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

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The Pre-1914 Anarchist "Lone Wolf" Terrorist and Governmental Responses

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The Pre-1914 Anarchist "Lone Wolf" Terrorist and Governmental Responses

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After discussing the extent to which the period from 1878–1934, with its frequent incidents of anarchist assassinations and bombings, can be considered the classic age of "lone wolf" or leaderless terrorism, this article focuses on four acts of anarchist violence and police and government responses to this violence. The four cases are the 1896 bombing of a Corpus Christi procession in Barcelona, the 1901 assassination of President McKinley, a 1902 bombing in Livorno (Leghorn) Italy, and the 1912 attempted assassination of Italian King Victor Emmanuel III. Confronted by these violent acts, the authorities resorted to two basic policies that might be referred to as "micro" and "macro" approaches. The macro approach was to launch massive crackdowns, arrest hundreds if not thousands of suspects (in some cases torturing them), and pass repressive legislation limiting freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom of assembly in order to discover the guilty terrorists and to squelch anarchist propaganda and organized activity. The micro approach was to focus on improving the intelligence capacity of the police by modernizing and expanding it, and creating or professionalizing the protective service for government ministers and heads of state.

Keywords anarchism, assassination, Corpus Christi bombing, Czolgosz, D'Alba, Giolitti, lone wolf, McKinley, terrorism, torture

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This article will focus on four acts of violence committed before World War I by lone anarchists (or apparent lone anarchists) and on police and government responses to this violence. I will explore the motivations of the different anarchists, as far as we know them, and compare and contrast the state's responses. The four cases are the 1896 bombing of a Corpus Christi procession in Barcelona, the 1901 assassination of President McKinley, a 1902 bombing in Livorno (Leghorn) Italy, and the 1912 attempted assassination of King Victor Emmanuel III. While the different targets and possible motivations of the anarchist terrorists are interesting, even more striking are the sharply differing actions of the authorities. In all these cases the police and government responses were far from flawless, but the ruthless measures of the Spanish provoked violent acts of revenge, whereas the briefly violent and mostly

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uncoordinated responses of the Americans led to no further terrorist deeds. The American government was long on anti-anarchist rhetoric but short on concrete acts of repression. This approach produced no martyrs. The Italian approach led to the same result as the American, but was conducted in a more controlled, low-key fashion, and avoided a violent, popular backlash.

The individual cases will make more sense if preceded by a brief discussion of the extent to which the era of anarchist terrorism, 1878–1934, should be considered the classic age of "lone wolf" or leaderless terrorism. Before this period, nineteenth century terrorists and assassins, such as the Italian nationalist Felice Orsini, the Irish Fenians, and the Russian populists, had constructed elaborate, sometimes international, conspiracies to carry out their violent deeds. By contrast, after the late 1870s the anarchists rejected authoritarian, centralized control over acts of planned violence as well as over anything else. Of the total number of violent anarchist incidents, which runs into the hundreds—possibly thousands if we include the quasi civil wars in Russia after the 1905 Revolution and in Barcelona in 1919–23—less than a handful were the product of large-scale conspiracies. All the rest were the deeds of lone individuals or of very small groups without command structures or leaders.

This posed a big problem for governments and law enforcement agencies since they had a difficult time trying to monitor lone potential assassins and bomb throwers who were often unknown and who belonged to no known group. Two contrasting examples illustrate the nature of this problem from the authorities' point of view. In 1874, the great anarchist and Internationalist leader Mikhail Bakunin planned a major revolt in the Romagna, in north central Italy. Police spies, however, were able to infiltrate the anarchist/Internationalist groups planning the revolt. The intelligence they provided led to the preventive arrest of key leaders and the easy subduing of the few insurgents who marched on Bologna in August 1874.[1] By contrast, in 1894 presumed individual anarchists bombed the Italian parliament building and the justice and war ministries, leading to the deaths of two people, but the police were never able to find or identify the perpetrators.[2]

In the face of such difficulties, the authorities resorted to one of two basic policies, which might be referred to as the micro- and the macro-approaches. The macro approach was to launch massive crackdowns, arrest hundreds if not thousands of suspects, and pass repressive legislation limiting freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom of assembly in order to squelch anarchist propaganda and organized activity. Italy, Spain, Portugal, and France adopted this approach at the peak of the anarchist terror during the 1890s.[3] The micro approach was to focus on improving the intelligence capacity of the police by modernizing and expanding it, and creating or professionalizing the protective service for government ministers and heads of state. In the case of Italy and France after 1900, the micro approach was also associated with socially progressive reforms such as allowing greater freedom of press and association, and allowing greater leeway for unions and other labor organizations that were attempting to improve working class conditions. This was important since much of the anger of the anarchists sprang from their bitterness over the "social question," the vast levels of social and economic inequality and injustice existing in society.

Cambios Nuevos Bombing, 1896

The first case of anarchist terrorism I want to discuss in detail was one of the bloodiest. On June 7, 1896, at 8:40 in the evening, a bomb (or bombs) exploded at the

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intersection of *Cambios Nuevos* (*Camvis Nous* in Catalonian) and *Arenas de Cambio*, narrow streets—one hardly more than an alleyway—near the center of medieval Barcelona. The bombing occurred during a popular religious procession in celebration of the Eucharist (i.e., the festival of Corpus Christi) that was proceeding from the Cathedral to the great medieval church of Santa Maria del Mar.[4] As a result of the explosion, more than 60 people were injured and twelve died.[5] Since it was a civic event of importance, soldiers marched in the religious procession, which was led not only by religious dignitaries, but also by the civil governor, the city mayor, and the captain general, who was the chief military commander in Catalonia. The bomb, however, was not aimed at these leaders but dropped at the rear of the procession where it killed ordinary people, including women and children as young as six years old. The Corpus Christi bombing produced fear and anxiety throughout not only Barcelona but also all of Spain. Newspapers of almost every political persuasion called for the severe repression of the anarchists.[6]

Unfortunately the Spanish police, which the British and others condemned as hopeless, could not find any evidence as to who perpetrated the crime.[7] Therefore, heeding the popular outcry, the government declared martial law in Barcelona for six months and arrested over 400 anarchists and others suspected of being sympathetic to the anarchists. These included radicals, Catalan republicans, and anti-clericals.[8] Since the jails of Barcelona were filled to overflowing, many of the arrested were imprisoned in the Montjuich fortress overlooking the city. There they were subjected to horrible tortures to extract confessions. The guards beat prisoners repeatedly with rods until their skin ruptured under the blows, or branded them with hot irons. Fingernails and toenails were ripped out and testicles crushed or tied off with guitar string until they atrophied.[9] In a secret trial characterized by many illegalities, a military court condemned five anarchists to death, although it is almost certain that none of them were responsible for the bombing.[10]

Many historians now believe that the real bomber was a French anarchist named Jean Girault who fled to Argentina after the bloody attack.[11] We may never know why he did what he did, but presumably it was because the Catholic Church had become closely identified with the Spanish monarchy and state. For many anarchists, it symbolized repression and persecution; moreover, the inclusion of major civil and military leaders in the religious procession made it doubly provocative.

After the bombing, government repression extended to republican and socialist groups, which were dismantled and their members arrested. The labor movement in Catalonia was also attacked and suffered enormous damage.[12] Since involvement in the labor movement provided one of the chief safety valves for social discontent and anarchist energies, its crippling helped to provoke future terrorist attempts.

While all these repressive measures were intended to destroy anarchism and weaken the opposition movement in Barcelona, they soon backfired. The grossly excessive measures of the police, military, and government were widely publicized and blackened Spain's reputation both inside Spain and abroad. In the eyes of much of the world, the Spanish anarchists became martyrs cruelly persecuted by a new Spanish Inquisition. Outrage over the sufferings of the innocent anarchists and others now overshadowed that over the original bombing attack. Shocked by these reports and by personally seeing the torture marks on one of the innocent anarchists who had been released, in August 1897 the Italian anarchist Michele Angiolillo sought revenge. He went to Spain and assassinated the Cánovas del Castillo, the Spanish prime minister, who was unguarded at the time.[13]

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After his murder, anarchist terrorism in Spain ended for over five years. This was due not only to police repression but also to the revival of the European and international economy at the end of the 1890s, some Spanish pro-labor legislation, the commutation of the harsh prison sentences received by the anarchists who had not been executed, and the repeal (1902) of the harsh anti-anarchist law of 1896. Nonetheless, this was a short truce, rather than an end to anarchist terrorism in Spain. It began again in January 1903 due to many of the same reasons that lay behind Girault's and Angiolillo's violent attempts: repression of the labor movement, repression of the right to assemble and publish, a lack of inclusion of the lower classes in a Spanish society dominated by a small elite, the sporadic use of torture by the police, and the general lack of legitimacy of the Spanish state.[14]

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McKinley's Assassination, 1901

The assassination of President McKinley caused shock and outrage comparable to that from the Corpus Christi bombing. On September 6, 1901, the anarchist Leon Czolgosz waited in line to greet the president during a brief public reception held during McKinley's visit to the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo, New York. When his turn came, Czolgosz shot the president twice. He died eight days later.

We have much stronger evidence explaining the reasons for Czolgosz's act as opposed to Girault's, although both were protests against what they perceived to be an unjust society impervious to and uninterested in the legitimate economic and social demands and needs of the lower classes. While the Spanish and the Americans liked to blame foreigners for anarchist terrorism, this was untrue in the case of Czolgosz. He was born in 1873 in Detroit, Michigan, the son of German-Polish immigrants. Czolgosz was sensitive, idealistic, intelligent, and a tireless reader. The brutal labor struggles of the 1890s, however, scarred him, marking a turning point in his life. Because of a severe depression in 1893, the owners of the Cleveland wire mill where Czolgosz worked decided to cut wages. Leon and the other workers went out on strike, but the strike was broken. Leon was fired and blacklisted from further employment.[15] He was only able to resume work, at lower pay, by changing his name to "Nieman," which means "nobody" in German. It was at this time that Czolgosz started to read radical, including anarchist, pamphlets and journals, joined a Socialist Club, and abandoned his Catholic faith. His favorite text, which he studied for years, was Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward*.[16] This book envisioned a utopian United States in which a government-owned trust worked for the common interest of every citizen, leading to the end of the violent conflicts between capital and labor that characterized so much of the period before World War I. Like several other anarchist assassins, Czolgosz drifted into radical circles and thinking in an attempt to find meaning for a life without much hope.

He also sought in anarchism a way to protest against injustice. A few months before he shot McKinley, Czolgosz told a Cleveland anarchist that "things were getting worse and worse—more strikes and they were getting more brutal against the strikers, and that something must be done."[17] Czolgosz was also upset by the "outrages committed by the American government in the Philippine islands" against a native uprising in favor of independence.[18] Since McKinley was commander in chief of the armed forces, he could be blamed for American actions in the Philippines and, due to his cozy relationship with the leaders of big business, he could also be held partially responsible for the sufferings of American workers.

Questions have been raised about the genuineness of Czolgosz's anarchist beliefs. One anarchist publication claimed that he acted out "of purely personal idiosyncrasy and not of any doctrine or propaganda."[19] Evidence from various witnesses and Czolgosz's repeated statements, however, demonstrate that Czolgosz was indeed an anarchist, but a solitary one with few links to the wider anarchist movement.[20] His assassination of the president was very much the act of a lone wolf since he received no assistance from other anarchists. This was unlike several terrorists of the period who, while acting essentially alone, received some financial help or advice from other anarchists.[21]

Newspaper accounts of Gaetano Bresci's assassination of Italian King Umberto I also exercised an important influence on Czolgosz's actions and demonstrate how media coverage may encourage terrorism. According to his parents, Czolgosz was fascinated by the assassination.[22] In May 1901, he sought out the treasurer of an anarchist association in Cleveland, saying "I hear the Anarchists are plotting something like Breschi [sic]; the man was selected by the comrades to do the deed that was done." When the anarchist treasurer denied these stories, Czolgosz confessed that he had not read of them in any anarchist publication but "in some capitalist paper."[23]

Many have claimed that Czolgosz was mentally ill.[24] Leon was secretive, moody, obsessively fastidious, and in his later years showed intermittent signs of depression, such as wanting to sleep all the time. He may have suffered a nervous breakdown in 1897. But the physicians who examined the assassin at the time of his arrest and in prison and the historian Eric Rauchway all conclude that Czolgosz was not insane.[25] Leon was a brooding, alienated loner, not crazy or even "half-mad."

Besides his alienation from American society and his identification with earlier self-proclaimed "anarchist tyrannicides", another important factor may have influenced Czolgosz's decision to murder McKinley. Czolgosz thought that he would soon die of natural causes. This was because Leon seems to have believed that he had advanced syphilis, although his autopsy showed no signs of that disease. Nonetheless, Czolgosz took medication to treat syphilis, and in July of 1901 told his brother Waldeck that he was not going to live long. Since he was going to die soon anyway, why not strike a blow against a system that he found so unjust?[26]

After McKinley's assassination, a police crackdown was accompanied by a tremendous popular backlash against the anarchists. While the authorities engaged in a vociferous, sporadic, and short-lived persecution of the anarchists, in comparison with the often violent popular reaction that went on for months, their acts were relatively minor. The police temporarily arrested anarchists, raided their homes and clubrooms, and occasionally confiscated their papers and possessions. The police also looked the other way when mobs drove anarchists and their families out of several towns and attacked and wrecked their publishing offices. In Chicago, the authorities arrested over fifty suspected anarchists, including Emma Goldman, and held them without bail for seventeen days on suspicion of involvement with the assassination. After Goldman protested against this injustice, a policeman slugged her, knocking out a tooth. After being released for lack of evidence, Goldman had to adopt a pseudonym since, when she used her own name, she could find neither work nor an apartment. On October 3, Goldman was prevented from giving a lecture on anarchism. But the American police, unlike the Spanish, carried out no widespread or long-lasting effort to persecute or torture the anarchists. Although Czolgosz appeared unharmed at his trial, Rauchway concludes that Czolgosz was probably tortured on one or two occasions by using light to burn his eyes.[27] Since at the time this use of torture was not conclusively proven or widely reported, it did not inspire other anarchists to avenge Czolgosz's death.

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American newspapers, journals, and congressmen called for police control over the anarchists, the declaration, by international agreement, that anarchism was the equivalent of piracy, the deportation of all anarchists to an island, and even "death in some disgraceful form" for those who merely attempted assassinations.[28] But unlike in Spain, none of these extreme measures were enacted.

Theodore Roosevelt, McKinley's presidential successor, understood how to embody and express the outrage felt by the vast majority of Americans regarding the assassination. At the same time he did little or nothing concrete that curbed American liberties or even repressed radicals in or outside the labor movement. Roosevelt's personality and presidential rhetoric, in which he went to bat against the giant corporate trusts and stood up for the average worker, soon captured the American imagination and undercut the appeal of extremist solutions to resolve America's problems. Thus, on the one hand, Roosevelt's first address to Congress in December 1901 was an incendiary condemnation of the anarchists, whom he denounced as depraved criminals akin to highwaymen, wife-beaters, pirates, and slave traders.[29] In response, Congress passed a law in 1903 prohibiting the entrance of anarchists and assassins into the country. Until the Red Scare of 1919, however, the law led to the exclusion or expulsion of only about fifty people.[30]

On the other hand, Roosevelt made it much clearer than McKinley ever had that he was no pawn of Wall Street and that he stood up for labor. In 1902, the president famously rejected the demands of Pennsylvania mine owners who wanted the U.S. military to help crush a coal miners' strike. Later he employed the "bully pulpit" of the presidency to denounce the huge business trusts that increasingly dominated the American economy. Even if Roosevelt had little success in curbing the trusts, he became the darling of the media and gave a strong impression of being progressive. While at the very tail end of his presidency, in 1908, an anarchist scare developed and a scattering of violent anarchist incidents took place, none of them were directed against the president or the federal government.[31]

In terms of combatting terrorism, where the Roosevelt administration made an important change was in protecting the president. Shortly after McKinley's assassination, presidential protection became more professional and permanent, rather than amateurish and ad hoc. The Secret Service, whose size was increased, took over this task, at first in a de facto manner and then in 1906 with congressional authorization and funding.[32] The police detail from the District of Columbia metropolitan police force assigned to protect the White House was also increased. In 1910, the Justice Department (and therefore the recently formed Bureau of Investigation) was authorized to protect the President.[33] If these reforms, including obliging the president to obey the caveats of his protectors rather than overruling them as the president had done at Buffalo, had been in place earlier, it is very likely that McKinley would not have been assassinated.

Livorno Bombing, 1902

If Roosevelt's anti-anarchist policy could be characterized as speaking loudly but wielding a small stick, that of his Italian contemporary Giovanni Giolitti, who dominated Italian politics between 1901 and 1914, first as interior minister and then as prime minister, could be characterized as just the opposite. In public he tried to downplay or ignore all anarchist incidents while at the same time significantly building up the size of the Italian police and its international intelligence capacity.[34] During his

years in power he was confronted by at least three and perhaps four examples of lone wolf terrorism. The first, least known, but bloodiest incident occurred on October 26, 1902. A huge bomb heard throughout the city exploded at the threshold of a seminary near the Bishop's palace in Leghorn (Livorno), Italy killing a twelve-year-old boy and injuring his nine-year-old sister and another boy. Given the death of children and the anti-clerical target, this event seems somewhat similar to the Corpus Christi bombing in Spain. Bishop Gianni of Livorno was an unpopular and notoriously intransigent cleric who had recently called for Rome's return to papal control.[35] As in Spain, the perpetrator of this deed was never conclusively identified.

But the reaction of the Italian authorities was much different than the Spanish. Interior Minister Giolitti was certainly very aware of the seriousness of the event, telegraphing the prefect of Livorno that "the authors [of the bombing] have to be discovered at whatever cost. If necessary promise rewards."[36] The police made some immediate arrests but then soon released those under detention when they provided alibis. Two days after the explosion, seven were arrested, and amongst these, the injured boy identified Ettore Cateni, a twenty-five-year-old alleged anarchist, as the bomber.[37] But he too proved to have an alibi and multiple witnesses to attest to his innocence.[38] Given this frustrating outcome, Giolitti's admonition to discover the bombers "at whatever cost" might have encouraged the use of torture to extract confessions, but as far as we know, such methods were never used during Giolitti's many years in power. A biographer writing almost fifty years after the event claims that the guilty party *was* identified, but contemporary records fail to confirm this.[39]

Assassination Attempt, Rome, 1912

Another, more extensively documented *attentat* reveals the same restraint by the authorities as in the Livorno bombing. On March 14, 1912, Antonio D'Alba, a self-proclaimed individualist anarchist and recently fired bricklayer, shot at the king while he was riding in his carriage through Rome.[40] D'Alba missed Victor Emmanuel III but severely wounded one of the mounted royal bodyguards as well as a horse, which subsequently died. One of the king's security escorts riding a bicycle subdued the attempted assassin before he was able to fire at the king another time. Victor Emmanuel's safety was therefore at least partially due to the improved security arrangements provided for the monarchy since his father's assassination in 1900, as well as to luck. In a very brief statement to parliament announcing news of the attempted assassination, Giolitti declined to point out D'Alba's anarchist affiliation. Instead he mentioned his criminal record, including several robberies and a conviction for abusing his parents. A confidential police report noted that D'Alba had never been seen at anarchist meetings. D'Alba was given a regular trial before a jury and defended by Enrico Ferri, one of the most famous lawyers in Italy, who made little of D'Alba's political convictions. Instead he depicted him as the product of a wretched family background and corrupted by life in the lower depths of the Roman metropolis. D'Alba received a harsh sentence of thirty years in prison. All this was typical of Giolitti's approach: to severely apply regular law—avoiding any resort to martial law or special legislation—and to downplay assassination attempts as the products of unstable minds. Indeed D'Alba was unstable, since he told his captors that he had been incited to his crime by a specter (*fantasma*) that appeared to him on various nights. D'Alba became neither a famous anarchist martyr, like Angiolillo or Bresci, nor inspired revenge attacks.[41]

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Conclusion

If anarchist terrorism grew from the blood of its martyrs, then the ineffective "macro" anti-anarchist policies of the U.S. government and the effective "micro" policies of the Giolittian government, which both failed to create any martyrs, must be rated a success while the macro policies of Spain, which did, a stunning failure. These experiences suggest that the best way to deal with the "lone wolf" anarchist terrorist was through micro policies such as improving personal protection for heads of state and government and enlarging, modernizing, and professionalizing the police. The legitimacy and popularity of socially progressive governments, when combined with these micro policies, turned out to be the best preventative against anarchist terrorism. In all probability, obscure lone wolf malcontents such as Girault, Czolgosz, D'Alba, and whoever bombed the Livorno seminary could not have been detected ahead of time. But better micro policies might have rendered Czolgosz's deed impossible and prevented Girault's from having a deadly sequel.

Notes

1. Giampietro Berti, "La sovversione anarchica in Italia e la risposta giudizaria dello Stato (1874–1900)," *Quaderni fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno* 38 (2009): 579–600, especially 579–583.
2. *La Tribuna* (Rome), March 10 and June 1, 1894.
3. Eugenio Florian, *Trattato di Diritto Penale*. 2: *Introduzione ai Delitti in Ispecie Delitti Contro La Sicurezza Dello Stato*, 2nd ed (Milan: Vallardi, 1915), 122–162; William Loubat, "De la Législation Contre les Anarchistes au Point de Vue International," *Journal du Droit international Privé* 22 (1895): 1–22; and 23 (1896): 294–320.
4. Temma Kaplan, *Red City, Blue Period: Social Movements in Picasso's Barcelona* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 31–35.
5. Angel Herrerin, "España: La Propaganda por la Represión, 1892–1900," in Juan Avilés Farré and Angel Herrerin, eds., *El Nacimiento del Terrorismo en Occidente* (Madrid: Siglo XXI de España, 2008), 116.
6. Ibid., 117.
7. Sidney Lee, *King Edward VII* (New York: Macmillan, 1927), 2:535.
8. Herrerin, "España: La Propaganda por la Represión, 1892–1900" (see note 5 above), 119; George Richard Esenwein, *Anarchist Ideology and the Working-Class Movement in Spain, 1868–1898* (Berkeley: University of California, 1989), 193; Rafael Núñez Florencio, *El Terrorismo Anarquista (1888–1909)* (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1983), 57–59.
9. Esenwein, *Anarchist Ideology and the Working-Class Movement in Spain* (see note 8 above), 195.
10. Joaquín Romero Maura, "Terrorism in Barcelona and its Impact on Spanish Politics, 1904–1909," *Past and Present* 41 (1968): 131.
11. Herrerin, "España: La Propaganda por la Represión, 1892–1900" (see note 5 above), 129.
12. Ibid., 121.
13. Ibid., 134; Esenwein, *Anarchist Ideology and the Working-Class Movement in Spain* (see note 8 above), 194–199; Francesco Tamburini, "Michele Angiolillo e l'Assassinio di Cánovas del Castillo," *Spagna Contemporanea* 4, no. 9 (1996): 101–130. Rudolf Rocker, *En la Borrasca* (Buenos Aires: Americalee, 1949), 63, was an eyewitness to Angiolillo's meeting with a torture victim.
14. Núñez Florencio, *El Terrorismo Anarquista (1888–1909)* (see note 8 above), 61–62, 69–70, 72, 102–103.
15. L. Vernon Briggs, *The Manner of Man That Kills* (Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1921), 304; Eric Rauchway, *Murdering McKinley: The Making of Theodore Roosevelt's America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2003), 166.
16. Briggs, *The Manner of Man That Kills* (see note 15 above), 305, 312.
17. Ibid., 321.
18. Rauchway, *Murdering McKinley* (see note 15 above), 102.

19. *The Free Society*, February 16, 1902, cited by Briggs, *The Manner of Man That Kills* (see note 15 above), 322.

20. Richard Bach Jensen, *The Battle Against Anarchist Terrorism: An International History, 1878–1934* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), chapter seven.

21. For example, Angiolillo received at least some money from radicals and was perhaps influenced by their advice. Tamburini, "Michele Angiolillo e l'Assassinio di Cánovas del Castillo" (see note 13 above), 110–118.

22. Walter Channing, "The Mental Status of Czolgosz, the Assassin of President McKinley," *The American Journal of Insanity* 59, no. 2 (October 1902): 263.

23. Briggs, *The Manner of Man That Kills* (see note 15 above), 317.

24. Both Doctors Channing and Briggs (see note 15 above), 332, concluded that Czolgosz was "insane," although neither had ever met the man.

25. Briggs, *The Manner of Man That Kills* (see note 15 above), 244–249, 289; Rauchway, *Murdering McKinley* (see note 15 above), 39–43, and especially 114–116, 204–206.

26. Briggs, *The Manner of Man That Kills* (see note 15 above), 308; Rauchway, *Murdering McKinley* (see note 15 above), 177–182.

27. Sidney Fine, "Anarchism and the Assassination of McKinley," *American Historical Review* 60 (July 1955): 780–788; Rauchway, *Murdering McKinley* (see note 15 above), 217.

28. Fine, "Anarchism and the Assassination of McKinley" (see note 27 above), 786–789; Jensen, "The United States, International Policing and the War against Anarchist Terrorism, 1900–1914," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 13, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 15–46; "Notes," *American Law Review* (September–October 1901): 744.

29. Congress, Senate, "President Roosevelt's Message to the Senate and House of Representatives, 57th Cong., 1st Sess.," *Congressional Record* XXXV (December 3, 1901): 82.

30. Fine, "Anarchism and the Assassination of McKinley" (see note 27 above), 793; William Preston, *Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903–1933* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1963), 33.

31. Robert J. Goldstein, "The Anarchist Scare of 1908: A Sign of Tensions in the Progressive Era," *American Studies* 15 (1974): 50–75.

32. "President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy," in *Hearings*, Vol. 25 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), exhibit no. 2550; Frederick Kaiser, "Origins of Secret Service Protection of the President: Personal, Interagency, and Institutional Conflict," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 18, no. 1 (Winter 1988): 112–113.

33. Richard B. Sherman, "Presidential Protection During the Progressive Era: The Aftermath of the McKinley Assassination," *The Historian* 46, no. 1 (November 1983): 18; Kaiser, "Origins of Secret Service Protection of the President" (see note 32 above), 118.

34. Richard Bach Jensen, "The International Campaign Against Anarchist Terrorism, 1880–1930s," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21 (January–March 2009): 96–97; and Jensen, *The Battle Against Anarchist Terrorism* (see note 20 above), chapter ten.

35. *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), October 28–29, 1902.

36. Giovanni Giolitti, *Dalle carte di Giovanni Giolitti: Quarant'Anni di Politica Italiana*, ed. Piero d'Angiolini, Giampiero Carocci, and Claudio Pavone (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1962), 2:275.

37. *Corriere della Sera*, October 29–30, 1902.

38. *Corriere della Sera*, November 1–2, 1902. Rumors that the "companions" of the bomb thrower had helped him escape were never confirmed. *L'Osservatore Romano* (Rome), November 4, 1902.

39. Gaetano Natale, *Giolitti e Gli Italiani* (Milan: Garzanti, 1949), 475–476. Another reason for doubting Natale's account is that his dating of the event is a year off.

40. Richard Bach Jensen, "Criminal Anthropology and the Problem of Anarchist Terrorism in Spain and Italy," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 16, no. 2 (December 2001): 31–44.

41. Copy of report including testimonials, Paolo Sessi, Inspector General of Public Security at the Royal Household to Direzione General P.S. (Ministero dell'Interno), Rome, March 14, 1912, Casa reale, Primo Aiutante di Campo, busta 217, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome.

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