Terrorism and Political Violence

ISSN: 0954-6553 (Print) 1556-1836 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftpv20

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To cite this article: Maria Josua & Mirjam Edel (2015) To Repress or Not to Repress—Regime Survival Strategies in the Arab Spring, Terrorism and Political Violence, 27:2, 289-309, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2013.806911

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.806911

Terrorism and Political Violence, 27:289–309, 2015

ISSN: 0954-6553 print/1556-1836 online
DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2013.806911

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

To Repress or Not to Repress—Regime Survival Strategies in the Arab Spring

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Authoritarian regimes use repression as an essential strategy to attain regime stability and survival. During the Arab Spring, different forms of repression have been employed. We argue that to explain this variation, three bundles of characteristics have to be taken into account: the setup of the regime, the state, and the challenge. As we assume that elites have a wider repertoire of strategies besides repression at their disposal, the analysis of repression has to be embedded in a broader framework of strategies of rule. Including specific forms and target groups of repression, we develop an explanatory model addressing the question of which repressive measures rulers utilize under which circumstances. The postulated relationship between repression and characteristics of the state, regime, and challenge are then tested in a comparative analysis of the reactions to the challenges arising with the 2011 uprisings in two very different Arab countries, Bahrain and Egypt. On the basis of these empirical findings, we propose a readjusted model explaining repression.

Keywords Arab world, authoritarian rule, military, protests, repression

Authoritarian regimes use repression as an essential strategy to attain regime stability and survival. But repression is not one single variable that is applied in a similar way everywhere. During the Arab Spring, different types and levels of repression have been employed, ranging from limited repression in Morocco to a full-scale civil war in Syria. While it seems obvious that measures of repression against popular protests vary between the Arab countries, how can this variation be explained?

In order to understand how and why elites choose repression strategies, we argue that various bundles of characteristics have to be taken into account: the setup of the regime, the state, and the challenge are important for explaining repression. Moreover, two issues are essential in order to understand the application of repression: First, if we want to know why regimes survive, stabilize, or collapse, it is vital to embed such measures in a broader framework of strategies of rule, assuming that elites have a broader repertoire of strategies than just repression at their disposal. Second, past research on repression has often produced contradictory findings, resulting from

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over-generalized assumptions. Over the past years, more scholars recognized the need to differentiate between different forms of repression. This article therefore not only discusses the question of whether and when repression occurs, but especially takes into account its specific forms and target groups.

Combining these factors, we develop an explanatory model addressing the question of which repressive measures rulers utilize under which circumstances. To this end, we set up hypotheses building on relevant research on repression and post-democratization literature, thereby including quantitative findings in our qualitative analysis.[1] The postulated relations between repression and characteristics of the state, regime, and challenge are then tested in a comparative analysis following a most dissimilar systems design. The empirical analysis takes a look at how rulers in two very different Arab countries, Bahrain and Egypt, have reacted to the challenges that arise with the 2011 uprisings. On the basis of these empirical findings, we propose a readjusted model explaining repression.

Repression as a Strategy of Political Rule in the Face of Challenges

A current strand of research in comparative politics deals with the stability and durability of non-democratic rule,[2] claiming that repression is a central element of regime stability.[3] While repression as a backbone of autocratic rule is at the heart of this paper, it is important to embed it into the context of other strategies of political rule, as the literature agrees on the assumption that no government[4] can maintain stability by relying on repression alone, because it would be too costly or simply impossible.[5] Still, many authors regard repression as a strategy that is chosen in order to—at least temporarily—re-stabilize a critical situation. Mostly, repression is seen as a last resort when legitimacy resources are not sufficient or available. Schlumberger condensed this relationship into a formula that sees stability as a combination of legitimacy and repression.[6] According to this perspective, the need for repression rises whenever legitimacy falls in order to maintain stability. But a sudden rise in the scope or intensity of repression may in turn lead to a dangerous drop in legitimacy among the population, so generally the decision for repression is likely to be guided by previously employed strategies. Legitimacy as the result of successful strategies of legitimation denotes the acceptance of a regime, no matter on what grounds.[7] So it is important to consider whether any sources of legitimacy were available prior to the Arab Spring.

Although research on authoritarianism has largely concentrated on questions of legitimation rather than repression, there seems to be broad agreement that repression is one *distinct* factor contributing to regime survival. Previous research on repression has identified one of the few law-like relationships in social sciences, which is that "domestic threats increase state repressive efforts."[8] But decision makers can usually choose between several options in their struggle against contenders. We concur with Boudreau, who builds on Tilly in regarding "violence, and repression more generally, as one potential answer to a larger question: what strategies might the state adopt to defeat adversaries and extend hegemony?"[9] Other scholars also consider a broader repertoire of possible regime measures besides repression, namely accommodation[10] or concessions.[11] Such other non-repressive measures all can be subsumed under what current research on regime stability frames as "legitimation strategies." Drawing on both strands of literature, we complement research on strategies of political rule with insights into the detailed working mechanisms of repression. These factors can be combined because the ultimate goal that motivates

these strategies is identical in both cases: Both repression and legitimation measures aim at containing challenges and threats in order to ensure regime survival.

The Decision to Use Repression

Repression is a strategy that elites actively choose when they decide on the grounds of available information that repressive measures are rationally the best means to reach their goals.[12] Repressive measures are taken when benefits exceed the costs,[13] and for any ruler, the preservation of power is the decisive expected benefit.[14] Costs arise in the form of negative side effects, both mundane ones like expenses for equipment and training of police and military forces, and more fundamental effects like the loss of legitimacy.[15] This cost-benefit balance is most importantly shaped by two structural circumstances that influence the decision calculus in favor of or against repression: First, the question is whether alternatives are available, i.e., non-repressive "diverse ways of influencing sociopolitical thought and behavior"[16] through normative and material means. Building on our previous considerations, alternatives to repression can be framed as the availability of legitimation strategies. Second, the potential effectiveness of repressive measures is relevant for the decision calculus. This may be estimated, e.g., with regard to "past effectiveness and organizational preparedness,"[17] and is determined by the capacity of the state apparatus. This second factor depends largely on state characteristics, whereas the availability of alternatives, especially of legitimation measures, is essentially shaped by regime characteristics.

The proposed decision calculus serves as a framework to identify the structural factors which help explain the application of repression. Regime and state characteristics influence the government's strategies from above and interact with factors from below, namely the characteristics of the challenge that threatens stability. These three bundles of characteristics are at the heart of our model explaining the decision for repression.

Elements of Repression

Research in the field of repression has often come to contradictory and overgeneralizing results. For example, after more than twenty years of research there is still no consensus on how repression influences dissent and protests. This is mainly due to a lack of disaggregation: in quantitative studies, repression in its different forms has mostly been construed as a single aggregate variable.[18] We prefer a more nuanced understanding of repression, proposing a definition that contains the measures, effects, targets, and the actors that employ these strategies. When repression is disaggregated, the most common distinction is drawn between two types of repression, one of which can be described as "softer" (mostly non-violent restrictions of civil liberties), the other one as "harder" (mostly violent coercion). Nonetheless, scholars partly disagree on the distinctive criterion: While Escribà-Folch and Lichbach opt for the means—the use of violence—as the decisive factor,[19] Davenport focuses on the intended *effects* of a measure: he separates repressive measures that "attempt to modify behavior/attitudes through constraining as well as channeling opportunities"[20] from those which have the effect of "eliminating actors."[21] We prefer this criterion describing the effect of a strategy over the "means" criterion that only indicates whether violence is employed because the "effect" has a direct influence on the challenging capacities of a targeted group or person and therefore has a larger

explanatory power. The equivalent to ''soft'' repression is understood as any measure that raises the costs of contention through negatively affecting the challengers' cost-benefit calculus for activism, thus constraining challengers. Incapacitating repression, in contrast, prevents the challengers physically from contentious action, not always, but most often by force.

Targets matter in the analysis of any strategy of political rule, as Bank has shown for strategies for legitimation and Josua for co-optation.[22] We have to take targets seriously also in the study of repression because the size and nature of targets lead to important variance in the use of repression.[23] It is generally assumed that repression is targeted against the most challenging actors.[24] The targeted nature of violent repression measures is crucial for a regime's popular support as it declines if violence becomes too indiscriminate.[25] Most elaborate on the question of targets is probably T. David Mason's model of the relationship between state-sanctioned terror and non-elite behavior.[26] According to Mason, repression can be directed against opposition leaders, rank-and-file supporters, or politically inactive parts of the population.[27] A definition of repression should moreover include the actors that employ these strategies: the government understood as the ruler and his elites who exert control over the state apparatus in authoritarian settings.[28] This leads us to define repression as the *sum of all strategies by ruling elites to contain challenges to their rule by constraining (raising the costs of contention for) or incapacitating opposition leaders, rank-and-file activists, or parts of the politically inactive population*.

Among the repression measures that serve to incapacitate challengers are: imprisonment, forced disappearances, house arrest, killing, and exiling. Most other measures have the function of raising the costs of contention (constraining), such as: torture, house-to-house search, restricting assembly and association rights, restricting the freedom of expression, physical harassment, non-physical intimidation, surveillance, libel, and the restriction of employment and career opportunities.

Why Repression: Structural Characteristics and Hypotheses

After having put forward a definition of repression, we take a look at the factors that guide a government's decision for repression. The following sections present hypotheses on the relationship between the regime, state, and challenge characteristics and the likelihood of the use of repression. Some hypotheses make more specific predictions concerning the use of incapacitating repression.

Regime Characteristics: Base of Legitimation and Organization of Power Relations

The logic which leads a government to apply certain survival strategies depends to a large extent on the structures of the center of power and the dynamics between the ruling elite and the people. Different forms of repression can be linked to certain regime characteristics which determine the availability and attractiveness of different options. Davenport attempts to find differences among authoritarian regimes by building on the regime typology developed by Barbara Geddes[29] and claims that single-party regimes are less repressive than military or personalist regimes because of less political insulation and less coercive expertise. Spinks, Sahliyeh, and Calfano find that monarchies in the Middle East violate fewer physical integrity rights than any republic of the region, although both bring up the rear in respecting civil liberties on a global level.[30] This difference between monarchies and republics can be traced back to a higher degree and different forms of legitimacy in monarchic regimes.

Monarchs can build upon traditional and religious justifications for their rule and thus enjoy the "king's advantage" over republican rulers.[31] Thus, characteristics of a given regime are the first features we have to analyze in order to explain the selection of repressive strategies. Following Fishman's definition,[32] it is necessary to consider the formal organization of the center of political power as well as informal structures of power, especially who has access to the elite, what is the ethnic or sectarian composition of society and of incumbents, which societal groups constitute the base of the regime, who forms the opposition, and how government and opposition interact.

Research on repression has frequently looked into the influence of regime characteristics on repression. There is general agreement that democracies are less repressive than authoritarian regimes because the latter lack institutions that balance the dominance of the executive.[33] While for a long time it was assumed that there was an inverse linear relationship between the degree of repression and the degree of democracy (the more democratic a country, the less repressive), recent studies show that the number of executive constraints—taken as a proxy for democratic rule—influences the level of repression only after a certain threshold is passed.[34] This implies that even within the group of authoritarian regimes, there must be further relevant regime characteristics that influence their repressiveness.

The literature has brought forward several hypotheses regarding the causal connection between regime characteristics and repression. First, some authors focus on the center of power. Building on considerations by Linz and Rummel,[35] Davenport argues that repression is more likely when only a few actors are institutionally included in the political process.[36] In such a case, there are fewer "alternative mechanisms of control to influence the population."[37] This leads to a first hypothesis: *The more inclusive a regime, the less likely it is to repress (HR1)*.

Another hypothesis Davenport puts forward refers to the institutional power structures: *The closer the military and/or security apparatus to the center of power, the more probable the employment of incapacitating repression (HR2*). It is assumed that this is the case because the coercive agents derive benefits from the application of coercive methods in the form of "enhanced resources, status, and fulfillment of organizational objectives."[38] This is especially true for neo-patrimonial regimes in which the coercive apparatus is likely to be under close control by the ruler.[39]

State Characteristics: The Capacity for Coercion

The second bundle of characteristics influencing the use of repression refers to the state. Although the distinction between regime and state characteristics is not always an easy one, especially in (neo)patrimonial regimes, in which the ruler regards the state as his domain,[40] for the study of repression it is nonetheless important to analytically differentiate between the power relations which are at the heart of the regime definition and the characteristics of the state apparatus proper, which can be termed the capacity for coercion.[41] Going back to the Weberian definition of the state,[42] which includes the legitimate use of coercion to implement rule, the capability of a ruler's apparatus to enact policies is central. The monopoly of power can be confirmed *ex negativo* when no groups other than state actors claim control of parts of the state territory. Regarding the use of physical force, the decisive institution for the positive implementation of rule is the security apparatus.

State characteristics are often considered in terms of strength. Way and Levitsky differentiate between the scope and cohesion of the state apparatus. *Scope* "refers to

the effective reach—across territory and into society—of the state's apparatus."[43] A state's coercive capacity depends mainly on the size and expertise of its security apparatus. Extensive scope of coercion gives ruling elites the capacity to prevent the emergence of oppositional groups and larger challenges through a well-trained and almost omnipresent security apparatus.[44] Using such preventive low intensity coercion, rulers do not have to avail themselves of the "high intensity coercion" that is much more risky.[45] Size matters, i.e., the number of soldiers and other security personnel, and in order to maintain such a high scope, a good financial situation is important.[46] *The larger the scope of a security apparatus, the more likely is repression (HS1).*

While the large scope provides a ruler with many tools for repressing his people, this mainly quantitative dimension of state capacity cannot completely capture potentially available repressive capabilities in the face of challenges. A second dimension of the state becomes decisive—the internal *cohesion* of the state apparatus. This is especially important when a government faces a serious, sudden threat and reacts by using high intensity coercion, e.g., shooting into large crowds. The internal cohesion and compliance within the state apparatus may then determine the fate of a government and possibly the regime. The level of cohesion determines whether a high-risk maneuver of incapacitating repression can be carried out without large-scale disobedience or defection.[47] *Therefore high cohesion makes incapacitating repression more probable (HS2).* This feature of the state apparatus is determined not only by material assets, which by themselves cannot fully explain its (dys)functioning in critical situations, but more importantly by "links between leaders and coercive agents."[48] There are several options with regard to how these links can emerge: through ethnicity, personal or quasi-familial ties, ideology, or solidarity through shared successful military struggles in the past (war, revolution, etc.).[49] The availability of such ties of cohesion is crucial for the application of high-risk repression. *Incapacitating repression is more likely in ethnically fragmented societies if the repressive apparatus is in the hands of one particular group (HS3).* This is especially true when this group is a minority and thus lacks legitimacy with the majority of the population.[50]

Protests, Dissidents, and Threat Perception: Challenge Characteristics

As survival strategies aim at containing challenges and threats, the nature of such challenges determines the choice of strategies and available options. Many studies that deal with the repression-dissent nexus agree that threats and repression mutually influence each other.[51] While the influence of repression on protests is still unclear, it is acknowledged that rising challenges increase repression.

Two factors are decisive for elites' threat perception: first, the nature of protests, including demands and means chosen by protesters, and second, the strength of protests in terms of their size and popular support for the demands. Highlighting the relevance of *actors* and *actions*, Tilly points out that "governments respond selectively to different sorts of groups, and to different sorts of actions."[52] With regard to the means of protest, research has mainly covered the use of violence. It can safely be said that *violent dissent makes repression more likely (HC1)*, so the first question is whether the protests are violent or non-violent.[53]

Furthermore, challengers always articulate certain *demands*, which "have a major impact on government responses."[54] Limited demands asking, e.g., for an increase of wages are less threatening than far-reaching, systemic demands.[55] The decision for repression is taken when the challenges threaten the respective power structures.[56]

Calls for the downfall of the regime constitute a much more imminent threat than mere calls for reform—even though they might also infringe upon the center of power. Therefore it is evident that limited demands are less likely to be answered through repression.[57] Another question is whether protests are extraordinary or "business as usual." New forms of contentious action are more threatening than others.[58] We therefore assume that *as the threat rises (with regard to demands or tactics), more incapacitating repression strategies are likely (HC2)*.[59]

Many researchers also consider the degree of mobilization.[60] A large coalition of protesting groups poses a larger threat to elites than scattered groups that do not coordinate their activities or that even pursue different goals and compete with each other. Especially broad "unlikely coalitions" of previously unconnected and unmobilized groups constitute a real threat when they appear to be more powerful or larger than the regime base. The effects can be ambiguous because an unprecedented level of mobilization massively raises the costs of repression, and thus existing hypotheses are contradictory. *A large number of protesters, especially combined with some frequency and durability, can make the decision for repression less likely (HC3)*.[61] The number of protesters in relation to the population size may give a rough indicator of the threat. But if a ruler fears that the demands cannot be fulfilled without a regime breakdown, he might use repression even in situations of high mobilization.[62] In our analysis we will test the first hypothesis, hoping to falsify one of the two competing hypotheses.

The Arab Spring: Between Revolt and Repression

The framework set up above for the analysis of repression will be applied to three case studies in two countries. The comparison of Bahrain and Egypt during the Arab Spring highlights different routes to repression, following the logic of a "most dissimilar systems with same outcome" research design. The variance in the structural characteristics is the basis for our case selection. Egypt is a republic without significant economic resources, but with a large population and massive protests. Bahrain as a tiny oil monarchy couldn't be more different given the structural and historical prerequisites. While high-scale protests also took place in all other republics, Egypt is by far the most important case, including a regime change which makes a diachronic comparison possible that could wield further results. In Bahrain, both the challenge and response have been rather constant, while in Egypt Mubarak's forced resignation altered the characteristics of the regime and the challenge, but not the state, enabling the study of two different cases within one country.

The timeframe chosen for the empirical application of the concept covers the protests for about one year after their beginning in 2011. With regard to the regime and state characteristics and the previous application of repression, it also refers to the period before the protests.

Bahrain

Political power in the small kingdom of Bahrain lies in the hands of the Sunni Al Khalifa family, which constitutes the bulk of the country's elite. The reigning King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa enjoys legitimacy based on tradition, but also co-optation and consultation mechanisms legitimize his rule and ensure the continued existence of a largely Sunni regime base.[63] At the same time, the Bahraini elite's situation is different from other Arab monarchies insofar as its religious denomination is not shared by

the majority of its population. Thus, "mechanisms of exclusion,"[64] such as the naturalization of Sunni foreigners, have been used to weaken the position of the Shiite majority, which makes up about 70% of the Bahraini population,[65] and to enlarge the regime's support base.

The Bahraini state apparatus attains internal cohesion via sectarian and familial ties. It is composed of mainly Sunni officers, and members of the ruling family dominate the upper ranks.[66] Moreover, foreigners with few relations to the population make up a large part of security and military institutions. Although the general capacity of the Bahraini state apparatus is relatively high, its manpower is limited due to the Kingdom's small population.[67]

Repression strategies in Bahrain have varied over the last decades, but decision makers have largely focused on constraining repression affecting the whole population. This includes limited possibilities to assemble and to form political associations and censorship of the media. With regard to the freedom of expression, Bahraini institutions commonly rely on self-censorship and the predominance of propaganda. While this tactic functions well in the case of conventional media, Internet censorship has been less successful.[68] Incapacitating forms of repression were less common in Bahrain than in republics of the region.[69] In the so-called Bahraini Intifada from 1994–1999, a violent uprising led by Shiite opposition groups, the government used harsh repression.[70] After this, torture and the lethal targeting of activists became rare but have been on the rise again since 2007,[71] largely due to growing tensions between oppositional forces and the government. The imprisonment of about 400 politicians and activists in August 2010 in the context of the last parliamentary elections also reflects this development.

Bahrain in the Arab Spring

In the wake of the Arab Spring, from February 2011 on both legal and illegal opposition groups and young Bahrainis without a prior record of activism took to the streets and occupied Pearl Roundabout in Manama, which became a symbol for their protest. Despite the country's small population of 1.2 million inhabitants, only half of whom are Bahraini citizens, the number of protesters reached about 100,000 by the end of February 2011. This indicates a broad base of protests. When the protesters chose February 14, 2011 as their starting date—exactly ten years after King Hamad had launched the "National Action Charter"—they showed their disappointment with promised but unfulfilled reforms. Although mainly Shiite citizens took part in the protests, their demands were not sectarian, but concerned mostly democratic and human rights, also including an end to Shiite discrimination.[72] Nonetheless, the fact that in the protests mainly Shiites confronted the Sunni ruling family had some influence on the scope of demands, exceeding the limited reforms that protesters called for in other Arab monarchies.

Reactions to the Protests in Bahrain

The Bahraini government's main reaction to the current challenge was harsh repression. In an attempt to quickly silence the protests, security forces attacked the demonstrations on Pearl Roundabout on February 17 and 18, 2011, beating doctors, nurses, and protesters. But protests in small villages were targeted, too. Within the first week, seven protesters were shot. This led to increased mobilization and

broadened the activists' demands. One protester put it like this: "We used to demand for the prime minister to step down, but now our demand is for the ruling family to get out."[73] During the weeks that followed, Pearl Roundabout was occupied by protesters under three umbrella organizations: the Feb14 Youth Coalition; a moderate alliance composed of Shiite and left-wing opposition groups; and the radical "Coalition for a Republic."

King Hamad tried to change tactics and on February 23 released prisoners that had been arrested prior to the parliamentary elections half a year before. He granted extra payments to families and promised new jobs and reforms, while the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) decided to support Bahrain with $10,000 bn. Crown prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa invited the opposition groups to a national dialogue, but most of them regarded the dismissal of the prime minister—the king's hardliner uncle—as a pre-condition for talks.

When these efforts failed and the Bahraini police seemed incapable of dealing with protests, King Hamad resorted to more repressive means. On March 15, he declared the state of emergency and started a comprehensive crackdown on the protesters. With Saudi, UAE, and Qatari troops assisting, military and security forces began to forcefully clear Pearl Roundabout. During these measures several people were killed, hundreds wounded, and at least six opposition leaders arrested.[74] In the following days and months, thousands were arrested and mostly tortured; others were fired from their jobs or dismissed from university. The crackdown was not only directed towards opposition leaders, but targeted anybody who criticized the government, especially journalists, bloggers, teachers, academics, and physicians. Violent and non-violent harassment was common and amounted to the arbitrary beating of school kids or questioning of people with Shiite-sounding names. Riot police and the military routinely raided Shiite villages in search of disloyal citizens, invading houses in the middle of the night, and injuring or even killing people by beating, through teargas and shotguns. Many detainees faced unfair trials in the newly established National Safety Courts.[75]

The government tightened censorship of the media so that the country fell twenty-nine places in the Press Freedom Index in 2011–2012 compared to 2010, ranking now among the seven countries with least press freedom worldwide.[76] Journalists and online activists were detained, intimidated, and libeled, and although Bahrain's Internet control apparatus had already counted among the "most robust censorship and internet surveillance systems in the world,"[77] the blocking of websites was further intensified. Media institutions were targeted as well. The independent newspaper *Al-Wasat* was temporarily banned. Some of its editors were forced to resign, while Kareem Fakhrawi, a founder of the newspaper who had been ordered to a police station, died in custody. Foreign journalists and members of international human rights organizations were denied access to the country. When the state of emergency was lifted on June 1, this did not end repression. Rather, relentless repressive measures of a similar number and quality have prevailed until now.

The ruling family increasingly tried to regain legitimacy. On July 2, another round of unsuccessful reconciliation talks started. King Hamad appointed the Bahrain Independent Commission of Investigation, which published its report in the end of November, documenting abuses by government forces between February and June 2011. The report was criticized for only blaming some unnamed lower-rank officers instead of highlighting the government's responsibilities.[78] King Hamad afterwards promised to reform the security sector with the help of British and U.S.

experts. Constitutional amendments to strengthen parliament, announced on January 15, 2012, have thus far not been implemented.

However, these measures could not distract Bahrainis from the persisting repression. Anybody who advocates political reform is still a potential target. Opposition leaders in particular were subject to unfair trials that had already begun under the state of emergency, facing life imprisonment. Even doctors who treated protesters have been sentenced to five to fifteen years in prison. Between February 2011 and March 2012, sixty-seven people were killed and about 3,000 people arrested, of whom about 90% experienced some form of torture, and 500 still remain in jail.[79] Although the Bahraini monarchy has managed to survive so far, the crackdown on and intimidation of protesters could not silence activism. On the contrary, on March 9, 2012 about 100,000 people participated in a demonstration which the prominent Bahraini human rights activist Nabeel Rajab assumes to be "the biggest in our history."[80] After the huge protests accompanying the Formula 1 Race in April and Rajab's detention in May 2012, the size of protests has stayed large.

Egypt

Important pillars of the neo-patrimonial regime under Egypt's former President Hosni Mubarak were the National Democratic Party (NDP) that dominated parliament and an extensive security apparatus. Mark Sedgwick showed that legitimacy in pre-revolutionary Egypt was extremely low.[81] Ideological, revolutionary, or charismatic legitimacy that were available to Nasser had worn out over the decades. One reason for the lack of popular support was the rise of the president's son Gamal Mubarak into the elite, along with fellow businessmen. Their neoliberal outlook and policies under the Nazif government from 2004 on did not match the needs and aspirations of the Egyptian population.[82] Also, the military resented Gamal Mubarak's heir apparency, fearing to lose control over the country's economy, of which it controls an enormous share. The large armed forces had played a crucial role in Egyptians politics since the 1952 coup led by the Free Officers, but its public role declined over time. Instead, the internal security forces grew in importance, which is demonstrated by the fact that in late 2010, one tenth of the NDP's members of parliament were former police officers.[83] Thus the interests of actors within the ruling coalition diverged, and the regime base had narrowed.

In terms of state characteristics, statehood existed in virtually all areas where people live.[84] Among the larger threats were labor strikes, such as 2008 in Mahalla al-Kubra. Moreover, a small and elitist movement called Kifaya opposed both Gamal and Hosni Mubarak. However, it never possessed the social base to pose a real threat to the regime. The emergency law that had been in place since the assassination of President Sadat in 1981 facilitated the detention of civilians without due process. For instance, in 2006 more than a hundred bloggers and journalists were detained and some of them also tortured.[85] The Muslim Brotherhood, the illegal but mostly tolerated opposition, was also a target of intimidation, arrest, etc. on the eve of the parliamentary elections in 2010. After the rigged elections, various opposition groups united for the first time and protested in front of parliament.

Cases of police brutality were increasingly documented online and on private TV channels.[86] This development was facilitated by the spread of mobile phones. In June 2010, the death of Khaled Said at the hands of the police in Alexandria was one of the focal points of anger at security forces and the beginning of silent demonstrations

organized through the Facebook site "We are all Khaled Said," which is administrated by Google executive Wael Ghonim. Censorship had been eased, but still no basic freedoms were granted. At the eve of the Arab Spring, Sedgwick concluded that "the current regime is in danger, and . . . many or even most Egyptians are experiencing a dramatic and growing degree of alienation from the regime."[87]

The Phase of the "Revolution": January 25–February 11, 2011

Until the overthrow of Ben Ali in Tunisia on January 14, 2011, constraining repression had worked as a deterrent to ordinary Egyptians. But when they saw the success of demonstrations in Tunisia, they realized that a change was actually possible, and turnout in the protests on Police Day, January 25, was higher than expected. During the beginning of the demonstrations organized among others by the April 6 youth movement, the Central Security Forces commanded by the Minister of Interior, the so-called riot police, tried to deal with the demonstrations the usual way, beating them with batons and using tear gas and water cannons. However, the surprisingly high number of protesters overwhelmed the security forces, and Egyptians finally lost their fear of the security apparatus. Demonstrators hunted riot police down the streets, so that Ghonim's assessment turned out to be true: "if the police force could be neutralized, the regime would be paralyzed."[88] Soccer fans ("ultras") fought street battles to defend Tahrir Square, where the protesters gathered and the monumental NDP headquarter building was torched.

In a desperate move to prevent mobilization for the announced "Day of Rage," Internet and mobile phone services were shut down on January 27. This strategy, however, completely failed in that people took to the streets to see what was happening in the first place as they could hardly obtain any information otherwise. Moreover, some 22,000 prisoners were allowed to escape in order to create insecurity.[89] However, the chaos that Mubarak evoked in his televised speeches did not materialize thanks to neighborhood committees. Apart from repression, the president tried to reverse the narrowing of his base by ousting the new business elite from government and his son Gamal from his position in the NDP. But it was too late.

On January 28, the Islamist movement joined the protests, while leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood were detained overnight.[90] Also, civil servants, such as judges, and industrial workers participated in demonstrations or began to strike. At the same time, the military took over presence in the streets from the security forces commanded by the Ministry of Interior. Despite attempts by protesters to drag the armed forces to their side (using the slogan "The army and the people are hand in hand"), many instances of repression have been documented, first of all by blogger Maikel Nabil Sanad. While the police were conspicuously absent from the streets, armed thugs and plain-clothed policemen attacked the protesters. In particular, the "Battle of the Camel" on February 2 became infamous. The armed forces tolerated these attacks instead of defending the protesters. Protesters on Tahrir Square were also supposed to be intimidated by F-16 jets flying over their heads. High-profile journalists and average activists were detained by military intelligence, even if only for short periods of time. Wael Ghonim was arrested for twelve days, and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Mohammed ElBaradei was put under house arrest.[91] In all, 846 demonstrators were killed during the eighteen days of Tahrir, but many more were reported missing.[92]

The repression that was applied by the central security forces didn't work: the thugs didn't prevent demonstrators from taking to the streets, nor did the army

prevent people from joining the protests in Cairo, estimated to have involved up to two million.[93] When workers started general strikes in various cities, the protests gained momentum with an even larger base. Mubarak's rule ended because of a lack of cohesion between the different pillars of the security apparatus. But although the military's and the protesters' interests coincided, the armed forces remained an agent of repression. On February 11, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took over power.

After Mubarak's Fall: The Military Against the People

With Mubarak's forced resignation, Egypt's regime characteristics changed, while state characteristics remained the same. The new regime was a military dictatorship with the SCAF as ultimate authority. It enjoyed transitional legitimacy for upholding order and for its alleged neutral role during the eighteen days of Tahrir. For some time, a convergence of interest with the moderate Islamists was evident. This tacit pact benefited both actors in the constitutional referendum in March 2011. After the first free parliamentary elections, a certain power sharing with the Islamist Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) evolved, which had already ended with the dissolution of parliament in June 2012. Business actors close to the FJP replaced the sacked businessmen, complemented by the economic interests of the military and populist policies.

As the nature of the regime changed, so did the *threat* arising against it. Apart from the downfall of Mubarak, the other demands of the revolutionaries have remained unfulfilled. In the opinion of many protesters, the revolution was not accomplished with Mubarak's resignation, but would not end unless a full-scale process of democratization was set in motion. The movement "The Revolution Continues" thus demanded a quick transition to civilian rule and openly challenged the new regime, but was underrepresented in parliament.

As the SCAF embarked upon new repression strategies, old demands resurfaced. One excessively used incapacitating strategy was to try civilians in military courts. This practice targeted nearly 12,000 activists, among them prominent bloggers.[94] Maikel Nabil Sanad, the SCAF's first critic, went on hunger strike for 130 days in prison and was further defamed as a Zionist because of his positive attitude towards Israel.[95] Regarding the restriction of civil liberties, more press freedom than before was allowed, but criticism of the military and increasingly also of Islam were being punished. Although the emergency law was abolished more than a year after Mubarak stepped down, the SCAF introduced analogous laws a few weeks afterwards, triggering a new wave of protests.

Violence continued after Mubarak's resignation: One strategy to deter female protesters was sexual harassment of detained demonstrators disguised as so-called "virginity tests" in March 2011. In the Maspero incident in October 2011, military vehicles ran over Coptic protesters and the army fired live bullets. Later on in November in heavy street battles in Mohamed Mahmoud Street, live ammunition was fired on protesters and doctors were targeted.[96] And for all killings of protesters that had taken place, very few officers were sentenced.[97] On February 2, 2012, the soccer fans that had defended Tahrir Square were attacked in the stadium of Port Said under the eyes of security forces, leaving seventy-four dead. In all, what is striking about the second Egyptian case is that due to higher cohesion between the security agencies, there was more repression after the regime change.[98]

The Arab Spring and the Blossoming of Repression: A Comparative Analysis

The case studies have demonstrated the spectrum of repression strategies in Bahrain and Egypt. We have disaggregated the outcome, repression, in the empirical analysis. Table 1 summarizes the forms of repression that were prevalent during the observation period, differentiating between incapacitating and constraining subtypes and denoting the respective targets.

Different combinations of characteristics lead to the same outcome, repression. After climbing down the ladder of abstraction to the more fine-grained level of specific strategies and single measures, further nuances become discernable.

Particularly the constraining measures are almost identical in all cases, leading to the impression that these are default strategies of authoritarian rule. In all cases, demonstrations are attacked by both thugs and security forces, and protesters are detained for indefinite periods of time and put before military courts (if at all). Ill-treatment and intimidation are widespread, but the relative number and spectrum of targets of repression in Egypt is smaller than in Bahrain. In Bahrain, even politically inactive citizens belonging to the majority sectarian group have been under general suspicion and are subject to house-to-house searches. One group that is targeted everywhere is bloggers. This hints at the perceived threat that free expression, especially uncensored and online, poses to the regimes after the Tunisian, Egyptian, and Libyan rulers' overthrows. In post-Mubarak Egypt, Islamists were no longer a target group of incapacitating repression.

Table 2 presents the results of the case studies pertaining to the hypotheses of our framework. Some differences regarding the regime characteristics can be found, though structural variance among the Arab cases is not that large. We claimed that the more inclusive a regime and the larger its base is, the less repression it needs (*HR1*). Though we witnessed, prior to the Arab Spring, a narrowing of the regime base through economic policies in both countries, the less inclusive case of Bahrain—which used repression against a broader target group than Egypt—seems to support this hypothesis. The military plays an outstanding role in the organization of the center of power in all cases (*HR2*). As in Egypt the rise of new business elites resulted in the relative marginalization of the military, the application of repression before Mubarak's overthrow was largely limited to the police forces. Only after the SCAF took over power did the military begin to systematically employ more visible forms of repression. The analysis of regime characteristics shows that not only structures, but also dynamic changes within the elite influence the decision for repression.

Concerning state characteristics, both countries have the capacity to apply systematic and nationwide repression measures (*HS1*). Although the security apparatus in Bahrain does not equal the scope of its counterpart in Egypt, external intervention by GCC forces compensated for this deficit. We trace back the limited repression in Egypt until February 2011 partly to a lack of cohesion between the police forces and the military (*HS2*). This was due to the declining role of the military under the last years of Mubarak's rule, which indicates that state and regime characteristics are interacting. Moreover, the Bahraini center of power and the security apparatus depend to a large extent on a ruling minority (*HS3*), which further increased the disposition to repress. This demonstrates the different but equifinal paths leading to repression.[99]

In both Bahrain and Egypt the threat was largely non-violent, so no conclusion regarding the nexus between the use of violence and the level of repression is possible

Table 1. Empirical measures of repression

Incapacitating or constraining repression	Measure	Bahrain	Egypt under Mubarak	Egypt under SCAF
Incapacitating repression	Imprisonment	1,234	1,200 (disappeared)	11,879
	Killed persons/ maximum protesters/ citizens	67/ 100,000/ 600,000	846/ 2,000,000/ 80,000,000	300+/ 100,000+/ 80,000,000
	Targets	Doctors, journalists, bloggers, activists	Islamists, journalists, activists	Bloggers, activists
	Agents	Riot police, armed forces (+GCC)	Central security forces, thugs, military police	Armed forces, thugs, snipers
Constraining repression	House-to-house search	Yes	No	No
	Targets	Disloyal citizens	–	–
	Restricting assembly and association, freedom of expression, surveillance, libel, restriction of employment/ career opportunities, non-physical intimidation, torture, physical harassment	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Targets	Doctors, journalists, bloggers, activists	Islamists, bloggers, activists	Bloggers, activists

Table 2. Regime, state, and challenge characteristics

Item	Bahrain	Egypt under Mubarak	Egypt under SCAF
Regime	Neo-patrimonial with family rule	Neo-patrimonial	Military regime
Inclusiveness	Low	Lowered over last years	Medium
Military and security apparatus	Close	Medium (military); close (security apparatus)	Very close (military)
State			
Scope	Medium (high with external support)	High	High
Cohesion	High	Medium	High
Challenge			
Demands	Far-reaching	Very far-reaching	Far-reaching
Violence	Low	Low	Low
Mobilization	High (not regime base)	High (including former regime base)	Low (not regime base)

(*HC1*). However, broad consensus in the literature suggests the importance of this variable. The challenges differ insofar as Bahraini protests have their base in the sectarian majority of society, whereas in Egypt protesters from all segments of society were united against the president. Although demands in Bahrain are more limited than in the Egyptian Mubarak era, at least as much repression is applied in Bahrain as in Egypt. This indicates that the regime characteristics might be more important than a rising threat (*HC2*). Concerning the influence of the mobilization level (*HC3*), our analysis again provides mixed results and demonstrates that it is not so much mobilization per se that matters, but it has to be reflected upon in relation to the base of protests. When as in Egypt former beneficiaries of power relations are mobilized, repression is less likely (*HC3**). The triggers for mobilization can be found in visible or excessive incapacitating measures—in Egypt the high visibility of the Khaled Said case, in Bahrain the lethal crackdown on peaceful protesters.

Figure 1 contains the various hypotheses that were not falsified in the analysis of our cases, summing up factors that make the application of repression, and more specifically incapacitating repression, more or less likely. They can serve as a point of departure for future studies.

Conclusion: No Future for Repression?

In authoritarian regimes, many roads lead to repression. This article demonstrated how similar forms of repression are employed in different settings. The decision for repression can be traced back to regime, state, and challenge characteristics, which mutually influence each other. Further research is needed on how exactly the factors that induce certain forms of repression strategies interact. Our analysis



Figure 1. Factors that make the use of repression more or less likely.

proposes that under certain circumstances regime characteristics might trump some challenge characteristics, whereas more attention should be paid to the relationship between the challengers and the government, i.e., whether or not they are considered as a (former) base of the regime.

We have demonstrated the relevance of including different regime strategies and considering them as a total package of repression and legitimation against the backdrop of relevant structural characteristics. The sources of legitimacy that were present prior to a challenge determine alternatives to repression and their attractiveness. Still, the relationship between repression and legitimation deserves further attention. From the perspective that regards them as alternative regime strategies against challenges, repression seems more likely when regime legitimacy is low. But the relationship between the two strategies is more complex, e.g., the application of repression can be perceived of as legitimate or not by certain groups. This role of legitimacy as a factor supporting repression should be studied in greater detail and promises to be highly interesting.

With regard to the consequences of repression, in Bahrain and Egypt constraining repression did not preclude the emergence of a massive challenge in the Arab Spring. It thus had no preventive effect, so that elites saw a subsequent need for incapacitating repression. The empirical analysis highlights the necessity for prospective research to take a closer look into the dynamics of preventive repression failure. Both before and during the uprisings, almost all constraining repression strategies were applied in all cases, suggesting that constraining repression is to a certain degree a

general feature of authoritarian regimes. The comparison of our cases shows that incapacitating repression directed against broad, visible target groups is used too extensively and decreases legitimacy. Instead, incapacitating repression fuels mobilization. So if the "success" of repression lies in the containment of challenges, the challenges have not diminished in any of our cases and stability has not arrived at the pre-Arab Spring level. Under which circumstances repression leads to the destabilization or stabilization of regimes in general remains an essential issue for further comparative and theoretical studies.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank two anonymous reviewers from *Terrorism and Political Violence* for very helpful remarks. A previous version of this article was presented at the Annual Conference of the German Political Science Association (DVPW)—Section for Comparative Politics, Marburg, March 29–31, 2012, where we benefited from an inspiring discussion, for which we are especially indebted to Timm Beichelt, Alexander Schmotz, and Andreas Schedler. We are also grateful to Oliver Schlumberger, Torsten Matzke, Jörg Haas, and André Bank for constructive and thoughtful comments.

Notes

1. We agree with Davenport and Inman, who underline the importance of considering a broader spectrum of relevant research, including qualitative and quantitative approaches as well as neighboring strands of literature; Christian Davenport and Molly Inman, "The State of State Repression Research Since the 1990s," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24, no. 4 (2012): 619–634.

2. See, e.g., Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger, "Waiting for Godot: Regime Change Without Democratization in the Middle East," *International Political Science Review* 25, no. 4 (2004): 371–392; Oliver Schlumberger, "Opening Old Bottles in Search of New Wine: Studying Nondemocratic Legitimacy in the Middle East," *Middle East Critique* 19, no. 3 (2004): 233–250; Steven Heydemann, "Upgrading Authoritarianism," *The Saban Center for Middle East Policy*, Analysis Paper 13 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, October 2007); Johannes Gerschewski, "The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-optation in Autocratic Regimes," *Democratization* 20, no. 1 (2013): 13–36.

3. It is not easy to give a sound definition of stability and to differentiate it properly from other concepts. While regime durability only captures for how long a regime has persisted and therefore is measured as a time dimension, regime stability can be framed as the probability of regime durability in the future, or "as the probability that a regime will not experience breakdown," a proposition first made by Torsten Matzke, cf. Maria Josua, "Co-optation as a Strategy of Authoritarian Legitimation—Success and Failure in the Arab World" (paper presented at the 3rd General Conference of the ECPR, Reykjavik, August 2011, 4). For different approaches towards the concept of stability, see Keith M. Dowding and Richard Kimber, "The Meaning and Use of 'Political Stability,'" *European Journal of Political Research* 11 (1983): 229–243.

4. In order to denote regime actors, i.e., the ruler and incumbent elites, who are in colloquial language often referred to as "the regime," we use the term *government* in Van Inwegen's sense: "the government is the group who controls the state"; see Patrick Van Inwegen, *Understanding Revolution* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2011), 7.

5. Ronald Wintrobe, "Dictatorship: Analytical Approaches," in Susan C. Strokes and Carles Boix eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 388.

6. Oliver Schlumberger, "Political Liberalization, Authoritarian Regime Stability, and Imitative Institution Building" (paper presented at the Fifth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Florence and Montecatini Terme, March 2004).

7. For the Arab world, the most frequently noted sources of legitimacy are material allocation, tradition, religion, and previously ideology (Schlumberger, "Opening Old Bottles" (see note 2 above)).

8. Christian Davenport, "Introduction," in Christian Davenport, ed., *Paths to State Repression: Human Rights Violations and Contentious Politics* (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 1. In this and other studies, mostly large-N techniques are used, focusing on social movements or on state terror, examining both causes for and consequences of repression.

9. Vincent Boudreau, "Precarious Regimes and Matchup Problems in the Explanation of Repressive Policy," in Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston, and Carol Mueller, eds., *Repression and Mobilization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 54.

10. Will H. Moore, "The Repression of Dissent: A Substitution Model of Government Coercion," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, no. 1 (2000): 107–127.

11. Karen Rasler, "Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution," *American Sociological Review* 61, no. 1 (1996): 132–152; James C. Franklin, "Contentious Challenges and Government Responses in Latin America," *Political Research Quarterly* 62, no. 4 (2009): 700–714.

12. We adhere to the notion of bounded rationality to acknowledge the fact that in the dynamic situations in which repression often occurs, information is far from complete, especially on the micro level. Despite the high level of uncertainty, repression as a strategy is not irrational per se. Christian Davenport, "State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace," *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 4 (2007): 485–504; Wintrobe, "Dictatorship" (see note 5 above).

13. Davenport, "State Repression" (see note 12 above), 488.

14. Abel Escribà-Folch, "Repression, Political Threats, and Survival Under Autocracy" (paper presented at the 3rd General Conference of the ECPR, Reykjavik, August 2011, 8). At the same time, the decision for repression is influenced by former interaction with political contesters. This path dependency leads to context-specific "repressive patterns" (Vincent Boudreau, *Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 3).

15. Davenport, "State Repression" (see note 12 above), 488. This is also problematic because of the uncertainty concerning the regime's support as described by Wintrobe as the Dictator's Dilemma: "The more [a ruler's] repressive apparatus stifles dissent and criticism, the less he knows how much support he really has," Wintrobe, "Dictatorship" (see note 5 above), 366.

16. Davenport, "State Repression" (see note 12 above), 488.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., 486; Escribà-Folch, "Repression, Political Threats, and Survival Under Autocracy" (see note 14 above), 7.

19. Cf. Escribà-Folch, "Repression, Political Threats, and Survival Under Autocracy" (see note 14 above), 7; Mark Irving Lichbach, "Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31, no. 2 (1987): 266–297.

20. Davenport, "State Repression" (see note 12 above), 487.

21. Ibid. A similar distinction is also proposed by Earl, who labels these repression methods "channeling" and "coercion," cf. Jennifer Earl, "Tanks, Tear Gas and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression," *Sociological Theory* 21, no. 1 (2003): 44–68.

22. André Bank, "Rents, Co-optation, and Economized Discourse: Three Dimensions of Political Rule in Jordan, Morocco and Syria," *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 14, nos. 1/2 (2004): 155–180; Josua, "Co-optation" (see note 3 above).

23. See, e.g., Davenport and Inman, "The State of State Repression Research Since the 1990s" (see note 1 above), 627.

24. Cf. Boudreau, "Precarious Regimes" (see note 9 above), and "Elections, Repression, and Authoritarian Survival in Post-Transition Indonesia and the Philippines," *The Pacific Review* 22, no. 2 (2009): 233–253. As activism carries the connotation of social movements, we prefer the broader term of challenge for describing the threat that leads a government to employ repression.

25. T. David Mason, "Nonelite Response to State-Sanctioned Terror," *The Western Political Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (1989): 467–482.

26. Ibid.; T. David Mason and Dale A. Krane, "The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror," *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 2 (1989): 175–198.

27. Ibid., 179. This threefold distinction is also mentioned by Christian Davenport, "The Promise of Democratic Pacification: An Empirical Assessment," *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 3 (2004): 543.

28. While the subjects of repression according to our definition are state actors, these might even avail themselves of individuals not belonging to the official security forces, so-called thugs. When they are instigated or paid by officials, they can be counted as indirect agents of the state repression apparatus.

29. Davenport, "State Repression" (see note 12 above); Barbara Geddes, *Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument* (Los Angeles: University of California in Los Angeles, 1999).

30. B. Todd Spinks, Emile Sahliyeh, and Brian Calfano, "The Status of Democracy and Human Rights in the Middle East: Does Regime Type Make a Difference?," *Democratization* 15, no. 2 (2008): 329ff.

31. Maria Josua, "The King's Advantage: Legitimität und Legitimierung monarchischer Herrschaft" (presentation at the 31st German Congress of Oriental Studies/17th congress of the German Middle East Studies Association, Marburg, September 2010).

32. Robert M. Fishman, "Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe's Transition to Democracy," *World Politics* 42, no. 3 (1990): 428.

33. Christian Davenport, "The Promise of Democratic Pacification: An Empirical Assessment," *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 3 (2004): 540; Patrick M. Regan and Errol A. Henderson, "Democracy, Threats and Political Repression in Developing Countries: Are Democracies Internally Less Violent?," *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (2002): 121; Michael Colaresi and Sabine C. Carey, "To Kill or to Protect: Security Forces, Domestic Institutions, and Genocide," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, no. 1 (2008): 39–67.

34. Christian Davenport and David A. Armstrong, "Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976–1996," *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 3 (2004): 538–554.

35. Rudoph J. Rummel, *Power Kills* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1997); Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000).

36. Davenport, "State Repression" (see note 12 above). In a similar vein, Cavatorta claims that if co-optation capacities are high, less repression is employed (Francesco Cavatorta, "More Than Repression: Strategies of Regime Survival. The Significance of Divide et Impera in Morocco," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 25, no. 2 (2007): 187–203).

37. Davenport, "State Repression" (see note 12 above), 486.

38. Ibid., 491.

39. Eva Bellin, "Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders," in Martha Pripstein Posusney and Michele Penner Angrist, eds., *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 28.

40. Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1947 [1922]).

41. Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 2 (2004): 139–157. While regime characteristics have an impact on—in Bellin's terminology—*both* the will *and* the capacity to coercion, state characteristics influence mainly the capabilities or capacities to coercion.

42. Understood as a political organization whose "administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its orders" (Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (see note 40 above), 29, own translation).

43. Lucan A. Way and Steven Levitsky, "The Dynamics of Autocratic Coercion after the Cold War," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39 (2006): 393; cf. also Boudreau, "Precarious Regimes" (see note 9 above).

44. Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo, "Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for Democratization," *Comparative Politics* 42, no. 2 (2012): 151–169.

45. Way and Levitsky, "The Dynamics of Autrocratic Coercion" (see note 43 above), 393.

46. Ibid.

47. See ibid., 395f.

48. Ibid., 388.

49. Ibid., 396.

50. Ted Robert Gurr, "The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: A Theoretical Analysis," in Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez, eds., *Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research* (New York, Westport, London: Greenwood Press, 1986), 59.

51. Boudreau, "Precarious Regimes" (see note 9 above); *Resisting Dictatorship* (see note 14 above); Christian Davenport, "State Repression and Political Order," *Annual Review of Political Science* 10 (2007): 1–23.

52. Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978), 106.

53. Davenport, "The Promise of Democratic Pacification" (see note 27 above); Franklin, "Contentious Challenges and Government Responses in Latin America" (see note 11 above), 710; Steven C. Poe, C. Neal Tate, Linda Camp Keith, and Drew Lanier, "Domestic Threats: The Abuse of Personal Integrity," in Christian Davenport, ed., *Paths to State Repression: Human Rights Violations and Contentious Politics* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 32; Sabine Carey, *Protest, Repression and Political Regimes: An Empirical Analysis of Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa* (New York: Routledge, 2009).

54. Franklin, "Contentious Challenges and Government Responses in Latin America" (see note 11 above), 700.

55. Poe et al., "Domestic Threats" (see note 53 above), 32.

56. Boudreau, "Precarious Regimes" (see note 9 above), 45.

57. Franklin, "Domestic Threats" (see note 11 above), 708.

58. Davenport, "Introduction" (see note 8 above), 5.

59. Dowding and Kimber, "The Meaning and Use of 'Political Stability'" (see note 3 above), 235, also make this argument with regard to stability, which they regard as given when the pattern of challenges is at its usual level.

60. Cf. Davenport, "Introduction" (see note 8 above).

61. Bellin, "Coercive Institutions" (see note 39 above), 29: "Mowing down thousands of people, even if it is within the physical capacity of the security forces, is a costly prospect. It may jeopardize the institutional integrity of the security apparatus (will the soldiers shoot?); it may jeopardize international support to the regime (will the patron pay?); it may jeopardize the domestic legitimacy of the security forces (will popular opposition be amplified?)."

62. Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism" (see note 41 above), 146.

63. Michael Schmidmayr, *Politische Opposition in Bahrain. Stabilität und Wandel in einem autoritären Regime* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011), 41ff.

64. http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/528.

65. Schmidmayr, *Politische Opposition in Bahrain* (see note 63 above), 23.

66. Bahrain Center for Human Rights, *Bahrain: Dangerous Statistics and Facts About the National Security Apparatus*, http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/2784/.

67. Bahrain spends about 20% of its budget on its military, which has a size of about 13,000 soldiers. The National Security Agency consists of about 1,000, the National Guard of 1,200. ("Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry," presented in Manama, Bahrain, on November 23, 2011.).

68. Schmidmayr, *Politische Opposition in Bahrain* (see note 63 above), 67.

69. Political Terror Scale 2010: http://politicalterrorscale.org/.

70. Schmidmayr, *Politische Opposition in Bahrain* (see note 63 above), 20.

71. Human Rights Watch, *Torture Redux: The Revival of Physical Coercion During Interrogations in Bahrain*, February 2010, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bahrain0210webwcover.pdf.

72. International Crisis Group, "Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (III): The Bahrain Revolt," *Middle East/North Africa Report* No. 105, April 6, 2011.

73. Martin Chulov and Mark Tran, "Bahrain Soldiers Fire on Protesters," *The Guardian*, February 18, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/18/bahrain-soldiers-fire-on-protesters.

74. Martin Chulov, "Bahrain Arrests Six Opposition Leaders for 'Contacting Foreign Agents,'" *The Guardian*, March 17, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/17/bahrain-arrests-opposition-leaders-crackdown; Martin Chulov, "America Rebukes Bahrain After Violent Crackdown on Demonstrators," *The Guardian*, March 16, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/16/five-die-bahrain-crackdown.

75. Human Rights Watch, *No Justice in Bahrain: Unfair Trial in Military and Civilian Courts*. February 2012, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bahrain0212webwcover.pdf.

76. Press Freedom Index 2011/2012, http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2011-2012,1043.html.

77. Sanja Kelly and Sarah Cook, *New Technologies, Innovative Repression: Growing Threats to Internet Freedom*, Freedom House, 2011, 2, http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Overview%20essay%20FINAL%204%2014%202011.pdf.

78. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, "Bahrain's Uncertain Future," *Foreign Policy.com*, November 23, 2011, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/23/bahrain_s_uncertain_future.

79. Bahrain's Human Rights Organizations, "Bahrain: The Human Price of Freedom and Justice: A Joint Report on Human Rights Violations in Bahrain," *Bahrain Center for Human Rights, Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights, Bahrain Human Rights Society*, November 22, 2011, http://bahrainrights.hopto.org/BCHR/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/BahrainTheHumanPrice.pdf.

80. "Bahrain's Shias Demand Reform at Mass Rally," *Al Jazeera*, March 10, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/03/201239144334860869.html.

81. Mark Sedgwick, "Measuring Egyptian Regime Legitimacy," *Middle East Critique* 19, no. 3 (2010): 251–267.

82. Torsten Matzke, "Wachstumspolitik für eine reiche Minderheit: Zu den sozioökonomischen Hintergründen der ägyptischen Revolution," in Holger Albrecht and Thomas Demmelhuber, eds., *Revolution und Regimewandel in Ägypten* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 111–140.

83. Saad el-Din Ibrahim, "Has Egypt Become a Police State?," *Egypt Independent*, December 20, 2010, http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/276358.

84. The personnel of the armed forces totaled 865,500 as of 2009 (http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/egypt/armed-forces-personnel), making up 3.26% of the total labor force. Military expenditure made up 7.11% of central government expenditure or 2.00% of the GDP in 2010.

85. Steven A. Cook, *The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 195ff.

86. Ibid., 195.

87. Sedgwick, "Measuring Egyptian Regime Legitimacy" (see note 81 above), 266.

88. Wael Ghonim, *Revolution 2.0. The Power of the People is Greater Than the People in Power: A Memoir* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012), 123.

89. Mohamed Elmeshad, "NGO Demands Investigation into Deaths of Over 100 Prisoners in Custody," *Egypt Independent*, September 11, 2011, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/ngo-demands-investigation-deaths-over-100-prisoners-custody.

90. "Fresh Protests Erupt in Egypt," *Al Jazeera*, January 28, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112810059478272.html.

91. Cook, *The Struggle for Egypt* (see note 85 above), 288f.

92. Evan Hill and Muhammad Mansour, "Egypt's Army Took Part in Torture and Killings During Revolution, Report Shows," *The Guardian*, April 10, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/10/egypt-army-torture-killings-revolution.

93. Cook, *The Struggle for Egypt* (see note 85 above), 296.

94. Al-Masry Al-Youm, "Fact-Finding Committee Investigates Protester Detentions," *Egypt Independent*, July 12, 2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/fact-finding-committee-investigates-protester-detentions.

95. They have been released by now; some 3,000 prisoners were pardoned on the revolution's first anniversary.

96. Salma Shukrallah, "We Are Targeted by Police and Army for Treating Demonstrators: Egypt Doctors," *Ahram Online*, December 26, 2011, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/30199/Egypt/0/We-are-targeted-by-police-and-army-for-treating-de.aspx.

97. In November 2011, a police officer who allegedly targeted the eyes of demonstrators, injuring sixty of them, was charged in court.

98. See Ahram Online's timeline, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/34046/Egypt/Politics-/Year-of-the-SCAF-a-timeline-of-mounting-repression.aspx.

99. Cf. also Eva Bellin, "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring," *Comparative Politics* 44, no. 2 (2012): 131.