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The Radical Group in Context: 1. An Integrated Framework for the Analysis of Group Risk for Terrorism

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On the basis of a systematic expert knowledge acquisition process, a framework has been developed that takes into account critical variables—internal and external, as well as interactions between them and the group under examination—that are understood to increase risk for escalation toward political violence. The indicators identified are grouped within four conceptual categories: (1) External factors, including historical, cultural, and contextual features; (2) Key actors affecting the group, including the regime and other opponents, as well as Constituents and Supporters; (3) The Group/Organization: Characteristics, Processes, and Structures, including an examination of such factors as leadership style and decision making, group experience with violence, and group ideology and goals; and (4) Characteristics of the Immediate Situation, including Triggering Events. A total of 32 variables were identified within the 4 categories to establish the overall integrated framework. This framework provides the basis for the rigorous analysis of a radical group's risk for terrorism.

The 1995 sarin gas attack against the Tokyo subway by the Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyo took Japanese law enforcement and the world's intelligence organizations by surprise. Yet the group was neither unknown nor obscure: It had achieved a reported membership of 10,000 in Japan and 30,000 in Russia, and opened offices in many major cities around the world. It had economic assets totaling over $1 billion, and group mem-

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bers, including the group's guru, had even made a bid for political office.[1] In addition, the group had given considerable indications that it was pursuing unconventional weapons (including testing and deployment of chemical weapons prior to the Tokyo attack) as well as voicing its apocalyptic vision in publicly available books and pamphlets.[2] Yet in spite of these indications, the activities that would classify it as the first substate group to perpetrate an act of mass casualty terrorism using a functional chemical weapon went largely unnoticed or ignored. This demonstrates not the absence of warning signs that would have alerted authorities to the organization's intentions, but rather the absence of an integrated analytical framework to focus the attention of analysts on the conditions and signs that indicate any group—whether politically, ethnically, or religiously motivated—is a risk for violence and terrorism.

Such a framework must necessarily come from an understanding of the underlying causes of terrorism. This is a difficult task in the absence of a universally accepted definition of terrorism. Terrorism is defined in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (d) as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience." Symbolic in intent, the terrorist act is designed to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims, including members of the victims' class, the government, and society. Terrorism falls into the spectrum of low intensity conflict, relying on the methods and strategies of unconventional warfare in targeting businessmen, tourists, and other noncombatants to gain exposure, pressure governments, and extort concessions, such as the release of prisoners or changes in domestic or foreign policies.[3]

Causal analyses of terrorism have focused predominantly on three areas: (1) political, economic and social conditions that correlate to increased incidences of politically motivated violence, (2) group dynamics–related processes that facilitate radicalization and an increased risk of violence in previously nonviolent protest groups, and (3) psychological traits and characteristics of group members that predispose them to seeking membership in violent organizations such as terrorist groups. However, these factors have generally been studied in isolation, with few attempts to integrate these approaches to create a comprehensive and dynamic risk model reflecting the radical group in the context of both external (structural) and internal (group dynamics and psychological) factors.

Several terrorism scholars have addressed parts of the problem, notably Crelinsten, Crenshaw, Della Porta, Gurr, Ross, and Sprinzak. In the introduction to *Terrorism in Context*, Crenshaw recognizes that "the causal chain that leads to the commission of acts of terrorism is complex," and emphasizes the importance of "psychological considerations and internal bargaining," "strategic reactions to opportunities and constraints," and "interactions among political actors" in the study of terrorism and terrorist groups.[4] Ross has identified structural and psychological causes of terrorism and developed a complex model linking the two.[5] Crelinsten has developed a framework for the analysis of terrorism based on the conceptualization of terrorism as political communication, focusing analysis on the dynamic relationship between the "controller, (i.e., the state), and the "controlled" (i.e., the substate protest group).[6] Della Porta has devised a model describing the radicalization process for European social revolutionary groups that integrates environmental and group dynamics variables.[7] And although Gurr has developed an assessment tool for evaluating risk for ethno-political rebellion that focuses on collective incentives, the capacity for joint action, and external opportunities, his model largely leaves out psychological and group dynamics variables critical to evaluating risk in radical protest groups.[8] So, although these efforts certainly improve our understanding of

the causes and dynamics of terrorism and political violence on a larger scale, there has been little progress in developing a comprehensive and systematic method for evaluating the terrorism potential of specific radical groups.

An exception is the recent work of Sprinzak, who has assembled a collection of critical variables into a formal risk-assessment methodology specific to the prediction of terrorism.[9] Within the context of the radicalization process, he enumerates 11 early warning indicators designed to predict the transition of radical groups from nonviolent protest to terrorism. These indicators are presented in Table 1, along with a brief description.

Sprinzak's indicators include contextual factors derived from the surrounding society as well as risk indicators specific to group characteristics and perceptions. In addition, Sprinzak recognizes dynamic variables and feedback loops between the radical group and other social actors. Each indicator is weighted, and scores are tallied to produce a Terrorism Potential Index (TPI).

Sprinzak's methodology marks a major advance on the path to assessing a radical group's risk for terrorism; it is, however, not without its limitations. First, the 11 indicators, although certainly important predictors of terrorism, are only a fraction of the available indicators. Given the difficulty of obtaining information on radical groups by even the most resourceful analysts, limiting the number of indicators to an essential few, although parsimonious, substantially diminishes the analyst's field of surveillance. Second, the relationship among Sprinzak's 11 indicators is never made explicit, nor does Sprinzak integrate his indicators into a comprehensive framework; rather, they are presented as discrete, though notionally interdependent, indicators of risk.[10] Finally, the calculation of a TPI is presented as providing a useful quantitative benchmark for the assessment of a radical group's proximity to terrorism, but in fact it confers dubious precision to what remains a largely qualitative estimation.

This article presents an integrated framework of indicators for the analysis of a radical group's risk for terrorism that substantially builds and expands on Sprinzak's 11 key indicators, incorporating them into a larger, more comprehensive, and dynamic model representing the radical group in context. Drawing on Lewin's field theory,[11] the radical group is conceived of as existing and behaving in a "field of forces." Thus the framework consists of four overlapping and interacting fields: (1) the historical, cultural, and contextual features that give rise to the group and form the backdrop against which the group operates, (2) the key actors affecting the group, (3) the group itself, including the characteristics, processes, and structures that define it, and (4) the immediate situation confronting the group that can trigger a change in tactics to increasing levels of violence or terrorism. These fields broadly represent the conditions, events, and actors interacting with the radical group as well as internal group characteristics and processes (both psychological and structural) that are critical for determining risk for escalation to terrorism. This organizing structure is illustrated in the schematic diagram in Figure 1, which adapts Stone and Schaffner's graphical depiction of an individual decision maker's political life space to the radical group in dynamic interaction with the main four elements (fields) of its context.[12] This contextual approach allows the analyst to assess risk for terrorism early in the group's development by specifying the widest possible spread of indicators across the spectrum of identifiable risk factors.

In this article, the first of two linked articles, the integrated framework is characterized in generic form. In the second article (also in this issue), the framework is applied to the five principal terrorist group types—nationalist-separatists, religious fundamentalists, other religious extremists (including nontraditional religious extremists), social revolutionaries, and right-wing extremist groups.

Table 1
Sprinzak's early warning indicators for radical groups at risk for terrorism

1. The intensity of delegitimization	The degree to which the radical group challenges the legitimacy of its opponents. The more intense the delegitimization, the greater the risk for terrorism.
2. Moral inhibitions and antiviolence taboos	Societal strictures on the legitimacy of violence. Radical groups operating in fragmented political cultures with a history of violence are a greater risk for terrorism.
3. Previous experience with violence	A radical group whose members have experience with violence, conflict, and weapons is an increased risk for terrorism.
4. Rational assessment of risks and opportunities	The degree to which the radical group has calculated the necessity and feasibility of confronting its enemies with violence is indicative of risk for terrorism.
5. Organizational, financial, and political resources	The degree to which the radical group has the resources to support a terrorist campaign is indicative of risk for terrorism.
6. A sense of imminent threat	The degree to which a radical group feels threatened by its enemies. The more imminent and catastrophic the threat is believed to be, the greater the risk the group will resort to terrorism.
7. Intergroup competition	The degree to which a radical group is in competition with another group for a shrinking constituency and terrorism is perceived to be the path to keeping the group on top.
8. Age of activitst	The degree to which the radical group is composed of young activists. The greater the concentration of activists between the ages of 18 and 25, the greater the risk for terrorism.
9. External influence and manipulation	The type and level of support provided to radical organizations. Radical groups receiving money and training support from foreign governments are an increased risk for terrorism.
10. A sense of humiliation and the need to take revenge	The degree to which the radical group is subjected to physical repression or torture, or perceives itself to be humiliated by its enemies. The greater the sense of humiliation, the greater the risk that the radical group will take revenge through terrorism.
11. The presence of violent leaders	The degree to which the leader or leadership of the radical group demonstrates a history of violent behavior. The more violent the leaders, the greater the risk for terrorism.



Figure 1. The radical group/organization's risk for terrorism in context.

Method

The integrated framework was constructed by employing a systematic expert knowledge acquisition exercise that used a modified Delphi procedure with six experts in the field of terrorism and political violence.[13] Each expert was asked independently to submit to the authors a list of factors indicative of risk for terrorism corresponding to three categories—group-specific, environment-specific, and interaction-specific (dynamic) factors—identified by the authors from the literature review as broadly representative of the likely categories of critical variables. The submissions from each expert were then combined and factor analyzed, eliminating redundancy before a combined list was sent back to each expert for final evaluation and prioritization. This process was repeated five times for each of the five types of radical groups identified earlier to identify potential differences in the importance of indicators by group type (reported on in the second article). To ensure that critical variables specified by other experts had not been inadvertently omitted, in parallel, the scholarly literature on terrorism was reviewed to identify indicators and critical variables to complement the findings from the expert panel. The research team then factor analyzed the combined results of the expert panel exercise supplemented by the literature review to produce the integrated framework.

The Framework

The framework offers a conceptualization of the radicalization process that takes into account critical variables—internal and external, as well as interactions between them and the group under examinations—that are understood to increase risk for escalation toward political violence. The framework, with its four macrocategories and numerous subcategories, attempts to present the most complete picture of risk-variables to give

an analyst sufficient guide points to assess the risk of terrorism. Unlike Sprinzak, the authors of this article do not assign specific weights to indicators in an attempt to establish a TPI. While a Terrorism Potential Index would be useful, the authors believe that at this state of knowledge, there is insufficient data to support the establishment of such a metric. Rather, the purpose of the framework is to sensitize the analyst to the width and breadth of conditions and characteristics that increase the risk that a radical group will move toward terrorism. It is clear that in many—indeed most—cases, data bearing on all of the variables presented will not be immediately available for analysis. However, sufficient variables are presented that should provide the analyst with enough data to make at least a preliminary assessment. Moreover, the comprehensive nature of this framework will draw attention to important data that may be readily available but have not heretofore been subjected to critical analysis. Finally, the framework includes as critical indicators a number of conditions and interactions that are relatively easier to assess in comparison to the internal characteristics of the group, improving the ability of analysts to conduct a risk assessment with little available data on the internal characteristics of the group. The four overlapping and interacting fields of the framework discussed earlier broadly represent the conditions, events, and actors interacting with the radical group as well as internal group characteristics and processes (both psychological and structural) that are critical for determining risk for escalation to terrorism. The four fields are then further divided into conceptual indicator categories to further improve the framework's analytical focus. The conceptual indicator categories more precisely represent the factors, conditions, and characteristics central to evaluating a group's risk for terrorism. For each conceptual indicator category, specific observable indicators are identified. The integrated framework for the analysis of group risk for terrorism is presented and described in detail in the sections that follow.

1.00 Historical, Cultural, and Contextual Features

Historical, cultural, and other contextual features interact to shape radical groups and direct them toward or away from violence. The protest group draws its raison d'être from adverse political, economic, and social conditions including a history of communal conflict along ethnic, religious, or class lines. A region's traditions governing protest, rebellion, social conflict, and violence influence the group's trajectory. When regions with historical and cultural factors conducive to violent conflict undergo political, economic, and social unrest and instability, they are at increased risk for political violence. A critical factor affecting risk for terrorism will be the level of preexisting conflict in the environment, especially if conflict has already resulted in violence. Protest groups that form under these conditions are at particular risk for turning to violence and terrorism. This section will systematically review these background features and identify indicators of contextual features that can motivate radical political activity, and cultural and historical traditions that can guide the group toward or away from terrorism.

1.10 Historically Rooted Culture of Violence

Certain regions of the world have long accepted violence as a quasi-legitimate means of expressing discontent; resolving political, economic, and social disputes; and wresting political control from the opposing group (e.g., Kashmir, Nagorno-Karabakh). In these regions, violence is an expected feature of the political order. Groups seeking to affect political change under such circumstances are more likely to perceive violence as the

necessary means for implementing their agenda. These regions are historically prone to communal conflict, military coupe, insurgency, and revolution, and are fertile grounds for political violence and terrorist group formation.

The observable indicators of risk associated with cultural tolerance for violence are:

A. A region has a history of communal conflict and division along either ethnic, religious, or socioeconomic class lines, especially if conflict has involved violence and terrorism.
B. The region has a history of frequent and violent coupe d'état.
C. The region has a history of insurgency or revolution (e.g., Latin America).
D. The region experiences high levels of violent crime.
E. Communal groups in the region commemorate or celebrate past violent events, such as historic victories (e.g., the Orange Order marches in Northern Ireland) and defeats (e.g., the Serb celebration of the battle of Kosovo Polje commemorating Serbia's historic defeat by the Ottoman Empire in 1389).
F. Cultural heroes are extolled for their bravery in conflict (e.g., Prince Lazar in the battle just cited).

1.20 Current Communal Conflict

Conflict between domestic groups provides an environment conducive to the emergence of protest movements and radical political groups at risk for terrorism. The nature of communal conflict may be ethnic (e.g., between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda), religious (e.g., between Sikhs and Hindus), or socioeconomic class-based (e.g., between peasants and wealthy landowners in El Salvador). Often ethnicity, religion, and class overlap. Conflict can occur over access to critical resources, political power, and ethnic and religious differences. It frequently results from the politicization of historical conflicts and grievances, opening old wounds. It may manifest itself in subtle or open discrimination, exclusion from political decision-making structures, harassment, violence, and terrorism. In a region experiencing significant conflict between communal groups, especially if conflict has escalated to violence, the risk that a radical group spawned in such a context will resort to terrorism is significantly increased.

The observable indicators of risk associated with communal conflicts are:

A. A majority or dominant group openly discriminates against a minority or subordinate group by:
   1. limiting or restricting access to political decision-making structures (e.g., the limitation imposed by the Sinhalese governing elites toward the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka);
   2. restricting access to certain jobs, goods and services, welfare benefits, and so on
   3. limiting or restricting activities, assembly, speech, or practice of religion.
B. A majority or dominant group actively persecutes a minority or subordinate group, including violence and harassment (e.g., Turkish persecution of the Kurdish minority).
C. Communal leaders politicize and exploit historical conflict and divisions (e.g., the manner in which Slobodan Milosevic fanned the fires of ethnic resentment in Serbia against the minority Albanian Kosovars in Kosovo);
D. The region is currently experiencing conflict along ethnic, religious, or class lines, especially if conflict has escalated to violence.

Political, Economic, and Social Instability

Areas experiencing political, economic, and social instability provide fertile ground for radical group formation.

Political instability has many sources. Unpopular regimes and frequent changes in leadership are strong contributing factors. Unpopular government practices, policies, and laws ranging from taxation to civil rights abuses have been associated with political protest and violence, including terrorism. Weak governments, or governments that fail to maintain law and order have also been associated with the presence of armed, nongovernmental groups that have both practiced and provoked terrorism (e.g., Colombia).

Economic turmoil and instability have also been associated with political and social unrest that has resulted in violence and terrorism. Economic changes associated with increased risk for violence have included rapid economic growth or decline, especially when it disproportionately affects different social groups through unemployment, economic or geographic displacement, or underemployment, particularly of youth (e.g., increase in neo-Nazi activity following the economic collapse in former East Germany). Rapid changes in the distribution of economic power caused by technological innovation or political change and large-scale migrations to urban areas have also been associated with an increased incidence of political unrest and violence (e.g., Mexico, Peru, and the former Soviet Union).

Finally, social instability is a frequent source of tension that can lead to political violence and terrorism. Social forces such as significant immigration of ethnic or religious minorities, especially when such immigration affects the existing ethnic balance, can lead to conflict and violence. The presence of large refugee populations or an increase in the flow of asylum seekers has also been associated with social tension and violence (e.g., the massive influx of foreign workers in Germany associated with a rising tide of Skinhead violence.)

The observable indicators of political, economic, and social instability are:

A. A region experiences *political instability*, characterized by:
   1. a government that pursues and supports unpopular policies;
   2. high levels of corruption within the government (e.g., Italy during the rise of the Red Brigade);
   3. a government that is prosecuting an unpopular war;
   4. an unstable government (frequent changes in leadership, coupe d'état) (e.g., Italy, again);
   5. a change in *political system* (e.g., from communism to democracy).

B. A region experiences political unrest, characterized by:
   1. large-scale protests;
   2. riots.

C. A region suffers *economic instability*, characterized by:
   1. rapid economic changes, such as urbanization, industrialization, modernization, and globalization;
   2. high rates of unemployment or underemployment, especially among youths;
   3. a high degree of income disparity (exemplified by a number of Central American countries, in which social-revolutionary terrorism took hold);
   4. economic recession or depression.

D. A region experiences significant levels of *social instability*, as a result of:
   1. a slow pace of reform;
   2. an increase in immigration of "unpopular" minorities into the area;

3. a significant refugee presence or increase in asylum seekers;
4. an increase in majority–minority tensions;
5. failure of the government to provide adequate social services to a significant portion of the population (as demonstrated by the manner in which Hamas compensated for the failure of the Palestinian Authority to provide an adequate infrastructure);
6. coexistence of two or more different cultures with significant differences in cultural practices, such as the Turkish and Greek Cypriots in Cyprus, or the Germans and the growing Turkish minority in Germany.

2.00 Key Actors Affecting the Group

No radical political group exists in isolation. A group's relationship with a regime or government, opponents, supporters, rivals, and competitors can either move the group toward violence and terrorism or deter it from taking that path. For example, regime security forces, such as the military or police, and violent groups affiliated with the regime, can provoke terrorism by their attacks on group members and constituents (e.g., Argentina under the military junta and Chile under Pinochet). Fear of loss of support can deter a group from violence or, in cases where supporters increasingly doubt the effectiveness of the group, force the group to act decisively and violently to prove its worth. Rival groups or competitors can encourage terrorism through contagion or by forcing the group to escalate the level of violence to compete for recruits and the support of constituents increasingly dissatisfied with the group's progress. This section delineates the characteristics of these key actors and their relationship to the radical group that demonstrate an increased risk that the radical group will escalate to violence and terrorism.

2.10 Opponents

The character and intention of a radical group's opponents strongly influences the nature of struggle between them. Opponents of the radical group can be the regime and its security forces, such as the police, military, or secret services, or other opponents such as hostile or despised minority groups. Occasionally, there are direct or indirect linkages between nonregime opponents and the regime, such as the relationship between the government of El Salvador and right-wing death squads used to combat domestic left-wing opposition. It is the perceived level of threat posed by the opponent that is critical (see section 3.72, Sense of Threat). For some groups, the existence of nonviolent but outspoken opponents may be sufficient to provoke violent acts, whereas other groups may be more tolerant of opposition. Two kinds of opponents are now considered.

2.11 The Regime. The regime as opponent can play a significant role in heightening or decreasing the risk that a radical group will resort to terrorism. Regime or government actions to block a group's access to resources, political power, or decision-making structures can motivate a group to escalate to violent activity (as exemplified by the rise in Islamic fundamentalist terrorism in Algeria after the military annulled the election of 1991 in which the religiously based Islamic Foundation Front [FIS] party was elected). In extreme cases, the regime may persecute or attack group members or their constituents. Violence perpetrated by regime forces against radical groups may even occur accidentally. Alternatively, the regime may directly or indirectly support group opponents carrying out attacks on the group. The regime responses may range from active direction

to passive acquiescence, with no action taken against the group opponent, and no steps taken to protect the group from its opponents. A regime demonstrating a determination to suppress a radical group with all steps necessary, including violence, can have the effect of driving the group underground, into ever more radical postures, by which it comes to perceives terrorism as the only remaining option against a vastly superior foe (e.g., Iraqi suppression of the Kurdish minority).

The observable indicators of risk associated with regimes are:

A. The regime promulgates unpopular policies (e.g., unpopular wars, taxes, social policies) that negatively impact the group or its constituents.
B. Regime representatives publicly criticize or otherwise verbally attack the group.
C. The regime attacks or threatens core symbols of group identity, such as holy places or historically significant landmarks (e.g., Taliban destruction of historic Buddha figures).
D. The regime blocks access to political decision-making structures for group members and their constituents.
E. The regime discriminates against and suppresses the group and its constituents (including restrictions on expression, assembly, and other activities) or supports other groups that do so.
F. The regime explicitly rejects the demands of the group.
G. Regime forces actively engage the radical group, including violent confrontation, arrests, torture, and assassination (e.g., current Israeli retaliatory targeting of Hamas officials associated with violence).

2.12 Other Opponents. A regime is not the only opponent a group might face. Other opponents may challenge the group and present enough of a threat to trigger violence and terrorism. Examples of such opponents include nonviolent but outspoken critics, the media, groups or individuals seeking legal action against a group, and rival ethnic, religious, or class-based groups. Such opponents are frequently allied with or tolerated by a regime, and draw strength from this association. As with regimes, the strength of these opponents and the degree to which they challenge the radical group are important factors affecting the risk for terrorism.

The observable indicators of risk associated with other opponents are:

A. Opponents of the group publicly criticize or otherwise verbally attack it.
B. Opponents of the group pursue policies, legal action, or sanctions that negatively affect the group or its constituents.)
C. Opponents of the group rise in strength, number, and influence (e.g., competition between Amal and Hizballah in Lebanon).
D. Opponents of the group discriminate against, harass, or otherwise act to restrict the group and its constituents' quality of life.
E. Opponents of the group physically attack group members, constituents, or their property (exemplified by the Kosovo Liberation Army in response to Serbian "ethnic cleansing").

2.20 Constituents and Supporters

Radical groups often identify themselves as affiliated with, supportive of, or representing a segment of a community or constituents. For community-based religious, ethnic, or nationalist groups, this constituency may be quite large (e.g., the Basque region of

Spain and the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka). In smaller, more radical, closed political or cultlike religious extremist groups, this constituency may be quite small, not extending significantly beyond the group.

Support is not, however, limited to constituents. Support for a group can come from a number of sources, both domestic and foreign. The group may receive support from local sympathizers or nonresident group supporters (e.g., the U.S.-based Irish Northern Aid Committee [Noraid]). Foreign regimes often aid radical groups in support of their foreign policy. For example, the 2001 edition of the U.S. State Department "Patterns of Global Terrorism" names Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.

Being familiar with sources of support is important because they offer clues to the group's intentions. When a group actively seeks or receives the support of regimes or organizations with a known violent purpose, the risk that the radical group will itself embark on the pathway to violence and terrorism increases. In addition, the likelihood increases that the targets of violence will shift to align with the goals of the group's benefactors.

Furthermore, a group's constituents or supporters can either deter or encourage terrorist activity. For example, a group may feel compelled to engage in violence or terrorism against another group that attacks its constituents or supporters. Alternatively, fearing a loss of support a group may refrain from terrorism. Supporters such as local or foreign governments, nonresident aliens or even affiliated terrorist groups can also exert influence on a group's trajectory toward terrorism.

The observable indicators of risk associated with group constituents and supporters are:

A. The group receives support from a source or sources with a known violent agenda (e.g., a hostile state or a terrorist group, such as Iran's support of Hizballah);
B. Supporters or constituents of the group exert pressure on the group to take violent action (e.g., by threatening to withdraw or shift support).
C. Supporters of constituents provoke violence, forcing the group to act.
D. Foreign or other influential supporters order the group to undertake terrorist operations.

2.30 Competitors

Rivalry between extremist groups often results in a spiral of escalation to violence and terrorism. Two or more radical groups with similar goals competing for constituents, resources, and recruits can create a dynamic resulting in rapid escalation toward terrorism as the groups' leaders find increasingly violent behavior the only means of dominating the radical environment and maintaining their position of power. The extent to which intergroup competition can result in escalation to violence and terrorism is determined by a number of factors, including the number of competitive groups in the environment, their relative strength and popularity, and most importantly, the degree to which competing groups are willing to utilize—or are engaged in—violent activity or terrorism. (Competition in refugee camps in Jordan and the occupied territories was fierce to recruit from the pool of displaced, angry Palestinian youth after the 1967 war.)

The observable indicators of risk associated with intergroup competition are:

A. A group with similar goals competes with the radical group for support, recruits, publicity, or prestige (e.g., Amal and Hizballah in Lebanon and Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Fatah in Israel).

B. A competing group benefits (e.g., in terms of publicity, recruitment, support, prestige, and advancement of their cause) from violent acts or terrorism.

3.00 The Group/Organization: Characteristics, Processes, and Structures

Although historical, cultural, and contextual features, along with the key actors affecting the group play an important role in assessing a group's risk for terrorism, the ultimate indicators of the group's progression toward violence and terrorism will be reflected in the group itself. The group's ideology and experience with violence, along with the type of leader and the way in which the group or organization's decision-making processes are structured reveal a great deal about the character and terrorism potential of the group. Organizational processes and activities, such as recruitment, selection, socialization, training, assignment, promotion, and attrition of group members also provide critical clues, especially as these basic processes change in support of increased radical activity and violence. Finally, a group progressing toward violence and terrorism will display characteristic psychological and behavioral signs that can tip off an analyst as to the group's intentions and directions. This section will describe the characteristics, structures, and processes of the radical group and organization and the psychological and behavioral indicators of increased risk for violence and terrorism.

3.10 Group Ideology and Goals

One of the richest sources of group indicators will be a group's ideological and goal statements, often found in interviews with and publications by group members and leaders. These statements capture a group's definition of its members and constituents, their opponents, their motivation, goals and objectives, and the means and time frame for accomplishing group goals. A group's initial positions on these issues and changes in these positions over time have a direct impact on its propensity for violence and terrorism. The more a group defines its members or constituents as victims of repression (as is the case with both the radical secular and religious Palestinian groups in Israel), the more likely the group is to turn to retaliatory violence. If the group's goals include overthrow of the regime or elimination of its opponents, it will be more likely to turn to terrorism following the failure of other nonviolent means. In addition, changes in ideological statements over time redefining group members, opponents, goals, justifiable means, and sense of urgency can indicate an increased risk of terrorism.

The observable indicators of risk associated with group ideology are:

A. The group increasingly believes that change is not possible in existing society and that a radical change is necessary (as was the case with Sendero Luminoso in Peru during the era leading up to the Fujimori regime).
B. The group's ideology calls for and legitimizes violent action against enemies (e.g., Hamas and Hizballah, which provide a broad range of social support while legitimating the use of violence).
C. The group's ideology specifies targets.
D. The group's ideology increasingly expands the spread of targets from specific (e.g., the police) to general (e.g., all members of group associated with the police, as exemplified by the genocidal spread of violence in Northern Ireland between Catholics and Protestants during the extremity of violence).

E. The group's ideology emphasizes the historical sins of a designated group (e.g., Armenian grievances over the unacknowledged massacre of 1915).
F. The group's ideology characterizes group members as righteous and uniquely empowered to rectify the perceived ills of society.
G. The group idealizes the goals and means of a terrorist group, revolutionary nation (e.g., Iran), or leaders associated with violence, terrorism, or revolution.

3.20 Group Experience with Violence

Past violent behavior is the best predictor of future violence. A group composed of members previously engaged in violent campaigns or led by individuals with a known history of violent activity signals a predisposition within the group to resort to violence. The group's collective experience with violence can come from leaders previously involved in directing violent campaigns, members with prior experience in other violent groups or participation in violent activities, and recruiting efforts directed at those who might contribute their expertise in violent means to the group (as exemplified by the Real IRE actively recruiting disaffected mainline IRA members after the Good Friday accords).

The observable indicators of risk associated with group experience with violence are:

A. The group's leaders demonstrate a history of violent behavior, including participation in other violent campaigns or organizations.
B. The group's members demonstrate a history of violent behavior, including participation in other violent campaigns or organizations.
C. The group actively recruits individuals that demonstrate a history of violent behavior, including participation in other violent campaigns or organizations. After the more ideological first generation of the Red Brigades, for instance, subsequent recruitment efforts were directed at criminal ranks.

3.30 Leadership Personality Characteristics

When group leaders have one of several political personality constellations, especially in extreme forms, they are particularly likely to shape the group in a manner that can lead the group in the direction of political violence, including terrorism. These types include:

3.31 Narcissistic Personality. These leaders are vulnerable to biased information processing so that they overestimate their own strength and underestimate the strength of opponents. They lack tolerance for competition, have difficulty relying on experts, and have a strong need for compliant followers. These characteristics make it likely that they will be surrounded by sycophants who are unlikely to communicate information that conflicts with this leader's grandiose and self-serving view of events or conditions, and will be reluctant to offer constructive criticism. Underlying the surface of arrogance and sense of entitlement is profound personal insecurity. They seek admiration and are extremely vulnerable to insult, slight, attacks, and are prone to reactions of rage. These characteristics make these leaders more prone to over-reaction, high-risk strategies, and violence, including terrorism (Ocalan of the PKK and Guzman of Sendero Luminoso are examples).

The observable indicators of risk associated with narcissistic leaders are:

A. The group leader is sensitive to or does not accept criticism.
B. The group leader is surrounded by sycophants.
C. The leader overvalues his chances of success and underestimates the strength of his opponents.

3.32 Paranoid Personality. Paranoids view themselves as surrounded by enemies. Their world is dominated by suspicion and distrust. They are suspicious of the motives of others, believing others are out to exploit, harm, or deceive them. Accordingly, they are preoccupied with unjustified doubts about the loyalty or trustworthiness of their associates or friends. They are constantly on guard, prepared to be attacked' and are invulnerable to information or persuasion that suggests otherwise. They are ready to take preemptive action against those they are convinced are out to get them. Paranoids have a deep-seated need to externalize blame to scapegoats for their own difficulties. Paranoids are highly represented among right-wing racists and ethnic separatists. Their lack of empathy for others and the ease with which they dehumanize and devalue enemies makes the transition to violence and terrorism less difficult for this type of leader.

The observable indicators of risk associated with paranoid leaders are:

A. The group's leader is obsessed with security and secrecy.
B. The group's leader blames and demonizes opponents of the group.
C. The group's leader advocates the stockpiling of weapons to defend against imminent attack (e.g., Randy Weaver at Ruby Ridge).
D. The group's leader frequently purges his inner circle.

3.33 Sociopathic Personality. Sociopaths lack concern for the impact of their actions on others, are untroubled by moral constraints, and view violence as just another tool to use to accomplish their goals. This is a common personality type among criminals. These individuals tend to be highly represented among the membership of many terrorist groups, but are less likely to rise to leadership positions unless the group has a significant criminal population. The presence of a sociopathic leader increases a group's risk of violence and terrorism by lowering constraints on the use of these tactics.

The observable indicators of risk associated with sociopathic leaders are:

A. The group leader has a history of criminal activity not motivated by politics.
B. The group leader focuses his wish for violent action on the establishment.

3.34 Malignant Narcissism. The malignant narcissist represents the most dangerous personality constellation in terms of the risk of violence and terrorism.[14] This leadership personality can best be thought of as a combination of the three traits described earlier: narcissism, paranoia, and sociopathy. Malignant narcissists exhibit grandiosity; suffer from poor underlying self-esteem with attendant sensitivity to slights, insults, or threats; suspect and blame others; have no compunctions regarding the use of violence;
and lack empathy or concern regarding the impact of their actions on others. (Shoko Asahara of Aum Shinrikyo is a dramatic example.)

The observable indicators of risk associated with malignant narcissist leaders are:

A. The group's leader displays no compunction regarding the use of violence.
B. The group's leader has dreams of glory and lacks empathy or concern regarding the impact of his acts on others.

C. The group leader focuses his anger for group setbacks on others, especially the establishment.

3.40 Leadership Style and Organizational Decision Making

In addition to the personality characteristics of the group's leader, the leadership style of the group, that is, the way in which leadership is exercised over the group, is an important predictor of potential for violence. Two prominent leadership styles at opposite ends of the spectrum are authoritarian/totalitarian and democratic, both with significant implications for the group's risk of violence and terrorism. Factionalization and splintering within authoritarian and democratic leadership structures can also provide essential information as to the group's likely course.[15] Finally, closed groups are discussed, as are communities of belief—groups or individuals united only in a common set of beliefs with no membership in an organization or formal leader.

3.41 Charismatic Leader–Follower Relationships. Charisma is a property of a social system, a fit between leaders with particular characteristics and a wounded followership at a moment of crisis.[16] Charismatic groups can be quite small in scale; where a particular wounded population is attracted to a particular group leader, it can be characteristic of a mass movement, or of a nation as a whole. In a charismatic system, the followers endow the leader with superhuman, godlike characteristics, give uncritical allegiance to the leader, give him uncritical emotional support, believe uncritically what he says, and uncritically follow his directions. What the leader says is moral is moral; what the leader says is immoral is immoral. The follower has ceded his own independent judgment to the leader and the group ethos as defined by the leader. A notable example of a charismatic leader–follower relationship in a nonreligious group is Abimael Guzmán and the Sendero Luminoso, while Osama bin Laden imparts charismatic authority to the radical Islamist organization al Qaeda.

An extreme form of charismatic authoritarian leadership is the messianic leader, who believes his authority comes directly from God and therefore feels relatively unconstrained by outside pressures or member demands. In a closed religious cult, such as Aum Shinrikyo, its messianic leader, Shoko Asahara, is of preeminent importance. Other examples are the Reverend Jim Jones, David Koresh, and Bagwan Shree Rajneesh, as well as the revered Velupillai Prabhakran of the Tamil Tigers.

The observable indicators of risk associated with charismatic leader–follower relationship is:

A. The followers uncritically follow the leader's directives.

3.42 Authoritarian/Totalitarian Leadership and Strong Central Organizational Decision Making. Groups with authoritarian/totalitarian leadership are characterized by closed decision-making bodies and processes that are restricted to the leader and personnel designated by him.[17] Rank and file members do not have frequent access or opportunities to influence decision-making processes. Groups and organizations led by authoritarian/totalitarian leaders are more vulnerable to radical action and violence through polarization and groupthink.

The authoritarian leader tends to see the world in black and white, friend or foe terms, demands loyalty and obedience and tolerates little, if any dissent. Successful authoritarian leaders are likely to punish or eliminate group rivals and rule group deci-

sion making with an iron fist. They allow little factionalization or splitting within the group.[18]

Authoritarian leaders characteristically develop hierarchical organizations with tight central control. In hierarchical organizations, such as military units, power is concentrated at the most senior levels of the organization, and decisions are communicated down the organizational ladder for execution by action units. Group processes and communication channels in hierarchical groups are usually highly structured and defined, governed by specific policies and practices. For example, relationships between group members in terms of obedience, communication, socialization, and control may be highly structured according to a member's position within the hierarchy. There are specified rules governing promotion, leadership replacement, and communications, similar to military organizations.

Armies are the model for many terrorist organizations as reflected in their organizational titles, such as the Japanese Red Army, the Red Army Faction, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army. In terrorist organizations, because of the inherent tension between organizational control and the security requirement for secrecy and reduced communication, there is rather more autonomy at the lower level of the organization than the military model might suggest.

Whether an organization is at risk for terrorism depends on the disposition of the leader and the group's ability to exert control over its members. Of particular concern are authoritarian leaders advocating violence who consolidate decision-making control over the group, allowing them high levels of control over the direction and development the group takes from nonviolence to terrorism. Authoritarian leaders who endorse violence may be quite dangerous to rivals for leadership within the group or organization. Such leaders are not reluctant to escalate to terrorism or other violent means to achieve their desired goals. Authoritarian leaders who do not endorse violence or terrorism may be effective at controlling dissenting members and thereby limiting a group's use of terrorism. However, they may not be totally effective at preventing factionalization or the splitting-off of more radical group members who wish to pursue terrorist methods.

The observable indicators of risk associated with authoritarian/totalitarian leadership and decision-making style are:

A. The radical group is headed by an authoritarian leader advocating violence.
B. An authoritarian leader advocating violence consolidates his or her decision making control over the group.
C. The radical group adopts a hierarchical group structure modeled after a military organization and fashions a military identity for itself. The leadership of the hierarchically structured organization advocates violence (e.g., The Red Brigades and the Red Army Faction).

3.43 Communities of Belief. It is useful to specify cells or individuals with *no* organizing central authority in addition to the spectrum from authoritarian central control of decision making to democratic decision making. These are referred to as Communities of Beliefs for the purposes of this model. Community of belief refers to scattered groups or individuals that share common values and philosophies regarding a social problem but lack a coherent command structure.[19] These individuals and groups may communicate directly through meetings, the Internet, radio, or other channels. Alternatively, they may only share common beliefs through specific books (e.g., *The Turner Diaries*, the "bible" of the extreme right wing in the United States), programs, events, or idealized leaders, such as Hitler.

In the community of belief, groups can magnify themes of revenge and violence present in the literature and communications between members and like-minded groups. Because of the lack of organization and consequent lack of organizational control that exists in belief communities, they are particularly dangerous, and may spawn unstable individuals acting in the name of the cause. (An interesting domestic example is the so-called leaderless resistance that drew on survivalist ideology and was highlighted by the standoff between the Montana Freemen and law enforcement during the summer of 1996.) Timothy McVeigh, responsible for the bombing of the Alfred P. Murah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, is a prominent example of an individual member of the right-wing community of belief, for he was not a formal member of any of the militia organizations or other right-wing groups whose ideology he espoused and acted on. Another individual example is Yigal Amir, the assassin of Yitzakh Rabin.[20] He was influenced to take action against the Israeli Prime Minister by the community of belief among the radical Zionists who saw Rabin and the Oslo Accords as a mortal threat to the land of Israel and established a Talmudic justification for the assassination. Clearly, monitoring individuals belonging to communities of belief is fraught with difficulties.

The observable indicators of risk associated with communities of belief is:

A. The literature and communications of a community of belief shifts into advocacy of violence against specific targets.

3.44 Factionalization and Split. Factionalization refers to a situation that can occur within a group or organization where no member of the leadership group has dictatorial powers or controls sufficient resources to dominate decision making. This is particularly likely in democratic organizations, but may also occur in authoritarian/totalitarian groups, especially if the leader's control, strength, and authority are diminished. In such a circumstance, disagreement between two or more subgroups that are vying for influence can form into distinct factions that adopt different policy positions, increasing the likelihood of splintering. In extreme cases, intra-group rivalry can result in internal warfare involving violence or terrorist acts against rival group members or their constituents.

Factionalization often occurs over the appropriate means to accomplish organizational/group goals or maintain group security, with a more extreme subgroup supporting violence or terrorism. (An excellent example is provided by the factional dispute within the leadership of the Students for a Democratic Society [SDS], with a more radical faction arguing that insufficient progress was being made using nonviolent means, and that violence was necessary to sensitize the masses and radicalize the population. The leadership of this radical faction split off from the mainstream SDS, forming the Weather Underground terrorist group.[21]

In organizations with strong, competitive leaders displaying distinct personality differences, factionalization can occur due not to ideological differences, but primarily as a consequence of personal rivalry (e.g., the split of Naif Hawatmah, founder of the DFLP, from the PFLP where he served as Deputy to George Habash). Factionalization may also be institutionalized as a means of maintaining a connection and influence over more radical members who endorse minority radical policies, including violence and terrorism. Thus, there is a much greater likelihood that groups with weak central control will allow a faction that is in disagreement with group authorities over the appropriateness of violence or terrorism to continue to exist and eventually pursue more radical and violent actions.

On the other hand, democratic organizations are also more likely than authoritarian

groups to allow or even facilitate the spinning off of more radical factions to pursue their own extremist mission. An extremist faction within an otherwise moderate organization that displays weak control over decision making may leave to pursue its own more violent goals. Thus factionalization may occur with or without splintering in democratic groups.

The observable indicators of risk associated with factionalization and splintering are:

A. The group experiences internal debate and factionalization over the use of violence. (When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, as a result of U.S.-brokered negotiations, Arafat and the PLO were to leave Lebanon for Tunisia. Decrying the weakness of Arafat and mainline Fatah, more militant groups split from the PLO, including the newly formed Fatah Intifada.)
B. A faction supporting more violent means splits from the parent organization.

3.34 Open vs. Closed Group. This indicator refers to the extent to which the group and its members are in continuity with society or restricted from outside contact and thereby walled-off and isolated from society. Although religious groups withdraw from society to facilitate spiritual goals, a group transitioning from open to closed in response to a perceived physical threat poses dangers. In general, the closed group, in which members are restricted from contact with the outside world, is particularly prone to extremist thought and action. The closed religious cult and the social revolutionary group that has gone underground are prime examples of closed groups. A notable exception is an open group in continuity with a dissident population, such as nationalist-separatist groups. This group may serve as the vehicle for extremist action within the larger society.

The observable indicators of risk associated with a closed groups are:

A. Group members' communication with the outside world is severely restricted, with no access to friends or family. (This is particularly true for closed millenarian cults.)
B. Exit from the group is severely restricted or blocked. At its extreme, the member who attempts to leave a closed group is considered a defector, and may be subject to severe sanctions, including execution. (Aum Shinrikyo had a garish "high-tech" method for dealing with defectors, incinerating them in an industry-size microwave oven.)

3.50 Organizational Processes

Several organizational processes are necessary for group survival and growth—recruitment, screening, socialization, training, assignment and promotion, and attrition. Specific changes in these processes serve as indicators of preparation for violence and terrorism.

3.51 Recruitment. Groups must seek out candidates for membership and develop criteria for acceptable versus unacceptable members. In large groups, separate recruitment, screening, and selection units may handle these functions. In smaller, less formal groups, these functions tend to be handled less formally. The indicators that follow address these possibilities. They also reflect the fact that specific changes in recruitment, screening, and selection can signal a greater risk of violence.

Groups that recruit from pools including violent, disgruntled, disenfranchised, vic-

timized, or radicalized personnel, such as the Lautaro Youth Movement in Chile, or the recruitment of unemployed disgruntled youth in the Gaza strip, or personnel with specialized training or experience suitable to violence are more likely to pursue violence and terrorism. Recruitment of younger activists is also a risk factor, as activists between the ages of 18 and 25 generally do not yet have families and serious responsibilities that might otherwise deter them from risking their lives for a cause.[22]

A shift in a group's recruitment tactics can also indicate an increased risk of terrorism or violence. A move toward more intensive and selective recruitment strategies suggests that a group is shifting its recruitment focus to facilitate new objectives associated with terrorism. (A striking example was the recruitment of Ph.D.-level microbiologists and chemists by Aum Shinrikyo, presaging the move toward chemical/biological terrorism.)

The observable indicators of risk associated with recruitment are:

A. Group recruits from a pool of disenfranchised, victimized, radicalized, or violent individuals, including:
   1. Individuals with a history of legal conflicts with government or criminal actions;
   2. Individuals that demonstrate a history of violent behavior or experience with weapons, including participation in military training, paramilitary or other violent organizations, or violent campaigns;
   3. Individuals with special educational background (e.g., microbiology), or specialized skills (e.g., explosives).

3.52 Screening and Selection. After recruitment a group must select the personnel it wants and screen out undesirable candidates. These screening and selection criteria indicate group requirements for specific types of individuals and group concerns regarding the risks of including others. Groups who are a risk for terrorism are more likely to select and screen more selectively; select in individuals such as those described earlier; and screen out individuals who are not capable of coping with the stressful demands of violence, and terrorist operations and lifestyle. Such individuals must be screened out as they hinder group operations and security.

As a group moves toward terrorism, its selection and screening criteria shift to promote group technical skills and security. These groups tend to develop specific selection criteria involving training, experience, or skills.)

The observable indicators of risk associated with screening and selection are:

A. The group screens out prospective members with:
   1. Ties to the government or other opponents;
   2. Physical infirmities or emotional instability that could interfere with performance;
   3. A lack of established loyalty to related causes or groups;
   4. A lack of family or social ties to the group.

3.53 Socialization. After members enter the group they must become familiar with group culture, including the rules, practices, philosophy, and decision-making and other regulatory functions. Group socialization practices that emphasize obedience to authority, absolute loyalty to the group and leader and the need for sacrifice while suppressing dissent can contribute to violence and terrorism. (This is particularly true of radical Islamist groups, such as al Qaeda. Members trained in the madrasas (the religious school),

are taught early [8–10 years old] to obey religious authority without question).[23] Some groups may require new entrants to commit a crime in order to "burn bridges" with society and ensure commitment to the group (e.g., the Red Brigades and Red Army Faction). In closed religious cults, new recruits are often required to give up all of their possessions. A shift in group socialization processes should be apparent as group leaders prepare group members for terrorist operations.

The observable indicators of risk associated with socialization are:

A. The group employs socialization practices that emphasize:
   1. Obedience to authority and absolute loyalty to the group or leader;
   2. Suppression of dissent;
   3. Need for sacrifice;
   4. Demonization and dehumanization of opponents.
B. The group requires prospective members to commit illegal acts in order to "burn bridges" to society.

3.54. Training. All groups and organizations provide some form of training for their members depending on their purpose and methods. Groups that are more likely to pursue terrorism provide members with training designed to promote military discipline and coordinated group action against opponents. Members must be trained to use weapons, follow directions, and must be prepared for the intensity of violent conflict. Even groups who recruit, select, and socialize former military personnel still must prepare and train for specific operations, with reference to their specific roles and assignments. A group moving toward terrorism will have to change its training practices to prepare its members.

The observable indicators associated with training in preparation for violence and terrorism are:

A. Group members appear in known terrorist training camps, sites, or organizations (e.g., Philippine insurgent groups have sent members to training camps in Afghanistan run by Osama bin Laden).
B. Group members train in operational skills such as tradecraft (e.g., surveillance, countersurveillance, and secure communications), weapons, and explosives.
C. The group engages in operations such as bank robberies, thefts, and kidnappings requiring skills similar to terrorist operations.

3.55 Assignment and Promotion. Groups must assign members to positions, establish criteria for success and failure, and promote successful members. A shift in assignments and promotion criteria toward individuals who have demonstrated ability to engage in confrontation or violent behavior may be indicative of a group move toward terrorism.

The observable indicators of risk associated with assignment and promotion are:

A. The group defines success as confrontation on behalf of the group.
B. The group identifies propensity for violence as a criterion for promotion.
C. The group emphasizes a form of ideological purity, extremism, or radical belief over other qualifications for assignment or promotion.
D. The group emphasizes operational skills or experience at the expense of other characteristics.
E. The group places extraordinary emphasis on loyalty to the leader or group over specific skills and abilities.

3.56 Attrition. A group's pathway to radicalization, violence, and terrorism is accompanied by steadily increasing levels of stress. Attrition, or the exiting of members from the group, can occur for multiple reasons that are symptomatic of the stress of the radicalization process. As in any organization, attrition can occur for professional or personal reasons. Individual members can decide to leave or be forced out for being insufficiently radical. When this occurs, the group becomes ever more extreme. The reasons for member attrition can also provide insight into a group's relative organizational strengths and weaknesses.

The observable indicators of risk associated with attrition are:

A. Members exit the group due to disagreements over appropriateness of more radical actions, including violence and terrorism.
B. Members exit the group due to personal concerns over their ability to adhere to difficult group requirements (need for violence, ability to live underground, separation from family, need to provide financial support to others, fear of risks, etc.).
C. Members exit the group due to stress-related illness or psychopathology resulting from group preparation for violence.
D. Members are expelled from the group for questionable loyalty, security risk, performance ability, and commitment.
E. Group members are executed by the group.

3.60 Groupthink and Polarization

Groupthink refers to the conformity-seeking tendencies of decision-making groups, when "members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action."[24] The vulnerability of a decision-making body to groupthink is exacerbated by situational factors including:

- directive, controlling leadership that is intolerant of alternative perspectives;
- group isolation from any system of checks and balances designed to limit popular but weak ideas;
- the need for decision-making under stress and time pressure;
- high group cohesiveness and esprit de corps;
- group culture suspicious of outsiders and outside ideas;
- group culture that places high value on consensus; and
- the existence of formal and informal group processes for discouraging deviant opinions.

Groupthink leads to deleterious cognitive and interpersonal consequences for decision making, resulting in dramatic simplification of the decision-making process and intolerance of dissent that increases the group's vulnerability to polarization.

Polarization refers to the tendency for groups to adopt more extreme positions than would have been predicted based on knowledge of individual member positions, also called the "risky shift."[25] The intensity of group polarization depends on a number of factors. Polarization is often increased when the group is led by an authoritarian leader, the group's decision-making structure is hierarchical, and strong support for more radical activity or positions exists within constituents or supporters of the group.[26]

The observable indicators of risk associated with groupthink and polarization are:

A. Within the group, internal debate becomes increasingly one-sided in favor of a dominant position favoring more radical goals and behavior, especially those involving violence.
B. The group demonstrates a willingness to punish or expel members or factions disagreeing with the leadership's policy decisions.[27] (Baumann, of the Red Army Faction, indicated the conformity induced by fear was dramatic, for to disagree risked death. Withdrawal was impossible "except by the graveyard.")[28]

3. 70 Group Psychological Progression toward Terrorism

The transition from protest to terror group is a gradual one.[29] Groups and organizations that reach terrorism generally do so at the end of a process of radicalization during which the balance progressively shifts from psychological constraints against violence to incentives for violence, to viewing violence/terrorism as the only course. Indicators that reflect the group's psychological progression toward terrorism are presented next.

3.71 Humiliation and Need for Revenue. The likelihood that an extremist group will resort to violence increases if group members are subjected to psychological and physical attacks that result in feelings of humiliation and need for revenge. There is a distinction to be drawn between acts that are designed to produce feelings of humiliation of the stigmatized group before an audience, and those that are physically threatening per se. It should be emphasized that this indicator reflects perceptions and feelings of both group members and the leader of humiliation and need for revenge.

The observable indicators of risk associated with humiliation and need for revenge are:

A. The group experiences a growing sense of stigmatization or isolation from society or government.
B. The group experiences humiliation from psychological attacks (e.g., slander, characterization of group members as non-human) against the group as a whole, individual members, or constituents (e.g., the Taliban policy of requiring non-Muslims to wear identifying arm bands, as did Hitler with the Jews under the Nazi regime).
C. The group experiences humiliation from physical attacks (e.g., arrests, trashing of property, random search and seizure of property) against individual members or constituents of the group.
D. The group experiences a sense of helplessness and rage in reaction to collective attacks (raids, pogroms, sanctioned massacres) against the group as a whole, designed to demonstrate the group's inferiority.
E. The group expresses desire for revenge and retaliation.

3.72 Sense of Threat. Groups often turn to terrorism when they feel threatened. Threat can be measured in group perceptions of the degree (or type) of threat and its immediacy. Degree of perceived threat can range from member concerns that their goals are at risk to their belief that the existence of the group, its members, or their constituents is at stake. Degree of threat may be expressed in both quantitative and qualitative terms. In addition to the amount of damage anticipated, group members also react to the type of threat feared. For instance, group members may experience threats to their families or homes as more alarming than the risk of arrest of group leaders or activists.

Threat immediacy refers to group perception of the nearness of the threat in time. Immediacy magnifies threat level and increases the risk of terrorism by reducing group

decision time and range of perceived options. Highly threatened groups are more likely to pursue high-risk strategies. Thus, the group may feel that they have no choice but to strike out in order to survive.

It should be emphasized that this indicator is derived from perceptions and feelings of the level of threat and immediacy of threat as perceived by group member and leader rather than the actual threat or risk posed or perceived by others.

The observable indicators of risk associated with sense of threat are:

A. The group perceives a serious threat to individual members or leaders resulting from physical attacks (including arrests, torture, assassination) or catastrophe.
B. The group experiences fear that the regime or other opponent is attempting to destroy the group as a whole.
C. The group adopts an increasingly paranoid defensive posture, including the intimidation, expulsion, even killing, of suspected traitors.

3.73 Negative Characterization of the Target Group.[30] As the group becomes psychologically prepared for terrorism, the language it uses to characterize its opponents will alter. The legitimacy of an opponent's authority, institutions, and organizations will be questioned and attacked in preparation for offensive operations. Dehumanizing and demonizing language will increasingly be used to describe opponents and their agents in order to lower barriers and taboos against acts of violence against these individuals and groups. In addition to paving the way for offensive operations, delegitimizing and dehumanizing characterizations of its enemies can be used to introduce the moral necessity for terrorist action. Sources for this indicator include ideological tracts, propaganda, communiqués, internal communications, and publications.

The observable indicators of risk associated with negative characterizations of the enemy are:

A. The group rejects the legitimacy of the regime or its agents, utilizing characterizations such as illegitimate, immoral, ineffective, and needing to be destroyed (e.g., characterization of the Federal government as illegitimate by the "survivalists" in the extreme right-wing movement in the U.S., such as the Posse Comitatus, who recognize no legitimate authority above the local sheriff).
B. Psychological distance displayed by the group toward its enemy increases.
C. The group increasingly uses depersonalizing and dehumanizing characterizations of their opponents, referring to them as sub-human, as animals or as objects.

3.80 Type of Support

The type of support a group receives can range from ideological, financial, and material to operational, including weapons, training, logistics, advisors, and troops. A radical group receiving operational support is a greater risk for terrorism than one receiving only ideological and financial support. Changes in the type of support a group receives, particularly as support changes from more ideological and financial to weapons and operational assistance, are of particular concern.

The observable indicators of risk associated with type of support are:

A. The group receives ideological support, including publication and distribution of propaganda.

B. The group receives significant financial support.
C. The group receives weapons.
D. The group receives training in the use of weapons and tactics or the use of training facilities, either domestically or internationally.
E. The group receives operational support, including safe havens, logistical support, advisors, or troops.
F. The group acquires the necessary resources and logistical support for going underground (e.g., safe houses, false documents).

3.90 Behavioral Indicators of Movement toward Terrorism

As the group progressively shifts from psychological constraints against violence to incentives for violence to viewing violence or terrorism as the only course, corresponding changes in group behavior reflect progression toward, and preparation for, strategic and tactical acts of intentional violence, including terrorism. The most important of these behavioral indicators are considered now.

3.91 Assessment that the Benefits of Terrorism Outweigh the Risks.[31] Although some groups progress incrementally toward terrorism without engaging in thoughtful strategic discussions, others explicitly assess the potential payoffs and risks as part of a decision-making process to adopt terrorism as a strategy. Group do not explicitly publish cost–benefit analyses prior to embarking on terrorism, but evidence of an internal group dialogue considering terrorism can arise in group literature and other communications.

The observable indicators of risk associated with the assessment that the benefits of terrorism outweigh the risks are:

A. The group expresses discouragement over having failed at other methods, including participation in the political process, nonviolent protest, strikes, riots, and negotiations.
B. There is disagreement between group leaders on how to proceed, that is, whether to continue nonviolent means versus resorting to violence.
C. The group favorably assesses its opponent's vulnerability to terrorism.
D. The group perceives its opponent's retaliatory power to be weak or ineffectual.
E. The group believes that its involvement in terrorism will net positive benefits for its constituents and sympathizers, both short term and long term, outweighing the costs of retaliation, even if its ultimate goals are never met.
F. The group believes it will eventually succeed at attaining its goals through terrorism.

3.92 Formation of Fighting Units. A radical organization forms fighting units and paramilitaries for a number of reasons not necessarily connected to intentions to engage in terrorism. For the most part, these fighting units are formed for self-defense, a show of force to ward off would-be attackers from rival groups. However, the presence of fighting units does suggest a willingness to resort to violence if necessary. In addition, the evolution of such fighting units is important to keep under surveillance, for as the larger organization begins to factionalize over the use of violence, fighting units and their leaders are likely candidates for splinter groups that are a high risk for terrorism.

The observable indicators of risk associated with the formation of fighting units are:

A. A group possesses or forms fighting units (paramilitaries, self-defense forces).
B. Intergroup conflict or competition arises between political leaders and leaders of the group's fighting units.

3.93 Negative Actions toward Target Group.[32] The group's behavior toward its enemies provides critical clues to its proximity to terrorism. Psychological distancing occurs when the group, recognizing the futility of constructive dialogue and coming to believe in violence as the only answer, increasingly withdraws from nonviolent means of conflict resolution and contact with opponents while gradually escalating acts of violence against its enemies. These acts of violence begin as unintentional escalations with opponents during protests and other confrontations. As the group comes closer to terrorism, its activists will intentionally seek and provoke violent confrontations.

The observable indicators of risk associated with violent actions toward a target group are:

A. The group increasingly withdraws from nonviolent contact with its opposition, evidenced by decreased contacts, communications, participation in shared organizations (such as political institutions), and cessation of negotiations.
B. The group transitions from unintentional violence against its opponents to planned, intentional acts.

3.94 Final Preparations for Violence and Terrorism. In the end stages of transition to violence and terrorism, the group will begin its final preparations for action. These preparations include operational and contingency planning and dry runs of actual attacks. In addition to organizational preparation, the group prepares to go underground to protect itself against retaliation.

The observable indicators of risk associated with the preparations for violence and terrorism are:

A. The group actively engages in operational planning and exercises in preparation for violent acts against enemies.
B. The group acquires weapons.
C. The group prepares to go underground.

4.00 The Immediate Situation

The radical group, operating against the backdrop of historical, cultural, and contextual features and interacting with other key actors in the environment (such as the regime and rival groups), must deal with and react to the immediate events that challenge it. In particular, physical attacks on the group, its leaders, or its constituents act as triggering events that have propelled groups to violence and terrorism. This section describes events that can trigger a group to engage in terrorism.

4.10 Triggering Events

In contrast to long-term conditions that give rise to radical groups (as described in section 1.00), triggering events are single events, or a series of events happening in close succession, that trigger within the group the conviction that acts of violence and terrorism by the group are necessary. A triggering event is the "last straw" beyond which the only recourse is violence.

The triggering events associated with increased risk for terrorism are:

A. Members of the group, their constituents, or a prominent figure idealized by the group are attacked, arrested, tortured, or assassinated by the regime or other opponents (e.g., the targeting of Hamas military leaders by Israel).
B. The radical group is blocked from running in an election, either because the regime has canceled the election altogether or has declared the party illegal.
C. The party representing a radical group believes it has been deprived of a victory at the polls because of the regime overturning the election results or fraudulently securing its own victory (exemplified by the nullification of the FIS election victory in Algeria by the military regime).
D. Anniversaries or "red letter days" commemorating a significant violent event for the group approach (the recent bombing of the airport in Sri Lanka by the Tamil Tigers coincided with the anniversary of the 1983 anti-Tamil riots considered to have marked the start of Sri Lanka's brutal ethnic war).

Summary and Conclusions

The analytic framework for the assessment risk for terrorism identifies a number of points in the development of radical groups into terrorist groups at which to identify risk, focusing attention on factors both internal and external to the group. External factors, including historical, cultural, and contextual features, the key actors affecting the group, and triggering events, can be assessed through readily available sources, such as news reports, cultural studies, and historical treatises on the region, whereas a group's internal characteristics and processes will be more difficult to observe and identify. And although external factors are not as determinative as the characteristics and processes of the group itself, they do offer significant clues for a preliminary assessment.

The number of indicators specified within the four overlapping fields is large. Indeed, the number of indicators is so large, some may well object, as to render the framework impractical and unwieldy. Insofar as the framework represents cumulative expert knowledge, the indicators are not merely theoretical but represent cumulative experience. Nevertheless, the framework has not yet been tested against specific cases. As the framework is tested and applied to current and historical cases, some of the conceptual indicator categories that prove only marginally useful to the assessment of risk for terrorism will be eliminated, whereas those most helpful will be explored and expanded on in greater depth.

In the second of two linked articles, the framework is applied to the five principle types of radical groups—nationalist-separatists, religious fundamentalists, other religious extremists (including nontraditional religious extremists), social revolutionaries, and right-wing extremist groups—to further hone the usefulness of the framework by identifying those conceptual indicator categories most relevant to the evaluation of risk for each group type.

Notes

1. D. Kaplan and A. Marshall, *The Cult at the End of the World* (New York: Crown, 1996); J. K. Campbell, Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (Seminole, FL: Interpact Press, 1997).

2. See, for example, S. Ashara, *The Day of Annihilation; Beyond Life and Death, The Land of the Rising Sun is Headed Toward a Bitter Fate* (New York: Aum Publishing).

3. A. Schmidt and A. Jongman, *Terrorism* (Amsterdam: Transaction Books, 1988), pp. 5–112.

4. M. Crenshaw, "Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts," in M. Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism in Context* (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), p. 5

5. J. Ross, "Beyond the Conceptualization of Terrorism: Psychological-Structural Model of the Causes of this Activity," in C. Summers and E. Markusen, eds., *Collective Violence: Harmful Behavior in Groups and Government* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), pp. 169–192.

6. R. Crelinsten, "Terrorism as Political Communication: The Relationship between the Controller and the Controlled," in P. Wilkinson and A. Stewart, eds., *Contemporary Research on Terrorism* (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1989), pp. 3–21.

7. D. Della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

8. T. Gurr, "A Risk Assessment Model of Ethnopolitical Rebellion," in T. Gurr and J. Davies, ed., *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998).

9. E. Sprinzak, *From Theory to Practice: Developing Early Warning Indicators for Terrorism* (Washington, DC: USIP, 1998).

10. Ibid., p 37.

11. W. Stone and E. Schaffner, *The Psychology of Politics* (2nd ed.) (New York: Springer Verlag, 1974), pp. 30–31.

12. Ibid., pp. 32–34. Stone and Schaffner drew upon the work of M. Brewster Smith, A Map for the Analysis of Personality and Politics," *Journal of Social Issues* 4(3) (1968), pp. 15–28 for the theoretical and representational underpinnings of their model, augmenting it creatively by placing their model in the context of field theory

13. The expert panel consisted of Ronald Crelinsten, University of Ottawa, Canada, Martha Crenshaw, Wesleyan University, Connecticut; Theodore Gurr, University of Maryland; Bruce Hoffman, St. Andrews University, Great Britain; Ariel Merari, Tel Aviv University, Israel; and Ehud Sprinzak, Hebrew University, Israel.

14. O. F. Kernberg, *Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism* (Northvale, NJ: Aronson, 1975) .

15. E. Sprinzak, "Extreme-Left Terrorism in a Democracy: The Case of the Weathermen," in W. Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge, 1990)

16. J. Post, "Narcissism and the Charismatic Leader-Follower Relationship," *Political Psychology* 7(4) (1986), pp. 675–687.

17. H. Ardent, *Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1968), pp. 71–73, 81–86.

18. T. W. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswick, D. Levinson, and R. N. Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper &; Bros, 1950), pp. 759–762.

19. J. Post, "Psychological and Motivational Factors in Terrorist Decision-making: Implications for CBW Terrorism," in J. Tucker, ed., *Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 271–289.

20. R. Robins and J. Post, *Political Paranoia* (Connecticut: Yale, 1997), pp. 165–167.

21. E. Sprinzak, "Extreme-Left Terrorism in a Democracy."

22. Sprinzak, *From Theory to Practice.*

23. J. Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture," *Foreign Affairs* (November–December 2000).

24. I. Janis, *Groupthink* (2nd ed.) (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1982).

25. A. Semmel and D. Minix, "Group Dynamics and Risk Taking," in L. Falkowski, ed., *Psychological Models in International Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979).

26. J. Post, "Group and Organizational Dynamics of International Terrorism: Implications for Counterterrorist Policy," in P. Wilkinson and A. Stewart, eds., *Contemporary Research on Terrorism* (Aberdeen, Scotland: Aberdeen University Press, 1987).

27. J. Post, "Terrorist Psychologic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces,"

in W. Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 33–34.

28. Baumann in W. von Baeyer-Kaette, D. Glassens, H. Feger, and F. Neidhardt, eds., *Analysen Zum Terrorismus 3: Gruppenprozesse* (Darmstadt: Deutscher Verlag, 1981).

29. For an excellent conceptualization of the radicalization process, see E. Sprinzak, "The Process of Delegitimation: Towards a Linkage Theory of Political Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 3(1) (1991), pp. 61–68.

30. For an example of the delegitimation process within a left-wing radical organization, see E. Sprinzak, "Extreme-left Terrorism in a Democracy," pp. 82–83.

21. Sprinzak, and M. Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice," *From Theory to Practice*; in W. Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism, pp. 7–25. It is important to note that the process by which a radical group decides to escalate to terrorism can be strongly influenced by psychological and group dynamics factors that may lead to unexpected valuations of costs and benefits (see J. Post, "Terrorist Psychologic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces," in W. Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism*, pp. 25–40).

32. In his indicator system, Sprinzak includes an increase in violent activity toward the target group as a subset of delegitimizing the enemy. However, evidence of escalating violence is significant enough to warrant its own indicator category.