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Sectarianism Revisited: The Provisional IRA Campaign in a Border Region of Northern Ireland

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This article revisits the debate, hosted by this journal in the 1990s, on whether the Provisional IRA campaign was sectarian. In the light of current debates about how Northern Ireland deals with its past, it challenges the analysis that emphasises the non-sectarian ideology of republicanism and ignores the effects of IRA violence. It uses research on the IRA campaign in Fermanagh and south Tyrone to argue that the campaign was unavoidably sectarian but rejects current attempts to label it a form of "ethnic cleansing."

Keywords border, ethnic cleansing, Fermanagh & South Tyrone, provisional IRA, sectarianism

The Debate on Sectarianism

After the paramilitary ceasefires of 1994 and as the Northern Irish peace process moved towards the key watershed of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement this journal published a number of articles that examined the claim that the IRA's campaign had been motivated by sectarianism. More than a decade later the issues raised in the articles have been given a new relevance by on-going debates in Northern Ireland about how to deal with its recent violent past. These debates have often polarised into what the historian Tony Judt refers to as a "politics of aggrieved memories"[1] between those who regard the IRA's campaign as a legitimate struggle of national liberation and those, particularly in Northern Ireland's majority unionist population, who accuse the IRA of waging a campaign of "ethnic cleansing" against their community. This article revisits the earlier debate in the light of current arguments and also on the basis of an in-depth analysis of the effects of the IRA campaign in the border region of Fermanagh and South Tyrone.

The first contribution by Robert White argued that while individual acts of the IRA may have been tainted by sectarianism, the fundamental ideology and the strategy and targeting that flowed from it were not. White argued that although the IRA had killed more than 340 Protestant civilians since 1969 it was not a sectarian organisation because it was waging its war against the British state and the security forces

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in Northern Ireland but not against the Protestant population. Protestant civilians were unfortunate ''collateral damage'' of the IRA's armed struggle against the British state.[2] Steve Bruce, in a critical response focussed on White's exclusion of those Protestants who died because they were members of the security forces, argued that the fact that the IRA killed fewer civilians than the loyalists simply indicated that the IRA had a larger number of ''legitimate targets'' than the loyalists due to the predominantly Protestant composition of the locally recruited security forces. Bruce argues that republican justifications ignored the fact that for the wider Protestant community, members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) were part of their community and that their killing was a direct attack on that community.[3]

White responded to Bruce's criticisms in a subsequent issue of the journal[4] and later returned to the question in his biography of the leading founder of the Provisional IRA and President of Republican Sinn Féin, Ruairí Ó Brádaigh.[5] He blamed the distorted picture of the ''openly anti-Protestant'' attitudes of leading Provisionals in an *Observer* article and a book, *To Take Arms: My Year with the IRA Provisionals* written by Maria McGuire, a defector from the Provisionals, who had been personal assistant to Ó Brádaigh. In her book McGuire claimed that after a car bombing in which several civilians were killed, Seán MacStiofáin, then Chief of Staff of the Provisional IRA, had exclaimed, ''What does it matter if Protestants get killed. They're all bigots, aren't they?''[6] Bruce criticised White for confining references to McGuire's book to a footnote but in his response White defended his dismissal of her as a source by quoting an interview he conducted with Ó Brádaigh who she claimed had been present to hear MacStiofáin's outburst. In this interview Ó Brádaigh asserted he recalled no such outburst and claimed the allegation was part of a smear campaign orchestrated by English newspapers.[7] It is impossible to come to any definite conclusion about the reliability of McGuire's account but it is important to note that she does not depict MacStiofáin as typical of the leadership of the Provisionals as she also reports that Ó Brádaigh and the leading Belfast Provisional, Joe Cahill, were shocked by this outburst.[8]

White was correct to deny that the Provisionals *tout court* can be dismissed as sectarian zealots motivated by atavistic anti-Protestantism. However, this was to engage with his critics at their weakest point. The charge that the IRA campaign was aimed at expelling the Protestant population from Ireland was one that was propagated by some Protestant evangelicals, particularly the Reverend Ian Paisley, and more recently it has been revived in the claim that the IRA waged a campaign of ''ethnic cleansing'' against Protestants during the Troubles. However, most critics of the IRA campaign, many of them from within the broader Irish nationalist political tradition, charged the IRA, not with a subjective sectarian intent, but with a wilful blindness to the sectarian effects of their violence. An example of this criticism mentioned by White is a speech by the then Irish Taoiseach, Liam Cosgrave (1973–1977), who blamed the IRA campaign for sparking a ''massive sectarian backlash.'' In his response, with which White concurred, Ó Brádaigh claimed Cosgrave was looking for a scapegoat and countered by instancing the Republicans' *Eire Nua* proposal for a federal Ireland in which Protestants would control the nine-county historic province of Ulster as an indication of the movement's non-sectarianism.[9] This is evidence, White argues, that the IRA's struggle was one of national liberation against British rule and not motivated by anti-Protestantism since it sought to take account of their specific religious and cultural interests within their proposed framework for a future united Ireland.

In his interviews with White Ó Brádaigh rejected the view of the left-wing, Official IRA that the IRA's bombing campaign was sectarian as it targeted the Protestant community and its businesses: "He viewed the conflict in political, not religious terms; the conflict was with the British government. He and the movement did not want to dominate Protestants in a Catholic state. Instead, they wanted to build a pluralist society with "all sides in a 32-county democratic socialist republic."'[10] White accepts this profession of the political and strategic aims of IRA violence at face value but as James Dingley noted in a response to White's original article:

> As White's thesis stands, he appears to let the IRA construct its own definitions of itself and their activities which he merely confirms. Of course the IRA can then justify its own acts from their point of view and then place all their victims into their own frame of reference. This White then allows them to do, without questioning any of the basic assumptions of their and White's, understanding of the situation in Northern Ireland.[11]

Although White has provided students of the Provisional IRA with two valuable accounts of how republicans understood their own struggle[12] that can only be one element in any comprehensive evaluation of their campaign. There is also a need for a grounding in the history and social relations of the areas where that struggle was prosecuted. Because this is lacking in White's work it suffers from a certain tunnel-vision where the IRA exists in ideological and military aspic unpolluted by deeply rooted sectarian animosities of the North of Ireland.

The Geography of Sectarianism

The nature and intensity of sectarianism is a complex issue. In the conclusion to his survey of different interpretations of the Northern Ireland conflict John Whyte alerted scholars to one important factor that had recurred through different parts of his study:

> This is the contrast between one part of Northern Ireland and another. Areas only a few miles from each other can differ enormously—in religious mix, in economic circumstances, in the level of violence, in political attitudes. This means that the nature and intensity of the conflict can vary widely.[13]

The IRA campaign was inevitably affected by the different local conditions in which it took place and it is impossible to deal adequately with the issue of sectarianism without taking this into account. It is in this context that what White refers to as "unconscious insensitivity"[14] on the part of the republicans could be extended to include a criticism of his own restriction of attacks with sectarian potential to those that directly targeted Protestant civilians. This leaves out all those Protestants who were members of the part-time sections of the security forces: the RUC Reserve and the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR). RUC Reservists and UDR members served in their local communities and lived in their own homes, not in protected security bases and barracks. They were also particularly vulnerable because the majority had civilian occupations which meant they presented themselves as unprotected and lonely

targets going about their business as postmen, farmers, factory workers, and school bus drivers. The campaign against these types of target was felt with particular intensity in rural and border areas where they composed a large proportion of the victims and where White's restriction of the category of sectarian to attacks on Protestant civilians is particularly open to question.

The limitations of White's approach is made clear in a section of his original article on "The Geography of Sectarianism." Here he identifies Belfast as the core of the problem of sectarian killings because it was where most of the IRA's Protestant civilian victims (46.6 percent) were killed.[15] In north Belfast almost 37 percent of IRA victims were Protestant civilians while in south and east Belfast the percentages were 36 and 34 respectively. In contrast were the border areas of Fermanagh and Tyrone where figures were 20 and 15 percent respectively. However what these figures obscure is the effect of the IRA campaign against locally recruited and part-time members of the security forces on the Protestant communities from which they were drawn. Protestants in border areas of Northern Ireland had a strong tradition of service in the part-time security forces. In this context the geography of sectarianism is an extremely important and under-researched aspect of the IRA campaign. Most of the existing research on the IRA, like most research on the Troubles, is heavily dominated by studies that either focus on the main urban centres of Belfast and Derry, or treat Northern Ireland as a single unit for analysis. This has meant that the distinct experiences of rural and border areas, apart from the city of Derry, have been neglected. These areas experienced some of the highest rates of violence during the Troubles.[16] They were also areas where the Protestant population, the majority in Northern Ireland as a whole, were a minority. The rest of this article will focus on the IRA campaign in the largest of the border areas: Fermanagh and South Tyrone (see Figure 1).

The IRA in Fermanagh and South Tyrone, 1921–62

At the time of the partition of Ireland in 1921, although the Protestant/Catholic ratio in the six counties of the new Northern Ireland state was 66/34 percent, in Fermanagh Catholics constituted 56 percent of the population while in Tyrone there was a Catholic majority of 55 percent.[17] Catholics in these counties because of their majority status and their nearness to the border with the Irish Free State did not expect partition to last. They looked to the Boundary Commission, created as part of the Treaty settlement agreed between the British government and Sinn Féin in 1921, to transfer them to the South. When the Commission recommended only minor changes in the border Catholics in these parts of Northern Ireland found themselves faced with a Unionist government which had in the interim altered the electoral system and rearranged local government electoral boundaries to ensure that the Protestant minorities in both counties controlled the county councils and most of the municipal authorities as well. For Northern Irish Catholics, Fermanagh and Tyrone became two of the most flagrant examples of the gerrymandering and discrimination which they suffered under the "Orange state."[18] The Protestant community in Fermanagh and Tyrone was acutely aware of its minority status and looked to both the ruling Ulster Unionist Party and the mass ethnic fraternal organisation, the Orange Order, to ensure that Protestant domination was maintained. The Order was strongest in the western, border counties of Northern Ireland.[19] These were also areas with strong communal memories of the seventeenth century

Figure 1. The Irish borderlands.[20]

plantation of Ulster and the expropriation of the Gaelic and Catholic landowners by new English and Protestant settlers. Protestants ended up with the best land as Catholics were pushed out to the hilly and more marginal areas. A journalist noted of south Fermanagh in 1980:

> The fact that Protestants hold much of the best land is a source of some resentment among the Catholics. ''This is an area of disadvantaged land, bad land,'' a Catholic resident explained, ''Where you get good land you tend to get them (Protestants). They have maintained their advantage over the years.''[21]

A major concern of Protestants was the perceived threat of ''peaceful penetration'' by Catholics in their areas through the buying of Protestant land and businesses which would, it was feared, change the demographic balance in favour of Catholics and lead ultimately to loss of Unionist political control.[22] Similar sentiments were expressed by Catholics. Margaret McKearney, who joined the IRA in Tyrone in the early 1970s, described community relations in her village where her father had a butcher's shop which drew its customers from both communities: ''... there was a

'them and us' mentality, like they didn't buy our land and we didn't sell it to them. They were quietly confident in our area that they were the superior race and that's it.''[23] Sean O'Callaghan, an IRA volunteer from county Kerry who became an informer, described the attitudes of local Provisionals during his time operating in the border area of Tyrone and Fermanagh in the mid-1970s:

> Inevitably the conversations I had with local IRA men and sympathisers centred around 'the Prods' or 'the Orangies' and it was becoming clear to me that the Provisional IRA were in reality representative of the Catholic ''Defender'' tradition. In rural areas of Tyrone, Fermanagh and Armagh the relationship between militant Irish Nationalism and Irish Catholicism was deep and complex. There was a deep and ugly hatred centuries old behind it.[24]

The grievances of Catholics in areas like Fermanagh and South Tyrone were at the core of the demands of the civil rights movement which emerged to challenge Unionist rule in the late 1960s. But although the civil rights leaders saw their struggle as analogous to that of blacks in the USA, the legitimate demands for an end to discrimination and gerrymandering were complicated by the underlying ethno-national conflict over the very right of the state to exist. The movement's marches succeeded in putting Northern Ireland at the top of the British government's agenda for the first time in nearly 50 years but it also contributed to a deepening sectarian polarisation between the Catholics and Protestants. This inevitably influenced the IRA's resort to armed struggle from 1970 onwards. The political scientist Brendan O'Leary, in an assessment of the IRA's 30-year campaign, has pointed out that there were in fact ''two wars'':

> The first (was) of national, ethnic and communal assassination, executed by IRA volunteers, loyalist paramilitaries and by some UK security personnel. There was also a guerrilla and counter-insurgency war, especially in the early years.[25]

The two aspects, ethnic/sectarian and strategic, overlapped and interpenetrated. O'Leary identifies IRA violence as primarily strategic in line with their objective of ending British rule in Ireland but acknowledges that for Protestants attacks on locally recruited security personnel were ''coded as sectarian.'' The balance between the two components of the IRA's campaign not only shifted over time but was crucially affected by the nature of the areas where it took place. There were certainly strategic reasons why an area like Fermanangh and south Tyrone was a major field of operations for the IRA. A majority Catholic area with a strong republican sub-culture, it was traversed by a long and winding frontier with the Republic of Ireland. The problem that the border represented for the security forces was set out in a document prepared by senior security officials in the Northern Ireland Office in the 1973:

> The border is over 300 miles long; in many places it passes through difficult terrain and is not clearly delineated on the ground; moreover different maps give varying information on its location. Apart from authorised border crossings there are 187 unapproved roads crossing the border as well as many tracks and farm trails.

> In these circumstances it is not surprising that those responsible for terrorist activity in the North find it convenient to take advantage of the border for their own purposes. It is not only a case of terrorists resident in the South being active in the North; many of the terrorists are Northerners but they make use of the South as refuge from pursuit and there is evidence of close co-operation by groups operating on different sides of the border.[26]

The border areas had a history of significant IRA activity. In 1921, the IRA launched a series of attacks from across the border into Fermanagh and Tyrone. This led to a number of clashes with British troops but also with local Protestants who were members of the new Northern state's part-time militia, the "B" Specials. The Special Constabulary were created in 1920 by the fledgling Unionist government. Based on the paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force which had been created in 1912 to resist the Irish nationalist demand for Home Rule, the Specials were a wholly Protestant force whose main function was to counter IRA attacks. Serving in their own areas in the violent conditions of the early 1920s, they developed a reputation for sectarianism and ill-discipline and were feared and detested by Catholics.[27] They were particularly active in border areas of the North and this led to some major confrontations which still feature in local collective memories.

In the spring of 1921 after a failed IRA attempt to kill a Special in Rosslea, local Specials burnt down Catholic houses in the village. The IRA commander across the border in Monaghan ordered a reprisal raid aimed at the homes and farms of Specials. Twenty-one homes were attacked and burnt down and two Specials shot dead along with a local man who was dragged from his home and bludgeoned to death.[28] In February 1922, the leader of the new Free State government in the South, Michael Collins, authorised an incursion into Fermanagh and South Tyrone to capture leading Protestants and Unionists and hold them in exchange for three IRA men who were under sentence of death in Londonderry Gaol. More than twenty Unionists were kidnapped and the raids caused widespread disruption in Fermanagh and Tyrone.[29] Significantly, the danger of the IRA raids provoking serious sectarian strife concerned not only local Protestants. The prominent local republican, Cahir Healy, opposed the continuation of IRA activity on the basis that it "inevitably led to sectarian warfare."[30] This period is still recalled by Protestants in the area.[31]

Memories of the violence and cross-border incursions fed into the sense of being under siege that existed amongst Protestants in these border areas throughout the history of the Northern Irish state. Such fears and insecurities came to the fore again in the 1950s when the IRA launched its "Operation Harvest," the most substantial assault on the Northern state since Partition. During the 1956–62 campaign the IRA had concentrated its activities in border counties. Its most famous raid: the attack on Brookeborough RUC station in January 1957, in which Seán South and Fergal O'Hanlon were killed, occurred in South Fermanagh[32] and was only the most newsworthy of a significant numbers of attacks on bridges, customs posts, and police stations in the area.[33] In contrast to the 1921–22 campaign and the IRA campaign from 1970, the leadership of the IRA during the 1956 campaign made the decision that the "B" Specials would not be targets. There is some evidence that this decision was not popular with local IRA men but it seems to have been effective as no "B" Special was killed or wounded during that campaign.[34] This was despite the fact that the 13,000 Specials played a central role in the Government's security response to the IRA particularly through their detailed knowledge of local Republican

activists.[35] This strategy was motivated by the IRA leadership's desire to fight a "clean campaign"[36] and not target "ordinary" Protestants. It was in marked contrast to the approach of the Provisional IRA which from the beginning of its campaign targeted local Protestants if they chose to join the security forces.

The IRA and the UDR in Fermanagh and South Tyrone

The "B" Specials were abolished in 1970 as part of the reforms imposed by the British government on the Unionist regime as a result of the civil rights movement. The Specials were replaced by the Ulster Defence Regiment. This was to be a regiment of the British Army although, unlike any other regiment, it was to only recruit within Northern Ireland. It was planned that the regiment, unlike the Specials, would be representative of both communities. Encouraged by moderate Catholic politicians and Church leaders, a considerable number of Catholics did join and by November 1970 sixteen percent of the force was Catholic.[37] However, a number of factors led many of these to resign whilst the supply of Catholic recruits dried up. Most of the command staff of the UDR were former "B" Specials as were many of the rank and file and this "chill factor" was added to by the Unionist government's introduction of internment without trial in August 1971 when only Catholics were interned, and the disaster of "Bloody Sunday" in Derry on 30 January 1972 when British paratroopers shot dead thirteen people during a civil rights demonstration. The Provisional IRA also set out to intimidate and murder Catholic members. The result was that by the end of 1972 Catholics made up 3.7 percent of the total.[38] The regiment was also accused of being infiltrated by Protestant paramilitaries and its members of having colluded in the assassination of Catholics. Even more common was the claim that UDR men regularly abused Catholics at vehicle check-points and while they were searching properties.[39]

In Fermanagh and Tyrone where many Protestants had been members of the "B" Specials, they now joined the part-time UDR and the RUC Reserve, activities which they could combine with their day-to-day occupations as farmers, factory workers, postmen, delivery men, and shopkeepers. The IRA's depiction of the UDR was of an organisation of "state sanctioned armed sectarian thugs."[40] This description was included in an article in the republican movement's weekly paper, *An Phoblacht'Republican News* (*AP/RN*), "UDR in the firing line," which reported the following incident that occurred in South Fermanagh on 5 February 1980: "A UDR man was shot dead by IRA volunteers during the evening. He was ambushed at Edenmore on the road to Kinawley."

The same incident is described in the most comprehensive register of all those who lost their lives during the Troubles:

> Alexander Abercrombie, UDR, Protestant, 44, married, 4 children, farmer. A part-time corporal, his body was slumped over the steering wheel of his tractor where he had been shot by the IRA on a remote part of his farm near Kinawley, about five miles from the county Cavan border. He was found by his brother who had gone to the farm to look for him when he had not returned for a meal.[41]

AP/RN's description of the killing was typical of its treatment of the IRA's UDR victims in its minimalism and its failure to mention that Abercrombie was not in uniform and was performing his occupation when he was shot.

The campaign against the UDR in Fermanagh and Tyrone had begun in the final months of Unionist government. On 1 December 1971 three gunmen forced their way into the Wilson family's farmhouse near Caledon, county Tyrone just 300 yards from the border. The family's only son was a UDR man. He had gone to bed with a cold and was shot dead in his bedroom.[42] After Bloody Sunday throughout Fermanagh and Tyrone Catholic-owned businesses closed for two days to coincide with the funerals of the victims and all Catholic schools were closed for four days. Protestants whose businesses stayed open were threatened and the IRA campaign intensified. A UDR man was shot in the back when he went to feed his animals on a farm near Kesh in the west of Fermanagh.[43] Although seriously wounded he survived the attack although he subsequently put his farm on the market and moved away from the border. On 1 March Tommy Fletcher, a forestry worker, was stopped by four gunmen as he was walking to work from his small farm which straddled the border near Garrison in the west of Fermanagh. He was brought back to the farm where his captors searched the house to get his UDR rifle and ammunition. Then after assuring his wife that he would not be killed the IRA men took him to an outhouse where he was shot fourteen times.[44] After Fletcher's death five other UDR men in the same locality all decided to leave as a result of threats to them and their families which had been brought to them by Protestant friends who lived across the border in county Leitrim and who the IRA used as messengers. A local reporter met one of the men who was leaving his farm house with the furniture and bedding in a trailer. He had been born on the farm and he and his wife had lived there for 40 years.[45] IRA attacks were not restricted to those they claimed were members of the security forces. Protestant farmers who lived near the border were also victims. On 26 July 1972, John McElwaine, a Protestant farmer who lived at Tallymore, Rosslea, 400 yards from the Fermanagh/Monaghan border received a visit from four armed IRA men who made him, his wife, and four children stand against a wall in their farmyard whilst they were robbed of valuables and watched as the IRA men threw petrol bombs into their home. They also destroyed a car, a tractor, and burnt down the hayshed. The same night another Protestant farmer in the area had his house petrol-bombed.[46] In September three carloads of IRA men crossed the border at Aghalane close to Newtownbutler to carry out raids for arms. One group went to the home of Thomas Bullock, a UDR man and a farmer. His wife tried to block the door and was shot dead and her husband was then killed.[47]

Within a month of the murder of the Bullocks it was reported that the Provisionals had called off their campaign against off-duty members of the UDR.[48] This was claimed to be because of the adverse effects on support for the IRA in the Catholic community of the killing of a Catholic UDR man in Newry and the wounding of a Catholic magistrate in Belfast.[49] If such a decision was ever made, its effects were short-lived. A few days later another part-timer, John Bell, a farmer from Newtownbutler, was shot dead when a car in which he, his father, and his brother were travelling was ambushed.[50] There seems to have been a tension between the leadership of the IRA and local units in border areas of the North who were strongly in favour of continuing the campaign against off-duty UDR personnel. The issue appeared again in January 1974 when the IRA officially confirmed a newspaper report that all units had been instructed to cease operations against off-duty members of the UDR.[51] The motivation was two-fold: the recognition that the killing of UDR members in border areas could lead to Protestant paramilitary

reprisal killings of Catholics in Belfast and the harmful effects that such killings had on on-going attempts to work out an agreement with the Ulster Volunteer Force, the Protestant paramilitary organisation, to end sectarian killings in Belfast. The leadership of the Provisionals was hopeful that growing disillusion of working class Protestants with mainstream Unionism might create possibilities for the creation of common ground against "the growing oppression of English forces against all sections of our people."[52] This reflected a longer standing aspiration of Ó Brádaigh to forge alliances with working class Protestants. This aspiration had been reflected in the leadership's policy document *Eire-Nua* (1971) which had set out constitutional structures for a federal Ireland which they saw as being aimed at attracting Protestants to the republican project.[53] However, as the Northern editor of the *Irish Times* noted of the proposal to cease attacks on off-duty UDR men:

> As representatives largely of the Protestant community, the killing of UDR men obviously has a divisive effect in the North. However, in such areas as Tyrone where the locally recruited B Specials were instrumental in the defeat of previous IRA campaigns there is thought to be pressure to maintain the campaign against the UDR.[54]

This pressure seems to have prevailed for in April a former UDR man was shot dead in the kitchen of the primary school of which he was headmaster in Derrylin, South Fermanagh.[55]

Ó Brádaigh's optimism about the possibilities of radical change remained undimmed. Within months the first British-sponsored attempt to stabilise the North on the basis of a power-sharing deal between the Ulster Unionists and the moderate nationalists of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) had been brought to an abrupt end in May 1974 by the Ulster Workers Council general strike. The disarray of British policy in the aftermath of strike encouraged the leadership of the Provisionals to believe rumours of a radical shift in British policy towards disengagement from the North. Hopes of a realignment within Unionist politics and a radical shift in British policy were key factors in leading the Provisionals into a year-long ceasefire negotiated with the British at the end of 1974. Ó Brádaigh and his allies had argued for the ceasefire on the basis that the British were disengaging from Northern Ireland. In fact the British had used the ceasefire to get rid of the politically embarrassing policy of internment and also to introduce the policy of "Ulsterisation": reductions in the overt presence of the regular British Army and turning over greater responsibility for security to the locally recruited forces of the RUC and UDR.[56]

A major outcome was that a group of the up-and-coming Northern Provisionals led by Gerry Adams emerged as critics of Ó Brádaigh's leadership. The northerners saw *Eire Nua* as unnecessarily conciliatory towards the Unionist community and believed the ceasefire had weakened, demoralised, and divided the IRA.[57]

The "Long War" strategy developed by Adams and his comrades in the late 1970s was based on the calculation that it could take up to two decades of armed struggle to break Britain's will to remain in Northern Ireland and in the interim one of the main functions of the armed struggle was to "keep the pot boiling"[58]: to keep Northern Ireland on London's political agenda. Adams was particularly concerned to ensure that no deal was developed between the Ulster Unionists and

the SDLP which would have marginalised republicans. As one Tyrone Republican explained, the killing of UDR men "stops the Unionists doing a deal with the SDLP."[59] It was also the case that "Ulsterisation" by cutting down on the number of British soldiers available as targets meant the Provisionals had an added incentive to target the RUC and UDR.

During the ceasefire the number of attacks had dropped slightly: in the Fermanagh/South Tyrone parliamentary constituency the number of security force deaths due to the Provisionals was 1972 (21); 1973 (13); 1974 (9); 1975 (6).[60] However, the establishment of Adam's hegemony in the republican movement coincided with an intensification of attacks on the UDR. In June 1978 the Fermanagh brigade of Provisionals warned that it was going to intensify its campaign against the "British war machine."[61]An early victim was Patrick Fee, a 64-year-old Catholic tradesman who was killed when the IRA ambushed a Fermanagh District Council van carrying a group of workers to cut grass at a local beauty spot. Four of his workmates were injured. The target was a part-time UDR man who was injured.[62] The county town Enniskillen which had suffered severely from IRA bombs in the early 1970s had not been bombed for nearly three years when a massive car bomb destroyed a new public library in November 1978.[63] The bombing campaign spread to incendiary attacks on businesses in other border towns and many of the businesses destroyed belonged to Protestants. Although the IRA claimed that their "economic" campaign was aimed at the British Exchequer which would have to pay the compensation bill, local Protestants detected a sectarian intent. They pointed to the fact that in towns like Newtownbutler, Lisnaskes, and Rosslea, nearly all the Protestant businesses had been attacked. In some cases there had been repeated attacks: one Protestant-owned drapery and footware store in Newtownbutler had been bombed ten times.[64] Rosslea's last Protestant businessman, Douglas Deering, a 52-year-old father of three who had been born in the village where his family owned a business selling groceries, petrol, and farm supplies, was shot dead in his shop in 1977. He had no connection with the security forces but his shop had been bombed four times before his murder.[65]

The fears and insecurity of border Protestants was described by a journalist who visited Newtownbutler in June 1980. So far that year three members of the town's Church of Ireland congregation had been killed. He described the position of UDR members in the area: "They seem to be sitting ducks. They are armed with legally-issued weapons for their personal protection but still the Provisionals can pick them off almost at will."[66] In January Robert Crilly, a 60-year-old part-time member of the RUC Reserve, was shot dead as he worked in his garage. The murder was witnessed by a 12-year-old boy who was visiting him.[67] On 17 April, Victor Morrow, a former member of the UDR, was shot dead 150 yards from his home on his way to work on the night shift of a factory in Lisnaskea. *AP/RN* had this to say of the killing:

> A founder member of Britain's sectarian militia, the UDR and a former member of the even more infamous 'B' Specials was shot dead by the IRA on the evening of 17th April. He was ambushed by the IRA on the Newtownbutler to Clones Road. The local IRA commander pointed out that their intelligence indicated that the dead man had been active member of the UDR in contradiction to media references to his recent resignation from the regiment.[68]

In fact the victim had retired from the UDR a year earlier. Perhaps he should have taken the advice of the local IRA who in a statement said that those who wished to resign from the UDR and RUC or had recently done so "can have their names taken off the list of targets if they make their position know through republican contacts or clerics."[69] Despite this, killings of former UDR and RUC men continued. In June, Richard Latimer, a 38-year-old part-timer in UDR was shot dead in front of his son in his hardware shop in Newtownbutler. His family had moved to Newtownbutler after being intimidated out of their farm near the border by gun attacks.[70]

Fermanagh and South Tyrone had traditionally been a bastion of the more moderate Ulster Unionist Party but the fears and resentment caused by the IRA campaign encouraged the militant Protestant politician, the Reverend Ian Paisley, to begin regular visits to the area to try and establish a presence for his Democratic Unionist Party. He was loud in his protests about IRA "genocide"[71]and threatened that if the British Government did not take action by the closure of all but the main cross-border roads, Protestants should take whatever steps were necessary to protect themselves. On June 23 1980 over seven thousand Protestants from all over Fermanagh came to Newtownbutler for a rally organised by the Fermanagh United Protestant Action Group for the Defence of Family and Home. They were addressed by Paisley and James Molyneaux, MP, the Leader of the Ulster Unionist Party. The response of *An Phoblacht/Republican News* to the rally was revealing:

> Paisley and Molyneaux are distorting the attacks on crown forces into 'Genocide against the Protestant people', an allegation which immediately collapses upon inspection. Only last week the Church of Ireland Primate, Dr John Armstrong, whilst expressing concern about killings in the area, stated that 'it is difficult to find evidence of a plan to eliminate Protestants.'[72]

AP/RN also quoted from an editorial on the killings in the *Irish Times*: "The Provos kill them because they donned a British uniform and participated in the war against the IRA." The paper did not quote the following section of the Archbishop's interview:

> In south Armagh and Fermanagh 54 Protestants had been killed. Many students from border areas at Queen's University Belfast were seriously worried about the safety of their parents and other relatives. The chaplains at Queens had been in communication with him about these students who are in a ferment of fear. Their studies are being upset. They get their Chaplains to ring to see if their parents are safe.[73]

Asked if there seemed to be a terrorist plan to kill Protestants or intimidate them so much that they would be compelled to move to other areas, he said "there seemed to be a disturbing pattern in the killings. Sometime the person killed would be the natural successor to the farm, like an elder son." *An Phoblacht* also omitted this section of the *Irish Times* editorial: "To the Unionist community along the Border, they (the UDR men) are husbands and fathers, often the mainstay of Protestant families. They do what their community by and large expects in joining the UDR ... the loss of men folk is a blow to the heart of any community."[74]

The IRA in Fermanagh condemned the organisers of the Newtownbutler rally for "attempting to create mass sectarian strife in Northern Ireland . . . we will not allow anyone to turn the war of national liberation against the Brits into sectarian strife." However, their declaration that "Fermanagh people have nothing to fear because of their religion" would not have reassured many Protestants when they read, "The only people who need fear are those who wear the British uniform or who associate with the collaborationist forces in maintaining the British occupation."[75] The death penalty for "association" hung over a large proportion of Fermanagh Protestants, many of whom had members of the security forces in their families and whose Unionism made them de facto "collaborators." Protestants in the county also knew that resignation from the UDR or RUC reserve was no guarantee of safety.

The attacks and killings struck at the Protestant community's morale and sense of security The Irish novelist Colm Tóibin visited South Fermanagh in 1986 and in his account of his time there quoted a local Protestant:

> They want us off the land, out of business, they want us gone. We're the planters. That's the way we're made to feel. We're like the Rhodesians, we're like the Israelis. But we've been here for hundreds of years. There are plenty of deserted Protestant farms down in Fermanagh. We're not going to be intimidated. We're going to fight.[76]

In fact despite the IRA campaign along the border there was little in the way of a violent reaction from local Protestants who were aware that as a minority they stood to lose out in any spiral of retaliatory killings. This pattern was maintained after the IRA's single most lethal attack when West Fermanagh Brigade of the Provisionals carried out the bombing of the Enniskillen Remembrance Day ceremony in November 1987 killing eleven Protestants and seriously injuring sixty-three. Nearly all their victims were civilians ranging in age from two to seventy-five.[77] This attack was described by John Hume, the leader of the SDLP, as "the single most provocative act committed against the Unionist people in the last seventeen years."[78] Undaunted, the West Fermanagh Brigade, based just across the border in Ballyshannon, county Donegal, continued their campaign and in March 1988, they shot dead Gillian Johnston, a 21-year-old shop worker, while she was sitting in a car with her fiancé. The IRA admitted to a mistake but claimed that the real target was a family member who was in the UDR. The RUC said there was no connection between the family or her fiancé and the security forces. The same unit set off a bomb under a school bus near Lisnaskea, aimed at the driver, a part-time UDR man, but injured school children.[79] In January 1989 Harry Keys, a farm-worker who was a former member of the RUC Reserve, was shot twenty-three times by the IRA while sitting in his car with his girlfriend, a Catholic, outside her home in county Donegal in the Irish Republic.[80] While the unit claimed that Keys was collecting intelligence for the security forces the Garda and local people believed it was a sectarian "grudge" killing because Keys was going out with a local Catholic.[81] In an unprecedented move the IRA Army Council announced that it had stood down the West Fermanagh Brigade and taken away the arms and explosives from the seven men and one woman who comprised the unit.[82] However, knowledgeable observers like the journalist Ed Moloney doubted the IRA's rationale for the disbandment: "an attempt to force political control on wildly wayward elements," seeing it instead as a "cynical publicity stunt provoked

by southern horror at the killing of Harry Keys.''[83] The disbandment came in the run-up to the annual conference of the IRA's political wing, Sinn Féin. The party was preparing for local and European elections and there was clearly a fear that the Keys murder would remind the electorate of the Enniskillen massacre and damage Sinn Féin's performance.

The presence of so many soft targets in border areas continued to attract IRA attacks into the 1990s. When the organisation introduced its ''human-bomb'' tactic by which victims were coerced to drive massive bombs to security force checkpoints where they would be exploded killing not only members of the security forces but the hapless drivers, Fermanagh Protestants were again victimised. In November 1990 a couple were held by the IRA who forced their eldest son to drive a 3700 lb bomb to a border checkpoint at Annaghmartin near Rosslea. The family had been attacked four times previously. On this occasion the IRA unit battered the legs of the son with an iron bar to try and ensure that he could not run from the vehicle to warn the soldiers. The son managed to escape from the van he had been forced to drive and warn the soldiers. The bomb itself failed to detonate. The IRA men informed the couple that they had been picked out because they had ''collaborated'' with the security forces: the woman worked in a clerical position in an RUC station and her husband, a shopkeeper, served members of the security forces.[84] The attack illustrated the brutally dismissive approach of republicans to the British identity of border Protestants. Working in a low-level clerical job for the police and serving members of the RUC cigarettes were judged sufficient cause to be brutalised and have one's son condemned to death.

Conclusion: The Issue of Ethnic Cleansing

The issues raised in the debate have been given a new resonance by the current discussion about how Northern Ireland should deal with its past.[85] In recent accounts by border Protestants of their experiences during the Troubles the belief that the IRA pursued a deliberate policy of ethnic cleansing has been a central theme.[86] Ethnic cleansing was introduced into Northern Irish political discourse as a result of the irruption of violent inter-ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Initially it was used by Unionist politicians: in 1992 the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party claimed that Protestants in border areas ''had been the victims of ethnic cleansing for over twenty years... Thousands have been intimidated from the border regions of Fermanagh and Tyrone.''[87] After the killing of a former UDR man in Tyrone in 1993, the DUP MP for the area, the Rev. William McCrea, claimed the victim had been the subject of a campaign of intimidation since he bought land in a predominantly Catholic area. The murder, claimed McCrea, was ''a continuation of ethnic cleansing of Protestants in the area.''[88] The Church of Ireland Archbishop, Dr Robin Eames, an ecumenical and moderate influence in the Protestant community, also reported a local belief in a sinister pattern: ''There is no doubt that the clergy believe there is a definite sectarian element to the IRA campaign in certain areas. It is being targeted at Protestants who owned land.''[89] In March 1984 Ronnie Funston, a 28-year-old farmer who had left the UDR eight years before, was shot dead on his tractor on the family farm near Pettigo on the border with the Republic. His body was found by his mother.[90] His parents claimed that he was killed to drive them off the farm. If that was the motive it succeeded for they left the area and the farm was still vacant and derelict nine years later.[91] A recent report on the

experiences of border Protestants during the Troubles commissioned by the Church of Ireland Diocese of Clogher which includes Fermanagh, Tyrone, and adjacent counties of the Republic, noted that "The question of whether or not there had been a concerted campaign of 'ethnic cleansing' in the Border regions was for most interviewees an accepted fact."[92]

When the term first began to be used in the local media some prominent border Protestants rejected the term arguing that it exaggerated the effects of the IRA's campaign and ignored those Protestants who refused to be intimidated.[93] The appropriateness of the term has also been challenged by scholars working on the conflict. Two Northern Irish legal academics dispute the "ethnic cleansing" narrative:

> The evidence from census figures . . . is that Protestant numbers in border areas have declined only marginally and that the major change has been the rapid increase in the number of Catholics. The conclusion must be that in urban areas the two communities are moving into what they regard as safer areas, while in rural areas they are staying put on their land.[94]

The cultural historian, Graham Dawson, who has investigated how the Troubles are remembered by border Protestants is also a critic:

> Such claims rest on a questionable treatment of evidence. While migration, including Protestant migration, away from the Border is a reality, this is due to a range of factors, including rural youth unemployment . . . . The pattern of violent death is clearly more complex than Unionist claims about "ethnic cleansing" allow. In the course of the Troubles, border Protestants and Unionists have been subjected to a politics of intimidation and terror, but this has not taken place on a scale, nor with the consistency of pattern to warrant the description "ethnic cleansing."[95]

The process of attacks and intimidation was clearly not of Balkan proportions. Michael Mann in his comparative study of ethnic cleansing[96] claims that "the danger zone of murderous ethnic cleansing is reached when movements claiming to represent two fairly old ethnic groups both lay claim to their own state over all or part of the same territory."[97] Fermanagh and South Tyrone was clearly such a danger zone. However, Mann also notes that "going over the brink" is most likely where "the state exercising sovereignty over the contested territory has been factionalised," i.e., full-blown ethnic cleansing occurs when the pre-existing state has disintegrated. Though border Protestants claimed to have been left at the mercy of the IRA, the fact that more were not killed was in part because of the continuing capacity of the British state to resist and contain paramilitary violence.

It was also limited by political ambitions of the political wing of the republican movement, Sinn Féin, when it emerged as a serious challenger to the SDLP for the political leadership of Northern Ireland's Catholics in the 1980s. From the mid-1980s Gerry Adams was attempting to build a pan-nationalist alliance with the SDLP and Fianna Fáil, the dominant party in the Irish Republic. The purpose of this alliance was to put political pressure on the British government for a shift in its Northern Ireland policy. Such objectives were endangered by the negative storm of publicity generated by Eniskillen and by the more flagrantly sectarian killings like

that of Harry Keys. In an interview Adams declared that it would be "vastly preferable" for the IRA to target British soldiers rather than the RUC and UDR: "When a British soldier dies it removes the worst of the agony from Ireland . . . It also diffuses the sectarian conflict because Loyalists don't see the killing of British soldiers by the IRA as an attack on their community."[98] This is the nearest the President of Sinn Féin has so far come to recognising the sectarian dimension of the IRA's campaign. A more forthright evaluation was given by a member of the IRA's Army Council in an interview in 1990:

> The Unionists too are victims of partition. There are Protestant families in Tyrone who have had six in one family killed. I understand that they will remain bitter for a long time: they will probably never integrate into an Irish state.[99]

As part of the mainstream republican movement's engagement with the peace process some republicans began to acknowledge that their struggle had been deformed by a sectarian dimension. John Kelly, a founding member of the Provisionals, admitted that sectarianism "derailed the whole thrust of the Republican movement so that in many cases it became sectarianised, a purely Catholic versus Protestant conflict."[100] Nowhere was this derailment more clear than in the border counties of Northern Ireland. Jim Gibney, a leading member of Sinn Féin, acknowledged the problem:

> I think that if you're talking about hurting the unionist community, the IRA probably hurt them more by killing RUC men and women, UDR men and women, members of the Crown forces who were also members of the unionist community. Also the bombing campaign of the IRA, it was largely against towns where there were Protestant business people. So, of course, it goes without saying that a campaign of that nature leaves a legacy behind, a legacy wherein there is deep pain and hurt on the unionist side. We'd be fools not to recognise it.[101]

Despite this recognition of the traumatic legacy of the Provisionals' campaign, the strategic attractions of Fermanagh and South Tyrone for a renewed campaign of violence have been obvious to those dissident republicans who claim that the republican mainstream has "sold out" its involvement in the new political dispensation in the North. In October 2007 a prominent Sinn Féin councillor in Fermanagh was suspended from the party for publicly criticising the party's involvement in new policing structures and in December Gerry McHugh, a Sinn Féin member of the Northern Ireland Assembly for Fermanagh, resigned charging the party with "administering British rule in Ireland."[102] Reports of the body tasked with monitoring paramilitary activity indicate that the South Fermanagh/Monaghan area is a particularly active centre for the dissidents. Attempts to kill police officers in Rosslea and Lisnaskea took place in 2008 and a major bomb was discovered near Newtownbutler in 2009. In March 2009 the then Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, Sir Hugh Order, revealed that he had requested the Special Reconnaissance Regiment to be deployed to Fermanagh to gather intelligence.[103]

Like their predecessors in the Provisionals, the current dissidents are impelled much more by the closed world of traditional republican ideology and the

opportunities for "armed struggle" in these borderlands than by a sectarian animus against local Protestants. However, if anti-Protestant religious or ethnic hatred does not inspire them it is also the case that like the Provisionals in the first two decades of their campaign, they are blind or impervious to the effects of their campaign on local Protestants. For the dissidents the uniform is sufficient reason to separate the victim from the broader Protestant community. However, the Provisional campaign demonstrated that UDR deaths were experienced as a communal loss. In Fermanagh 31 Orangemen were killed by the IRA. All but four of them were members or former members of the security forces. In border areas where 70 percent of adult male Protestants were members of this fraternal organisation the killing of an Orangeman had profound community reverberations.[104] This was also the case with attacks on Protestant businesses and farms. If the IRA can be acquitted of a campaign of ethnic cleansing it is impossible for an analysis of their campaign in Fermanagh and south Tyrone to ignore its structural blindness to the devastating effects it had, not simply on those it killed, but on the wider Protestant community. In 2001 a research project with a number of Protestant communities from border areas asked about their experience of the Troubles. A not untypical response was, "In the years of the Troubles we were persecuted; we slipped along quietly with our heads down."[105] Protestants, whether in the security forces or not, felt a sense of isolation, threat, and lack of sympathy from the majority community. There was a belief that many of those murdered had been "set up" by neighbours. Protestant sense of embattled isolation increased significantly after the election of the republican hunger striker, Bobby Sands, in the parliamentary by-election for Fermanagh and South Tyrone in 1981. After the Sands victory a group of "horrified Protestants" from the Rosslea area of south Fermanagh gave their reaction:

> In the past three years we have lost several of our beloved neighbours by the bullet and the bomb. Many a handshake and seeming words of sympathy have been expressed by our Roman Catholic neighbours, many of which we thought were genuine. But now we know the truth. Everyone who voted for Sands, voted for the murder of their Protestant neighbours.[106]

This was far from the truth: many voted for Sands in the hope of saving his life and also for the traditional reason of preventing a Unionist from winning the seat. Communal myopia rather than support for the IRA campaign was behind the vote but it illustrated in a peaceful manner the ethnocentrism without which the violence of the IRA and its massive contribution to deepening sectarianism would not have been possible.

Notes

1. Tony Judt, *Postwar A History of Europe since 1945* (London: Pimlico, 2005), 825.
2. Robert White, "The Irish Republican Army: An Assessment of Sectarianism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 1, 1997, 20–55.
3. Steve Bruce, "Victim Selection in Ethnic Conflict: Motives and Attitudes in Irish Republicanism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 1, 1997, 56–71.
4. Robert W. White, "The Irish Republican Army and Sectarianism: Moving Beyond the Anecdote," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 2, 1997, 120–131.
5. Robert W. White, *Ruairi O Bradaigh: The Life and Politics of an Irish Revolutionary* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).

6. Ibid., 122.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 215.
10. White (see note 4 above), 69.
11. James Dingley, "A Reply to White's non-sectarian Thesis of PIRA Targeting," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10, no. 2, 1998, 107.
12. See also his *Provisional Irish Republicanism: An Oral and Interpretative History* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993).
13. John Whyte, *Interpreting Northern Ireland* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 258–259.
14. White (see note 2 above), 48.
15. White (see note 2 above), 46.
16. Michael Poole, "The Geographical Location of Political Violence in Northern Ireland," in J. Darby et al., *Political Violence: Ireland in a Comparative Perspective* (Belfast & Ottawa: Blackstaff, 1990), 76–77.
17. Michael Farrell, *Northern Ireland: The Orange State* (London: Pluto Press, 1980), 24.
18. Henry Patterson, "In the Land of King Canute: Border Unionists and Unionist Politics 1945–1963," *Contemporary British History*, 20, no. 4, 2006.
19. Eric P. Kaufmann, *The Orange Order: A Contemporary Northern Irish History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 5.
20. Map is drawn by Jack Bryan and taken from Graham Dawson, *Making Peace with the Past? Memory, Trauma and the Irish Troubles* (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 2007), xxiv.
21. "Protestants in NI Border town want the Border sealed," *Irish Times*, 23 June 1980.
22. Ibid.
23. Rogelio Alonso, *The IRA and Armed Struggle* (London & New York: Routledge, 2007), 53.
24. Sean O'Callaghan, *The Informer* (London: Corgi Books, 1999), 118.
25. B. O'Leary, "Mission Accomplished? Looking Back at the IRA," *Field Day Review*, Vol. 1, 2005, 234.
26. "Background to Border Security Problem," 16 May 1974, National Archives, FCO 87/371.
27. Farrell (see note 18 above), 35–36.
28. Robert Lynch, *The Northern IRA and the Early Years of Partition 1920–1922* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2006), 52–53.
29. Ibid., 101–103.
30. Enda Staunton, *The Nationalists of Northern Ireland 1918–1973* (Dublin: Columba Press, 2001), 36.
31. A farmer and local unionist councillor I interviewed in the area produced a copy of a recent biography of a leading IRA figure who had organised raids into south Fermanagh in 1922: Fearghal McGarry, *Eoin O'Duffy A Self-Made Hero* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
32. Some indication of the significance of the Brookeborough raid was its immortalisation in two very popular ballads: *The Patriot Game* and *Sean South of Garryowen*. The best account of the raid in its local context can be found in Peadar Livingstone, *The Fermanagh Story* (Monaghan: Clogher Historical Society, 1969), 384–386.
33. A detailed inventory of IRA attacks in Fermanagh and Tyrone can be found in John Maguire, *IRA Internments and the Irish Government: Subversives and the State 1939–1962* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2008).
34. Enda Staunton has claimed that the claim that the "B" Specials were not targeted "does not stand up to examination" and points to an IRA statement in September 1958 that in future the Specials would be regarded as "legitimate resistance targets": Staunton (see note 30 above), 225. Yet this was two years into the campaign and implies that they were not targets up until then. By this time the campaign had been effectively defeated and it is difficult to explain the lack of Special casualties unless they had been excluded from the list of targets during the height of the campaign.
35. Ian S. Wood, "The IRA's Border Campaign 1956–1962," in M. Anderson and E. Bort, eds., *The Irish Border History, Politics, Culture* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 122.

36. Dr. Ruan O'Donnell who is writing a history of the campaign and has interviewed many of those who participated notes: "Conflict with the RUC was to be minimised and that with the paramilitary B Specials forbidden on the grounds that it was neither necessary nor desirable to antagonise Irish Unionists," see his *From Vinegar Hill to Edentubber: The Wexford IRA and the Border Campaign* (Loch Garman: Cairde na Lochra), 4.

37. Michael Farrell, *Arming the Protestants; The Formation of the Ulster Special Constabulary and the Royal Ulster Constabulary 1920–1927* (Dingle: Brandon, 1983), 290.

38. John Potter, *A Testament to Courage: The Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment* (Barnsley: Leo-Cooper, 2001), 67.

39. Chris Ryder, *The Ulster Defence Regiment: An Instrument of Peace?* (London: Methuen, 1991), 151–185.

40. "UDR in the firing line," *An Phoblacht Republican News*, 9 Feb. 1980.

41. D. McKittrick, S. Kelters, B. Feeney, C. Thornton, and D. McVeal, *Lost Lives* (London & Edinburgh: Mainstream, 2004), 820.

42. Ibid., 122.

43. *Impartial Reporter*, 3 February 1972.

44. *Impartial Reporter*, 2 March 1972.

45. *Impartial Reporter* 16 March 1972.

46. "IRA adopt a new tactic of pillaging and burning homes of Protestants," *Impartial Reporter*, 27 July 1972.

47. *Impartial Reporter*, 28 September 1972.

48. McKittrick et al. (see note 41 above), 285.

49. *Irish Times*, 16 Oct. 1972.

50. McKittrick et al. (see note 41 above), 285.

51. *Irish Times*, 1 Feb. 1974.

52. Ibid.

53. Henry Patterson, *The Politics of Illusion: A Political History of the IRA* (London: Serif, 1997), 181.

54. "Provisionals to halt attacks on off-duty UDR men," *Irish Times*, 29 January 1974.

55. *Irish Times*, 11 April 1974.

56. M. L. R. Smith, *Fighting for Ireland: The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement* (London: Routledge, 1995), 142.

57. Paul Bew and Henry Patterson, *The British State and the Ulster Crisis: From Wilson to Thatcher* (London: Verso: 1985), 78–88.

58. The term was used by Sinn Fein's general secretary, Tom Hartley, at an internal Sinn Fein conference in 1988 to refer to the utility of the IRA's violence, see Martyn Frampton, *The Long March: The Political Strategy of Sinn Fein, 1981–2007* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 64.

59. Ed Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA* (London: Penguin, 2002), 338.

60. Kenneth McGuinness (Unionist MP for Fermanagh and South Tyrone), *Terrorist Murders in Fermanagh and South Tyrone 1971 to date* (copy in Northern Ireland Political Collection, Linenhall Library Belfast).

61. *Impartial Reporter*, 29 June 1978.

62. *Impartial Reporter*, 24 August 1978.

63. *Impartial Reporter*, 16 November 1978.

64. *Impartial Reporter*, 5 April 1979.

65. McKittrick et al. (see note 41 above), 722 & *Impartial Reporter*, 21 February 1980.

66. Ibid.

67. *Impartial Reporter*, 10 January 1980.

68. *Impartial Reporter*, 26 April 1980.

69. *Impartial Reporter*, 28 June 1980.

70. *Impartial Reporter*, 12 June 1980.

71. Paisley toured the Fermanagh border and claimed that the IRA had drawn up a list of prominent Protestants to be murdered. He exclaimed that Protestant farmers along the border were living in a state of terror: "It's plain genocide," *Impartial Reporter*, 1 May 1980.

72. *An Phoblacht/Republican News*, 28 June 1980.

73. *Irish Times*, 19 June 1980.

74. Ibid., "Down what road?," 25 June 1980.

75. *An Phoblacht/Republican News*, 28 June 1980.
76. Colm Toibin, *Walking Along The Border* (London: Queen Anne Press, 1987), 109.
77. Dawson (see note 17 above), 288.
78. *Daily Telegraph*, 9 November 1987.
79. Moloney (see note 59 above), 341.
80. McKittrick et al. (see note 41 above), 1157.
81. Rory Godson, "'Keys killing was 'grudge,'" *Sunday Tribune*, 29 Jan. 1989.
82. Sean Flynn, "IRA sources say Donegal unit will not re-emerge," *Irish Times* 25 Jan. 1989.
83. Ed Moloney, "'Killing rate' test for Provo standdown," *Sunday Tribune*, 29 Jan. 1989.
84. *Impartial Reporter,* 29 Nov. 1990.
85. Kirk Simpson, *Truth Recovery in Northern Ireland: Critically Interpreting the Past* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009).
86. Dawson (see note 17 above). 217–227.
87. Ibid., 218.
88. Sean O'Neill, "IRA strategy of ethnic cleansing on Ulster border," *Daily Telegraph*, 4 May 1993.
89. McKittrick et al. (see note 41 above), 1318.
90. Ibid., 979.
91. The Funstons were interviewed for an Ulster Television *Counterpoint* programme, "Driven from the land" in 1993. My thanks to Patrick Speight for making a copy of this programme available.
92. David Gardner, *Whatever you say say nothing* (Enniskillen: Church of Ireland Hot Gospel Project, 2008), 26.
93. On "Driven from the land" (see note 91 above) Ian Paisley claimed that there was such a campaign. This was denied by a nationalist politician and a Catholic priest but interestingly a prominent Tyrone Presbyterian minister and the Church of Ireland Bishop of Clogher rejected the term as inappropriate to the situation of border Protestants, dire though they considered it to be.
94. Kevin Boyle and Tom Hadden, *Northern Ireland The Choice* (London: Penguin, 1994), 7.
95. Ibid., 219–220.
96. Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3–9.
97. Ibid., 6.
98. Moloney (see note 59 above), 337.
99. "The men of war promise third violent decade," *The Independent*, 29 September 1990.
100. Ibid., 224.
101. Alonso (see note 23 above), 164.
102. *Impartial Reporter*, 25 October 2007; *Irish News*, 3 December 2007.
103. Martyn Frampton, "'After truce and treaty . . .' The return of militant republicanism," paper given at seminar on *Revisiting the Troubles* organised by U.S. Institute of Peace, London, 4 November 2009.
104. See report on unveiling of memorial to Fermanagh Orangemen murdered during the Troubles, *News Letter*, 7 April 2006.
105. Marie Crawley, *'You feel you'd no say' Border Protestants and Community Development* (RCN: Cookstown, 2003), 5.
106. *Impartial Reporter*, 9 April 1981.