.<sup>115</sup> While these groups’ exact compositions are not known they are said to be co-founded by ex-MB youth<sup>116</sup> but to also include non-Islamist members.<sup>117</sup> These groups also use vengeance and retaliation for murder as a legitimization for violence—albeit in contrast to the MB without religious legitimization or referring to *fatawa*, thus allowing them to attract members outside of the Islamist camp.<sup>118</sup>

However, the MB seems to follow a double strategy. Although it integrates into its discourse elements that reverberate with groups such as Revolutionary Punishment and Popular Resistance, it also integrates *Salafist* arguments—especially in the MB-affiliated media, such as *Misr al-An* and *Rabi’a* TV channels.<sup>119</sup> Here, air time is given to Muslim scholars who have argued along *Salafist* lines—and even against the MB’s traditional rejection of concepts such as practicing *takfir*—that the killing of Egyptian soldiers and al-Sisi is a legal necessity (*darura*) that justifies reciprocity (*mu’amalat bi-l-mithl*) for violations perpetrated by the regime.<sup>120</sup> Air time has also been given to preachers who have declared al-Sisi, his security apparatus and those who support him an apostate.<sup>121</sup> In addition, the *fatwa* invoked by the MB in its statement from May 2015, which legitimates potential violence, is signed by several *Salafist* scholars from within and outside Egypt.<sup>122</sup>

Thus in a time of crisis (since Mursi’s ousting and the severe repression that followed), the MB demonstrates more sympathy in its affiliated media toward *Salafist* positions and grants them air time. This seems not so much an approximation to *Salafist* thought as it is part of a

wider MB strategy to build broad alliances in its struggle against the al-Sisi-regime and in its quest to reinstall the democratically legitimate rule of the MB.<sup>123</sup>

Interestingly, segments within the militant *Salafist* spectrum in particular show ideological shifts that can be considered to be an ideological approximation to the MB, as they have started to eclipse those *Salafist* ideological elements that fundamentally clash with traditional MB thought. The group Afnad Misr is a case in point.

### ***Afnad Misr: A militant Salafist group moving toward the Muslim Brotherhood***

Afnad Misr was formed on 23 January 2014.<sup>124</sup> Its relationship to Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in particular is ambiguous: Although the group was considered to be the Cairo-based wing of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis after it described the latter as brothers,<sup>125</sup> it has not pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and differs greatly from the arguments made by Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis and other militant *Salafist* groups. Afnad Misr does not insist on the establishment of a global caliphate that reflects the global *umma* but rather it recognizes Egypt as a distinct nation-state that should be converted into an Islamic State.<sup>126</sup> Thus Afnad Misr focuses on the current Egyptian regime as the primary enemy and has coordinated attacks in Greater Cairo targeting police officers, stations, and vehicles.<sup>127</sup> The group has labeled its perpetrated attacks as “Retribution is life” (*qisas hayat*).<sup>128</sup> This points to another important characteristic of Afnad Misr that sets it apart from other militant *Salafist* groups. While Afnad Misr’s line of argumentation clearly exhibits militant *Salafist* ideology—the group for example refers to scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya and to *sira*-literature in order to justify its militant action against the Egyptian state<sup>129</sup>—the group refrains from practicing *takfir*.<sup>130</sup> Although Afnad Misr refers to al-Sisi as *taghut*, a term that means “tyrant” but also implies the Quranic meaning of “false god” or “idol”, it refrains from calling anyone an unbeliever (*kafir*) or an apostate (*murtadd*). Even the police, army, and security apparatus are labeled as “criminal agencies”<sup>131</sup> (*al-ajhiza al-ijramiyya*) in Afnad Misr’s regularly published claims of responsibility. As a consequence, instead of justifying its *jihad*, which the group declares the individual duty of every Muslim, with *takfir*, it calls for vengeance and retribution. In so doing it aligns itself with the line of argument advocated by the MB.

Afnad Misr thus functions as an ideological hinge: As representatives of the militant *Salafist* strand, it potentially opens up for non-*Salafists* by tying its call for *jihad* to retribution. Indeed, authors have reported that also some ex-MB members have joined the ranks of Afnad Misr.<sup>132</sup>

### **Conclusion**

This article has asked whether the post-Arab Spring era has witnessed an ideological approximation between the two large Islamist strands—the *Salafist* and the MB movement—in Egypt, concerning their notion of the state and of violence. To this end, this article has analyzed the ideological dynamics within the MB and among a variety of *Salafist* parties and militant groups.

Concerning the issue of political thought, this article has argued that all *Salafist* parties studied here have—like the MB—adopted some democratic elements, such as the rotation of power through regular elections or separation of powers. However, especially al-Nur (and its mother organization al-Dawa) as well as al-Raya have set their political visions apart from

that of the MB and have grounded these visions within *Salafist* legal–theological concepts and discourse. The most striking marker of their political thought is the linking of citizenship to a Muslim’s quality or quantity of creed, and the attaching of an eschatological function to the envisioned state. But as the *Salafist* spectrum diversifies, some *Salafist* parties not only choose their points of reference from within *Salafist* circles but also use arguments that reverberate MB discourse. These ideological moves towards the MB of certain segments of the *Salafist* movement are matched by a “Salafization” of parts of the MB.<sup>133</sup> Ideological dynamics within the Islamist spectrum are thus cutting across the *Salafist*–MB division. They have also been paralleled by cooperation between some *Salafist* parties and the MB since Mubarak’s ousting.

With regard to the question of violence, this article has argued that not only the MB but also the militant *Salafists* have seen important changes since Mursi’s ousting in 2013. New militant *Salafist* groups have emerged. While some are oriented toward ISIS and have increased their ideological distance to MB thought, other new militant *Salafist* groups have instead eclipsed those elements of the traditional militant *Salafist* doctrine that fundamentally clash with MB doctrine. This potentially allows more MB members to identify with these groups. On the other hand, although the MB displays more sympathy toward militant *Salafist* argumentation in its affiliated media (such as Misr al-An or Rabi’a TV), it does not seem to have adopted *Salafist* positions toward violence into the group’s official discourse. Instead, the MB in an important official statement from May 2015 refers to a *fatwa* that legitimizes potential violence as *Sharia*-prescribed redress for murder.

Struggles to redefine the MB’s identity and especially the legacy of its founding father Hasan al-Banna are especially prominent among the violence-prone segments within the MB youth. Should these MB segments in the process start to rely more strongly on the teachings of Sayyid Qutb (the other influential historical MB thinker after al-Banna) and on his conception of *takfir*, the greater the common ground between them and the militant *Salafists* might become. The MB and *Salafist* identities clearly still gain traction in the post–Arab Spring era and thus make sense as analytical categories, but scholars should take note of how these identities are currently being redefined, especially at the fringes of the movements. Without buying into the “ISIS-ification” of the MB brand of Islamism<sup>134</sup>—a policy and discourse that authoritarian regimes are currently perpetuating in the region, especially in Egypt and the Gulf, largely in an effort to reverse the Arab Spring—a further ideological approximation between the two large Islamist trends could facilitate cooperation in the future.

## Acknowledgments

We thank Sebastian Elischer, Sandra Destradi, and Adam Knobler, as well as two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

## Notes

1. Marc Lynch, “Introduction,” *POMEPS Briefings* 24, Project on Middle East Political Science (February 2014), 3–6. Available at <http://pomeps.org/2014/02/11/rethinking-islamist-politics-brief/> (accessed 9 July 2015); Jillian Schwedler, “Beyond Islamist Groups: Suggestions for a New Research Agenda on Islamist Politics,” *POMEPS Briefings* 24, Project on Middle East Political Science (February 2014), 47–49. Available at <http://pomeps.org/2014/02/11/rethinking-islamist-politics-brief/> (accessed 9 July 2015).

2. Important differences named are, for example: (1) While the MB is traditionally marked by a hierarchic organizational structure, the *Salafist* movement is more decentralized and marked by diverse follower-sheikh-relationships. (2) In contrast to the MB *Salafists* have a strong legal-theological endeavor and view themselves to be in the tradition of the traditional *ahl al-hadith* movement. Thus, while *Salafists* seek to purify religion, the MB has traditionally a more inclusive understanding of Islam. (3) While the MB—next to its *da'wa* activities—has been politically active and peaceful (at least for the past forty years), the *Salafist* mainstream has long been politically quietist. Only minorities within the *Salafist* movement have been embracing violence or formal politics. The literature, however, also names ideological interactions between the *Salafist* movement and the MB, such as their mutual reference to Sayyid Qutb. See Marc Lynch, "Islam Divided Between *Salafi-jihad* and the *Ikhwan*," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33(6) (2010), pp. 467–487; Stéphane Lacroix, *Awakening Islam. The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia* (London and Cambridge, MA: HUP, 2011), pp. 51–73, pp. 83–89; Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29 (2006), pp. 207–239, at p. 222; Roel Meijer, "Introduction," in Roel Meijer, ed., *Global Salafism. Islam's New Religious Movement* (London: Hurst & Company, 2009), pp. 1–32, at pp. 21–27. For a discussion on "Salafism" as an analytical category see Justyna Nedza, "'Salafismus'—Überlegungen zur Schärfung einer Analysekatgorie," in Behnam T. Said and Hazim Fouad, eds., *Salafismus. Auf der Suche nach dem wahren Islam* (Freiburg: Herder Verlag, 2014), pp. 80–105.
3. Khalil al-Anani and Maszlee Malik, "Pious Way to Politics: The Rise of Political Salafism in Post-Mubarak Egypt," *Digest of Middle East Studies* 22(1) (2013), pp. 57–73; Stéphane Lacroix, "Sheikhs and Politicians. Inside the New Egyptian Salafism," *Brookings Doha Center Policy Briefing* (2012), passim. Available at [www.brookings.edu/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/07-egyptian-salafism-lacroix/stephane-lacroix-policy-briefing-english.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/07-egyptian-salafism-lacroix/stephane-lacroix-policy-briefing-english.pdf) (accessed 9 July 2015); Jonathan Brown, "Salafis and Sufis in Egypt," *The Carnegie Papers*, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace (December 2011), pp. 8–11. Available at [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/salafis\\_sufis.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/salafis_sufis.pdf) (accessed 9 July 2015); Daniel A. Boehmer and James P. Murphy, "The Politicization of the Egyptian Salafiyya: Principled Participation and Islamist Competition in the Post-Mubarak Era," *IMES Capstone Paper Series* (2012), passim. Available at [www.gwu.edu/imes/assets/docs/Capstone%20Papers%20-%202012/Boehmer,%20Murphy.pdf](http://www.gwu.edu/imes/assets/docs/Capstone%20Papers%20-%202012/Boehmer,%20Murphy.pdf) (accessed 10 July 2015).
4. Ibrahim al-Hudaybi, "Al-Ikhwan fi marhala intiqaliyya," *Mada Masr* (18 February 2015). Available at <http://www.madamasr.com/ar/opinion/politics/الارخوان-غبي-مرحلة-انتقالية> (accessed 13 July 2015); Eric Trager, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood gets a Facelift," *Foreign Affairs* (May 2015); Mokhtar Awad, "Understanding the Ideological Drivers Pushing Youth Toward Violence in Post-Coup Egypt," *POMEPS Briefings* 24, Project on Middle East Political Science (February 2014), 9–12. Available at <http://pomeps.org/2014/02/11/rethinking-islamist-politics-brief/> (accessed 9 July 2015).
5. Trager, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood gets a Facelift."
6. Author Interview with 'Amr Darraj, Istanbul, 29 July 2015; Nathan J. Brown and Michele Dunne, "Unprecedented Pressures, Uncharted Course for Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood," *The Carnegie Papers*, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace (July 2015). Available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/07/29/unprecedented-pressures-uncharted-course-for-egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood/ie2g> (accessed 30 July 2015).
7. Mohamed Mötaser, *Muslim Brotherhood Statement Reiterates Commitment to January 25 Revolution löschen, Goals* (29 May 2015), n.p. Available at <http://ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=32154> (accessed 9 July 2015); Muhammad Muntassir, *Bism illah al-rahman al-rahim* (28 May 2015), n.p. Available at <https://www.facebook.com/M.B.SPOKESMAN1?ref=nf> (accessed 9 July 2015).
8. The hypothesis that *Salafist* parties might take a similar path as the MB and might turn more pragmatic once they participate in formal politics has been raised by Bjørn Olav Utvik, "The Ikhwanization of the *Salafis*: Piety in the Politics of Egypt and Kuwait," *Middle East Critique* 23(1) (2014), pp. 5–27; Khalil al-Anani, "The Role of Religion in the Public Domain in Egypt After the January 25 Revolution," *Research Paper*, Arab Center For Research & Policy Studies (April

2012), pp. 33–42. The question whether *Salafist* parties might adopt more pragmatic stances has also been raised by Lacroix, “Sheikhs and Politicians,” p. 9; Boehmer and Murphy, “The Politicization of the Egyptian *Salafiyya*.” The notion that *Salafist* parties might turn more pragmatic or moderate once they participate in electoral politics follows the logic of the “inclusion–moderation hypothesis,” which assumes that once radical political groups or parties enter electoral politics, they abandon their radical convictions as these may alienate large segments of voters. The inclusion–moderation hypothesis has its roots in the literature on the moderation of post-revolutionary socialist parties in Europe. See, for example, Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (New York: Free Press, 1962 [1915]); Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction,” in Lipset and Rokkan, eds. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives* (New York: Free Press, 1967). The hypothesis has also been taken up by the literature on the third wave of democratization. See, for example, Donald Share, “Two Transitions: Democratization and the Evolution of the Spanish Socialist Left,” *West European Politics* 8(1) (1985), pp. 82–103; Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993). Here the moderation of opposition groups was often viewed as facilitating processes of democratization. See, for example, Adam Przeworski, “Some Problem in the Study of the Transition to Democracy,” in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991 [1986]), pp. 47–63. For an opposite view see Nancy Bermeo, “Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict during Democratic Transitions,” *Comparative Politics* 29(3) (1997), pp. 305–322. In the past 10 to 15 years the hypothesis has also been taken up by scholars working on Islamist groups. See, for example, Janine Clark and Jilian Schwedler, “Who Opened the Window? Women’s Activism in Islamist Parties,” *Comparative Politics* 35(3) (2003), pp. 293–313; Mehmet Gurses, “Islamists, Democracy and Turkey: A Test of the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis,” *Party Politics* 20(4) (2012), pp. 646–653. For an excellent overview see Jilian Schwedler, “Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis,” *World Politics* 63(2) (2011), pp. 347–376.

9. Lynch, “Introduction,” pp. 3–6.
10. They represent different strands within the *Salafist* party spectrum. For a description of this spectrum see al-Anani/Malik, “Pious Way,” pp. 57–73; Lacroix, “Sheikhs and Politicians,” p. 7, 8; Ashraf El-Sherif, “Egypt’s *Salafists* at a Crossroads,” *Carnegie Endowment For International Peace* (April 2015), passim. Available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/29/egypt-s-salafists-at-crossroads/i7y8> (accessed 9 July 2015). *Salafist* political parties draw their strength from previously existing *Salafist* networks, which have been active in Egypt in providing social services and conducting missionary activities. They, thus, often have a strong local following. In the elections for the People’s Assembly in 2011/2012, several *Salafist* parties formed an electoral alliance and came second after the MB, with roughly 25 percent of the seats.
11. Al-Nur has been the second largest party represented in the parliament elected in 2011/2012; the party that won most seats had been the MB’s party.
12. See Mustafa Sulayman, “Rasmiyan... ‘Imad ‘Abd al-Ghafur yastaqil min ‘al-Nur’ wa-yu’assis ‘al-Watan,’” *al-‘Arabiyya* (29 December 2012/16 Safar 1434), n.p. Available at [www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/12/29/257655.html](http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/12/29/257655.html) (accessed 6 May 2015).
13. See Richard Gauvain, *Salafi Ritual Purity. In the Presence of God* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 238–240.
14. He was a former MB hard-liner, who had moved to the *Salafist* camp several years ago. See Brown, “*Salafis* and *Sufis*,” pp. 10, 11; Lacroix, “Sheikhs and Politicians,” pp. 7, 8.
15. See for example Hussam Tammam, *Tahawalat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun* (Cairo: Maktaba al-Madbuli, 2006); Khalil al-Anani, *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Misr* (Cairo: Maktaba al-Shuruq, 2007).
16. The MB won 88 seats, 20 percent of the total seats.
17. See, for example, Nathan Brown, Amr Hamzawy, and Marina Ottaway, “Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process in the Arab World: Exploring the Grey Zones,” *Carnegie Papers—*

- Middle East Series 67, *Carnegie Endowment For International Peace* (2006). Available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP67.Brown.FINAL.pdf> (accessed 31 July 2015).
18. Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, *Barnamaj al-Hizb: In urid ila l-islam ma istata't wa-ma tawfiqi illa bi-llah* (2007), p. 10.
  19. The MB has added the protection “dignity” to the legal concept of *maqasid*.
  20. See Annette Ranko, *The Muslim Brotherhood and its Quest for Hegemony in Egypt. State-Discourse and Islamist Counter-Discourse* (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2015), pp. 186–188. See Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, *Barnamaj al-Hizb*.
  21. See Ranko, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, pp. 188–189.
  22. See Annette Ranko, “Selective Moderation of the Muslim Brotherhood under Mubarak,” *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 55 (2014), p. 510.
  23. Rights that have a religious connotation are for example the active right to run for the office of president—if the state is deemed to have central religious duties. Gudrun Krämer, *Gottes Staat als Republik—Reflexionen zeitgenössischer Muslime zu Islam, Menschenrechten und Demokratie* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999).
  24. In the program of 2007 MB explicitly rejected a Christian head of state. After 2011 MB has sought to evade this question.
  25. Author Interview with Muhammad Habib, Cairo, 2010.
  26. Author interview with Muhammad Habib, Cairo, 2010. This also became visible when several members left the MB and founded their own parties after 2011. For example, the revolutionary youth formed its own party and two parties were formed by more pragmatic members of the “generation of the 1970ies.” See al-Anani, “The Role of Religion,” pp. 33–42.
  27. Author interview with Muhammad Habib, Cairo, 2010; author interview with ‘Abd al-Rahman Mansur, Cairo, 2010.
  28. Hossam Tammam, “The Salafization of the Muslim Brothers,” *Marased*, 2011, passim. Available at [https://www.bibalex.org/Attachments/Publications/Files/2012072613022217192\\_MRASE\\_Denglish2.pdf](https://www.bibalex.org/Attachments/Publications/Files/2012072613022217192_MRASE_Denglish2.pdf) (accessed 31 July 2015). Author Interview with Abu I‘Illa Madi, Cairo 2010; Author Interview with ‘Abd al-Rahman Mansur, Cairo, 2010.
  29. Author Interview with ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Ghazali, Cairo, 2010.
  30. Al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya’s party is to an extent an exemption, as the group has started to formulate political thought already from 1999 onward.
  31. Al-Anani, “The Role of Religion,” and al-Anani/Malik, “Pious Way.”
  32. Hizb al-Nur, *al-Barnamaj* (31 May 2011), pp. 1, 4, 5, 7. Available at [https://archive.org/details/hizb\\_alnoor](https://archive.org/details/hizb_alnoor) (accessed 10 July 2015); Hizb al-Raya-Muhafiza al-Qahira, *Barnamaj Hizb al-Raya* (20 March 2013), n.p. Available at [www.facebook.com/video.php?v=460529924019671](http://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=460529924019671) (accessed 4 May 2015); Hizb al-Watan, *Man nahnu* (n.d.), n.p. Available at [http://alwatanparty.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=12&Itemid=16](http://alwatanparty.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=12&Itemid=16) (accessed 10 July 2015); Al-Watan Party, *al-Dimuqratiyya al-haqiqa yatamm fiha* (21 March 2015), n.p. Available at [www.facebook.com/watanpartyeg/photos/pb.149164271898814.-2207520000.1430903101./480884345393470/?type=3&src=https%3A%2F%2Fscontent-lhr.xx.fbcdn.net%2Fphotos-xfp1%2Fv%2Ft1.0-9%2F11071745\\_480884345393470\\_6671048009440142913\\_n.png%3Foh%3Dc71b5f6cebe686a0485ce2dd569d80d1%26oe%3D55D48EEF&size=960%2C720&fbid=480884345393470](http://www.facebook.com/watanpartyeg/photos/pb.149164271898814.-2207520000.1430903101./480884345393470/?type=3&src=https%3A%2F%2Fscontent-lhr.xx.fbcdn.net%2Fphotos-xfp1%2Fv%2Ft1.0-9%2F11071745_480884345393470_6671048009440142913_n.png%3Foh%3Dc71b5f6cebe686a0485ce2dd569d80d1%26oe%3D55D48EEF&size=960%2C720&fbid=480884345393470) (accessed 10 July 2015); Hizb al-Fadila, *Ahdaf al-hizb* (1 May 2011), n.p. Available at <https://ar-ar.facebook.com/alfadyla> (accessed 10 July 2015).
  33. al-Anani/Malik, “Pious Way,” p. 65.
  34. See, for example, Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, ‘Abd al-Qadir, *al-‘Umda fi ‘idad al-‘udda li-jihad fi sabil allah ta‘ala* (n.d.), pp. 50–55, 107–165, 404–419. Available at [www.tawhed.ws/a?a=85ud42ss](http://www.tawhed.ws/a?a=85ud42ss) (accessed 3 April 2012); Joas Wagemakers, “Salafi Ideas on State-Building before and after the Rise of the Islamic State,” *POMEPS Studies* 12, Project on Middle East Political Science (March 2015), pp. 31–33. Available at <http://pomeps.org/2015/03/17/islamism-in-the-is-age/> (accessed 9 July 2015); ‘Abd al-Bari ‘Atwan, *al-Dawla al-Islamiyya. Al-judhur, al-tawahhush, al-mustaqbal* (Bayrut: Dar al-Saqi, 2015), pp. 21–44.
  35. To erect an “Islamic state” was the main goal of militant Islamist who assassinated President Sadat in 1981 and who threw Egypt into a wave of violence in the 15 years that followed. To

- mitigate fears in the society, *Salafist* parties today do not call for a theocratic, Islamic state but for a “modern state,” so as to set themselves apart from militants’ calls to a return to the early caliphate. This is quite a similar logic to the MB, that has called for a “civil state” instead for a theocracy, which they deem to be foreign to Islam and instead deem as a uniquely European medieval system of clerical rule of the Pope. See al-Nur, *Barnamaj*, pp. 3, 4; Yasir Burhami, *Limadha taghayyara mawqif al-salafiyin min al-muskaraka al-siyasiya* (2011), n.p. Available at [www.anasalafy.com/play.php?catsmktba=25230](http://www.anasalafy.com/play.php?catsmktba=25230) (accessed 24 March 2015); ‘Ala’ Bakr, *al-Farqan bayn al-dawla al-thiyyuqratiyya wa-dawla al-madaniyya wa-dawla al-islam* (21 March 2011), n.p. Available at [www.anasalafy.com/play.php?catsmktba=24914](http://www.anasalafy.com/play.php?catsmktba=24914) (accessed 24 March 2015).
36. See for example the analysis of Lacroix, “Sheikhs and Politicians,” and al-Anani/Malik, “Pious Way”; see also Utvik, “The Ikhwanization of the Salafis,” pp. 5–27. While most *Salafist* parties remain hesitant to use the term democracy, one *Salafist* party, however, openly calls for a “constitutional and democratic state” with an Islamic or *Salafist* frame of reference, the al-Watan party. See ‘Abd al-Ghafur, *Ru’ya Hizb al-Watan (1)*. Finally, like the MB, several *Salafist* parties also use the formula that the Christian minority would enjoy “same rights and duties” as Muslims. This suggests that Muslims and Christians would be granted equality before the law, but de facto this formula is limited to the realm of *political* rights and glosses over those political rights that are being attached religious connotations, as shown in the section before. See Hizb al-Nur, *Barnamaj*, p. 6; Al Watan Party, *al-Dimuqratiyya al-haqiqqa*; ‘Imad ‘Abd al-Ghafur ra’ys Hizb al-Watan nuhibbuka, *Ru’ya Hizb al-Watan li-mustaqbil al-wad’ al-siyasi fi Misr (2)* (6 February 2015), n.p. Available at [www.facebook.com/watanpartyeg/timeline?ref=page\\_internal](http://www.facebook.com/watanpartyeg/timeline?ref=page_internal) (accessed 6 May 2015).
  37. See El-Sherif, “Egypt’s Salafists at a Crossroads.” Thus the authors include into their analysis statements of al-Da’wa leaders.
  38. See ‘Ala’ Bakr, *al-Dawla bayn al-islam wa-l-madaniyya al-haditha* (22 February 2011), n.p. Available at [www.anasalafy.com/play.php?catsmktba=24247](http://www.anasalafy.com/play.php?catsmktba=24247) (accessed 24 March 2015); ‘Abd al-Mun’im Shahat, *Al-Islam „wa-l-dimuqratiyya“ mawatin al-ittifaq wa-mawatin al-ikhtilaf* (31 May 2013), n.p. Available at [www.anasalafy.com/play.php?catsmktba=40815](http://www.anasalafy.com/play.php?catsmktba=40815) (accessed 24 March 2015).
  39. Bakr, *al-Dawla*; al-Nur, *Barnamaj*, p. 2.
  40. al-Nur, *Barnamaj*, p. 3; Shahat, *Al-Islam*; Bakr, *al-Farqan*.
  41. al-Nur, *Barnamaj*, pp. 4, 5, 6.
  42. By drawing parallels to the understanding of the Sufi concept of annihilation (*fina*) by the Hanbalite scholars Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim, Burhami and Shahat try to resolve the contradiction of God as sole legislator and the people as source of legislative power. See Yasir Burhami, *Hawla al-ittiham bi-tahrim al-dimuqratiyya wa-rada biha idha addat ila tadbiq al-shari’a aw ja’t bi-l-salafiyin* (10 December 2011), n.p. Available at [www.anasalafy.com/play.php?catsmktba=31391](http://www.anasalafy.com/play.php?catsmktba=31391) (accessed 24 March 2015); Shahat, *Al-Islam*.
  43. While the *Salafists*’ understanding of *Sharia* is tied to the precepts of the most literalist and strict school of jurisprudence—the Hanbaliyya—the Muslim Brotherhood incorporates elements of *all* jurisprudential traditions. This offers the Muslim Brotherhood a relatively wide range of theological and legal options.
  44. See Bakr, *al-Farqan*; Kent Davis-Packard, “A Ripple Beneath the Surface: Trends in Salafi Political Thought,” Brookings—Analysis Paper 33 (September 2014). Available at <http://www.brookings.edu/media/research/files/papers/2014/09/22-salafis-egypt-davis-packard/a-ripple-beneath-the-surfacefinal.pdf> (accessed 31 July 2015).
  45. See Burhami, *Hawla al-ittiham*.
  46. Hizb al-Raya-Muhafiza al-Qahira, *Barnamaj*.
  47. *Ibid.*
  48. *Ibid.*
  49. The MB sometimes makes “emotional” references to the caliphate, especially in speeches, for example Supreme Guide Muhammad Badi’ shortly after Mubarak’s fall. But de facto the group accepts the nation-state as framework for its political activity and immediate goals. Author Interview with Hussam Tammam, Cairo, 2009.

50. Hizb al-Raya-Muhafiza al-Qahira, *Barnamaj*.
51. See Sulayman, "Rasmiyan... 'Imad 'Abd al-Ghafur"; 'Izz al-Din Saniqra and Sifa' Azab, "Dr. Yusri Hamad na'ib hizb «al-Watan» al-salafi al-jadid: utalib al-ra'ys Mursi bi-l-shafafiyya," *al-Sharq al-Awsat* (4 January 2013/21 Safar 1434), n.p. Available at <http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=12456&article=711641#.VUCpQJOjYtw> (accessed 26 April 2015); Hizb al-Watan, *Man nahnu*.
52. Al Watan Party, *Tarikh Hizb al-Watan* (8) (29 April 2015), n.p. Available at [www.facebook.com/watanpartyeg/photos/pb.149164271898814.-2207520000.1430903102./479163148898923/?type=3&src=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent-lhr.xx.fbcdn.net%2Fphotos-xap1%2Fv%2Ft1.0-9%2F11081196\\_479163148898923\\_6082898512564721207\\_n.png%3Foh%3Dd212b00be2912399e16ce20f37f3b430%26oe%3D55D47BCB&size=960%2C720&fbid=479163148898923](http://www.facebook.com/watanpartyeg/photos/pb.149164271898814.-2207520000.1430903102./479163148898923/?type=3&src=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent-lhr.xx.fbcdn.net%2Fphotos-xap1%2Fv%2Ft1.0-9%2F11081196_479163148898923_6082898512564721207_n.png%3Foh%3Dd212b00be2912399e16ce20f37f3b430%26oe%3D55D47BCB&size=960%2C720&fbid=479163148898923) (accessed 06 May 2015); Saniqra /Azab, "Dr. Yusri Hamad."
53. Author interview with Muhammad Habib, Cairo, 2010.
54. Saniqra /Azab, "Dr. Yusri Hamad."
55. Andrew McGregor, "Egypt's Muslim Brothers Watch as Divisions Rend Their Salafist Challenges," *Terrorism Monitor* 11(2) (2013), pp. 1–3. Available at [www.jamestown.org/single/?tx\\_ttnews\[tt\\_news\]=40364&no\\_cache=1#.VUCFrpOjYtx](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40364&no_cache=1#.VUCFrpOjYtx) (accessed 29 April 2015).
56. Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, *Barnamaj al-Hizb*, p. 10.
57. 'Abd al-Ghafur, *Ru'ya Hizb al-Watan* (1); Al Watan Party, *al-Dimuqratiyya al-haqiqa*.
58. Hizb al-Fadila, *Ahdaf*; 'Abd al-Rahman Kamal and Mustafa Tala't, "Tahaluf al-umma' yu'lin al-ribat fi 'l-shawari' wa-l-'awda li-l-mayadin li-nusra al-shar'iyya..wa-yahudd al-jihad wa-daght wasila al-taharrur min al-taba'iyya al-kharijiyya," *Jarida al-sha'b* (n.d.), n.p., available at [www.elshaab.org/news/53747/-العودة-للميادين-لنصر-الشرعية-والشوراع-والرباط-في-الاشوارع](http://www.elshaab.org/news/53747/-العودة-للميادين-لنصر-الشرعية-والشوراع-والرباط-في-الاشوارع) (accessed 09 July 2015); Hamdi Dabash, "5000 tawqi' li-insha' Hizb al-Fadila al-salafi.. wa «Hasan wa-Ya'qub» yarfudan ri'asatahu," *al-Misri al-Yawm* (19 May 2011), n.p. Available at <http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/132962> (accessed 10 July 2015).
59. See e.g. al-Anani, "Role of Religion," p. 31.
60. However, the authors acknowledge the inevitable limitations involved for research on the current dynamics within the Islamist spectrum under the present circumstances of severe state repression. The authors have sought to reduce this limitation by focusing to a large extent on texts (published by the respective Islamist groups) rather than on interviews.
61. See Hisham al-Suruji, "Wilayat Sina'i"far' Da'ish fi Misr..al-nish'a-al-tatawwur-al-ahdaf," *al-Islamiyyun* (18 February 2015), n.p. Available at <http://islamion.com/news/show/19463> (accessed 10 July 2015).
62. See Muhammad Kamil, "Jund al-Khilafa bi-Ard al-Kinana'.tanzim jadid yad'u li-qital al-Sisi wa-l-jaysh wa-l-shurta," *al-Watan* (24 September 2014), n.p. Available at [www.elwatannews.com/news/details/565087](http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/565087) (accessed 9 July 2015); Gianluca Mezzofiore, "Egypt: Isis-Linked Jund Al-Khilafah Threatens to Kill Christians," *International Business Times* (20 September 2014), n.p. Available at [www.ibtimes.co.uk/egypt-isis-linked-jund-al-khilafah-threatens-kill-christians-1467862](http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/egypt-isis-linked-jund-al-khilafah-threatens-kill-christians-1467862) (accessed 9 July 2015).
63. See 'Ali Bakr, "al-Qa'ida' al-Misriyya: al-ta'hirat al-muhtamala li-zuhur tanzim 'Ansar al-Jihad' fi Sina'i," *al-Ahram* (5 August 2012), n.p. Available at [www.siyassa.org.eg/NewsQ/2288.aspx](http://www.siyassa.org.eg/NewsQ/2288.aspx) (accessed 9 July 2015); The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, *Ansar al-Jihad* (n.d.), n.p. Available at <http://timep.org/esw/profiles/terror-groups/ansar-al-jihad/> (accessed 9 July 2015).
64. It is one of many militant groups who—without being unified under a common command—are calling themselves Ansar al-Shari'a in and outside Egypt. It is unclear whether it has ties to the groups Ansar al-Shari'a bi-Misr (formed in July 2013) that operates in Sinai or to Kata'ib Ansar al-Shari'a (formed in March 2014). See David Barnett, "New Ansar al Sharia in Egypt Claims more than a Dozen Shooting Attacks," *The Long War Journal* (18 March 2014), n.p. Available at [www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/03/new\\_ansar\\_al\\_sharia.php](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/03/new_ansar_al_sharia.php) (accessed 9 July 2015); Aaron Y. Zelin, "Know Your Ansar al-Sharia," *Foreign Policy* (21 September 2012), n.p. Available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/21/know-your-ansar-al-sharia/> (accessed 9 July 2015).

65. See The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, *Ajnad Misr* (n.d.), n.p. Available at <http://timep.org/esw/profiles/terror-groups/ajnad-misr/> (accessed 9 July 2015).
66. See Jan-Peter Hartung, *A System of Life. Mawdudi and the Ideologisation of Islam* (London: Hurst & Company, 2013), pp. 193–221; Sabine Damir-Geilsdorf, *Herrschaft und Gesellschaft. Der islamistische Wegbereiter Sayyid Quṭb und seine Rezeption* (Würzburg: Ergon, 2003), pp. 76–88, 179–190.
67. See Damir-Geilsdorf, *Herrschaft*, pp. 249–271.
68. See Lav, *Radical Islam*, pp. 167–191.
69. Joas Wagemakers, *A Quietist Jihadi-Salafi. The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi* (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 147–189.
70. See ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam al-Difa‘ ‘an aradi al-muslimin ahamm furud al-‘ayn (1404/1984), passim. Available at [www.tawhed.ws/r?I=x483iubf](http://www.tawhed.ws/r?I=x483iubf) (accessed 20 April 2011); Brynjar Lia, *Architect of Global Jihad : The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri* (London: Hurst & Company, 2007), pp. 72–75, 102–105; Lav, *Radical Islam*, pp. 170–175.
71. Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy. Why Jihad Went Global* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 143–150. For an account on how militant *Salafists* legitimize attacks on Muslim regimes and on how they frame these attacks as an integral part of their activism against the far enemy see Justyna Nedza, “The Sum of its Parts: The State as Apostate in Contemporary Saudi Militant Islamism,” in Camilla Adang, Hassan Ansari, Maribel Fierro, Sabine Schmidtke, eds., *Accusations of Unbelief in Islam. A Diachronic Perspective on Takfir* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), pp. 304–326.
72. See Roel Meijer, “Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong as a Principle of Social Action: The Case of the Egyptian al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya,” in Roel Meijer, ed., *Global Salafism. Islam’s New Religious Movement* (London: Hurst & Company, 2009), pp. 189–220, at 207–217; Omar Ashour, *The De-Radicalization of Jihadists. Transforming Armed Islamist Movements* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 90–109.
73. See Hossam Bahgat, “Who Let the Jihadis out?,” *Mada Masr* (16 February 2014), n.p. Available at [www.madamasr.com/sections/politics/who-let-jihadis-out](http://www.madamasr.com/sections/politics/who-let-jihadis-out) (accessed 10 July 2015).
74. See, for example, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, *Bi-khusus qasf ta‘irat isra‘iliyya bi-duna tayyar li-mujahidina fi Sina‘i* (23 July 2014), n.p. Available at <https://ilovesinai.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/d8a8d98ad8a7d986-d8a3d986d8b5d8a7d8b1-d8a8d98ad8aa-d8a7d984d985d982d8afd8b3.png> (accessed 11 July 2015).
75. Ahmad ‘Ashush, *al-Bayan al-ta‘sis li-l-tali‘a al-salafiyya al-mujahida Ansar al-Shari‘a* (n.d.), n.p. Available at [http://archive.org/download/bayan\\_17/Ba1.doc](http://archive.org/download/bayan_17/Ba1.doc) (accessed 11 June 2015).
76. Jama‘a Ansar al-Jihad fi Jazirat Sina‘i, *Bayan raqm (1)*.
77. Zelin, “Know Your Ansar al-Sharia.”
78. See Fiqi, “Ahmad ‘Ashush”; Jama‘a Ansar al-Jihad fi Jazirat Sina‘i, *Bayan raqm (1)*; Kamil, “«Jund al-Khilafa»”; ‘Ashush, *al-Bayan al-ta‘sis*; Jama‘a Ansar al-Bayt al-Maqdis, *Risala ila al-mujannidin min al-jaysh wa-l-shurta wa-ahalihim* (23 December 2013), n.p. Available at <http://alwakei.com/news/43384/index.html> (accessed 11 July 2015); Jama‘a Ansar al-Bayt al-Maqdis, *Al-jayshal-misri ‘amala wa-ijram* (11 September 2013), n.p. Available at <https://ilovesinai.wordpress.com/2013/09/13/الفرق-بين-جند-الاسلام-التكفيرية-وأنص> (accessed 11 July 2015).
79. See Jama‘a Ansar al-Bayt al-Maqdis, *Bi-khusus mubaya‘a amir al-mu‘minin Abi Bakr al-Baghdadi al-qurayshi al-husayni* (3 November 2014), n.p. Available at <http://almesryoon.com/-دفتر-أحوال-الوطن-588775-جماعة-أنصار-بيت-المقدس-تعلن-مبايعه-داع> (accessed 11 July 2015); Jama‘a Ansar al-Jihad fi Jazirat Sina‘i, *Bayan raqm (1)*; Kamil, “«Jund al-Khilafa»”; ‘Ali Bakr, “«al-Qa‘ida” al-Misriyya.”
80. Kamil, “Jund al-Khilafa.”
81. Jama‘a Ansar al-Jihad fi Jazirat Sina‘i, *Bayan raqm (1)*; Fiqi, “Ahmad ‘Ashush.”
82. Fiqi, “Ahmad ‘Ashush.” He, for example, also includes American or Israeli women into the category of combatans.
83. In doing so they referred to the Wahhabite scholar Ibn ‘Atiq (d. 1883/4) who in the so-called second Saudi state (1818–1891) during the war of succession in course of which one of the candidates requested the support of the Ottoman army described the collaboration with the foreign

- force as a violation of *al-wala' wa-l-bara'* and therefore as apostasy. See al-Dawla al-Islamiyya-Wilayat Sina'i, *Tahdhir wa-wa'id li-man a'ana junud al-ridda wa-l-tandid* (18 April 2015/28 Jumada I. 1436), n.p. Available at <http://xebercom.com/file/2015/04/CCy8YCVIAILH5p.jpg> (accessed 11 July 2015).
84. See The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, *Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis/Wilayat Sinai* (n.d.), n.p. Available at <http://timep.org/esw/profiles/terror-groups/ansar-bayt-al-maqdis/> (accessed 10 July 2015).
  85. About the doubts in his authorship see Barbara Zollner, *Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 65–71.
  86. *Ibid.*, pp. 71–86.
  87. See Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, pp. 86–93; Lav, *Radical Islam*, pp. 64–72.
  88. By 2005 the MB had become the by far biggest opposition bloc in parliament with 88 candidates.
  89. For an account of how the MB failed when in power and of the impact of Mursi's fall for Egypt's regional status see Elizabeth Iskander Monier and Annette Ranko, "The Fall of the Muslim Brotherhood: Implications for Egypt," *Middle East Policy* XX(4) (Winter 2013), pp. 111–123.
  90. Al-Hudaybi, "Al-Ikhwan."
  91. *Ibid.*; "Understanding the Ideological Drivers."
  92. Author interview with anonymous youth member of MB, Istanbul, 30 July 2015. 'Amr Darraj argues that 65 percent of the leaders (on all levels) have been replaced in recent elections. The majority of them is in their 30ies or below. As 1st, 2nd, and 3rd tiers of leaders have been imprisoned, he argues that now the 4th and 5th tiers have replaced them. He further argues, that the MB has seen a restructuring process that has brought with it a strong decentralization in decision making processes, and an increased autonomy of the different committees and divisions in order to face the current situation of repression. Author interview with 'Amr Darraj, Istanbul, 29 July 2015; Trager, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood gets a Facelift."
  93. Al-Hudaybi, "Al-Ikhwan"; Awad, "Understanding the Ideological Drivers."
  94. Montaser, *Muslim Brotherhood*; Muntassir, *Bism illah*.
  95. Mostafa Hashem, "A Generational Battle among Brothers," *Sada—Analysis on Arab Reform* (29 January 2015). Available at [http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/index.cfm?fa=show&article=58865&solr\\_hilite](http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/index.cfm?fa=show&article=58865&solr_hilite) (accessed 13 July 2015).
  96. This committee is dominated by the MB youth. Hashem, "A Generational Battle."
  97. Author Interview with Sa'd al-Katatni, Cairo, 2010; Al-Ikhwan al-Musulimin, *Mujaz 'an al-shura fi l-Islam wa-ta'dud al-Ahzab fi l-Mujtama' al-Muslim* (Cairo: Dar al-tawzi' wa-l-nashr al-islam-iyya, 1994).
  98. See Anonymous (Faris al-Thawra), *Risala ila sufuf al-thuwar: "wa-u'du"* (27 January 2015), n.p. Available at [www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.aspx?ArtID=220195&SecID=211](http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.aspx?ArtID=220195&SecID=211) (accessed 9 March 2015).
  99. Awad for example has argued that this has not been the case. Awad, "Understanding the Ideological Drivers."
  100. Anonymous (Faris al-Thawra), *Risala*.
  101. In Muslim legal thought several nonviolent forms of *jihad* are being identified. See Richard Bonney, *Jihād. From Qur'an to bin Laden* (London: Palgrave, 2004), pp. 91–107; E. Tyan, "Djihād," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 1963), vol. 2, pp. 538–540.
  102. Author interview with anonymous MB youth-leader, Istanbul, 30 July 2015.
  103. Anonymous, *Egypt Muslim Brotherhood Reiterates Commitment to Non-Violence* (20 January 2015), n.p. Available at [www.ikhwanweb.com/print.php?id=31988](http://www.ikhwanweb.com/print.php?id=31988) (accessed 10 July 2015). In addition, the *jihad*-statement had been taken off the Arabic website *ikhwanonline* after several weeks and the Arabic website has subsequently also been restructured, carrying mainly statements of the official MB media spokesperson, Muhammad Muntassir.
  104. Muntassir was designated as the new MB spokesperson after the restructuring processes and elections that had taken place within the MB in early 2015. He is in his mid-30s, is located in Egypt, and is described as a representative of the newly empowered revolutionary MB youth. Author interview with anonymous MB youth-leader, Istanbul, 30 July 2015.

105. However, this “official discourse” has not remained uncontested. As the discourse increasingly sharpened against al-Sisi and began to deem violence as a legitimate means in the struggle against the Egyptian regime, several old guard Brotherhood leaders (who had been spared imprisonment at least until summer 2015), such as Mahmud ‘Izzat and Mahmud Ghuzlan, came out in protest and declared that the new leadership camp was not entitled to talk in the name of the Muslim Brotherhood. This was quickly followed by a counterstatement by the new leadership camp on the group’s official media outlets. For an insightful study of the Muslim Brotherhood’s internal rifts and developments since 2013 see Samuel Tadros, “The Brotherhood Divided,” *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* (20 August 2015). Available at <http://www.hudson.org/research/11530-the-brotherhood-divided> (accessed 13 October 2015).
106. Muhammad Muntassir, ‘*Am min kharab..wa-tabqa al-thawra* (8 June 2015), n.p. Available at [www.facebook.com/M.B.SPOKESMAN1/posts/1455893004704870](http://www.facebook.com/M.B.SPOKESMAN1/posts/1455893004704870) (accessed 10 July 2015); al-Mutahaddith al-‘ilami bi-ism Jama‘a al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, *Mal’una ayy kalimat taqal fi hadha al-mawqif* (17 May 2015), n.p. Available at [www.facebook.com/M.B.SPOKESMAN1/posts/1449003055393865](http://www.facebook.com/M.B.SPOKESMAN1/posts/1449003055393865) (accessed 10 July 2015).
107. He has instead called for other actions; for example, he called on Egyptians living abroad to gather at Egyptian consulates and embassies to protest in order to give utterance to their anger. See Muntassir, ‘*Am min kharab*.
108. Mohamed Montaser, *Muslim Brotherhood*.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. Abu Hudhayfah, “‘Call of Egypt’—More than 150 Muslim Scholars Issue Statement Against the Sisi Regime,” *Documenting Oppression Against Muslims* (27 May 2015), n.p. Available at [www.doamuslims.org/?p=3356](http://www.doamuslims.org/?p=3356) (accessed 10 July 2015).
112. Mathias Rohe, *Das islamische Recht. Geschichte und Gegenwart* (München: Beck, 2011), p. 138f; Rudolph Peters, *Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law. Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-First Century* (New York et al: CUP, 2005), p. 39.
113. Peters, *Crime and Punishment*, p. 39f.
114. The finding that under circumstances of severe state repression—at least segments of—the MB have radicalized their discourse, supports a prominent body of political science literature, that argues that repression as well as political exclusion may lead to the radicalization of Islamist groups. See, for example, Mohammed M. Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004); Mohammed M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement,” in Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed., *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Katerina Dalacoura, “Islamist Terrorism and the Democratic Deficit in the Middle East: Political Exclusion, Repression and the Causes of Extremism,” *Democratization* 13 (2006).
115. See The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, (*Allied Popular Resistance Movement* (n.d.), n.p. Available at <http://timep.org/esw/profiles/terror-groups/aprm/> (accessed 10 July 2015); Anonymous, *Emerging Groups Threaten Egypt’s Security* (27 February 2015), n.p. Available at [www.msrisk.com/tag/revolutionary-punishment/](http://www.msrisk.com/tag/revolutionary-punishment/) (accessed 10 July 2015).
116. Al-Hudaybi, “Al-Ikhwan”; Awad, “Understanding the Ideological Drivers.”
117. Trager, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood gets a Facelift”; Anonymous, *Emerging Groups*. Several Facebook pages of the MBs Freedom and Justice Party promote these groups. See, for example, Hizb al-Hurriyya wa-l-‘Adala bi-Ma‘adi wa-l-Basatin, *Al-‘iqab al-thawri fi nisf ‘am* (15 June 2015), n.p. Available at [www.facebook.com/FreedomElMaadi/photos/pb.122306507875263.-2207520000.1436544430./720327048073203/?type=3&src=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent-lhr3-1.xx.fbcdn.net%2Fphotos-xpt1%2Fv%2Ft1.0-9%2F11406902\\_720327048073203\\_1097293919420367473\\_n.jpg%3Foh%3Df4a2344ec3fde43d84fed6c99999b56b%26oe%3D56584630&size=584%2C467&fbid=720327048073203](http://www.facebook.com/FreedomElMaadi/photos/pb.122306507875263.-2207520000.1436544430./720327048073203/?type=3&src=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent-lhr3-1.xx.fbcdn.net%2Fphotos-xpt1%2Fv%2Ft1.0-9%2F11406902_720327048073203_1097293919420367473_n.jpg%3Foh%3Df4a2344ec3fde43d84fed6c99999b56b%26oe%3D56584630&size=584%2C467&fbid=720327048073203) (accessed 10 June 2015).
118. Both groups orient their militant actions at economic targets and the Egyptian infrastructure. Increasingly they also target personnel of the security apparatus. They identify their call for militancy as an act of vengeance mainly for the MB and its supporters killed by the regime since

2013. Important to note is that—in contrast to the MBs new line of argumentation that draws on religious/legal elements—the argumentation of the Revolutionary Punishment stays completely unreligious. See Anonymous, ‘*Ajil! Bayan raqm 7*’ (30 January 2015), n.p. Available at [www.facebook.com/LOVERS.OF.IKHWAN](http://www.facebook.com/LOVERS.OF.IKHWAN) (accessed 10 July 2015); Haraka al-‘iqab al-thawri, ‘*Amaliyya qita’ al-alsina*’ (14 April 2015), n.p. Available at <https://vimeo.com/124974473> (accessed 14 June 2015); Anonymous, “The First Communique of the Popular Resistance Movement,” *Middle East Monitor* (15 August 2014).
119. Anonymous, “Muslim Brotherhood Turn to Terrorism Against Al-Sisi Regime: Threats of Attacks Against Foreign Diplomats, Workers In Egypt On Turkey-Based MB TV, Calls for Jihad And For Assassination Of Al-Sisi, Regime Heads,” *Special Dispatch 5972*, The Middle East Media Research Institute (20 February 2015), n.p. Available at [www.memri.org/report/en/print8446.htm](http://www.memri.org/report/en/print8446.htm) (accessed 10 July 2015).
120. See Hosam Elnil, #*Salama ‘Abd al-Qawi yuharrid ‘ala qatl #al-Sisi* (13 January 2015). Available at [www.youtube.com/watch?v=sU7-W5iEvXg](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sU7-W5iEvXg) (accessed 10 July 2015).
121. See PalEgy, *al-Qiyadi al-ikhwani Wajdi Ghanim yuharrid ‘ala l-qatl* (28 January 2015). Available at [www.youtube.com/watch?v=dore\\_yynFEE&feature=youtu.be](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dore_yynFEE&feature=youtu.be) (accessed 10 July 2015); IslamicThoughts, *al-Shaykh Wajdi Ghanim—bi-adalla al-Sisi kafir wa-murtadd ‘an al-Islam* (11 August 2013). Available at [www.youtube.com/watch?v=p10qrVE\\_Vjw](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p10qrVE_Vjw) (accessed 10 July 2015).
122. See Abu Hudhayfah, “Call of Egypt.”
123. As the MB leadership has not yet ultimately positioned itself whether violence will be an indispensable part of that struggle, it has also declared to seek increasing cooperation with democratic and nonviolent political and social forces in and outside Egypt. Author interview with anonymous MB youth-leader, Istanbul, 30 July 2015; in combination with ‘Amr Darraj, Istanbul, 29 July 2015.
124. See The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, *Ajnad Misr* (n.d.), n.p. Available at <http://timep.org/esw/profiles/terror-groups/ajnad-misr/> (accessed 10 July 2015).
125. Anonymous, “‘Ajnad Misr’ wa-istinsakh ‘Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis’ (bayn ‘al-Ikhwan’ wa-‘Hazi-mun’),” *Bawab al-Harakat al-Islamiyya* (21 July 2014), n.p. Available at [www.islamist-movements.com/3064](http://www.islamist-movements.com/3064) (accessed 10 July 2015).
126. See Ajnad Misr, *Tafghir al-hiwar al-maftuh ma’ al-mas’ul al-‘am li-Ajnad Misr al-qa’id Majd al-Din al-Misri* (13 January 2015), p. 3. Available at [https://twitter.com/ajnad\\_misr\\_02](https://twitter.com/ajnad_misr_02) (accessed 10 July 2015).
127. The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, *Ajnad Misr*.
128. See, for example, Ajnad Misr, *Bayan raqm 004* (7 February 2014), n.p. Available at [www.copts-united.com/uploads/1803/41\\_20140207164213.jpg](http://www.copts-united.com/uploads/1803/41_20140207164213.jpg) (accessed 11 July 2015); Ajnad Misr, *Bayan raqm 005* (2 April 2014), n.p. Available at <http://almesryoon.com/images/ad622c50085b56ca4e0ea3337abd0c07.jpg> (accessed 1 July 2015); Ajnad Misr, *Bayan raqm 009* (30 June 2014), n.p. Available at [http://media.elwatannews.com/news/Large/247326\\_7047439.JPG](http://media.elwatannews.com/news/Large/247326_7047439.JPG) (accessed 11 July 2015).
129. It also takes up a hostile position against Shiites. See Ajnad Misr, *Tafghir*, pp. 11, 15.
130. In order to avoid being described as Murji’ites—a polemic term that relates to an early theological Muslim school and is mostly used by militant *Salafists* against their politically quietist and political counterparts who refuse to practice *takfir*—Ajnad Misr emphasize *takfir* as a legit legal practice. See Ajnad Misr, *Tafghir*, p. 19; Lav, *Radical Islam*, passim.
131. See, for example, Ajnad Misr, *Bayan raqm 004*; Ajnad Misr, *Bayan raqm 006* (19 April 2014), n.p. Available at [www.vetogate.com/upload/photo/gallery/44/5/560x1000/547.jpg](http://www.vetogate.com/upload/photo/gallery/44/5/560x1000/547.jpg) (11 July 2015); Ajnad Misr, *Bayan raqm 010* (21 September 2014), n.p. Available at [www.misr5.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/جماعة-أجناد-مصر.jpg](http://www.misr5.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/جماعة-أجناد-مصر.jpg) (accessed 11 July 2015).
132. See Anonymous, “Ajnad Misr.”
133. Tammam, “The Salafization of the Muslim Brothers.”
134. Khalil al-Anani, “The ISIS-ification of Islamist politics,” *POMEPS Studies 12*, Project on Middle East Political Science (March 2015), pp. 37–38. Available at <http://pomeps.org/2015/03/17/islamism-in-the-is-age/> (accessed 9 July 2015).