


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The Radical Group in Context: 2. Identification of Critical Elements in the Analysis of Risk for Terrorism by Radical Group Type

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In this second of two linked articles describing an integrated framework for the analysis of risk for terrorism of a radical group, a subset of observable indicators for each of the 32 variables within the integrated framework is presented. On the basis of an expert knowledge acquisition process, five types of terrorist groups—nationalist–separatist, religious fundamentalist, new religions (other religious extremists, including millenarian cults), social revolutionary, and right wing—are compared in order to identify which indicators are of greatest importance for each terrorist group type. Historical, cultural, and contextual features can be assessed effectively through the use of open sources and experts. Group characteristics, processes, and structures were consistently rated as highly important across all five group types. Ratings for new religions differed most consistently from those of other group types.

In the introductory article in this sequence, an integrated framework for the analysis of risk for terrorism for radical groups was presented. Four conceptual categories were identified: 1.00 Historical, Cultural, and Contextual Features; 2.00 Key Actors Affecting the Group; 3.00 The Group/Organization: Characteristics, Processes, and Structures; and 4.00 The Immediate Situation. On the basis of a review of the literature and an expert knowledge acquisition process, 32 variables were identified within the 4 categories to establish the overall integrated framework. Because the variables were insufficiently precise to serve as observable indicators, a subset of observable indicators was identified for each of the 32 variables.

The identified observable indicators within the four categories are listed in the sections that follow.

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Observable Indicators of Risk for Terrorism

For each conceptual indicator category, observable indicators of risk for terrorism associated with the category are listed. The four fields serve as the organizing framework.

1.00 Historical, Cultural, and Contextual Features

1.10 *Historically Rooted Culture of Violence*

The observable indicators of risk associated with cultural tolerance for violence are:

- A. A region has a history of communal conflict and division along either ethnic, religious, or socioeconomic class lines, especially if conflict has involved violence and terrorism.
- B. The region has a history of frequent and violent coups d'état.
- C. The region has a history of insurgency or revolution.
- D. The region experiences high levels of violent crime.
- E. Communal groups in the region commemorate or celebrate past violent events, such as historic victories (e.g., the Orange Order marches in Northern Ireland) and defeats (e.g., the Serb celebration of the battle of Kosovo Polje commemorating Serbia's historic defeat by the Ottoman Empire in 1389).
- F. Cultural heroes are extolled for their bravery in conflict (e.g., Prince Lazar in the battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389).

1.20 *Current Communal Conflict*

The observable indicators of risk associated with communal conflict are:

- A. A majority or dominant group openly discriminates against a minority or subordinate group by:
 1. limiting or restricting access to political decision-making structures;
 2. restricting access to certain jobs, goods and services, welfare benefits, and so on;
 3. limiting or restricting activities, assembly, speech, or practice of religion.
- B. A majority or dominant group actively persecutes a minority or subordinate group, including violence and harassment.
- C. Communal leaders politicize and exploit historical conflict and divisions.
- D. The region is currently experiencing conflict along ethnic, religious, or class lines, especially if conflict has escalated to violence.

1.30 *Political Economic, and Social Instability*

The observable indicators of political, economic, and social instability are:

- A. A region experiences *political instability*, characterized by:
 1. a government that pursues and supports unpopular policies;
 2. high levels of corruption within the government;
 3. a government that is prosecuting an unpopular war;
 4. an unstable government (frequent changes in leadership, coupe d'état);
 5. a change in political system (e.g., from communism to democracy).

- B. A region experiences *political unrest*, characterized by:
 1. large-scale protests;
 2. riots.
- C. A region suffers *economic instability*, characterized by:
 1. rapid economic changes, such as urbanization, industrialization, modernization, and globalization;
 2. high rates of unemployment or underemployment, especially among youths;
 3. a high degree of income disparity;
 4. economic recession or depression.
- D. A region experiences significant levels of *social instability*, as a result of:
 1. a slow pace of reform;
 2. an increase in immigration of “unpopular” minorities into the region;
 3. a significant refugee presence or increase in asylum seekers;
 4. an increase in majority–minority tensions;
 5. failure of the government to provide adequate social services to a significant portion of the population;
 6. coexistence of two or more different cultures with significant differences in cultural practices, such as the Turkish and Greek Cypriots in Cyprus, or the Germans and the growing Turkish minority in Germany.

2.00 Key Actors Affecting the Group

2.10 Opponents

2.11 *The Regime*. The observable indicators of risk associated with regimes are:

- A. The regime promulgates unpopular policies (e.g., unpopular wars, taxes, social policies that negatively impact the group or its constituents).
- B. Regime representatives publicly criticize or otherwise verbally attack the group.
- C. The regime attacks or threatens core symbols of group identity, such as holy places or historically significant landmarks.
- D. The regime blocks access to political decision-making structures for group members and their constituents.
- E. The regime discriminates against and suppresses the group and its constituents (including restrictions on expression, assembly, and other activities) or supports other groups that do so.
- F. The regime explicitly rejects the demands of the group.
- G. Regime forces actively engage the radical group, including violent confrontation, arrests, torture, and assassination.

2.12 *Other Opponents*. The observable indicators of risk associated with other opponents are:

- A. Opponents of the group publicly criticize or otherwise verbally attack it.
- B. Opponents of the group pursue policies, legal action, or sanctions that negatively affect the group or its constituents.
- C. Opponents of the group rise in strength, number, and influence.
- D. Opponents of the group discriminate against, harass, or otherwise act to restrict the group and its constituents’ quality of life.

- E. Opponents of the group physically attack group members, constituents, or their property.

2.20 Constituents and Supporters

The observable indicators of risk associated with group constituents and supporters are:

- A. The group receives support from a source or sources with a known violent agenda (e.g., a hostile state or a terrorist group).
- B. Supporters or constituents of the group exert pressure on the group to take violent action (e.g., by threatening to withdraw or shift support).
- C. Supporters or constituents provoke violence, forcing the group to act.
- D. Foreign or other influential supporters order the group to undertake terrorist operations.

2.30 Competitors

The observable indicators of risk associated with intergroup competition are:

- A. A group with similar goals competes with the radical group for support, recruits, publicity, or prestige.
- B. A competing group benefits (e.g., in terms of publicity, recruitment, support, prestige, and advancement of their cause) from violent acts or terrorism.

3.00 The Group/Organization: Characteristics, Processes, and Structures

3.10 Group Ideology and Goals

The observable indicators of risk associated with group ideology are:

- A. The group increasingly believes that change is not possible in existing society and that a radical change is necessary.
- B. The group's ideology calls for and legitimizes violent action against enemies.
- C. The group's ideology specifies targets.
- D. The group's ideology increasingly expands the spread of targets from specific (e.g., the police) to general (e.g., all members of group associated with the police).
- E. The group's ideology emphasizes the historical sins of a designated group.
- F. The group's ideology characterizes group members as righteous and uniquely empowered to rectify the perceived ills of society.
- G. The group idealizes the goals and means of a terrorist group, revolutionary nation (e.g., Iran), or leaders associated with violence, terrorism, or revolution.

3.20 Group Experiences with Violence

The observable indicators of risk associated with group experience with violence are:

- A. The group's leaders demonstrate a history of violent behavior, including participation in other violent campaigns or organizations.

- B. The group's members demonstrate a history of violent behavior, including participation in other violent campaigns or organizations.
- C. The group actively recruits individuals that demonstrate a history of violent behavior, including participation in other violent campaigns or organizations.

3.30 Leadership Personality Characteristics

3.31 *Narcissistic Personality.* The observable indicators of risk associated with narcissistic leaders are:

- A. The group leader is sensitive to or does not accept criticism.
- B. The group leader is surrounded by sycophants.
- C. The leader overvalues his chances of success and underestimates the strength of his opponents.

3.32 *Paranoid Personality.* The observable indicators of risk associated with paranoid leaders are:

- A. The group's leader is obsessed with security and secrecy.
- B. The group's leader blames and demonizes opponents of the group.
- C. The group's leader advocates the stockpiling of weapons to defend against imminent attack.
- D. The group's leader frequently purges his inner circle.

3.33 *Sociopathic Personality.* The observable indicators of risk for sociopathic personality are:

- A. The group leader has a history of criminal activity not motivated by politics.
- B. The group leader focuses his wish for violent action on the establishment.

3.34 *Malignant Narcissist.* The observable indicators of risk associated with malignant narcissist leaders are:

- A. The group's leader displays extreme grandiosity, paranoid, and antisocial traits.
- B. The group's leader displays no compunction regarding the use of violence.
- C. The group's leader has dreams of glory and lacks empathy or concern regarding the impact of his acts on others.
- D. The group leader focuses his anger for group setbacks on others, especially the establishment.

3.40 Leadership Style and Organizational Decision Making

3.41 *Charismatic Leader-Follower Relationships.* The observable indicators of risk associated with charismatic leader-follower relationships are:

- A. The group is consumed by a sense of millenarian urgency.
- B. The followers uncritically follow the leader's directive.
- C. The group has charismatic characteristics and the leader has a history of violence or believes that violence is necessary in the pursuit of the leader's goals.

3.42 Authoritarian/Totalitarian Leadership and Strong Central Organizational Decision Making. The observable indicators of risk associated with authoritarian/totalitarian leadership and decision-making style are:

- A. The radical group is headed by an authoritarian leader advocating violence.
- B. An authoritarian leader advocating violence consolidates his or her decision-making control over the group.
- C. The radical group adopts a hierarchical group structure modeled after a military organization and fashions a military identity for itself.
- D. The leadership of the hierarchically structured organization advocates violence.
- E. There is increased polarization of the group as elites in disagreement with the controlling leader(s) either leave voluntarily or are expelled.

3.43 Observable Indicators of Risk Associated with Communities of Belief. The observable indicators of risk associated with communities of belief is:

- A. The literature and communications of a community of belief shift into advocacy of violence against specific targets.

3.44 Factionalization and Splintering. The observable indicators of risk associated with factionalization and splintering are:

- A. The group experiences internal debate and factionalization over the use of violence. A faction supporting more violent means splits from the parent organization.
- B. The group permits a faction that is in disagreement with group authorities over the appropriateness of violence or terrorism to continue to exist and eventually pursue more radical and violent actions.
- C. The group fails to keep factions advocating more extreme measures from leaving the organization where they would be subject to the moderating influence of the organization.

3.45 Open vs. Closed Group. The observable indicators of risk associated with a closed group are:

- A. Group members' communication with the outside world is severely restricted, with no access to friends or family.
- B. Exit from the group is severely restricted or blocked. At its extreme, the member who attempts to leave a closed group is considered a defector, and may be subject to severe sanctions, including execution.

3.50 Organizational Processes

3.51 Recruitment. The observable indicators of risk associated with recruitment are:

- A. Group recruits from a pool of disenfranchised, victimized, radicalized, or violent individuals, including:
 - 1. individuals expressing desire for revenge;
 - 2. individuals with a history of legal conflicts with the government or criminal actions;
 - 3. individuals that demonstrate a history of violent behavior or experience with weapons, including participation in military training, paramilitary, or other violent organizations, or violent campaigns;

4. individuals with special educational background (e.g., microbiology), or specialized skills (e.g., explosives).
- B. The radical group changes its recruitment strategy by:
 1. adapting recruitment methods to attract personnel with skills and motivations necessary for violence;
 2. using more elitist entry requirements (e.g., high levels of demonstrated skill, experience, and performance);
 3. perpetrating media coverage generating events, such as demonstrations and open confrontations with police to draw recruits.

3.53 *Socialization*. The observable indicators of risk associated with socialization are:

- A. The group employs socialization practices that emphasize:
 1. obedience to authority and absolute loyalty to the group or leader;
 2. suppression of dissent;
 3. need for sacrifice;
 4. demonization and dehumanization of opponents.
- B. The group requires prospective members to commit illegal acts in order to “burn bridges” to society.
- C. The group (especially religious cults) requires a major donation of personal assets by new members.

3.54 *Training*. The observable indicators associated with training in preparation for violence and terrorism are:

- A. Individuals with specialized training experiences or skills associated with terrorist operations, weapons, communications, explosives, operational planning, and so on join the group.
- B. Group members appear in known terrorist training camps, sites or organizations.
- C. Group members train in operational skills such as tradecraft (e.g., surveillance, countersurveillance, and secure communications), weapons, and explosives.
- D. The group engages in operations such as bank robberies, thefts, and kidnappings requiring skills similar to terrorist operations.

3.55 *Assignment and Promotion*. The observable indicators associated with assignment and promotion are:

- A. The group defines success as confrontation on behalf of the group.
- B. The group identifies propensity for violence as a criterion for promotion.
- C. The group emphasizes a form of ideological purity, extremism, or radical belief over other qualifications for assignment or promotion.
- D. The group emphasizes operational skills or experience at the expense of other characteristics.
- E. The group places extraordinary emphasis on loyalty to the leader or group over specific skills and abilities.

3.56 *Attrition*. The observable indicators associated with attrition are:

- A. Members exit the group due to disagreements over appropriateness of more radical actions, including violence and terrorism.

- B. Members exit the group due to personal concerns over their ability to adhere to difficult group requirements (need for violence, ability to live underground, separation from family, need to provide financial support to others, fear of risks, etc.).
- C. Members exit the group due to stress-related illness or psychopathology resulting from group preparation for violence.
- D. Members expelled from group for questionable loyalty, security risk, performance ability, and commitment.
- E. Group members are executed by the group.

3.60 Groupthink and Polarization

The observable indicators associated with groupthink and polarization are:

- A. Within the group, internal debate becomes increasingly one-sided in favor of a dominant position favoring more radical goals and behavior, especially those involving violence.
- B. The group demonstrates a willingness to punish or expel members or factions disagreeing with the leadership's policy decisions.
- C. The group cites a broad range of different reasons supportive of more radical positions (security, support, competition with other groups, target vulnerability, and so on) and argue for a more radical position and will not consider arguments to the contrary.
- D. Group members perceive themselves in competition for a violent leader's approval.
- E. There is no convincing spokesperson or a more moderate minority position and those who venture to disagree are silenced or expelled.
- F. The group is governed by majority decision rule versus unanimity.

3.70 Group Psychological Progression toward Terrorism

3.71 Humiliation and Need for Revenge. The observable indicators associated with humiliation and need for revenge are:

- A. The group experiences a growing sense of stigmatization or isolation from society or government.
- B. The group experiences humiliation from psychological attacks (e.g., slander, characterization of group members as non-human) against the group as a whole, individual members, or constituents.
- C. The group experiences humiliation from physical attacks (e.g., arrests, trashing of property, random search and seizure of property) against individual members or constituents of the group.
- D. The group experiences a sense of helplessness and rage in reaction to collective attacks (raids, pogroms, sanctioned massacres) against the group as a whole, designed to demonstrate the group's inferiority.
- E. The group expresses desire for revenge and retaliation.

3.72 Sense of Threat. The observable indicators associated with sense of threat are:

- A. The group perceives a serious threat to individual members/leaders resulting from physical attacks (including arrests, torture, and assassination) or catastrophe.

- B. The group experiences fear that the regime or other opponent is attempting to destroy the group as a whole.
- C. The group adopts an increasingly paranoid defensive posture, including the intimidation, expulsion, even killing, of suspected traitors.

3.73 Negative Characterizations of the Enemy. The observable indicators associated with negative characterizations of the enemy are:

- A. The group rejects the legitimacy of the regime or its agents, utilizing characterizations such as illegitimate, immoral, ineffective, and needing to be destroyed.
- B. Psychological distance displayed by the group toward its enemy increases.
- C. The group increasingly uses depersonalizing and dehumanizing characterizations of their opponents, referring to them as sub-human, as animals or as objects.

3.80 Type of Support

The observable indicators of risk associated with type of support are:

- A. The group receives ideological support, including publication and distribution of propaganda.
- B. The group receives significant financial support.
- C. The group receives weapons.
- D. The group receives training in the use of weapons and tactics or the use of training facilities, either domestically or internationally.
- E. The group receives operational support, including safe havens, logistical support, advisors, or troops.
- F. The group acquires the necessary resources and logistical support for going underground (e.g., safe houses, false documents).

3.90 Indicators of Movement toward Terrorism

3.91 Assessment that the Benefits of Terrorism Outweigh the Risks. The observable indicators associated with the assessment that the benefits of terrorism outweigh the risks are:

- A. The group expresses discouragement over having failed at other methods, including participation in the political process, nonviolent protest, strikes, riots, and negotiations.
- B. There is disagreement between group leaders on how to proceed, that is, whether to continue nonviolent means vs. resorting to violence.
- C. The group favorably assesses its opponent's vulnerability to terrorism.
- D. The group perceives its opponent's retaliatory power to be weak or ineffectual.
- E. The group believes that its involvement in terrorism will net positive benefits for its constituents and sympathizers, both short term and long term, outweighing the costs of retaliation, even if its ultimate goals are never met.
- F. The group believes it will eventually succeed at attaining its goals through terrorism.

3.92 Formation of Fighting Units. The observable indicators associated with the formation of fighting units are:

- A. A group possesses or forms fighting units (paramilitaries, self-defense forces).

- B. Intergroup conflict or competition arises between political leaders and leaders of the group's fighting units.

3.93 Actions toward Target Group. The observable indicators associated with violent actions toward a target group are:

- A. The group increasingly withdraws from nonviolent contact with the opposition, evidenced by decreased contacts, communications, participation in shared organizations (such as political institutions), cessation of negotiations.
- B. The group transitions from unintentional violence against its opponents to planned, intentional acts.

3.94 Final Preparations for Violence and Terrorism. The observable indicators associated with the preparations for violence and terrorism are:

- A. The group actively engages in operational planning and exercises in preparation for violent acts against enemies.
- B. The group acquires weapons.
- C. The group prepares to go underground.

4.0 The Immediate Situation

4.10 Triggering Events Associated with Increased Risk for Terrorism

The observable indicators of triggering events associated with increased risk for terrorism are:

- A. Members of the group, their constituents, or a prominent figure idealized by the group are attacked, arrested, tortured, or assassinated by the regime or other opponents.
- B. The radical group is blocked from running in an election, either because the regime has canceled the election altogether or has declared the party illegal.
- C. The party representing a radical group believes it has been deprived of a victory at the polls because of the regime overturning the election results or fraudulently securing its own victory.
- D. Anniversaries or "red letter days" commemorating a significant violent event for the group approach.

The Five Principle Types of Radical Groups

Although there are universal features that characterize groups moving into terrorism, these features must be tailored to the type of organization, and, within that typology, to the particular region or country involved. In the spectrum of terrorism, there is a wide variety of causes, actors, and motivations. Each group must be analyzed in its own unique historical, political, and cultural context, for beneath the general features in common, terrorist groups and organizations differ remarkably. It would be unreasonable to suppose that an ethnic minority in the Middle East or Europe struggling for hundreds of years to achieve separate national status would enter the path of terrorism in the same fashion as a closed religious cult in Japan or a group of right-wing "survivalists" in middle America.

This article applies the framework to the five principle types of radical groups—nationalist–separatists (NS), social revolutionaries (SR), religious fundamentalists (RF), nontraditional religious extremists, including “new religions” (closed religious cults; NR), and right-wing groups (RW)—to further hone the usefulness of the framework by identifying those indicators most relevant to the evaluation of risk for each group category.

The typology of terrorism employed was drawn from A. Schmid and A. Yongman,¹ augmenting the religious fundamentalist category with a new category of religious extremists, representing “new religions,” as exemplified by Aum Shinrikyo. A description of the five group types follows.

Nationalist–separatist terrorism. Also known as ethno-nationalist terrorism, includes those groups fighting to establish a geographically separate political state based on ethnic dominance or homogeneity. The Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) in Spain, and the radical groups seeking to establish a Palestinian homeland, such as the Abu Nidal Organization and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), are prominent examples. Nationalist–separatist terrorists are usually attempting to garner international sympathy for their cause and to coerce the dominant group. Thus, ETA is attempting to pressure Spain into yielding to its demands for an independent Basque state. These causes of the nationalist–separatist terrorist groups and organizations are particularly intractable, for the bitterness and resentment against the dominant ethnic group has been conveyed from generation to generation.²

Social revolutionary terrorism. Also known as terrorism of the left, social revolutionary terrorism refers to groups seeking to overthrow the capitalist economic and social order. Drawing on the “propaganda by the deed” tradition of the European and Russian anarchists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these groups are exemplified by the European “fighting communist organizations” active throughout the 1970s and 1980s, for example, the Red Army Faction in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy, and the Weather Underground in the United States. Although social revolutionary terrorist groups have experienced a significant decline over the last two decades, paralleling the collapse of communism in Europe and the end of the Cold War, social revolutionary terrorism and insurgency are still underway, as exemplified by Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path) and the Movement Revolutionaire Tupac Amaru (MRTA) in Peru; a number of groups in Columbia—the Fifteen May Organization (M-15), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), and the National Liberation Army of Columbia (ELN); and the Japanese Red Army (JRA) in Japan.

Religious fundamentalist terrorism. Among all of the “People of the book,” Jewish, Christian, and Muslim, there are extremists seeking to “force the end.” Traditional groups include Islamic, Jewish, Christian, and Sikh radical fundamentalist extremists. In contrast to social revolutionary and nationalist–separatist terrorists, for religious fundamentalist extremist groups, the decision-making role of the preeminent leader is of central importance. For these true believers, the radical cleric is seen as the authentic interpreter of God’s word, not only eliminating any ambivalence about killing, but endowing the destruction of the defined enemy with sacred significance. Whether ayatollah, rabbi, or priest, the radical cleric has used sacred text to justify killing in the name of God. The most violent radical Islamist groups, such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hizballah, responsible for many of the suicide bombings in Israel, do in fact have domestic constituencies. Indeed, these radical Islamist groups share nationalist–separatist motivations with many of the secular Middle Eastern terrorist groups operating in the Middle East.

Religious extremist terrorism. Both religious fundamentalist terrorism as well as new

religions terrorism are included here. In both cases, religious belligerents are defending their faith against enemies of their faith, responding to the interpretation of scripture by radical clerics who endorse killing in the name of God.

Nontraditional religious extremist groups, also known as “new religions,” such as Aum Shinrikyo, responsible for the 1995 sarin gas attack on Tokyo subways, are generally closed cults in a struggle for survival against a demonized enemy that must be destroyed. Although the majority of millennial apocalyptic cults are waiting for the millennium, some religious belligerents are seeking to force the end, and, in the case of Aum Shinrikyo, to precipitate the final struggle. Charismatic leaders of closed cults, like Aum Shinrikyo’s Shoko Asahara, who see themselves in a Godlike role (a self-perception rewarded by the Godlike reverence with which they are treated by their followers) can become obsessed with power. Especially for closed religious cults, the dynamic is one of a charismatic leader who holds total sway over his followers. What he declares is moral and required *is* moral and required. The followers yield their individual judgment to the leader, acting as if they have no independent critical faculties of their own. No doubt or doubters are permitted in these powerful, hermetically sealed closed organizations. But, Aum Shinrikyo is quite unusual within the spectrum of millennial cults, for most of these cults are not religious belligerents seeking to precipitate the apocalypse, as was the case with Aum, but rather tend to withdraw from society, passively awaiting the “final days.”

Right-wing terrorism. This type comprises those groups seeking to maintain an extant political order or to return society to an idealized “golden age” of the past in which ethnic relations more clearly favored the dominant majority. Examples include neo-Nazi groups and groups espousing racist ideology, such as the Ku Klux Klan. These groups generally espouse fascist ideologies, including racist, anti-Semitic, and antigovernment “survivalist” beliefs. These groups in the United States fear the federal government, which they see as contributing to the decline of the majority’s dominance. In their view, the federal government is illegitimate. Because of this dehumanization of their enemies, attacks on target groups, such as Blacks, or, in Europe, on enclaves of foreign workers, are justified by their ideology. Because of their delegitimation and dehumanization of the government, attacks on government facilities are certainly feasible by such groups, including attacks on the seat of the federal government, Washington, D.C., as represented in *The Turner Diaries*, or the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City by Timothy McVeigh.

Method

The method employed was an elaboration of the method used in developing the integrated framework: a systematic expert knowledge acquisition exercise, employing a modified Delphi procedure, in which a panel of experts in the field of terrorism and political violence was systematically interviewed and re-interviewed, supplemented by a literature review.³ Recognizing that each group was unique, the panel of experts was asked to evaluate the indicators for each group type. In order to identify potential differences in the importance of indicators by radical group type, the Delphi panel separately evaluated each indicator in terms of either High (H), Medium (M), or Low (L) relevance as a predictor of terrorism for each of the five types of radical groups (for indicators felt to be of no relevance to a particular type of group, an N was recorded). The results were then factor analyzed to produce a single set of ratings, presented in the tables that follow.

Indicators of High Importance by Group Category

In this section, the consensus judgment of the importance of the indicators within the four conceptual categories of the framework is presented in tabular format, differentiating the five categories of radical groups.

In general, it will be observed that one type of radical group—the nontraditional religious groups (NR) such as Aum Shinrikyo—is an outlier; the variables judged to be significant for other groups were for the most part considered to be of low relevance for closed cults. This was particularly true for conceptual category 1.00 Historical, Cultural, and Contextual Features. Although these external features were judged to be of low significance by comparison—cults are typically less concerned with the social, political, or economic realities of their particular context than are all other kinds of radical groups—the internal characteristics of the group, specially characteristics of the charismatic cult leader (3.3) and group decision making (3.4) were uniformly high.

Indicator Ratings

1.00 Historical, Cultural, and Contextual Features

1.10 Historically Rooted Culture of Violence

Observable indicators of risk associated with cultural tolerance for violence

	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The region has a history of communal conflict along ethnic, religious, or socioeconomic class lines, especially if conflict has involved violence.	H	H	M	H	H
B. The region has a history of frequent and violent coups d'état.	M	L	L	M	H
C. The region has a history of insurgency or revolution.	H	M	L	H	H
D. The region experiences high levels of violent crime.	M	M	L	M	H
E. Communal groups in the region commemorate or celebrate past violent events, such as historic victories (e.g., the Orange Order marches in Northern Ireland) and defeats (e.g., the Serb celebration of the battle of Kosovo Polje commemorating Serbia's historic defeat by the Ottoman Empire in 1389).	H	L	L	H	H
F. Cultural heroes are extolled for their bravery in battle (e.g., Serb Prince Lazar at the battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389).	H	H	L	H	H

Within this conceptual category, 1.0 Historical, Cultural, and Contextual Features, and two variables, 1.1 Historically Rooted Culture of Violence, and 1.2 Current Communal Conflict were judged to be of high significance nearly across the board for the four major terrorist group categories: nationalist-separatists (NS), social revolutionaries (SR), right-wing extremists (RW), and religious fundamentalists (RF). For the variable 1.3 Political, Economic, and Social Instability, 1.3 B Political Unrest, was judged to be of High significance for the four major groups. 1.3 D Social Instability was particularly important for both NS and RW groups.

1.20 Current Communal Conflict

Observable indicators of risk associated with communal conflict	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. A majority or dominant group openly discriminates against a minority or subordinate group by:					
1. limiting or restricting access to political decision-making structures;	H	H	L	M	M
2. restricting access to certain jobs, goods and services, welfare benefits, and so on;	H	H	L	H	M
3. limiting or restricting activities, assembly, speech, or practice of religion.	H	H	M	H	H
B. A majority or dominant group actively persecutes a minority or subordinate group, including violence and harassment.	H	H	L	H	H
C. Communal leaders politicize and exploit historical conflict and divisions.	H	H	L	H	H
D. The region is currently experiencing conflict along ethnic, religious or class lines, especially if conflict has escalated to violence.	H	H	M	H	H

1.30 Political, Economic, and Social Instability

Observable indicators of political, economic, and social instability	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The region experiences <i>political instability</i> , characterized by:					
1. a government that pursues and supports unpopular policies;	M	L	L	M	M
2. high levels of corruption within the government;	L	L	L	L	L
3. a government that is prosecuting an unpopular war;	L	M	L	H	M
4. an unstable government (frequent changes in leadership, coups d'état);	M	M	L	M	H
5. a change in political system (e.g., from communism to democracy);	M	M	L	M	H
B. The region experiences <i>political unrest</i> , characterized by:					
1. large-scale protests;	H	H	L	H	H
2. riots.	H	H	L	H	H
C. The region suffers <i>economic instability</i> , characterized by:					
1. rapid economic changes, such as urbanization, industrialization, and modernization;	L	H	L	M	L
2. high rates of unemployment or under-employment, especially among youths,	M	M	L	H	H
3. high degree of income disparity;	M	M	L	M	L
4. economic recession or depression.	M	M	L	M	L
D. The region experiences significant levels of <i>social instability</i> , as a result of:					
1. a slow pace of reform;	L	L	L	M	L

2. an increase in immigration of “unpopular” minorities into the region;	M	L	L	L	H
3. a significant refugee presence or increase in asylum seekers;	M	L	L	L	H
4. an increase in majority–minority tensions;	H	M	L	M	H
5. failure of the government to provide adequate social services to a significant portion of the population;	M	L	L	H	L
6. coexistence of two or more different cultures with significant differences in cultural practices, such as the Turkish and Greek Cypriots in Cyprus, or the Germans and the growing Turkish minority in Germany.	H	M	L	L	H

2.00 Key Actors Affecting the Group

2.10 Opponents

2.11 The Regime

Observable indicators of risk associated with regimes	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The regime promulgates unpopular policies (e.g., unpopular wars, taxes, social policies) that negatively impact the group or its constituents.	M	H	M	M	M
B. Regime representatives publicly criticize or otherwise verbally attack the group.	M	H	M	M	M
C. The regime threatens or attacks core symbols of group identity, such as holy places or historically significant landmarks.	H	H	H	M	M
D. The regime blocks access to political decision-making structures for group members and their constituents.	H	M	L	M	M
E. The regime discriminates against and suppresses the group and its constituents, or supports other groups that do so.	H	H	H	H	M
F. The regime explicitly rejects the demands of the group.	M	M	L	H	M
G. Regime forces actively engage the radical group, including violent confrontation, arrests, torture, and assassination.	H	H	H	H	H

For this category, 2.0 Key Actors Affecting the Group, when the regime (2.11) discriminates against a secular or religious minority, it is of particular significance for NS and RF terrorism. When other opponents physically attack group members or their property (2.12 E), it is of high significance across the board. The variable 2.20 Constituents and Supporters, which addresses support or pressure from supporters, internal or external, to move in violent directions, is of high significance for the major groups.

This category, 3.0 The Group/Organization: Characteristics, Structures, and Processes, concerns the inner workings of the group or organization, and, in general, is of high importance for all groups. Unlike categories 1.0 and 2.0, which are concerned with external, and thus more easily observable and measurable behaviors, the variables associated with the internal characteristics, structures, and processes are not so easily observed.

2.12 Other Opponents

Observable indicators of risk associated with opponents	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. Opponents of the group publicly criticize or otherwise verbally attack it.	L	L	L	L	L
B. Opponents of the group pursue policies, legal action, or sanctions that negatively affect the group or its constituents.	M	L	L	L	L
C. Opponents of the group rise in strength, number, and influence.	M	M	L	M	M
D. Opponents of the group discriminate against, harass, or otherwise act to restrict the group and its constituents' quality of life.	M	M	M	M	M
E. Opponents of the group physically attack group members, constituents, or their property.	H	H	H	H	H

2.20 Constituents and Supporters

Observable indicators of risk associated with group constituents and supporters	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The group receives support from a source or sources with a known violent agenda.	M	H	N	H	H
B. Supporters or constituents of the group exert pressure on the group to take violent action (e.g., by threatening to withdraw or shift support).	H	H	N	H	H
C. Supporters or constituents provoke violence, forcing the group to act.	H	H	N	H	H
D. Foreign or other influential supporters order the group to undertake terrorist operations.	H	H	N	H	H

2.30 Competitors

Observable indicators of risk associated with intergroup competition	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. A group with similar goals competes with the radical group for support, recruits, publicity or prestige.	M	M	L	M	M
B. A competing group is benefiting (e.g., in terms of publicity, recruitment, support, prestige and advancement of their cause) from violent acts or terrorism.	M	M	L	M	M

3.00 The Group/Organization: Characteristics, Processes, and Structures

3.10 Group Ideology and Goals

Observable indicators of risk associated with group ideology	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The group increasingly believes that change is not possible in existing society and that revolutionary or radical change is necessary.	H	H	H	H	M

B. The group's ideology calls for and legitimizes violent action against enemies.	H	H	H	H	H
C. The group's ideology specifies targets.	H	H	H	H	H
D. The group's ideology increasingly expands the spread of targets from specific (e.g., the police) to general (e.g., all those associated with the police).	H	H	H	H	H
E. The group's ideology emphasizes the historical sins of a designated group.	H	H	M	H	M
F. The group's ideology characterizes group members as righteous and uniquely empowered to rectify the perceived ills of society.	M	H	H	H	H
G. The group idealizes the goals and means of a terrorist group, revolutionary nation (e.g., Iran), or leaders associated with violence, terrorism, or revolution.	H	H	H	H	H

3.20 Group Experience with Violence

Observable indicators of risk associated with experience with violence	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The group's leaders demonstrate a history of violent behavior, including participation in other violent campaigns or organizations.	H	H	H	H	H
B. The group's members demonstrate a history of violent behavior, including participation in other violent campaigns or organizations.	H	H	H	H	H
C. The group actively recruits individuals that demonstrate a history of violent behavior, including participation in other violent campaigns or organizations.	H	H	H	H	H

3.30 Leadership Personality Characteristics

3.31 Narcissistic Personality

Observable indicators of risk associated with narcissistic leaders	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The group leader is sensitive to or does not accept criticism.	M	M	M	M	M
B. The group leader is surrounded by sycophants.	M	M	H	M	M
C. The leader overvalues his chances of success and underestimates the strength of his opponents.	M	M	M	M	M

3.32 Paranoid Personality

Observable indicators of risk associated with paranoid leaders	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The group's leader is obsessed with security and secrecy.	M	M	M	H	M
B. The group's leader blames and demonizes opponents of the group.	H	H	H	H	M
C. The group's leader advocates the stockpiling of weapons to defend against imminent attack.	H	H	H	H	H
D. The group's leader frequently purges his inner circle.	M	M	H	M	M

3.33 Sociopathic Personality

Observable indicators of risk associated with sociopathic leaders	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The group leader has a history of criminal activity not motivated by politics.	M	M	H	M	L
B. The group leader focuses his wish for violent action on the establishment.	H	H	H	H	L

3.34 Malignant Narcissist

Observable indicators of risk associated with malignant narcissist leaders	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The group's leader displays extreme grandiosity, paranoid, and antisocial traits.	H	H	H	H	H
B. The group's leader displays no compunction regarding the use of violence.	H	H	H	H	H
C. The group's leader has dreams of glory and lacks empathy or concern regarding the impact of his acts on others.	H	H	H	H	H
D. The group's leader focuses anger for group setbacks on others, especially the establishment.	H	M	M	H	M

3.40 Leadership Style and Organizational Decision Making

3.41 Charismatic Leader-Follower Relationship

Observable indicators of risk associated with charismatic leader-follower relationship	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The group is consumed by a sense of millenarian urgency.	M	M	H	N	M
B. The group uncritically follows the leader's directives.	M	M	H	M	L
C. A group has charismatic characteristics and the leader has a history of violence or believes that violence is necessary in the pursuit of the leader's goals.	H	H	H	H	H

3.42 Authoritarian/Totalitarian Leadership and Strong Central Organizational Decision Making

Observable indicators of risk associated with authoritarian/totalitarian leadership and decision-making style	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The radical group is headed by an authoritarian leader advocating violence.	H	H	H	H	H
B. An authoritarian leader advocating violence consolidates his or her decision-making control over the group.	H	H	H	H	M
C. The radical group adopts a hierarchical group structure modeled after a military organization and fashions a military identity for itself.	H	H	H	H	M
D. The leadership of the hierarchically structured organization advocates violence.	H	H	H	H	H

E. There is increased polarization of the group as elites in disagreement with the controlling leader(s) either leave voluntarily or are expelled.	H	H	M	H	M
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3.43 Communities of Belief

Observable indicator of risk associated with communities of belief	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. Literature and communications of communities of belief shift into advocacy of violence against specific targets.	H	H	H	H	H

3.44 Factionalization and Splintering

Observable indicators of risk associated with factionalization and splintering	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The group experiences internal debate and factionalization over the use of violence.	H	H	N	H	M
B. The group permits a faction that is in disagreement with group authorities over the appropriateness of violence or terrorism to continue to exist and eventually pursue more radical and violent actions.	H	H	N	H	H
C. The group fails to keep factions advocating more extreme measures from leaving the organization where they would be subject to the moderating influence of the organization.	H	H	N	H	H

3.45 Open vs. Closed Group

Observable indicators of risk associated with a closed group	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. Group members' communication with the outside world is severely restricted, with no access to friends or family.	M	M	M	M	M
B. Exit from group is severely restricted or blocked. At its extreme, the member who attempts to leave a closed group is considered a defector, and may be subject to severe sanctions, including execution.	H	H	H	M	M

The consensus judgment was the variables within this category are extremely important because they reflect the actual behaviors of the group in contrast to the political, economic, and social conditions that serve as a broad but general risk indicator. Of the nine variables within this category, a number were of high significance across the five radical group types. In this category were: 3.10 Ideology and Goals, concerned with violent, extremist ideologies and absolutist goals; 3.20 Group Experience with Violence; and 3.70 Group Psychological Progression Towards Violence. Within the variables, a number of specific indicators were also judged to be of high significance across the board. These included: under 3.30 Leader Personality, 3.34 Malignant Narcissism, and several subindicators under 3.32 Paranoid Personality and 3.33 Sociopathic Personality; under the variable 3.40 Leadership Style and Decision Making, 3.41 C, concerned

3.50 Organizational Processes

3. 51 Recruitment

Observable indicators of risk associated with recruitment	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. Group recruits from pool of disenfranchised, victimized, radicalized, or violent individuals, including:					
1. Individuals expressing desire for revenge;	H	H	H	H	H
2. individuals with a history of legal conflicts with government or criminal actions;					
3. individuals that demonstrate a history of violent behavior or experience with weapons, including participation in military training, paramilitary or other violent organizations, or violent campaigns;	H	H	H	H	M
4. individuals with special educational background (e.g. microbiology), or specialized skills (e.g., explosives).	H	H	H	H	H
B. The radical group changes its recruitment strategy by:					
1. adapting recruitment methods to attract personnel with skills and motivations necessary for violence	H	H	H	H	H
2. using more elitist entry requirements (e.g., high levels of demonstrated skill, experience, performance);	L	M	M	M	M
3. perpetrating media-generating events, such as demonstrations and open confrontations with police, to draw recruits.	M	H	M	H	H

3.52 Screening and Selection

Observable indicators of risk associated with screening and selection	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The group screens out prospective members with:					
1. ties to the government or other opponents;	L	M	M	M	M
2. physical infirmities or emotional instability that could interfere with performance;	M	L	L	L	L
3. a lack of established loyalty to related causes or groups;	L	M	N	M	M
4. a lack of family or social ties to the group.	L	M	N	M	M

3.53 Socialization

Observable indicators of risk associated with socialization	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The group employs socialization practices that emphasize:					
1. obedience to authority and absolute loyalty to the group or leader;	M	M	H	M	M
2. suppression of dissent;	M	M	H	M	M
3. need for sacrifice;	H	M	H	L	L
4. dehumanization of the enemy.	H	H	H	H	H
B. The group requires prospective members to commit illegal acts in order to "burn bridges" with society.	H	H	N	M	H
C. The group (especially religious cults) requires a major donation of personal assets by new members.	N	L	M	L	L

3.54 Training

Observable indicators of risk associated with training	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. Individuals with specialized training experience or skills associated with terrorist operations, weapons, communications, explosives, operational planning, and so on, join the group.					
B. Group members appear in known terrorist training camps, sites or organizations.	H	H	N	H	H
C. Group members train in operational skills such as surveillance, weapons, and driving.	H	H	H	H	H
D. The group engages in operations such as bank robberies, thefts, and kidnappings requiring skills similar to terrorist operations.	H	H	H	H	H

3.55 Assignment and Promotion

Observable indicators of risk associated with assignment and promotion	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The group defines success as confrontation on behalf of the group.	M	M	M	H	M
B. The group identifies propensity for violence as a criterion for promotion.	H	H	H	H	M
C. The group emphasizes a form of ideological purity, extremism, or radical belief over other qualifications for assignment or promotion.	M	M	M	M	M
D. The group emphasizes operational skills or experience at the expense of other characteristics.	H	H	H	H	M
E. The group places extraordinary emphasis on loyalty to the leader or group over specific skills and abilities.	L	L	M	M	M

3.56 Attrition

Observable indicators of risk associated with attrition	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. Members exit the group due to disagreements over appropriateness of more radical actions, including violence and terrorism.	H	H	H	H	H
B. Members exit the group due to personal concerns over their ability to adhere to difficult group requirements (need for violence, ability to live underground; separation from family, need to provide financial support to others, fear of risks, etc.).	H	H	H	H	H
C. Members exit the group due to stress-related illness or psychopathology resulting from group preparation for violence.	H	M	M	H	M
D. Members expelled from group for questionable loyalty, security risk, performance ability, commitment, and so on.	M	H	H	H	H
E. Group members are executed by the group.	H	H	H	H	H

3.60 Groupthink and Polarization

Observable indicators of risk associated with groupthink and polarization	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. Within the group, internal debate becomes increasingly one-sided in favor of a dominant position favoring more radical goals and behavior, especially those involving violence.	H	M	N	H	M
B. The group demonstrates a willingness to punish or expel members or factions disagreeing with the leadership's policy decisions.	H	M	M	M	M
C. The group cites a broad range of different reasons supportive of more radical positions (security, support, competition with other groups, target vulnerability, and so on) argue for a more radical position and will not consider arguments to the contrary.	H	H	N	H	M
D. Group members perceive themselves in competition for a violent leader's approval.	H	M	H	H	M
E. There is no convincing spokesperson for a more moderate, minority position, and those who venture to disagree are silenced or expelled.	H	H	N	M	L
F. The group is governed by majority decision rule versus.	M	L	N	L	L

3.70 Group Psychological Progression toward Terrorism

3.71 Humiliation and Need for Revenge

Observable indicators of risk associated with humiliation and need for revenge	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The group experiences a growing sense of stigmatization or isolation from society or government.	M	M	M	M	M
B. The group experiences humiliation from psychological attacks (e.g., slander, characterization of group members as non-human) against the group as a whole, individual members, or constituents.	H	H	H	H	M
C. The group experiences humiliation from physical attacks (e.g., arrests, trashing of property, random search and seizure of property) against individual members or constituents of the group.	H	H	H	H	H
D. The group experiences a sense of helplessness and rage in reaction to collective attacks (raids, pogroms, sanctioned massacres) against the group as a whole, designed to demonstrate the group's inferiority.	H	H	H	H	H
E. The group expresses desire for revenge and retaliation.	H	H	H	H	H

3.72 Sense of Threat

Observable indicators of risk associated with sense of threat	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The group perceives a serious threat to individual members/leaders resulting from physical attacks (including arrests, torture, assassination);	H	H	H	H	H

B. The group experiences fear that the regime is attempting to destroy the group as a whole.	H	H	H	H	H
C. The group adopts an increasingly paranoid defensive posture, including the intimidation, expulsion, even killing, of suspected traitors.	H	H	H	H	H

3.73 Negative Characterization of the Enemy

Observable indicators of risk associated with negative characterizations of the enemy	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The group rejects the legitimacy of the regime or its agents, utilizing characterizations such as illegitimate, immoral, ineffective, and needing to be destroyed.	H	H	H	H	M
B. The group increasingly uses depersonalizing and dehumanizing characterizations of their opponents, referring to them as sub-human, as animals or as objects.	H	H	H	H	M
C. Psychological distance displayed by group toward its opponent increases.	M	M	L	M	L

3.80 Type of Support

Observable indicators of risk associated with type of support	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The group receives ideological support, including publication and distribution of propaganda.	M	M	N	M	M
B. The group receives significant financial support.	M	M	N	L	M
C. The group receives weapons.	H	H	N	H	H
D. The group receives training in the use of weapons and tactics or the use of training facilities, either domestically or internationally.	H	H	N	H	H
E. The group receives operational support, including safe havens, logistical support, advisors, or troops.	H	H	N	H	H
F. The group acquires the necessary resources and logistical support for going underground (e.g., safe houses, false documents).	H	H	N	H	M

with a group with charismatic properties whose leader has a history or interest in violence; 3.42 Authoritarian/Totalitarian Leadership and Strong Central Organizational Decision Making; 3.43 Communities of Belief, wherein literature and communications shift in the direction of advocacy of violence; 3.44 Factionalization and Splintering (with the exception of NR); 3.45 B Restricted Access from Closed Groups, of high importance for NS, RF, and NR groups; within the variable 3.50 Organizational Processes, 3.51 Recruitment, when associated with history or specialization in violence was of high importance; 3.53 B Socialization process requires new members to commit illegal acts; 3.54 Training in weapons, terrorist tactics of high importance across the board; 3.55 B and D, Promotion based on operational skills; 3.56 Attrition of individuals opposed to violence; 3.60 Group-think of variable importance, especially notable for NS groups and, to a lesser degree SR groups; for 3.80, Types of Support, a number of subcategories associated with weapons,

3.90 Indicators of Movement toward Terrorism

3.91 Assessment that the Benefits of Terrorism Outweigh the Risks

Observable indicators of risk associated with the assessment that the benefits of terrorism outweigh the risks	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The group expresses discouragement over having failed at other methods, including participation in the political process, nonviolent protest, negotiations, strikes, and riots.	M	M	M	M	M
B. There is disagreement between group leaders on how to proceed, that is, whether to continue nonviolent means vs. resorting to violence.	H	M	N	M	M
C. The group favorably assesses its opponent's vulnerability to terrorism.	H	H	H	H	M
D. The group perceives its opponent's retaliatory power to be weak, ineffectual.	H	H	M	H	M
E. The group believes that its involvement in terrorism will net positive benefits for its constituents and sympathizers, both short term and long term, outweighing the costs of retaliation, even if its ultimate goals are never met.	H	H	N	H	M
F. The group believes it will eventually succeed at attaining its goals through terrorism.	H	H	H	H	M

3.92 Formation of Fighting Units

Observable indicators of risk associated with the formation of fighting units	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. A group possesses or forms fighting units (paramilitaries, self-defense forces).	H	H	H	H	H
B. Intergroup conflict or competition arises between political leaders and leaders of the group's fighting units.	H	H	N	H	M

3.93 Actions toward Target Group

Observable indicators of risk associated with violent actions toward target group	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The group increasingly withdraws from nonviolent contact with opposition, evidenced by decreased contacts, communications, participation in shared organizations (such as political institutions).	H	M	L	M	M
B. The group transitions from unintentional violence against its opponents to planned, intentional acts.	H	H	H	H	H

3.94 Final Preparation for Violence and Terrorism

Observable indicators of risk associated with the preparations for violence and terrorism	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. The group actively engages in operational planning and exercises for violent acts against enemies.	H	H	H	H	H
B. The group acquires weapons.	H	H	H	H	H
C. The group prepares to go underground.	H	H	N	M	H

training, and so on were of high importance for the four main terrorist groups types; and within 3.90 Indicators of Movement Toward Terrorism, a number of highly salient indicators, including 3.91, Assessment that Benefits of Terrorism Outweigh the Risks, 3.92 Formation of Fighting Units, 3.93 B Planned Acts of Violence Against Opponents, and 3.94 Final Preparation for Violence and Terrorism.

Under category 4.0 The Immediate Situation, a triggering event of high significance across the board was 4.10 A, the arrest, torture, or assassination of an idealized group leader or group members by the regime.

4.0 The Immediate Situation

4.10 Triggering Events Associated with Increased Risk for Terrorism

Observable indicators of triggering events associated with increased risk for terrorism	NS	RF	NR	SR	RW
A. Members of the group, their constituents, or a prominent figure idealized by the group are attacked, arrested, tortured, or assassinated by the regime or other opponents.	H	H	H	H	H
B. The radical group is blocked from running in an election, either because the regime has canceled the election altogether or has declared the party illegal.	M	M	M	M	M
C. The party representing a radical group believes it has been deprived of a victory at the polls because of the regime overturning the election results or fraudulently securing its own victory.	M	M	M	M	M
D. Anniversaries or “red letter days” commemorating a significant violent event for the group approach.	M	M	M	M	M

Conclusions

Several general conclusions emerged from the comparison of these ratings between and across groups.

Historical, Cultural and Contextual Features, rated as important to the prediction of terrorism for all but new religion groups, can be assessed effectively through the use of open sources and experts. This finding indicates the continued importance of readily available information in the initial phases of assessing an area’s risk of terrorism from emerging groups. These are external variables, for which the requisite information is easily obtained. This category, in effect, can be considered a low-power lens that provides a screening function, identifying groups of potential concern.

Group Characteristics, Processes, and Structures were consistently rated as highly important to the prediction of terrorism across all five group types. Group ideology and goals; experience with violence; authoritarian leadership and decision making; organizational processes such as recruitment, training, and attrition; and group psychological processes such as humiliation and need for revenge; and sense of threat and negative characterization of the enemy were rated consistently as highly important.

The concomitant importance and difficulty of obtaining information regarding these indicators suggests a need to focus more closely on groups identified as being of

concern. Looking within the group and within the leader's psychology requires a high-power lens and more specific information.

This finding also serves to focus attention on the importance of the more easily collectable sources of information on these group process indicators. In particular, efforts should be made to ensure that leader communications and group documents are fully exploited. Innovative approaches to content analysis that detect and profile the psychological state and attitudes of individuals and groups are particularly relevant to group process indicators.

Ratings for new religions differed most consistently from those of other group types. The relative insulation of new religions from historical, cultural, and contextual features, and other actors, especially opponents and supporters, resulted in the decreased importance of these indicators, compared to the other groups. Although factionalization, splitting, groupthink, and polarization were less important than in other groups, the closed and intense environment of new religious groups gave leadership and socialization processes extreme importance for new religions groups, reflecting the dominant role of the charismatic messianic leader. Leader statements and other indicators of leader attitude are of critical importance to monitor.⁴

The expert panel was least confident regarding their ratings for new religions reflecting the relatively small number of these groups and the recency of their entry into terrorism. This finding indicates that new religions constitute a significant analytical challenge, especially after the lethal activities of Aum Shinrikyo. A broader range of information sources on these groups and their indicators is required.

Notes

1. A. Schmid and A. Yongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature* (Amsterdam: Transactions Books, 1988).

2. J. Post, "Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces," in W. Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 25–40.

3. The expert panel consisted of Ronald Crelinsten, University of Ottawa, Canada; Martha Crenshaw, Wesleyan University, Connecticut; Theodore Gurr, University of Maryland; Bruce Hoffman, St. Andrews University, Great Britain; Ariel Merari, Tel Aviv University, Israel; and Ehud Sprinzak, Hebrew University, Israel.

4. With the wisdom of hindsight, the publication of *Declaring Myself the Christ* by Shoko Asahara in 1992 reflected an alarming turn. Earlier, his philosophy had been characterized by the timelessness of Buddhism. In this manifesto, Asahara proclaims himself to be not only the enlightened master, but also the Lamb of God. The wedding of Christianity to Buddhism in his idiosyncratic religious ideology incorporated the millenarian urgency of the book of Revelation, and reflected his urgency to accomplish his goals in the face of his rejection at the polls and his conviction that he did not have long to live.