


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A First Draft of the History of America's Ongoing Wars on Terrorism

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Research Note

A First Draft of the History of America's Ongoing Wars on Terrorism

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This research note attempts to map the Al Qaeda movement's trajectory from the 11 September 2001 attacks to the stunning events of 2014—which saw the continued rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), its expulsion from the Al Qaeda movement, followed by ISIS's stunning thrust into Iraq, its declaration of a caliphate, and the re-engagement of American military forces in this region. It attempts to place in context the Al Qaeda movement's evolution to explain why the United States under President Barack Obama, despite hopes and expectations to the contrary, is still enmeshed in the war on terrorism proclaimed by George W. Bush over a decade ago.

On 11 September 2001, nineteen terrorists hijacked four airplanes and changed the course of history. What followed was no less consequential: a global war on terrorism led by the United States that resulted in Al Qaeda's expulsion from Afghanistan, the loss of its training camps, operational bases and command headquarters in that country, and the killing and capture of hundreds of Al Qaeda terrorists. More than a decade after the 9/11 attacks it remains clear that, even if we always knew *why* we were fighting this war, we arguably were never entirely certain *who* we were fighting. When the enemy appeared to be exclusively the core Al Qaeda organization, founded and led by Osama bin Laden, the answer was obvious. But when it involved the multiplicity of actual, putative or suspected Al Qaeda affiliates and associates; or the so-called franchises and casual hangers-on; or the array of wannabe *jihadi* and lone wolves; or, more recently, an even more extreme splinter organization, the answer was often less clear.

Not surprisingly, therefore, profound disagreement arose in academic as well as government circles over the nature of the threat, the importance and relevance of Al Qaeda itself and, following its expulsion from Afghanistan, whether a leader-*less* process of terrorist radicalization and violence had superseded a leader-*led* one. Arguments were made that Al Qaeda had ceased to be an organization; that it had practically disappeared as a hierarchical structured entity; and, that the movement that existed at the time of the attacks on New York City and Washington, DC had either evolved or disintegrated into

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a mere idea or the shell of an ideology—an amorphous phenomenon devoid of leadership and strategy. The main terrorist threat was then decreed to no longer to come from articulated, *jihadist* groups and organizations, but rather to emanate from independent, self-constituted local cells or from isolated self-selected individuals—the “bunches of guys” theory.¹

A countervailing view throughout this period challenged these assumptions. It held that Al Qaeda had persisted as a distinct and active terrorist organization and that until his death, bin Laden continued to exercise an important degree of command and charismatic influence over both Al Qaeda’s ranks and the global *jihadist* movement allied or associated with it. Far from being an amorphous phenomenon, this camp argued that the Al Qaeda global terrorist threat had become a polymorphous phenomenon, composed of an admittedly heterogeneous collection of like-minded groups, led by a variety of leaders who all nonetheless embraced the same strategy and conformed to observable patterns of organizational behavior.²

It is now abundantly clear that Al Qaeda did not cease to exist following its expulsion from Afghanistan, and the subsequent U.S.-led global counterterrorism campaign; but rather that it adapted and adjusted to the unprecedented struggle waged against it. Indeed, contrary to the conventional wisdom of the time, bin Laden had not been reduced to a mere figurehead but continued to direct and influence Al Qaeda operations.

Al Qaeda, moreover, embraced a goal-oriented strategy that was repeatedly communicated and explained to its enemies and adherents. Although its core leadership was progressively eroded by death or capture and its operational capabilities commensurately degraded, the fact remains that during this period Al Qaeda also consistently expanded its ties with affiliated and associated groups—who often took the initiative in allying themselves with Al Qaeda—while continuing to plan and less regularly successfully execute terrorist attacks in a variety of countries. Al Qaeda, accordingly, evolved into a global terrorism movement that functioned equally well with top-down and bottom-up components: commanding and directing terrorist operations while remaining at the vortex of an increasingly decentralized structure populated by newly created, autonomous territorial extensions.

Although the *jihadist* movement posed a less cohesive threat during the decade following the 11 September 2001 attacks, at the same time, it had transformed itself into a dynamically heterogeneous collection of both radicalized persons and functioning terrorist organizations. Command and control of these entities was uneven but the Al Qaeda senior leadership nonetheless appeared to have had a direct hand in the most important and potentially spectacular operations of that era. The 2004 Madrid commuter rail bombings; the 7 July 2005 suicide attacks on London transport; the 2006 airline plot to down seven U.S. and Canadian passenger planes en route to a variety of North American destinations from London’s Heathrow Airport; the aborted 2009 suicide bombings of the New York City subway system, among other incidents, which all had a clearly undeniable Al Qaeda pedigree.

The evolving global terrorist threat coming from these variegated *jihadist* actors also differed remarkably across nations and regions of the world, but it was always connected by a shared ideology and a common mindset serving and respecting the same preeminent leader—bin Laden. Encouraging, abetting, and facilitating the creation of allies, affiliates, and associates in a variety of far-flung corners of the globe was a critical component of this strategy. Accordingly, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) emerged from the remnants of the movement’s previous organizations in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), however, were both established through agreements of mutual convenience with preexisting and geographically dominant *jihadist* organizations. AQI was thus the latest manifestation of the evolution of a group

that had modestly begun its life as the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's Tawhid wal Jihad organization that brought that group within the broader Al Qaeda network's ambit; while AQIM was the product of an agreement concluded by Al Qaeda's senior leadership with the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), the more globally oriented spin-off of the locally oriented Armed Algerian Group (GIA). Both Tawhid wal Jihad and GSPC disappeared following the formal establishment of AQI and AQIM, respectively.

This decentralization resulted in the transformation of Al Qaeda into a complex global terrorist structure that included a surviving central nucleus with increasing numbers of territorial affiliates. Interaction between what has variously been called Al Qaeda Central, Core Al Qaeda, or the Al Qaeda Senior Leadership, and its affiliates and allies—including interaction between these respective local and regional entities—varied enormously depending on the latter's antecedents, organizational history, commanders, internal dynamics, operational circumstances, and capacity to function independently of the parent organization. Regardless, a distinctive, often exclusive bond was forged between Al Qaeda's general command and its territorial extensions. Indeed, the leaders of AQAP, AQI, AQIM, and Al Shabaab, for example, all pledged *bayat*, or an oath of fealty, to the emir of Core Al Qaeda, first to bin Laden and, following his death, to al-Zawahiri, as well.

At the same time, Al Qaeda leaders tried, with limited success, to promote—primarily through the organization's online propaganda efforts—the mobilization of self-selected, independently constituted cells of self-radicalized individuals and so-called “lone wolves,” that is, persons operating entirely on their own, in many countries of the world, but most especially in the West. Inspired by Al Qaeda's ideology, they generally lacked significant, much less actual, connections with existing terrorist organizations. But, by inspiring, motivating, and animating this array of self-trained, auto-radicalized *jihadists*, Al Qaeda could capitalize on their ideological affinity and exploit their violent inclinations simply by providing sufficient encouragement to carry out *jihad*.

Accordingly, in the years following 11 September 2001 it was no longer possible to equate the global terrorism threat solely with the threat posed by Core Al Qaeda. As it evolved due to the pressure and success of international countermeasures, the global terrorism threat diversified both geographically and organizationally in order to survive. Acts of *jihadist* terrorism became frequent in a variety of South Asian, Middle Eastern, and African countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Nigeria; while more sporadically manifesting themselves in places as diverse as Kenya, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Spain, and the United Kingdom, and even the United States. Organizations including the Afghan Taliban, its Pakistani counterpart, AQI, AQAP, AQIM, and Al Shabaab presented the most serious and sustained threats in the countries in which they operated, often in alliance with other terrorist or insurgent groups active in those same operational venues.

Hence, while bin Laden's killing inflicted a serious blow on Al Qaeda, it was not the lethal one that many hoped. Rather, he left behind a resilient movement with an ideology that remained compelling and a brand that was still attractive even if the organization behind both had been seriously weakened. Despite its systematic attrition as a result of the U.S. drone campaign, for example, Al Qaeda was able to expand and consolidate its presence in a variety of new locales, including North and West Africa, the Levant, and the Sinai Peninsula. Al Qaeda thus demonstrated a remarkable ability to continue to replenish its ranks with new recruits and adherents; to project a message that still found an audience in various corners of the world, and, to articulate a strategy that continues to inform both the movement's and the core's operations and activities—which today is championed by bin Laden's successor, al-Zawahiri.

Then, the fall-out from the Arab Spring infused Al Qaeda with new meaning and purpose. Having played no part in the transformative social, political, and economic developments that swept across North Africa and the Middle East some three years ago, the terrorist movement initially was regarded by many as a spent force—an irrelevant anachronism. Social media and civil protest, observers fawned, had achieved what terrorism had manifestly failed to deliver—thus marginalizing the terrorists forever. Al Qaeda, as even bin Laden had then recognized, was losing the war of ideas and the struggle for Muslim hearts and minds. The longing for democracy and economic reform across North Africa and the Middle East, these same optimists enthused, had also decisively trumped repression and violence.

How different it all looks today. Both Core Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), or the Islamic State (IS), the latest re-branded iteration of the former AQI—have arguably accomplished the impossible. They have not only acquired relevance and power; but have actually grown and expanded in fighters, territory, status, and stature. Despite having suffered the greatest onslaught directed against a terrorist organization in history, the Al Qaeda movement's ideology—whether championed by the upstart ISIS or the remnants of the core movement—has nonetheless both thrived and prospered.

Taking advantage of the vacuum of authority created by the upheaval that followed the Arab Spring by peddling a patently sanguinary sectarian message while adroitly exploiting the proliferation of poorly governed places and un-administered territory along porous national borders, Core Al Qaeda's affiliates and associated groups—including AQI—moved swiftly to establish new sanctuaries and safe havens in North Africa, pockets of West Africa, the Sinai, and, most consequentially, the Levant. The military coup that toppled the regime of Mohammad Morsi in Egypt further contributed to the Al Qaeda movement's credibility and appeal: seeming to validate al-Zawahiri's repeated admonitions about having any faith in the West and the sanctity of democratic processes.

Accordingly, Al Qaeda today is present in more places than it was on the eve of the 11 September 2001 attacks. It currently maintains at least seventeen major networks in at least as many theaters of operation: more than double the number of six years ago.³ Hence, despite repeated U.S. government proclamations heralding its impending strategic collapse, against all odds Al Qaeda has survived.

Thirty years ago, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said that publicity provides the oxygen that terrorists breathe. In the Al Qaeda movement's and the ISIS's cases, continued access to sanctuary and safe haven is the oxygen that sustains both and has enabled the movement to expand both geographically and numerically in recent years.

Syria has played an especially critical role in Al Qaeda's efforts both to re-insert itself back into the region's politics and to appear relevant. That country is regarded as treasured Muslim territory, referenced by the Koran and Hadith. It is also an ancient cockpit of conflict between Sunni and Shi'a (e.g., the Nusayaris—the ancient name for the Alawites and Shi'a). What is today Syria was formerly a province of the Ottoman Empire that was administered from Damascus and included Islam's third holiest shrine—Jerusalem's al Aqsa Mosque and Dome of the Rock—as well as the rest of Palestine, Jordan, and Lebanon. It is also geographically contiguous with two of the movement's most hated enemies: the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Jewish state of Israel, therefore presenting tremendously appealing targets for the struggle's next phase.

Both AQI's and Jabhat Al Nusra's success in Syria is a particularly alarming case in point. These organizations provided the broader movement precisely the relevance it had lacked and enabled Al Qaeda's ideology to gain newly acquired traction and again

to become a player and force in Middle Eastern politics. AQI's re-branding as ISIS and attempts to absorb Jabhat Al Nusra, the Syrian-based clone that the ISIS had created, also evidenced that splinter's newly acquired strength and confidence.

Not surprisingly, Syria is often described as the "perfect *jihadi* storm"⁴—much worse than Afghanistan was three decades ago. Both Syria and more recently Iraq as well have undeniably become magnets for foreign fighters; with violence theologically justified by *fatwas* (religious edicts) provided by leading Muslim clerics; riven with strong sectarian grievances driving the violence; and, where rebels, including core Al Qaeda loyalists like Jabhat al Nusra as well as the more powerful renegade ISIS, have benefitted from the largesse of wealthy Arabian Gulf patrons. But a critical distinction between the struggle in Afghanistan during the closing decades of the twentieth-century and Syria and Iraq in the early twenty-first-century, is the evolution of information technology and communications.

The growth and communicative power of social networking platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, Flickr, WhatsApp, among other such media has transformed terrorism: facilitating both ubiquitous and real-time communication between like-minded radicals with would-be recruits and potential benefactors—thus fueling and sustaining these struggles to a hitherto unprecedented extent.

Hence, it is common nowadays for foreign fighters prosecuting these conflicts to amass thousands of followers on platforms such as Twitter and Facebook. They communicate with their audiences often on a daily basis—and sometimes multiple times each day—providing first-hand, immediate accounts of heroic battles and more mundane daily activities: making *jihad* accessible and comprehensible on a uniquely intimate and personal basis.

Fighters invite, motivate, animate, and summon their Twitter followers and Facebook friends to come to Syria and Iraq and partake of the holy war against the apostate Assad regime and that of Nuri al Maliki and now Haider al Abadi. Blatant sectarian messaging and divinely ordained clarion calls to resist Persian domination and help determine the outcome of the eternal struggle between Sunni and Shi'a—and the latter's Alawite satraps—provide additional, compelling incentives. Indeed, a recent ISIS recruitment video posted on the Internet featured heavily armed militants with distinctive British and Australian accents trumpeting the virtues of *jihad* and the ineluctable religious imperative of joining the caravan of martyrs. In this context, it is noteworthy as well that the on-camera executioner of the two American journalists and British aid worker hails from the United Kingdom.

It is therefore not surprising to find that all of Al Qaeda's most important affiliates—al Shabaab; Ansar Al Sharia; Boko Haram; the Abdullah Azzam Brigades; Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb; Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsular; Jabat Al Nusra; and the Afghan Taliban—as well as ISIS—all have Twitter accounts on which they regularly tweet.

The advantages of the new social media to terrorists are manifold. Ease, interactivity and networking, reach, frequency, usability, stability, immediacy, publicity, and permanence are benefits reaped by those terrorist groups exploiting and harnessing these technologies. A new generation of celebrity fighters is also being created, heralded and extolled in a familiar vernacular to Facebook friends and Twitter followers alike.

Technological advances in digital media and social platforms are not the only innovations in warfare that have peaked Al Qaeda's and ISIS's interest. There are also already indications that Syria's ongoing civil war coupled with the focus on the use of chemical weapons by both government and opposition forces have sharpened both groups' interests and ambitions to obtain nerve agents, poison gas, and other harmful toxins for use as weapons. For example, in May 2013 Turkish authorities seized two kilos of sarin nerve gas—the same weapon used in the 1995 attack on the Tokyo subway system—and arrested twelve men linked to Al Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra. Only days later, another

set of sarin-related arrests was made in Iraq of ISIS operatives overseeing the production at two factories of both sarin and mustard blistering agents. And, in November 2013, Israel reported that it was been holding a senior Al Qaeda operative with expertise in chemical and biological warfare.

It is also now apparent that Core Al Qaeda has a deeper bench than was once imagined. The Al Qaeda senior leadership is able to draw on this bench to replenish its decimated ranks, often with individuals who, while mostly unknown outside the movement, nonetheless have tremendous credibility within it. Many are veterans of the Afghan–Soviet War and, accordingly, have at least thirty years experience as *mujahedeen* fighting the movement’s variegated foreign and domestic enemies. Their ascendance within Al Qaeda to positions of importance demonstrates that even while the U.S. drone campaign has made deep inroads among the established Al Qaeda senior leadership, the movement still possesses the capacity to replace eliminated commanders with competent successors.

To ensure its longevity in ways involving rank-and-file fighters, Core Al Qaeda has also begun to diversify its principle recruitment pool. Today, Al Shahab (“The Clouds”), Al Qaeda’s preternaturally active media and outreach arm, produces more messages and propaganda in Urdu than in Arabic. Indeed, Core Al Qaeda has been deliberately recruiting middle- and upper-middle-class Pakistanis, often with university degrees in engineering and the hard sciences. The recent announcement of the formation of AQIS—Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent—further demonstrates Core Al Qaeda’s shift from an Arab to a south Asian demographic base.

Al-Zawahiri’s appointment in 2013 of Nasir al-Wuhayshi, the founder and commander of AQAP, as Al Qaeda’s deputy commander is indicative of a revitalized strategy to extend the movement’s reach deeper into the Middle East and Africa. By creating an ancillary regional headquarters to direct, coordinate and support operations, Core Al Qaeda is able to project force and exert some coordination over its geographically diverse and distant affiliates and associates and therefore have some influence on battlefields far removed (e.g., battlefields far removed from its south Asian base).

Despite Al Qaeda’s current focus on local and regional conflicts, the movement has not lost its desire to target the United States and the West. The intention to attack further afield remains undiminished—albeit temporarily put on hold until these local and regional situations either evolve or resolve themselves. AQAP’s efforts and intentions in this regard are unrelenting. Moreover, as a result of the upheaval in North Africa and the Levant in particular, it is possible that other affiliates may use these bases as potential launching pads for attacks in Europe and even the United States. Just a few years ago, Al Qaeda arguably possessed only three such potential bases for mounting international attacks: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen. Today, that number has doubled to include Syria, Turkey, and perhaps North and West African countries as well.

The proliferation of some 12,000 plus foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq—including the nationals of an estimated 81 countries throughout the world⁵—has inevitably raised the prospect of them returning to their home or adopted countries to establish the infrastructure needed to engage in, or themselves to undertake, future terrorist attacks. Their ability to move freely across the European Union and perhaps even to travel to the United States without suspicion, thus presents renewed security concerns and challenges.

Conclusion

As painful as it may to concede, Al Qaeda clearly thinks and acts strategically. In this respect, as far back as 2005, it defined a seven-stage strategy to victory that has subsequently been

only modestly adjusted and adapted to both unforeseen and emerging global developments. This strategy entails the following phases:

- The Awakening Stage (2000–2003), which coincided with the 11 September 2001 attacks, and is described in Al Qaeda propaganda as “Reawakening the nation by dealing a powerful blow to the head of the snake in the U.S.”
- The Eye-Opening Stage (2003–2006), which unfolded after the U.S. invasion of Iraq and was allegedly designed to perpetually engage and enervate the United States and the West in a series of prolonged overseas ventures.
- The Rising Up and Standing on the Feet Stage (2007–2010) involved Al Qaeda’s proactive expansion to new venues of operations, as we have seen in West Africa and the Levant.
- The Expansion Stage (2010–2013), which continued after bin Laden’s killing and sought to exploit the new opportunities created by the “Arab Spring” to topple apostate regimes, especially in Syria.
- The Declaration of the Caliphate Stage (2013–2016) when Al Qaeda will achieve its ultimate goal of establishing trans- or supra-national Islamic rule over large swaths of territory in the Muslim world. ISIS has clearly stolen a march on them in this respect.
- The Total Confrontation Stage (2016–2020) will occur after the Caliphate has created an Islamic Army and commences the final “fight between the believers and the non-believers.”
- The final, Definitive Victory State (2020–2022), when the Caliphate will ultimately triumph over the rest of the world.⁶

It is disturbing to map the accuracy of this strategic trajectory dating from 2005 and to realize that, from Al Qaeda’s vantage point, we are indeed on schedule in the stage of declaring the Caliphate. Further, no matter how half- (or even quarter) baked its grandiose pretensions may be, the fact remains that propaganda does not have to be true: it only has to be believed. For Al Qaeda’s followers, sympathizers, and supporters this seven-stage strategy presents a compelling narrative—the more so, as the United States and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) prepare to leave Afghanistan and intervene in only the most limited fashion in Iraq and Syria.

Only a few short months ago the conventional wisdom inside the Beltway was that the bloody split between Core Al Qaeda’s and ISIS would consume, neuter, and ultimately destroy them both. As the conventional wisdom on Al Qaeda has rarely been correct anyway, it is not surprising that this too proved to be little more than wishful thinking. Instead of two collapsing Al Qaedas we now have one surging and the other reviving. However fanciful ISIS’s caliphate and embryonic Islamist empire may seem, it is equally undeniable that ISIS is now sovereign over a territorial expanse stretching from Aleppo in Syria to the suburbs of Baghdad. In this respect, history has often shown how splits within terrorist movements have led to increased levels of violence and greater bloodshed as factions compete with one another for prestige, support, and viability. The violence and bloodshed already sparked by this split is thus far from over and in fact may only have begun.

Beyond any doubt, ISIS has forcibly re-drawn the map of the modern Middle East. Regardless of whether its self-proclaimed Caliphate survives, ISIS has at least already achieved what bin Laden never delivered. ISIS has not only erased the contrived boundaries imposed on the region by the Western victors following World War I, but it has imposed Islamic law over the vast expanse of territory it now controls, resurrected the Caliph and re-established the Caliphate—fulfilling the unrequited promises made by both bin Laden

and al-Zawahiri. The likelihood that we face a two-pronged threat from two powerful Al Qaedas and not just one will surely present new challenges and difficulties to national militaries, intelligence and security agencies, and law enforcement already stretched thin by governmental budget cuts and diminished resources and now confronted by a diversifying and growing terrorist movement, multiplying across countries and regions. The possibility that core Al Qaeda and ISIS might yet re-unite (especially should al Baghdadi be eliminated, given his strong personal and implacable enmity with al-Zawahiri)—creating a combined terrorist threat of a geographical and kinetic magnitude hitherto unimagined cannot be safely dismissed or entirely discounted.

In sum, the final chapter of Al Qaeda's long and bloody history has yet to be written. It has proven to be a highly resilient movement capable of adaptation and adjustment that, despite grievous leadership losses, has still been able to harness the energy of its constituent parts and marshal a powerful narrative and ideology both to sustain it and carry on the struggle proclaimed by bin Laden nearly three decades ago. These characteristics ensure both that the final battle against Al Qaeda has not yet been fought and in coming years the movement may assume new and different forms that could not have previously been anticipated or predicted and therefore require an entirely different approach and means to finally eliminate it.

Acknowledgments

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Notes

1. Marc Sageman, “Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks,” in *The Twenty-First Century* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), p. 66. See also, Scott Shane, “Experts Say Focus on Al Qaeda Misses Broader Threat,” *New York Times*, 13 August 2006; and, idem, “Rethinking The Terrorist Threat,” *New York Times*, 20 September 2009.

2. See Bruce Hoffman, “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters,” *Foreign Affairs* 87(3) (May/June 2008), pp. 133–138; and Fernando Reinares, “Global Terrorism: A Polymorphous Phenomenon,” Real Instituto Elcano (Madrid), 21 April 2009. Available at http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano.in/zonas.in/international+terrorism/ari65-2009#.VFZg3ihH2VE (accessed 6 November 2014).

3. Pre-2008 networks and locations Al Qaeda in the Far East (Indonesia and the Philippines); Al Qaeda in Afghanistan; Al Qaeda in Pakistan; Al Qaeda in East Africa (al Shabaab); Al Qaeda in Iraq; Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb ([AQIM] Algeria); and Al Qaeda in Europe. Since 2008, Al Qaeda has expanded to the Sudan (Al Qaeda in the Two Niles); Tunisia (Ansar al Sharia); Lebanon; Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Nigeria (AQIM); Syria (Jabhat al Nusra and associated groups); North America (e.g., the 2009 suicide bomb plot to attack the New York City subway system and the 2013 plot to attack trains in Canada); and the recently announced creation of Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent.

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6. Quoted in Yassin Musharbash, "The Future of Terrorism: What al-Qaida Really Wants," *Spiegel Online*, 12 August 2005. Available at <http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-future-of-terrorism-what-al-qaida-really-wants-a-369448.html> (accessed 4 November 2014).