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From Munich to Boston, and from Theater to Social Media: The Evolutionary Landscape of World Sporting Terror

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Modern terrorist attacks are usually characterized by intentionally extreme public displays of massive violence to get wide propagation, courtesy of the media. This article uses large-scale, world sporting events, from the 1972 Munich massacre to the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing to document and analyze how terror acts grew and acclimatized into a reality in which the symbiotic, massive linkage between two gigantic entities—sports and the media—allows terrorism to prosper.

On 5 February 2015, Muslim snooker player Rory McLeod publically announced the meaning of the ISIS badge he wore when playing Ronnie O'Sullivan in the Welsh Open. McLeod, the only British Muslim on the snooker circuit, caused a commotion on social media by wearing the badge. McLeod explained that the badge bore the logo of ISIS Business Solutions, which was his personal sponsor of the last 14 years, rather than that of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Islamic terror organization (sometimes known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant [ISIL] and later renamed the Islamic State). ISIS is a *Jihadist* militant group in Iraq and Syria that is influenced by the Wahhabi movement and known for killing dozens of people at a time and carrying out public executions, crucifixions, and other acts documented worldwide via the media.

It is no wonder so many spectators were concerned about the ISIS logo. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, terrorists recognized the potential and advantages of

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online platforms, new media, and online social networks. Paradoxically, the most innovative network of communication developed by modern Western societies, the Internet, now serves the interests of the greatest adversary of the West, specifically international terrorism. All terrorist groups have their own websites, forums, chat rooms, Facebook and Twitter accounts, YouTube channels, and Instagram pages. They use these platforms to spread propaganda; raise funds; seduce, radicalize, recruit, and train members; communicate; and plan and launch attacks.[1]

As the literal meaning of the word indicates, terror (originally from the Latin word *terrere*, which means to frighten or scare) is a military strategy that hopes to change the political situation by spreading fear, rather than by causing material damage.[2] Terrorist acts have been perpetrated for as long as there have been political disputes. British statesman Edmund Burke (1729–1797) was the first to use the term to describe the actions of the Jacobins during the French Revolution in the late 1790s. This article uses large-scale world sporting events to document and analyze how terror acts have changed and acclimatized into reality, in which the symbiotic, massive linkage between two gigantic entities—sports and the media—allows terrorism to prosper.

According to communication scholars, the emergence of media-oriented terrorism led several researchers to reconceptualize modern terrorism within the framework of symbolic communication theory.[3] As Jenkins concluded: "Terrorist attacks are often carefully choreographed to attract the attention of the electronic media and the international press. Taking and holding hostages increases the drama. The hostages themselves often mean nothing to the terrorists. Terrorism is aimed at the people watching, not at the actual victims. Terrorism is a theater."[4] Much has changed since Jenkins's observation, so he later modified his position and argued that "many of today's terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead."[5] However, the fundamental argument of his statement has remained accurate over the past 40 years, with a number of academic interpretations coming from sociologists, political scientists, psychologists, and communication scholars from around the world. Risking over-simplification, modern terrorist attacks are usually characterized by intentionally extreme public displays of massive violence, with an aim to get wider dissemination, courtesy of the media. The media serves as a battleground in today's conflicts, as the image war occurs alongside events on the ground.[6]

The First Act

The 1968 Olympics in Mexico City was almost certainly the exact point at which sports became so vulnerable to political messages. Staging a silent protest against racial discrimination, African-Americans Tommie Smith and John Carlos, gold and bronze medalists in the 200-m race, stood with their heads bowed and a black-gloved hand raised as the American National Anthem played during the victory ceremony.[7] Millions around the world watched live at one of the-first-ever color-TV telecast. Many more shared the collective memory of John Dominis's famous photograph, which raised American racial relations to prominence.

A direct line can be drawn from Carlos's and Smith's protest in Mexico[8] to one of the darkest hours of world sports four years later. During the 1972 Munich Olympic Games, the Palestinian terror group Black September took the Israeli national team hostage, eventually murdering 11 team members (five athletes, two referees, and four coaches) and one German police officer after a 16-hour live television[9] standoff. As an estimated 800 million people watched in horror, America's ABC network broadcaster, Jim McKay, broke the news: "My father used to say our greatest hopes and our worst fears are seldom

realized. They're all gone [the hostages]." For the first time in modern Olympic history, competition was suspended for a memorial service held in the Olympic Stadium, which was attended by 80,000 spectators and 3,000 athletes.

Black September[10] was unfortunately remarkably successful in terms of transmitting news of its terrorist incident. The terrorist group had chosen to act at the Olympics because it knew that communication resources had been set up at the games to reach a global audience. For the first time, many people learned about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict or that there were groups willing to resort to violence for the Palestinian cause. From the terrorists' perspective, they must not only stage the incident but also ensure the availability of communications to transmit that incident to a global audience. Mohammad Daoud Oudeh (better known as Abu Daud), who orchestrated the attack on the Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympic Games, later admitted that:

> We recognized that sport is the modern religion of the Western world. We knew that the people in England and America would switch their television sets from any program about the plight of the Palestinians if there was a sporting event on another channel. So we decided to use their Olympics, the most sacred ceremony of this religion, to make the world pay attention to us. We offered up human sacrifices to your gods of sport and television. And they answered our prayers. From Munich onwards, nobody could ignore the Palestinians or their cause.[11]

Furthermore, Black September issued the following announcement a week after the killings:

> In our assessment, and in light of the result, we have made one of the best achievements of Palestinian commando action. A bomb in the White House, a mine in the Vatican, the death of Mao Tse-tung, an earthquake in Paris could not have echoed through the consciousness of every man in the world like the operation at Munich. The Olympiad arouses the people's interest and attention more than anything else in the world. The choice of the Olympics, from the purely propagandistic viewpoint was 100% successful. It was like painting the name of Palestine on a mountain that can be seen from the four corners of the earth.[12]

The Munich massacre proved that sporting events, particularly those with global appeal, were an obvious terrorist target, as such attacks will attract the attention of the world to the particular terrorist cause. Many terrorist organizations realized the potentials of mass-mediated terrorism in terms of effectively reaching huge audiences. Weimann and Winn's study examined 6,714 incidents of international terrorism from the late 1960s to the early 1990s. Their analysis revealed a significant increase in terrorist acts that involved media-oriented contemplations (in choice of victims, location, timing, form of action, and contact with media). Bell argued: "It has become more alluring for the frantic few to appear on the world stage of television than remain obscure guerrillas of the bush."[13] Terrorist theory increasingly realized the potential of mass media. Acts of terrorism were more often perceived as means of persuasion and psychological warfare, in which the victim is "the skin on a drum beaten to achieve a calculated impact on a wider audience."[14]

The Second Act

On 15 June 1996, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), which was waging a war against the British government by terror tactics, exploded a bomb. The PIRA's aim was for the British government to give up control of Northern Ireland in favor of a unified Ireland. In the 1970s, the PIRA started its campaign of terrorism in both the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland. The PIRA procedure of pre-warning an attack, aligned with Jenkins's initial assumption, happened in the British city of Manchester on the morning of the attack.[15] Despite the early hour, an estimated 75,000 to 80,000 people were already shopping, working, and touring in the center of town. At the time of the evacuation, England was hosting Euro '96 (the European Football championship), with a game between Germany and Russia due to be played at Old Trafford the following day.

In the United States, on 27 July 1996, an anonymous 911 call warned that a bomb would explode in Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta, during the summer Olympic Games. The caller said: "There is a bomb in Centennial Park. You have 30 minutes." The call was later determined to have been made from a pay phone near the park. A pipe bomb packed with nails and screws hidden inside a backpack exploded 30 minutes later where a crowd had gathered for a concert. The explosion killed one person and wounded more than 100 others. A cameraman also died of a heart attack while running to cover the event. President Bill Clinton denounced the explosion as an "evil act of terror" and the Games continued as planned. Security guard Richard Jewell, who discovered the bag, was initially falsely implicated in the bombing. It took until 2003 for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to indict Eric Rudolph, a former explosives expert for the United States Army, who believed that "the conception and purpose of the so-called Olympic movement is to promote the values of global socialism" and had hoped to "confound, anger and embarrass the Washington government in the eyes of the world for its abominable sanctioning of abortion on demand."

On 5 April 1997, around 60,000 spectators attending England's famous horse race, the Grand National, were evacuated after bomb threats, reportedly from the PIRA. The race was delayed for 48 hours after the police finished their inspection.

All three of these terrorist attacks meant that sponsors' exhibits, presentation areas, live sites, parks where the public gathered to celebrate the Olympics, football festivities, or race track exhibitions were just as vulnerable to terrorism as (Olympic) stadiums and also needed protection.[16] As Tarlow[17] explained, there are several logistical reasons why sports events at the turn of the century became such attractive targets. Spectator numbers and flows make it difficult to physically identify terrorists; the proximity of events to transportation hubs allow quick escape routes; and event-associated hospitality sectors (such as live sites, hotels, and restaurants) have the potential to be affected, spreading the reach and impact of a sports-related terrorist incident.

9/11: A Game Changer

While many other sports-related terror attacks became widespread on a global scale,[18] most (168 incidents from 1972 to 2004[19]) did not catch the public eye. However, the events of 11 September 2001 (now known as 9/11) turned our worst nightmares into reality. Al Qaeda terrorists hijacked a number of passenger airlines, two of which were intentionally flown into the upper floors of New York City's Twin Towers at the World Trade Center, bringing them crashing down, killing and seriously wounding thousands. One can speculate that the World Trade Center was chosen not only because it was packed with

people, but also because it was a widely recognized, iconic symbol of U.S. global commercial domination. Likewise, sporting mega-events, such as the Olympic Games and the Football World Cup, not only offer large concentrations of people but are also highly symbolic of national prestige and power. In the immediate aftershock of the attack on the Twin Towers, major sporting events hosted in the United States (the World Series, the Super Bowl, and the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City) were subject to security conditions that never had seen before anywhere in the world.[20] For example, the American organizers of the Olympic Games instituted two measures then unique to game security: A 52-mile no-fly zone was imposed around the entire Games site, and sharpshooters were placed on various mountaintop positions to protect specific competition venues.

Such measures became standard. The increased threat of terrorism brought risk management to the forefront of mega-sport event planning and resulted in a range of new security measures for sport spectators and tougher safety standards for organizers. The 2006 Super Bowl in Detroit offers a particular example of such measures involving one of the largest security operations in U.S. history:

> Inside the ring of steel, fans were screened by metal and radiation detectors; special security forces and bomb disposal teams were on standby; computer-linked high-resolution CCTV was utilized along with real-time satellite imagery to allow instant response; and the area was guarded by 10,000 police and private security guards.[21]

Outside the United States, the decade after 9/11 saw full terror incidents on almost every continent. On 1 May 2002, the European Championship Soccer Cup semi-final match between Spanish rivals Real Madrid and Barcelona was rocked by a car bomb explosion near Bernabeu Stadium, just hours before the match. The motive of the attack was not immediately clear, but 11 members of the Batasuna group (linked to Euskadi Ta Askatasuna [ETA]) were arrested. The match went on after sufficient security checks. A week later, on 8 May 2002, the New Zealand cricket team canceled its tour of Pakistan midway through, after a suicide bomber attacked outside the Sheraton Hotel in Karachi where the team was staying. Fourteen people were killed, including 11 French Navy experts, two Pakistanis, and the Pakistani team's physiotherapist. In 2006, the chief of Iraq's Olympic Committee and 30 athletes and officials were kidnapped from a sports conference in Baghdad by 50 gunmen. On 17 May, the Iraqi taekwondo team of 15 was kidnapped while traveling for a competition in Jordan. The team was never found. In the same month, a gunmen killed Iraqi's team tennis coach and two players. The 2008 Dakar Rally off-road race was cancelled after the threat of an Al Qaeda attack. It was the first time in the race's 30-year history that it was cancelled. Three months later, a suicide bomber attacked the Sinhala and Tamil New Year marathon in Sri-Lanka, killing 15 athletes and injuring 90 others. The Sri Lankan government held the militant group Tamil Tigers responsible for the attack. Eleven month later, in March 2009, the Sri Lankan cricket team bus was attacked by gunmen while on its way to a match in Lahore. The gunmen attacked the bus with rockets and grenades, and fired many rounds of ammunition. Six policemen and two civilians were killed, and six players of the Sri Lankan team were seriously injured. A militant group closely associated with Al Qaeda was believed to have carried out the attack.[22]

These global incidents, among many others, proved how vulnerable large sporting events are to terrorist attacks. High-profile coverage news coverage boosts terrorist groups' attempts to use these events to leverage their political and religious agenda.

The Third Act

On 15 April 2013, the Boston Marathon ended abruptly and frighteningly when two bombs went off near the finish line. Three people were killed, and 264 were injured by detonated explosives that had been packed into pressure cookers, then stuffed into ordinary black backpacks and walked to the site by unassuming-looking young men. A few days later, what followed was something unprecedented in the United States: a complete lockdown of the city of Boston.[23]

Political commentator Chemi Salev,[24] writing in the Israeli *Haaretz* newspaper, days after the Boston attacks, assessed the erupting panic in the aftermath of the Boston bombing. He wrote: "This was terrorism's great victory, its spectacular triumph, and its abhorrently glorious day in the sun. Never, in the history of violence aimed at innocent civilians, have the lives of so many been disrupted so much by the relatively amateurish actions of so few."

After the two bombs detonated at the Boston Marathon Finish area at 18:50 GMT (14:50 Boston time), news spread quickly through social media. Reports almost instantly showed up on Twitter. It highlighted the incredible effectiveness of social media in general, and Twitter in particular, as a source of breaking news.

There were more than 3.5 million Boston Marathon–related tweets during the first 24 hours. Figure 1 shows that the initial level of Boston Marathon social media mentions averaged around 10,000 per hour. By 19:00 GMT, 10 minutes after the first bomb exploded the number of mentions had reached almost 750,000, highlighting how effective news was picked up and shared via social media in the short span of time during and immediately after the event. By 8 p.m. GMT, social media mentions peaked at slightly fewer than 900,000, falling continuously thereafter.[25]

However, despite the rapidity of Twitter and other social media platforms in spreading news, some inevitable drawbacks can occur. Media coverage of collective traumas may trigger psychological distress in individuals outside the immediate community. Holman et al. examined if repeated media exposure to the Boston Marathon bombings was associated with acute stress and compared the impact of direct exposure (being at/near



Figure 1. Boston Marathon social media mentions.

the bombings) versus media exposure (bombing-related television, radio, print, online, and social media coverage) on acute stress. They conducted an Internet-based survey two to four weeks after the bombings with a nationally representative sample and representative subsamples from Boston and New York (4,675 adults). According to their findings, repeated bombing-related media exposure was associated with higher acute stress than was direct exposure. Therefore, media coverage following collective trauma can widely spread acute stress.[26]

Summary and Conclusions

This article's main argument is that terrorism has wide-reaching implications at social, political, and psychological levels. While there is still no universally accepted definition of terrorism, it is commonly agreed that terror attacks are a military strategy that hopes to change the political situation by spreading fear, rather than by causing material damage. Scholars believe there are elements common to most terrorist acts. First, they are usually committed by groups who do not possess the political power to change policies they believe are insupportable. Second, terrorists often justify their acts on ideological or religious grounds, arguing that they are responding, not to existing laws, but trying to right a greater wrong or promote a greater good. Third, targets are selected to maximize negative psychological effects on societies or governments.[27]

The current article documents and analyzes the development of interactions between terror acts and two major entities: Sports and the media. Sports are often used as a tool to convey political statements. Linking political statements to terrorism, Atkinson and Young provide a general explanation of the interconnection between sports and terrorism:

> For many reasons, individual terrorists or terrorist organizations might find suitable targets in athletes participating in games, spectators attending the events, or selected corporate sponsors of sports contests. Especially in those situations where athletic contests draw sizeable international audiences in geographical settings already embroiled in strife, sport can be utilized as a vehicle for political sparring, and waging and disseminating forms of political violence against others.[28]

Terrorist organizations around the world realized the potentials of mass-mediated terrorism in terms of effectively reaching huge audiences. Some scholars even argue that without the media, there would likely be no modern terrorism.[29] Accordingly, it is not surprising that large sporting events with global appeal and mass spectatorship are desired targets. At the same time, spectator numbers and flows make it difficult to physically identify terrorists; the proximity of events to transportation hubs allows quick escape routes; and event-associated hospitality sectors can be affected, spreading the reach and impact of a sporting terrorist incident.

The symbiotic relationship between media and terrorism is often discussed from a mutual-benefit perspective. As Rohner and Frey argue:

> Terrorist attacks are a particular form of communication by terrorist groups. The media are used as a platform for securing a broad dissemination of the terrorists' ideology. The media benefit from terrorism, as reports of terror attacks increase newspaper sales and the number of television viewers. There is a common-interest-game, whereby both the media and terrorists benefit

> from terrorist incidents and where both parties adjust their actions according to the actions of the other player.[30]

After 9/11, the concern surrounding terrorist attacks increased, along with new risk and security strategies at sporting events. This was particularly evident at the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games and the 2002 *Fédération Internationale de Football Association* (FIFA) World Cup. New antiterrorist measures were implemented, such as improving airport security, flying fighter-jet patrols over no-fly zones above stadiums, stationing sharpshooters and undercover operatives in strategic places on the lookout for suicide bombers, and collaborating with foreign governments and national and international agencies. Consequently, sporting events have necessitated larger security budgets.[31] Reviewing the assets that are vulnerable to attack during Olympic events, particularly the 2012 Olympics in London, Johnson asserted:

> Successful security operations at recent games raise questions about whether the high levels of expenditure are proportionate to the high levels of threat. . . . Given that we cannot afford to meet all potential security threats, we must allocate finite resources to address those threats that are most likely or which pose the greatest consequences. However, the dynamic political and social context for many games makes it difficult to validate the findings of any security risk assessment. There will therefore continue to be great uncertainty about the sufficiency of security measures for future Games.[32]

The social media tools that helped[33] fight such threats and fears after the Boston Marathon bombings have also proven to be a double-edged sword. Major events now often use hashtags, such as #WorldCup2014, that allow Twitter users to easily search for related content. ISIS hijacked World Cup hashtags in English and Arabic to share pro-ISIS content, in addition to using various ISIS-specific hashtags as well.[34]

As the world becomes more interconnected, it is inevitable that the risk of terrorism at major sporting events will continue, if not increase, in frequency. This risk may be combated to a large degree by cooperation between civilians, multinational corporations, and foreign governments at such an event. However, it is possible that terrorist groups will look to lower-security venues in order to convey their symbolic sentiments, as was the case with the Damaturu bombing in Nigeria in 2014.[35]

What does the future hold? As British terrorism scholar Paul Wilkinson put it, "Fighting terrorism is like being a goalkeeper. You can make a hundred brilliant saves, but the only shot people remember is the one that gets past you." Broadcasted mega-events allow people to alleviate their daily frustrations by superseding much deeper collective sentiments: the pride of belonging in a community of winners. Sporting failure or attacks on athletic personalities may also seriously affect the reputation of political leadership, ultimately undermining the state's authority. This is the very reason why international terrorism groups will continue aiming at such major athletic celebrations to perpetrate their attacks. Damaging the public image of the hosting country has extensive negative effects and might lead to political destabilization.[36]

Notes

1. Gabriel Weimann, *Terror on the Internet: The New Arena. The New Challenges* (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace [USIP] Press, 2006).

2. Yuval Noah Harari, "The Theatre of Terror." Available at http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/jan/31/terrorism-spectacle-how-states-respond-yuval-noah-harari-sapiens (accessed May 2015).

3. Among them: Gabriel Weimann and Conrad Winn, *The Theater of Terror: Mass Media and International Terrorism* (New York: Longman, 1994).

4. Brian M. Jenkins, *International Terrorism* (Los Angeles: Crescent Publication, 1975), p. 4.

5. Brian M. Jenkins, "The New Age of Terrorism," in D. G. Kamien, ed., *The McGraw Hill Homeland Security Handbook* (McGraw-Hill Professional, 2006), p. 119.

6. Ami Ayalon, Elad Popovich, and Moran Yarchi, "From Warfare to Imagefare: How States Should Manage Asymmetric Conflicts with Extensive Media Coverage," *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2014), pp. 1–20; Moran Yarchi, "The Effect of Female Suicide Attacks on Foreign Media Framing of Conflicts: The Case of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 37(8) (2014), pp. 674–688.

7. At a press conference after the event, Tommie Smith, who holds seven world records, said: "If I win, I am an American, not a black American. But if I did something bad, then they would say 'a Negro.' We are black and we are proud of being black. Black America will understand what we did tonight."

8. What is less remembered is that before the 1968 Olympic Games, thousands of students took to the streets in Mexico City to protest against President Diaz Ordaz's totalitarian government's social and economic policies and what they perceived as the waste of resources lavished on the Olympics. Matters came to a head on 2 October, when, barely a week before the Games started, hundreds of student protesters were gunned down in cold blood by Mexican security forces in Plaza de las Tres Culturas in the Tlateloloco district of Mexico City. K. Witherspoon, *Before the Eyes of the World. Mexico and the 1968 Olympic Games* (Champaign: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008).

9. Consequently, the terrorists were able to watch the police prepare their attacks.

10. Although it has yet to be proven, this implied that Black September had received assistance from the Baader-Meinhof terror group. This connection offered the first evidence that under certain circumstances, domestic and international political issues could come together to threaten the security of the Olympics. John Sugden, "Watched by the Games: Surveillance and Security at the Olympics," *International Review for the Sociology of Sport* 47(3) (2012), pp. 414–429.

11. C. Dobson and R. Paine, *The Carlos Complex: A Pattern of Violence* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977).

12. Alan M. Dershowitz, *Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 46.

13. J. B. Bell, "Terrorist Script and Live-Action Spectaculars," *Columbia Journalism Review*, 17(1) (May–June 1978), pp. 47–50.

14. A. Schmid and J. de Graaf, *Violence as Communication* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), quoted in Weimann, *Terror on the Internet*.

15. Five days after the blast, the PIRA issued a statement in which it claimed responsibility but regretted causing injury to civilians.

16. K. Toohey and A. J. Veal, *The Olympic Games. A Social Science Perspective*, 2nd ed. (Wallingford, Oxford: CABI Press, 2007).

17. P. E. Tarlow, *Event Risk Management and Safety* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2002).

18. An example is the Olympic stadium in Stockholm in 1997, which was severely damaged by a terrorist bomb planted by a group opposed to a Swedish bid for the 2004 Olympic Games that was ultimately awarded to Athens.

19. K. Clark, "Targeting the Olympics," *U.S. News and World Report*, 14 June 2004, p. 34.

20. John Sugden, "Watched by the Games: Surveillance and Security at the Olympics," *International Review for the Sociology of Sport* 47(3) (2012).

21. J. Coaffee and D. Murakami Wood, "Security is Coming Home. Rethinking Scale and Constructing Resilience in the Global Urban Response to Terrorist Risk," *International Relations* 20(4) (2006), pp. 503–517.

22. IBNlive.com, "Ten sporting events that came under terror attack." Available at http://ibnlive.in.com/news/ten-sporting-events-that-came-under-terror-attack/385649-5-23.html (accessed 25 April 2015).

23. Christine Sylvester, "TerrorWars: Boston, Iraq," *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 7(1) (2013), pp. 11–23.

24. Chemi Salev, "The Boston Bombers have Already Scored a Tremendous Victory for Terror," *Haaretz*. Available at http://www.haaretz.com/blogs/west-of-eden/the-boston-bombers-have-already-scored-a-tremendous-victory-for-terror.premium-1.516532 (accessed 12 April 2015).

25. "Social Media use at the Boston Marathon." Available at http://www.mediameasurement.com/social-media-boston-bombing (accessed 10 January 2015).

26. E. Alison Holman, Dana Rose Garfin, and Roxane Cohen Silver, "Media's Role in Broadcasting Acute Stress Following the Boston Marathon Bombings," *PNAS* 111(1) (2014), pp. 93–98.

27. Constitutional Rights Foundation, "America Responds to Terrorism: What is Terrorism?" Available at http://www.crf-usa.org/terror/America%20Responds%20 to%20Terrorism.htm (accessed 12 April 2015).

28. Michael Atkinson and Kevin Young, "Political Violence, Terrorism, and Security at the Olympic Games," in K. Young and K. B. Wamsley, eds., *Global Olympics: Historical and Sociological Studies of the Modern Games* (Oxford: Elsevier, 2005), pp. 269–274.

29. J. N. Shurkin, "Terrorism and the Media," in B. Bongar et al., eds., *Psychology of Terrorism.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 82.

30. Dominic Rohner and Bruno S. Frey, "Blood and Ink! The Common-Interest Game between Terrorists and the Media," *Public Choice* 133(1–2) (2007), pp. 129–145.

31. Red24.com, "Terrorism and the World Cup." Available at https://opinion.red24.com/2014/07/01/terrorism-and-sports-world-cup (accessed 25 April 2015).

32. Chris Johnson, "A Brief Overview of Technical and Organisational Security at Olympic Events." Available at http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/johnson/papers/CW_Johnson_Olympics.pdf (accessed May 2015).

33. Google launched a special person-finder tool to facilitate news about individuals. In addition, Boston authorities made full use of social media, especially Twitter, to inform and advise people on developments and what to do. Boston police also used Twitter to ask people to submit any footage they had from the marathon and, specifically, the explosions. This shows the positive potential social media and the Internet have during events such as this. The quickly established #BostonHelp was used to tweet important information and updates about where help and support was available. This was particularly aimed at people in locked-down areas, or runners stranded in Boston, offering food and places to sleep. Available at http://www.mediameasurement.com/social-media-boston-bombing/ (accessed 10 January 2015).

34. AFP, "How Isis used Twitter and the World Cup to spread its terror." Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10923046/How-Isis-used-Twitter-and-the-World-Cup-to-spread-its-terror.html (accessed 25 April 2015).

35. On 17 June 2014, a bomb detonated at a FIFA World Cup viewing place in Damaturu, Nigeria, killing 21 people and leaving scores injured. Taking advantage of the international spotlight surrounding the sporting event, this terrorist attack prompts a distinct recollection of the attacks committed by al-Shabaab militants in Uganda during the 2010 World Cup final, which left 74 people dead. However, this narrative is not limited to these relatively insecure nations.

36. Maximiliano E. Korstanje, Rodanthi Tzanelli, and Anthony Clayton, "Brazilian World Cup 2014: Terrorism, Tourism, and Social Conflict," *Event Management* 18(4) (2014), pp. 487–491.