


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Publisher: Routledge

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Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uter20>

Global Jihadist Recidivism: A Red Flag

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Published online: 20 Feb 2008.

To cite this article: Dennis A. Pluchinsky (2008) Global Jihadist Recidivism: A Red Flag, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31:3, 182-200, DOI: [10.1080/10576100701878457](https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100701878457)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100701878457>

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Global Jihadist Recidivism: A Red Flag

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This commentary examines the issue of global jihadist recidivism and identifies it as a potential long-term international counterterrorism concern. Although there are no comprehensive and accurate statistics on global jihadist recidivism, there is sufficient anecdotal evidence that suggests that the tendency for released imprisoned global jihadist terrorists is to return to terrorist activity. It is important to understand that arresting, indicting, and sentencing a captured global jihadist terrorist is not the end of the counterterrorism skirmish. In fact, the next stages of incarceration and reformation are more crucial to the endgame. The problem of global jihadist recidivism is at the core a manpower issue. Prisons have always been an important front for all types of terrorist groups. Recidivism or the failure of prison rehabilitation programs is simply one component of this front. Terrorist groups do not want their imprisoned members to reform and resign from the organization. Further research needs to be conducted on the recidivism rate for terrorists and whether religious terrorists would have a higher rate than secular ones. The academic, think tank, and U.S. government communities need to examine this issue to determine if it is a long-term international counterterrorism problem. The author believes it will be.

Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has said that for every jihadist we kill, three more are recruited. A corollary to this line of thinking is that for every imprisoned jihadist who is executed or given a life sentence, seven are eventually released. When global jihadists are arrested and sentenced what is the ultimate fruit of this process? In theory, it is hoped that these prisoners would reform during their incarceration. However, if these released prisoners become recidivists and return to the armed struggle then arrests only suspend jihadists' participation in jihad, not end it. If this is what in fact is happening then we are setting ourselves up for future manpower infusions for the global *jihad* movement. The tendency of the law enforcement and intelligence communities is to move on to other targets once a global jihadist is captured. However, arresting, convicting, and sentencing global jihadists are not the end game. A terrorist is only temporarily neutralized by imprisonment. More than anytime in the modern history of terrorism, the prisons have become a key front in the war on terror. Not only because of the potential for jihadist radicalization of criminals but also because of the prison's crucial role in reforming imprisoned global jihadists. It is prison reform that takes a jihadist off the board, not the arrest.

This commentary is a preliminary alert and cursory examination of the question of recidivism and released imprisoned global jihadists. It is important to note that this

Received 16 March 2007; accepted 4 June 2007.

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commentary does not address domestic jihadist recidivism in organizations like Hamas, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, Lebanese Hezbollah, or mainline Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia. The focus is on global jihadist organizations, individuals, and small cells. A global jihadist can be defined as a Muslim who (1) believes that Islam is under attack by the West with the objective of destroying Islam, (2) perceives that the United States is the primary enemy of Islam, (3) believes it is Islam's manifest destiny to rule the world, and (4) believes that the only proper response to this threat to Islam and the Muslim Ummah is militant *jihad*. A recidivist is defined as one who, after release from custody for having committed a crime, is not rehabilitated.

The first hurdle in examining the issue of global jihadist recidivism is in attempting to collect open source data to estimate the number of global jihadists arrested and imprisoned since early 2002. This is difficult because many countries that have arrested and imprisoned global jihadists do not accurately and consistently release such information to the public. To the author's knowledge, no total figure has been estimated in the open source literature concerning the number of global jihadists arrested or imprisoned over this period. Moreover, there have been no open source estimates as to how many global jihadists are currently pending trial or are imprisoned worldwide. The author posits that outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, which present a different dimension of the jihadist recidivist issue, the figure cannot be more than 5000 detained or serving prison terms worldwide. Breaking down the post 9/11 era into two periods, 2002–2003 and 2004–2007, it is postulated that most of the imprisoned global jihadists were sentenced during the second period. The dividing event for these two periods was the 11 March 2004 train attacks in Madrid because this incident signaled the emergence of the homegrown or leaderless terrorism component of the global *jihad* movement.

The crucial question of course is what happens to these 5000 global jihadists once they have completed their prison sentences? The author is also not aware of any unclassified studies that have tracked the length of global jihadist prison terms. The Appendix contains a representative chart of global jihadist prison sentences imposed over the past three years in several countries. The information was collected from open source material. Excluded from this chart were jihadists who were executed or given life sentences. The author estimates that only about 15 percent of captured global jihadists are either executed or receive life sentences. Most receive sentences of less than 20 years. A significant number, however, receive sentences of less than 10 years. Given the fact that even terrorists receive sentence reductions for good behavior, and furthermore that many countries have a tradition or policy of pardoning prisoners for special events or religious holidays, it is unlikely that many global jihadists will serve out their full prison terms.

For example, in August 2005, an Indonesian court reduced the sentences of Jemaah Islamiyah cleric Abu Bakar Bashir and 18 other JI militants as part of a nationwide amnesty to celebrate Indonesia's national day. Many Middle Eastern and Asian countries issue amnesties for special events. Some exclude terrorists from the amnesty. However, enough key countries grant pardons that it is cause for concern.

It is important to consider the entire process of neutralizing a terrorist. He or she must be found, arrested, indicted, convicted, sentenced, rehabilitated, and in most cases eventually released. There are potential obstacles throughout this process. When the terrorist is finally sentenced there is the natural tendency to legally and analytically remove the terrorist from the playing board. However, there are indicators that terrorists, especially global jihadists, have the propensity to return to militancy when released from prison. There is a clear trend for released criminals to become recidivists. According to a 2 June 2002 Department of

Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) press release, the data from the “largest recidivism study ever conducted in the United States” indicated that 67 percent of prisoners released in 1994 from state prisons committed at least one serious new crime within the following three years. This was a re-arrest rate 5 percent higher than that among prisoners released during 1983. The author of this commentary was unable to find any major, credible study that examined the recidivist rates of released global jihadists. The problems inherent in such an unclassified study are the international scope of this issue and the unreliability of host country statistics and record-keeping. However, the DOJ/BJS study implies that there is a tendency of released criminals is to return to crime. Thus, it can be assumed that this would be a logical tendency of secular terrorists and more so for religious terrorists.

There have not been a sufficient number of global jihadists released from prison over the past three years to deduce a trend toward recidivism or not. Many global jihadists will be released over the next 10–15 years and this is when trends will surface. However, there is enough anecdotal evidence to suggest that the trend will be toward recidivism. A possible experimental case could be the monitoring of some 2629 jihadist prisoners freed by the Algerian government between the beginning of March and September 2006. This list was shared with the French government and the French are reportedly very concerned about these releases. It is unknown if anyone in France or Algeria will be studying the recidivism rate among these released jihadists.

The author’s hypothesis is that there is an apparent tendency for global jihadists to become recidivists. Consider the following anecdotal evidence:

- The individual who blew himself up on 11 March 2007 inside an Internet cafe in Casablanca, Morocco was Abdelfettah Raydi. Raydi was sentenced to five years imprisonment in 2003 under the Anti-Terrorism Law. He was granted royal pardon in 2005. (Source: *Moroccan News Agency*, 12 March 2007, GMP20070312950073)
- As a result of the national reconciliation process promoted by Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, 2629 Algerian terrorists were released between the beginning of March and September 2006. A French newspaper reported that Abou Mousaab Abdelouadoud, who leads the Algerian GSPC, said in a letter published in January 2007 in the daily *El Khabar* that many of the former prisoners were joining his ranks. (Source: *Le Figaro*, 16 January 2007 EUP20070116029003)
- Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri was imprisoned in Egypt from 1981–1984 for jihadist activities. When released he returned to the *jihad*, more determined and radical than when he went in. Given that Zawahiri was tortured in Egyptian jails and forced to provide information on a colleague, the author suspects that Zawahiri has a special affinity for imprisoned jihadists and if there is a primary generator for operations designed to release imprisoned jihadists it would be him.
- Prison escapes are another indicator that a prisoner has not reformed. On 10 July 2005, four Al Qaeda prisoners (Abu-Yahya al-Libi, aka: Muhammad Hasan al-Libi, Abu-Nasir al-Qahtani, Abu Abdallah al-Hashimi, and Muhammad Ahmad, aka: Al-Faruq al-Iraqi) escaped from the prison located inside the U.S. Bagram airbase. All returned to *jihad*. In February 2006, 23 jihadists escaped from a Yemen prison. Some eventually turned themselves in but most returned to *jihad*.
- Former Guantanamo prisoners Mohamed Mazouz and Brahim Benchakroun, who spent more than three years in Gitmo, were handed over to Moroccan authorities in August 2004. Directly after their transfer, Mazouz and Benchakroun were interrogated by the police and then referred to the investigating judge and then

on to the court. Both men were eventually given bail and less than four months later a newspaper reported that they were rearrested for forging links with a cell called

- Attawhid Wal Islah [unification and reform]. (Source: Casablanca *Al Masaa*, 28 November 2006, GMP20061128950027)
- “Hassan El Khattab was arrested in August 2006 for setting up Ansar Al Mahdi cells in various Moroccan towns. It has been reported that he had made plans for his jihadist project while in jail where he was sent because of his implication in the Sale terror cell that had come to be known as the Assaika [lightning] group cell. In 2003, Khattab was sentenced to two years in jail and was released in late December 2005.” (Source: Rabat *Al-Alam*, 11 January 2007, GMP20070111950089)
- “Seven members of the group Salafia Jihadia were arrested in the Moroccan central city of Meknès. They were allegedly preparing for criminal and terror acts against military bases, universities, hotels, and government buildings. Four of them were released, whereas the remaining three were handed over to Rabat judiciary police. The individuals who were released had already served prison terms for involvement with a non-authorized association (Salafia Jihadia), advocacy of terror acts, incitation to hatred and violence, and harming the security of the State. They were released because of lack of evidence.” (Source: *Maghreb Arab Press*, 15 February 2007.)
- “An Algerian terrorist cell was recently neutralized. This group was recently reconstituted by terrorists who had repented. Of the 19 members who make up this network, 12 were brought on March 3, 2007 before the state prosecutor, who questioned them, whereas five are on the run and two, who turn out to be the network’s leaders, are under arrest at El-Harrach jail. This group has been working in close collaboration with those groups active in the Kabylie maquis, particularly Boumerdes, and which have been the perpetrators of the recent terrorist attacks in that region of Algeria.” (Source: Algiers *Liberte*, 4 March 2007, GMP20070304280002)
- Moroccan press reported that some 317 terrorist suspects have been arrested since August 2006. Some former prisoners of the “Salafia Jihadia,” who were released on pardon or finished their prison terms, were among the members of the dismantled cells. The report states that “recidivism cases confirm that several ex-prisoners, released since 2003, still remain much committed to violence ideology and that proven repentance is almost missing among them.” (Source: *Maghreb Arab Press*, 26 November 2006)
- Samir Azzouz, part of the Dutch Hofstad jihadist group, was arrested in the Ukraine in January 2003, in the Netherlands in October 2003, in the Netherlands in June 2004, and again in the Netherlands in October 2005. In December 2006, he was sentenced to 8 years in prison. (Source: *AFP*, 28 December 2006)
- An Israeli terror victims association, Almagor, released a report on 16 September 2006 that concluded that terrorists (not involved in blood crimes) who were released from Israeli custody perpetrated 14 terror attacks in the past several years that killed 132 Israelis. The report stated that from 1993–99, Israel released 6912 terrorists in the context of various confidence-building gestures, some of whom returned to terror activities “at the cost of huge destruction of life.” The report issued a list of 14 major attacks carried out or engineered by released terrorists, including the 2002 Park Hotel attack in Netanya (29 killed, 155 injured), the 2002 Karkur Junction attack (14 killed, 42 injured), the suicide attack at Jerusalem’s Cafit Cafe (11 killed, 20 injured), and the 2003 suicide attack at Cafe Hillel, also in Jerusalem, in which

seven people were killed and many more were injured. (Source: Tel Aviv *Ha'aretz*, 18 September 2006, GMP20060918735013)

- Kashmiri jihadists hijacked an Air India plane out of Katmandu in 1999. They demanded the release of three imprisoned Kashmiri jihadists. One of the terrorists released, Maulana Masood Azhar, later masterminded the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament. The Indian Airlines hijacking also resulted in India releasing Omar Sheikh, the terrorist who would later go on to plan the kidnapping of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl on 23 January 2002 in Karachi, Pakistan.
- At least 200 people continued to be detained without charge or trial throughout 2005 as suspects in the “War on Terror.” More than 100 others were released after they agreed to engage in religious dialogue with Islamic figures and signed a pledge renouncing “extremist” views. However, dozens of those released were later rearrested after it was reported that some of those freed had gone to Iraq to fight against U.S.-led forces. (Source: *Amnesty International Report for 2005*, chapter on Yemen)
- “One police source spoke of the route of one released Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) member. After being freed he immediately joined the underground movement before traveling to France to set up a business and marry a Frenchwoman. He then made the mistake of entering into direct contact with a GSPC official exiled in the United Kingdom, the result being his immediate expulsion. Without this beginner’s mistake, the man could have carried out his plans undisturbed.” (Source: Paris *Le Figaro*, 16 January 2007, EUP20070116029003)
- A December 2006 study by the Clingendael Institute in The Hague entitled “Jihadi Terrorists in Europe” examined the backgrounds of 242 jihadist terrorists in Europe. It found that “at least 58 had a criminal record while involved in jihadi terrorist activities. . . this means that almost a quarter of the jihadi terrorists in Europe had previously been convicted by a court before their arrest for terrorist offences.” (Source: Edwin Bakker, “Jihadi Terrorists in Europe,” *Clingendael Security Paper*, 30 January 2007, p. 42)
- “The alleged head of the cell was Saïf Bourrada, 35, a GSPC associate who in 1998 was convicted of taking part in a series of bomb attacks three years earlier, including one on the Paris subway that killed seven people. Bourrada was released from prison in 2003 after serving about half of a 10-year sentence. He reportedly went to Cairo for about six months before setting up this new terrorist cell. He was arrested again on October 4, 2005.” (*Washington Post*, 19 October 2005, p. A15; *Counterterrorism Blog*, 6 December 2006, www.counterterrorism.org)

A recidivist has been defined as one who, after release from custody for having committed a crime, is not rehabilitated. In most cases, the terrorist recidivist may return to participating in terrorist operations. However, it is also possible that the recidivist may engage in other forms of illegal activity that further the cause of his group or movement. For example, Irish Republican Army (IRA) prisoners who were released did not all return to their units. Some became involved in the political side of the Irish Republican movement. The two most notorious examples would be Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams. McGuinness served time in British and Irish prisons. When released, he became increasingly prominent in Sinn Féin, the political wing of the IRA. Adams also served time in prison and like McGuinness gravitated toward Sinn Féin after he was released. The point is that imprisoned terrorists who are released do not necessarily have to return to violence to be considered not

rehabilitated and therefore a recidivist. They could also return to propaganda or logistical work, or engage in training. If they return to any duties or responsibilities that further the cause of their illegal organization or movement then they must be counted as a recidivist.

There are five characteristics of global jihadist recidivism that make it alarming.

1. **It is a global problem.** It is not confined to just one or several countries. Most of the terrorist threats that have confronted U.S. overseas interests over the past forty years have been domestic in origin and scope. The majority of anti-American terrorist attacks overseas have been carried out by domestic terrorist groups. Anti-American terrorist organizations with an international operational area are rare. The only terrorist threats with an international scope that the U.S. has faced came from: (1) secular Palestinian terrorists in the 1970s and 1980s, (2) Iranian-backed Shia terrorist constructions in the 1980s, and (3) Libyan and Syrian state-sponsored terrorist constructions in the 1980s. The current threat from a Sunni-dominated global *jihad* movement is the most recent manifestation of a terrorist threat that encompasses multiple regions of the world. Consequently, the issue of global jihadist recidivism must be monitored internationally.
2. **It involves religious extremists.** It is logical to assume that terrorists with a secular motivation and goal are more likely to be reformed in prison than terrorists who are driven by religious grievances and theological exhortations. If one was operating on God's word and according to God's laws, how can that person admit that what he did was wrong? This is not to say that religious terrorists cannot be reformed. The point is that the propensity for reform is less likely for global jihadists than secular terrorists. This means that the process of imprisoning these jihadists and subjecting them to prison rehabilitation programs is an uphill battle.
3. **Disinformation, deception, and lying are Jihadist traits.** One is never certain that global jihadists who reform in prison are sincere or simply practicing the jihadist principle of "Takeyya," which means "to prevent," or guard against. This principle has been interpreted as giving Muslims the liberty to lie under circumstances that they perceive as life threatening. They can even deny the faith, if they do not mean it in their hearts. Jihadists interpret this principle to mean that they are permitted to lie or deceive anytime they perceive that their own well-being, or that of Islam, is threatened. Consequently, those imprisoned jihadists who claim that they have reformed must still be monitored after their release. Moreover, given the eternal nature of their armed struggle and the long-term patience they are taught, this monitoring will be more open-ended than with secular terrorists.
4. **The dispersal tendency.** If domestic imprisoned anti-American terrorists are released and become recidivists they would tend to continue to operate in their country of origin. Global jihadist recidivists do not necessarily stay in their country of origin. They could emigrate to other countries, go fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, or join another jihadist organization in another country. The assumption is that this dispersal tendency would make it harder to monitor global jihadist recidivists.
5. **Jihad of the individual and small cell.** For most secular and even some religious terrorist recidivists, one way to prevent their return to terrorism is for counterterrorism agencies to destroy the terrorist group of the released terrorist. If the parent terrorist organization was no longer active when the terrorist was released then the possibility of recidivism was reduced. However, the current

global *jihad* movement embraces the concept of leaderless terrorism or what Abu Musab al-Suri, a global jihadist strategist, calls the “*jihad* of the individual and small cell.” This means that a global jihadist, who is released from prison and finds that his parent terrorist organization has been destroyed, has other militant options to continue *jihad*. A key underlying assumption of this article is that over the next twenty years, the most prominent manifestation of urban terrorist activity outside Iraq and Afghanistan will most likely be global jihadist leaderless terrorism.

The combination of these five characteristics strongly suggests that jihadist recidivism is not a normal terrorist recidivist problem.

At its core, jihadist recidivism is a manpower concern. The global *jihad* movement obtains its manpower from three sources: (1) Muslim recruits, (2) converts, and (3) released jihadists. From a counterterrorism perspective, terrorists must be either killed or captured. The more terrorists that are killed, especially experienced operatives or leaders, the more damage to the operational capability of a group. While the arrests of terrorists are also damaging to the group, this damage is not always permanent. If an arrested terrorist is convicted and given a long prison sentence then there are only two possible positive outcomes upon his release: (1) the incarceration has removed or dampened his inclination for political violence, or (2) the group he belonged to no longer is active. However, there is one possible negative outcome. The terrorist may return to armed struggle after his release and may even be better trained and motivated as a result of his incarceration. The U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities rightly perceive that manpower, technological, information technology, financial, and diplomatic resources should be directed at killing or capturing terrorists and damaging or destroying their logistical, financial, and weapons supply lines. However, it is also crucial to shrink their manpower pool. The prisons are a key manpower generator for the global jihadist movement. Prisons provide recruits through the process of radicalizing criminal elements. If prisons fail to reform imprisoned jihadists then they return to the *jihad*. These are manpower issues.

The prisons and prisoners have always been a major issue for terrorist groups. Terrorist organizations place a lot of emphasis on maintaining discipline, group cohesion, and group identity in its imprisoned comrades. Terrorist organizations know that incarceration can lead to rehabilitation or to personal doubt. Terrorist organizations do not perceive jailed members as lost but simply not on active service. The prisons can be used for training inexperienced members who are imprisoned. Imprisoned members can also be used for propaganda tools. Consider how the global jihadists have used the Abu Ghraib and Gitmo controversies for propaganda purposes. In addition, hunger strikes can be initiated inside the prisons by terrorists. This event attracts domestic and international attention and can galvanize supporters and sympathizers, especially if the hunger strikers die. The longest terrorist prison hunger strike in the history of terrorism took place from 2000–2006 in Turkey where 122 members of the Turkish left-wing terrorist group Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) died on hunger strike. Left-wing and ethnic terrorist groups have consistently used prison hunger strikes to further their political objectives. The importance of imprisoned comrades to terrorist organizations is also underlined by the many prison escapes that have been planned and attempted, either originating from inside or outside the prison. Captured terrorists also place a responsibility on some terrorist organizations to provide financial assistance to the families of imprisoned members. From

a counterterrorism perspective, aside from successful prison rehabilitation of terrorists, another positive development that periodically emerges from imprisoned terrorists is that many discussions to re-evaluate armed struggle comes from the prisoners. The genesis of the ceasefires and renouncing of armed struggle by the IRA, the Basque separatist group ETA, the German Red Army Faction, the Italian Red Brigades, and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) originated with imprisoned members. This is a counterterror pressure point that has not been adequately explored or utilized.

For the global *jihad* movement, prisons and prisoners have been and will continue to be important issues. There are periodic threats and hints to release imprisoned jihadists, videos are made celebrating imprisoned jihadists, prisons are used to radicalize and recruit, and some prisons are being used to train and plot. For example, the Martyrs for Morocco cell headed by Mohamed Achraf was organized in Topas prison in Salamanca, Spain in November 2003. The cell was planning suicide attacks against the high court and other targets in Madrid when it was neutralized in November 2004. A jihadist cell also formed in California State prison in Sacramento, California and neutralized in August 2005. In August 2006, Indonesian police revealed Bali bomber Imam Samudra had used a lap-top computer smuggled into his prison cell to chat on the Internet with co-conspirators about raising money for future attacks. There have also been reports that jihadist prisoners in Indonesia have been translating terrorist training manuals from Arabic.

Conclusion

The objective of this commentary was to raise a red flag on the issue of global jihadist recidivism. The issue of terrorist recidivism in general has not been adequately researched. Given that the primary terrorist threat that the West faces comes from a global jihadist movement, it is even more urgent to evaluate whether the issue of global jihadist recidivism will become a minor or major security concern for the international community. It is the opinion of the author that global jihadist recidivism has the potential to be a major counterterrorism problem over the next several decades. It is a manpower issue that has the potential to periodically refuel the global jihadist movement. Terrorist recidivism has for the first time become a global issue and problem for the United States. It is a problem that must be addressed with resources and new policies. There are clearly valid presumptions, preliminary indicators and anecdotal evidence that suggest that global jihadist recidivism needs to be examined in more detail and that governments consider establishing dedicated analytical units to establish a database to record prison sentences of global jihadists, any reductions or pardons of their sentences, deportations, extraditions, and extraordinary renditions. This unit would also evaluate the prison profiles of key countries to determine the degree of jihadist radicalization of criminals and the success of their rehabilitation programs as it applies to incarcerated global jihadists. There is a specter hovering over the world's conflict with global jihadists. It is recidivism. The problem is at its early stages so there is time to address it and develop ways to mitigate it.

Appendix: Samples of Global Jihadist Prison Sentences

Note: The purpose of this table is to provide some snapshots of the sentences that global jihadists receive in certain countries. The sources used were: Open press, Open Source Center, State Department Country Reports on Terrorism and Human Rights, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch.

Jihadist prison sentences—Excluding life sentences

Name	Country	Year	Term	Group
Azmi al-Jayousi	Jordan	2007	8	AQ
Jameel Kutkut	Jordan	2007	8	AQ
Unknown	Jordan	2007	2	AQ
Unknown	Jordan	2007	2	AQ
Unknown	Jordan	2007	2	AQ
Said Ibrohim Nasriddinov	Tajikistan	2007	23	Gitmo–IMU
Mohamed Ben El Hadi				
Messahel	Morocco	2007	15	
Abdelghani Aaouiech	Morocco	2007	10	
Adelfattah El Hidaoui	Morocco	2007	8	
Abdelhak Touri	Morocco	2007	6	
Lahcen Mhader	Morocco	2007	6	
Adel Ghirar	Morocco	2007	6	
Said Fares	Morocco	2007	4	
Mohamed Harmouch	Morocco	2007	2	
Unknown	Morocco	2007	2–10	
Mohamed Boujaidi	Morocco	2007	5	
Abdelaziz Benyaich	Morocco	2007	3	
Ayoub Zaim	Morocco	2007	2	
Abdelhak Kouani	Morocco	2007	2	
Younès Zarali	Morocco	2006	2	
Abdelhamid Saddaoui	Algeria	2007	20	GSPC
Azdine Sayeh	France	2006	2	AQ
Ibrahim Keita	France	2006	2	AQ
Ahmad Basir Umar	Indonesia	2006	3	JI
Joko Wibowo	Indonesia	2006	12	JI
Harry Setya Rahmadi	Indonesia	2006	5	JI
Joko Padang	Indonesia	2006	10	JI
Adhitya Triyoga	Indonesia	2006	6	JI
Wawan Suprihatin	Indonesia	2006	10	JI
Anif Solchanuddin	Indonesia	2006	15	JI
Ardi Wibowo	Indonesia	2006	6	JI
Sri Puji Mulyo Siswanto	Indonesia	2006	6	JI
Mustaghfirin	Indonesia	2007	12	JI
Abdelilah Hriz	Morocco	2007	3	Madrid
Miqdad al-Dabbas	Jordan	2005	15	Zarqawi
Mahmood Eid Mohammed				
Dabbous	Egypt	2005	35	AQ in SA
Al-Khadar Salam				
Abdullah al-Hatami	Yemen	2005	3.4	
Abdullah Ahmed				
Saleh al-Raimi	Yemen	2005	4	
Unknown	Yemen	2005	2	

(Continued on next page)

Jihadist prison sentences—Excluding life sentences (*Continued*)

Name	Country	Year	Term	Group
Unknown	Kuwait	2005	3	“
Mounir el Motassadeq	Germany	2003	15	AQ/9-11
Samir Azzouz	Netherlands	2006	8	Hofstad
Ismail Akhnikh	Netherlands	2006	13	Hofstad
Jason Walters	Netherlands	2006	15	Hofstad
Nouriddin El Fatmi	Netherlands	2006	5	Hofstad
Soumaya Sahla	Netherlands	2006	3	F Hofstad
Mohamed Chentou	Netherlands	2006	4	Hofstad
Unknown	Netherlands	2006	<2	Hofstad
Unknown	Netherlands	2006	<2	Hofstad
Unknown	Netherlands	2006	<2	Hofstad
Mehdi Kammoun	Tunisia	2007	5–8	Partisans of Sunnah
Unknown	Tunisia	2007	5–8	“
Unknown	Tunisia	2007	5–8	“
Unknown	Tunisia	2007	5–8	“
Unknown	Tunisia	2007	5–8	“
Nabil Slimani	Tunisia	2007	11	“
Unknown	Tunisia	2007	<11	
Unknown	Tunisia	2007	<11	
Unknown	Tunisia	2007	<11	
Unknown	Tunisia	2007	<11	
Unknown	Tunisia	2007	<11	
Unknown	Tunisia	2007	<11	
Unknown	Tunisia	2007	<11	
Unknown	Tunisia	2007	<11	
Khalib Adib	Morocco	2003	20	Salafist Jihad
Unknown	Morocco	2003	15	“
Unknown	Morocco	2003	15	“
Unknown	Morocco	2003	15	“
Unknown	Morocco	2003	15	“
Unknown	Morocco	2003	2–10	“
Unknown	Morocco	2003	2–10	“
Unknown	Morocco	2003	20	“
Unknown	Morocco	2003	20	“
Unknown	Morocco	2003	20	“
Unknown	Morocco	2003	20	“
Unknown	Morocco	2003	20	“
Unknown	Morocco	2003	20	“
Unknown	Morocco	2003	20	“
Unknown	Morocco	2003	20	“
Unknown	Morocco	2003	20	“
Unknown	Morocco	2003	20	“

(Continued on next page)

Jihadist prison sentences—Excluding life sentences (*Continued*)

Name	Country	Year	Term	Group
Maamar Ouazane	France	2006	2	Chechen Group
Khaled Ouazane	France	2006	<10	Chechen Group
Hassan Habbar	France	2006	<10	Chechen Group
Abdelwahab Djouba	France	2006	<10	Chechen Group
Abdewlahed Regad	France	2006	<10	Chechen Group
Chellali Benchellali	France	2006	1.5	Chechen Group
Hafed Benchellali	France	2006	<10	Chechen Group
Hafsa Benchellali	France	2006	<10	Chechen Group
Menad Benchellali	France	2006	10	Chechen Group
Mirouane Benahmed	France	2006	10	Chechen Group
Mourad Benchelali	France	2006	<10	Gitmo “ “
Nouredine Merabet	France	2006	9	Chechen Group
Mohamed Marbah	France	2006	8	Chechen Group
Said Arif	France	2006	9	Chechen Group
Unknown	France	2006	<10	Chechen Group
Unknown	France	2006	<10	Chechen Group
Unknown	France	2006	<10	Chechen Group
Unknown	France	2006	<10	Chechen Group
Unknown	France	2006	<10	Chechen Group
Unknown	France	2006	<10	Chechen Group
Unknown	France	2006	<10	Chechen Group
Unknown	France	2006	<10	Chechen Group
Unknown	France	2006	<10	Chechen Group
Unknown	France	2006	<10	Chechen Group
Unknown	Egypt	2006	5–15	Taba/Sinai
Unknown	Egypt	2006	5–15	Taba/Sinai
Unknown	Egypt	2006	5–15	Taba/Sinai
Unknown	Egypt	2006	5–15	Taba/Sinai
Unknown	Egypt	2006	5–15	Taba/Sinai
Unknown	Egypt	2006	5–15	Taba/Sinai
Unknown	Egypt	2006	5–15	Taba/Sinai
Unknown	Egypt	2006	5–15	Taba/Sinai
Unknown	Jordan	2000	7–15	Millenium
Unknown	Jordan	2000	7–15	Millenium
Unknown	Jordan	2000	7–15	Millenium
Unknown	Jordan	2000	7–15	Millenium
Unknown	Jordan	2000	7–15	Millenium
Unknown	Jordan	2000	7–15	Millenium
Unknown	Jordan	2000	7–15	Millenium
Unknown	Jordan	2000	7–15	Millenium
Unknown	Jordan	2000	7–15	Millenium
Unknown	Jordan	2000	7–15	Millenium
Unknown	Jordan	2000	7–15	Millenium
Unknown	Jordan	2000	7–15	Millenium
Unknown	Jordan	2000	7–15	Millenium

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Jihadist prison sentences—Excluding life sentences (*Continued*)

Name	Country	Year	Term	Group
Unknown	Turkey	2007	3–18	'03 Istanbul
Unknown	Turkey	2007	3–18	'03 Istanbul
Unknown	Turkey	2007	3–18	'03 Istanbul
Unknown	Turkey	2007	3–18	'03 Istanbul
Unknown	Turkey	2007	3–18	'03 Istanbul
Unknown	Turkey	2007	3–18	'03 Istanbul
Unknown	Turkey	2007	3–18	'03 Istanbul
Abdul Basit Abu-Lifa	Denmark	2007	7	Plot
Mohamed Taharaoui	Spain	2007	13	Dixan group
Smail Boudejelthi	Spain	2007	13	Dixan group
Ali Kaouka	Spain	2007	13	Dixan group
Souhi Kaouka	Spain	2007	13	Dixan group
Mohamed Amine	Spain	2007	13	Dixan group
Benacura				
Makhmudzhon Shokirov	Tajikistan	2007	10	Hizb ut-Tahrir
Salahudin Sutowijoyo	Indonesia	2006	3	Jl/AusEmb
Taufik Ridho	Indonesia	2006	8	Jl/AusEmb
Iqbal Husaini	Indonesia	2006	7	Jl/AusEmb
Enceng Kurnia	Indonesia	2006	6	Jl/AusEmb
Purnama Putra.	Indonesia	2006	7	Jl/AusEmb
Faheem Khalid Lodhi	Australia	2006	20	Sydney
Anouar Mjerar	Morocco	2007	7	GSPC
Unknown	Morocco	2007	<10	GSPC
Unknown	Morocco	2007	<10	GSPC
Unknown	Morocco	2007	<10	GSPC
Unknown	Morocco	2007	<10	GSPC
Unknown	Morocco	2007	<10	GSPC
Unknown	Morocco	2007	<10	GSPC
Unknown	Morocco	2007	<10	GSPC
Unknown	Morocco	2007	<10	GSPC
Unknown	Morocco	2007	<10	GSPC
Unknown	Morocco	2007	<10	GSPC
Unknown	Morocco	2007	<10	GSPC
Unknown	Morocco	2007	<10	GSPC
Unknown	Morocco	2007	<10	GSPC
Unknown	Morocco	2007	<10	GSPC
Unknown	Morocco	2007	<10	GSPC
Unknown	Morocco	2007	<10	GSPC
Unknown	Morocco	2007	<10	GSPC
Unknown	Morocco	2007	<10	GSPC
Unknown	Morocco	2007	<10	GSPC
Unknown	Morocco	2007	<10	GSPC
Unknown	Morocco	2007	<10	GSPC
Mohamed Ben Moujane	Morocco	2007	10	Gitmo AQ
Unknown	Morocco	2006	3–5	Gitmo AQ
Unknown	Morocco	2006	3–5	Gitmo AQ
Unknown	Morocco	2006	3–5	Gitmo AQ
Unknown	Morocco	2006	3–5	Gitmo AQ
Mustapha Khayri	Morocco	2007	10	Sale Group

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Jihadist prison sentences—Excluding life sentences (*Continued*)

Name	Country	Year	Term	Group
Abdelouhab El Bahlouli	Morocco	2007	8	Sale Group
Abdelhak El Basraoui	Morocco	2007	8	Sale Group
Azeddine Nouali	Morocco	2007	6	Sale Group
Khalid M'rabti	Morocco	2007	5	Sale Group
Abdelilah Redouani	Morocco	2007	5	Sale Group
Ali El Abdi	Morocco	2007	5	Sale Group
Mohamed Benharrous	Morocco	2007	4	Sale Group
Lahcen Benmoussa	Morocco	2007	4	Sale Group
Jaouad Aouam	Morocco	2007	3	Sale Group
Tarek Cherkaoui	Morocco	2007	3	Sale Group
Mustapha Zitouni	Morocco	2007	3	Sale Group
Hassan Bouiyi	Morocco	2007	3	Sale Group
Abdelmouin Sbai	Morocco	2007	3	Sale Group
Kamal Belyamani	Morocco	2007	2	Sale Group
Mimoun Rahou	Morocco	2007	1	Sale Group
Mohamed Salmi	Morocco	2007	2	Sale Group
Abdelilah Ahriz	Morocco	2007	3	Sale Group
Mohammad Shalabi	Jordan	2007	15	AmEmbassy
Amer Sraj	Jordan	2007	15	AmEmbassy
Saleh Awad	Jordan	2007	7	AmEmbassy
Unknown	Jordan	2004	11–15	GID
Unknown	Jordan	2004	11–15	GID
Unknown	Jordan	2004	11–15	GID
Unknown	Jordan	2004	11–15	GID
Unknown	Jordan	2004	11–15	GID
Unknown	Jordan	2004	11–15	GID
Unknown	Jordan	2004	11–15	GID
Unknown	Jordan	2004	11–15	GID
Unknown	Jordan	2004	11–15	GID
Unknown	Jordan	2004	11–15	GID
Unknown	Jordan	2004	11–15	GID
Said Oudghiri	Jordan	2007	10	Sahel cell
Brahim Dazdaz	Jordan	2007	4	Sahel cell
Khaled Mokaddem	Jordan	2007	4	Sahel cell
Adel Cherif El Harrag	Jordan	2007	4	Sahel cell
Mohamed Berrada	Jordan	2007	4	Sahel cell
Said Ahouzine	Jordan	2007	4	Sahel cell
Redouane Laaribi Laroussi	Jordan	2007	4	Sahel cell
Abdelilah Gargouri	Jordan	2007	4	Sahel cell
Ali Yassine El Bahja	Jordan	2007	2	Sahel cell
Abdelmalek Btioui	Jordan	2007	2	Sahel cell
Abdellatif Bouzerda	Jordan	2007	6	Sahel cell
Unknown	Jordan	2007	3	Sahel cell
Unknown	Jordan	2007	2	Sahel cell

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Jihadist prison sentences—Excluding life sentences (*Continued*)

Name	Country	Year	Term	Group
Unknown	Jordan	2007	2	Sahel cell
Abdelouahab Rafiki	Morocco	2006	20	Salafia Jihadia
Hassan Kettani	Morocco	2006	30	Salafia Jihadia
Unknown	Jordan	2007	7–15	US Interests
Unknown	Jordan	2007	7–15	US Interests
Unknown	Jordan	2007	7–15	US Interests
Lahoussine El Hask	Belgium	2007	7	GICM
Abdallah Ouabour	Belgium	2007	6	GICM
Khalid Bouloudo	Belgium	2007	5	GICM
Unknown	Jordan	2007	3–5	Iraq
Unknown	Jordan	2007	3–5	Iraq
Unknown	Jordan	2007	3–5	Iraq
Unknown	Jordan	2007	3–5	Iraq
Unknown	Jordan	2007	3–5	Iraq
Abdallah Kouidri	Morocco	2007	3	
Said Baha	Morocco	2007	3	
Unknown	Morocco	2006	4	Islamic Party
Unknown	Morocco	2006	4	Islamic Party
Unknown	Morocco	2006	4	Islamic Party
Unknown	Morocco	2006	4	Islamic Party
Unknown	Morocco	2006	4	Islamic Party
Unknown	Morocco	2006	3	Islamic Party
Unknown	Morocco	2006	3	Islamic Party
Unknown	Morocco	2006	3	Islamic Party
Unknown	Morocco	2006	3	Islamic Party
Unknown	Morocco	2006	3	Islamic Party
Unknown	Morocco	2006	3	Islamic Party
Unknown	Morocco	2006	3	Islamic Party
Unknown	Morocco	2006	3	Islamic Party
Unknown	Morocco	2006	3	Islamic Party
Unknown	Morocco	2006	3	Islamic Party
Driss Elatellah	Belgium	2004	5	Antwerp cell
Saber Mohammed	Belgium	2004	5	Antwerp cell
Youssef el Moumen	Belgium	2004	5	Brussels
Tarik Karim	Belgium	2004	5	Brussels
Dhiren Barot	Great Britain	2006	+40	Citibank plot
Abbas Boutrab	Northern Ireland	2005	6	Engineer
Mohamed Meguerba	Algeria	2005	10	
Rachid Ramda	France	2006	10	
Mohammed Ajmal Khan	Great Britain	2006	9	LeT
Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas	Spain	2005	27	Abu Dahdah

(Continued on next page)

Jihadist prison sentences—Excluding life sentences (*Continued*)

Name	Country	Year	Term	Group
Andrew Rowe	Great Britain	2005	15	Brit convert
Muhammad Rafik	Italy	2005	4.8	Milan plot
Kamel Hamroui	Italy	2005	3.4	Milan plot
Adel Tebourski	France	2005	2–7	Fountainbleu
Youcef el-Aouni,	France	2005	2–7	Fountainbleu
Unknown	France	2005	2–7	Fountainbleu
Unknown	France	2005	2–7	Fountainbleu
Unknown	France	2005	2–7	Fountainbleu
Anwar Baian Al-Jilani	Yemen	2005	4	Tawheed Brigades
Khaled M. Al-Butani	Yemen	2005	3	Tawheed Brigades
Abdul Rahman Basurra	Yemen	2005	3	Tawheed Brigades
Umran Al-Faqih	Yemen	2005	2	Tawheed Brigades
Muhammad Wahab Khiti	Yemen	2005	3	Tawheed Brigades
Ahmad Abdul Wahab Khiti	Yemen	2005	3	Tawheed Brigades
Mohammad Kutkut	Yemen	2007	8	Prison escape
Unknown	Yemen	2007	2	Prison escape
Unknown	Yemen	2007	2	Prison escape
Unknown	Yemen	2007	2	Prison escape
Unknown	Yemen	2007	2	Prison escape
Mohammed Dirie	Canada	2005	2	Toronto cell
Yasim Abdi Mohamed	Canada	2005	2	Toronto cell
Djamel Beghal	France	2005	10	AmEmb plot
Abdelkrim Lefkir	France	2005	6	AmEmb plot
Ahmed Laidouni	France	2005	7	AmEmb plot
David Courtailler	France	2005	4	AmEmb plot
Jerome Courtailler	France	2005	4	AmEmb plot
Johan Bonte	France	2005	1	AmEmb plot
Kamel Daoudi	France	2005	9	AmEmb plot
Nabil Bounour	France	2005	6	AmEmb plot
Rachid Benmessahel	France	2005	3	AmEmb plot
Mohamed Chaouki Baadache	France	2005	10	AmEmb plot
Abdelghani Rabia	Netherlands	2005	6	
Nizar Trabelsi	Belgium	2003	10	Kleine Brogel AB
Amor Sliti	Belgium	2003	5	Masood plot
Tarek Maaroufi's	Belgium	2003	6	Masood plot
	Belgium	2003	10	Kleine Brogel AB
	Belgium	2003	5	Masood plot
	Belgium	2003	6	Masood plot
Abdelcrim el Hadouti	Belgium	2003	5	
Saajid Badat	Great Britain	2005	13	Richard Reid
Andrew Rowe	Great Britain	2005	15	AQ convert

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Jihadist prison sentences—Excluding life sentences (*Continued*)

Name	Country	Year	Term	Group
Ashraf al-Dagma	Germany	2005	7.5	Al-Tawid cell
Djamel Moustafa	Germany	2005	5	Al-Tawid cell
Ismail Shalabi	Germany	2005	6	Al-Tawid cell
Mohammed Abu Dhess	Germany	2005	8	Al-Tawid cell
Shadi Abadallah	Germany	2005	4	Al-Tawid cell
Abderahmane Chenine	France	2003	6	
Charef Betterki	France	2003	2.5	
Nacim Rebani	France	2003	5	
Nasseredine Mamache	France	2003	2	
Rabich Chenine	France	2003	5	
Kamel Bourgass	Great Britain	2005	17	Ricin plot
Mohammed Meguerba	Algeria	2006	10	
Yahia Mouad Mohamed Rayah	Italy	2006	5	AQ
Rabei Osman el Sayed Ahmed	Italy	2006	10	3/11/04
Omar Sheikh	Pakistan	2002	Death?	Dan Pearl
Salman Saqib	Pakistan	2002	Life?	Dan Pearl
Fahad Naseem	Pakistan	2002	Life?	Dan Pearl
Adil Sheikh	Pakistan	2002	Life?	Dan Pearl
Unknown	Pakistan	2005	18	HUM
Unknown	Pakistan	2005	18	HUM
Unknown	Pakistan	2005	18	HUM
Unknown	Pakistan	2005	18	HUM
Unknown	Pakistan	2005	18	HUM
Unknown	Pakistan	2005	18	HUM
Unknown	Jordan	2005	1–3	AmEmb
Unknown	Jordan	2005	1–3	AmEmb
Unknown	Jordan	2005	1–3	AmEmb
Unknown	Jordan	2005	1–3	AmEmb
Unknown	Jordan	2005	1–3	AmEmb
Unknown	Jordan	2005	1–3	AmEmb
Unknown	Jordan	2005	2.5	Foreign Dips
Unknown	Jordan	2005	2.5	Foreign Dips
Unknown	Jordan	2005	5	Liquor stores
Unknown	Jordan	2005	5	Liquor stores
Unknown	Jordan	2005	5	Liquor stores