


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### Disaggregating and Defeating Terrorist Safe Havens

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**Disaggregating and Defeating Terrorist Safe Havens**

I am very concerned about Syria becoming an enclave for extremists, because extremists thrive in chaos. They thrive in failed states. They thrive in power vacuums. They don't have much to offer when it comes to actually building things, but they're very good about exploiting situations that are no longer functioning. They fill that gap.

- President Barack Obama, March 2013<sup>1</sup>

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**Abstract.** *Terrorist organizations' physical safe havens continue to shape the terrorist threat to the United States by extending the groups' longevity and increasing the threat they pose. As a result, eliminating terrorist safe havens has been a key component of U.S. counterterrorism policy since at least 2001. However, some scholars challenged the post-9/11 policy consensus that terrorists find sanctuary in weak states and so-called "ungoverned spaces." This article seeks to bridge this gap between scholarship and policy by offering a typology for disaggregating different kinds of terrorist safe havens. Our typology operates on two axes based on host government will, i.e. the host government's posture toward each group with haven inside its borders, as well as government capability, specifically whether the host government possesses the specific capabilities needed to oust each group. This intersection of will and capability produces three types of havens. We briefly illustrate each type of haven using the exemplar case study of Pakistan—a location often described as an overarching safe haven, but which is actually home to several sanctuaries—and offer policy recommendations for addressing them. A need exists to disaggregate and identify how the United States can approach haven elimination. This typology and the analysis that stems from it offer a starting point for devising such strategies.*

Terrorist organizations that have posed the greatest threat to their adversaries over the longest period of time share one characteristic that has little to do with their ideology, size or goals: they possessed a safe haven.<sup>ii</sup> Haven allowed ideologically distinct groups from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, an ethno-nationalist separatist organization, to the FARC in Colombia, a leftist group, to al-Qaida, a transnational Sunni jihadist organization, to flourish violently. Havens allowed the Red Army Faction (RAF) to terrorize West Germany for nearly three decades with only a few dozen members at any one time. Haven allowed insurgent groups such as the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network a place to rest and recuperate.<sup>iii</sup> These safe places provide groups the ability to dictate the pace of operations and retain the offensive or, conversely, to recover from disruptions and hide from mounting pressure.<sup>iv</sup> Of the fifty-eight groups designated by the United States as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO), at least thirty-nine enjoy at least one haven.<sup>v</sup> The most capable and resilient terrorist organizations operating today—including Hezbollah, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, the Haqqani Network, FARC, and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb—all have well-established sanctuaries and show no signs of relinquishing these sanctuaries. The continued unrest in Libya, Syria, and Iraq and the potential for safe havens to emerge in those spaces forces policy-makers to ask: Where is the next terrorist frontier? Where will the next sanctuary emerge from which terrorist groups can thrive?<sup>vi</sup>

Despite dominating the attention of military planners, policy-makers, and scholars in the years following the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> (hereafter 9/11), discussions of safe havens often obscure more than they reveal. Safe havens are diverse entities. Thus, any attempt at devising policy to eradicate them must do so in a way that is appropriate to each haven. To assist academics and policymakers in this task, we put forward a typology for understanding safe

havens as the product of a dynamic relationship between government capacity and will vis-à-vis individual terrorist groups. This typology accounts for the interplay of both variables – capacity (the “how” of safe haven formation), and government willingness (the crucial “why” of safe haven formation). Understanding these two distinct axes will allow policy to move beyond a focus simply on coercive tactics or on building state capacity to confront safe havens.<sup>vii</sup>

Then, delving into the types of safe haven, this article will briefly illustrate examples of various types of havens that co-exist within one country: Pakistan. As a single state encompassing multiple distinct and quite different types of safe havens, Pakistan serves as an example of the need to disaggregate havens and the importance of applying the typology before constructing policy. The article will conclude with policy recommendations for the United States to eradicate or degrade each different kind of safe haven in Pakistan and other locales of interest for the U.S. government.

## **Defining Key Concepts**

Inconsistencies in the definitions of terrorism, safe havens, and weak states have contributed to the debates within the research program about the relationship between terrorist safe havens and weak states.<sup>viii</sup> First, terrorism is a notoriously difficult concept to define. For the purposes of this article, terrorism is defined according to terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman’s definition as a “fundamentally and inherently political” act that is “planned, calculated, and indeed systematic.”<sup>ix</sup> He outlines five components of terrorism: 1) political aims and motives; 2) use of violence or threats of violence; 3) violence intended to have psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target; 4) perpetrators who are part of an organization with an identifiable chain of command, cell or ideologically motivated collection of individuals; and 5)

perpetrators who are part of a subnational group or non-state entity.<sup>x</sup> This definition contains no judgment about the justness of the cause and the validity of violence; rather it focuses on terrorism as a violent tactic employed by non-state actors in pursuit of political aims.

Second, the challenge of pinpointing the places and spaces that constitute a safe haven has complicated this research program to the detriment of understanding this phenomenon.<sup>xi</sup> Important works on the topic, like Campana and Ducol's "Rethinking Terrorist Safe Havens" and Innes's "Terrorist Sanctuaries and Bosnia-Herzegovina" point out shortfalls with the common usage and contest the discourse surrounding havens, but do not offer an alternative definition.<sup>xii</sup> Other influential works, such as Edward Newman's "Weak States, State Failure and Terrorism" and Stewart Patrick's "Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction" broadly tackle whether and how terrorist groups operate in weak states, but do not specifically define sanctuaries or distinguish safe havens from other places where groups operate.<sup>xiii</sup>

The greatest shortfall in definitions is the dearth of attention on the importance of a haven's vulnerability to counterterrorist action. The U.S. Government uses several definitions of safe havens, and they all highlight that havens exist where groups have freedom to undertake core support activities *with relative security or limited fear of counterterrorism action*.<sup>xiv</sup> Academic works that define sanctuaries have frequently overlooked this second defining component. In his work on "Black Holes," Rem Korteweg defines terrorist sanctuaries simply as "areas in which non-state militant organizations are able to undertake activities in support of terrorist operations."<sup>xv</sup> Similarly, Cristiana C. Brafman Kittner's scholarship on Islamic terrorist havens defines them as "geographic spaces where Islamist terrorists are able to successfully establish an organization and operation base" to conduct activities.<sup>xvi</sup> Consistent with the U.S.

government definitions, we argue that it is critical to understand havens as places in which terrorist groups can operate without fear of counterterror retaliation or pressure.

There are as many places and ways to hide as there are ways to define them.<sup>xvii</sup> Two additional aspects of the safe haven definitional debate are important to address: the distinction between “bases or areas of operation”—a vaguely defined catchall term employed by the Department of State and some academic works<sup>xviii</sup>—and safe havens, and the distinction between physical and virtual safe havens.

Safe havens differ from areas of operations in that they afford relative security, whereas in areas of operations, groups typically experience counterterrorism pressure that causes fear and, consequently, limits their activities. Secondly, terrorist groups engage primarily in *support* activities in safe havens, including training, recruitment, fund raising, and communications, which largely precludes conducting terrorist attacks *within* the haven. When terrorist groups regularly conduct attacks in an area—excluding those intended to raise funds—the area shifts from being a safe haven to an area of operations or active conflict zone. Conducting attacks increases the likelihood that groups will experience pressure and thus removes the security that defines a haven.

The debate continues as to whether terrorist groups still even need a physical space to train, equip, and recruit. Some even argue that the United States, in its treatment of safe havens, has an “obsession with physical space at the expense of virtual space.”<sup>xix</sup> This argument posits that extremists can use the Internet to perform some of the functions of a sanctuary, such as some communications, radicalization, and training, potentially eliminating the need for physical haven.

Rather than being an asset, some contend that havens make terrorist groups more vulnerable.<sup>xx</sup> This article, however, argues that the groups that will best be able to withstand hostile governments' counterterrorism efforts, maintain their operational tempo, and thereby pose a threat and survive over the long term require physical space.<sup>xxi</sup> These need not be large-scale sanctuaries; indeed, the size of the haven required is contingent on the size of the group seeking haven. But direct, face-to-face interactions in a haven reduce the communication and operational security risks that complicate Internet interactions and they facilitate a degree of trust that is practically impossible through Internet interactions alone. Moreover, terrorist groups that possess havens can more efficiently manage resources and execute command and control over their members and the type and tempo of violence.<sup>xxii</sup> Lastly, groups with sanctuaries are more effective at forging alliances with other terrorist organizations, which can thereby increase the terrorist threat.<sup>xxiii</sup> Therefore, while the Internet clearly has utility for fundraising and recruiting, it has not replaced the need for physical sanctuaries.

Third, what this article refers to as "weak states" encompasses a variety of common terms, such as fragile states, crisis states, post-conflict states, failing states, and failed states.<sup>xxiv</sup> Multiple criteria and definitions of weak states exist,<sup>xxv</sup> though a common thread among them is the idea that these states experience systemic weakness.<sup>xxvi</sup> For example, the Brookings Institution's Index of State Weakness in the Developing World, developed by National Security Advisor Susan Rice and Stewart Patrick, defines state weakness as:

[c]ountries that lack the essential capacity and/or will to fulfill four sets of critical government responsibilities: fostering an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable economic growth; establishing and maintaining legitimate, transparent, and

accountable political institutions; securing their populations from violent conflict and controlling their territory; and meeting the basic human needs of their population.<sup>xxvii</sup>

Key features of weak states usually include: 1) a government's inability or refusal to ensure security within and on its borders; 2) a failure to provide basic services to the populace; and 3) a lack of legitimacy among the populace.<sup>xxviii</sup> Weakness operates along a spectrum, with the weakest states often considered failed states.<sup>xxix</sup>

Policy makers have focused on the potential for terrorist sanctuaries to emerge in “ungoverned spaces,” or “under-governed spaces” where weak, but internationally recognized, sovereign authorities abdicate responsibility to other actors.<sup>xxx</sup> U.S. counterterrorism doctrine, such as in the 2006 and 2010 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, declared that, “[w]e will continue to prevent terrorists from exploiting ungoverned or under-governed areas as safe havens – secure spaces that allow our enemies to plan, organize, train, and prepare for operations.”<sup>xxxi</sup> As early as 2003, the National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism pledged that “[t]he United States will work in concert with our international and regional partners to ensure effective governance over ungoverned territory, which could provide sanctuary to terrorists.”<sup>xxxii</sup> The Department of Defense launched an Ungoverned Areas Project, which concluded, “all ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, and contested areas are *potential safe havens*.”<sup>xxxiii</sup>

No one pathway to state weakness exists. States can be chronically weak or rapidly collapse from crises; inherently weak because of geographic, physical or economic reasons; circumstantially weak due to a confluence of threats, natural or manmade; or dangerously weak

or safely weak.<sup>xxxiv</sup> In addition, groups can—and have—found sanctuary in strong, liberal states. For example, Basque ethno-nationalist separatists found haven in neighboring France until relatively recently.<sup>xxxv</sup> Liberal democracies sometimes possess exploitable vulnerabilities or lack the will to oust groups, as evidenced by the notorious development of “Londonistan.”<sup>xxxvi</sup> However, predictions that the *banlieues* of Paris were more likely to become terrorist group sanctuaries than so-called “ungoverned areas,” such as the slums of Karachi or vast expanses of the Sahara, have not materialized; instead, havens in the latter locations have expanded and deepened.<sup>xxxvii</sup>

In summary, safe havens are not places where terrorist groups live in constant fear of detection or clash with their enemies. Nor are they where sleeper cells reside while waiting for orders to engage in terrorist activities. Instead, havens exist where groups have freedom to undertake support activities with relative security or limited fear of counterterrorism action. In the current international environment, terrorist groups that pose the greatest threat to U.S. security have found haven in weak states.<sup>xxxviii</sup> Even so, not all of these havens are solely or primarily a product of a lack of governance, which points to a need for a more nuanced way to understand the different types of havens. Moreover, even when havens exist in areas lacking in central governance, more governance may not be the solution.

### **Bridging Policy and Scholarship**

Following the Cold War, central governments that lacked control over their territory and did not provide vital services to their populations could no longer rely on powerful benefactors; as a result, the number of weak states commensurately increased.<sup>xxxix</sup> As early as 1998, the U.S.

National Security Strategy recognized that threats could emanate from these places, though the threats were generally determined to be of a development or human rights nature—not a geostrategic or homeland security concern.<sup>xi</sup> The 9/11 attacks dramatically changed this perception. Post-9/11, concerns proliferated that weak states posed a multitude of threats to U.S. security, including, but not limited to, offering an environment conducive to terrorist sanctuaries. Afghanistan served as a cautionary tale of the perils of ignoring weak states or viewing them solely as humanitarian problems.

Thirteen years after the attacks of 9/11, few large-scale safe havens sponsored by states—like those seen in South Yemen, Sudan, and Afghanistan between 1970 until 2001—currently operate. To varying degrees, these governments both actively supported the havens in their borders and possessed the capacity to eradicate them. With the decline of such terrorist sanctuaries in the post-9/11 environment, diagnoses of terrorist safe havens have focused on government capacity failures, primarily in weak states and so-called “ungoverned spaces.”<sup>xli</sup>

Most notably asserted in the 9/11 Commission Report, a conventional wisdom emerged after 9/11 that “terrorist organizations fled to some of the least governed, most lawless places in the world.”<sup>xlii</sup> Multiple National Security Strategies concurred with this assessment.<sup>xliii</sup>

Al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates and adherents rely on the physical sanctuary of ungoverned or poorly governed territories, where the absence of state control permits terrorists to travel, train, and engage in plotting. In close coordination with foreign partners, the United States will continue to contest and diminish al-Qa‘ida’s operating space through mutually reinforcing efforts designed to prevent al-Qa‘ida from taking advantage of these

ungoverned spaces... Our challenge is to break this cycle of state failure to constrict the space available to terrorist networks.<sup>xliv</sup>

The Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security likewise argued that “[i]llicit transnational networks, particularly terrorist and criminal groups, exploit weak states for the porous borders and minimal law enforcement that allow easy movement of money, people, drugs, and weapons.”<sup>xlv</sup> Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev asserted that “[t]oday’s terrorist does not need a strong state to provide funding and supplies. Rather it seeks a weak state that cannot impede a group’s freedom of action, but has the veneer of state sovereignty that prevents other, stronger states from taking effective counterterrorism measures.”<sup>xlvi</sup> National Security Advisor Susan Rice and her co-authors Graff and Pascuel likewise argued that:

[p]oor, weak, or conflict-prone states provide an ideal environment for a global organization in the business of producing large-scale terrorist attacks... In view of its [al-Qaeda’s] considerable infrastructure needs, the organization has sought appropriate locales in which to train bombers and store contraband, set up communication hubs, coordinate the activities of local cells in various countries, and establish at least rudimentary business operations, transshipment points, and traffic routes to generate income. *Poor, weak states with inadequate border and territorial controls fit the bill. They serve as a sanctuary for violent extremist groups and their cells and hubs and lack legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens.*<sup>xlvii</sup> (emphasis added)

Policymakers across the ideological spectrum concurred that weak states pose a threat to U.S. security, particularly by hosting terrorist groups. Similar to President Obama’s concern

about terrorists' exploitation of failed states and power vacuums, former President Bush asserted, "America is now less threatened by conquering states than we are by failing ones."<sup>xlvi</sup> The Director of the CIA under President Bush likewise warned of "[c]hallenges such as the world's vast stretches of ungoverned areas—lawless zones, veritable "no man's lands" like some areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border—where extremist movements find shelter and can win the breathing space to grow."<sup>xlvi</sup> The 2006 National Security Strategy cautioned that:

[r]egional conflicts can arise from a wide variety of causes, including poor governance, external aggression, competing claims, internal revolt, tribal rivalries, and ethnic or religious hatreds. If left unaddressed, however, these different causes lead to the same ends: failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists.<sup>1</sup>

The policy consensus surrounding the idea that terrorist threats emanate from weak states is remarkable at a time when few other issues have enjoyed support from both sides of the political aisle.

Scholarship challenging the policy zeitgeist that weak, especially failed, states act as terrorist incubators soon followed. Some scholars went so far as to call the argument a "myth," or "self-fulfilling prophecy."<sup>li</sup> The counterarguments ranged from the empirical fact that many weak states do not shelter terrorist groups<sup>lii</sup> to the claims that weakest states do not tend to be where terrorist groups find sanctuary.<sup>liii</sup>

Scholars criticizing the policy consensus point out that perpetually failing states, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ivory Coast, are frequently challenged by heavily armed

warring factions, which, rather than attracting terrorists, pose risks to groups seeking sanctuary. In addition, the lack of international presence in many of the weakest states can complicate foreign terrorists' ability to blend in with the local population. Without a large foreign presence in which to immerse, foreign terrorist groups may be readily identifiable as outsiders, thus complicating the secrecy that provides security in such an environment.<sup>liv</sup> Foreign terrorist groups thus may not be able to find security—one key facet of a safe haven—in the weakest states.

Other scholars stressed that the weakest states tend to lack the basic functioning foundations, particularly ready access to financial and logistical infrastructure for terrorist groups to engage in support activities, the second key facet of a safe haven. These resources tend to be more available in weak but functional states, like Pakistan and Kenya, rather than their weaker, failed neighbors, such as Afghanistan and Somalia.<sup>lv</sup>

Yet few states in the international system are truly failed and even fewer are genuinely ungoverned. Furthermore, not all weak states pose an equal likelihood of becoming a terrorist safe haven. The governments in the weak states that do host terrorist groups have varying motives and capabilities to eradicate the havens in their borders. In light of limited resources for counterterrorism responses, what kinds of safe havens exist in weak states and how can the United States take steps to eliminate them?

## **Safe Havens: At the Intersection of Political Will and Capability**

Safe havens do not automatically emerge where areas are characterized by “rugged terrain, weak governance, room to hide or receive supplies, and low population density with a town or city near enough to allow necessary interaction with the outside world.”<sup>lvi</sup> Furthermore, the idea that “all ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, and contested areas are potential safe havens” obscures more than it reveals. In fact, havens are created, perpetuated, and eradicated by people, not environmental factors. Based on the intersection of government intent and capability vis-à-vis individual terrorist groups, we propose a typology to specify the conditions that allow safe havens to form and operate, and, equally importantly, the changes required to eradicate them.

A typology based on the interaction between political will and capability highlights that havens emerge from a variety of conditions and that building the capacity of weak states only addresses one aspect needed to eliminate safe havens.<sup>lvii</sup> Moreover, building overall capability may not address the specific capacities needed to combat havens. In addition, governments’ intent and capability can shift over the lifespan of a sanctuary and will vary by the group and haven location in question.<sup>lviii</sup> Combinations of capacity and willingness intersect to produce three types of safe havens: Quadrant I: Government-Enabled Sanctuary; Quadrant II: Government-Sponsored Sanctuary; and Quadrant IV: Contested Sanctuary. Strategies to eliminate the havens must be tailored based on which Quadrant the haven falls into, allowing policy to delve into the capability and intent equation for each group’s sanctuary.

**Insert Typology here.**

*Two Axes: Capacity and Will*

Rather than judging government capacity based on overarching, state-level indicators of weakness,<sup>lix</sup> government capacity to deny safe haven should be gauged relative to the terrorist organization(s) that it faces and its capability in the specific location(s) of the group's haven for two main reasons. First, unfortunately, no uniform set of capacities will eliminate the diverse havens that exist today, as government capability cannot be assessed separate from the terrorist group(s) in the havens. Even in countries where multiple havens reside, such as Pakistan, the government needs different capabilities to combat the array of groups that find haven there. Macro-level state capacity indicators do not capture the ways that a weak government's capacity to eradicate safe haven fluctuates within its borders and varies depending on the terrorist group it faces. The government may be capable of denying haven in some parts of its territory, such as near the capital or in areas where public support for the government exists, but be less able to project into areas further afield or among disaffected subsets of the population. The type of capability required to oust a foreign organization in the border hinterlands, likely a military task, will differ from those needed to confront a predominantly domestic group, which may depend on strengthening the justice sector or rule of law. Second, some terrorist groups' capability configurations will be more adept at exploiting certain state weaknesses. Thus, overarching state-building efforts to strengthen the central government risk failing to develop the specific capabilities needed to reach those areas where terrorists find haven, and will have little impact on the problem.

A government's intent towards the resident terrorist group is also a complex variable, simplified as a spectrum ranging from support to opposition. Governments, especially weak ones, can and do attempt to disguise permissive or neutral policies by blaming their lack of capacity to avoid international censure. Assessing intent requires an in-depth understanding of the state's history, culture, adversaries, conflicts, and view of its national security. The government's intent toward the haven(s) in its territory will also depend on whether the organization is directly challenging the host government or whether it is externally focused and thus poses little threat to the host government. Governments can have a permissive policy towards one resident organization, while opposing another; therefore, intent must be calibrated for each group in each haven.

In assessing whether a government is willing and able to eliminate the havens in its borders, it is critical to recognize that states are not monolithic actors, especially not weak ones.<sup>lx</sup> Rather, they harbor deep divisions that can foster multiple and even contradictory policies that affect the governments' capacity and intent towards havens in their borders. Thus, intent and capability assessments must focus on the actors that exert the most influence over safe haven policies. Rather than the current practice of identifying geographic places as safe havens with focus on building overall state capacity, if multiple havens exist, each should be simultaneously plotted at multiple points along the capacity and will axes depending on which terrorist organization is under consideration.<sup>lxi</sup> For example, in Pakistan, havens should be plotted based on the Pakistani Army's intent—the primary decision-maker of Pakistan's sanctuary policies<sup>lxii</sup>—towards Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, the Haqqani Network, the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, al-Qaida, among others, even though their havens sometimes overlap, rather

than identifying Western Pakistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas or just Pakistan writ large as a haven, as often occurs.<sup>lxiii</sup>

Understanding where a government falls on the willingness continuum and correctly assessing where this intersects with capacity offers a baseline to develop a strategy to eliminate each sanctuary. The intersection of will and capacity for an individual haven can be fluid. U.S. policy must critically assess both the current position of havens as well as project the direction and future positions with an eye towards factors that have caused shifts in the past, like strengthening security services along the capacity axis or international isolation along the intent axis.

In crafting a policy to eliminate the haven, policy makers must recognize that the government capacity and will necessary for a haven to form differ from the capacity and will required to eliminate a haven. The capability and will to permit a haven to form is minimal. A government need only turn a blind eye and opt not to interfere. Yet eliminating a haven usually requires harnessing substantial political will and utilizing significant capacity, though the capacity and intent required will vary based on the resident group. When a government that actively supports the formation and sustainment of a haven—seemingly thus a Quadrant II haven—does not have the capacity to eradicate the haven, policies should approach it as a Quadrant I haven. Conflating haven formation/sustaining capacity and intent with eradication capacity and intent will lead to counter-productive or ineffective policies.

The top two quadrants—Quadrant I (government-enabled) and Quadrant II (government-sponsored)—represent the conditions under which the government lacks the will to oust the resident group(s). This posture occurs for an array of reasons. The host government may refute

the resident group's designation as "terrorist," deny that its policies allow the haven, or not view the group as a threat that merits expending already scarce resources to eliminate. The latter posture occurs when the resident group poses a threat to another government, thus confronting the haven risks provoking a threat where little currently exists, an untenable option for weak states. Quadrant I differs from Quadrant II in that the government lacks the capacity to eradicate the haven. The main variation in the two types of government-supported sanctuaries occurs along the capacity axis, though the degree of central government support for the haven can also vary. The capability required to eliminate the haven will vary based on the characteristics of the group. The same government can simultaneously have Quadrant I and Quadrant II havens in its territory, as will be illustrated below when contrasting the Pakistani Government's intent and capability towards Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT), the Afghan Taliban, and the Haqqani Network.

### *Quadrant I*

Sanctuaries that fall under Quadrant I (government-enabled) occur when a state has both limited capacity to eradicate a group's haven *and* a policy supportive of its sanctuary. The intent policy may be motivated by some combination of strategic considerations vis-à-vis other states, domestic sympathy for the terrorist organization, ideological compatibility, or desire to influence the resident group.<sup>lxiv</sup> Simultaneously, these governments lack the capacity to eradicate the haven because of their weakness, the resident group's strength, or some combination thereof. A lack of intent reinforces the lack of capability, as these governments do not invest their limited resources in developing the capability to eliminate the havens they support. In addition, concerns about the costs of extracting the group weigh heavily on governments with insufficient capability, which

may strengthen their commitment to their policy on the support side of the spectrum.

Often Quadrant I havens pose the greatest challenge for U.S. policy, especially when the government's capacity vis-à-vis the resident group is on the far left of the spectrum. Because of the host government's enabling posture towards the haven, the United States cannot simply provide capacity building support and expect results. Similarly, efforts to change the host government's intent to the opposition side of the spectrum will be difficult because a shift in its posture against the resident group may provoke a threat that the government cannot readily address. Quadrant I havens can operate in a cycle of perpetuation, in which a lack of capacity begets a lack of intent and vice versa, a cycle difficult to break.

LT's haven in Pakistan exemplifies the intractability of Quadrant I havens. Characterizing LT's haven as government-enabled, rather than Quadrant II government-sponsored, will likely—and justifiably—produce protests among some Pakistan watchers, as it seemingly ignores the Pakistani Army's well-established policy of supporting this dangerous anti-India proxy, which is responsible for carnage such as the 2008 attacks in Mumbai. Let us be clear: LT's haven operates comfortably under the Pakistani Army's tutelage and within the Army's area of influence. Indeed, LT's sanctuary functioned as a Quadrant II haven for many years, particularly when the group was dependent on the Army for training and funds. If the typology's purpose was to assess a haven's existence and perpetuation, LT's would fall under Quadrant II, as the Army both supports and sponsors it. However, this typology informs haven elimination policies, and we assess that LT's unfettered growth and expansion over the last decade, coupled with the explosion of domestic security threats in Pakistan, political unrest, as well as the Army's perpetual preoccupation with India, have gradually shifted LT's sanctuary

along the capability axis into Quadrant I. While the Army has sought to improve its capability vis-à-vis India and, to a lesser extent, its ability to engage in counter-insurgency operations in the Federally Administered Tribal areas, it has not forged a capability to oust a well-supported domestic terrorist group entrenched in the country's heartland.

Admittedly, LT's extensive infrastructure exists primarily in the parts of the country where the government writ functions most ably.<sup>lxv</sup> Outside Lahore, the provincial capital of Punjab Province, LT operates a 200-acre headquarters compound unfettered. The group runs Islamic seminaries, schools, ambulances, blood banks, and recruitment centers throughout Pakistan and receives preferential treatment from the Army as a service provider during humanitarian crises within Pakistan.<sup>lxvi</sup> Moreover, LT's training facilities in Pakistan-Administered Kashmir reside where the Army's presence and capability is pervasive, clearly signaling the Army's support for LT's sanctuary.<sup>lxvii</sup> Therefore, this designation of LT's haven in Quadrant I does not overlook the group's well-established ties with the Army and the sponsorship it receives from the most powerful institution in Pakistan, but focuses on the hurdles to eliminating the group's haven.

The Pakistani Army's supportive policy towards LT's haven is twofold and thus the difficulties in shifting intent are as well. First, LT has acted as a reliable asymmetric weapon against the Army's perennial enemy, India, for decades.<sup>lxviii</sup> Second, despite the upheaval in Pakistan since 9/11, during which time some of the Army's proxies turned against it violently and new groups emerged to challenge the state, LT remains loyal and committed to the Pakistani state.<sup>lxix</sup> It propagates a narrative that rejects violent jihad within Pakistan and thus challenges the messages expounded by anti-state groups responsible for the deterioration of Pakistan's domestic

security.<sup>lxx</sup> It seeks to transform Pakistani society through preaching and conversions, not violence.<sup>lxxi</sup> Therefore, even if the Army's view on the utility of the group against India changes, any moves against the group's haven risk provoking a threat in an environment already rife with security challenges.<sup>lxxii</sup>

Under these conditions, it is difficult to fathom the circumstances that would cause the Army to shift its intent towards LT's sanctuary. But should this occur, it faces obstacles on the capacity front as well. Unlike the havens in Pakistan enjoyed by the Haqqani Network or Afghan Taliban, discussed below in the Quadrant II state-sponsored haven section, or even to some degree the Pakistani Taliban, a Quadrant IV haven, given the environment in Pakistan, eradicating LT's haven probably cannot be accomplished solely or even primarily through military force. Unlike those groups, LT is a multi-faceted, indigenous organization comprised of educated elites from the dominant ethnic group with political capital, education, resources, followers, and extensive reach throughout Pakistan.<sup>lxxiii</sup>

Complicating any effort to confront the haven militarily, the group's haven overlaps with the Army's traditional recruiting grounds in Punjab, and the group's ranks include former officers.<sup>lxxiv</sup> Unlike other terrorist groups with havens in Pakistan, LT shares the Army's predominant Punjabi ethnic composition, which reinforces ties between the two entities, contributes to the Army's permissive policies towards LT's haven, and would complicate efforts to confront the group.<sup>lxxv</sup> Therefore, even if the Army's intent towards LT shifted, a military solution, such as an operation in Punjab against LT may be untenable for the Army's cohesion and perhaps even the stability of the country.<sup>lxxvi</sup>

While the Army could and should take actions to reduce the group's sanctuary, a

successful strategy to eliminate LT's extensive haven must rely on the weak civilian institutions, the ineffectual judicial system, and demobilization and de-radicalization programs, which Pakistan has a poor track record of implementing effectively.<sup>lxxvii</sup> Pakistan must develop a judicial framework with laws, prosecutors, judges, and police capable of dealing with LT's havens, especially in light of the group's prohibition against violence in Pakistan.<sup>lxxviii</sup> The Army can—and should—curtail its support for the group and devise ways to reduce the size and influence of the group, which will help to narrow the gap between the capability the government has to confront this haven and what it needs. But the Army's recipe of heavy-handed military operations, reliance on its shadowy intelligence apparatus, the Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISI), and the use of extra-legal detentions or killings is not a viable strategy to eliminate LT's haven.<sup>lxxix</sup>

Tackling this organization's sanctuary will only become more difficult over time, as it embeds itself further into Pakistan. LT is emerging from the post-9/11 era unscathed by counterterrorism actions, unlike any of its counterparts in the region, because of its well-oiled safe haven in Pakistan. With fundraising networks in the Gulf and Europe, it has gained a modicum of financial independence in recent years.<sup>lxxx</sup> It continues to expand its presence and influence in Pakistan and cycle recruits through its vast training apparatus.<sup>lxxxii</sup> Therefore, eliminating its haven will require more and more capability the longer the Pakistani government waits to tackle this task.<sup>lxxxii</sup>

To break the cycle, policy remedies to Quadrant I havens such as that of LT must work on both angles simultaneously, with commitments to provide capacity-building support for the intuitions needed to eradicate the resident group or other assistance in exchange for concrete

demonstrations of changes in the host government's intent. Aid provision must be contingent on clear deliverables, such as prosecutions or legislations, which demonstrate government intent to both oppose the resident group *and* to build the requisite capabilities to eliminate the haven. While these governments face capacity shortfalls, they can undertake measures to limit or degrade the haven that signal movement on the intent axis.

When this type of engagement is not possible, the United States should apply sanctions. In the Pakistani case, the United Nations 1267 list includes LT and its leading members but the United States has exerted only limited pressure on Pakistan over LT's haven.<sup>lxxxiii</sup> Tellingly, the latest State Department Country Report on Terrorism fails to include Punjab among the areas of Pakistan where the group finds sanctuary or as an "area of operation," despite the well-established fact that LT's headquarters resides there, or list Punjab as a place in Pakistan where a terrorist haven exists.<sup>lxxxiv</sup> More generally, the State Department's designations of state sponsors of terrorism have become insufficiently responsive and nimble to meaningfully assist in the eradication of terrorist safe havens. Continuing to designate states as sponsors because of poor bilateral relations, as is the case with Cuba, rather than due to ongoing state sponsorship, has damaged the efficacy of this policy tool, especially in light of the failure to designate states that actually sponsor or enable havens, like Pakistan.<sup>lxxxv</sup> Admittedly, in the case of Pakistan, a state sponsor designation has the potential to derail this important bi-lateral relationship during a fragile period of civilian rule. Therefore, the state sponsors list should be revamped to act as a policy tool with sufficient nuance to be effective without destroying bilateral ties. For instance, the state sponsorship sanctions could be structured in tiers that are more easily applied and withdrawn, thereby mitigating the intensity of the current all-or-nothing designation system. This

change would add badly needed carrots and sticks to U.S. policy options in this area. Safe haven sponsorship should carry the most significant penalties and sanctions.

Another important nuance to economic tools is the need for “smart” sanctions that target specific entities that demonstrate a lack of intent to confront terrorist havens in their borders or willingness to build capability. While not a perfect policy tool,<sup>lxxxvi</sup> smart sanctions that target the finances and mobility of individuals while attempting to spare the broader population have gained popularity over the last decade<sup>lxxxvii</sup> and have recently been successfully applied against the Qaddafi regime in Libya.<sup>lxxxviii</sup> Smart sanctions will help to weaken the entities, like the Pakistani Army, that are responsible for perpetuating safe havens and could pave the way for other partners to emerge.

Conversely, when feasible, the United States should direct assistance towards willing elements of these governments that should be involved in haven eradication. In Pakistan’s case, opportunities exist to provide aid to the civilian institutions that will be necessary for the long-term solution to the LT problem. The Army’s support for LT stems from its deeply-rooted strategic calculus about the threat from India.<sup>lxxxix</sup> Even if this mindset changed—an unlikely proposition—the Army would remain averse to provoking a threat from an organization it cultivated for decades. In other words, as long as the Army occupies a predominant position in Pakistan, its LT haven policy will persist. This reality points to a need for the U.S. to support the often rocky and messy efforts to build durable civilian rule in Pakistan, including refocusing aid on civilian institutions and away from the military. However, a civilian government motivated to eradicate the haven would only shift LT’s haven into Quadrant IV, unless the requisite institutions are adequately developed in the interim.

*Quadrant II*

Quadrant II in the upper right corner represents the realm of government-sponsored safe havens. The element of the government responsible for safe haven policies could oust the resident terrorist organization, but opts not to. Governments that sponsor havens are often autocratic and muzzle dissent, but provide few goods and services to the populace.<sup>xc</sup> They offer terrorists safe haven inside their borders due to strategic concerns, ideological affinity, or domestic pressures.<sup>xci</sup> They may seek to ensure their own security, to challenge external opponents or to exert influence over the resident organization. This form of government-sponsored sanctuary became rare after 9/11 as the international pressure against such policies mounted.<sup>xcii</sup> Of the four designated state sponsors,<sup>xciii</sup> the U.S. Department of State claims that two—Cuba and Sudan—provide safe haven to client groups.<sup>xciv</sup> Even those offerings appear to be limited to a few members, who may or may not be engaging in support activities. Presumably, given their modest size, both governments could force those individuals to leave their countries or curb any support activities.

Quadrant II havens ignored by the state sponsor list include the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network's havens in Pakistan.<sup>xcv</sup> Unlike LT, the Pakistani Army possesses the capability to eliminate these havens, but chooses not to for strategic reasons, namely its desire to retain influence in Afghanistan.<sup>xcvi</sup> While both foreign groups enjoy freedom of movement in Pakistan, including in major cities like Karachi, Peshawar, and even Islamabad, they concentrate their havens in areas bordering their respective home bases in Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban primarily resides in Balochistan Province, particularly the provincial capital of Quetta, adjacent to Qandahar.<sup>xcvii</sup> The Afghan Taliban's ally, the Haqqani Network, enjoys sanctuary in FATA,

primarily North Waziristan and to a lesser extent Kurram, agencies that border Paktia, Paktika, and Khowst.<sup>xcviii</sup> Pakistani Army military operations in FATA, including most recently in North Waziristan, do not target the Haqqani Network, and thus the group finds haven to support its insurgency and terrorist attacks in Afghanistan.<sup>xcix</sup>

Unlike LT, Pakistani military efforts targeted at these sanctuaries could eliminate, or at least badly degrade, the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network's havens with little risk that the groups would turn their guns toward Pakistan. The Army and ISI could exert pressure to push them into Afghanistan or at least cause concern about their security that would hinder their support activities and degrade their havens. Although they would resist losing their beneficial havens, because of their overwhelmingly nationalist objectives in Afghanistan, especially with the drawdown of U.S. forces underway, it is unlikely that either group would shift its mission to focus on Pakistan. This would require the Pakistani Army to expend resources, possibly including diverting some from its eastern border, but falls within its capability.

But this outcome is not on the horizon, as the Pakistani Army's strategic calculus precludes such a shift. The Pakistani Army allows both groups haven in Pakistan in order to ensure influence over Afghanistan, particularly as a hedge against Indian influence on its western border.<sup>c</sup> Its perceived need for such influence will persist after the U.S. drawdown and may grow, depending on developments in Afghanistan. This points to a difficult reality. Shifting a government's intent towards a haven requires policies that correctly assess and target its motive for offering haven. When a government—or the entity responsible for the haven policies, as in the Pakistan case—views sponsoring a group's haven as necessary for its national security, it will be exceedingly difficult for the United States to shift its intent.

Nonetheless, history demonstrates that over time international pressure, sanctions, and isolation can shift sponsoring governments' calculations toward havens in their borders. Both Sudan and Libya revised their haven policies in part due to prolonged international pressure.<sup>ci</sup> Similar to the discussion of Quadrant I havens, a more nimble state sponsors of terrorism designation framework and an application of "smart" sanctions would be useful policy tools for eliminating Quadrant II safe havens. Although governments that sponsor havens for ideological reasons may be impervious to such pressures, realpolitik considerations can sometimes wear down ideological commitments, especially when it affects the pocketbooks of individual officials or the stability of the government. Sponsoring havens must be a costly form of state sponsorship, given that terrorist groups' capability is bolstered by sanctuary where they can plan, plot, and recover.

Targeted strikes against the terrorist group may be a viable policy tool to pressure government-sponsored havens, when other options fail. This approach must be used with care, as it can backfire. The U.S. cruise missile strikes in Afghanistan following al-Qaida's attack against the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 had a rally around the flag effect and increased bin Laden's mystique, rather than causing the Afghan Taliban to question its haven policies.<sup>cii</sup> But targeted strikes against havens can erode the group's sense of security and signal to host governments that their sovereignty is in jeopardy if their policies continue.

Regime change is a last resort to state-sponsored havens. In the wake of costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and events in Libya and Syria, such policies are unlikely, unless the threat posed from the resident group is sufficiently serious. However, one component of the government may control sanctuary policies. Empowering other facets of the government can

offer a long-term solution. As noted in the Quadrant I discussion, robust efforts to support civilian rule in Pakistan may gradually help to shift sanctuary policies out of the hands in the military and into the purview of elected leaders. Meddling in another country's domestic politics can be difficult and counterproductive, thus this option is most viable when it is consistent with other facets of U.S. foreign policy (such as better governance and democratization), and when the calculus in support of the haven is unwavering.

#### *Quadrant IV*

Lastly, Quadrant IV (contested) safe havens exist when governments oppose sanctuary within their borders, but lack the requisite capacity to eradicate the resident group, either because of their weakness, the group's strength or some combination thereof. It merits repeating that Quadrant IV sanctuaries are not areas of active conflict between the government and the terrorist group; they are spaces where an organization engages in support activities with relative security primarily because of the government's lack of capacity.

A focus on central government capacity overlooks the reality that even where central governments are absent, few, if any, spaces remain truly "ungoverned" – alternative structures rise to govern these spaces by design or with the tacit consent of the central government.<sup>ciii</sup> Alternatively, the possibility exists that the state might be predatory, criminalized, and exploitative, especially against minorities and rivals, leading residents to consciously develop alternative governance in part as a form of protection as well as to fill gaps in service provision.<sup>civ</sup> In these situations, local actors function as the primary decision makers. Therefore, for terrorist groups to find haven in these spaces, they must interact with alternative governance actors. As with central governments, some alternative authority systems are hostile to terrorist

groups and sufficiently strong to repel them. But opportunities exist for terrorist group havens in these spaces when these structures decay and/or upheaval creates space for new powerbrokers to alter the system.<sup>cv</sup> In Quadrant IV environments, terrorist groups use a combination of three leverage points to carve out sanctuary: physical force, resources, and identity status.<sup>cvi</sup> Using these three leverage points, three primary pathways emerge for terrorist groups to find haven in alternatively governed spaces: cooptation, challenge, and replacement.<sup>cvi</sup>

First, terrorist groups can co-opt alternative governance structures by offering physical force or resources that buttress existing local power brokers, particularly those who seek additional power to secure or improve their position. Terrorist groups provide resources or firepower to back the powerbrokers' authority. They will seek out powerbrokers with which they share an identity feature and/or who will appropriate their legitimating ideology, which can bolster local powerbrokers' status.<sup>cvi</sup> Terrorist groups, particularly those that are not indigenous, sometimes use cooptation to acquire protection within the existing system. Over time, foreign groups may embed themselves further by marrying women related to local powerbrokers. Most notably, al-Qaida Core has used cooptation to find haven in FATA.<sup>cix</sup>

A second approach that terrorist groups undertake to find haven in Quadrant IV environments involves challenging existing powerbrokers using some combination of the three leverage points and competing for influence.<sup>cx</sup> The terrorist group probably must possess more than one leverage point. Using their ideology, firepower and/or resources, terrorist groups become powerbrokers within the alternative governance system and use that status to find haven. As the organization garners status for its authority, it challenges the existing structures in a way

that is appealing to those of chronically low status or dissatisfied members of society. Religion can be an effective ideology to challenge statuses conferred as birthrights, like tribal lineage, as it provides an avenue to improve status when few others exist.<sup>cxix</sup> Alternatively, the terrorist group may use its resources or firepower to offer services to garner support and operating space. The Pakistani Taliban used this approach in the agencies in FATA to create havens, challenge, and sometimes displace the tribal malik structure and anachronistic governance system that the Pakistani Government uses to manage the buffer with Afghanistan.<sup>cxii</sup> Its strength and approach varied by agency, which we cannot discuss with the requisite depth here, but overall, the Pakistani Taliban used this strategy to build its havens in FATA.

Third, terrorist groups may confront and, if successful, replace the existing alternative governance system. This is apt to occur when they possess all three—force, resources, and a legitimating identity with resonance—and when the alternative system has grown dysfunctional and illegitimate in the eyes of the affected populace. These challenges typically come from within, though perhaps with the support of foreigners or an imported ideology. Terrorist groups can replace the existing system by obtaining elevated status through the provision of services. Rather than social service provision, Baylouny argues that providing infrastructure, policing, conflict resolution, arbitration, and mediation confer influence and authority in these environments, as evidenced by the Afghan Taliban and Islamic Court Union's takeovers in Afghanistan and Somalia, respectively.<sup>cxiii</sup> This kind of service provision must be backed with a legitimating ideology that the populace accepts as well as enough manpower and resources for the group to impose its will.<sup>cxiv</sup> In addition to challenging them, the Pakistani Taliban has

replaced the alternative governance system in some parts of FATA, though often only temporarily.

Examining the avenues through which terrorist groups leverage alternative governance systems to find haven points to several potential policy approaches. First, some of these havens can be addressed using the will/capability equation with efforts focused on assisting the host government to build its capacity to eradicate the haven, particularly when a high level of intent exists. James Forest argues that, under these conditions, reform must tackle deeper, systemic issues underpinning the central government's lack of legitimacy, corruption, and service provision failure until it displaces alternative governance structures.<sup>cxv</sup> This long-term undertaking includes significant costs and high likelihood of failure, but can offer an enduring solution if executed successfully.<sup>cxvi</sup> This may be a necessary option in scenario three, in which a terrorist group functions as the alternative governing authority.

Policy approaches that focus on building central government capacity are only appropriate in certain situations. Policymakers must not ignore the reality that some nation-states remain artificially configured and lack the foundation to become a strong state, no matter how much aid is disbursed. As Phil Williams argued, "the very weakness of so many states that has facilitated the emergence of ungoverned, alternatively governed, and contested spaces also makes it impossible for states to reassert control."<sup>cxvii</sup> In addition, efforts by the central government, particularly weak governments prone to corruption and poor governance, to exert greater control in areas governed by alternative structures risk generating strife and conflict that further destabilizes the state.<sup>cxviii</sup> As a result, contrary to the capacity-building diagnosis implied

in the typical “ungoverned spaces” terminology, the focus needs to be on the way in which these spaces are governed, by whom, and their relationship to haven-seeking terrorist groups.<sup>cxix</sup> In other words, fleshing out the alternative governance structures’ vulnerabilities and/or resistance to terrorist groups may be as important as understanding the central governments’ intent and capability towards the resident terrorist group.

The importance of alternative governance structures in Quadrant IV havens points to a need for greater engagement at that level in order to eradicate some contested havens. Yet, doing so risks further undermining an already weak government and potentially harming relations it. This is a preferable option when bilateral relations with the host government are poor, as is the case in Syria, or when a high degree of opposition to haven eradication persists among those in charge of haven policies. Then the U.S. can work directly with the “natural” allies that exist at this level, who already oppose the terrorists’ presence, usually for parochial reasons. The terrorist groups’ impact on the alternative governance structure will invariably put it at odds with some local powerbrokers who stand to lose their position with a change in the system. Some will be distasteful partners, but this problem is not exclusive to local partners, as plenty of government partners prove to be problematic allies.<sup>cxx</sup> For example, in Karachi, the secular political party that governs the mega-city, Muttahida Qaumi Movement, advertises itself as a bulwark against Sunni terrorist groups like the Pakistani Taliban. Yet it simultaneously perpetrates political, ethnic, and criminal violence that also destabilizes the economic capital of Pakistan.<sup>cxxi</sup>

This strategy has the potential to backfire, if allies are not selected with care. In Somalia, the warlords who used Mogadishu as their personal fiefdoms for over a decade banded together

in 2006, allegedly with U.S. backing, to oppose the rise of Islamic Courts Union, from which al-Shabaab emerged, with disastrous results.<sup>cxxii</sup> The populace reviled these warlords. The alternative governance system that they operated had badly decayed. Warlords' opposition to the Islamic Courts Union, which, unlike the warlords, provided coveted services like policing and dispute resolution, actually increased the credibility of the Islamic Courts.<sup>cxxiii</sup>

The third option is a surgical counterterrorism approach that selectively targets the terrorist group and its local backers. This is the most plausible for scenarios one and two, particularly when the groups are not indigenous. The idea is to erode the resident groups' sense of security and force them to worry about their survival, rather than being able to conduct support activities. In addition, it increases the costs for harboring them, as their protectors' assets may be destroyed and lives endangered. This approach also has the potential to backfire and rally local support for the resident terrorist group, especially if strikes are imprecise, cause civilian casualties or harm figures who enjoy the loyalty of the populace.<sup>cxxiv</sup> But in scenarios with few options and an imminent threat, this approach offers an option short of a full-scale military intervention.

The U.S. can also support military interventions by other governments affected by the threat under scenario three. However, the threat from the haven must be sufficiently serious to consider this option, as military interventions can galvanize additional recruits and supporters and alienate the local populace.

While it is still important to diagnose the intent and capability formula for Quadrant IV havens, the prescription may need to shift away from the expensive and uncertain results of

capacity building. Instead, delving into the way in which terrorist groups approach the alternative governance structure can inform haven eradication efforts. While the alternative options have drawbacks, they offer ways to degrade these havens that side step the high costs and uncertain nature of capacity building.

## **Conclusion**

Terrorist havens have evolved to operate under changed international conditions and, as such, they remain an acute threat to U.S. national security. The conditions in which groups carve out haven vary. A need exists to disaggregate and identify how the United States can approach haven elimination. This typology and the analysis that stems from it offer a starting point for devising such strategies. Drawing on the illustrative case of Pakistan, we have presented policy recommendations crafted to a haven's location within the will/capacity matrix. A summary of these recommendations is included below:

### *Quadrant I: Government-Enabled Havens*

We recommend providing capacity-building support contingent on demonstrations that the host government is modifying its intent. The U.S. government must focus its support on entities that demonstrate a willingness to eradicate the resident terrorist group. As a last resort, the U.S. government could apply targeted sanctions against the state.

## *Quadrant II: Government-Sponsored Havens*

We argue that the state's intentions can be modified with international pressure, targeted sanctions, and isolation. The last counterterrorism tools that should be considered by the U.S. government are aerial strikes and regime changes since the risks from these two options are high.

## *Quadrant IV: Contested Havens*

To eliminate these havens, the U.S. government can provide capacity-building assistance that addresses the underlying issues of government incompetence. To that end, the U.S. government must work with local actors in alternatively governed areas while selecting allies carefully. The last resort for eliminating Quadrant IV havens includes applying surgical counterterrorism tactics when necessary and potentially supporting military interventions by other governments.

While we recognize the reality that the United States must work with central governments when possible, this typology delves deeper into those governments' posture towards individual groups, rather than focusing on state-level conditions that remain difficult for the United States to alter. In some cases, working with the central government is insufficient or undesirable. Under those conditions, this assessment must shift to the alternate governance structures that allow or deny access to terrorist groups.

Because safe haven eradication requires more intent and capability than sanctuary formation, the adage that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure clearly applies. However, building the capacity of all weak states involves an untenable investment of resources. Thus, the U.S. government must focus on the central government or alternative governance

structures' will and capacity vis-à-vis proximate terrorist groups. Safe havens do not emerge overnight. Therefore, efforts to insert insecurity and disrupt support activities early can help to derail havens before they become entrenched. But where they do exist, the United States must devise strategies targeting the conditions under which each individual group finds haven.

<b>FTOs</b>	<b>State Department Identified Locations/Areas of Operation</b>	<b>Safehaven? (as of 10/2014)</b>
Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)	Lebanon, Arabian Peninsula	Yes
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)	Lebanon	No
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	Sulu Archipelago (Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi), Zamboanga Peninsula	Yes
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB)	Gaza, Israel and the West Bank, Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon	Yes
Ansar al-Dine (AAD)	Northern Mali, Southwestern Libya	No
Ansar al-Islam (AAI)	Iraq	Yes
Army of Islam (AOI)	Gaza, Egypt, Israel	Possibly (believed to be running training camps in Gaza)
Asbat al-Ansar (AAA)	Ain al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp near Sidon, Lebanon	Yes
Aum Shinrikyo (AUM)	Japan, Russia	No
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)	Spain, France, Cuba, Venezuela	Yes
Boko Haram (BH)	Northern Nigeria, Northern Cameroon, Lake Chad Basin	Yes
Communist Party of Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)	Philippines (Luzon, Visayas, northern and eastern Mindanao, Manila)	Yes
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)	Northern Ireland, Irish Republic	No
Gama'a al-Islamiyya (IG)	Afghanistan, Yemen, Iran, the UK, Germany, France	Yes
Hamas	West Bank, Gaza, Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon	Yes
Haqqani Network (HQN)	Afghanistan-Pakistan border; Miram Shah, North Waziristan, Pakistan	Yes
Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)	India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, South Asia	Yes
Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)	Bangladesh, India	No
Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM)	Kashmir, Afghanistan, Pakistan (Muzaffarabad, Rawalpindi)	Yes
Hizballah	Beirut (Bekaa Valley), southern Lebanon, outskirts of Aleppo and	Yes

	Damascus (Syria)	
Indian Mujahedeen (IM)	India	Yes
Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)	Pakistan, Central Asia, Europe, and Afghanistan	Yes
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)	South Asia, Central Asia, Iran	Yes
Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru)	Northern Nigeria	Possibly (operating in similar areas as Boko Haram, which has safe haven)
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)	Pakistan, India (southern Kashmir, Doda, and the Kashmir Valley)	Yes
Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)	Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia	Yes
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)	Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia	Yes
Jundallah	Iran (Sistan va Balochistan province, Greater Balochistan area (Afghanistan and Pakistan))	Yes
Kahane Chai	Israel, West Bank settlements (Qiryat Arba in Hebron)	No
Kata'ib Hizballah (KH)	Iraq, Syria	Yes
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	Turkey, Iraq, Europe	Yes
Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT)	Pakistan, South Asia	Yes
Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)	Pakistan (Punjab, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Karachi, and Baluchistan)	Yes
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	Sri Lanka, India	No
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)	Southwest Asia, Europe, UK	Yes
Al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB)	Algeria, southwestern Libya, Mali, and Niger	Yes
National Liberation Army (ELN)	Colombia, Venezuelan border	Possibly (cooperating with FARC, which controls territory)
Palestine Islamic Jihad – Shaqaqi Faction (PIJ)	Gaza, Israel, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria	Yes
Palestine Liberation Front – Abu Abbas Faction (PLF)	Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon	Yes
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the West Bank, Gaza	Yes
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)	Damascus, bases in southern Lebanon, Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria	Yes
Al-Qa'ida (AQ)	Pakistan (Federally Administered Tribal Areas)	Yes

Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	Yemen	Yes
Al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI)	Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Middle East, North Africa, Iran, South Asia, Europe	Yes
Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)	Northeastern Algeria (Kabylie region) northern Mali, Niger, Mauritania	Yes
Real IRA (RIRA)	Northern Ireland, Great Britain, Irish Republic	No
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	Colombia, Venezuelan Panamanian and Ecuadoran borders	Yes
Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N)	Athens, Greece	No
Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)	Turkey (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana), Europe	Yes
Revolutionary Struggle (RS)	Athens, Greece	No
Al-Shabaab (AS)	Somalia (rural areas in the middle and lower Jubba regions, Bay and Bakol regions, Golis Mountains, Puntland's larger urban areas)	Yes
Shining Path (SL)	Peru (Huallaga Valley, Apurimac, Ene, Montaro River Valley)	No
Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	Pakistan (Federally Administered Tribal Areas)	Yes
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)	None (formerly Colombia)	No




Fig 1

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**Notes**

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