5 Terrorism and the state

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Introduction

Any chapter that confronts the subject of terrorism immediately encounters problems of definition. Thus, acts of violence that come under the label 'terrorism' are not easy to study. Some heuristic clarifications on defining terrorism are provided by the sociologist Peter Waldmann and the political scientist Louise Richardson.[1] Together, their key defining elements leave us with the following insight: terrorism is a specific form of violence carried out by sub-state groups which plan and execute their politically motivated violent actions from a semi-legal or illegal milieu against civilians and against state institutions. The choice of victims and the type of terrorist act are of symbolic importance and aim to spread insecurity and win sympathy.[2] Applying the terrorist label to violent acts is a means of delegitimizing social movements and political groups and is routinely used by states. Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, these labelling processes became a powerful instrument in political life to deny the legitimacy of violent protests and to maintain and strengthen the modern state's monopoly of legitimate violence. Employing the terrorist label facilitates the isolation, social exclusion and persecution of oppositional groups. In this discriminatory discourse, the state and the media may create 'moral panics'. At the same time, this use of the term conceals the fact that the state – in the past as well as in the present – may act in a similar way to 'terrorists'. Indeed, state terrorism (not to be confused with state-sponsored terrorism) has led to many more deaths than the acts of so-called terrorists.

Seen in this perspective, terrorism may appear as little more than a label used by the state authorities to delegitimize their opponents. According to the famous dictum, one person's terrorists are another person's freedom fighters. Any study of modern terrorism cannot therefore disregard these problems. However, there is a danger here of avoiding what is a more complex historical problem. What is remarkable about much of the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe

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has been the way in which a particular form of politically motivated informal violence has developed within a variety of social movements, which has chosen to use methods that we can, with all the imprecision inherent to history, define as terroristic in nature. If this chapter does not therefore have the exact contours of some of the other chapters in the volume, it does, however, address an issue that historians need to consider. Terrorism (to use the necessarily contested term) appeared in Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century[3] and was closely related to two major developments: the emergence of the modern state, which effectively claims a monopoly over physical force, and the simultaneous expansion of complex modern societies characterized by the existence of organized social movements[4] (such as the labour movement), a political mass market and mass media which communicated news effectively and on a large scale. Terrorists both directly and indirectly challenged the state's monopoly of physical violence. Against this background, states took up the fight against this new enemy, employing police forces, paramilitary organizations and in many cases the military. The close relationship between state actions and terrorist violence makes it inevitable that our analysis not only looks at how terrorist actions are reactionary, but also how the state responds to terrorism or even provokes acts of violence labelled as terrorist.

Terrorism has its roots in social movements (such as the labour movement, New Left movements) and social milieux (communities, neighbourhoods, subcultures). Terrorists may mobilize social groups in order to gain support, but they are also restricted by the social milieu when their actions exceed the accepted norms and goals of their supporters. Terrorism is also a strategy of communication in which media play an important role.[5] The interactive processes of communication in which not only the terrorists but also state and society (including media) are involved need to be investigated. How do these actors perceive actions of political violence? And, more especially, in what situations can acts of terrorism acquire real levels of popular support?

State actions have a strong influence on terrorism. As Peter Waldmann pointed out,[6] security forces and terrorist groups become trapped in processes of mutual escalation in which each side claims it is reacting to the opponent's violence. In this interactive process, terrorist groups get locked into a dynamic of radicalization and social isolation that is reinforced by living an isolated, clandestine existence in the underground. De-individualization often goes hand-in-hand with a growing dependence on other group members, and strong internal emotional ties develop. The social isolation of the illegal group contributes to a growing radicalization of actions and of thinking. In these situations,

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ideology, or in some cases religion, function as mediums of compensation, and are often accompanied by the invention of particular rituals and symbols. The underground lifestyle helps foster images of heroic elites or martyrdom (often with pre-modern resonances) and makes the group immune to social realities. Thinking and acting follows only black and white terms, leaving no space for differentiation. A hermetic culture develops in which ideology and religion also serve to support the recruitment and mobilization of new activists.

A wealth of studies on terrorism exists, mostly written from social science, political science and legal studies perspectives and focusing on the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.[7] More recent publications have been strongly influenced by the September 11 attacks of 2001, and study organizations, ideologies and the potential threat that terrorism poses to democracy. Historical works on terrorism, however, are not abundant and this lack of research is all the more true for comparative historical studies.[8] During the 1970s and early 1980s, considerable scholarship emerged on the history of nineteenth-century anarchism in individual countries such as Germany, Italy, France and Russia and also on leading anarchist activists, such as Bakunin, Kropotkin, Malatesta or Most. Some of these publications were provoked by terrorist acts during the 1970s or influenced by labour-history perspectives that sometimes focused on revolutionary trade unionism or syndicalism.[9] Overall, however, historical scholarship on terrorism remains remarkably dominated by studies on nineteenth-century Russia or Western Europe during the 1970s.

The narrow temporal and geographical frameworks employed in many historical studies leads to problems of periodization. This volume does not follow David Rapoport's classification of terrorism into four waves.[10] Instead, we have categorized terrorism into five overlapping phases from the mid-nineteenth until the early twenty-first century. The first phase of terrorist violence began in the final quarter of the nineteenth century and included the activities of anarchist militants in Western Europe and Russia, although the label terrorist was – with the exception of Russia – seldom used at the time. Nationalist terrorism in the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans will also be studied as part of this phase. The second, right-wing phase of terrorism started after the First World War and stretched well into the 1930s. During these interwar years, militants tried to gain control of (newly established) states. A third phase of terrorist violence, with an anti-colonial focus, emerged in the mid-1930s and continued through the Second World War until the 1980s. In this period self-appointed 'freedom fighters' (a term invented during the period) struggled to remove colonial powers.

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This chapter analyses the militant measures that ethnonationalist activists used to target perceived oppressors, but also actions taken for the defence of their communities. A fourth phase of terrorism, associated with the New Left, emerged during the manifold cultural and political upheavals of the late 1960s, until the demise of the socialist states in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The early militants of this phase, who were mainly influenced by the protest movements of the 1960s, challenged the state monopoly of physical violence on unprecedented scales.

The fifth section of this chapter deals with religiously motivated terrorism in the post-1980s period, although this is a very problematic term.[11] New manifestations of terrorism had origins in the Western interventions in the Middle East and North Africa and in the rejection of a Western-dominated international order more generally. While most authors argue that religious terrorism started in the 1980s and is characterized by suicide bombings, four qualifications need to be made. First, religious convictions do not lead per se to terrorism. Religious communities resort to violent means when experiencing political and social isolation and when feeling under threat. Second, acts of religious terrorism are not only committed by Islamist groups but also by Christian fundamentalists such as Timothy McVeigh in 1995 or (in an earlier period) Jewish militants such as the Irgun. Third, religious, political, nationalist and even local concerns are often very closely related and are thus hard to separate. Anti-colonial violence had a religious character, as nationalism was articulated through local religions. Fourth, the motivations of religious terrorists stem from at least two sources: from individual religious beliefs and from an imagined transnational religious community, such as the global Islamist Umma. Recent patterns have led some authors to speak of 'transnational terrorism'. This term, however, tends to neglect the local roots (the radical milieu) as well as individual belief systems of (religious) terrorists. A religious terrorist does not solely act as a 'homeless … modern nomad' who is only symbolically connected with like-minded individuals. He or she inevitably has connections with certain social milieux.[12]

Anarchist and nationalist terrorism (*c.* 1870s–1914)

A number of developments shaped the emergence of terrorism during the nineteenth century. The term itself was not widely used and retained many ambiguities, but terrorism came to be associated principally with social revolutionary movements and struggles for national independence. They were directed against the ruling classes and their supporters and aimed to destabilize the existing political order. During

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this period, states endeavoured to rationalize their internal structures, to bureaucratize administrations and to strengthen the monopoly over force, and the violent actions of social revolutionaries and nationalists aimed to frustrate these processes in the interests of social and economic change or independence from broader imperial structures.

There was little consensus about how to label these movements. 'Terrorist' co-existed with other terms such as nihilist and anarchist, and all of these terms held negative connotations rooted in the French Revolution. Robespierre and the Jacobin government sought to create a positive image of the Terror – employed against enemies of the revolution and as means of disciplining their own supporters – by closely linking ideas of 'virtue' with 'terreur'. Terror was described as positive and a necessary part of government: it is 'la justice prompte, sévère, inflexible'. This positive interpretation of state terror did not survive the Jacobins and, after 1795, liberals began to promote the view of the years 1792–4 as one of unlimited violence carried out arbitrarily by an out-of-control state. Benjamin Constant, for instance, described terror as the consequence of 'pouvoirs sans bornes' and of 'puissance illimitée'. Associations between Terror and the state began to fade by the mid-point of the nineteenth century, when liberals became more and more integrated into parliamentary politics and institutions, and started to perceive the organized lower classes, rather than an unrestrained state, as the principal threat to peaceful order. In their view, present dangers no longer stemmed from state force, but were found among protest movements that used violent means in their struggle against established political orders. The term 'Terreur' became part of a political vocabulary used by officials, journalists and politicians to discredit radical groups who committed violent acts to spark the revolutionary energies of rural and urban populations. 'Terrorism' soon came to be an alternative label for 'nihilism' and 'anarchism'.

Given the baggage associated with the term, most radical social movements unsurprisingly avoided describing themselves as terrorists after 1848. Only in Russia was the term used by some intellectuals who defended individual murder as a political means of action. After the shooting of General Fydor Trepov, the governor of St Petersburg, on 24 January 1878, his assassin, Vera Zasulich, professed to be a 'terrorist, not a killer'. She employed the term to differentiate between politically motivated violence and criminal acts. Outside of Russia, however, social and political movements distanced themselves from 'terrorism' or applied it to the strategies of government and entrepreneurial classes during industrial conflicts. In doing so, the term became synonymous with different kinds of constraints. In Ireland and Britain, for instance,

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terrorism was used during the nineteenth century to describe intimidation before and during elections in order to secure success for a particular candidate.[13]

Even if the terrorist label was not widely adopted in the nineteenth century, various groups and individuals used terrorist means: they employed violence to intimidate state power, garner popular support and promote change. This violence evolved across different countries and under a variety of conditions. It was linked to deep divergences inside socialist and social-democratic parties between those who chose legal means and participation in parliament and those who sought to mobilize exploited rural and urban classes by 'exemplary actions', as witnessed in Germany, France and Italy. But violence was also used in countries where the legal means of defending popular interests were non-existent or dysfunctional. In Russia and Spain, terrorist groups tried to mobilize rural populations against the latifundia and traditional structures of power.[14]

Finally, terrorist violence also appeared during struggles to obtain political autonomy or independence. National minorities in the Balkans and across the Ottoman Empire used violence to sway European public opinion, promote social and political reforms, and obtain territorial enlargement and national independence. In these countries, Mark Mazower noted, 'the strength of expansionism was a major focus for popular politics'. The actors inside these different contexts were usually small groups of politically conscious intellectuals, frequently organized hierarchically, but sometimes artisanal workers and peasants were also prominent. In some cases, they were linked to the criminal world. In certain regions of the Balkans or in Ireland, militants were able to mobilize larger sections within the population at different moments, but in Western Europe they usually remained a small intellectual minority inside the wider social movement.

In Western and Southern Europe, the period before the First World War has been characterized as a time of anarchist terrorism. David C. Rapoport has contended: 'The "Anarchist wave" was the first global or truly international terrorist experience in history.'[15] In this view, anarchist groups were the most committed supporters of violent acts, evident in their doctrine of 'propaganda of the deed'.[16] Propaganda of the deed was not conceived as an individual act of violence, but as part of an insurrectionary strategy that would culminate in the battle to defeat state power. As Carlo Cafiero and Errico Malatesta, members of the Italian section of the First International, stressed: 'the act of insurrection confirms socialist principles, and is the most efficient means of propaganda and the only one which can penetrate, without deceiving and corrupting

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the masses, into the deepest social stratas and attract the vital forces of Humanity to the International Workingmen's Assocation'.[17] The social strata they spoke of were the numerically important peasantry and the urban working class. Similar to the two Italian anarchists, members of various socialist movements across different jurisdictions shared the hope that decisive violent acts might mobilize the proletarian and agrarian masses that had so far remained passive. Thus propaganda by the deed was, as its name suggests, a strategy of communication. But this strategy was not generally accepted. Similar to the social movements in Western and Southern Europe, radical Russian intellectuals debated two conflicting strategies: one side aimed to develop 'propaganda by the deed' and the other sought to win over the population with peaceful political propaganda. There was broad agreement in anarchist circles throughout Europe, however, at least in June 1879, that the terrorist act should be considered as the *ultima ratio*: 'Political terror as a form of struggle is acknowledged only as an extreme and exceptional measure for certain special circumstances.'[18]

Anarchist ideas developed in European countries where insurrectionary strategies had failed. During the 1848 revolutions, uprisings were suppressed with relative ease by national armies in different Western European countries. In 1870, Blanquists, who were faithful to the strategy of insurrection, succeeded in occupying the Hôtel de Ville in Paris; but, as they had no clear political strategy or plan of how to proceed with this symbolic power, they were easily removed. In Russia, the nine attempts at killing Tsar Alexander that preceded his death in March 1881 did not provoke positive reactions in the rural population. Despite disappointments, the *Narodniki* pursued a Jacobin strategy of a successful 'coup' for a short period. In most countries, however, the difficulties inherent in a political struggle which wanted to take power from the state by a *coup de main armé* were all too evident. In Italy, the insurrectional strategy did not succeed in the rural riots in Romagna, Apulia or Sicily in 1874. In Ireland, the struggle of the Land League against high rents and British landowners came to a peaceful end with the 1882 Kilmainham Treaty, despite the high levels of violence during the 'Land War' (1879–82). Even before this treaty, two of the leaders of the Irish National Land League, Michael Davitt and William O'Brien, strongly argued against bomb attacks in their organization's newspaper, *United Ireland*. After the Paris Commune in 1871, revolutionary ideas were repressed and a move towards a more legal republicanism became evident among the population.[19]

The situation was different in Spain. In the south, notably in Andalusia, small groups continued to be active among the peasantry,

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organizing resistance during economically bad years and challenging unequal property structures. They targeted the authorities and local power holders by occupying land, strikes and murder, which provoked violent repression. In these circumstances, the idea of a civil war and armed struggle was propagated by different organizations in Andalusia, but different attempts at insurrection failed and the movement was reduced to local offshoots.[20]

Insurrection also proved to be an attractive strategy for militant nationalists in the Balkans. Besides the secret anarchist societies that operated in Serbia and Bosnia, there were open confrontations between the Turkish army and national independence movements. The Macedonian Revolutionary Movement profited from the support of sections of the Christian community, and some elements of the peasantry aimed at an open military confrontation with the Ottoman army in 1903. The attack was ill prepared and poorly supported, and collapsed along with the illusionary hopes that the European Great Powers would intervene to support the Macedonian cause against the Porte. Insurrection also failed in Turkish Armenia during the Sassan Rebellion of 1894, when the Hunchakian Revolution Party tried to challenge the Turkish army and draw the attention of the European powers to the disastrous plight of Armenians. Though European diplomats succeeded in negotiating a Reform Programme with the Sultan, it was never implemented. Another attempt during the Zeitun Rebellion (1895–6) proved similarly unsuccessful. It was only in 1910 that the Albanian rebellion against the Turkish state was successful and after the first Balkan war an independent Albania was created.

Confronted with the failure of insurrection as a means of social and political change, social movements in most European countries came to be divided between those who chose legal means and parliamentary opposition, and those who continued to use violence. In countries with opportunities for legal political participation and political rights, the reformist strategy quickly became predominant. Even in Spain, where the anarchists were influential inside the labour movement, ideas of creating a political party and of promoting unionization as well as republicanism became prominent in Barcelona during the 1880s.[21] The majority of German social democrats, predominant inside the Second International, defended the use of peaceful means and Wilhelm Liebknecht was categorical in his refusal of violence: ‘Violence did not make a revolution and is not revolutionary at all.’[22] Among those who accepted violent means in principle, some began to encourage individual violence, a strategy based on the idea that the success of murder and bombing would show the weakness of the existing order and encourage

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the proletarian population to rise against government. As Carlo Cafiero argued in *La Révolté* in 1880: 'Above all, whatever smells of revolt and gunpowder, there we must be … the people carry the living revolution in their entrails, and we must fight and die for them.'[23] But this strategy was widely contested, even inside the Russian movements. *Narodnaja Volja*, which promoted individual acts of violence, was severely criticized by those who patiently struggled to change the political attitude of the workers through more peaceful means. Chaltrurin, the co-founder of the union of workers of Northern Russia, complained that when they have some success, 'some members of the intelligence have somebody eliminated and everything is destroyed … They should give us some time'.[24] Irish 'physical-force' nationalists also moved away from insurrection. In December 1875, *The Irish World* argued against the idea of insurrection as 'untimely and ill-advised' and suggested a 'new mode of warfare'.[25]

The *fin de siècle* witnessed numerous developments inside the anarchist movement. The legal, parliamentary strategy of socialism became increasingly successful and attracted more and more supporters. The Italian anarchist movement was rocked when Andrea Costa, who along with Malatesta and Cafiero had been a prominent leader of the anarchist movement, criticized revolutionary activism and argued in favour of legal action. At the end of the 1870s, he turned towards socialism and was elected a deputy in 1882.[26] But in some countries, anarchist ideas came to fruition not in organized parties, but among trade unions. The creation of revolutionary syndicalism in France and Spain was a sign that former anarchists had moderated their violent politics and chose to concentrate on the general strike. On the other hand, a smaller number of anarchists refused to compromise and continued to promote violence as the means of bringing change, a strategy that often degenerated into individual acts of revenge.[27]

Terrorist acts continued to be prominent in societies where socialism did not have the avenues to develop legally. This was the case in Russia and Spain where political murder played an important role in political change.[28] The Spanish Prime Minister Canalejas was killed in 1912 after restricting freedom of press and suppressing social movements. In such cases, terrorism could be seen as a reaction to state repression. In 1909, the police and army intervened by firing on protests in Barcelona against military service in Morocco, killing hundreds of participants. Similar repressive measures surrounded the execution of the anarchist Francisco Ferrer. At the end of the nineteenth century, the importance of violence and an atmosphere of tension in Russia has also been stressed: 'everyday newspapers throughout the Russian Empire

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recorded dozens of individual assassination attempts, bombings, ideologically motivated robberies, incidents of armed assault, kidnapping, extortion and blackmail for party purpose and vendettas based on political issues'.[29]

In societies where certain levels of legality were respected, only isolated members of the anarchist movements used violence. They did not aim to mobilize broader parts of the population but to punish officials for participation in repression. In Russia, Vera Zasulich wounded a St Petersburg police chief because of his maltreatment of political prisoners. Between 1893 and 1897, a series of terrorist actions in Barcelona started with an attack on General Arsenio Martinez Campos, who was accused of being responsible for the execution of Jerez peasants.[30]

In Germany and Austria, individual terror appeared in the 1880s, in France between 1882 and 1892. In Italy terrorist acts surfaced during the 1890s with the attempted assassination of Crispi, while outside of Italy the French President Sadi Carnot was killed by an Italian anarchist, as were the Spanish prime minister and the Empress of Austria. In Spain the harsh repression of an insurrection of rural workers at Jerez and the execution of its leaders motivated Paulino Pallas to attack General Martinez Campo. Pallas was executed for this deed and, to avenge his death, Santiago Salvador threw two bombs in Barcelona's Liceo Theatre, which was packed to capacity at the time.[31] In his study of anarchism, Ulrich Linse has portrayed the image of a 'vicious circle of assassination – police repression – assassination'. He argues that 'each political assassin takes revenge for his predecessor who has been executed … political murder becomes a form of vendetta'.[32] Angel Smith also refers to a 'spiral of action and repression' in Barcelona.[33] Across Europe, 'propaganda by the deed' increasingly led anarchists into political isolation.

That said, there were major differences in the ways in which anarchist violence was used. In Russia, terrorist acts and political murder appeared earlier than in other European countries, while in Spain both rural and urban violence lasted longer. At the same time, not all anarchists supported individual terror or even violence as a legitimate political means. In 1892 the Italian anarchist Francesco Merlino stated that a revolutionary might use violence but 'he must know how to use it so as not to create unnecessary victims, so as not to create, under the pretext of curing, the evils and pain of poor humanity'.[34] Here the relationship between the means and goals of revolutionary practice were clearly formulated. In 1892, Kropotkin had already distanced himself from terrorist means when he wrote, 'very sad would be the future of the revolution if it could only triumph by terror'.[35] Even in Barcelona,

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'by no means all anarchists supported terrorist acts'.[36] Not all terrorists were anarchists in the period before 1914. One might even argue that it was only in those moments in which the anarchists lost their contact with larger social movements (mainly the labour movement) that individual terror emerged as a strategy that ultimately led anarchism up a dead end.

Anarchists were not alone when they employed individual terror, but the approaches of other groups differed. The Russian intellectuals who engaged in individual violence during the 1870s and 1880s were not organized in loose groups, as was the case with the anarchists, but in hierarchical organizations. Inside the large-scale Social Revolutionary Party (PSR) lay a clandestine branch committed to individual terror and which killed a minister of education, two interior ministers, a general governor and a member of the royal family.[37] The Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), which struggled for national independence, was much more structured than an anarchist organization and retained a strict hierarchy. In 1882, a splinter, clandestine organization named the Irish National Invincibles emerged inside the IRB which advocated assassination and was responsible for the 1882 Phoenix Park murders in Dublin.[38] The Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) by contrast used terror 'as a primary means of fund-raising, publicity and recruitment'. It promoted, aside from national independence, ideas of social justice and of equality between Islam and Christianity. In Armenia, the discussion whether national liberation should be linked to socialism was even leading to a split in the Hunchakian Revolution Party in 1898.

The history of early terrorism can be understood as part of the history of social (and socialist) movements evolving under diverse conditions across different European countries. The decline of anarchist violence was an indicator of the success of the legalistic and parliamentary strategies employed by socialists and social democrats in those societies where a certain political space and mechanisms of political participation were guaranteed. The anarchists of different European societies who contested this form of representation were partially attracted to terrorist violence after their failure either to win mass support or compete with socialist parties. The willingness to use violence varied between persons and countries. It was stronger in Spain, where the conditions of political life were difficult and repression was extremely bloody. In Russia, the specific circumstances of autocratic governance and general political apathy pushed intellectuals to use assassination and bombings in order to provoke change. In Macedonia, Albania and Turkish Armenia, minority ethnic and religious groups used violent

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means to struggle against the Ottoman Empire and to gain public support in Western Europe. In societies like Germany, France, Italy and Ireland mechanisms existed for integrating political outsiders that were reasonably effective.[39]

Terrorism was nurtured by certain milieux inside social groups. One might make loose distinctions between artisanal and rural violence. The first group was prominent inside the anarchist movement. The famous French anarchist Jean Grave worked as a shoemaker before moving to typography and directing the newspaper *Révolté* in Geneva.[40] In 1892, the Parisian newspaper *Le Matin* listed 500 anarchists in Paris. Among them there were ten journalists, twenty-five typesetters, two proofreaders but also numerous artisans who worked as tailors, shoemakers, cabinet makers, barbers, bricklayers.[41] In Italy as well, it was the blacksmith Petro Acciarito who attempted to assassinate King Umberto on 22 April 1897. Intellectuals were predominant in the early Russian organizations as well as in Macedonia, Romania and Turkish Armenia. Between 1902 and 1911, however, the social actors were changing: most of the acts of terrorism in Russia were carried out by workers and artisans, with intellectuals becoming less important.[42] Women became increasingly involved in revolutionary actions.[43] A second group sympathetic to terrorist methods could be found among peasants and farm labourers, who protested during bad harvests against high prices and unequal land structures, as in Spain. They were also present in southern Italy among those who resisted the government's attempts to establish a monopoly over legitimate force in the 1890s.

In some cases migration encouraged the use of terrorist violence. In the United States, 'skirmishing' – a form of urban guerrilla warfare – was advocated and supported by money from the Irish immigrant community. It is well known that Gaetano Brecsi, who killed King Umberto in 1900 to revenge the *Fatti di Maggio*, had just returned to Italy from New Jersey before he fired the pistol.[44] German emigrants in New York who formed the Social Revolutionary Club did not commit any violent acts themselves but continually defended violent strategies, notably when the club expressed its 'sympathy with the deed of the Russian Nihilists' after the assassination of Tsar Alexander II.[45] The Hunchakian Revolutionary Party was created by students in Geneva, another branch in Tiflis. At the same time, Jensen is correct in downplaying the importance of emigration for terrorism when he writes: 'The role of diasporas in fomenting terrorism, however, should not be exaggerated … Before 1914, twenty percent or less of the French and Spanish and none of the German anarchists involved in propaganda by the deed were émigrés.'[46]

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The history of terrorism cannot be explained without looking at confrontations with the state. Terrorist attacks aimed to provoke the state in a way that revealed its weaknesses, and often heads of states were targeted. Between 1894 and 1912, 'seven European, Russian, and American monarchs or heads of state or government were assassinated by anarchists (or former anarchists)', and there was an attempt on the life of the Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II.[47] In this sense, terrorism before 1914 was less – as Rapoport claims[48] – a doctrine than a practice. Jean Grave, editor of the *Révolté*, stressed this feature of the movement after 1881: 'we all were dreaming – more than less – of bombs, attentats, "outstanding" actions which might undermine bourgeois society'.[49] In Barcelona, 'a climate was created in which attacks on leading politicians or military figures were received with broad sympathy in anarchist and even wider working-class circles'.[50] Terrorism did not only aim at provoking the state but was conceived as a reaction to the harsh repression that characterized Russia and Spain during the 1880s and 1890s. Terrorist attacks also attempted to destabilize weak states, evident in the Balkans when guerrilla warfare and attacks on Turkish garrisons and soldiers were employed to undermine the credibility of Ottoman rule.

Yet terrorism did not diminish state power but contributed to state building. Governmental officials described assassins and dynamiters as outlaws, or as Crispi put it in 1894, a 'new enemy of society'.[51] All around Europe governments used terrorist attacks in order to create 'moral panics inside populations'. Newspapers were instrumental in creating such reactions. In 1892, when the anarchist Ravachol was condemned to death in Paris, the imminence of revenge attacks by his alleged followers was proclaimed in newspapers and special issues of *La Dynamite*. Many anonymous letters threatened individual or public targets. In this way, newspapers created an atmosphere whereby the government could act quickly and propose three new laws restricting public liberties.[52] Media coverage of terrorist acts, however, had other effects. In 1878, the sympathetic way in which German newspapers reported on the two attempts to shoot Kaiser Wilhelm I increased his popularity.[53]

The value of an active press policy and careful observation of newspaper content became apparent to different European governments during the era of assassinations. In Germany, Italy and France, newspapers were subjected to strict controls that limited the liberty of expression and prohibited articles that promoted or defended violence against the established order. Britain seems to have been an exception inside Europe as core civil and public rights were not restricted. But this image changes if the Irish context is considered. The British authorities did

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not hesitate to suspend habeas corpus and restrict liberties when they perceived the social order to be under threat.[54]

At the same time, the establishment of a monopoly of physical violence was facilitated by terrorism. Even less well-organized states such as Spain or Italy used their experiences of violence in order to reinforce the police and the army, such as the establishment of the Guardia Civil. After the Sicilian upheavals in January 1896, Crispi complained 'in Italy, the means of resistance are lacking' and he asked for 'an effective law … that can destroy this pestilence that spreads among the people, and against which the defensive weapons of all governments of the world are ready'.[55] Significantly, during this period a policy of internal political exile – *il confino* – was established which was re-employed under Mussolini's fascist government. France and Germany witnessed the emergence of the political police while Britain, Italy, Spain, Russia, Germany, Austria and France used *agents provocateurs* to infiltrate terrorist groups along with international networks of spies and informers.[56] The success of this strategy was visible in Germany where government used its links to the underground to manipulate the perceived threats posed by anarchists in ways that benefited the exigencies of politics and government.[57]

The murder of Alexander II, who had tried to introduce liberal reforms in Russia, opened up an era of severe repression during which the secret police and army were developed and consolidated. Both contemporaries and historians viewed repression in Russia to be particularly severe and barbaric, but against this thesis Jane Burbank has argued that 'the Russian Empire was less efficiently policed and less harshly disciplined than the canonically "European" powers'.[58] Capital punishments were less frequent than in other European countries, Russia sent a smaller portion of its population to Siberia than Britain shipped overseas and the French labour colonies had more yearly victims than the ones in Siberia. Burbank also underlines that one should also consider daily routine policing as well as emergency interventions, and demonstrates that the police were not just repressive but were part of local structures of daily life.[59] This argument against over-emphasizing the repressive nature of policing in different European societies is interesting when applied to other countries.[60] In the Ottoman Empire, for example, the weakness of the army and police was proverbial, yet conflicts such as those in the Balkans provoked reforms and when violent attacks occurred the Porte's army reacted with the violence usually associated with authoritarian governments.

The movements and actions that sought to reveal the state's weaknesses and shake its legitimacy ultimately contributed to its reinforcement. In

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this process, national governments succeeded in transforming the image of the terrorist from a kind of social and political Robin Hood to a criminal who should be punished.[61] Terrorist actions also pushed different European states to collaborate and to look for common procedures and agreements to persecute terrorists across borders. International cooperation to stamp out anarchism was sought by the continental powers, and Britain, which had its own problems with Irish dynamiters, supported initiatives to exchange information regarding violent organizations and the possibilities of international laws to control them.[62] At the 1898 anti-anarchist conference in Rome, however, the dangers posed by dynamite had greatly diminished in Britain and British delegates refused any agreement on the extradition of convicted terrorists or common measures to persecute them. Though the Rome conference had some small success, the dangers of terrorism and political murder were not sufficiently strong to overcome nationalist tendencies and encourage long-lasting international agreements inside Europe.

Finally, terrorism before 1914 was characterized by its international character and transnational relationships. 'The (Russian) Terrorist Brigade in 1906 had its headquarters in Switzerland, launched strikes from Finland (an autonomous territory of the Russian empire), got arms from an Armenian terrorist group, Russians help with training, and were offered funds by the Japanese to be laundered through American millionaires.'[63] This might be an exceptional group. But it is true that national boundaries did not stop collaborations across borders. Sadi Carnot, the French prime minister, and the Empress Elizabeth of Austria were assassinated by Italian anarchists. Their motivations were not nationalist, but grew out of solidarity with their international comrades and their desire for revenge. In addition, small terrorist cells of German, French and British anarchists met in the convivial atmosphere of London, while other revolutionaries gathered at Geneva.[64]

Right-wing terrorism of the interwar years

After the Great War classical revolutionary terrorism temporarily decreased in Europe.[65] This was a consequence of economic improvement, but also of the changes in social and political life. In most European countries the labour movement could act under improved legal conditions. On the one hand struggles between political parties and trade unions were aiming to enlarge or defend spaces and resources of action. On the other hand, more radical and often more militant forms of opposing existing societies became available with the establishment of communist parties and organizations. Communism was,

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however, careful to distinguish itself from the unstructured terrorism of the past. Loyal to its notion of a more serious strategy of revolutionary action, the acts of violence committed by communist activists tended to be more organized, formalized and goal-oriented than the sometimes individualistic and symbol-laden 'propaganda of the deed'.[66] Nonetheless, during the depression years violence in working-class neighbourhoods was labelled as terroristic. These actions grew out of militant milieux that were only loosely connected to communist parties and organizations.[67] After the First World War, the Bolsheviks took on the anarchist terrorist's mantle as public enemy no. 1. Moreover, during the interwar years, terrorism in Europe was overshadowed by other kinds of political violence like civil war and revolution. The predominance of these violent actions absorbed public attention leaving only little room for the pre-1914 discourses on individual acts of terrorism.

After 1918, terrorist attacks undoubtedly occurred in European countries, though only some of them could attract long-lasting or intense public attention. This was true for two types of country. First, in countries like Spain and Italy the militancy of pre-war labour relations remained relatively unchanged and anarchism or anarcho-syndicalism had strong footholds in the labour movement.[68] Conflicts between a weak government, employers and weak working-class organizations led to frequent uses of violence from all sides. Between 1919 and 1923, violent conflicts in Catalonia between government and employers on the one side and syndicalists and anarchists on the other side led to 'conditions of quasi-civil war'.[69] This violence was not only exercised by social movements, but also by the government, employers and hired-gunmen, which were employed on all sides. Italian anarchists exploded bombs in Milan (1920 and 1923) and in Turin (1921). In France, Prime Minister Clemenceau was wounded by an anarchist in 1919. In the United States, labour-related terrorist violence featured letter-bombs to high officials, but also spectacular explosions such as the one at Wall Street in September 1920.

Second, in Italy, Austria and Germany, and also in Spain after the First World War, there were strong right-wing or fascist organizations. These groups employed terrorist violence based on a mixture of nationalism with anti-communist/anti-Bolshevist rhetoric, but also on anti-Semitism.[70] In Italy, opposition to the fascist government led to the attempted assassination of Mussolini in the Diana Theatre in Milan in 1923.[71] When looking at (attempted) political murder after the First World War multiple motives can be found, including personal interests and jealousies. Thus, assassinations were no longer motivated by purely political motives or acts of mere revenge.[72] Instead, as Eric Hobsbawm

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has observed, there was a widespread belief that 'one's own cause is so just and the adversary's so terrible that all means to achieve victory or avoid defeat are not only legitimate but necessary'.[73] In Bulgaria Petko Petkov (member of the agrarian party) was murdered in 1924. In Austria there was an attempt on the life of Chancellor Ignaz Seipel (1924) and on the mayor of Vienna, Karl Seitz (1927). In Romania the fascist Iron Guard killed a police prefect (1926). In Weimar Germany leading politicians were killed by right-wing organizations. Among the victims were Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht (January 1919), but also Matthias Erzberger (August 1921) and Walther Rathenau (June 1922). Assassination attempts were made among others against Philipp Scheidemann (1922) and the journalist Maximilian Harden (1922).[74] In Berlin in 1921–2 Turkish politicians were assassinated by Armenian nationalists.[75] In October 1934 three Croatian nationalists killed the Yugoslav king, Alexander, in Marseilles.[76]

As the Turkish, Russian, German and many other cases demonstrate (see Chapters 3 and 4), the political murders of the post-First World War years were not merely the acts of single individuals, but were also part of a new culture of paramilitarism.[77] When compared with nineteenth-century anarchism, where not only men but also women were active, right-wing terrorism after the Great War was principally a male affair.

In Germany, the motivations of the right-wing terrorists fighting against the democratic Republic were shaped by a mixture of militant nationalism, anti-republicanism, anti-Bolshevism and anti-Semitism. Right-wing militants comprised former First World War veterans and younger men (among them many students) who had not participated in the war but instead mythologized a collective front-line experience. Many members of these right-wing militias later joined national socialist organizations. Public reactions towards right-wing murder in the Weimar Republic were characterized by degrees of sympathy and apologism, but there were also labour strikes and public proclamations defending the democratic Republic. This ambivalence also held for the Law for the Protection of the Republic, which was passed in July 1922 by the Reichstag, but it was the federal states that decided how it would be put into practice.[78]

Anti-colonial terrorism (*c.* 1920s–1990s)

Anti-colonial terrorism emerged after the First World War and gained further momentum in the aftermath of the Second World War. In the 1920s, it is hard to disentangle anti-colonial terrorism from other

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forms of political violence, except maybe in the case of the Irish War of Independence (1919–21). But even there a bloody civil war between pro- and anti-treaty Irish nationalists, lasting until May 1923, followed the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty that established the Irish Free State.[79] What should be kept in mind is the fact that anti-colonial terrorism, like other forms of political violence, destabilized countries where state monopolies over physical violence were not yet complete or were eroded over the course of war. Given this fact it comes as no surprise that after 1918 newly established European states like Czechoslovakia and Poland, but also Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal struggled hard to establish police forces which were independent of armies (that were often characterized by anti-republicanism) and were willing and able to defend democracy against political enemies from left and right.[80]

In addition, one can include the heterogeneous partisan and resistance movements of the Second World War under the category of anti-colonial terrorism. Resistance to Nazism and to the policies of the Third Reich as an occupying power drew large numbers of Europeans into acts of violence which, though they were not terroristic in origin, often became in effect terroristic in character. Thus, many resistance groups engaged in attacks on German soldiers and civilians, and engaged in assassinations of those collaborators who were perceived to have betrayed their own people for the German cause. These militants not only aimed at winning sympathy or spreading fear (especially among those who collaborated with the occupiers), but they also wanted to free territories from occupying forces using guerrilla tactics. Partisans were active in the Soviet Union, the Balkans, Greece, France and Italy to name only a few countries.[81] Moreover, conflicts with partisans, at least in the occupied parts of the Soviet Union, were fought not only by the army (and thus in a war), but also by the police, and established a durable psychology of hostility to terrorism and partisan activities in the minds of those who participated in them. In Germany, anti-partisan actions were still present in the memories of policemen when they encountered New Left terrorism during the 1970s.[82] From the start of the campaign against the Soviet Union in June 1941, German anti-partisan actions were not only motivated by racial, political or circumstantial elements but also by a 'guerillaphobia'[83] that dated back to the First World War.[84]

The Soviet partisan movement is hard to distinguish from the more city-based political undergrounds formed by party activists. Rural villages were the main recruitment area for the partisans. Peasants and the working class provided the backbone of the guerrilla army, with the rest, roughly 10 per cent, made up of former soldiers. While no reliable

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data exists, it is estimated that there were some 280,000 active Soviet partisans in the summer of 1944, with many women among them.[85] Beginning in 1942, the partisans employed a broad range of tactics against the German occupiers, including coordinated actions to frustrate transport and communication systems and larger raids against the military.[86] The infamous railway war in the Kursk region in 1943 illustrated the effectiveness of partisan tactics. German military officials called partisans 'terrorists' and their response was often accompanied by mass murder of civilians, political enemies, and pogroms against Jews.[87] In this special kind of partisan warfare (*Bandenkampf*), German actions were led by combined army, SS and police units and supported by local auxiliaries. Their efforts often failed as partisans held public support and were able to retreat into impassable terrain. Aside from the Soviet Union, intense partisan wars occurred in the Balkans (mainly in Yugoslavia), where many German units had to be deployed against the guerrillas. In May 1942, Reinhard Heydrich was attacked in Prague by Czechoslovakian partisans and died the following month. In Eastern Europe, partisan wars were crueller, fiercer, and had much higher death tolls than in the West.

Almost everywhere in German-occupied Europe, however, cycles of violence and repression became a dominant feature of the final years of the war, bringing large sections of the population into contact with the reality of terrorism and state repression. Such terror, and its repression, also blurred the dividing line between civilians and combatants to unprecedented degrees. As a consequence, terrorists in the post-1945 period were more prepared to kill not only members of the political elites, but also innocent parties, which in turn provoked harsh state reactions.

If the fight against the fascist occupiers and their tactics of mass annihilation mobilized the partisan movements of the Second World War, national self-determination was the central focus of post-war anti-colonial activists. Along with the Irish Republican Army, similar national liberation movements existed and three of these organizations achieved their aims of building national states:[88] the Jewish Irgun Zwai Le'umi (Irgun),[89] the Cypriot EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) and the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). After 1945, the success of anti-colonial terrorism was due to several factors. First, the foundations for success were facilitated by the fact that the international community – most recently with the establishment of the United Nations – embraced the principle of self-determination. Diaspora groups and foreign states supported anti-colonial actions in ways unseen before. Anti-colonial militants portrayed themselves as

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freedom fighters, while states and mass media continued to describe them as terrorists. Second, anti-colonial terrorists largely abandoned the tactics of killing representative members of the elites, and instead targeted members of the police forces and also bystanders. This forced colonial powers to reinforce the military, which did not solve the conflict. In Algeria, the brutal policy of torture employed by the French army general Massu acquired notoriety and mobilized many Algerians into the ranks of the anti-colonial forces.[90] Third, anti-colonial terrorists did not employ violence alone, but endeavoured to build modern political organizations that were effectively structured and sensitive to social and political change. Moreover, harnessing the rapidly growing media, they were able to communicate their goals beyond local regions to transnational audiences. Kurdish terrorist organizations, with their 'history of constant failure', were oriented towards traditional social structures and were unable to organize political parties effectively.[91] Due to clan-based patterns of organization, where the key role belonged to the *agha* or clan-leader, they remained internally fragmented and sectarian in outlook. That (Kurdish) terrorism resurfaced again and again was due to the extreme repression employed by the Turkish state.[92]

Bruce Hoffman points out that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was instrumental in making terrorism a truly international phenomenon.[93] This process started in July 1968 with the hijacking of an Israeli El-Al airplane travelling from Rome to Tel Aviv. Because El-Al was state-owned, the hijacking forced the Israeli state to communicate directly with the terrorists who, in this case, demanded the release of imprisoned Palestinians. The episode illustrated how terrorists were no longer based in one country and that they did not hesitate to choose victims from any third-party state. Thus, hijacking airplanes found an important place in terrorist tactics. During the 1972 Munich Olympics, the Israeli team was held hostage by the Palestine Group Black September. The move ended in bloodshed with nine Israeli hostages, five terrorists and one policeman losing their lives. Although Black September did not achieve their immediate aims, the situation in Palestine stood at the centre of international media attention. These events strongly influenced German terrorists, but also the actions of Armenian terrorist organizations ASALA (Armenian Army for the Secret Liberation of Armenia) and JCAG (Justice Command of Armenian Genocide), which were formed in 1975. Over the following ten years, these two organizations killed more than forty Turkish diplomats. Via Lebanon, the influence of the Palestinian conflict on Armenian terrorists continued to be evident into the 1990s.[94] An impact was also felt in Turkey, where the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a

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Marxist-Leninist ethnonationalist organization, formed in 1978 and started a campaign of violence in 1984.[95]

Anti-terrorist policies – be they bloody counter-insurgency tactics, or trials against alleged terrorists – played an important role in supporting the claims of the anti-colonial, ethnonationalist movements of the 1960s/1970s. In the Basque Country, ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna) was founded in 1959 and fought against the cultural repression initiated by the Franco regime. ETA leaders viewed their country as a colony, occupied by a foreign imperialist power, and emulated the guerrilla tactics employed in Latin American countries.[96] Nationalism, violence and ethnicity together with myths, symbols and memories of the past were deeply entrenched in Basque society and were mobilized to legitimize ETA's violent politics.

The case of ETA draws our attention to gendered aspects of radical terrorist communities, especially the family. Against the backdrop of social and political transformations in Spain during the 1960s, which allowed women to take up factory jobs and also to take part in covert cultural and political activities in radical youth organizations, by the 1970s women began to join ETA on a somewhat larger scale. A decade later, female membership of ETA reached 10 to 15 per cent and roughly 8 per cent of ETA prisoners were women. In joining the ranks of the militants, these women gained temporary access to ETA's male-dominated power structures. Family experiences also formed an important factor in female participation. The life histories of these early female activists underline the importance of their families, father and mother alike, in the process of radicalization. While male ETA militants of these years often portrayed their fathers as weak, many of the early female militants remembered their fathers as strong, politically active figures, which influenced their own rebelliousness. Political activism contributed to bridging the gap between the cosmos of the family and traditional culture on the one hand and the dangerous political world outside and police repression on the other hand. The Basque nationalist discourse about the role of the family, which 'has always been defined as political territory', also influenced radicalization. Differing from Italian women activists of 1968, who often distanced themselves from their mothers, the early female militants of ETA did not portray their mothers' roles as being confined to (passive) domestic duties by male chauvinism. Against the background of intensified social change in the 1960s, motherhood in the Basque Country came to signify the potential for future political rebellion.[97]

In 1968–9, a peaceful social protest movement of mostly Catholic groups from the middle classes was met with harsh repression by the

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police and the British army in Northern Ireland.[98] Similar to Basque terrorism, the militants of the Catholic-nationalist Irish Republican Army (IRA) as well as the Protestant-loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defence Association (UDA) paramilitary organizations had working-class and lower-middle-class backgrounds. Therefore their militancy was more defensive and more territorially based than that of the New Left. For militants in Northern Ireland, the interaction with the surrounding social milieu (the community, the neighbourhood) with its traditions, myths (especially about the 1916 Easter Rising) and imagined or real threats was highly important.[99] Spatial components were instrumental in influencing the conflict: it was about defending communities or neighbourhoods against perceived threats from the other side. As in the Basque case, militant activism was strongly influenced by memories of the past, by myths and symbols. In post-1969 Northern Ireland, the official monopoly over physical violence was contested by the different paramilitary organizations that sought to undermine the legitimacy of the British Army and the RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary). The media landscape was extremely fragmented with each party in the conflict editing numerous newspapers. Moreover, press information was distrusted and rumours became important in the internal communication processes. The 1998 Good Friday Agreement was negotiated against the background of a positive international setting provided by the Blair and Clinton administrations. Compromise became possible at a time when the impact of globalization diminished the importance of establishing an independent nation-state, while social movements rooted in local communities, as well as in political parties such as Sinn Fein, had successfully demonstrated the peace-building potential of inter-community cooperation and dialogue.

New Left terrorism (*c.* 1960s–1980s)

Carlos Marighella in his famous *Manual of the Urban Guerilla* (1969) wrote: ‘The words armed struggle and terrorism no longer imply evil … Terrorism today is not factionalism. It does not dishonour one. It is rather the focus of mass action’.[100] During the 1970s and 1980s, many European countries saw the emergence of social revolutionary terrorist organizations associated with the New Left. Among them were the Brigate Rosse (BR) and Prima Linea (PL) in Italy, the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) and Bewegung 2. Juni in Germany, the Gauche Proletarienne (GP) and the Action Directe (AD) in France, the Grupo de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre (GRAPO) in Spain and the Revolutionary Organization 17 November in Greece.[101] GRAPO

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killed seventy-nine people between 1975 and 2000, the Brigate Rosse fifty-three between 1974 and 1981, and AD twelve between 1980 and 1986.[102] Many women became active in these domestic terrorist organizations, which rejected traditional gender roles and accepted active female participation. In the Italian Red Brigades 18 per cent of activists were women, while in the German RAF the number reached 30 per cent. Conversely, in international terrorist organizations, which focused less on the transformation of conventional social behaviour, women were far less active.[103]

The general development of 1960s–1980s New Left terrorism in Western Europe can be divided into two phases: from 1968 until the early 1970s and from the mid-1970s until the 1990s. Starting in the late 1950s, Western European societies saw the beginning of a period of deep social and cultural change such as the liberalization of everyday norms and values, sexual liberation and the erosion of family values.[104] These changes were intensified by the 1968 youth and student revolts. The 1960s social movements, which had predecessors dating back to the late 1950s, were characterized by a mix of formal political activities associated with the New Left and by countercultural elements such as consumption of drugs, rock music, new dress codes and street theatre.

The militants of the first phase of New Left terrorism were strongly influenced by the powerful social protests that often culminated in youth revolts in the years around 1968. These movements, which were sometimes harshly repressed, were initially based at universities and developed against the background of the Vietnam War and Cold War-inspired anti-communism, but they were also influenced by the legacies of fascist pasts. These social movements (and the militants within them) not only established tight international networks of communication but also recognized the importance that the media (especially television) had for the fight against the establishment.[105] Many of these militants came from the educated middle classes, but in some countries, such as Italy, organizations like the Brigate Rosse had comparatively high numbers of working-class members.[106]

The New Left terrorists mixed Marxism, Maoism, and the ideologies of Third World Liberation movements. The German Red Army Faction (RAF) was formed in May 1970 and its leading figures – Ulrike Meinhof and Andreas Baader – declared 'we are neither Blanquists nor Anarchists'.[107] Their publications were written in a very abstract and hermetic language. When compared to their German counterparts, French and Italian militants were more pragmatic and concerned with local problems. Regarding ideology, the Gauche Prolétarienne (GP) in their journal *La Cause du Peuple* and their main publication *Vers la*

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guerre civile (1969) espoused Maoist principles.[108] The former militants of the Red Brigades admitted with hindsight the vagueness of their political philosophies.[109]

The main targets of the German RAF were buildings of symbolic importance such as press offices, police stations or US army headquarters but also included members of the political or economic elites and police officers.[110] In order to fund underground activities many bank robberies were committed. A competing model of a militant activism can be identified in the Berlin-based clandestine group Bewegung 2. Juni and its predecessor, the Zentralrat der umherschweifenden Haschrebellen (Central Committee of Roaming Hashish Rebels). Most of their members like Michael 'Bommi' Baumann came from working-class backgrounds and laid a stronger focus on unconventional provocative actions in Berlin. They were mainly known for the 1975 kidnapping of CDU politician Peter Lorenz in Berlin.

Mobilizing supportive milieux was crucial for the numerically weak terrorist organizations of the New Left and working-class associations were perceived as potentially sympathetic. The German working classes, however, only responded negatively to terrorist activities. Thus already at an early stage German terrorists were forced to establish contacts with other militant organizations, as they had few local allies. In 1969, members of the Bewegung 2. Juni established contacts with Palestinian militants from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). International cooperation continued when members of the RAF met with Palestinian and Japanese terrorists in May 1972.[111] The hijacking of a Lufthansa plane in October 1977 in support of the RAF was also an example of cooperation with militant Palestinian groups.[112]

While the RAF did not manage to mobilize support among the working classes their colleagues in France and Italy gained at least a temporary foothold among workers, mainly in the metal and car industries. In the beginning, French terrorists were also supported by some factions of the working classes with rural backgrounds (North African immigrant workers) who were not traditionally involved with trade unions. In early 1972 the militants of the French GP realized that the working classes were indifferent toward militant actions and the organization dissolved.[113] The support base of the Italian terrorist organizations Lotta Continua, Potere Operaio, Gruppi di Azione Partigiana (GAP) and also the Brigate Rosse (BR) could mostly be found among the unskilled and casual labourers from rural areas of the south.[114]

None of the terrorist organizations of the 1970s had mass support. Their historical importance, however, lies less in their size, or in the

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often unrealistic nature of their ambitions, or even perhaps in their methods. Instead it lies in the way in which their actions and perhaps even more their mentalities were expressive of a wider mentality felt within society.

In the mid-1970s, a new age-cohort of New Left activists emerged from the decentralized social movements of the 1970s: ecological groups, the women's movement, anti-prison and squatting movements, but also in the anti-nuclear-power organizations. In Germany these new terrorists had nearly no first-hand experience of the 1968 movements, but were radicalized by three events: the trials of the early terrorists (Baader, Meinhof, Ensslin), by organizing support campaigns against the conditions of imprisonment of political prisoners, and by participating in militant squatting actions.[115] These terrorists of the mid-1970s concentrated on planning how to free prisoners. Culminating in the kidnapping and killing of the employers' representative Hanns-Martin Schleyer in 1977, their strategy turned out to be a 'free-political-prisoners terrorism' accompanied by the dominant motifs of punishment and revenge. Political aims became less important.[116] By late 1977 German left-wing terrorism was on the wane, although there were still occasional assassinations and killings. In April 1998 the RAF declared its dissolution.

Some Italian activists of the 1977 youth protests joined terrorist organizations such as Prima Linea and Formazioni Comuniste Combattenti. Compared to the early 1970s, terrorism came to be more diffuse in Italy towards the end of the decade: in 1978, for example, 209 groups claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks.[117] The youth movement of 1977 also brought stronger hedonist and countercultural elements into Italian terrorism.[118] In the mid-1980s, however, the terrorist threat in Italy had all but vanished, though there some attacks persisted. All in all, during the 1980s Italian terrorists lost their Robin Hood image and failed to attract uninterested youths to their ranks. Police repression and the flexible responses of the judiciary also contributed to their demise. In 1986, leading activists Mario Moretti and Renato Curcio declared the end of the 'experiment of armed resistance'.[119]

By the end of the decade, it became obvious that neither the French working classes nor intellectuals supported terrorism anymore. During this period a new terrorist organization was formed out of the ranks of the autonomous movement and took shape in the summer of 1977 in opposition to the building of the atomic power plant at Malville. The autonomous movement was transnational in nature, incorporating elements from Germany and Italy.[120] After severe police repression in March 1979, disillusionment grew among the autonomous activists and out of this crisis Action Directe (AD) emerged.[121] AD's members committed

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violent acts similar to those of the RAF, killing two policemen in 1983. Its ranks consisted of anarchists, anti-Franco immigrants and former activists of the autonomous movement. Action Directe was outlawed in August 1982 and in February 1987 the figureheads were arrested.

In both phases of New-Left terrorism, be it in Germany, France or Italy, the approach that state institutions (mainly the police) adopted against political violence was instrumental in pushing activists to join the political underground. As Peter Waldmann has convincingly demonstrated, many terrorists experienced police brutality, be it at demonstrations, during evictions at squat houses or during search actions.[122] We should not forget, however, that it was not only violent repression that radicalized activists: equally important was how these experiences were interpreted according to histories of subjugation or injustice. Terrorism thus, as always, was not a stand-alone phenomenon; it developed out of a wider culture of repression, alienation and marginalization. In particular during the 1970s, it developed out of a wider societal dissatisfaction, which saw the existing society, state structures and political order as inherently repressive and alienating. Only therefore through acts of intransigent rebellion could a stand be taken against the manifold injustices of the existing world.

In Germany, being subjected to police brutality was interpreted against the history of national-socialism. For protestors it was indisputable that policemen were former fascists out to re-establish a fascist order. This perception was bolstered by the fact that, parallel to the high tide of youth protests in German cities, numerous policemen were put on trial due to involvement in mass murder during the Nazi regime.[123] Legacies of the past also affected the way state officials interpreted acts of violence. Many German policemen were convinced that youthful protestors aimed at destroying the Federal Republic in order to establish communism. Similarly, politicians feared that the demise of the Weimar Republic would be repeated.

During the 1960s, there existed in German society a deep-rooted aversion to conflict and a desire to strive for social harmony. Sociological studies have established there was also a profound social insecurity caused by the lack of a widely accepted national identity. Instead, the economic miracle and the push for economic success were highly valued, forming a sort of minimal consensus for the West German state.[124] Moreover, politicians and policemen in West Germany referred not to the nation but to an abstract state. In the eyes of protestors, however, this state was unquestionably linked to fascism as well as US imperialism.[125]

These distortions and shortcomings in the process of political communication were intensified by the fact that the left was marginalized

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in West Germany. After the Communist Party was banned in 1956 and the Social Democrats abandoned Marxism at their convention in Bad Godesberg in 1959, there was no strong leftist milieu that could integrate social protest movements. Following the experiences of the Second World War, there was a deep-rooted taboo in West German society that almost forbade discussions about physical violence. There was no serious dialogue about how to solve the problems associated with violent behaviour. Against this background, the fear of social exclusion and a loss of legitimacy curtailed political discourses, and nearly paralysed meaningful communication.

In comparison, Italian and French terrorists held very different national traditions of militancy. In France, the events of May 1968 had already underlined that employing violence had hedonistic and pleasure-oriented aspects. These protests, along with the militancy of terrorist organizations like the GP, were influenced by two traditions: the symbolic heritage of street fighting at the barricades and the importance of the violent, general strike. Moreover, at early stages of their activities the militants of the GP were convinced that sooner or later the proletariat would follow them on the path towards revolution.[126] Although members of the New People's Resistance attacked police stations and destroyed cars, these acts resembled a violent partisan struggle more than terrorism.[127] Targets were highly personalized (they kidnapped a Renault manager for some hours) and less oriented against an anonymous system or state. Three factors (symbolism of street fighting at the barricades, violent strike traditions and the expectation of mass support from the working classes) prevented early 1970s French militants from developing strategies of individual terror like killing members of the political or economic elites or civilians.[128] In addition, social isolation during the early 1970s was diminished due to support from leading French intellectuals like Jean-Paul Sartre.

In 1968, the newly appointed prefect of the Paris Police, Maurice Grimaud, was more liberal and less racist than his predecessor Maurice Papon.[129] Grimaud, along with other leading French policemen, considered the student protests to be political and not merely criminal actions inspired by mass hysteria or psychological factors. Activists and demonstrations came to be handled politically, as policemen and politicians alike realized the spontaneous character of most of these protests and were not preoccupied by the idea that they were orchestrated by foreign powers, as was the case in Germany.[130]

We should not forget, however, that legacies of past police actions were also present. In the early 1960s, the policing of demonstrations against the war in Algeria (1954–62) came to be remembered for brutality,

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particularly the events at the metro station Charonne in October 1961, when the police killed eight demonstrators. Rumours later circulated that many more Algerians had been killed by the police.[131] This 1961 protest was motivated by one especially cruel bomb attack by the right-wing OAS (Organisation Armée Secrète).[132] In 1963, the French government established a State Security Court to which military officers were appointed, in order to control OAS terrorism. Before its abolition in 1981, these courts were also used to try left-wing activists.[133]

In Italy the strategy of tension initiated by right-wing institutions and terrorists during the intense bombing campaigns between 1969 and 1974 was one of the factors that served to legitimize revolutionary violence as a defence against the re-emergence of fascism.[134] Left-wing militants also fought against regional colonialism in the *Mezzogiorno* or south of Italy. Overall, the threat of fascist pasts and presents was mitigated by other influences. As the name 'Brigade' demonstrated, there were vivid traditions of resistance traced to the communist partisan movements of the *Resistenza* during the Second World War.[135] The myth of the *Resistenza* – however distorted it may have been – reassured Italian protestors of shared traditions and of the efficacy of violence. Additional links were drawn with the rural banditry of the nineteenth century. A socially accepted tradition of violent protests – be it during strikes or demonstrations – meant that the use of violence by policemen or demonstrators was not considered to be exceptional. Moreover, the public image of the state was not that of an efficient and powerful institution, while the police were seen as corrupt, ineffective and pervaded by rivalries between the two major forces: the *carabineri* and the *policia*. We should not forget that state and police officials in Italy had little knowledge about the structural and cultural roots of left-wing terrorism. Instead, they focused on the general increase in criminality and a kind of 'social alarm' came to dominate.[136]

As these examples demonstrate, terrorism remained strongly dominated in the 1970s by particular nationalist traditions of protest and rebellion. What they encountered, however, was an increasingly uniform response by state police forces, which during the post-war years had become better funded, better equipped and more adept in countering terrorist actions. During the 1970s, the practice of state rule in Europe changed – not only in a more repressive direction but with a stronger focus on prevention.[137] In Germany, the numbers of police recruits increased and technical equipment and tactics were modernized. Preventative strategies became more widespread. Between 1974 and 1978, special laws against terrorism were introduced curtailing the rights of lawyers and inhibiting prisoners' ability to communicate

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among themselves. After the kidnapping and murder of Schleyer in 1977, there was an unexpected public reaction against anti-terrorist policies. Numerous voices emerged that criticized police actions, such as the massive collections of electronic data on suspects, while simultaneously politicians realized that repressive actions were not the only way to fight terrorism. A phase of social-science research on terrorism began.

In Italy the 1978 kidnapping of Prime Minister Moro and his subsequent murder intensified state repression and preventive actions.[138] Emergency legislation was passed with broad parliamentary support, changing the criminal code as well as the code of criminal procedure (new crimes connected with terrorism were defined and special treatment for those collaborating during inquiries was introduced). Police powers were widened and preventive arrest came into effect in late 1979. In addition, the 1981 Police Reform Act made anti-terrorism operations more effective.

In the late 1960s the French state began to reorganize the policing of domestic unrest with policies characterized by a mixture of reform and intensified prevention. Raymond Marcellin was appointed minister of the interior in late May 1968 and remained in office until 1974. He immediately drew up lists of known left-wing activists and outlawed left-wing organizations. Public street demonstrations were forbidden for eighteen months, but OAS members were amnestied. In his 'fortified state', the police force grew by 50 per cent.[139] In 1970s France the brutal exercise of physical violence became associated less and less with domestic security as surveillance and censorship became more prominent. The club-swinging riot police of the Compagnies Républicaines de Securité (CRS) gradually made way for plainclothes policemen employing preventive strategies. Nonetheless, anti-terrorism policies in France were far from perfect, evident in the fact that no less than seven different police services and four different cabinet ministries handled matters relating to terrorism.[140]

Although strong social movements developed in both Britain and the Netherlands during the 1960s, no New-Left terrorism emerged in either country that was comparable to Germany, Italy or France.[141] Current research underlines how young protestors in the former countries remained integrated into the social and political system. The Dutch and British governments took concrete measures to engage with activists and social movements, while the police forces acted with controlled force, in keeping with positive national master-narratives of policing. In Britain, there were violent confrontations between the police and student protestors in 1967–8, but both sides acted on the assumption

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that the other side would show restraint when using force. Under these circumstances the myth of the British 'bobby' who was able to handle all situations without using lethal violence was an important factor in preventing violence from getting out of hand. Moreover, neither policemen nor politicians felt that youth protests threatened the stability of the state. In the 1980s, this mutual trust eroded and the police began to act more violently, notably during the miners' strike. Matters were very different in Northern Ireland, where the Royal Ulster Constabulary showed little restraint. In the Netherlands, even the late anti-colonial activism of the South Moluccans in 1975–7 did not lead to major political or social disruption.[142] The English and Dutch cases demonstrate that strong social movements and supportive social milieux are not sufficient preconditions for the growth of terrorism and that the (re)actions of government and society are of equal importance.

Religiously inspired terrorism (since *c*. 1980s)

Following the end of the Cold War, a terrorism rooted in religious cultures surfaced as a global phenomenon. The rise of religious terrorism was already evident during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, and in the civil war in the Lebanon of the 1980s and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, but it became more decentralized after the collapse of the Soviet Union. These years also saw a new phase of globalization during which the nation-state lost importance and international networks of communication (Internet) grew rapidly, while traditional social relationships went into decline.[143] The number of terrorist groups with religious motivations, Islamist as well as Christian, increased. Given this fact, it is important to bear in mind two points: it is hard to discern religious motives from political ones, and religion does not cause terrorism but serves to legitimize it.

In the 1990s, the Islamist Al-Qaeda emerged as the most formidable transnational terrorist organization. Mark Sageman convincingly subdivides Al-Qaeda into two parts: Al-Qaeda Central and the global networks of the movement. Following this categorization, there are three stages of global Islamist terrorism.[144] First, militants fighting the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in the 1980s were at the core of the original Al-Qaeda, which the author calls Al-Qaeda Central. They were ardent followers of Osama bin Laden and developed intense bonds of solidarity among themselves. This 'old guard' had upper- and middle-class backgrounds (like Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri from Egypt). The golden age of Al-Qaeda Central was in the five years preceding 11 September 2001. In the second phase, Islamist militants, inspired

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by the old guard terrorists, joined the global social movement of Al Qaeda during the 1990s. They were mainly middle-class-based and motivated by the suffering of Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir etc. This phase came to an end with the invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11. The third phase began after the invasion of Iraq. When training camps in Afghanistan were destroyed, close connections with Al Qaeda Central were cut off and militants remained in their home countries. Many of these activists of the global Al Qaeda social movement were second-generation Muslim immigrants with roots in the middle and lower classes.

With 11 September 2001, however, suicide attacks gained unprecedented public attention.[145] Suicide bombings, developed in the early 1980s in the Near East (Iran, Lebanon, Kuwait, Palestine), became one of the key tactics of religious terrorism. While modern suicide terrorism had its roots in the civil war in Lebanon between 1973 and 1986, it was systematically developed in 1983. In April of that year, militant Islamists attacked the US embassy in Beirut, in October the headquarters of the US Marines and French paratroopers were attacked, and in November Israeli administrative buildings in South Lebanon were bombed. These attacks led to the death of nearly 500 people. In the 1990s, the Kurdish PKK was responsible for fifteen suicide bombs that targeted politicians and the police. These actions were motivated less by religion than Marxist-Leninist ideology.[146]

The engagement of women in suicide bombings caused great public interest, but it would be inaccurate to view females as mere agents following orders. Many of these militants gained a degree of status and developed a political and social consciousness that, if only temporarily, gave them independence from the machismo of their male counterparts.[147] Their use of violence, however, was bound to traditional codes and did not represent any form of progressive gender relations. Secular and religious terrorist groups legitimized female suicide attacks using three principal discursive strategies. They were rationalized as a last resort in desperate times, they were historicized and put in a tradition of female militancy, and finally, they were elevated to a 'level in which she becomes awe-inspiring – whether due to her beauty, brilliance or piety'. Both bomber and deed became 'transcendent and any contingency associated with her being female' was relegated to the background.

As with previous terrorist movements, motivations lay less in a specific ideological conviction than in a wider social and cultural sense of marginalization and rebellion. Frequently there was a 'mutual self-recruiting atmosphere' among many Islamist militants where 'social bonds came before any ideological commitment'.[148] Motivations for

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acts of violence lie in moral outrage, interpretations of Western military actions and the linkage of these two factors with everyday personal experiences (of discrimination) in diaspora society.[149] In the 1990s, half of the Islamist militants arrested in France grew up together in Oran, Algeria. Emigration is regularly based on networks of family or friends, and these social bonds in the host country fostered the formation of in-groups with strong internal cohesion, mutual loyalty and sometimes a hatred for the outside world. Since the early 2000s, virtual groups interacting on the Internet also became important.

The most recent suicide bombings in Europe on public transport (11 March 2004 in Madrid and 7 July 2005 in London) can demonstrate how the three key structuring elements (social milieu/social movements, relationship to the state and to its institutions, importance of communication) interact and radicalize young Muslims in diaspora communities.[150] The four London suicide bombers were born and raised in England. They lived in typical British Muslim neighbourhoods that were extensions of rural Pakistan communities and where many young men were without regular employment. Their militant activism developed out of a scenario not untypical among twenty-first-century diaspora communities. They witnessed or suffered racial prejudice or even racist attacks, especially in the wake of 11 September 2001. Their family life was characterized by deep generational tensions between their immigrant parents and themselves as young adolescents struggling against over-controlling parents and South Asian patriarchy. The dominant pattern of masculinity among these young men imposed a 'burden of responsibility to protect others against suffering'.[151] The four terrorists were involved considerably in their local communities and had engaged in voluntary work. In addition, they also organized a street gang, which typically carried out strong-arm social policies like removing drug dealers or enforcing publicly rigid sexual norms.

Although these 'unaffiliated terrorists' were attracted to Al-Qaeda, they were not led by a supreme leader nor were they the brainwashed instruments of terrorist masterminds.[152] Television and Internet images of hundreds of dead civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq made them feel powerless against mass murder. Similar to the situation of the Madrid bombers[153] the political aspirations of the London group were less influenced by a national identity or the aspiration to establish a sovereign nation-state. Instead, they were influenced by an imagined worldwide Muslim community, the Umma. Recent social science studies have elaborated the concept of a political Islam, dominant among young British Muslims, that is based on dichotomies of good versus evil, the

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Umma versus the West. No non-violent social movements existed which sufficiently addressed their anger 'at the abuses being inflicted on the global Muslim family'.[154] As a result, they built a highly cohesive group or clique[155] in which they planned and executed acts of violence. Islam had become for them the doorway to a transnational fellowship or global community.[156] Step by step the four became involved in a Jihadist network that 'fed them an intensified and politicized rendition of global Muslim suffering, a theological justification, and a strategic rationale for revenge attacks, and a fundamentalist world view that removed all moral inhibitions'.[157]

While the transnational nature of contemporary religious terrorism might resemble the anarchist terrorism of the nineteenth century, the actions of twenty-first-century suicide bombers are aimed less at political or economic elites and seek to gain maximum media attention by killing innocent civilians.[158] This then was primarily a terrorism of display, which sought to advance its cause by demonstrating the ability to rebel against a society seen as inherently repressive and hostile to Islamic values.

Conclusions

This chapter has outlined the history of terrorism in the contexts of social movements/milieux, the relationship between terrorism and the state, and processes of communication stimulated by terrorist acts. By definition we have focused on sub-state terrorism and organized its development in five phases: the anarchist and nationalist phase of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the right-wing terrorism of the interwar years, the anti-colonial terrorism which started after the First World War and lasted until the 1980s, the New-Left terrorism of the 1970s/1980s and religiously inspired terrorism of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

In conclusion, four points might be said to emerge from this brief overview of the disparate phenomena discussed in this chapter. First, and perhaps most necessarily, there is no continuous or unitary history of terrorism. The different forms of terrorism discussed here had little in common with each other, and owed little to the inspiration of preceding examples, although 1970s left-wing terrorists made some references to earlier anarchist forms of political violence. This leads to the second conclusion: terrorism is not a stand-alone phenomenon, instead it emerges in response to other events. These can be external events, such as social upheavals or forms of nationalist protest. The most important one of these has been the actions of state authorities or of occupying

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powers. Terrorism has often been created primarily by its opponents, in the sense that it has been the actions of police forces, occupying armies or wider state repression which has given rise to terrorism. This is perhaps most obvious in the case of the Resistance movements in Europe in the 1940s, but it is also true of, for example, the way in which many of the terrorist movements of the 1970s developed out of contact with the newly efficient and repressive police forces of Europe.

The third conclusion which emerges is the way in which terrorism is linked to particular stages in social movements. Terrorism is rarely the tool of fully developed social movements but something which emerges at a time when the strategies and aims of these movements remain vague or when these movements are on the wane. This proved to be the case both in the late nineteenth century, but also in the 1960s and 1970s when the contemporary social movements met the harsh repression of the police or were not able to mobilize durable support from the working classes. In these situations violent strategies and actions could gain the upper hand within these movements.

Finally, the fourth conclusion which comes out of this chapter, which is also closely related to the previous point, is the way in which political violence labelled as terrorism is a phenomenon which is inseparable from a complex process of communication between state institutions on the one side and the terrorist militants on the other side. The actors on both sides try to win wider public support. When studying these processes of interrelated communication it should not be forgotten, however, that terrorists' actions were often inspired by a wider social and cultural sense of marginalization and rebellion rather than by specific ideological motivations.

Above all, in assessing today's terrorism and the large-scale state-sponsored responses to it, it appears reasonable to agree with Eric Hobsbawm's observation, made in the wake of the July 2005 bombings in London, that the 'real danger of terrorism lies not in the actual danger from anonymous handfuls of fanatics but from the unreasonable fear their activities provoke, and which today both media and unwise governments encourage. This is one of the major dangers of our time, certainly a greater danger than small terrorist groups'.[159]

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