


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### Are Terrorists Courageous? Micro-Sociology of Extreme Left Terrorism

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## Are Terrorists Courageous? Micro-Sociology of Extreme Left Terrorism

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*This article contests the affirmation—based on common sense—according to which terrorists simply need courage. The typical terrorist act can be considered part of the sociological category known as “vile violence” that is the act of striking out at a victim after having placed him or her in a desperate situation that does not allow for any escape. This article is based on primary and secondary sources, such as the analysis of thirty-five homicides committed in Italy by six terrorist units of the extreme left; interviews with extreme left terrorists; interviews with victims of extreme left terrorists; autobiographies of extreme left terrorists; autobiographies of victims of extreme left terrorists; video interviews of extreme left terrorists; and written statements of the investigating magistrates.*

### The Adrenaline in Terrorists’ Bodies

To use violence in an effective manner, terrorists must control the flow of adrenaline that invades their bodies when they are ready to kill their victims. As is true for all people, terrorists also fear physical clashes; they fear killing and being killed. How do they control this fear and remain lucid when they shoot?

Consisting of three parts, this article seeks to answer this question by using a micro-sociological approach. The first part presents the primary and secondary sources relating to the problem. The second describes the sociological approach supporting the research. The third discusses a typical terrorist act that may be considered part of the sociological category known as “vile violence” that is the act of striking out at a victim after having placed him or her in a desperate situation that does not allow for any escape. The limitations of this study are delineated in the conclusion.

This article contests the affirmation—based on common sense—according to which terrorists simply need courage. On the contrary: the professional terrorist is an organizer of “situations of death” based on vile violence.

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## Sources

### *This Article Is Based on the Following Sources*

First, an analysis of thirty-five homicides committed in Italy by six terrorist units of the extreme left between 1976 and 2002. The terrorist organizations are the Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades), Prima Linea, Proletari Armati per il Comunismo, Brigata XXVIII marzo, Comitati Comunisti Rivoluzionari, and Nucleo di Comunisti. The homicides were reconstructed by analyzing the evidence issued by the investigating magistrates in their written statements. When it has not been possible to access this evidence, articles published by the *Corriere della Sera* and by *La Stampa* have been used.

The homicides that have been analyzed are those of Enrico Pedenovi (Milan, 29 April 1976); Francesco Coco (Genoa, 8 June 1976); Giovanni Saponara (Genoa, 8 June 1976); Antioco Deiana (Genoa, 8 June 1976); Lorenzo Cotugno (Turin, 11 April 1978); Francesco Di Cataldo (Milan, 20 April 1978); Giuseppe Lorusso (Turin, 19 January 1979); Guido Rossa (Genoa, 24 January 1979); Emilio Alessandrini (Milan, 29 January 1979); Andrea Campagna (Milan, 19 April 1979); Antonio Cestari (Milan, 8 January 1980); Rocco Santoro (Milan, January 8, 1980); Michele Tatulli (Milan, 8 January 1980); Paolo Paoletti (Monza, 5 February 1980); Guido Galli (Milan, 19 March 1980); Walter Tobagi (Milan, 28 May 1980); Renato Briano (Milan, 12 November 1980); Manfredo Mazzanti (Sesto San Giovanni, 28 November 1980); Luigi Marangoni (Milan, 17 February 1981); Antonio Frasca (Settimo Milanese, 3 June 1981); Aldo Moro's bodyguards: Domenico Ricci, Oreste Leonardi, Giulio Rivera, Francesco Zizzi, Raffaele Iozzino (Rome, 16 March 1978); Aldo Moro (Rome, 9 May 1978); Francesco Rucci (Milan, 18 September 1981); Giuseppe Taliercio (Venice, 6 July 1981); Giorgio Soldati (Cuneo, 10 December 1981); Roberto Peci (Rome, 3 August 1981); Lando Conti (Florence, 10 February 1986); Licio Giorgieri (20 March 1987); Roberto Ruffilli (Forlì, 16 April 1988); Massimo D'Antona (Rome, 20 May 1999); and Marco Biagi (Bologna, 19 March 2002).

Second, eight extreme left terrorists have been convicted of multiple homicides (five women and three men). Of these, only two agreed to be interviewed on the means they used to kill their victims. Five of the terrorists are currently being held in a maximum-security prison in an Italian city. On 23 February 2012, I received a letter from magistrate Roberto Calogero Piscitello, the director general of Italian Prisons, who informed me that these terrorists had rejected my proposal to interview them in prison in the strongest possible terms. They would never speak to me—wrote the judge—for any reason.

The sixth terrorist has spoken directly to the author, using a series of offensive remarks. According to this convicted terrorist, this author is “a servant in the service of capitalism” who utilizes sociology against the interests of the proletariat. An outline of this semi-structured interview is found in Appendix 1.

Third, semi-structured interviews with three victims who survived attacks by members of the Red Brigades and Prima Linea. The first two victims were rendered lame as the result of gunshot wounds; the third is a woman who saw the kneecapping of her father by Red Brigade members. These victims were asked to reconstruct what the terrorists were doing and saying as they fired. This semi-structured interview may be found in Appendix 2.

Fourth, nine video interviews of extreme left terrorists at the archives of Italian State Television (RAI) have been used. Of these, only the interview with Franco Bonisoli—one of the Red Brigades members who attacked the bodyguards of Aldo Moro—was useful in the reconstruction of the emotional tension that filled the bodies of the terrorists while they were killing their victims. This interview dates back to 1989.

Fifth, the autobiographies of the following extreme left terrorists: Patrizio Peci,<sup>1</sup> Mario Moretti,<sup>2</sup> Renato Curcio,<sup>3</sup> Valerio Morucci,<sup>4</sup> Prospero Gallinari,<sup>5</sup> Alberto Franceschini,<sup>6</sup> Raffaele Fiore,<sup>7</sup> Sergio Segio,<sup>8</sup> Tonino Loris Paroli,<sup>9</sup> and Anna Laura Braghetti.<sup>10</sup> Patrizio Peci is the only extreme left terrorist to have described carefully his emotional state while he killed his victims.

Sixth, the autobiography of Sergio Lenci has been used. Lenci was a professor of Architecture at the University of Rome “La Sapienza” who survived an attack by Prima Linea and who described what the terrorists were doing while they tried to kill him. They shot Lenci in the head but did not realize that, miraculously, he remained alive. Between 1980 and 2000, Lenci lived with a bullet stuck in his cranium.

### Violent Situations: A Typology

According to sociologist Randall Collins, the process of becoming civilized has encouraged in humanity a psychological propensity to avoid physical clashes. This is the reason why in the situations of daily life it is not easy that violence develops. In the imminence of a violent clash, a strong emotional tension strikes people and renders them less lucid and with reduced control over their bodies’ movements. Even in the rare cases in which physical contact is reached, violence is almost always ineffective because of what Randall Collins termed “the barrier of confrontational tension and fear” that slows down the surge of the combatants. In order to strike and to bloody a person it is not a body that is in shape and muscular that is needed. What is required is a particular situation that makes it possible to keep the flow of adrenaline under control.<sup>11</sup>

Collins has found five “situations” that help avoid the barrier of confrontational tension and fear.<sup>12</sup>

As we will see, the typology of violence exercised by terrorists of the extreme left consists of a combination of the violent situation of type one and the violent situation of type four. Terrorists prefer to attack weak and isolated people through deceit.

1. Most widespread is the violent situation that Collins calls “attacking the weak” (i.e., a person who is weak, undefended, and isolated). When two groups consisting of numerous persons confront each other, everything usually ends with insults and threats. If, instead, a group of persons targets an isolated individual, the probability that violence will manifest itself is very high. To assault an isolated individual reduces the production of adrenaline that derives from the fear of being overcome by the victim’s reaction.
2. The second method of avoiding the emotional tension that is unleashed in the imminence of a physical clash is represented by disciplined combat following rules addressed to spectators (*audience-oriented, staged, and controlled fair fights*). This means a “fair” form of violence because it is subject to a series of agreed-on practices that aim at gratifying spectators. For example, duels were limited to aristocrats and gentlemen who sought to kill each other respecting a ceremony. The duelers succeeded in overcoming the emotional barrier of fear represented by clashes by switching attention from the adversary to the audience. Their major preoccupation was to give a positive image of themselves during a violent *performance*.
3. The third type of violent situation is represented by combat in which the adversaries strike at each other over long distances. The best way to unleash violence consists in striking the enemy without witnessing their agony. As we will see below

by reconstructing the violence of the terrorists, observing a person covered in blood that breathes his last involves an enormous emotional engagement. Soldiers prefer to fire artillery from far away rather than look at their dying enemies in the eyes. However, long-distance violence has the disadvantage of rendering violence imprecise and, therefore, ineffective.

4. The fourth method of overcoming the barrier of confrontational tension and fear consists in the strategic use of deceit. This is the most effective form of violence. It verifies itself when the attacker approaches the victim without allowing him to understand his intentions. The victim does not have the time to react and cannot touch off in the aggressor the emotional tension that derives from fear and from physical encounter. By approaching the victim deceitfully, the assassin succeeds in keeping under control the flow of adrenaline that pass through his body.
5. The fifth situation that helps the aggressor to overcome the emotional barrier of a clash is the situation in which snipers find themselves in wartime—concentrated more on their technical expertise than on the physical suffering of the victim. The sniper's main problem is to calculate the right distance and the best time to squeeze the trigger. Snipers also have the advantage of hiding from the view of their enemies. By avoiding direct interaction, snipers keep the flow of adrenaline at a rather low level. All this makes their violence particularly diligent, competent, and effective.

### **The First Semi-Structured Interview with the Terrorist Adriano**

What is the situation preferred by terrorists when they decide to kill or kneecap their victims?

These are the words of Adriano [not his real name]; a terrorist who committed multiple homicides and was interviewed by the author in 2014 for a total of six hours spread over three meetings. In some phases of the interview, Adriano asked to interrupt the taping of his voice but consented to the taking of notes. Adriano was condemned for committing seven homicides. In addition to having killed people, he also shot some victims in the legs. He has two university degrees. As I have already indicated, the framework of this semi-structured interview is found at the end of this article.

Question: "What is necessary to prepare to commit a homicide?"

Adriano: "The first thing is to prepare everything with extreme care, you have to plan the details. When you hit a target you have to be certain not to take risks. If you do not want to take risks, your target must not have any way to escape."

Question: "You are saying that, when you strike a target, you must be sure that he cannot defend himself. Have I understood you correct?"

Adriano: "Precisely. When you hit a target you have to be sure that he cannot defend himself."

Question: "How can you be sure that he does not have any way to escape?"

Adriano: "First you have to follow him for a long time and know his habits perfectly."

Question: "How many people are necessary to accomplish that?"

Adriano: "It depends on the kind of target you want to hit, but also on the type of city, the type of neighborhood in which the enemy finds himself. First you

have to understand if the neighborhood is a busy one, and if there are many police. If you strike a man like Aldo Moro, you need a lot of men, but I have never attacked people that were so important, even if I was one of the heads of my organization. In order to kill a person without bodyguards I used four or five men to track him. We would relieve each other, take turns.”

Question: “You would relieve each other for what reason?”

Adriano: “We would relieve each other, for example, when our target left home for work. A comrade would wait for him by his house in order to understand what his hours were. It was necessary to observe everything. You have to see if he leaves with his children, with his wife, whether he brings his children to school, whether he walks to work, whether he takes the tram, whether he drives. Then you follow him to his job. Then another comrade arrives and lingers before his building where the person—the target—enters. If there is only one comrade tailing him the risk of being recognized by the victim or the police increases.”

Question: “What is the best way to organize a homicide?”

Adriano: “I told you, it is important to pay attention to the details.”

Question: “Certainly, this is clear, but. . .”

Adriano: “You must strike your objective when you are certain that there are no ways to escape, that he cannot run away. You have to strike when he does not expect it. Timing is very important. It should be fast, very fast. You must do everything fast. You have to strike quickly and get a way fast because once you have fired time works against you. When I killed a person, I did not only have the problem of killing but of getting away.”

Question: “I understand. Can you tell me something about your emotional state? I mean: in the morning the alarm rings, you wake up and take the pistol, ok? You are going out to shoot. What do you feel inside? Are you agitated? What goes through your head?”

Adriano: “The first thing that you do before leaving home is to check your pistol. You have to make sure that it is working well, that everything is set. The pistol has to be perfect.”

Question: “Sure, and then? You leave home and then what? Are you agitated?”

Adriano: “Wait, even this depends. You must consider that I am a person, let’s say, who has always been used to violence. Before killing, I would shoot people in the legs, so I did not begin with a homicide, that came gradually.”

Question: “When you wake up in the morning. . .”

Adriano: “You wake up in the morning [here Adriano pauses a few seconds]. My brain, but also my body, perceives everything in a way that is speeded up. When I would leave the house, my perception, my sense organs, perceived everything that happened around me in a way that was speeded up. It was as if I was going a thousand per hour while the world stood still. I would have recognized danger from a kilometer away. If a leaf moved I would notice it! However, I can tell you that not everyone commits a homicide with the same feelings.

Question: “You participated in the homicide of [name omitted] Can you tell me something about that action?”

Adriano: “Why we decided to kill him?”

Question: “No, I would like to know, please, how you all killed him. I would like you to reconstruct the situation in which you all killed him. Did you kill him?”

Adriano: “Yes, I killed him, I remember it well. I organized the ambush. I led the group.”

Question: “Please tell me what time it was, if it was cold or hot, if the street was busy or deserted. Please, tell me everything you remember.”

Adriano: “I remember that it was cold, it was winter, in the morning, very early. I was with a female comrade. Both of us fired. She fired as well, but she had to conduct battles within herself, against herself.”

Question: “What battles?”

Adriano: “Battles, enormous interior breaches. She was not made for shooting. She fired, but she was not an expert like me.”

Question: “And you? Do you remember if your body shook before firing?”

Adriano: “No, no, my body did not shake, but. . . . Even when you fire—you have to understand this—it is not that you are alone. There are three, four, five comrades with you. A comrade is hidden around the corner and is the lookout; another waits in the car; another comrade hides somewhere else and is ready to intervene if things go badly. When you fire you know that you are not alone. Understood? You know that comrades are with you and are ready to intervene.”

Question: “Is it this that makes you strong, that gives you security?”

Adriano: “Obviously, this makes you strong.”

Question: “The victim, instead, does not notice anything. Right?”

Adriano: “The victim does not notice anything because you have prepared everything in detail. You have to strike him when he does not expect it but sometimes things do not go right. It can happen that you make a mistake. However, if you have prepared things well, if you have paid attention to the details, you can’t make a mistake, except in exceptional cases.”

Question: “Then, if I understand correctly, you would all fire on your victims when these were in a condition of great weakness. Is this correct?”

Adriano: “The fundamental problem is that of tailing the victim well. Before entering into action, you must be certain that everything is organized in the minimum details. You cannot leave anything to chance. Before firing, you have to know exactly what are the habits of the person you are striking. You must be certain that [the victim] cannot flee. You must put the person [you kill] in the condition of not being able to defend himself. He cannot ask for help. If the victim is weak, you are strong. This is why you must strike [the victim] at the right moment, when he is isolated, possible early in the morning, when there are few people around and when there is not much traffic. Managing the details is fundamental.”

I will summarize the most important points of Adriano’s testimony.

There is the realization that a homicide requires a complex organization. The principal aim of the activity of the terrorists is that of placing the victim in a desperate condition. Before being killed, the left-wing terrorists have to be certain that the victim has no possibility of defending himself or of asking for help. Adriano helps us to understand that the typical violence perpetrated by terrorists of the extreme left is aimed against defenseless persons who are attacked when they do not expect it.

I would like to enrich Adriano's testimony with that of Patrizio Peci, a *brigatista* who committed multiple homicides and who we will discuss more in depth later on. In his autobiography, published for the first time in 1983, Peci writes that the victims of the Red Brigades must never react when they are about to be struck. Peci explains that the victims see before them only one *brigatista* but do not know if they are surrounded by other members of the Red Brigades who are ready to intervene if there is any reaction on the part of the victim. For each action, Peci continues, there is always a Red Brigades member who fires at the victim and another three who are hiding. Of these three, one is always armed with an assault rifle.<sup>13</sup>

The thirty-five homicides that I have analyzed during my research confirm Peci's words. For reasons of brevity, I will limit myself to describe the homicide of Lorenzo Cotugno, a prison guard in Turin who was killed on 11 April 1978.

Lorenzo Cotugno had just exited the elevator to go to work. When the doors opened, the *brigatista* Cristoforo Piancone fired some pistol shots into Cotugno's legs, and he reacted by firing three shots against Piancone. At this point, the *brigatista* Nadia Ponti entered into action. Cotugno and Ponti looked at each other in the eyes and fired at the same time. Two bullets, one in the left leg and one in the right arm struck Ponti. Immediately a third *brigatista* entered into action—Vincenzo Acella—who had been hiding behind the elevator, behind Cotugno. Acella fired two bullets into Cotugno's back and then one into his head. The *brigatisti* succeeded in getting away. Cotugno—who initially believed that he was fighting only against one person—died.

## The Second Semi-Structured Interview with the Terrorist Massimiliano

Let's go now to the testimony of Massimiliano [not his real name], the second terrorist who has committed multiple homicides, interviewed by the author in 2011.

I will only give part of my interview, which lasted over three hours in a single sitting.

Question: "A while ago you told me that, when you belonged to your organization and lived underground, fear accompanied you everywhere, that it never abandoned you. Can you help me better understand what you were afraid of?"

Massimiliano: "I lived with the fear of dying. I lived with the fear of being arrested or killed. When I left my lair I knew that every step I took could be my last. I knew that the police had my photograph and that I could meet a carabinieri at every corner of the city. I went around with a pistol and had to be ready to use it. I always had a pistol with me. In fact, I was arrested while I was seated at a table in a bar [café] while I spoke to a comrade. We were seated outside and were drinking in that bar in via [name omitted]. I don't know if it still exists. It was a beautiful day. All of a sudden, I saw a lot of people emerging from behind the plants with pistols in hand. They were carabinieri.

Question: "What plants?"

Massimiliano: "The bar was surrounded by plants. The plants that separated the tables from the street."

Question: "Why were you sentenced to life?"

Massimiliano: "I don't know."

Question: "Did you ever fire at anyone?"

Massimiliano: "Yes."

Question: "Can you explain to me how an ambush is organized? If I wanted to kill or shoot someone in the legs, what would I have to do?"

Massimiliano: "First you would have to be very good at tailing people. You have to study all the habits of your victim—when he leaves the house, where he parks his car, if he has children, if he takes them to school, when he gets back home."

Question: "Where would you get all this information?"

Massimiliano: "It's a job. It was my job."

Question: "I understand. Could you explain to me in detail how an ambush is organized? For example, you woke up in the morning and you knew that you had to take action against an enemy. At what time did you wake up? What went through your head before leaving home? Were you nervous, preoccupied?"

Massimiliano: "I would always set the alarm clock early, even when I did not have to take action against a target. I would leave home early, when the city was busy, to hide myself in the crowd."

Question: "And then what would you do?"

Massimiliano: "I would follow my target. I would frequently gather information on my targets indirectly."

Question: "In what sense? From whom would you get information?"

Massimiliano: "Sometimes I would get it from plumbers or from workers."

Question: "Sorry, I don't understand. What was the role of plumbers?"

Massimiliano: "Many workers were our sympathizers. I'll give you an example. A group of workers went to a person's house to do a job. Then they would contact us and say: we are doing a job at the house of an important person! The workers would tell us how a building was laid out, about the apartment, at what time the children went to school, if there was a garage in the building, the license plate number, and so on."

Question: "Once you gathered this information, you were ready to strike? Is that true?"

Massimiliano: "Certainly, you can strike only when you are sure that you will not be seen. The effect of surprise is decisive. You have to get close to the victim without being noticed. You have to get a meter from him without getting recognized, and then you fire."

Question: "You have to fire when the victim is desperate, right?"

Massimiliano: "No, if the victim is desperate it means that you have made some mistake. The victim does not have to notice anything until the last second."

Question: "If he is desperate it means that he can ask for help. Isn't that true?"

Massimiliano: "Exactly. It happened sometime. If the victim starts yelling, or even running away, the action could fail and the comrades be put at risk."

Question: "What do they risk?"

Massimiliano: "They risk, they risk! [Massimiliano has an agitated tone.] They risk being captured by the police, of being recognized by someone. There is also the risk that the person you are following has a pistol. This has happened. It has happened that some had a pistol and began firing against the comrades. A [female] comrade died in this way because while we were tailing him no one understood that he went around with a pistol."

Question: “You would gather a lot of information in order to strike without risking being hit. You knew everything about your victims while they knew nothing about you.”

Massimiliano: “The effect of surprise is fundamental.”

Question: “The more your victims were weak, the more you were strong. Is that right? Can I say that?”

Massimiliano: “That depends on what you mean. Sure, before beginning an operation you must be certain that the person you are striking has absolutely no possibility of defending himself or of being defended. Tailing someone allows you to understand if your target is armed or has an escort.”

To summarize the most important points of Massimiliano’s testimony: extreme left terrorists fear being killed. Before completing a homicide they study the habits of their victims to be sure that they are fighting against people who are completely helpless. Like Adriano, Massimiliano explains that the typical violence of extreme left terrorists is aimed at people who cannot defend themselves and who do not expect to be attacked.

Fear of dying is found also in the video interview of Franco Bonisoli, one of the terrorists of the Red Brigades who murdered the bodyguards of Aldo Moro on 16 March 1978 (five killed). Four *brigatisti* fired against the policemen: Raffaele Fiore, Valerio Morucci, Prospero Gallinari, and Franco Bonisoli.

### The Video Interview with Franco Bonisoli

Bonisoli is one of the few extreme left terrorists who have spoken about the emotional tension that affected their body while they killed their victims. In remembering the massacre, Bonisoli is overcome by great emotional tension that does not allow him to control his facial muscles. His jaw, his eyes, and his cheeks tremble visibly. Bonisoli covers his mouth with his hand and begs the journalist Sergio Zavoli to stop the cameras so he will have time to recover from that explosion of emotion. Bonisoli says that he does not have a lucid remembrance of what happened in the minutes of the massacre because he was prey to a powerful emotional tension that made him little present to himself. He explains that Aldo Moro was accompanied by a group of armed men that could have responded to the fire of the terrorists. According to Bonisoli, the fundamental problem was to execute the operation as rapidly as possible to avoid being killed.<sup>14</sup>

Question: “Bonisoli, who knows how many times you saw the images of Via Fani on television, those bodies shattered by projectiles and all that blood. So, on the 16th of March, when the scene was before your eyes, how did you see it?”

Bonisoli: “In cases like that one, there is no time to think. The problem is to leave as soon as possible and succeed in completing the action. Take Aldo Moro away, leave, and so on. Succeed in getting away safely, and so on. In cases like that one does not succeed in thinking. One always thinks afterwards [Bonisoli is visibly agitated and does not succeed in speaking well. His mouth trembles.]”

Question: “Bonisoli, did you fire on that day?”

Bonisoli: “Yes.”

Question: “How many shots?”

Bonisoli: I don't remember . . . the whole magazine [Bonisoli is ever more agitated, looks downward, begins being unable to control his facial muscles any more because of the emotions caused in remembering]."

Question: "Against whom did you fire?"

Bonisoli: [a long silence. Bonisoli looks downward and touches his hair nervously. He does not answer. He avoids the gaze of the journalist who is seated before him.]

Question: "What were you thinking about while you were fleeing?"

Bonisoli: "The problem then was to get away as soon as possible. There was no time to think."

According to the ballistic analyses that were made at the scene of the massacre, the *brigatisti* wasted half of their bullets despite having opened fire from a close distance (four meters). Of the 91 projectiles, only 45 hit their targets.<sup>15</sup>

The *brigatisti* have always affirmed that they were very modest from a military viewpoint. Mario Moretti, the man who led the commando unit that attacked Moro's escort, has always said that the *brigatisti* had a military preparation that "made one laugh,"<sup>16</sup> but that they were very good in organizing ambushes. Moretti's words have been confirmed in the analysis of the 34 homicides committed in Italy by terrorists of the extreme left, from whom there does not emerge any particular expertise in military capacity. Adriano and Massimiliano have said that they were not prepared to use firearms. Here is what Adriano said:

I was trained very little in the use of pistols. All of us were dilettantes with regard to arms. We were very good in organizing ambushes but none of us knew how to use firearms well. I can tell you something that will seem comical. I went shooting with several comrades to train in an isolated area. I fired at the window of an abandoned house. The window had some iron bars. Do you know what happened? The bullet hit one of the iron bars, ricocheted and hit me between the eyes! Maybe you don't believe me but I swear that that is exactly what happened! Luckily, the pistol was not very forceful and I saved myself.

Here instead is Massimiliano's testimony: "Everyone thinks that we Red Brigades members were good in utilizing firearms. It's not true. For example, I always went around with a gun but I never trained to shoot, also because it was not easy to find a place to practice. We were good at organizing everything that it is necessary to organize when we had to strike a political enemy. We knew how to tail people, how to hide, how to strike at the right moment, but we were never good with firearms."

Members of the Red Brigades were much better in creating situations in order to overcome the fear of a clash than to pull a trigger—they fired badly, but they were good at hunting their prey. The *brigatisti* went into action after having pushed their victims into a desperate situation without any hope of escape

### The Autobiography of the Terrorist Patrizio Peci

What sources can we use to increase our knowledge about the adrenaline that flows through the body of terrorists when they kill their victims? Besides the interviews with Adriano and Massimiliano, I have used a document that I consider the most

important historical document on the theme of this article—the autobiography of Patrizio Peci, a terrorist that we have met earlier. Condemned for having committed five homicides, Peci has described the emotional tension that flowed through his body before striking his victims. We begin with an analysis of the enormous fear that Peci says to have felt before killing the Carabinieri *Maresciallo* Rosario Berardi (Turin, 10 March 1978). Peci explains that his heart “beat very strongly” because he feared dying. This fear had its origins in the knowledge that the officer was an armed man who could respond to his fire.

Here is Peci’s testimony:

To kill *maresciallo* Berardi was a very dangerous operation for many reasons: Berardi had to be struck at a distance of a hundred meters from the police station, in front of a bar that was always filled with policemen. In addition, Berardi always went around with a handbag [for men] and a bulletproof vest and always walked with his hands in his pockets. We were certain that he always had his finger on the trigger of his pistol. In order to kill him, we created a very strong cell and prepared ourselves laboring under a tension that had never existed before. Berardi would not have had any possibility to move because—an exceptional case—two of us would have fired at him. Berardi scared us. We stalked him but on the first day he did not leave home.

On the second day, two policemen stopped right next to us.

The third day was the right one. Nadia Ponti [a member of the Red Brigades] signals to us that Berardi has come out. I am in the middle of the street, on a sidewalk where one waits for the tram to keep the area under surveillance with an assault rifle. Vincenzo Acella and Cristoforo Piancone [two Red Brigades members] are ready to fire. The street is full of people. Berardi is a hundred meters away and is walking toward us. God, how slowly he walks! At twenty meters from us, he stops to light his pipe and *my heart starts beating very rapidly. They are seconds in which I think about three thousand things; above all you think that you can die. Now you are there, alive, and within five seconds you could be dead.* If Berardi has understood that we are ambushing him? After lighting his pipe, Berardi takes a few drags and, satisfied, has placed his hands in his vest. Now Berardi is beside Piancone and Acella. Now he passes them. Many shots. Berardi is dead without even noticing anything, while he was smoking.<sup>17</sup>

Peci’s testimony is important not only because it tells us about the beating of the heart of a terrorist who is afraid of being killed by his victim but also because it allows us to compare the heartbeats of a terrorist who attacks an armed victim and the heartbeats of a terrorists who attacked an unarmed victim.

Let’s ask ourselves: Does the heart of the terrorist Patrizio Peci beat very hard also when he strikes at a victim who is isolated and helpless?

When Peci attacked a weak man, he did not tremble. To the contrary, he executed his task with extreme calm and lucidity.

Let’s compare the emotional tension that crossed the body of Peci when he is ready to kill *maresciallo* Berardi with the emotional tension he felt when he was ready to fire at Antonio Coccozzello, a Christian Democratic politician who was walking unarmed in an

isolated street in Turin (25 October 1977). Cocozzello is the typical desperate victim who cannot defend himself.

Peci describes the movements of Cocozzello's body, and Cocozzello as "fat and no longer young." Cocozzello, who has no possibility of defending himself or asking for help, flees horrified and bloody. The physical weakness of the victim's situation allows the red terrorist to keep the emotional tension and the flow of adrenaline under control. Peci observes the scene and approaches him calmly, certain that he is not running any risk. The victim is dispatched and the violence is effective.

The length of this citation is justified by its importance.

Peci writes:

His name was Cocozzello, and he was a DC municipal counselor. . . . He was tall, fat, no longer young, standing still on the sidewalk. *Tranquilly walking*, I pass near him and, when I am beside him, a half a meter, *very naturally*—as if nothing had happened—I shoot two bullets of my Nagant revolver into his legs. Usually the victim realizes a few seconds before that you are getting ready to shoot him and tries to run away. Not having noticed me before, I was convinced that Cocozzello would have fallen without any problem, but no. Cocozzello has heard the noise, has felt the pain, has looked at his legs, has seen the blood, has looked at me, has looked at my pistol and—incredibly—has started to run away. Even though he was fat, old, and wounded, he has succeeded in spurting away like a racer, so much so that I stood there looking at him, amazed, without even trying to fire. Finally, after five or six meters, he fell, and I went close to him and put myself at his side, with the usual technique. Meanwhile Cocozzello was yelling, in fact, he was screaming a lot, and, despite the two bullets in his legs, tried to kick me. I thought: look at the courage he has. He manages to kick while being shot! Also, it was worse for him, because by doing that he risked making me miss my aim and shooting him in some vital point. Luckily I did not miss and I only shot him in the legs with another four bullets.<sup>18</sup>

It should be noted that the homicide of Rosario Berardi occurred on 10 March 1978 and is therefore after the wounding of Cocozzello, which came about on 25 October 1977. For this reason, the emotional tension that Peci felt when he was to kill Berardi cannot be attributed to inexperience. On 10 March 1978, Peci was an expert terrorist; he had already accomplished many kneecappings and had participated in various homicides. Peci does not tremble before Berardi because he is a terrorist with scant experience. He trembles because he fears being killed by his victim. It is not surprising that he defines the operation against Berardi as "very dangerous." In his autobiography, Peci declares that he has always been "serene" when he attacks a weak and defenseless victim, while he says that he is always "nervous and preoccupied" when he has to pounce on a victim that is armed and can defend himself.

Peci's testimony confirms the words of the terrorists Adriano and Massimiliano: the preferred victim of the extreme left terrorist is a weak man, disarmed and without the possibility of escape.

As we have seen, it is not easy to gather information on the adrenaline that flows through the veins of the terrorists while they murder their victims. In order to increase our understanding of this theme, we must use all the documents that we have.

### **The First Interview with the Victims of Terrorism**

Up until this point, I have tried to reconstruct the emotional tension that flows through the bodies of terrorists by using the testimony of the terrorists Adriano and Massimiliano, Patrizio Peci's autobiography, and the video interview with Franco Bonisoli. Another way of increasing our knowledge on this theme is to interview the victims of terrorism. Some of these persons have survived the attacks on them and have been able to narrate how the terrorists behaved while they acted violently against them. The interviews have been released by two victims of the Red Brigades and by a victim of Prima Linea. The first interview was conducted with Carlo [not his real name], who the Red Brigades shot in the legs in 1980. Since then, Carlo has undergone more than fifty operations on both his legs.

I will give part of an interview with him that I conducted in Turin on 4 November 2011.

Question: "Can you tell me exactly what happened when the terrorists broke into the headquarters of the cultural association of which you were the president?"

Carlo: "Exactly what do you want to know?"

Question: "What did they say to you? How many were they? Were they yelling? Were they using bad language?"

Carlo: "First of all, I would like to clarify why the Red Brigades considered me an enemy of the proletariat. It is important for me to say this."

Question: "Sure, tell me."

Carlo: "I will answer your questions, but you have to promise me to tell my story. You have to say that I was a man without any power. I had not done anything bad to anyone."

Question: "I promise that I will do so. Tell me what you want to let me know."

Carlo: "I never had any political power and I have always been a person with little money and no powerful friends. I came from a poor family. You must say this. I had founded a cultural association in a poor neighborhood of Milan to help poor people get an education. I offered help at no cost to people who wanted to study, and I was a volunteer. The Red Brigades thought that I was an enemy of the proletariat because I helped people in need. They said that this was a means of preventing proletarians from rebelling. One day in 1980, the carabinieri killed four terrorists and the Red Brigades decided to avenge themselves."

Question: "How did they decide to avenge themselves?"

Carlo: "By retaliating in order to avenge their dead comrades. I was chosen among three persons to be killed. They had decided to kill me in retaliation because they considered me an enemy of the proletariat because I helped needy people."

Question: "I know your story and feel close to you from a human point of view. I am very sorry for you."

Carlo: "They shot many bullets into my legs. Look at how they reduced me! It has been thirty years that I am in and out of hospitals! Look at my legs! [Carlo lifts his pants and shows me the scars left by the bullets.]"

Question: "I know. I am very sorry. [I pause and wait until Carlo starts again on his own, when he is ready.]"

Carlo: "I was in the headquarters of my association. A group of Red Brigades members broke in while I was talking with some friends. They came in with pistols in hand and screaming: Red Brigades! They grab me and push me against the wall. They yell: piece of shit, shut up! Now we'll kill you like a pig! Then they say: kneel! They wanted to shoot me in the head."

Question: "What did you do?"

Carlo: "I did not kneel because I did not want to die like that. I reacted. I yelled at the *brigatista* who pointed his gun at me: 'Turd! I always helped poor people! I will not kneel before you!' At that point I noticed that my reaction had had a positive effect because my assassin did not have the courage to shoot me in the head. Another *brigatista* started screaming: 'shoot him! Shoot the pig!' The *brigatista* who had his gun pointed at me hesitated. Then he started shooting me in the legs. If I had kneeled, he would have killed me. I stood standing and looked him in the eyes. This made the difference."

Question: "Do you think that he was frightened?"

Carlo: "He did not have the courage to kill me. He did not have the courage to kill me while I was looking him in the eyes. If I had kneeled, they would have killed me. I am certain of that. Everyone has told me that."

## The Second Interview with the Victims of Terrorism

We come now to the second testimony of a victim of Prima Linea, interviewed in Paris on 30 May 2012. The story of Franco [not his real name] confirms that the terrorists strike effectively when their victims have no possibility of defending themselves.

When their victims are weak, the terrorists are strong.

Question: "Can you tell me what happened that day in Turin, 11 December 1979?"

Franco: "We were at school. At a certain point the terrorists entered the building. They took the students and gathered them in the auditorium."

Question: "How many students were you?"

Franco: "Many, about 200. There were twelve terrorists."

Question: "What did the terrorists do?"

Franco: "They said that we were all hostages. Then they took five teachers and five students. I was one of those five students. Then they fired two bullets into our legs. Each of us had two bullets in the legs."

Question: "Was it only one terrorist who shot you?"

Franco: "Only one."

Question: "Did anyone try to react?"

Franco: "Impossible, the terrorists had assault rifles. It did not come to anyone's mind to react."

Question: "Did you get any impression as to whether or not the terrorist who fired at you was agitated or afraid?"

Franco: "No, I did not get this impression. To the contrary, he seemed very calm. I remember one particular impression. I have never forgotten it."

Question: "What was it?"

Franco: "The terrorist fired two bullets into the legs of a boy who wore a pair of pants that were big. They missed."

Question: "In what sense?"

Franco: "In the sense that the bullets put holes in the pants, but not in the boy's legs. Unfortunately, another terrorist of the unit saw the error. So the terrorist who had missed came back and calmly fired two other shots into the legs of that poor boy. The terrorist seemed to be a surgeon. Then these assassins started talking in a way that seemed delirious. They said that they knew our names and that they would have killed us all if we had returned to that school. They said that they had attacked us because of our desire to get a degree. They said that a degree was a bourgeois desire. They said that they knew our names and that they would have killed us all if we had returned to that school."

### The Third Interview with the Victims of Terrorism

The third victim of terrorism is Claudia [not her real name]. When the Red Brigades shot her father in the legs, Claudia was a baby. The interview took place on 2 May 2013.

Question: "Can you tell me what happened that morning?"

Claudia: "The attack on my father was a unique kind of case in the history of Italian terrorism. I would say that it was unique for its horror, for the way in which it took place, for the horrible idea that popped into the heads of the terrorists. Do you know what they did to my father?"

Question: "Could you tell me what happened that morning?"

Claudia: "My father was shot by [name omitted]. My father was a security guard who worked at [name omitted]."

Question: "I know something of the attack against your father because the attacker [name omitted] has described it in his autobiography. He has also written that he was afraid of your father because he had a pistol. Please, tell me everything you remember about that morning."

Claudia: "It was early. My father dressed for work. He put the keys in the door lock to open it. The *brigatisti* threw themselves against the door and overpowered him. They were standing still behind the door and were waiting for him to open it. This fact always made an impression on me. It always shocked me to think that someone had followed my family, including me. The terrorists were behind the door of my house. They were practically in the house. This had never happened before. The terrorists attacked their victims in the street. They had never hidden behind the door to an apartment."

Question: "I understand. It must have been a frightening experience. I am also shocked by this story. Can I ask you what happened afterwards? Where were you when the terrorists broke in?"

Claudia: "I was in my bedroom; I heard my father scream and I looked down the corridor. I was in my pajamas. My father was fighting against three persons with all his strength. Two *brigatisti* were trying to immobilize him while a third, who was [name omitted], aimed a gun at his face. The terrorist [name omitted] then shot my father in the legs while the other two fled down the stairs."

Question: "Your father was attacked when he was least expecting it. He did not have any possibility of understanding what was about to happen. Did I get it right?"

Claudia: "Exactly. My father opened the door and the terrorists pushed themselves inside. It was 5:30 A.M. My father was to begin work at six. Everyone in the building was asleep.

Question: "Everyone in the building was sleeping. Therefore, your father could not cry out for help because there was no one on the stairs when the terrorists began their action. Do I have it right?"

Claudia: "That is the way it was. Three of them attacked one person because they knew that my father was a strong person."

Question: "Many years have passed since then, but I would like to ask you a detail."

Claudia: "What detail?"

Question: "Did the terrorists seem to you to be lucid or scared?"

Claudia: "They were certainly scared because my father reacted strongly and put them in a difficult situation. It was not an easy action for them. My father fought. After having shot him in the legs, they ran out the stairs."

The testimony of the victims of terrorism helps us understand that the main job of the terrorists does not consist of pulling the trigger; rather, it is to create a situation that impedes the victim from defending himself. The terrorist is not a courageous person. Courage is not indispensable in order to be a terrorist. The professional terrorist is an excellent organizer of "death situations" based on vile violence.

### **The Attempted Homicide of Sergio Lenci**

Sergio Lenci was a professor of architecture who had elaborated a series of projects aimed at improving the daily life of prisoners. Prima Linea decided to kill him because this terrorist group believed that the improvement of daily life of prisoners would have reduced their hatred of bourgeois society.

Rome, Friday, 2 May 1980. Lenci was in his office on a holiday. Most of its inhabitants had left the "Eternal City" to go on trips. The situation in which the attempted homicide took place was the following: his condominium building was empty and none of Lenci's collaborators or secretaries were there. Who would have helped him if he yelled for help? Even in this case, the terrorists tried to get around the problem of emotional tension caused by the fear of the confrontation by attacking an isolated victim by means of deception. Well dressed, the terrorists rang the bell saying that they were engineers.

Here is Lenci's description, which helps us understand the strategic use of deception by terrorists:

As soon as I opened the door about ten centimeters, a young man who was very small stuck his foot in the opening and reached out toward me with his hand, insisting that he was an engineer, trying to push the door open while I was trying to close it. However, behind him there were other persons who threw their weight behind the door and easily pushed their way in. I found myself facing three young men and a girl. The men were dressed normally, with tie and jacket. The young woman, of small stature, was dressed in gray, with a knit hat on her head.<sup>19</sup>

Lenci yelled desperately, but he was knocked to the floor with a punch to the stomach. His mouth was covered with duct tape and his hands were tied behind his back. They brought him into the bathroom and stuck his head between the toilet and the bidet.

The terrorist *Ciro Longo* gives us an example of how violence can be ineffective when terrorists cannot manage the fear caused by clashes.

*Longo* fired a bullet at the back of *Lenci's* neck, but, incredibly, the projectile got stuck in his cranium, leaving him alive and understanding all that was going on. Before beginning the action, *Longo* had agreed with his comrades that, after he had fired the first bullet, he would have grabbed *Lenci's* head to turn it around and fire a second one into his temple. However, the terrorist was so shocked by the blood that he refused to grab the victim's head. He fired again at the back of *Lenci's* head, but his trembling hand caused him to miss. The bullet missed and grazed his hair. The terrorists fled and *Lenci* saved himself thanks to a series of fortunate circumstances.

### Conclusions: The Limitations of This Study

Extreme left terrorists are afraid of dying. In order to accomplish their homicides without letting themselves be overpowered by the emotional tension, they have to be certain that their victims cannot defend themselves. When extreme left terrorists decide to kill an armed man, they are afraid. When they kill a weak man who has no possibility of escape, they are not afraid. This means that the most complicated part of a terrorist's job does not consist of pulling the trigger but in the ability to place the victim into a condition of total desperation. The violence of Red Brigades terrorists—in the great majority of cases—is a “vile” violence, that is, a type of violence that is directed at people who cannot defend themselves.

The objective of this article is to reconstruct the emotional state of the terrorist while he kills his victims by using a micro-sociological approach. To confront such a theme poses three great problems.

The first problem is represented by the sources. What sources should be used? The best sources are the testimony of the terrorists themselves but it is not easy to get an appointment with a terrorist who has killed multiple times. It is even more difficult to find a terrorist who has murdered several times who is willing to talk about the emotions he felt while killing his victims. Some extreme left terrorists are willing to speak to sociologists but they want to feel free to talk, want to be the protagonists of the meeting and, above all, want to project a positive image of themselves.<sup>20</sup> To be clear, extreme left terrorists do not like to talk about their most violent actions.<sup>21</sup>

The second problem is methodological: What kind of interview should be utilized? In my experience of an interviewer of terrorists, the best kind of interview is the semi-structured one. A structured interview is completely directed by the sociologist and extreme left terrorists do not like it because they like to hear themselves talk, to narrate, and to reason. An unstructured interview leaves the terrorist too much liberty, allowing him to digress and take the discussion into a thousand different directions. The terrorist who is a multiple killer must be guided but not too much. This is why semi-structured interviews have seemed to me to be the best tools. During my interviews, I have let the terrorists speak freely, waiting for the best moment to “slip in” my questions—which I had written and memorized several weeks before the meetings—by using the interviewee's own language as early as possible.<sup>22</sup>

The third problem is represented by the lack of sociological literature about the adrenaline that flows through the body of extreme left terrorists when they kill their

victims. Although some scholars held many interviews with terrorists—they are psychologists for the most part<sup>23</sup>—none of them asked extreme left terrorists the question that is decisive for the purpose of this research: How do you feel when you kill a victim after having placed him or her in a desperate situation that does not allow for any escape?

Appendix 1 provides the outline of the semi-structured interview that I have utilized when speaking to the terrorists.

Appendix 2 provides the outline of the semi-structured interview that I have utilized when speaking to the victims of extreme left terrorists.

## Notes

1. Patrizio Peci, *Io l'Infame* (Milan: Sperling & Kupfer, 2008).
2. Mario Moretti, *Brigate rosse. Una storia italiana*, eds. Carla Mosca and Rossana Rossanda (Milan: Mondadori, 2007).
3. Renato Curcio, *A viso aperto*, ed. Mario Scialoja (Milan: Mondadori, 1993).
4. Valerio Morucci, *A guerra finita. Sei racconti* (Rome: ManifestoLibri, 1994); Valerio Morucci, *Ritratto di un terrorista da giovane* (Casale Monferrato: Piemme, 1999); Valerio Morucci, *La peggio gioventù. Una vita nella lotta armata* (Milan: Rizzoli, 2004). Morucci was one of the Red Brigades members who attacked the bodyguards of Aldo Moro.
5. Prospero Gallinari, *Un contadino nella metropoli. Ricordi di un militante delle Brigate rosse* (Milan: Bompiani, 2006). Gallinari was a Red Brigade multiple murderer who never repented nor distanced himself from terrorism. He was one of the Red Brigades members who attacked the bodyguards of Aldo Moro.
6. Alberto Franceschini, *Mara, Renato e io. Storia dei fondatori delle Brigate rosse* (Milan: Mondadori, 1998); Alberto Franceschini, *Che cosa sono le Brigate rosse*, ed. Giovanni Fasanella (Milan: Rizzoli, 2004).
7. Raffaele Fiore, *L'ultimo brigatista*, ed. Aldo Grandi (Milan: Rizzoli, 2007). Raffaele, Fiore is a Red Brigade multiple murderer who never repented nor distanced himself from terrorism. He was one of the Red Brigades members who attacked the bodyguards of Aldo Moro.
8. Sergio Segio, *Miccia Corta: Una Storia di Prima Linea* (Roma: Derive Approdi, 2005); Sergio Segio, *Una Vita in Prima Linea* (Milan: Rizzoli, 2006).
9. Tonino Loris Paroli, *Andate e Ritorni*, eds. Giovanna Panigadi and Romano Giuffrida (Paderno Dugnano: Colibri, 2009).
10. Anna Laura Braghetti, *Il prigioniero*, ed. Paola Tavella (Milan: Mondadori, 1998).
11. Randall Collins, *Violence. A Micro-Sociological Theory* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 19.
12. Randall Collins, "Micro and Macro Causes of Violence," *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 1 (2009), pp. 9–22.
13. Peci, *Io l'Infame*, p. 164.
14. Video Interview with Franco Bonisoli. Available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FIF8P3z3RPA> (accessed September 1, 2014).
15. Vladimiro Satta, *Il caso Moro e i suoi falsi misteri* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2006), p. 10.
16. Moretti, *Brigate rosse. Una storia italiana*, p. 122. Moretti says: "But no, let's not confuse organizational skill with the technical and military skills of guerrilla warfare. I assure you that the *brigatisti* were not great warriors. They were formidable political organizers. . . . Our military training would have made a corporal of any army laugh."
17. Peci, *Io l'Infame*, p. 166. Italics added.
18. *Ivi*, p. 164. Italics added.
19. Sergio Lenci, *Colpo alla nuca. Memorie di una vittima del terrorismo* (Bologna: il Mulino, 2009), p. 26.
20. Alessandro Orsini, "Interview with a Terrorist by Vocation: A Day Among the Diehard Terrorists, Part II," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 8 (2013), p. 674.
21. Alessandro Orsini, "One Day Among the Diehard Terrorists. The Psychological Costs of Doing Ethnographic Research," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 4 (2013), p. 343.

22. When framing questions—sociologist Giampietro Gobo wrote—the interviewer should avoid employing terminology taken from the ethnographer’s scientific jargon, but instead to acquire and use the interviewee’s own language as soon as possible. Cf. Giampietro Gobo, *Doing Ethnographic Research* (London: Sage, 2008), p. 197.

23. Donatella Della Porta, *Il Terrorismo di Sinistra* (Bologna: il Mulino, 1990); Xavier Rauter, “The Red Brigades: Farewell to Arms,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 4 (1993); Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* (New York: Harper-Collins, 2003); Jerrold Post, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita Denny, “The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with Thirty-Five Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 1 (2003), pp. 171–184; Ariel Merari, Ilan Diamant, Arie Bibi, Yoav Broshi, and Giora Zakin, “Personality Characteristics of ‘Self Martyrs’/‘Suicide Bombers’ and Organizers of Suicide Attacks,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 1 (2009), pp. 87–101; Ariel Merari, Jonathan Figchel, Boaz Ganor, Ephraim Lavie, Yohanan Tzoreff, and Arie Livne, “Making Palestinian, ‘Martyrdom Operations’/‘Suicide Attacks’: Interviews With Would-Be Perpetrators and Organizers,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 1 (2009), pp. 102–119; John Horgan, *Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical Extremist Movements* (London: Routledge, 2009); Ariel Merari, *Driven to Death* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Scott Atran, *Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists* (New York: Harper Collins, 2010); Anne Speckhard, *Talking to Terrorists* (McLean, VA: Advances Press, 2012). Marc Sageman worked with Islamic fundamentalists on a daily basis during the Afghan–Soviet war, from 1986 to 1989. Cf. Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

## Appendix 1

### Outline of the Semi-Structured Interview with Terrorists

For what crimes have you been convicted?  
 Have you ever been involved in violent actions?  
 Can you explain to me how to organize a political killing or wounding?  
 How many people are necessary to tail a political enemy?  
 How many people are necessary to kill a political enemy?  
 Is it preferable to kill during the day or at night?  
 Is it preferable to kill in a busy street or in a deserted one?  
 Before killing a person, did you try to understand if he was armed?  
 The night before a violent action committed by you, were you able to sleep or did you remain awake because of the emotional tension.  
 When you woke up in the morning to commit a homicide, what were your first thoughts?  
 Before leaving the house to commit a homicide, what exactly did you do?  
 When you left the house to commit a homicide, were you nervous? Were you afraid?  
 A few seconds before shooting your victim, did your heart beat rapidly, or were you calm?  
 When you shot at your victim, did the presence of your comrades give you strength?  
 Did you ever mess up a homicide or an attempt to wound the victim because you were agitated?  
 Can you describe to me a homicide that you committed?  
 Can you describe to me how you wounded a victim?

## Appendix 2

### Outline of the Semi-Structured Interview with the Victims of Terrorism

Can you tell me what happened that day? What do you remember about the attack in which you were a victim or your father has been a victim?

Were you armed or disarmed?

Did you have time to understand that you were in danger, or did you realize the danger after they had wounded you?

Did you try to run away?

Can you describe for me the situation in which you found yourself? Were you in a situation in which you could have called for help or run away?

Before shooting you, did the terrorists say anything? Do you remember a particular phrase?

If the terrorists said something, did you have the impression that their voice trembled or did it seem to you that they were lucid and relaxed?

While they were about to shoot you, did you have the impression that the terrorists were agitated?

After having shot you, did the terrorists run away or did they leave calmly?