


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The Psychological and Behavioural Bases of Islamic Fundamentalism

MAX TAYLOR and JOHN HORGAN

This article explores psychological and behavioural issues that may help our understanding of some important contemporary developments in Islam. The particular areas of immediate concern are the behavioural bases of the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and violence. A more general issue, however, relates to how we might understand the nature of religious and ideological control over behaviour. At the outset, general issues related to the concept of fundamentalism will be discussed. This is a very contentious term, and in some circumstances might be thought to refer more to the perspective of the beholder than that of the believer. Subsequently, the concept of fundamentalism within the context of Islam will be considered, emphasizing the nature of fundamentalist ideology, while ways of understanding the processes of fundamentalism within a behavioural framework will be described. The broader implications of this discussion will then be extended with particular reference to religious control over behaviour.

Introduction: Using the Term 'Fundamentalism'

Throughout this article, we use the term 'fundamentalism' to identify a broad category of religious behaviour. Religious fundamentalism as a term has a clear and relatively specific meaning within the Christian West, referring to maintenance of traditional beliefs involving a literal acceptance of the creeds as fundamental, as well as belief in the inerrancy of the Scriptures. It is a term most readily associated with a distinct school of American Protestantism, although its usage has extended to embrace a much wider context. The term is frequently associated with holding conservative political views.

Perhaps the critical quality of fundamentalism is that believers take religion 'seriously'.¹ That is to say, not only is there a sense of truth and error in their belief systems, but in recognizing truth it is the duty of the believer to follow religious prescriptions because they represent truth. From a psychological perspective, the significant feature of 'taking religion seriously' is that it implies not just consistency in one's belief(s), but also in *behaviour*. A quality of the fundamentalist believer is, therefore, the expression of the particular fundamentalist priorities in behaviour of some form. Bruce² notes that amongst other things, we might characterize the features of this behaviour as exclusive, proselytizing and confrontational.

This raises the question, considered later, of what the behavioural qualities are that give rise to such features.

Because fundamentalism is associated with a referencing back to traditional beliefs and values, Bruce also notes that the liberal West has a tendency to view such movements as necessarily politically conservative and reactionary, and therefore negative, in the sense of reacting against modernity and seeking a return to some (assumed) earlier *and* less liberal society. It is this latter assumption, which we might characterize as the assumption of conservatism as opposed to liberalism, that may be erroneous when applied in Islamic contexts (it is worth noting that Bruce also argues that this is an inappropriate assumption in many contemporary Christian fundamentalist churches).

Certainly, this critical quality of fundamentalist Islam as evidenced to the Western observer is a desire to return to the founding principles of Islam associated with the creation of an Islamicized society. We cannot necessarily assume, however, that this represents a movement 'backwards' away from what the West would regard as liberal social values and 'civilization' towards a conservative, essentially negative unchanging world based upon the seventh century. The renewal implied by seeking to return to the fundamentals of Islam has its origins in the very beginning of Islam, and what we see in the contemporary Islamic world may be better seen in terms of cyclical renewal than retreat.

What constitutes 'backwards' is, of course, a matter of judgement anyway, and we must not forget the relativity such a judgement implies. Paradoxically, the changes desired by the Islamic fundamentalist believer may be in many ways similar to those desired by the contemporary political radical. Both, for example, reject the status quo and seek profound social change. These desired changes might in addition be necessarily revolutionary, resulting in the destabilization and ultimate overthrow of an established regime. Whilst the political radical and the fundamentalist may ultimately desire different things, they may well share common processes sufficient to create allegiances. We can see why, therefore, what might be thought of as contradictory terms – 'radical' and 'fundamentalism' – come together in some aspects of contemporary Islam.

To understand this more clearly, it is necessary to view the aspirations of Islamic fundamentalism within the particular social context in which it might occur. At the risk of anticipating later discussion, we might note that a critical quality of the contemporary Islamic view of the world is that all present and past Muslim society (with the possible limited exception of *Shi'a* Iran in some circles) are of limited significance when compared with the 38-year period from 622 to 660 AD (from the *Hijra* to the seizure of power by the Umayyad Caliph Mu'awiya) which marked the 'Golden Age'

of Islam³ of the period of the Rightly Guided Caliphs.⁴ This referencing back to the Golden Age is not simply a response to present conditions, and indeed, for the devout (whether fundamentalist or not) needs no justification in social or economic terms. It is an imperative of belief and an essential quality of the Islamic view of the world. Given this, the transposition to the fundamentalist position of Western values such as freedom and choice, lack of certainty, and assumptions about the legitimacy of the state, can be very misleading and address the wrong frame of reference when applied to Islamic societies.

In the following, the term 'Islamic fundamentalism' will be used to refer to the sense described above in which the believer does take religion seriously, where there is a sense of truth and error which manifests itself in social and political activity, and where the framework for social change lies primarily in the historical revealed word of God, rather than the present social and economic climate.

Whilst we can identify the broad parameters of fundamentalist ideology, the social and political influence of fundamentalist thinking is much more difficult to assess. The position taken by the authors of this paper is that its significance lies not so much in the numbers of believers who adhere strictly to the fundamentalist position, but rather that it provides the moral authority and ideological force from which significant political influence might develop. Despite colonialism, economic limitations and political upheaval, Islam continues to command widespread general support across a broad spectrum of citizens in Islamic countries ranging from the rural to urban, poor to affluent. We believe that the significance of fundamentalism lies in its capacity to influence and channel that support in particular directions – hence issues such as determining the total number of fundamentalist believers may be of far lesser importance. Particular circumstances (e.g. the nature of a particular ruler, war, etc.) may influence the precise qualities aspired to, and the pragmatic needs of the moment may always, of course, temper the political expression of fundamentalist ideology.

The Fundamentalist Position

Whilst this article focuses on Islamic fundamentalism, it is not our purpose to exhaustively analyse the details of the various fundamentalist positions that can be identified within Islam, nor for that matter to present a more general analysis of Islam. As with similar Christian movements, there are subtleties and nuances between different views that are of enormous significance to the believer, but which are of limited consequence for the non-initiate. An analysis of these issues would be much more appropriate to a focus on the theological or political qualities of these movements, rather

than the psychological and behavioural issues of concern here. What will follow, therefore, will be a general introduction to the area of fundamentalist Islam, stressing matters of concern to the behavioural analysis that follows. Whilst an attempt is made to place the concepts encountered within their more general framework, no effort has been made to present a detailed account of the theological issues involved. The approach taken here is supportive of a psychological and behavioural analysis of the limited qualities of fundamentalist activity, and that necessarily obligates that account. It is worth noting at the outset, of course, that despite the enormous literature by and about Islamic fundamentalism, comment on the psychological and behavioural issues that might be involved remain sparse.⁵

The reasons for the increase in influence of fundamentalist movements within Islamic societies are very complex. They relate both to the external and internal dynamics of those societies, and analyses can be developed at a variety of levels. In contrast to this complexity for the outside observer, however, the believer would of course assert that this view represents the revealed word of Allah, and would place any account of the resurgence of these distinctive forms of Islam within a theological context. This simplicity of belief and explanation is a significant quality of the fundamentalist view of the world.

One set of factors that can be identified from a Western social and psychological perspective lies in a general feeling of discontent with the nature of contemporary Islamic states. This perspective leads us to largely relate both theological and political views to common causes. Thus, the discontent may from time to time manifest itself in overtly political activity, associated with left-wing political movements; or in the case of fundamentalism, that discontent becomes evident in a theological context, and addresses primarily religious goals. However, the all-embracing social nature of Islam necessarily means that religious activity will impinge on broader socio-political issues. This necessarily draws together the theological and the political. Indeed, the inclusive quality of Islam presents the Western observer with great difficulties of understanding. Areas of social separation that the West prides itself on (such as the distinction between the law and due process, and social and political issues related to public wellbeing) are confounded in Islamic societies. A very useful and revealing discussion of the relationship between the law and Islamic society from an anthropological perspective has been presented by Rosen,⁶ based on experience of Moroccan *Qadi* courts. This reveals surprising differences with Western legal views in fundamental assumptions about the nature of the legal process, evidence and even the concept of truth, for example. Thus, what we might characterize in the West as a retreat into theology from the problems of the world, within Islam necessarily means a growing

engagement with the world and absorption of the political within the theological. What to the West may appear to be a paradoxical juxtaposition lies at the very heart of Islamic fundamentalism.

Two broad classes of influence can be identified which seem to be associated with the discontent in Islamic societies – those concerned with the relationship between Islamic states and the wider world, which we might characterize as *external* factors, and those concerned with Islam itself and its practices, which we might term *internal* factors. External factors tend to relate to the broad themes of Arab nationalism (at least in the Middle East), but given the social nature of Islam, external and internal factors of course interact in complex ways.

One significant external factor of relevance to the Muslim masses (although of probably less relevance to the religious) is the relative failure of the Arab and Muslim states to rival Western material wealth and success.⁷ Despite immigration trends in recent times, the Muslim world remains predominantly a part of the developing world, and also despite very considerable natural resources (in the form of oil, for example). The major Muslim countries, such as Egypt and Syria, have generally failed to achieve substantial rises in living standards comparable to the West, and still have large, poor peasant economies. In the richer countries (such as the Gulf States) economic wealth has benefited a relatively limited few, and has not been distributed to poorer Islamic countries, or to their very large migrant communities. Indeed, despite the overt theocratic qualities of life in the Gulf States, to many devout Muslims the effects of increased oil wealth have been to increase the influence of the West and challenge the social basis of Islam, rather than to complement and enhance it. The Gulf War and its aftermath has added to these concerns. Similarly, the impetus to modernization, secularism and Westernization which from time to time characterized both Nasser's and Sadat's Egypt, for example, has clearly failed to produce much improvement in most people's lives. Furthermore, whilst Western economic practices may have contributed relatively little to public wellbeing, much Western investment that occurs in Islamic countries is associated with multinationals, whose loyalties are seen to lie largely with the West. Indeed, such economic benefits as they may bring are often perceived as being of less significance than the negative effects of encouraging secularism and behaviour contrary to Islamic values.

A further significant factor in a longstanding sense of unease is the repeated humiliating failure of Arab armies to defeat Israel. At the popular level, this emotive issue probably serves to polarize opinion more than anything else, and is a significant element in the appeal of Arab nationalism. This public sense of failure to achieve what are perceived to be essentially Arab (and to a lesser extent, Islamic) objectives in the face of a strong West

is a potent and enduring force which cannot be underestimated. Tourism and the Western media add further to the sense of specific Islamic concern, through encouraging secularism and the adoption of hedonistic lifestyles. This results in a strange and unexpected paradox. Whilst the contemporary Western view of Islam may be one of buoyancy and concern at its advance (not without some justification), the fundamentalist views a situation where Islam appears to be on the retreat from a growing tide of secularism and associated Western values.⁸

Internal features of Islam complement and interact with this general sense of nationalist discontent. In the context of concern to us, four relevant qualities of Islam as a religion and as a social movement can be identified⁹ that sustain fundamentalist positions. These are:

- 1) its claims to universal validity;
- 2) its theocratic demands extending to all aspects of life;
- 3) the sanctification of Islamic law and its rulings; and
- 4) the general equation of the state with the implementation of Islam.

Islam claims that it is the perfect and final embodiment of God's law; it is thus necessarily the preferred, obvious and appropriate religion for all people. Conditional tolerance of other religions is strictly limited to 'people of the Book' – *ahl al-kitab* – (broadly speaking Christians and Jews) who share a common heritage, even though incomplete and flawed. These religious groups can live within an Islamic state without conversion or coercion provided they accepted Muslim rule and payment of a special tax. They have the status of *dhimmi* and may be left in peace 'under conditions of discrimination, and acceptance of inferiority and humiliation'.¹⁰ Believers in other religions, who do not recognize the role and status of 'the Prophets' cannot be tolerated, and must be converted or killed.

This confers upon a fundamentalist Islamic community a sense of superiority that draws upon a rich history of Muslim advance and military success. However, the colonial experiences of Islamic states clearly challenged this view. When Western (and largely Christian) states have confronted Islam, they have emerged victorious in all arenas of conflict. Whilst challenging to notions of Islamic superiority in the short term, this is in itself not necessarily so critical when a broader perspective is taken. There are historical examples from the time of the Prophet of Islam retreating, only to rise again with renewed vigour. Retreat and the development of a temporary *modus vivendi* with the forces of secularism can be tolerated as short-term responses to circumstances.

More problematic to contemporary fundamentalists in this context are the experiences of post-colonialism, and the contrast between the

achievements of Islamic countries in the contemporary world and the glorious history of Muslim advance in the 7th to 10th centuries. Post-colonial Muslim aspirations to redress the wrongs of colonialism, and to re-establish the relative position of Muslim vs. Christian (from Muslim perspectives) have failed, yet Muslim countries have at least ostensibly been ruled by Muslims and presumably have had the capacity to draw upon the full potential of the force of Islam. In the eyes of the fundamentalist, therefore, Islam is challenged and compromised not only by discrepancies in material wealth, but also in terms of its capacity to sustain its own moral and religious authority.

Responses to these apparent challenges to the moral authority of Islam are a critical element of the fundamentalist position. They can clearly be seen in the writings of Sayyid Qutb,¹¹ who occupies an important position in the development of Islamic fundamentalist thinking. His writings provided the ideological basis on which many aspects of contemporary fundamentalist thinking have developed. Whilst there may be disputes within the various fundamentalist movements about the appropriateness of the solutions he offers, his ideological influence remains unchallenged. In probably his most influential book¹² (published in 1978), he analysed the state of Islam with particular respect to the challenge to its moral authority. The tone of his analysis can be seen from the following extract:¹³

The leadership of mankind by Western man is now on the decline, not because Western culture has become poor materially or because its economic and military power has become weak. The period of the Western system has come to an end primarily because it is deprived of those life-giving values which enabled it to be the leader of mankind.

It is necessary for the new leadership to preserve and develop the material fruits of the creative genius of Europe, and also to provide mankind with such high ideals and values as have so far remained undiscovered by mankind, and which will also acquaint humanity with a way of life which is harmonious with human nature, which is positive and constructive, and which is practicable.

Islam is the only **system which** possesses these **values**¹⁴ and this way of life.

It is interesting to note that fundamentalist analyses of the problems facing Islam never question the ideological bases of Islam. In a sense, of course, this follows from 'taking religion seriously', or at least taking seriously the original precepts upon which a religion is based. But the fundamentalist goes beyond adherence to basic precepts, and makes no distinction between the general principles upon which Islam might be founded and the pragmatic responses to life as the 7th-century followers of Islam might find

it; nor does the relationship with the contemporary world impinge on the analysis. Perhaps as a consequence of that, fundamentalist analyses always locate the source of any problems in their world view externally to the ideological foundations of Islam. Either the West is responsible for deflecting or distorting the inevitability of the proper progress of Islam, or Islamic leaders have failed either through being subverted (again by the West), or because they fail to follow Islamic precepts. What they perceive as the fundamentalist tenets of Islam are never open to question. Parallels may be drawn here with some of the psychological bases of prejudice, which will be returned to later.

That is not to say, however, that there is no criticism of different perspectives on fundamentalism from within Islam, and indeed within the various fundamentalist positions. Babear,¹⁵ for example, discusses some of the shortcomings of the fundamentalist position from an orthodox Wahabist perspective. Significantly, the discussion is largely concerned with strategy, rather than principle. Consistent with the above discussion, he notes three common themes to fundamentalist writers – the total debilitation of the *Ummah*, the Western cause of such debilitation, and the flawed basis of any solutions to this problem other than Islam. We might note that in his paper he questions all but the final theme.

There is certainly a strong tendency amongst writers such as Qutb to stress the poor state of contemporary Islam. In this respect, the theory of modernity as the new barbarity (*Jahiliyyah*), which has its origins in the writings of Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi, has played a very prominent role in the fundamentalist justification for the debilitation of the *Ummah*. At its simplest, the theory of the new *Jahiliyyah* refers to the basic incompatibility between Islam and modernity (as represented by Western values). It echoes the struggles of the Prophet and his followers in the very beginnings of Islam, and draws on the Qur'anic themes familiar to all Islamic believers. Striving against the state of *Jahiliyyah* provides the focus and justification for the fundamentalist agenda, embracing both the assertion of and the reason for the debilitated *Ummah*, and its remedy. Qutb expressed this clearly as follows:

Jahiliyyah (barbarity) refers to the domination (*hakimiyya*) of man over man, or rather the subservience to man rather than to Allah. It denotes rejection of the divinity of God and the adulation of mortals ... In any time and place human beings face that clear-cut choice: either to observe the Law of Allah in its entirety, or to apply laws laid down by man of one sort or another. In the latter case, they are in a state of jahiliyyah ... Modern-style jahiliyyah in the industrial societies of Europe and America is essentially similar to the old-time

jahiliyyah in pagan and nomadic Arabia. For in both systems, man is under the dominion of man rather than of Allah.¹⁶

Qutb argues¹⁷ that Islam is forced to battle with *Jahiliyyah* both to protect itself ('its [Islam's] very nature demanded that *Jahili* societies would attack it...'¹⁸) and as an injunction from Allah because Islam is the total and only way of life for the believer. To battle against *Jahiliyyah* fulfils the requirements of *Jihaad*. It may be necessary in particular circumstances to reach a temporary accommodation with the world as it exists; but restraint and tolerance is 'a question of strategy rather than of principle; ...a matter pertaining to requirements of the movement and not belief.'¹⁹ To achieve its ends and to fight against *Jahiliyyah*, Islam 'has a God given right to step forward and take control of the political authority, so that it may establish the Divine system on earth'.²⁰

We can see in the above the drawing together of the themes referred to both by Babeair above and in the earlier discussion in this article. The state of *Jahiliyyah* in which the *Ummah* finds itself is the fault of the West, and the remedy required of the devout is *Jihaad*. The logic is compelling and attractive if the basic principles are agreed. Above all, however, the analysis is simple, direct, familiar and consistent with the history of Islam, and non-threatening. Furthermore, it has great appeal to the urban and rural poor, who have gained relatively little from the various experiments with modernity in the Islamic world. It offers a means of addressing wrongs and, by focusing on moral and spiritual issues rather than material, serves to place Islam on at least equal terms with the West.

Millenarianism

The issues discussed above can also be viewed from another context, which begins to place them within a broader conceptual framework. Many of the features of Islamic fundamentalist thinking can be interpreted from a millenarian perspective.

Millenarianism describes a distinctive quality of the content of ideology, but it also relates to the way in which ideology may influence behaviour. It relates to expectations of the attainment of the Millennium, an expected utopian end. From a theological perspective, this may be associated with the arrival of the Messiah, or God's direct intervention on earth in some sense. From a political perspective, it may be associated with the attainment of a secular utopian state. Millenarianism plays an important role in the development of political and religious movements and has been argued to be one of the significant factors in the development of certain types of political violence.²¹

In his analysis of the influence of millenarianism on Nazi ideology, Rhodes²² identified five fundamental but general qualities of millenarianism of relevance to our discussion:

- 1) an analysis of the world in terms of a real or impending catastrophe, which has an immediate effect on the individual's life;
- 2) a revelation that explains this state of affairs, and which offers some form of salvation or redressing of ills;
- 3) as part of the revelation, the possession of special knowledge that the disastrous state is the result of the action of malevolent forces (spiritual or secular) which conspire to corrupt and subvert the normal organs of society or the state. Through the possession of special knowledge, the holder has a unique and powerful capacity to fight the malevolent and corrupting forces;
- 4) a sense of timeliness for action, in that the forces of corruption are nearing completion of their tasks; and finally,
- 5) a conviction that these forces can be defeated because of the special insights, and that the defeat of the forces of evil will result in the ushering in of a new and better world.

Clothed in Islamic terms, these qualities have recurred throughout the history of Islam. Indeed, the origins can be traced to the assassination of Ali,²³ and the recurrent *Mahdis al-muntazar* that have emerged to challenge the existing order from the very beginnings of Islam tend to be expressed in millenarian terms. Whilst social and economic factors have undoubtedly played a part, millenarian movements have remained essentially religious movements. Many of the qualities of Islamic fundamentalist thinking correspond to Rhodes' qualities of millenarianism. Fundamentalist analyses of the current state of Islam strongly emphasize the catastrophic nature of contemporary life. Much of Qutb's work, for example, clearly demonstrates this, as do the content of innumerable sermons, pamphlets, etc., based upon his and other fundamentalist thinkers' work. The revelatory qualities of the Qur'an, and the role of the fundamentalist in revealing its unique capacity to redress the world's ills, offer the 'special' salvation which is so much a feature of millenarian thinking. The special quality of knowledge of the cause of the disastrous present can be seen in al-Mawdudi's concept of modernity as the new barbarity (*Jahiliyyah*), where the influence of the West is very clearly presented to the Islamic masses in diabolical terms. Through returning to the basic principles of Islam, and especially the implementation of *Shari'ah*, the uniquely powerful forces of Islam can be mobilized against the new *Jahiliyyah*. Furthermore, the sense of timeliness and urgency is a prominent feature of fundamentalist thinking. All of these

forces come together in the conviction that if implemented, Islam *must* be victorious and *must* defeat the forces of *Jahiliyyah*. The looking back to the Golden Age of Islam heralds the dawning of a new Golden Age, if society is truly Islamicized and the *Shari'ah* implemented.

There are many millenarian qualities to Islam, as indeed there are to Christianity. Both look forward to a time of better life which will follow the return of the Messiah, or the occurrence of the millennial event. From time to time, messianic movements have greatly influenced Islam, and the capacity of views like these to influence behaviour should not be underestimated. There are many historical examples of violent behaviour, both Islamic and non-Islamic, which can be cogently argued to have a strong millenarian influence,²⁴ not the least of which was the Nazi state.²⁵

A more recent Islamic example of political violence that can be argued to draw upon millenarian influences was the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat in October 1981. Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj was the principal author and theoretician of the group that assassinated Sadat, and Faraj was himself executed on 15 April 1982 for his role in that event. The plotters who assassinated Sadat appear to have ardently desired the foundation of an Islamic state in Egypt, and the assassination of Sadat was to be its herald. They adopted a frankly millenarian outlook where it was argued that Sadat represented the apostate, the representative of *Jahiliyyah*. So strongly were the assassins influenced by the millenarian Islamic ideology that they made little or no preparation for the takeover of power after the death of Sadat.²⁶ They appear to have believed that once they had heeded the call to *Jihaad*, and assassinated Sadat the Unjust Ruler (*Hakin Zalim*), God would intervene. Their action in assassinating Sadat was to herald the millennial event. Indeed, one reason why the *Faridah*²⁷ could be published in Egypt after the event was that the assassination appeared not to have established God's intervention, at least in the terms envisaged by Faraj.

The themes discussed above have exercised great influence over contemporary fundamentalism. Whilst they may emerge in varying contexts, and be subject to differences in emphasis, they set the scene for the moral and psychological appeal of radical Islam. What is interesting and relevant from our point of view is the sense in which political and social issues are drawn into the theological argument, which, as we will see later, has direct behavioural consequences. The remedy for the perceived problems of Islam is not simply constrained by a special world of theology; it necessarily embraces the broader society in which Islam functions. This position is very clearly developed by Faraj.²⁸ In his discussion of the ills of contemporary Islam in general, and Egypt in particular (very much in the style of Qutb), he accuses the then political leadership of Islamic countries of apostasy. Whilst they were born Muslims, they do not run their states as Muslim states (with

the use of the *Shari'ah* as the basis for legislation and social intervention and planning). To Faraj, the 'neglected duty' is the duty of *Jihaad*, the consequences of which will necessarily redress the ills of Islam.

Psychological and Behavioural Perspectives

The kinds of influences discussed above present major difficulties and challenges for psychological and behavioural explanations. The analysis takes as its starting point concepts that have relatively limited psychological meaning, and its strength lies not at the individual level but in the identification of general trends from which a critique might be developed. Yet the broad social trends are made up of individuals who are behaving in particular ways for particular reasons. The behaviours at an individual level that we observe and are concerned about need to be understood if we are to develop coherent intervention strategies. The broad social or political analyses may help our understanding of general processes, but contribute little to the understanding of the individual's place within these broader events.²⁹

Taylor³⁰ has already argued in detail that the direction and organization of the behaviour of the politically committed relates to the degree and nature of ideological control over behaviour. This analysis extends as readily to religious as to political commitment in that both involve forms of ideology. At the outset of this discussion it has to be noted that psychological approaches to ideology are relatively undeveloped and behavioural analyses almost non-existent. Such literature that there is makes heavy use of mentalistic concepts, and seems to be at its most developed in terms of psychodynamic or other personality explanations, as described in recent reviews of the psychological literature.³¹ Most analyses of ideology seek explanation by reference to internal predisposing states, a point of view that seems both lacking in empirical support and unnecessarily limiting in conceptual terms. This criticism applies as much to authors from traditions other than psychoanalytic who have contributed to this area, such as Eysenck.³² Furthermore, perhaps because such explanations 'push' accounts of behaviour inside the individual (in terms of thoughts, attitudes, traits, etc.) there is a tendency to consider ideology as something separate from, and outside of, the broader framework in which we seek to understand the controls of behaviour.

Of particular note is a failure in analyses of the psychological effects of ideology to make a fundamental distinction between ideology as a *process* (structuring and influencing behaviour) and the content of *particular* ideologies. The extent to which ideology controls and influences our behaviour may be seen as something apart from particular ideological prescriptions, which contain as it were the content of a particular ideology.

This distinction is an important one to make, and relates to a broader distinction that can be made between becoming involved in some activity, and the circumstances surrounding and controlling a particular action.³³ Keeping this distinction in mind enables us to look at ideology as a multifaceted force influencing behaviour. At one level, we can see the role of ideology in providing the direction and coherence of behaviour in terms of particular ideological prescriptions, but, perhaps more importantly, we can see at another level why certain kinds of ideologies become strong controllers of behaviour. It is appropriate to look for understanding of the sources of that control in those processes we know to control other behaviour – the environmental and contextual forces we refer to generically as *contingencies of reinforcement*.

A behavioural approach seems particularly appropriate for our discussion, for one striking feature of fundamentalist Islam is the sense in which it emphasizes behaviour, rather than attitude or beliefs. We can illustrate this, for example, by the way in which Qutb develops at some length his views on the weaknesses of Western concepts of religion as belief, in contrast to the emphasis on the practical affairs of life that characterizes Islam.³⁴ For Qutb (and to a lesser extent, for less extreme Muslims in general) it is not sufficient for the believer just to *believe*; he or she must also act on that belief, responding to the parameters of belief expressed in the Qur'an, and striving to behave in ways consistent with Islamic precepts.

This perspective on the relationship between belief and behaviour in fact draws upon a more general issue in Islam, related to the assumptions of a close link in Islam between intention and behaviour. The conceptual separation of an intention to do something from actual behaviour assumed to be related to that intention is a critical feature of Western notions about motivation. Indeed, it is embodied in the legal system in the concept of *Mens Rea*. Islam does not make such assumptions, and indeed 'intent and act are thought to be so closely linked that one can read rather directly from a person's words and deeds the intent that lies within'.³⁵ Areas of conceptual similarities between behavioural approaches and Islamic views in this area need much more comparative analysis. Indeed, a clearer understanding of this may well have important implications for the general conduct of relations with Islam.

Whilst categorizing Qutb's views in Western psychological jargon would probably seem offensive and inappropriate to him and his followers (and probably to most Muslims), there nevertheless seems to be a strong emphasis on behavioural features within Islam in general, and in Qutb's writings in particular. The relationships between behaviour and its consequences are expressed in ways that would be quite familiar to contemporary behaviour

analysts, despite the unfamiliarity of the concepts. This is not to say that Islam can be readily reduced to behavioural terms; the fundamental problem of the materialism of behavioural approaches yields irreconcilable contradictions with Islam. Yet there are areas for further exploration.

A Behavioural Approach

How might a behavioural account contribute to this discussion? In the following, we will explore general features that might be relevant (based on Taylor),³⁶ followed by a more explicit analysis of the relationship of this approach to Islam. There are various levels at which such an approach might be viewed. At one level, it may be a helpful way of making psychological sense of a complex area, without necessarily implying detailed relationships that could be empirically explored. Alternatively, it may be seen as setting a potential agenda for empirical exploration, and offering a way of expressing more fundamentally orientated work in an applied setting. The development of this perspective should not necessarily imply exclusion of insights from other areas of psychology, especially those involving social processes.³⁷ Indeed, perhaps one of the areas of greatest need in applying psychology is the integration of more empirically based work with insights from less controlled but more socially focused approaches.³⁸

At first sight, simple behavioural approaches may appear to be lacking in some respects to address so complex a problem as religious behaviour. Accounts of the direction and control of behaviour in terms of environmental consequences (such as reinforcement), are unquestionably powerful when applied to circumstances where we can identify a direct relationship between behaviour and reinforcing (or aversive) consequences. If we do something and immediately receive a reward of some kind, the controlling effect of the reward on subsequent behaviour will be readily apparent.

Accounts of this kind seem lacking, however, when they are applied to behaviour determined and controlled by more *distant* ends. Yet it is of course the importance of such distant ends that characterizes both religious and secular ideological behaviour. The committed religious enthusiast may immerse himself or herself in meetings, prayer, social action, etc., on a day-to-day level, and we can readily enough identify immediate reinforcers in the nature of the friendships formed, social contact, personal satisfaction and group approval. But of course the religious activist's behaviour is *also* directed towards the attainment of some more distant and general objective, such as increasing the number of believers, effecting some change in the law or change in more general social conditions – through, for example, the adoption of *Shari'ah*, or even the overthrow of society and its replacement by a new and better order. How can the day-to-day behaviour we observe to be the stuff of religion (and politics) be related in any direct sense to

outcomes of this kind, when such outcomes are so far removed and distant from the particular behaviour we are concerned with?

One useful way of explaining the effectiveness of control of delayed outcomes on present behaviour is to propose some form of chaining, whereby particular relationships of behaviour and consequence are *directly* linked, one to the other, to the more distant end. Thus, we can envisage a complex sequence of events, each related to the next, that might explain an individual joining a religious or political group, becoming more and more involved in it, and finally moving towards total commitment in some form. Such a chain would envisage an incremental movement towards the distant behaviour state through a complex series of inter-related activities.³⁹

Models reflecting this approach can be identified in the literature on terrorism,⁴⁰ for example, and we will use this area in the following as a specific example of the more general issue. The increasing involvement of the West German terrorist Michael Baumann (founder of the 2nd of June Movement), described initially by Kellen,⁴¹ illustrates this. Like many terrorists, Baumann did not suddenly embark upon a terrorist career. Rather, he seems to have moved gradually towards it as he became increasingly marginalized from society, drifting into political radicalism, and eventually terrorism. As his increased involvement developed, so other associated events helped to sustain him. It is worth noting that the attractions of his lifestyle increased as he became more marginalized, for as he notes: 'if you had long hair, there were always an incredible number of chicks hanging on to you'.⁴² The inter-relationships of the various factors associated with his development as a terrorist are inevitably highly idiosyncratic, and difficult to anticipate, yet on looking back, a chain of interrelated events can be discerned. A process of this kind is inevitably peculiar to the individual involved, although nevertheless logical to the observer given hindsight.

Even if idiosyncratic, the processes whereby a person becomes a member of a terrorist group, and the incremental approach towards commitment and perhaps violence that might imply, may well be forcibly explained in these terms. Expressed generally, the starting point for an individual – a sense of injustice, a particular precipitating event, or even more remotely, a friendship – may appear very far removed from a terminal point, planting a bomb or shooting a police officer. But we could readily envisage a process whereby they would be linked through a complex sequence of interlocking but idiosyncratic circumstances. We would be developing in such an explanation an account of the 'internal' logic of that behaviour, which of course would contrast with its apparent illogic when viewed from the perspective of broader social norms and expectations. Social psychological processes such as entrapment⁴³ and more general features of group membership would readily fit within this framework,

interacting with and shaping the chained and incrementally progressing behavioural sequences.

Yet even when viewed from a terminal point and with the benefit of hindsight, the process of 'becoming' a terrorist in these terms may seem obscure and difficult to understand. In the particular case of terrorism, the behaviour of the terrorist grossly departs from normal rules of conduct and expectations. In these circumstances, rather than look for lawful behavioural relationships as explanations, as we have above, we may feel we should have recourse to explanations in terms of mental illness or deviance in some sense to help us to understand what seems to be inexplicable behaviour. If we could clearly see the sequence of events that led to that point of placing a bomb, and if we could recognize the complex series of reciprocal relationships between particular behaviour and outcomes, the logic of development may well become clearer, and appear less mysterious. The difficulty is, of course, that such clarity even of hindsight is not generally possible. Detailed reconstruction of the events that might determine a particular behaviour, however simple, is something that in complex social settings can only ever be imperfectly guessed at. Not all is negative, however. Explanations of these kinds have utility in some circumstances, by at least offering a framework for further analysis, removing the behaviour in question from the realms of inaccessibility. Taylor and Ryan,⁴⁴ for example, have used this kind of explanation to attempt to describe the development of fanatical behaviour in the context of terrorist violence, by drawing on the idea of incremental development in terms of chains of behaviour.

Nevertheless, there are further difficulties with such explanations. The most important one is that they appear to be both unnecessarily mechanistic and deterministic, and dependent on *post hoc* analysis. Indeed, this is of course the same kind of criticism that can be levelled at Freudian and psychoanalytic explanations of behaviour, the kind to be found in Post's⁴⁵ analyses, for instance. The chain that would need to be postulated to explain any particular behaviour in these terms may well be of enormous length, stretching (literally and metaphorically) the credibility of the analysis. Equally, whilst behaviour may well be determined by the contemporary and historical environment in which it occurs, analyses of this form overemphasize the *inevitability* of particular circumstances, giving a false sense of predictability and inevitability. One certain feature of the development of the terrorist, for example, is that whilst many people experience circumstances that may be correlated with induction into a terrorist lifestyle, relatively few people actually become violent terrorists.⁴⁶ The same applies, of course, to the religious enthusiast.

Another and perhaps fundamentally problematic aspect of such

explanations is the implicit assumption that behaviour has a beginning and, more particularly, an end from which we can look back in analysis. This seems to ignore the reciprocity and dynamism of behaviour, devaluing the flexibility that seems to characterize it, and assuming a linear relationship between environmental events and behaviour. Such criticism should not necessarily result in a rejection of this kind of explanation, however; but the limitations it implies should be recognized.

An alternative analysis from a behavioural perspective is to develop explanations in terms of what has been called *rule following*.⁴⁷ The control exercised by distant outcomes that is so much a feature of all behaviour, not just religious or political behaviour, may well be better characterized as mediated by a rule which relates those distant outcomes to particular behaviours, rather than by an inevitable chain of responses and consequences.

A rule is a verbal description of relationships between behaviours and consequences, especially aversive events and reinforcement. 'If you touch that stove when it's hot, you'll burn yourself', or 'Tell that joke to Jim, he'll like it', are very simple examples of behavioural rules. They describe what is technically referred to as a *behavioural contingency*, or relationship between an event and behaviour. A behavioural contingency consists of a description of a response, a description of an outcome, and the identification of circumstances of some form in the presence of which the response will produce that outcome. Those circumstances in which a response will produce the outcome are technically referred to as *discriminative stimuli*. In the example above, in the presence of a hot stove (a discriminative stimulus), touching that stove (a response) will present an aversive burn (an outcome). Another simple example might be the events that confront a comedian, where in the presence of a receptive audience (a discriminative stimulus), telling a joke (a response) will produce a rewarding laugh (an outcome).⁴⁸

A rule, therefore, is a generalization about the circumstances that control behaviour (both positive and negative) that have applied in the past, or *will* apply in the future. Another way of expressing this relationship is to refer to *contingency rules*. The examples given above illustrate simple contingency rules that might exist. The first, for example, is of the form that might be taught to a child, the second is perhaps a more complex example. In the former, the particular environmental event that will produce the aversive outcome (the discriminative stimulus) is the stove; in the latter it is a receptive audience. Outcomes of course can be positive or negative, again as illustrated above.

In terms of understanding complex behaviour, the utility of an analysis in terms of contingency rules can be contrasted with the chain analysis of ideological behaviour detailed above. The chain analysis emphasizes the importance of immediate acting circumstances in the control of behaviour.

Such behaviour might be termed *contingency controlled*, as opposed to *rule governed*. The distant outcomes in themselves have no necessary relationship with the immediate controlling contingencies. The individual might 'drift' towards something (like involvement with terrorism or religion), but that eventual state has little or no relationship with the particular circumstances that affect the individual at any given time. An analysis in terms of contingency rules, on the other hand, emphasizes the relationship between present behaviour and some deferred consequences. The rule effectively mediates between present behaviour and that deferred or distant consequence. By drawing on the same explanatory and conceptual framework, therefore, we can identify two very powerful but different kinds of explanation. Presumably in any given complex situation, we will not be concerned with them individually, but in some kind of reciprocal combination.

To postulate such contingency rules does not imply mentalistic explanations of the kind referred to earlier in our brief reference to psychological approaches to ideology. The importance of introducing the concept of rules lies not in substituting one obscure kind of explanation with another.⁴⁹ Rather, by looking at rules as verbal descriptions (for both the speaker and the listener)⁵⁰ mediating distant outcomes to immediate behaviour, we are indicating a process whereby such rules might develop. This is both consistent with and complementary to other kinds of behavioural explanations. It recognizes and draws upon the powerful situational forces that we know to control behaviour, and places them in a context that enables us to explain the complex organized qualities of behaviour over time.

Rules can be abstractions from inevitable immediate environmental contingencies, or they can be abstractions or analyses of contingencies that have occurred, or will occur. One very powerful form of rule noted by Skinner⁵¹ which is based on the latter, is an ethical, religious or government law. These are almost invariably injunctions (for example, the Sixth Commandment instructs 'Thou shall not commit adultery'), although in application ('If you do, you will incur God's displeasure') the injunctive quality may be softened, resulting in a description of immediate contingencies ('if you do, I will leave you'). That very softening reflects the combination of a contingency rule (the Commandment) with an immediate circumstance (or contingency) affecting present behaviour referred to above. Indeed the notion of ideology implied here fits into this particular framework for rules, in that ideology frequently is a series of injunctive prescriptions of behaviour, which on analysis soften to more explicit descriptions of immediate contingencies. We might even describe this contingency-based softening of ideology as the pragmatic *process* of politics, or perhaps living the religious life. In summary, for the purposes of our discussion here, it is

sufficient to note that rule-following behaviour offers a means of relating distant objectives and outcomes to immediate activity.⁵²

Rokeach⁵³ defined ideology as 'a common and broadly agreed set of rules to which an individual subscribes which help to regulate and determine behaviour'. This view is entirely consistent with that developed here. Ideology gives the individual a set of rules that determine and shape behaviour. The circumstances in which behaviour occurs gains its 'meaning', or perhaps we could say its apparent purposiveness, by reference to some distant end. This end is expressed in terms of a rule, rather than by reference to the immediate circumstances prevailing at the time. The distant end therefore mediates behaviour. In analysing the process of this, we can begin to see interrelationships between what might otherwise seem very disparate and unrelated activities. By reference to rules in this sense, for example, we can readily see the way in which rules can substitute, and 'short-circuit', experience of particular behavioural contingencies.

Thus, the politically committed or religious enthusiast takes part in a variety of activities, all of which are structured around and controlled by broad ideological rules that control his or her behaviour. The source of the rules is authority of some kind, and they are expressed in some transmittable verbal medium (like writing, for example). The importance of transmission of verbal rules through some medium is of considerable conceptual importance in this analysis,⁵⁴ and of course this is a particularly appropriate quality for analyses of political and religious ideology. Thus, the rules that structure our behaviour come from the Bible, the Qur'an, the writings of Marx, Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, and so on. Sometimes the rules are expressed in a very detailed way, as in parts of the Qur'an, for example, but more usually, the rules expressed in works of this kind are very general, and do not offer particularly detailed prescriptions for behaviour. We therefore see the development of additional rules elaborating and expanding on the original rules, through commentaries, *al-hadith*, Papal encyclicals and sermons. These ancillary developments may well relate more closely to immediate contingencies. It is not without significance that a feature of the ideologically committed (both secular and religious) is their regular attendance at study groups, discussion forums and services at which the general rules are worked out into a more particular form. Thus the general ideological rules become expressed in more particular ways such that the individual can both more readily learn them, and the behavioural contingencies implied by the rules more readily and effectively exert their influence.

In passing, we might also note the important immediate circumstances that will also apply in this process, and may serve to interact with and supplement the more distant rule-related contingencies. Meetings and discussions of the kind noted above may serve to refine ideological

prescriptions, but they also exercise considerable control over behaviour themselves, through social reinforcement and the forces of group behaviour. Thus, when looking at the long-term focus of rules, we cannot ignore more immediate contingencies that might act as subsidiary supports.

Rules do not exercise perfect control over behaviour. Even the most enthusiastic devotee of a religion may from time to time lapse and sin (the strength of the rule-governed contingency, however, might be indicated by the extent to which he is aware of sinning and the nature of that awareness, perhaps as guilt). We can say in general that the degree of control the environment exercises over behaviour is related to the nature and strength of the reinforcing contingencies that might operate on an individual. Where the relationship between behaviour and its consequences is unclear, or where the consequences are not particularly distinctive or are perhaps multiple, so the particular control of any one contingency over behaviour will be less than absolute.

Likewise, we need not assume that all rules when expressed are necessarily effective. Malott⁵⁵ distinguishes between 'hard-to-follow' rules and 'easy-to-follow' rules. The 'easy-to-follow' rules describe relationships where behaviour will produce an outcome which is probable and sizeable, even if delayed; they may also involve other probable and sizeable subsidiary contingencies (for example aided perhaps by study groups, social contact, and other qualities of the environment in which the individual lives). We might embark on an arduous programme of study, not because reading course books reinforces us, but because at the end of the programme, we receive a degree or diploma that makes it more likely that we might earn a higher income. A considerable aid to this process (as any evening student will know) is the informal contact a student has with others in his position. In a more technical discussion, Cerutti⁵⁶ has referred to subsidiary contingencies of this kind as 'collateral consequences'.

'Hard-to-follow' rules, in contrast, describe contingencies that are either improbable or have outcomes that are small (in terms of either aversive or reinforcing consequences), and are perhaps lacking in subsidiary 'easy-to-follow' rules. We might also envisage circumstances where rules might conflict – for example, some of the health-related activities we *should* perform to ensure a healthy future may conflict with other rule-determined behaviours related to earning a living, or making professional or occupational progress. Thus, we might work in unhealthy or dangerous environments placing health at risk where the balance of rules and consequences related to occupational advancement are more powerful in terms of outcomes.

Developing this theme, therefore, we might describe someone who is ideologically or religiously committed as being under the control of

particular rules, derived from whatever ideological source. The origins of such control lie in the normal learning processes that we are familiar with, and relate to the situational consequences of behaviour. It is important to stress that whilst this may appear to be a relatively simple and straightforward explanation of how ideology or religion might come to occupy an important role for an individual, the processes that will occur for that individual will of necessity be complex, reciprocal and interactive. An explanation of the behaviour may be made by reference to relatively simple processes, but the operation of the processes we have identified may well be extraordinarily complex.

We should note that whilst we have drawn attention to the role that rule-following might have in explanations of ideological and religious activity, this is not to say that this explanation *only* serves this form of behaviour. Rather, it would seem likely that *all* forms of behaviour are subject to the control of rules of some form. The difference between the ideologically and religiously committed and others is that perhaps, for such committed individuals, the rules can be expressed in a relatively clear way. Ideology is necessarily transmittable through a verbal or analogous medium. Furthermore, such rules may be 'easy-to-follow', and as we noted earlier, have a measure of cohesion and strength because they are expressed. Indeed, by virtue of being expressed, they may gain further cohesion and power through specifying clearer relationships. Thus, the behaviour of the ideologically committed may appear more organized and directed because the rules are more clearly articulated and interrelate in clearer, logical and powerful ways. The relationships between immediate and distant outcomes becomes, therefore, more explicit, and able to exercise closer control over behaviour. In summary, then, our behaviour (whether ideologically based or otherwise), remains both controlled by rules relating distant outcomes to immediate events *and* by immediate contingencies. For the ideological, the rules may be more explicit and logical, and additionally supported by powerful subsidiary contingencies.

This analysis is somewhat speculative, in that empirical verification of these concepts in terms of the large-scale activities implied by political and religious behaviour is necessarily lacking. On the other hand, the analysis offers considerable conceptual advantages over other psychological speculations in this area. By relating ideology (political or religious) to rule-following behaviour, we are describing a process whereby particular ideologies, expressed as behavioural rules, gain control and influence over behaviour. It also offers us a perspective from which to analyse particular ideologies, for, given such a process, we can now look at the functional relationships of particular political activity. In general terms, the position advanced here is not a unique development in analyses of political

behaviour. It bears some similarities with other perspectives emphasizing functional relationships, such as that developed by Dietrich⁵⁷ of the rise to power of the Nazi party. However, in contrast to the position developed here, Dietrich's analysis is based on the related area of social behaviourist principles.⁵⁸ Skinner's notion of rules seems to be an important conceptual advance over social learning theory in the area we are concerned with, however, offering a specificity in analysis which is consistent with the power to apply it to more general situations.

From this short analysis, we can see how political or religious ideology can be seen as the expression of explicit and internally cohesive and logical contingency rules, helping to relate distant events to immediate behaviour. Our analysis does not need to draw on 'special' explanations, but rather uses existing powerful explanatory frameworks. By referring to rule-governed behaviour, we can see how ideology relates to authority (as the source of rules), and how ideology provides rules that determine our behaviour. The focused way in which the religious extremist, for example, seems bounded by his ideological assumptions to the exclusion of all else illustrates in a simple way the rigid and insensitive nature of rule governance.

This approach therefore sets the scene for an analysis of religious fundamentalism, in terms of a framework in which particular ideological priorities might be expressed. An important implication of this discussion is that in the conceptual terms discussed here, fundamentalism is not necessarily a primary, and therefore distinctive, quality of either ideology or religious activity, although it may be that it is more likely in some forms of religious expression than others. Nor need we look for particular individual qualities that allow for the expression of fundamentalist views. Rather, fundamentalism can be seen as an instrumental quality of ideology, its incidence being determined by the interaction of ideology as contingency rules, the particular content of ideology, and local and immediate behavioural contingencies and situational factors. Indeed, under some circumstances, what we regard as fundamentalism may simply be a rather minor element linked with, and subsidiary to, other more powerful controlling contingencies. The broader consequences of fundamentalism may, of course, be profound for the recipient, or the society in which it occurs, but as far as the individual is concerned, it may well be an incidental element in the broader contingencies controlling behaviour.

In attempting to understand the determinants of fundamentalist behaviour from this perspective, we can assume that both immediate contingency relationships and more distant rule-governed contingencies interact and control behaviour. As far as rule-governed contingencies are concerned, they may exercise effective or ineffective control. For most people in normal situations, we can see examples of both kinds of rule-

following, and the contradictions and uncertainties we observe in people's behaviour may be related in part to the balance of effective and ineffective rules, or the conflict between rules. It is reasonable to assume that such a balance is related at least to some extent to the degree to which rules are articulated. The case of the religious fundamentalist seems to represent a situation where a form of ideological rule exercises extensive and powerful control over behaviour.

Such effectiveness of control may indicate the main reason for the distinctive rigidity of fundamentalist believers. This can be characterized as a remorseless and unshakeable adherence to a particular position, and to the logical following through of that position regardless of whether such behaviour conflicts with broader moral or social prescriptions (this is perhaps related to the exclusivity and confrontational qualities of fundamentalism noted by Bruce earlier). Perhaps what we see in the fundamentalist is an individual showing in fact two distinctive qualities of behavioural control. The first is that the behaviour is under close control of ideological rules (in the sense of effective rules used above) which by virtue of their origins are easy for that individual to follow, or have similar strength through subsidiary consequences and supports. The second quality is that circumstances or contingencies in his immediate environment exercise reduced control over behaviour, with limited or no supportive contingencies. It has been recognized that close control by rule-following contingencies results in insensitivity of behaviour to immediate circumstances.⁵⁹ Such insensitivity in the particular circumstances we are concerned with may be a very significant element in the development of this particular quality of fundamentalism. Indeed, Skinner⁶⁰ describes many of the features of behaviour which might be relevant here in terms of the qualities which he sees as typical of rule-governed behaviour – lack of variety in responses and reasons, an emphasis on truth, and so on.


The behaviour of the religious fundamentalist can be thought of as having qualities similar to those of normal people, differing along a continuum of some kind, rather than differing in absolute terms. Perhaps one way of characterizing that continuum is in terms of the extent to which the fundamentalist's behaviour is controlled by a limited set of rules that are relatively constrained in extent and closely interrelated. This contrasts with the relative multiplicity of rules that might control normal behaviour, and the extent of control exercised by immediate circumstances.

If we express this difference in such a way, this is not simply a tautology, nor is it an elaborate version of mentalistic accounts. An individual can be 'fanatical' about a variety of things – he or she might fanatically follow a sport or become wholly absorbed and involved in an aspect of work. Both are examples of the control exercised by behavioural rules. The nature of

the particular rule-following behaviour will clearly determine the focus, and the distinctive quality of fanatical religious behaviour will clearly determine the focus. The distinctive quality of *fanatical religious behaviour* (which might be an appropriate term for fundamentalism) is the extent of control which is itself a reflection of the all-embracing qualities of religion, in contrast to the limited scope of sport-related rules, for example. In describing ideologically controlled behaviour in this way, and in particular by relating it to the behaviour of the religious fundamentalist, we are not therefore only describing the nature of behavioural control, but also describing the processes whereby such control develops. This seems to be an advance on other ways of conceptualizing the problem.

It may seem perverse to exclude reasoning and thoughts from an analysis of extreme fundamentalist activity, given the emphasis on rule governance, and given the point made above that a rule is a verbal description of relationships between behaviours and consequences. Many contemporary views on the nature of complex behaviour emphasize the significance of verbal control, which serves to bridge the gap between cognitive and behavioural accounts. However, the analysis presented can embrace 'private events' such as thoughts, perceptions, etc., as contextual and process variables if we extend it to include cognitive-behavioural approaches. After all, the religious extremist is characterized not only by extreme behaviour, but also by extreme cognitions, that might be thought to support and complement the extreme expression of behaviour. The essentially verbal and language-based origins of such cognitions readily complement the analysis

FIGURE 1
A PROCESS MODEL OF FUNDAMENTALIST BEHAVIOUR



of the role of ideology presented so far. Drawing on a rich tradition of clinical intervention, we can outline a conceptual model that might help us understand further both the relationship between cognitions and behaviour, and also indicate points for intervention in terms of changing the inappropriate cognitions supportive of fanatical behaviour. The following diagram presents one way of conceptualizing these relationships

Process and Content

The above discussion also enables us to make a critical distinction. We can distinguish between the processes that might allow the expression of ideology, and the qualities of a particular ideology. In one sense, behavioural rules refer to the broad set of contingencies relating distant outcomes to behaviour. These higher-order rules we might characterize as the process of ideology. It would not be unreasonable to assume that different kinds of rules may well result in particular kinds of effects on behaviour. On the other hand, the particular content of rules (or in technical terms, the contingencies they imply) refers to their more immediate ideological content and prescriptions. The content qualities of ideology, whilst relating to more general rules, are also likely to involve more immediate circumstances, relating to events on a day-to-day level. This distinction is probably most apparent in religious ideologies, where there is often a very direct link between behaviour and the content of ideology. Particular activities relate to ideological prescriptions, through subsidiary activities such as prayer, retreats and abstention from particular foods. They gain their 'meaning', however, through reference to the higher-order rules.

This distinction enables us to identify a number of important qualities of religious ideology that can now be brought within the broader framework of rule-following behaviour. In particular, distinctions may be made between the content of ideology (the particular kind of religion, the specific nature of religious rules), and the process of ideology, implied and influenced by an ideology's particular content. At least three principal factors can be identified:⁶¹

- 1) the specific content of an ideology (in terms of militancy, injunctions at a micro-level, etc.);
- 2) a more diffuse and higher-level aspect of content, particularly as it relates to millenarianism;
- 3) the process implied by extreme ideological control, which can be characterized as 'lack of public space'.⁶²

Other factors may of course be relevant, and this area needs further

exploration. The nature and influence of the above have been developed at some length within a behavioural context elsewhere.⁶³ The following briefly identifies relevant issues.

Specific Ideological Content

The precise day-to-day injunctions of a religion are clearly one important element in determining religious behaviour. The prescriptions to prayer, for example, or the performance of fasting during Ramadan, are examples of the control of day-to-day religious life. The five 'pillars' of Islam can be seen in this light, as an example of specific ideological content. Allied to this level of specificity are more general injunctions, perhaps even directly related to violence. Nazi ideology was replete with reference to the Jews as negative objects, for example, urging discrimination and violence upon them in a very explicit way. The extent to which an ideology explicitly rejects a group, and expresses that rejection in militant terms, is clearly one aspect of the potential for violence within an ideology.

Fundamentalist Islam quite clearly develops, as part of the content of its ideological prescriptions, militancy against Western life and Western culture. Islam contains many qualities that can be used to sustain a militant approach, the most notable of which is the concept of *Jihaad*. '*Jihaad* in Islam is simply a name for striving to make this system of life dominant in the world',⁶⁴ expresses clearly the combative nature of Islam, at least as seen by Qutb. If it is accepted that Western life is *Jahili*, that the state of *Jahiliyyah* is by definition opposing Islam, and that it is the righteous duty of the believer to fight and defeat *Jahiliyyah*, Islam must *necessarily* be in a state of *Jihaad* against the West. Strategic considerations may limit the extent and nature of warfare and short-term accommodations may be made; but ultimately, war must be engaged (an important rider to this is the conviction that victory is certain).

This ideological imperative for *Jihaad* need not in any way diminish the peaceful aspirations of Islam seen from the perspective of the *believer*. A fundamental requirement of Islam is that a Muslim is required to establish the sovereignty of God on earth. *Jihaad* is a means of establishing this – '*Jihaad*, then, is a means to achieve a universal change by establishing peace of conscience, domestic peace, national peace and international peace'.⁶⁵ Because for the believer Islam is necessarily the only possible way to attain God's dominion on the earth, the establishment of an Islamic world must produce God's peace and justice. Islam might be termed a self-contained religion – it contains within itself all that is necessary for the believer to attain salvation and God's peace. Not to accept this obvious and unchallengeable logic can only be the result of malevolent influences, which are working to oppose the establishment of God's law (an issue

related to conspiracy theories discussed later). Qutb argues at considerable length⁶⁶ the tolerant nature of Islam, but this tolerance extends only to those who accept the logic. Enemies of Islam are offered three choices:⁶⁷ to adopt Islam, to pay the tribute (as an acknowledgement that the non-believer will not impede the progress of Islam), or to fight (because they 'obdurately stand between men and Islam's righteous and peaceful principles').⁶⁸ Given these views, what might be termed the militant logic of radical and fundamentalist Islam will inevitably bring about confrontation between Islam and the West.

In behavioural terms, what we might characterize as the logic of Islam is no more than an expression of behavioural rules, which specify relationships between long-term ends and immediate behaviour. The rules have their origin in the bases of Islam and the *Shari'ah*, (the Qur'an, etc.) and the more detailed relationships are made explicit (and given a distinctive emphasis) by authors such as Qutb. They are further refined by various commentaries and at the local level by weekly sermons in the mosques, etc.

A more explicit example of behavioural rules is of course the concept of *Shari'ah*. Islam equates the laws of human nature with the laws of the universe (what we might term physical laws). Both are aspects of God's will, both are immutable qualities of life, and both *must* be obeyed. This extends as much to voluntary as involuntary behaviour – but for the former, God especially prescribed the *Shari'ah* to ensure that man's 'life is in harmony with his own nature'.⁶⁹ *Shari'ah* is the divine expression of God's law, and is found in the Qur'an, the *sunnah* and *al-hadith* (the precise weighting and form given to each element of the Holy writings relates to particular emphases and traditions within Islam).

The refinement process in the development of religious behavioural rules can be seen in the relationship between *Shari'ah* and the sources of Islamic law. The only source of authoritative written law in Islam is the Qur'an: 'It is the exact spoken word of God as reduced to writing by the prophet.'⁷⁰ Whilst the Qur'an contains direct guidance, it is often expressed at a level of general principle, from which detailed judgements have to be derived. The *sunnah* were recorded after the Prophet's death, and constitute more substantive forms of guidance. The other sources of law (analogical reasoning or *qiya*, and the notion of consensus or *ijma*) allow of more detailed working out of general propositions related to the particular social circumstances of the time. It is of some significance that the contemporary role of *qiya* and *ijma* in the determination of *Shari'ah* constitutes one of the watersheds that divide fundamentalist thinking from other emphases within Islam. However, *Shari'ah* serves to establish a common bond between all Muslims, and its divine origin places it in a unique position with respect to

human affairs. Its application is an element of faith for the devout, as the clear, unambiguous and detailed expression of God's will.

The *Shari'ah* specifies behaviours appropriate to situations at a variety of levels. In the West, we tend to be most aware of *Shari'ah* when applied within the context of criminal law, and more specifically in terms of the system of punishments specified for theft (amputation) and adultery (stoning). But *Shari'ah* extends far beyond these limited confines, and embraces all aspects of jurisprudence, social living, the relationship between people in business and commercial enterprises, and indeed the relationship between states. The self-contained nature of Islam is apparent in this area as in others – 'one cannot enforce a part of Islamic law and neglect another for then it would not be Islam'.⁷¹

The detail of what is precisely meant by *Shari'ah* is itself a matter of some debate, and as we noted earlier, its exact meaning and referencing to the Qur'an, *sunnah* and *al-hadith* represents one of the watersheds along which approaches to Islam divide. No matter what particular approach is taken, however, an essential social expression of the necessary fundamental and total change desired by the fundamentalist believer is a demand to implement the *Shari'ah*, generally regardless of the broader social contexts and religious allegiances of those subjected to it. It is this demand that embodies in many respects the particular ideological qualities of social control within contemporary radical Islam. Because most Muslim states do not apply *Shari'ah*, the issue has become a tangible social aspiration which brings together both fundamentalist politics and theology: 'Thus the *Shari'ah* which God has given to man to organize his life is also a universal law ... obedience to the *Shari'ah* becomes a necessity for human beings so that their lives may become harmonious and in tune with the rest of the universe.'⁷²

For the Islamic fundamentalist, the *Shari'ah* is essentially an expression of behavioural rules. We should note that it is expressed at a behavioural level, and sets out clearly and unambiguously (subject to whatever interpretation authority places upon it) what an individual should and must do in given situations. If the fundamentalist does take religion seriously (as we noted earlier), and acts upon what religion requires, he implements and adheres to these rules in his everyday life. It is difficult to imagine a clearer example of behavioural rule-following than the fundamentalist believer.

Diffuse and Higher-level Aspects of Ideological Content

Ideology can be seen as affecting behaviour at a variety of levels. An example of this can be seen in the earlier discussion, where reference was made to the millenarian qualities of militant fundamentalist Islam. These qualities can also be located within a general framework emphasizing

behavioural rules. However, of particular relevance to our discussion are the relationships in millenarian ideology between the expected end-state and human agency in bringing about the desired state. Many, if not all, religions are millenarian, in the sense that they allow the believer to look forward to a better, happier and probably more *just* life after death. The particular quality that brings millenarianism within our explanatory framework is the sense of *imminence* of millenarian attainment. It is also this quality that relates millenarianism to violence.

Whether imminence is a variable affecting the reinforcing consequences of behavioural rules, or whether it relates to Malott's notions of 'easy to follow' and 'hard to follow' rules, or indeed other factors, is unclear. There are, however, cogent arguments to support the notion that the timeliness of action which is so much a feature of millenarian activity relates to the imminent attainment of the Millennium, and that such a sense of timeliness is a significant factor in the development of violence⁷³ and an associated sense of personal agency.

Millenarianism is at one level an aspect of the content of ideology, but at another level of analysis it has certain features that relate to more general processes. As we have seen in our earlier discussion, fundamentalist Islam strongly emphasizes the timeliness of action for the believer, given the apocalyptic features of the present, and the profoundly positive consequences of engagement with the apocalyptic forces. Consistent with the above discussion, we might note that the focus of the negative effects on the world is secularism, embodied by Western values and economic power. Thus we see a further behavioural pressure towards fundamentalist confrontation with the West, which we can conceptualize within the context of behavioural rules.

The Process of Ideological Control and Lack of Public Space

Hannah Arendt, in her analyses of the atrocities committed by the Nazis during World War II, developed the concept of lack of public space.⁷⁴ This concept addresses the issue of how people who were in other respects 'normal' could become involved in the appalling activities that characterized the Third Reich. Lack of public space relates to the inability of individuals to exchange and develop ideas in states where extreme control is exercised over life, most notably evident in totalitarian states. She gives this capacity to communicate significance in both the political and moral arena, and in particular relates the degree of social control it implies to a loss of a sense of reality and morality, making possible the atrocities of, for example, the concentration camps.⁷⁵

The extreme degree of social control required by fundamentalist

interpretations of Islam meets the requirements for lack of public space, in Arendt's terms, and in consequence we might expect to see the lack of regard for the restraints on behaviour towards enemies emerging within Islam (although this is a subject dealt with at great length in the Qur'an, where clearly defined and explicit rules are given to regulate conduct). In behavioural terms, lack of public space relates very clearly to the degree of control exercised by behavioural rules. Societies showing a lack of public space are characterized by both explicit articulation of rules governing behaviour, and their rigid application and enforcement. Fundamentalist Islamic aspirations readily fit this view.

We can see from the above, therefore, that what we observe as characteristic behaviour of the fundamentalist believer readily fits into the framework of behavioural rule-following. In a sense, the precise detail of religious observance required is of less importance than the fact that behaviour is under close control of the religious ideology, expressed as rules. The rigidity of purpose, the insensitivity, the focusing, the intensely personalized view of the world, the tolerance of what to the non-initiate is incompatibility, the simplification of the world view, the loss of critical judgement, etc.⁷⁶ all seem to be qualities of the religious fundamentalist. They are also qualities that might be thought to illustrate behaviour subject to extreme rule governance, as opposed to contingency control.

Complementary Approaches

There are other more explicitly psychological insights that complement the behavioural approach described above. One such relates to the concept of *conspiracy*. As we noted earlier, an important quality of fundamentalist thinking is the malevolence of forces opposed to Islam, which conspire to subvert its message, and undermine the allegiances of believers. Much of Qutb's analysis of the state of the world of Islam, for example, hinges upon assertions of the West's desires to subvert the rightful progress of Islam as *the* superior religious and social system. How else can the debilitated state of the *Ummah* be explained? The critique of Islamic fundamentalism offered by Babair⁷⁷ clearly conforms to this analysis. Sometimes the conspiratorial intention is deliberate, and results from explicit acts of policy (shades of this were seen in some Islamic critiques of the Persian Gulf war), but sometimes the West is the unknowing instrument of a diabolical power. In a slightly different context, Fisk⁷⁸ noted the tendency amongst the combatants in Lebanon to explain victory by reference to courage, patriotism, etc., and defeat by reference to plots. This is probably a more general process rather than one confined to the Lebanese experience, but it is particularly evident amongst the various Lebanese parties. The defeat of

Saddam Hussein in the Persian Gulf war has also sometimes been explained in this way, with frequent reference to 'conspiracies' of either imperialism or colonialism.

Equally, the notion of conspiracy is central to millenarianism. It is an element of the struggle to attain the Millennium, and also might be thought to be a factor in the notion of 'timeliness' of millenarian attainment. The central feature of conspiracy in whatever disguise it appears is that forces (sometimes defined, sometimes undefined) conspire to subvert, entrap, or otherwise destroy the positive functions of society. When millenarian Islam embraces conspiracy theories, we might expect forces of great momentum and power to develop.

The psychological bases of conspiracy theories are complex, but a factor in the context of concern to us is the sense of undeserved suffering experienced when an individual fails to attain material or spiritual benefits despite living a right and proper life.⁷⁹ How can a devout Muslim in a necessarily superior society and who obeys God's laws and acts in an upright and moral way experience the defeat, humiliation, and lack of material advance that characterized Islamic societies in the 20th century? If you accept the premises, the believer is being subjected to an undeserved injustice that is of fundamental importance, in that it challenges God's order. For the fundamentalist believer, *because* God ordains your way of life, it *can only* fail to deliver its promises *because* it is being subverted through some conspiracy of forces opposed to it. To admit otherwise challenges the bases of belief. This is not to imply that conspiracy theories are inappropriate, and only related to contrasts and inconsistencies between belief systems and actual events. Analyses of the conduct of international affairs suggests that sometimes, of course, there are both overt and covert conspiracies at work, and the perceptions of participants are accurate!

Leaving aside situations where there are genuine grounds for suspecting conspiracy, one way of understanding the processes that might be involved in conspiracy is to refer to Festinger's theory of Cognitive Dissonance.⁸⁰ The cognitive conflict caused by the juxtaposition of firmly held beliefs about superiority, etc., and the evident failure to attain objectives is resolved by reference to the action of external agencies. A related explanation refers to processes of attribution as a means of understanding the world as we experience it, and in particular to what has been termed actor-observer bias. This refers to the tendency of people to attribute the causes of their own behaviour to external factors, as opposed to qualities of their own actions. In particular, it is the world in which we live that gives rise to our defeats, rather than the inadequacy of our own actions. Attribution of defeat to external causes that actively conspire and plot against us readily fits into this model. A related perspective, which serves to extend the concept of

conspiracy, and to address the universality of conspiracy theories, is to see conspiracy as 'the figurative or imaginary core of a social representation'.⁸¹

There is no necessary conflict between a behavioural approach and the more socially based approaches outlined above. However we conceptualize the issue, the notion of conspiracy is a way of making sense of a complex and confusing world, where real or imagined disadvantage occurs. In technical terms, it might equally help to relate it to cognitive structures, or to concepts such as rule governance. The *practical* significance and influence of the notion of conspiracy, however, cannot be underestimated as a factor in the Islamic perception of the world, and as a support for the structure of fundamentalism.

Other social processes seem relevant to this discussion and merit brief reference. The complex of issues discussed above with reference to conspiracy theories also have elements in common with processes of *prejudice formation* and *stereotyping*. Elements of both processes can be clearly seen in fundamentalism. The images of the West presented by authors such as Qutb draw upon simple stereotypes, attributing largely simplistic negative characteristics to entire communities. Indeed, in other contexts, the anti-Westernism so frequently preached in fundamentalist sermons, etc., would attract the term racism, and be seen as examples of prejudice. The psychological and cognitive bases of the refusal of the believer to question the fundamental tenets of Islam noted earlier might be thought to be related to similar processes observed in analyses of prejudice, where rigidity of view despite evidence to the contrary seem to characterize the prejudiced individual.

Concluding Comments

From the above, it can be seen that the processes involved in fundamentalism can be subjected to psychological analysis. The perspective preferred in this article draws upon behavioural approaches to structure and organize the way in which we might analyse the situation. Equally, other ways of conceptualizing the problem may have utility. What is important to assert is that the processes of fundamentalism are not beyond analysis, nor do they fall outside the conceptual structures already available to psychology.

'Understanding' in the terms offered in this article is not only related to the development of adequate psychological ways of conceptualizing fundamentalism. It may also serve as an adjunct to inform more effective policy generation. Western interaction with fundamentalist Islam so often tends to complement the processes we have identified, rather than to either challenge them, or use them to better advantage. The fundamentalist activist represents a major challenge to peace and stability in both the Middle East

and Africa, as well as the Islamic republics of the former Soviet Union, and further empirical work is urgently required to better develop the conceptual structures we might bring to bear on this issue. The benefits of better understanding the behaviour of fundamentalists extends beyond the confines of psychological theorizing to address major issues of security and peace.

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NOTES

1. S. Bruce, 'Protestant Resurgence and Fundamentalism', *Political Quarterly* 61 (1990), pp.161–68.
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3. G. Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt* (Trans. J. Rothschild) (Los Angeles: University of California, Los Angeles 1984) p.226.
4. See C. E. Bosworth, *Islamic Dynasties: A Chronological and Genealogical Handbook (Islamic Surveys, No. 5)* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1981).
5. See M. Taylor, *The Fanatics: A Behavioural Approach to Political Violence* (London: Brassey's 1991); D. C. Rapoport, 'Sacred Terror: A Contemporary Example From Islam', in W. Reich (ed.) *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press 1990) pp.103–130.
6. L. Rosen, *The Anthropology of Justice: Law as Culture in Islamic Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989).
7. E. Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1985) p.10.
8. Ibid., p.3.
9. J. Jansen, *The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and the Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. 1986) pp.xxii–xxiii.
10. L. Kuper, 'Theological Warrants for Genocide: Judaism, Islam and Christianity', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 2/2 (Spring 1990) pp.351–79.
11. See in particular, S. Qutb, *Milestones* (Beirut: Holy Koran Publishing House 1978). Although a number of fundamentalist authors can be identified, in the following discussion Sayyid Qutb is taken as the principal author representing the fundamentalist position. His influence can be identified throughout contemporary radical Islam.
12. Ibid., see especially pp.7–19.
13. Ibid., p.9.
14. Bold type included in original text.
15. A. S. Babear, 'Contemporary Islamic Revivalism: A Movement or a Moment', *Journal of Arab Affairs* 9 (1990) pp.122–46.
16. Cited by Sivan (note 7) pp.23–24.
17. Qutb (note 11); see his Chapter 4, 'Jihaad in the Cause of God', pp.93–141.
18. Ibid., p.135.
19. Ibid., p.139.
20. Ibid., p.139.
21. See Taylor (note 5); also D. C. Rapoport, 'Messianism and Terror', *The Center Magazine*, Jan./Feb. (1986), pp.30–39; and D. C. Rapoport, 'Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions', *American Political Science Review*, 78/3 (1984), pp.658–77.
22. J. M. Rhodes, *The Hitler Movement: A Modern Millenarian Revolution* (Stanford, CT: Hoover Institution Press 1980).

23. A. S. Ahmed, *Discovering Islam* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1988) p.61.
24. Rapoport, 'Fear and Trembling' (note 21) also Rapoport, 'Messianism and Terror' (note 21) and D. C. Rapoport, 'Why Does Religious Messianism Produce Terror?', in P. Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart (eds.), *Contemporary Research on Terrorism* (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press 1987), pp.72–88.
25. Rhodes (note 22).
26. Jansen (note 9) p.31.
27. An abbreviation of *Al-Faridah al-Gha'ibah, The Neglected Duty* by Muhammad Abd'al-Salam Faraj (see Janssen, note 9).
28. Discussed at length by Jansen (note 9).
29. M. Taylor, *The Terrorist* (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers 1988).
30. Taylor (note 5).
31. The second author has recently reviewed 30 years of psychological research on terrorism. See J. Horgan, *Terrorism and Political Violence: A Psychological Perspective* (PhD dissertation, Department of Applied Psychology, University College, Cork, 2000). For a summary, see J. Horgan, "'It's the Question that Drives Us": The Search for the Terrorist Personality' (under submission). For other reviews, see A. Silke, 'Cheshire-Cat Logic: The Recurring Theme of Terrorist Abnormality in Psychological Research', *Psychology, Crime & Law*, 4/1 (1998), pp.51–69; M. Crenshaw, 'The Psychology of Political Terrorism', in M. G. Hermann (ed.) *Political Psychology: Contemporary Problems and Issues* (London: Jossey-Bass 1986), pp.379–413; and Taylor (note 29).
32. For example, H. J. Eysenck, *The Psychology of Politics* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1954).
33. This issue is explored in more detail in a forthcoming book on the psychology of terrorism (by the authors of this article) in the particular context of developing a useful model that describes how people become involved, remain within, and ultimately disengage from terrorist organisations.
34. Qutb (note 11).
35. Rosen (note 6).
36. Taylor (notes 5 and 29).
37. Horgan (note 31).
38. *Ibid.*
39. See especially T. Bjorgo, *Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, Perpetrators and Responses* (Oslo: Tano Aschehoug 1997). Although Bjorgo discusses behavioural processes related to right-wing extremist violence, the parallels are valuable and should be developed further in the context of different 'types' of terrorism.
40. *Ibid.*; also see Taylor (note 29).
41. K. Kellen, *Terrorists: What are They Like? How Some Terrorists Describe Their World and Actions* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation 1979).
42. *Ibid.*
43. J. Brockner and J. Z. Rubin, *Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts: A Social Psychological Analysis* (New York: Springer-Verlag 1985).
44. M. Taylor and H. Ryan, 'Fanaticism, Political Suicide and Terrorism', *Terrorism*, 11/2 (1988), pp.91–111.
45. See J. M. Post, 'Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behaviour', *Terrorism*, 7 (1984), pp.241–56; J. M. Post, 'Hostilite, Conformite, Fraternite: The Group Dynamics of Terrorist Behaviour', *International Journal of Group Psychotherapy*, 36/2 (1986), pp.211–24; J. M. Post, "'It's Us Against Them": The Group Dynamics of Political Terrorism', *Terrorism*, 10/1 (1987), pp.23–35; and J. M. Post, 'Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Psychological Forces', in W. Reich (ed.) *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, States of Mind* (pp.25–40) (New York: Cambridge University Press 1990).
46. This issue is discussed in detail in Taylor (note 29).
47. B. F. Skinner, *Contingencies of Reinforcement* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 1968). Skinner introduces the term rule-following in Chapter 6, p.133. Notes 6.1 to 6.4 are especially useful (pp.157–71).
48. After R. W. Maltot, 'Rule Governed Behavior and Behavioral Anthropology', *The Behavior Analyst*, 11 (1988), pp.181–200.

49. There are relationships between the concept of behavioural rules, and more traditional forms of cognitive psychology. These are coherently explored in H. W. Reese, 'Rules and Rule-governance: Cognitive and Behavioristic Views', In S. C. Hayes (ed.) *Rule-Governed Behavior: Cognition, Contingencies and Instructional Control* (New York: Plenum Press 1989) pp.3–84.
50. B. F. Skinner, 'The Behaviour of the Listener', in Hayes (note 49), pp.85–96.
51. Skinner (note 47), p.140.
52. The issues we have raised here relate to a complex area of behavioural analysis, and more technical details of this approach can be found in, for example, Skinner (notes 47 and 50); Mallot (note 48); H. Schlinger and E. Blakely, 'Function-Altering Effects of Contingency-specifying Stimuli', *The Behavior Analyst*, 10 (1987), pp.41–45; and Hayes (note 49).
53. M. Rokeach, *Belief, Attitude and Values* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 1968).
54. Hayes (note 49). Whilst not explored in detail here, the notion of behavioural rules fits readily into the rational choice paradigm (D. B. Cornish and R. V. G. Clarke, *The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives on Offending* (New York: Springer-Verlag 1986); also see N. Leites and C. Wolfe, *Rebellion and Offending* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation 1970); J. Denardo, *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1984); D. Mason, *Individual Participation in Collective Racial Violence and Terror: A Rational Choice Synthesis* (PhD dissertation, University of Georgia 1982).
55. Mallot (note 48)
56. D. T. Cerutti, 'Discrimination Theory of Rule Governed Behavior', *Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior*, 51/2 (1989), pp.259–76.
57. D. J. Dietrich, 'National Renewal, Anti-Semitism, and Political Continuity: A Psychological Assessment', *Political Psychology*, 9/3 (1988), p.385–411.
58. A. Staats, *Social Behaviorism* (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press 1975).
59. Cerutti (note 56).
60. Skinner (note 47).
61. For a more extensive discussion of this, see Taylor (note 5).
62. A concept developed from H. Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1958).
63. An extensive discussion of these factors in relation to ideology can be found in Taylor (note 5).
64. Qutb (note 11) p.139.
65. S. Qutb, *Islam and Universal Peace* (Indianapolis, IN: American Trust Publications 1977) p.72.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid., pp.73–74.
68. Ibid., p.74.
69. Qutb (note 11) p.164.
70. Rosen (note 6) p.41.
71. Qutb (note 65) p.70.
72. Qutb (note 11) p.165.
73. For a discussion, see Rapoport, 'Fear and Trembling' (note 21) p.658.
74. See Arendt (note 62); also H. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1987).
75. The brief discussion is premised on the much fuller account of the issues in Chapter 6 of Taylor (note 5).
76. Ibid., the discussion in Chapter 2 also identifies these features as aspects of fanaticism.
77. Babear (note 15).
78. R. Fisk, *Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1991) p.78.
79. D. Groh, 'The Temptation of Conspiracy Theory', in C. F. Graumann and S. Moscovici (Eds.), *Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy* (New York: Springer-Verlag 1987) p.1.
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81. S. Moscovici, 'The Conspiracy Mentality', in Graumann and Moscovici (note 79) p.154.