

Can the Violent *Jihad* Do without Sympathizers?

PETER MASCINI

Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
Faculty of Social Sciences
Rotterdam, The Netherlands

According to some terrorist fighters and academicians the constituencies of Muslim extremists are vital to the persistence of the jihad. Interviews and public information were used to examine the accuracy of this claim. The analysis demonstrates that sympathizers are indispensable to some preparative terrorist activities, yet not to others. Extremists depend less on sympathizers for making foreign journeys, generating revenues, and communication than they do for recruiting and sponsoring. So, sympathizers may be important for the persistence of the jihad, yet their role is not self-evident. This implies that receding of sympathy for the jihad will not automatically reduce it.

Introduction

Several terrorist fighters are convinced that Muslim extremism cannot do without Islamic communities tacitly or openly approving of the violent *jihad*.¹ Recently, an employee of the German intelligence service expressed this view as a result of the arrest of 15 extremists who would belong to a network that was concentrated in Ulm and Neu Ulm and that would have been occupied with recruiting, counterfeiting passports, and fund-raising.² According to him Muslim communities had withhold certain activities from the authorities and had even actively supported some of these activities. There are also academicians who emphasize the importance of sympathizers in relation to the violent *jihad*. For instance, Benjamin Barber, author of *Jihad vs. McWorld*, remarked in an interview that: “The problem is not terrorists. There are only a few crazy terrorists. The problem is a large number of people who are not terrorists but who look the other way or support the terrorists.”³ Roberta Senechal de la Roche has argued that support of third parties is a necessary precondition of all kinds of terrorism, hence not only of violence committed in the name of *jihad*.⁴ Collective violence could not surpass the level of impulsive, incidental outbursts without this support of third parties.

These policymakers and academicians implicitly assume that intergroup struggle is a sufficient condition for group participation in violent conflict. According to Roger V. Gould most sociological explanations of group conflict are based on this presupposition. However, one can wonder whether that is justified in case of the *jihad*. After all, it is imaginable that sympathizers are backed down from actively supporting the preparation of the *jihad* because of fear of retribution. Especially in a time when Muslims run the risk

Received 18 February 2005; accepted 27 August 2005.

Address correspondence to Peter Mascini, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, Faculty of Social Sciences, Room M6-06, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: Mascini@fsw.eur.nl

of being considered a potential terrorist on the basis of a shared faith only, this fear could deter them from aiding extremists with the preparation of violence.

Therefore, the assumption that sympathizers are prepared to transform their support of the *jihad* into concrete aid might prove problematic. This raises the question whether the constituencies of Muslim extremists really play an indispensable role in the preparation of the violence committed in name of the *jihad*. Moreover, if sympathizers do not play a decisive role in certain respects, is this because they are deterred to transform their support of the *jihad* into action or are there other reasons responsible for this? The role of sympathizers was ascertained with respect to three preparatory activities that always precede terrorism, yet do not necessarily end up in it. The activities consist of nesting—placing extremists in countries of destination, financing, and communication. The analysis was restricted to the activities of terrorist networks that have committed themselves to a global struggle between “pure” Muslims and infidels and that are operational in Europe and North America. Networks that had originally been committed to local political–religious conflicts in Arabic countries yet had subsequently become active in Western countries for this global battle were counted among this category as well.⁵ Among the most important representatives of these global jihadist networks are Al Qaeda, Ansar al-Islam, the Algerian Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), and the Takfir wal Hijra movement.

Interviews and public publications like papers, (official) reports, newspaper articles, and scientific publications were used to answer the central questions.⁶ The interviews were held between May and July 2004 with eight professionals who had recently been involved in counterterrorism in the Netherlands.⁷ Respondents were asked open questions concerning Dutch criminal cases on the violent *jihad* they had been involved with directly or indirectly. The questions referred to how defendants had gained entrance to the Netherlands, how they managed to stay, how they generated income, and how they communicated. With respect to each of these strategies questions were posed on whether, and if so, how they resorted to governmental agencies, kin, sympathizers, and criminal organizations.

The next section deals with the theory on the role of constituencies in group conflict. The following section presents the data analysis. Conclusions are drawn in the final section.

Solidarity and Supporting Terrorism

Senchal de la Roche has founded her argument that sympathizers are vital for terrorism on Donald Black’s “geometry of terrorism” theory.⁸

Black conceives terrorism as a specific kind of social control; aimed at the correction of deviance. In case of terrorism social control would be carried out by way of “self-help.” He defines self-help as “the expression of a grievance by unilateral aggression.”⁹ Usually self-help is related to societies in which individuals depend on themselves in conflicts because the state has no monopoly on the execution of violence. However, according to Black, self-help is also present in areas where it is difficult for civilians to resort to the authorities. Terrorism would refer to a specific kind of self-help: “*pure terrorism is self-help by organized civilians who covertly inflict mass violence on other civilians.*”¹⁰ In short, terrorism is about structural violence employed to more or less randomly chosen opponents by civilians who organize themselves in secret. This means that terrorism can be distinguished from smaller scale types of violence like feuding and from collective forms of violence with a more impulsive, incidental, or overtly character like riots, lynchings, and civil war vigilantism.

Black states that terrorism can only occur when there exists a large social distance between an aggrieved group and a group that is blamed for it, while the physical distance between both groups is small.¹¹ The social distance can cover different dimensions: cultural—for example, with respect to differences in language, philosophy of life, and ethnicity; relational—for example, the amount of mutual contacts, friendships, and marriages—and hierarchical—for example, the differences in power and status. Social distance sets off a clear image of an enemy and reduces the threshold to victimize as many random victims as possible among the enemy, while the physical vicinity offers the occasion to make these victims.

According to Senechal de la Roche a large social distance between parties does indeed explain why conflicts are fought out violently instead of peacefully,¹² but not why the violence is applied recurrently and well-organized instead of incidentally and unorganized.¹³ She ascribes the latter to the social distance within and among third parties. Violence could only surpass the incidental and unorganized character when third parties are involved in a conflict that are very partisan, in the sense that they clearly choose one side. There is question of “*strong partisanship*” when third parties support one party against the other and are solidary among themselves. Mutually solidarity especially occurs when the social distance between parties is small, which means: participating actively in each other’s lives and being culturally homogenous and interdependent. Maximal partisanship occurs when all parties involved are polarized: two sides of homogeneous groups that are at great social distance of each other. Polarization generates a “gravitating” force attracting newcomers indirectly to one or both sides.

The violence committed in the name of the *jihad* is also recurrent and well-organized. The global list of insurgencies expands further everyday. These attacks are often preceded by long and profound preparations and involve extremists who contacted people in different countries. So, if Senechal de la Roche is right than third parties sympathizing with the *jihad* ought to play an indispensable role in the *jihad*. However, is this true? Are the constituencies of the *jihad* willing to actively support the preparation of insurgencies committed in the name of the *jihad*?

As mentioned before, Roger V. Gould argues that sociological theories on collective violence like those of Black and Senechal de la Roche assume too easily that solidarity automatically implies preparedness of individuals to actively contribute to collective violence.¹⁴ However, sympathizers can also decide not to contribute on the basis of their awareness that they can be avenged for it personally: “Any confrontation between collections of people—whether the boundary dividing them is one of class, ethnicity, neighborhood, clan, race, gender, or religion—involves the possibility that group action will not occur because behavior is dominated by individualistic motives.”¹⁵ His research on feuding in nineteenth-century Corsica has indeed ascertained two factors restricting the willingness of individuals to participate in collective violence on behalf of their reference group.

First, conflicts stemming from group contention were less often resolved violently than conflicts originating from one-on-one contention because the antagonists took into account the possibility that the violence would escalate. After all, group contention implied that opponents were part of a group that could be mobilized to strike back.¹⁶ Moreover, it occurred that kin of the perpetrators were seldom victimized when they did not contribute to the violence themselves or helped to escape the culprit. According to Gould this meant that “avengers did not randomly choose from the offender’s kin group, but rather targeted kin who declined to distance themselves from the offender or his action. Far from treating the solidarity of the rival groups as given, then, vendettas of this sort were sanctions *against*

solidarity.”¹⁷ This mechanism would deter individuals to manifest solidarity with their kin: “When retaliation is conditional on demonstrations of solidarity, a potential aggressor is disciplined *ex ante* by the knowledge that drawing on allies will provoke retaliation by the victim’s allies, and an aggressor’s allies know *ex post* that they are not potential targets for retaliation as long as they have refrained from helping the others.”¹⁸

On the one hand Gould argues that his findings with respect to avenging on Corsica in the nineteenth century can not automatically be generalized to other historical and geographical contexts, but on the other hand he does not rule this out beforehand either. Indeed it is imaginable that both factors that deterred Corsicans from helping kin in case of conflicts, also restrain the constituencies of the *jihad* to support the preparation of terrorism.

Muslim extremists fight powerful leaders in Western and Arabic countries and choose their victims because of general characteristics ascribed to the enemy (e.g., nationality, religion, or ethnicity) rather than because of wrongful conduct by specific individuals. This “logic of collective liability” entails that a large group considers itself a potential victim of the *jihad* and, consequently, perceives a common interest to fight it.¹⁹ The Establishment is motivated to take the initiative to counter the *jihad* because terrorism undermines their authority and because civilians hold the authorities responsible for the protection of their security. This means that sympathizers might fear the retaliation of a large group of powerful opponents when they actively support the preparation of the *jihad*. This can deter them from actually giving it. At the same time it is difficult for counterterrorists to determine who belongs to the enemy. On Corsica solidarity was based primarily on kin relationships that were publicly known,²⁰ while with respect to the *jihad* solidarity is based on shared faith that is much more difficult to objectify. As a result, Muslims can easily be accused falsely of contributing to the preparation of the *jihad*. This is more likely to happen, as the threat of insurgencies is perceived as more real. The awareness that the slightest hint can be enough to become a suspect of supporting the *jihad* can be yet another deterrent.

In sum, it is imaginable that individual interests prevent sympathizers from playing the decisive role in the preparation of the *jihad* that is assumed by Senechal de la Roche’s theory on collective violence. The next section analyzes the role of sympathizers with respect to three preparatory activities: nesting, financing, and communication.

Nesting

Muslim extremists apply two strategies in order to nest in countries of destination. Their first strategy is to recruit people inside countries of destination. Their second is to secure entrance to and residence in those countries. Combinations of both strategies also occur. This is so when recruiters or potential recruits attempt to get entrance to or stay in countries of destination. Both strategies will be discussed separately.

Recruiting

Extremists are being recruited in Western countries. They often own the nationality of the country of destination. Therefore they attract less attention than insurgents that enter from Islamic countries or conflict areas do.²¹ Sympathy for violent goals does not have to be the only or even main reason for new recruits to become active. Other possible reasons are the wish to belong to a group, to gain power and esteem, or to experience adventure and distraction.²² However, sympathy is of course an important breeding ground for recruitment.

Recruiters are often former jihadists.²³ They enjoy standing among radicals because they have actively contributed to the Holy War. Recruiting begins in Islamic centers, coffee shops, asylum seeker centers, salafist mosques, or prisons.²⁴ Especially latter two locations are used as a starting point for recruitment. The chances are high that recruiters track potential recruits in salafist mosques²⁵ because moderate Muslims deliberately evade them.²⁶ Prisons are a hot spot for other reasons. In there, recruiters have ample time to promote an alternative lifestyle to criminals who often feel rejected by society and who possess knowledge, contacts, and capabilities that can come in handy for the preparation and execution of attacks.²⁷

Radical Muslims who can easily be isolated from their social environment are especially receptive to recruitment. According to the AIVD this concerns three categories in particular.²⁸ The first category consists of autochthonous Westerners who converted to Islam. They are inclined to cut through all ties with people they were engaged with before their conversion while they are not yet deeply embedded in the Islamic community.²⁹ The second category consists of radical Muslims who have recently immigrated. They are usually single men who have abandoned their families in their country of origin. Their contacts with the country of origin have weakened, while they have not yet established a broad social network in the country of residence. The so-called Hamburg cell, that has played a lead role in the 11 September attacks, is illustrative of this category. This cell consisted of a group of foreign students that had gradually discontinued contacts with their families in their countries of origin.³⁰ The last category consists of young second or third generation migrants originating from North Africa. They maintain fewer ties with the country of origin than their parents do, while their contacts with the autochthonous population are often limited. They are especially likely to become potential recruits when they are marginalized even further after a crisis like an addiction, a detention, or the death of a significant other.³¹ For example, former professional football player Nizar Trabelsi was an alcoholic and a drug addict before he became involved in the preparation of an attack on the American embassy in Paris or an American army basis in Belgium,³² and the process of radicalization of Mohammed B, the suspected assassin of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, is supposed to have accelerated after the death of his mother.³³

Recruiters attempt to isolate potential jihadists further by persuading them to visit private assemblies in places like living rooms, where they communally pray and watch videos of radical imams, insurgencies, and Muslim victims of violence. In addition they visit propagandistic websites and chat groups. Subsequently, they are prepared for the Holy War by making religious educational trips and visiting training camps. For example, in the Netherlands the convict Radoin Daoud housed illegal Muslims, organized radical sermons, showed jihadist videos, and made cassette tapes of people exalting to be prepared to die as a martyr. He bonded with these illegal immigrants by providing them identity papers (interview).

In short, sympathizers are indeed essential for successful recruitment for the violent *jihad*. They are particularly inclined to focus increasingly on the violent *jihad* and to avoid presumed dissenters as much as possible. Radical imams and sheiks that encourage the violent *jihad* contribute to this radicalization process.

Entrance and Residence

Extremists who exclusively operate in their own country are certainly not the only ones who are involved in the violent *jihad*. This kind of terrorism is a transnational phenomenon

par excellence.³⁴ Al Qaeda has had a safe haven in Afghanistan between 1997 and 2001 when the Taliban ruled this country. According to the *International Institute for Strategic Studies* at least 20,000 recruits from all parts of the world have been trained in camps in Afghanistan.³⁵ Subsequently, these recruits have participated in battles in countries like Bosnia, Chechnya, and Iraq or they have returned to their countries of origin. Extremists have also left countries in order to follow a religious education in a Koran school, *madrassa*, or to visit radical imams in mosques. Furthermore, some have intermediated between terrorist cells in different countries. Transnationalism requires of Muslim extremists to manage the entrance to and residence in other countries. This unavoidably brings them into contact with the authorities that are responsible for the admittance, policing, and extradition of aliens.

Extremists can avoid contacts with state agencies entirely by immigrating illegally. Extremists who domiciled illegally have indeed been arrested in different countries. Additionally, there are indications that militant Muslims have been brought into countries with the help of smugglers from countries like Albania, Turkey, and Latin America.³⁶ However, illegal immigration and residence have clear disadvantages for extremists. First, they make them dependent on family, friends, and co-religionists because without legal residence permit it is difficult to approach official agencies for work, housing, medical care, or social benefits. Second, illegal immigrants who help with the preparation of terrorist activities can be incarcerated and extradited because of their illegal status alone.

Extremists can also enter a country legally and try to obtain a legal residence permit. Hundreds are known to have succeeded in this.³⁷ Several insurgents of assaults in the United States and in Europe have acquired a tourist, student, or business visa, whereas others have obtained a legal residence permit because they married a wife with the nationality of the country of destination. Still others have been granted political asylum, sometimes after several applications under different names. However, there is little evidence that they have ever received help from sympathizing officials to obtain legal residence permits.³⁸ Active assistance of corrupt officials is hard to organize in practice, let alone to maintain a large-scale fraud over a longer period. Therefore, extremists usually have no alternative but to try to deceive officials.

Muslim extremists need passports and identity papers in order to hoax officials. They can steal these documents, buy them from persons who declare theirs missing, or fabricate them.³⁹ Especially blank passports and visas that contain a legitimate registration number but no personal information are popular⁴⁰ because no information has to be removed from them.⁴¹ Another advantage is that the chance to be arrested with such documents is negligible. Interpol disposes of a database consisting of almost two million missing passports yet the database is consulted in just a few countries.⁴² Furthermore, passports from visa-free countries are attractive to jihadists.⁴³ Travelers with such passports are temporarily allowed to reside in a country provided they own a return ticket.⁴⁴ In the meanwhile the United States has tightened the rules of the visa-waiver-program for the majority of the countries of the European Union without abolishing it altogether.⁴⁵

In short: extremists can hardly recourse to sympathizers for international migration. The latter can help to hide illegal immigrants and to counterfeit documents, but they are of limited use for obtaining residence permits. Active assistance of corrupt officials is hard to organize in practice. This means that extremists are forced to deceive officials in order to obtain residence permits.

Financing

Islamist networks need money to survive and to execute their activities. They use two strategies to get the necessary financial means. Either they look for sponsors or they generate revenues themselves.⁴⁶ Both strategies will be discussed separately.

Sponsoring

Sponsors can be states or organizations. Countries that have been suspected of supporting the violent *jihad* financially are usually ruled by an elite of which at least a section sympathizes with the violent *jihad*. This applies to countries like Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan.⁴⁷

Terrorists misuse the so-called *zakat*—one of the five religious duties of every Muslim—in order to receive sponsorship of organizations. Zakat is the obligation to donate a share of one's own resources to the needy. Radical imams have been arrested for passing on charity money raised in mosques to terrorist organizations⁴⁸ and radical believers have coerced moderate imams to hand over such money.⁴⁹ Furthermore, the assets of branches of foundations like *Al Aqsa*, Benevolence International Foundation (BIF), Al Haramain en Muwaffaq have been frozen because they supplied money to terrorist organizations.⁵⁰ Sometimes this happened because of extremists that had infiltrated a legitimate foundation and sometimes it happened with the approval of the executive committee.⁵¹

So, extremists can profit from zakat without the knowledge of the donors. Extremists also profit unobvious from the habits of Muslims and migrants in order to transfer money. Militant Muslims employ *hawala* to do this.⁵² There are clear indications that rich Arabs have transferred money to Al Qaeda thru the hawala system.⁵³ Hawala is used to transfer money from one party to the next outside the official financial circuit.⁵⁴ It is founded on the mutual trust that all parties concerned will repay their debts.⁵⁵ It appeals to Islamic terrorists because it leaves few traces and does not stand out because millions of migrants use it. However, this does not mean that hawala bankers do not keep accounts at all.⁵⁶

Furthermore, Muslim extremists resort to money transfer services of businesses like Western Union.⁵⁷ For example, the hijackers of the 11 September attacks received \$20,000 through this company from an Al Qaeda paymaster. As is true for hawala, money transferring is especially popular among migrants for providing and receiving cash money because it is also possible in countries where not everybody has a bank number.⁵⁸ After it became known that this form of money transferring was also used for terrorist purposes, Western Union was compelled in the United States to pass on information on transfers to enforcement agencies. Nowadays, the agents of Western Union are perceived to be a larger risk with respect to financing terrorism than the customers. For this company screens these, mostly foreign, agents only marginally.⁵⁹

In short, Muslim extremists can recourse to sponsors who sympathize with the violent *jihad*. Besides, they resort to third parties who are secretly used by extremists. Latter parties concern Muslims who stick to the religious duty of zakat and immigrants who use hawala bankers or money transfer companies. Extremists exploit them because they are familiar with their habits. So, extremists profit from these Muslims and immigrants without their knowledge or consent.

Generating Revenues

Sponsorship certainly does not cover all expenses of extremists. Only some recruiters are released from generating revenues, and occasionally elite Al Qaeda members have provided

“seed money” to cells that enabled them to execute part of their plans. In general, extremists have to largely manage themselves financially.⁶⁰ Consequently, certain individuals and cells are occupied predominantly or even entirely with acquiring revenues for the *jihād*. For this, they do not receive active support of sympathizers.

Extremists have yielded revenues by undertaking licit and illicit enterprises. Al Qaeda has owned retail, transport, and industrial businesses that were not only used as a storefront to launder money and transport weapons but also as an independent income source. In this case they can resort to ignorant consumers. Furthermore, there are indications that jihadist groups have made alliances with organized crime in “failed states.” These states officially repudiate unlawful practices yet are unable to withstand them. For example, Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas would have been engaged in drug trade, human smuggling, and counterfeiting of American dollars, audiovisual material, perfumes, and brand clothing in the border area between Argentine, Brazil, and Paraguay.⁶¹ Furthermore, Al Qaeda would have operated in diamond smuggle in western Africa.⁶² However, the 9/11 Commission Report states that there is no hard evidence that Al Qaeda has earned money with the drug or diamond trade.⁶³

Other cells have engaged in criminality themselves. The explosives that were used for the train bombings in Madrid were traded for XTC and soft drugs, for example. The “gang of Roubaix” has robbed in order to finance a bombing during the G-7 in Lille according to the French public prosecutor.⁶⁴ In England a gang has furnished the *jihād* with large sums of money through a large banking scam combined with shoplifting. The gang members bought clothes and electronics with bank checks that were based on fraudulent bank numbers and swapped these goods for cash before it became clear that the bank checks were not covered.⁶⁵ In the Netherlands supporters of the Takfir Wal Hijra movement have been arrested and convicted for robbing, pick-pocketing, trade in counterfeited brand clothing, credit card fraud, drug trade, and telecom fraud (interview).⁶⁶

Much of the criminality is multifunctional. For instance, criminality does not only help to finance terrorism but also victimizes the enemy.⁶⁷ In other words, criminality enables extremists to proceed their battle with other means than violence. Additionally, the trade in false documents does not only bring forth resources but also enables militant Muslims to hide their identity.⁶⁸ In the Netherlands suspects have been arrested who had used several identity documents at the same time. This enabled them to conceal that they had encountered the police previously (interview). Likewise, counterfeited identity papers have been used to obtain social-security numbers. A Dutch investigation brought to light, for example, that several suspects of facilitating terrorism had applied for a social security number with the help of counterfeited French identity cards (interview). Telecom fraud is also multifunctional because it generates both revenues and communication means. Fencing stolen cell phones and telephone cards, not paying off phone bills, hacking telephone centers, and selling hacked information to phone shops are different kinds of telecom fraud.⁶⁹

In short, the role of sympathizers is limited with respect to generating revenues. First, extremists are forced to resort to other parties like consumers and criminal organizations because the donations of sponsors fall short. Second, criminality offers the possibility to victimize the enemy by other means than violence. So, resorting to others than sympathizers can at the same time present a necessity and an opportunity to extremists.

Communication

Muslim extremists resort to all sorts of communication means for their activities: couriers, letters, cell phones and satellite telephones, short wave transmitters, E-mails, chat groups,

and websites. Usually they shut out the social environment anxiously in order to keep their plans secretly. They cut themselves off the outside world, for instance, by arranging face-to-face meetings, sending encrypted messages, using voice over the Internet, or telephoning by means of “easy room” telephone cards that could be bought and filled up from all over the world and which have been removed by now.⁷⁰ However, extremists do use the social environment in order to mingle unobtrusively among a larger public. In this case it is irrelevant whether the public sympathizes with the *jihad*.

For example, some of the 11 September insurgents have used public libraries,⁷¹ other Al Qaeda members have resorted to Internet cafés,⁷² and Dutch convicts mostly called from telephone booths (interview). Phone shops also play an important role in the preparation of terrorism (interview).⁷³ For example, five people have been arrested in the Dutch town of Schiedam for using a phone shop for conspiring and stocking chemical ingredients of explosives.⁷⁴ In September 2003 the United States requested the Dutch government to extradite three persons who had contacted an American suspect of connections with bin Laden in a phone shop using false telephone cards.⁷⁵

Phone shops provide facilities to phone and use the Internet. Usually these shops specialize in these services but sometimes laundries, barbershops, or Islamic butchers exploit one or two telephone lines in their businesses. Most customers of phone shops are migrants who want to contact their relatives abroad. Hawala bankers also like to operate from phone shops because of the concentration of migrants.⁷⁶ Both the background of the clientele and the presence of hawala bankers attract Muslim extremists to phone shops. There they can communicate with foreign contacts unobtrusively because the majority of the customers use phone shops for this reason too and they can recourse to hawala bankers to transfer money.

The Internet offers jihadists another possibility to operate unobtrusively. In this case sympathizers do play a significant role. The Internet contains countless chat groups, websites, Web logs, and news groups concerning Islam that are chiefly visited by Muslims.⁷⁷ Many of them perceive the Internet as a concrete manifestation of a global Muslim community, *ummah*.⁷⁸ Radical Muslims who promote the *jihad* also mingle in these Internet environments.⁷⁹ Muslims use these sites for recruiting, conspiring, and fund-raising.⁸⁰ Potential recruits who have been spotted in chat rooms receive surveys and are tested on- and offline before recruiters decide whether they will be accepted as new members.⁸¹

The Internet also plays an increasingly important role in the training and education of new recruits since the destruction of the training camps in Afghanistan.⁸² The Internet contains elaborate instruction manuals on abduction, guerilla tactics in cities, and military battle techniques for jihadists,⁸³ and a film has been posted on a site that explains stepwise how to explode bombs with the help of cell phones, just as the commuter train bombings in Madrid were committed.⁸⁴ The Internet is also used for religious education. Saudi Arabic mullahs have provided Dutch radical Muslims with advice, for example.⁸⁵

The Internet is an attractive medium to extremists because it enables them to communicate anonymously with people all over the world. They can conceal and change their identity by ditching old E-mail addresses and creating new ones⁸⁶ and by stealing unguarded server space.⁸⁷ Jumping virtually from one computer to the next offers a possibility to conceal their physical location. Anonymity can also easily be preserved because hosting companies hardly check the minimal information they demand from their customers.⁸⁸

In short, militant Muslims use their social environment to mingle unobtrusively among an ignorant larger public that usually does not consist of sympathizers. Extremists move into public establishments like libraries, cyber cafés, phone shops, and the virtual *ummah*. The

popularity of the latter two locations shows that extremists prefer to immerse themselves in a larger crowd that is dominated by migrants or Muslims. Just as has been shown with respect to financing it is true that Muslim extremists often profit from their habits independent of their views on the violent *jihad*.

Conclusion

This article has looked into the role of the constituencies of Muslim extremists with respect to the preparation of the violent *jihad*. It is clear that they play an essential role in certain aspects. Sympathizers perform as sponsors, potential recruits, or propagandists of the violent *jihad*. However, extremists also recourse to migrants and Muslims who share several habits yet are completely unaware of the intentions of extremists. For example, they secretly use hawala bankers to transfer money, human smugglers to cross borders, and the Islamic “online community” to communicate. They also misuse the religious duty of Muslims to donate a share of their resources to the needy. Extremists also resort to non-Muslims. They appeal to immigration officers and steal personal documents from non-Muslims. They also use non-Muslims as consumers or make them a target of criminality.

Thus, backup of constituencies does not play an essential role in all aspects of the preparation of the *jihad*. Three reasons were found for this: it can be unnecessary, impossible, or unfavorable. First, extremists often do not need sympathy in order to reach their goals. Extremists secretly use Muslims and migrants as a cover and as a means to recourse to traditions and habits that are familiar to them. Resorting to their constituencies would create unnecessary risks. Second, in some facets extremists are unable to obtain support of their constituencies. This is so when sympathizers lack the means, knowledge, and opportunities needed to prepare and execute insurgencies. For instance, it is very difficult to find sympathizers who are able to provide residence permits. In this case extremists are forced to rely on other parties. Finally, in some facets resorting to sympathizers is unfavorable. This can either be for offensive or defensive reasons. An offensive reason applies when extremists want to continue the Holy War with other means than violence by resorting to the enemy instead of sympathizers. For example, criminality not only brings in revenues but also victimizes the enemy. A defensive reason for not recouring to sympathizers is to avoid suspicion. Some extremists have behaved like Westerners or have married non-Islamic women because they want to go unnoticed.⁸⁹ For this reason mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed commanded the hijackers of the 11 September attacks to avoid the Muslim community in the United States as much as possible.⁹⁰

Do the findings of the present study support the terrorist fighters and scholars who assign a crucial role to constituencies with respect to the violent *jihad*? Not entirely. The analysis demonstrated that sympathizers are indispensable to some preparative terrorist activities, yet not to others. Extremists depend less on their constituencies for making foreign journeys, generating revenues, and communication than they do for recruiting and sponsoring. The practical implication of this conclusion is that pushing back partisanship does not automatically result in the receding of the violent *jihad*. Do the findings support Gould’s thesis that personal interests can prevent constituencies from participating in collective violence? No, but this might be true anyway. This study did not establish how often and under what conditions sympathizers refused to give help because of fear of retaliation. However, it demonstrated that fear of retaliation is not the only reason why sympathizers do not play a decisive role in all facets of the preparation of the *jihad*. Sometimes terrorists were responsible for this rather than sympathizers. Muslim extremists sometimes choose

not to resort to their constituencies because of strategic reasons. They attempt to avoid taking unnecessary risks or to hit their enemies by other means than violence.

Therefore, although sympathizers may be important for the continuation of the *jihad*, their role is not self-evident. This is not only so because sympathizers might fear retaliation for helping Muslim extremists, but also because extremists do not always allow them to help. This conclusion asks for a refinement of the assumption that Muslim extremism cannot do without their constituencies.

Notes

1. The *jihad* is certainly not violent by definition (Hashmi, Sohail H. "Jihad." In *Encyclopedia of Politics and Religion*, ed. Robert Wuthnow, Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1998). pp. 425–426. Fighting an inner spiritual struggle for pure faith, defending the Muslim faith against aggressors, and conquering the hegemony of Muslims over non-believers are all referred to as *jihad*. This study is restricted to latter interpretation of the *jihad*. However, from this point, for matters of efficiency the adjective violent will not be added anymore when referring to the *jihad*.

2. David Rising, "Two provincial German towns emerging as unlikely center for Islamic extremism" *Associated Press*, 1 February 2005, available at (http://news.findlaw.com/scripts/prINTER_FRIENDLY.PL?page=/ap_stories/1/0000/2-1-2005/20050201010014_01.html).

3. *Agence France-Presse*, "US remains under terror threat from Al-Qaeda," *Breaking News*, 7 September 2004, available at (http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-09-09-threat-us_x.htm).

4. Roberta de la Roche Senechal, "Why is collective violence collective?," *Sociological Theory* 19(2) (July 2001), pp. 126–144.

5. Bruce Hoffman, "The changing face of Al Qaeda and the global war on terrorism," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27(2004), p. 550–551.

6. For a critical account of the reliability of data originating from public publications, see Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), pp. 64–68.

7. Respondents were a national prosecutor, two policy employees of the Dutch national intelligence and security service (AIVD), three analysts of the national police unit on counterterrorism and special tasks (UTBT), and two inspectors of the Rotterdam police force who led the investigation on the preparation of an insurgency on the American embassy in Paris or an American army basis in Belgium.

8. Donald Black, "The geometry of terrorism." *Sociological Theory* 22(1), (March 2004), pp. 14–25.

9. Donald Black, "Crime as Social Control," *American Sociological Review* 48 (February 1983), p. 34.

10. Black, "The geometry of terrorism," p. 16, italics in original.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

12. Roberta Senechal de la Roche, "Collective violence as social control," *Sociological Forum* 11(1) (1996), pp. 97–128.

13. de la Roche, "Why is collective violence collective?," pp. 126–144.

14. Roger V. Gould, "Collective violence and group solidarity: Evidence from a feuding society," *American Sociological Review* 64(3) (June 1999), pp. 356–380, Roger V. Gould, "Revenge as sanction and solidarity display: An analysis of vendettas in nineteenth-century Corsica," *American Sociological Review* 65 (October 2000), pp. 682–704.

15. Gould, "Collective violence and group solidarity," p. 375.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 376.

17. Gould, "Revenge as sanction and solidarity display," p. 692, italics in original.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 701.

19. Black, "The geometry of terrorism," p. 16.

20. Gould, "Revenge as sanction and solidarity display," p. 702.
21. David Crawford and Keith Johnson, "New terror threat in EU: Extremists with passports. Local Islamic youth join Jihad," *The Wall Street Journal*, 27 December 2004.
22. Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of terrorism: Instrumental and organizational approaches," in *Inside Terrorist Organizations*, ed. David C. Rapoport (London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 13–31; Oskar Verkaaik, *Migrants and Militants: Fun and Urban Violence in Pakistan, Muslim Politics* (Princeton, NJ [etc.]: Princeton University Press, 2004).
23. AIVD, "Rekruterung in Nederland voor de jihad: van incident naar trend (Recruiting for the Jihad in the Netherlands: From Incident to Trend)," (2002) available at (<http://www.aivd.nl/search/contents/pages/2957/rekruterung.pdf>), p. 14.
24. Ibid.
25. For example, Khalid el Hasnoui and Ahmed el Bakiouli, who were found dead in 2002 in Kashmir after they had been recruited for the *jihad* in the Netherlands, had often visited the radical Al Fourqaan mosque in Eindhoven; see Siem Eikelenboom, *Jihad in de polder: de radicale islam in Nederland (Jihad in the Polder: Radical Islam in the Netherlands)* (Amsterdam: Veen, 2004), p. 63.
26. Conform Alex Duval Smith, "France split over battle for Muslim souls and minds," *The Observer*, 11 July 2004, available at (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4968379-110633,00.html>).
27. *NRC-Handelsblad*, "Spanje streng voor moslimgevangenen (Spain Stern on Muslim Prisoners)," *NRC-*, 26 October 2004.
28. AIVD, "Rekruterung in Nederland voor de jihad."
29. Conform Dominik Cziesche et al., "Der Islamo-Faschismus: 'Als wäret ihr im Krieg'" (Islamic Fascism: "As if we were at war") *Der Spiegel* Special no. 2 (2004), p. 33/4.
30. The 9/11 Commission Report. "Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States." 2004.
31. R. S. Leiken, "Bearers of global jihad? Immigration and national security after 9/11" (The Nixon Center, 2004) available at (http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/Leiken_Bearers_of_Global_Jihad.pdf), p. 9.
32. Emerson Vermaat, "Bin Laden's terror networks in europe" (Toronto, Ontario: The MacKenzie Institute, 2002) available at (<http://216.119.99.176/commentary.html>), note 34.
33. Evert de Vos, "Jihad in de polder: wat bewoog Mohammed B. en Samir A.?" ("Jihad in the Polder: What Motivated Mohammed B. and Samir A."), *Intermediar*, 11 November 2004.
34. Leiken, "Bearers of global jihad? Immigration and national security after 9/11."
35. Hoffman, "The changing face of Al Qaeda and the global war on terrorism," p. 559, endnote 16.
36. E. R. Muller, R. F. J. Spaaij, and A. G. W. Ruitenbergh, *Trends in terrorism (Trends in terrorism)* (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer: 2003), p. 56/7; *Channelnewsasia.com*, "US probe finds Al-Qaeda travel agency," 23 August 2004, available at (http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_world/view/102524/1.html).
37. S. A. Camarota, "The open door: How militant Islamic terrorists entered and remained in the United States, 1993–2001," (Center for Immigration Studies, 2002), available at (<http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/theopendoor.pdf>); AIVD, "Rekruterung in Nederland voor de jihad"; Leiken, "Bearers of global jihad?," p. 15/6; Vivienne Walt, "Police see more European citizens involved in terror activities," *The Boston Globe*, 13 June 2004, available at (<http://www.hvk.org/hvk/articles/0604/101.html>).
38. The authors have found two cases where sympathizers may have provided help. First, somebody who had entrance to airport Schiphol would have helped a refugee from Germany to flee to Syria (interview). This man was about to be arrested for supporting terrorist activities against the Americans in Iraq. However, an investigation has not been able to clarify who had helped him to flee. The second case concerns a man with a double nationality; see Antony Barnett and Martin Bright, "Heathrow worker jailed for links with Al-Qaeda," *The Observer*, 21 March 2004, available at (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,12780,1174715,00.html>). According to an anonymous source he has "helped" the spiritual leader of the Moroccan group "Salifa Jihadia" on airport Heathrow

when he worked there as a site manager for a Canadian airline. In the meantime, both are incarcerated in Morocco due to their involvement with the assault in Casablanca in 2003. The authors know of one possible case where active help would have come from corrupt instead of sympathizing officials. According to an immigration adjudicator of the U.S. Immigration and Nationalization Service, an illegal Moroccan, who had connections with alleged September 11 ringleader–hijacker Mohammed Atta and Osama bin Laden’s brother Khalil, would have obtained a residence permit for a sham marriage by bribing immigration officials; see *TomFlocco.com*, “Congressman refuses to probe illegal alien terrorist cell in his own district,” 28 January 2005 available at (<http://www.tomflocco.com/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=106>), *TomFlocco.com*, “Sleeping with the Enemy,” 26 May 2004, available at (<http://tomflocco.com/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=63>). The Department of Homeland Security would have deported this illegal immigrant without hearing him as a material witness in the lawsuit this designated whistleblower filed against her superiors.

39. B. van Urk, J. Bosma, and A. B. F. M. Gussenhoven, “Rapport identiteitsfraude en (reis)documenten (Report identity fraud and (travel) documents),” (Koninklijke Marechaussee, 2003), available at (<http://gids.recht.nl/?nid=15948&RNLSSESSION=>).

40. For example, two North Africans who assassinated the Afghan rebellion leader Massoud possessed blank Belgium passports that were stolen in The Hague and Strasbourg; see Vermaat, “Bin Laden’s terror networks in Europe.” p. 2/3.

41. P. J. Smith, “The terrorists and crime bosses behind the fake passport trade,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review* 13(7) (July 2001), pp. 42–44 available at (<http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/citizen/0701fake.htm>).

42. Craig S. Smith, “Few nations check to see if passports are stolen, Interpol says,” *The New York Times*, 23 August 2004; *USNews.com*, “Terror’s best friend. 10 million missing passports floating around the world could mean a real security nightmare,” 6 December 2004, available at (<http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/041206/usnews/6passports.htm>).

43. Smith, “The terrorists and crime bosses behind the fake passport trade.”

44. Zakarias Moussaoui, the presumed twentieth 11 September hijacker, entered the United States this way. He remained in the United States illegally after he overstayed his temporary residence permit; see Camarota, “The open door: How militant Islamic terrorists entered and remained in the United States, 1993–2001,” p. 37.

45. Communique on the European Union and the visa waiver program communique, *Communique on the European Union and the Visa Waiver Program*, 18 October 2004, available at (<http://www.useu.be/Categories/Justice%20and%20Home%20Affairs/Oct1804USEUNonVWPStates.html>).

46. Conform Ramon Spaaij, “De financiering van terrorisme (The financing of terrorism),” *Proces*, no. 2 (2003), pp. 72–86; Mark Basile, “Going to the source: Why Al Qaeda’s financial network is likely to withstand the current war on terrorist financing,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27 (2004), pp. 169–185.

47. Josh Meyer, “Terror camps scatter, persist,” *Los Angeles Times*, 20 June 2005, available at (<http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/la-fg-camps20jun20,1,175000.story?page=2>). However, sponsors can also consist of secular states sharing a common enemy. For instance, an unofficial source cited a soldier who defected to the United States and who accused socialist president Chavez of Venezuela of donating one million dollar to Al Qaeda after 11 September, see *Joseph G2 Bulletin Farah’s*, “Al-Qaida south of the border. Rumsfeld: Human smuggling rings tied to Bin Laden’s terrorist network,” 16 February 2004, available at (http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=37133).

48. Eikelenboom, *Jihad in de polder: De radicale islam in Nederland*. Steven Emerson, *American Jihad: The terrorists living among us* (New York [etc.]: Free Press, 2003).

49. Mohamed Sifaoui, *Inside Al Qaeda: How I infiltrated the world’s deadliest terrorist organization* (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2003), p. 107/8.

50. Financieel Expertise Centrum, “Terrorismefinanciering en terrorismebestrijding (Financing terrorism and counterterrorism),” (2003), p. 44; Eikelenboom, *Jihad in de polder: de radicale islam in Nederland*; The final report of the national commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States, p. 170.

51. Emerson, *American Jihad*; Basile, "Going to the source: Why Al Qaeda's financial network is likely to withstand the current war on terrorist financing," p. 173; The final report of the national commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States.

52. Rohan Gunaratna, *Al Qaeda: Global network of terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Financieel Expertise Centrum, "Terrorisrefinanciering en terrorismebestrijding"; Van Traa-team, "Verkeerd verbonden? Beluizen in Amsterdam" ("Wrong connection? Phone shops in Amsterdam"), (Amsterdam: 2003), available at (<http://www.eenveiligamsterdam.nl/documents/thema008/Verkeerd%20verbonden,%20beluizen%20in%20Amsterdam.pdf>).

53. Robert Looney, "Hawala: The terrorist's informal financial mechanism," *Middle East Policy* 10(1) (Spring 2003), p. 166.

54. Nikos Passas, *Informal value transfer systems and criminal activities*. Wetenschappelijk Ondernoken Documentatie Centrum (Meppel: Boom, 2005).

55. Matthias Schramm and Markus Taube, "Evolution and institutional foundation of the Hawala financial system," *International Review of Financial Analysis* 12(4) (2003), pp. 405–420.

56. Conform E. R. Kleemans et al., *Georganiseerde criminaliteit in Nederland: Tweede rapportage op basis van de Wodc-monitor (Organized Crime in the Netherlands)*, Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum (Meppel: Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2002), available at (http://www.wodc.nl/images/ob198_tcm11-4814.pdf), pp. 117, 124. A hawala banker has been arrested in Spain, for example, because he left one particular transfer out of his books. An investigation proved that a telephone and a truck had been bought from this transfer money and that these goods were finally used to blow up a synagogue in Tunis (interview).

57. Glenn R. Simpson, "Expanding in an age of terror: Western Union faces scrutiny," *The Wall Street Journal*, 20 October 2004; see also Kleemans et al., *Georganiseerde Criminaliteit in Nederland: Tweede Rapportage op Basis van de Wodc-Monitor*, pp. 110–113.

58. Kleemans et al., *Georganiseerde criminaliteit in Nederland: Tweede rapportage op basis van de Wodc-monitor*, pp. 110–113.

59. Therefore, an agent was able to do business with a Jordanian bank that maintained contacts with Palestinian terrorist groups; see Simpson, "Expanding in an age of terror."

60. Gunaratna, *Al Qaeda: Global network of terror*; Basile, "Going to the source: Why Al Qaeda's financial network is likely to withstand the current war on terrorist financing."

61. BBC News, "'Hezbollah drug ring' broken up," 22 June 2005, available at (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4117960.stm>). Federal Research Division Library of Congress, "Nations hospitable to organized crime and terrorism," (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2003), available at (http://www.loc.gov/frd/frd/pdf-files/Nats_Hospitable.pdf); *Joseph Farah's G2 Bulletin*, Al-Qaida South of the Border.

62. Basile, "Going to the source: Why Al Qaeda's financial network is likely to withstand the current war on terrorist financing."

63. The final report of the national commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States, p. 171.

64. Financieel Expertise Centrum, "Terrorisrefinanciering en terrorismebestrijding," pp. 48/9.

65. *Times Online*, "High street fraud raised millions for terrorism," 25 November 2004, available at (<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,1-2-1373244-2,00.html>).

66. Algemeen Dagblad, "Nederlanders hielpen Al-Qaeda: Amerikanen willen uitlevering drie Amsterdammers" ("Dutch helped Al-Qaeda: Americans request extradition of three Amsterdam citizens"), 29 September 2003; Eikelenboom, *Jihad in de polder: De radicale islam in Nederland*.

67. Conform Steven Adolf and Wubby Luyendijk, "Takfir: kameleon onder islamisten" ("Takfir: chameleon among Islamists"), *NRC-Handelsblad*, 10 November 2004.

68. *Expatica*, "Islamic terrorist suspects held after police raids," 17 January 2005, available at (http://www.expatica.com/source/site_article.asp?subchannel_id=26&story_id=15674).

69. Van Traa-team, "Verkeerd verbonden? Beluizen in Amsterdam."

70. Caroline de Gruyter, "Midden-oosterse terroristen bellen graag bij Swisscom" ("Middle Eastern terrorists like phoning at Swisscom"), *NRC-Handelsblad*, 26 November 2004.

71. Anti-Defamation League, "Jihad online. Islamic terrorists and the Internet" (2002), available at (http://www.adl.org/internet/jihad_online.pdf).
72. Gordon Corera, "A web wise terror network," *BBC news*, 6 October 2004, available at (http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/in_depth/3716908.stm).
73. Anti-Defamation League, "Jihad online. Islamic terrorists and the Internet," p. 5.
74. *Algemeen Dagblad*, "Samir (17) Had met Al-Qaeda contact" ("Samir (17) consorted with Al-Qaeda"), 24 July 2004.
75. Eikelenboom, *Jihad in de polder: De radicale islam in Nederland*, p. 265.
76. Van Traa-team, "Verkeerd verbonden? Belhuizen in Amsterdam," p. 22.
77. Magriet Oostveen, "De knip-en-plak-islam: hoe jonge moslims in Nederland hun radicale wereldbeeld samenstellen" ("The eclectic Islam: How young Dutch Muslims assemble their world view"), *NRC-Handelsblad*, 27 and 28 November 2004.
78. Lawrence Wright, "The terror web. Were the Madrid bombings part of a new, far-reaching jihad being plotted on the Internet?," *The New Yorker*, 2 August 2004, available at (http://www.newyorker.com/printable/?fact/040802fa_fact).
79. AIVD, "Rekrutering in Nederland voor de Jihad; van incident naar trend," p. 18; *NRC-Handelsblad*, "De brigade van Abu Nawwaar" ("Abu Nawwaar's brigade"), 4 September 2004; for examples, see Eikelenboom, *Jihad in de polder: De radicale islam in Nederland*, p. 65 and *NRC-Handelsblad*, "De bibliotheek van Mohammed B." ("Mohammed B.'s library"), 17 November 2004.
80. Anti-Defamation League, "Jihad Online. Islamic terrorists and the Internet."
81. Anick Jesdanun, "Internet is extremists' channel of choice," *USA Today*, 25 June 2004, available at (http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2004-06-25-terror-online_x.htm).
82. *TaipeiTimes*, "Online support grows for Iraq's 'Prince of cutthroats,'" 6 October 2004, available at (<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2004/10/06/2003205773>); Tom Regan, "US cybersecurity chief's sudden resignation comes as terrorists increasingly use the Internet as a tool," *Csmonitor*, 7 October 2004, available at (<http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1007/dailyUpdate.html?s=rsst>).
83. Eric Lipton and Eric Lichtblau, "The reach of war: Web war," *The New York Times*, 23 September 2004.
84. Jon Boyle, "Internet virtual classroom for Al-Qaeda supporter," *BizReport*, 12 August 2004, available at (<http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=5957906>).
85. AIVD, "Saoedische invloeden in Nederland: verbanden tussen salafitische missie, radicaliseringsprocessen en islamitisch terrorisme" ("Saudi influences in the Netherlands: Connections between Salafist mission, processes of radicalization, and Islamic terrorism"), (2004), available at (<http://www.aivd.nl/contents/pages/8931/rapportsaoedischeinvloeden.pdf>).
86. Ariana Eunjung Cha, "From a virtual shadow, messages of terror," *The Washington Post*, 2 October 2004, available at (<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A1570-2004Oct1.html>).
87. For instance, *jihad* videos have recently been discovered on servers belonging to the Dutch football club Cambuur, the George Washington University, and the Arkansas Department of Highways and Transportation, see interview; Wright, "The terror web. Were the Madrid bombings part of a new, far-reaching jihad being plotted on the Internet?"
88. Cha, "From a virtual shadow, messages of terror."
89. Olivier Roy, "Euroislam: The Jihad within?," *The National Interest* 71 (Spring) (2003), pp. 63-74, available at (http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_2003_Spring/ai_99377576/print); *TomFlocco.com*, "Sleeping with the enemy," 26 May 2004; Eliane Sciolino and Jason Horowitz, "The talkative terrorist on tape: Madrid plot 'was my project'," *The New York Times*, 12 July 2004.
90. The final report of the national commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States, p. 215/6.

Copyright of *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

Copyright of *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.