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Publisher: Routledge

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Terrorism and Political Violence

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftpv20>

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Version of record first published: 04 Sep 2006.

To cite this article: Carolyn C. James & Özgür Özdamar (2005): Religion as a Factor in Ethnic Conflict: Kashmir and Indian Foreign Policy, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 17:3, 447-467

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546550590929219>

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Religion as a Factor in Ethnic Conflict: Kashmir and Indian Foreign Policy

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Ethnic conflicts with a strong religious component do not have merely domestic or foreign causes and consequences. As a result, internationalization of ethnic conflict has become an important subject of inquiry both in terms of pure research and policy-oriented studies. This article presents a case study of Indian-Pakistani relations over Kashmir, used to evaluate the role of religion and the explanatory power of the approach presented here. The aim of the study is to apply a foreign policy approach that simultaneously incorporates domestic and external factors in an analysis of how and in what ways religious elements of the Kashmir question affect India's foreign policy. The approach, an application of "systemism," contributes to current developments in the realist school of international relations through its emphasis on the need to look at both international and state levels in combination. Earlier applications of realism, as both neotraditional and structural realism clearly demonstrate, tend to remain restricted to one level or the other. In this approach, a religious dynamic can have a domestic source yet be effectively examined in terms of international ramifications.

Introduction

Ethnic conflicts with a strong religious component do not only have domestic or foreign causes and consequences. As a result, internationalization of ethnic conflict has become an important subject of inquiry both in terms of pure research and policy-oriented studies. In this paper, India's foreign policy related to Kashmir will be analyzed within the context of religion. The aim of this study is to apply a foreign policy approach that simultaneously incorporates domestic and external factors in an analysis of how and in what ways religious elements of the Kashmir question affect India's foreign policy. The approach, an application of "systemism," contributes to current developments in the realist school of international relations through its emphasis on the need to look at both international and state levels in combination. Earlier applications of realism, as both neotraditional and structural realism clearly demonstrate, tend to remain restricted to one level or the other. In this

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approach, a religious dynamic can have a domestic source yet be effectively examined in terms of international ramifications.

Religion influences many aspects of politics and society and is considered by many to be an inseparable and integral component. There are many definitions of religion in connection with social and political matters. In this study, *religion* refers to three specific characteristics of a broader concept. One of the most important effects of religion is its ability to bolster or undermine the legitimacy of governments. For example, a Marxist interpretation acknowledges the relationship between legitimacy of the state and religion, and claims that religion is a tool of dominant and opposing classes to facilitate their own political actions. Secondly, religion refers to a source of identity that meets the human need to develop a secure identity for the individual or group. Third, religion is a source of political mobilization or the organization of political activities.¹ Therefore, our definition of religion refers to an individual or group identity capable of political mobilization and affecting the legitimacy of governments and government policy.

This study begins by presenting a particular ontological approach and method of inquiry—systemism—that facilitates understanding the connection between domestic factors and external, or international, features. The section continues by presenting the theoretical premises that are related to internationalization of ethnic conflict and concomitant religious factors as synthesized from the literature. The third part of the section presents an approach to the study of foreign policy that incorporates international, state, and subnational considerations of foreign policy with religion as an essential component. The second section of the paper presents a case study of Indo-Pakistani relations over Kashmir, used to evaluate the role of religion and the explanatory power of the approach presented here. The concluding section sums up the contributions of the analytical framework, assessing the impact of each factor from the framework on foreign policies while concentrating on religion. Overall generalizations and implications for further research and policy are summarized.

Theory and Approach

Systemism

Ethnic conflict occurs neither wholly in nor between states. To understand ethnic conflict, factors operating within the state and beyond its borders should be taken into consideration.² In this part, an important alternative approach to theories of international relations is summarized. Rejecting suppositions that either holism or individualism can sufficiently represent international events, systemism suggests a midpoint in the continuum:

The alternative to both individualism and holism is systemism, since it accounts for both individual and system and in particular, for individual agency and social structure.³

According to James, systemism means a commitment to understanding a system in terms of a comprehensive set of functional relationships.⁴ This approach allows the study of both domestic and external factors and their relationship with each other to better understand international relations. It is appropriate for a study of how ethnic

conflict influences foreign policy through a full range of linkages, including religion. That is, the connections between state-level and international factors are articulated. Domestic events interact with other domestic activities or policies *and* international factors. In the same way, international activities have both global and state-level influences. Specifically, systemism focuses on each of the following causal connections: domestic-domestic, domestic-international, international-international, and international-domestic. Especially in a study in which the relationship between domestically generated, religion-based ethnic conflict and foreign policy is sought, systemism is the most appropriate choice to comprehend both domestic and external factors and domestic-international interactions.

For example, the Kashmir case has a significant ethno-religious dimension domestically for India with interstate ramifications. Domestic ethnic and religious sources of the contention interact with both state-level factors that shape the ethnic conflict (such as political leadership) and external factors that cause internationalization. Such complex relationships can be explained effectively with a foreign policy approach based on systemism.

Ethno-Religious Conflict

The increase in ethnic conflicts around the world is a reality. The conflicts that arise from ethnicity-related factors now are as important as issues that substantially determine the course of international relations, such as political and economic globalization, the balance of power, regionalization, terrorism, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Ethnic conflicts can have an important religious dimension. Religion is potentially a very important element of ethnicity; in fact, some ethnic groups have their primary origin in religion.⁵ The salience of religion to ethnicity is illustrated in Kashmir. The identification of an ethnic group is determined by common perceptions among its members. Conflict among these groups carries an ethnic quality to it. If there is a primary religious difference among the conflictual parties, ethnic conflict can assume a specifically religious dimension—labeled by Fox as “ethno-religious” conflicts.⁶ Kashmir is a prime example of this type of conflict.

There are several definitions of ethnicity, ethnic conflict, and ethno-religious conflict. We have presented some definitions about ethnic and ethno-religious conflicts on which there is a fair consensus. However, there is no consensus among students of ethnic conflict as to the causes of these conflicts. To a certain extent, agreement exists that some combination of economic, political, and psychological factors can explain ethnic conflict.⁷

However, the consensus ends there. Depending on the cases studied, various explanations are put forward by scholars, diverse theories are created, and evidence from different cases is used to support these theories. Yet since the aim of this study is to evaluate the role of religion between ethnic conflicts and foreign policy, studies on the internationalization of ethnic conflict will receive primary focus.

Recent studies on the internationalization of ethnic conflict suggest that ethnic conflict may lead to violent, often unmanageable, interstate differences.⁸ However, just as consensus cannot be reached on the causes of ethnic conflict, there is no consensus as to how ethnic conflict is internationalized. Is ethnic conflict subnationally generated, then externalized? Do ethnic conflicts weaken state structures and thus invite external intervention, or is it a more complex interaction?

First, Carment and James suggest that irredentist conflicts, among which Kashmir can be included, tend to be the most violent kind of ethnic strife.⁹ The potential for conflict in such irredentist, ethnic conflicts holds a particular danger since the situation can escalate into war between the nuclear-armed states of India and Pakistan.

In their most recent study, Carment and James present four hypotheses about the problem of internationalization.¹⁰ First, weakened state structures invite external predation and, in turn, conflict escalation. The Serbian case at the beginning of the 1990s and the Somalian case in the late 1970s support this hypothesis. Either Pakistani or superpower involvement in the Kashmir conflict also might support this hypothesis. The second hypothesis is that international organizations (both governmental and nongovernmental) serve as vehicles for external meddling by states that are attempting to intervene on behalf of their brethren. This hypothesis could be supported by United Nations (UN) involvement in India, and Kashmir in particular. The third hypothesis is that the shift in the ethnic balance of power within a state will produce escalation. The Kashmir case does not support this hypothesis as well as the example of Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990s.¹¹ The last hypothesis is about international factors such as global and regional integration; the more integrated the target state, the greater the likelihood of ethnic conflict escalation as a form of backlash against rapid change. According to Carment and James, this proposition is supported by the Yugoslavian case, in which rapid changes in the 1990s were observed in eastern Europe. In each of these cases, an ethnic conflict had international dimensions.

Midlarsky reaches a similar conclusion.¹² Midlarsky considers two instances of ethnic conflict prior to World War I, Bosnia and Macedonia, reaching the conclusion that ethnic conflict can escalate into full-scale interstate war, then regional war, and even a global war. According to Midlarsky, ethnic conflicts are more likely to internationalize when they are related to the balance of power among rival states, as was the case prior to World War I.

Another major theoretical contribution to the understanding of ethnic conflict is Alexis Heraclides's study.¹³ Heraclides bifurcated state motives for involvement in an ethnic conflict. Whether partisan or mediatory, states have instrumental (utilitarian) and affective reasons to intervene in ethnic strife. Instrumental motives include international political considerations, economic gains, domestic political motives, and military gains. On the other hand, affective reasons are related more to justice; humanitarian considerations; ethnic, religious, racial, or ideological affinity; and personal relationships. When these motives exist, interactions among factors influence the internationalization of conflicts. In other words, the international system can influence subnational wars in three different ways: by diffusion and encouragement, by isolation and suppression, and by reconciliation.

A final point to be mentioned leading to the internationalization of ethnic conflict is the security dilemma. According to Kaufman,¹⁴ once violence reaches the point at which ethnic communities cannot rely on the state to protect them, each community mobilizes to take responsibility for its own security. This leads to the intervention of other states, usually as a help to the ethnic group in need of these aids, hence leading to the internationalization of the conflict. On the other hand, Van Evera suggests that ethnic conflict creates security dilemmas for both ethnic groups and neighboring states that result in spiral effects, international conflict, and external intervention.¹⁵ For example, the Kashmir problem between India

and Pakistan has resulted in a classic example of a security dilemma that eventually escalated into nuclear rivalry.

These studies support the belief that ethnic conflicts can have international dimensions, influencing relationships among states and even being capable of causing a full-scale war. Not every ethnic conflict causes interstate conflict, but some obviously do. What role, then, does religion play in the internationalization of ethnic conflict?

The next section introduces a foreign policy approach in which ethnic and religious factors have connections to the policies of other nations as well as international-level and state-level factors that influence foreign policy. As our case of Kashmir suggests, ethnic conflict, including the role of religion, has substantial influence over the foreign policy of India in particular, but also that of Pakistan. The goal of the foreign policy approach used in this study is to better explain these connections.

Foreign Policy Approach

The foreign policy approach developed for this study aims to articulate how the Kashmir conflict has influenced India's foreign policy. The approach is adapted from McGowan and Shapiro's classic work on comparative foreign policy studies.¹⁶ There are two reasons why this approach is taken as the basis for this study. First, the choice of factors fit well into the nature of foreign policy studies. That is, the external and subnational components employed give a comprehensive picture, introducing an interdisciplinary understanding of history, religion, economics, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and political science. Second, by introducing these factors, it provides a comprehensive framework for applying a system-oriented approach to the study of foreign policy, with a potential for rigorous comparative studies.

Additions and alterations to McGowan and Shapiro are made to better understand the origins of domestic-level religious factors that experience internationalization. A subnational dilemma within a given state can have an impact on the foreign policy of that state as well as others. For example, conflictual relations among groups with ethno-religious identifying characteristics exist in India. Dealing with events in India's state of Jammu and Kashmir is daily fare for national leadership. However, what occurs in Kashmir is not the sole concern of Indian politicians. External links to other states (such as Pakistan) in addition to the environment of the international system (such as post-cold war unipolarity) will have ramifications on India's foreign policy. None of these elements in isolation provide a complete picture.

The approach has three main sequential steps. Part 1 consists of domestic-level factors that have been included to provide greater understanding of sources of conflict at the state and subnational level (see table 1). They represent the interaction among state-level domestic factors with subnational sources of conflict, in this case those with an ethno-religious characteristic.¹⁷ At the state level, eight different factors are considered: individuals, elites, politics, government, economics, linkages (trends in a decision maker's past policy behavior), analogies (comparisons to past events), and culture.¹⁸ The assumption is that there exists a two-way, domestic-level interaction of domestic and subnational factors outside of, and perhaps prior to, interaction at the international level. For example, state-level factors refer to India, while the subnational elements apply specifically to Kashmir in order to assess the

Table 1. Factors of explanation for comparative foreign policy decisions

Domestic factors	Subnational factors	International influences	State-level responses
individuals	ethno-religious issues	policies of other nations	individuals
elites		other international factors	elites
politics			politics
government			government
economics			economics
linkages			linkages
analogies			analogies
culture			culture

Part 1
Domestic origins of
ethno-religious conflict

Part 2

Part 3

Original framework by Patrick J. McGowan and Howard B. Shapiro, *The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings* (Beverly Hill; CA: Sage Publications, 1973).

region's influence on Indian foreign policy. The goal at this step is to pinpoint initial ethno-religious sources of conflict between the Kashmir region and the national government in New Delhi.

The resulting interactions between the state and subnational groups have two subsequent main connections. The first point of influence is on the policies of other nations and other international-level factors. In turn, international responses and the foreign policies of other states subsequently influence the original domestic-level factors, repeated at this point in the approach to represent international-to-domestic connections (individuals, elites, etc.). In other words, events within India triggered responses from other states and international institutions, which in turn produced feedback and affected aspects of India's domestic affairs. It is at this point that a state's political or governmental factors, for example, are assessed in terms of having an impact on its own foreign policy. In other words, this approach incorporates external and international responses to an initial domestic situation before it attempts to understand ultimate foreign policy patterns.¹⁹ While the link between domestic and international politics is not new, this approach provides a structure well-suited for further rigorous and comparative studies.

Applied to the Kashmir conflict, this approach has the potential to explain a variety of domestic- and international-level relationships. The balance of this paper will concentrate on one: ethno-religious factors. In the following two sections, Indian foreign policy regarding the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir is presented. Specifically, India's policies toward the subnational and ethno-religious troubles in Jammu and Kashmir are investigated, with reference to Pakistani and international influence on the ultimate Indian foreign policy.

Indian Foreign Policy—The Case of Kashmir²⁰

Understanding why Indian foreign policy has been affected by domestic factors so extensively is an important area of inquiry. Religion-based conflicts have been shown to be a source of more conflicts in Asia than in any other region of the world.²¹ The aim of this section is not to address this question broadly; rather, the goal is to analyze religious factors that are influential in determining Indian foreign policy. Several factors are pertinent, such as the multiethnic and religious character of the subcontinent, India's efforts to balance the authority of the central state over ethnically and religiously diverse federal states, and Pakistan's policies toward these same minority groups in India, particularly in Kashmir. No state is able to pursue a foreign policy that is independent of domestic pressures, especially those that originate from ethnic and religious subgroups. India and Pakistan are particularly vulnerable to these forces.²²

Kashmir is considered one of the most likely places on earth to spark a major conflict.²³ The origin of the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan dates back to the partition of the British colonial empire after World War II. There are five large regions in the state of Jammu and Kashmir that were incorporated under a single administration in the mid-nineteenth century. As a result, the state of Jammu and Kashmir was the largest among the 562 princely states that constituted the empire before 1947. Although Kashmir is treated as a homogenous unit, it is actually the opposite in terms of demography, religion, culture, ethnicity, and language.²⁴

The policies of princely states were affected by the British plan to divide the colonial empire into two independent states: India and Pakistan. Princely states were given the chance to choose which country to join. Kashmir, however, chose not to join either of them. Maharajah Singh, Kashmir's ruler at the time, sought avenues to independence. Opposing his ambitions were both India and Pakistan, whose respective leaders claimed Kashmir should belong to their union. Eventually Singh, afraid of a Pakistani intervention, decided to call for Indian troops. The immediate solution recommended by the UN was a cease-fire and a plebiscite to determine the future of Kashmir. The following succession of intense conflicts and India's unwillingness to hold a plebiscite has shaped the status of modern Kashmir.

Analyses of the origins of the dispute over Kashmir predominantly suggest that both countries claimed Kashmir because of their nation-building strategies. For the elite of newly independent India, the possibility of a Muslim majority in Kashmir choosing to live and prosper within a primarily Hindu state was a symbol of secular nationalism and state-building. This was the long-term goal of Jawaharlal Nehru, first prime minister of India. However, for Pakistan (and its first leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah) the primary defining characteristic of the nation of Pakistan was Islam. In other words, Pakistan's leadership believed Kashmir represented the impossibility of secular nationalism in the region. Therefore, Kashmir and its Muslim citizens must be part of an Islamic homeland.²⁵

How has the situation in Kashmir affected Indian policy? Traditionally, the analysis of the foreign policy of India focuses on two contextual frameworks. The pluralist, regional hegemony thesis suggests that India's postindependence policies have been characterized by a persistent accumulation of power by the central state to control rising demands from an increasingly pluralist society. Centralization has led to the militarization of the Indian state, the use of force to repress domestic

dissent, and rising hegemonism in relations with its neighbors. The second framework is a neo-Gramscian one suggesting India's main purpose after independence has been the neutralization of the "subaltern" or dominated classes. Both theories reach the same conclusion. The increase in centralized power within domestic politics leads to growing hegemonism in the international sphere.²⁶

The two approaches to the analysis of Indian foreign policy hold valid insights. However, their weakness in terms of incorporating the domestic and international factors shaping the Indian foreign policy suggests the usefulness of a novel framework developed by Maya Chadda.²⁷ According to this perspective, Indian foreign policy is directly influenced by the religious and ethnic diversities and the incomplete nation-building in both India and the subcontinent in general. Chadda asserts that in South Asia, India seeks a degree of overarching power that would give it "relational control." India's foreign policy objective is to maximize freedom of action and widen available options in foreign policy so that outcomes can be influenced in its own favor.

More specifically, India's foreign policy is greatly influenced by ethno-religious divides on the subcontinent and neighboring states' involvement in Indian domestic issues. Chadda argues that India, through relational control, seeks to insulate its nation-building project from any destabilizing development in neighboring countries.²⁸ Specifically, India's incongruent legal, national, religious, and ethnic boundaries have led Indian policy makers to maintain relational control over neighboring states by preventing great power interference in the region. Political turmoil in contiguous states, extraregional ethnic conflicts spilling over onto the subcontinent, and displacement of (or threats to) different religious or ethnic communities could destabilize interlocking balances within India. Thus, to prevent such ethno-religious security threats, India prefers having neutral neighbors. Kashmir is a prime example of relational control in India's foreign policy due to its protracted nature and core ethno-religious aspects.

The complexity of the problem has territorial dimensions in addition to the ethno-religious factors. Apart from the religious variances, ethnic divisions between Hindus, Buddhists, and Muslim Kashmiris were exacerbated by their territorial dispersion throughout the state. Those three main problems have caused irredentist, even secessionist, demands in India, Pakistan, and within Kashmir itself.

This rivalry between two states in the subcontinent has had a substantial effect over Indian and Pakistani foreign policy. The conflict over Jammu and Kashmir has resulted in the following incidents: the 1948 and 1965 wars, the 1971 war over Bangladesh,²⁹ the 1990 crises, the 1999 Kargil War, and the 2002 crises.

For India, the Kashmir conflict is definitely a two-dimensional issue. First, ethnic conflict has domestic causes. Subnationally it is related to the success or failure of Indian domestic policies. Second, externally the conflict is linked to the subcontinental rivalry between India and Pakistan.³⁰ However, this division does not suggest a foreign policy for India that is isolated from domestic concerns.

The foreign policy approach presented here has the capability to better explain relationships between foreign policy and the religious and ethnic conflicts concerning Kashmir. In order to demonstrate the approach's usefulness, the focus of this next section will be on India's policies toward Pakistan. The connections between domestic and international factors provide a substantial analysis of Indian foreign policy. With further concentration on the role of religion, the ways each factor has had an impact on foreign policy will be addressed.

Part 1 of Table 1—Initial Domestic and Subnational Factors

In this approach, domestic factors are studied as sources of ethnic conflict in a given region. Ethnic and religious variances, territorial claims by domestic groups, and economic and governmental factors are the original contributors to the ethnic problem. In Indian-held Kashmir, the main source of conflict has been religious and ethno-secessionist claims of the groups that live there. The dominant population (about two-thirds) is Muslim, while there are Hindus and Buddhists concentrated in the northern part of the state. In both the Indian and Pakistani sides of Kashmir, the overall population is predominantly Muslim. However, in the region of Jammu, Hindus are a 66 percent majority, and in Ladakh, Muslim and Buddhist populations are roughly even.³¹

A full history of how these groups organized, became pitted against each other, and their specific claims are the concern of another study. However, many domestic factors have resulted in long-term instabilities for Kashmir; a mix of ethnic, religious, and territorial battles; irredentism; hypernationalism; and economic reform and turbulence leading to protracted interstate and intrastate conflict.³²

A review of the politics of identity in Kashmir reveals the importance of ethno-religious divides on domestic and foreign policies for India. Kashmiri identity is shaped by pairs of conflictual groups, including Muslims versus Hindus and Islamic radicals versus Kashmiri nationalists who desire at a minimum autonomy, if not full independence.³³ However, this study asserts that the most influential identity and the source of conflict in Jammu and Kashmir has been religious, specifically Islam.

Domestic factors, in terms of their combined interaction in part 1, are closely connected to the two sets of international factors in part 2. That is, substate causes of ethnic conflict interact with individual, elite, political, governmental, economic, and cultural factors that shape the conflict. It is at this point that the ethno-religious problem becomes internationalized, as depicted in part 2 of table 1. The rise in Islamic identity has the constant potential to cause trouble among Muslim residents in Jammu and Kashmir. This atmosphere causes India to feel more threatened and less secure. In response to this increased sensitivity to Islamic insurgents in Kashmir, the area has come under increasingly greater scrutiny by the central government. Discussions concerning Jammu and Kashmir are more numerous in New Delhi and there has been a greater tendency to intervene and micromanage affairs at the expense of regional autonomy. Policies toward Jammu and Kashmir have also grown more hard-line in nature.

Part 2 of Table 1: Pakistan's Policies

The slogan of "Islam in danger" and Pakistan's religious influence over the region have the potential to stir religious sentiments at any given time. For example, the 1963 incident in which the hair of the prophet Muhammad disappeared from Srinagar's holy Mosque of Hazaratbal, although taking place in India, led to serious riots among Muslims in Kashmir and worsened Indo-Pakistani relations. More recently, developments in and around Kashmir have strengthened Islamic identity, resulting in substantial changes in Indian foreign policy: a general inspiration derived from the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the emergence of militant Islamic groups fighting against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, and the enormous increase in religious schools (madrassas) that has strengthened Islamic fundamentalism in

the region.³⁴ In the last couple of years, the Taliban regime's rule and Al Qaeda's involvement in Afghanistan strengthened Islamic influence throughout the region as far as Pakistan and India, influencing Kashmiri secessionism. Growing Islamic fundamentalism has become such a great force in the region that even Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf stresses repeatedly the importance of U.S. aid for reforming the educational system in Pakistan in the war against terrorism. According to the Islamonline news section, Pakistan has more than ten thousand madrassas that provide free education, food, and board to poor children.³⁵ These schools allegedly are connected to the Taliban forces in Afghanistan and insurgents in Kashmir.

Pakistan's ultimate foreign policy goal vis-à-vis India is an irredentist policy—to gain the territory of Jammu and Kashmir from India. Pakistan's irredentist foreign policy has been put into practice as support for insurgent movements in Kashmir. As a consequence, Indian foreign policy has been affected profoundly, hardening against Pakistan.

It is not surprising that since its establishment Pakistan's foreign and domestic policies, such as defense buildups and economic agendas, have been dominated by its relationship with India. There are two overriding concerns for Pakistani leadership: (a) the perception since partition that India is a threat to Pakistan's existence and her territorial integrity and (b) concern about India's secular politics in the subcontinent. Pakistan considers secularism as the greatest threat to its *raison d'être*—Islam. These concerns are understandable considering relations between the two states, and the past Indian armed intervention into Bangladesh in its successful bid for independence from Pakistan in 1971.³⁶

As a result, Kashmir may well have become a more important issue for Pakistani than Indian leaders. The Bangladeshi partition, in particular, resulted in a desire to control all of Kashmir. According to Prabha, there are four main reasons that Pakistan wants to conquer Kashmir: (a) it would enable Pakistan to regain the confidence of the Muslim population in the region, (b) the conquest of Kashmir would further strengthen the autocratic state structure of Pakistan, (c) it would help settle down other problems with Sindh and Baluchistan and secure territorial integrity of the country,³⁷ and (d) if Jammu and Kashmir is acquired, then Pakistan can search for a national ideology based on socioeconomic factors, rather than relying so heavily on Islam.

The political processes to gain territory in Kashmir started right after the partition in 1947. Former Pakistani leader Jinnah used various political means, including sending delegates, offering privileges and even independence to Kashmiri leaders in attempts to convince them to join Pakistan peacefully.

Pakistan has used various conventional foreign policy tools to attempt to acquire Jammu and Kashmir, including warfare, international organizations, political processes, diplomacy and propaganda, and foreign aid.³⁸ Theoretically, warfare is supposed to be the last resort that states use in international relations. However, for the Indo-Pakistani relationship, this doesn't seem to be the case. In the little more than five decades since independence, India and Pakistan have engaged in four distinct wars—1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999. The 1947 war was an apparent success in that Pakistan acquired the part of Kashmir that it still controls today, "Azad Kashmir," or Free Kashmir. The last three attempts were all failures and did not result in an advantage to Pakistan.³⁹

Although it was India who first brought the problem to the UN, Pakistan also used international organizations to hold plebiscites in Kashmir or to engage in

international mediation. Pakistan also used diplomacy and propaganda to create good publicity within the international community. These efforts focused on British and Islamic nations.

However, none of these efforts ended in a favorable way for Pakistan, neither through bilateral nor multilateral diplomatic attempts. The main reason behind these failures was the Simla Agreement of 1972 signed after the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, which resulted in the separation of Bangladesh. According to this agreement, Pakistan accepted that any negotiation about Kashmir should be bilateral between India and Pakistan. The implication of this article on Indo-Pakistani relations is that India has never considered any other diplomatic option for the settlement of the dispute after this agreement. Also, this agreement has been used by India as a weapon against further Pakistani efforts to internationalize the conflict. India effectively has used the agreement to prevent interference by other states such as the United States, China, or other Muslim nations.

The last point to be mentioned is the foreign aid that Pakistan has received from the United States and Arab nations. Indian policy makers have alleged that Pakistan transferred some military capabilities to the insurgent groups of Kashmir, although there is little or no evidence to support the accusations. As for nonconventional efforts, India has accused Pakistan of supporting terrorism. Especially since the end of the 1980s, when Pakistan has been experiencing political turmoil, it is blamed by India for supporting terrorist groups in Kashmir.

The significant point about these efforts has been that Pakistan has attempted to use religion as a tool of foreign policy to create positive publicity about its claims to Kashmir. Since the partition, Pakistan has used anticolonialist and Muslim-solidarity views to color its foreign policies. The country has based its foreign policy substantially on its Muslim identity. Politically, Pakistani officials have supported the Palestinian people as well as anticolonial movements in North Africa. In economic matters they have sought the support of richer Gulf states.⁴⁰ Concerning Kashmir, Pakistan has sought the support of all Muslim nations. As a result, the more religiously oriented Arab countries of the Middle East have articulated support for Pakistan against India and their hope of seeing the “salvation” of the Kashmiri Muslims. In addition, Indian nationalists still allege that some rich Muslim countries financially support Kashmiri insurgencies. A recent quote from the Pacific News Service is illustrative:

Sheikh Issues Fatwa Over Kashmir: Sheikh Faysal Mawlawi, the deputy chairman of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, has issued a fatwa—a non-binding ruling in accordance with Islamic law—in case of war between India and Pakistan. According to Mawlawi, it is the duty of all Muslims to support Pakistan. He said that if there is an Indo-Pak war, the reason would clearly be Kashmir, and the Kashmiris want to be attached to Pakistan, which is an Islamic country.⁴¹

There are three main options for Pakistan to strengthen its territorial and national security in the near future. Two of them are interconnected: democratic liberalization and the pursuit of regional cooperation. The third option, based upon Islam, has been dominant in the past few decades. The Islamic option has two aspects. The external aspect is to build even closer ties with other Muslim nations such as Iran and Turkic states in central Asia and to support stability and peace

in Afghanistan. However, there are great uncertainties to this option. First, there are great doubts about the regime in Iran and the situation in Afghanistan after the UN-led occupation in 2001–2002. Second, the Turkic republics of central Asia are ideologically and culturally closer to Turkey and its secularity. Subnationally, the Islamic approach poses serious dangers to the stability of Pakistan. The growing extremist, Wahhabite type of Islam is a great threat to the Pakistani government.⁴² Any analysis of the future of Pakistani foreign policy must take into account the substantial changes caused by the military coup in 1999 and the events following the September 11 attacks in the United States. These include the United States' increasing involvement in Asian politics, the continuing war on terrorism, and Pervez Musharraf's support for the U.S.-led search for Al Qaeda militants in the region. Pursuing the Islamic option will not be hampered because of consideration of U.S. interests and influence in the region. In addition, Pakistani policy makers seem to recognize the threat of extremist political Islam against the Pakistani state both in subnational and external security matters. Thus it might be expected that Pakistan will pursue more regional cooperation options in the near future, including the avoidance of main crises with India.

To summarize Pakistan's fit into this foreign policy approach, ethno-religious realities and events in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir prompted foreign policy responses from Pakistan, an external participant, which in turn elicited responses from India in the form of internationalized, or foreign, policy.

Part 2 of Table 1—External Factors: The UN, the Cold War, and Alliances

Domestic problems within Indian Kashmir are perceived as a threat to the founding principles of Pakistan and have led to Pakistan's involvement in the Kashmir dispute. Related to this internationalization problem, the UN and the cold war superpowers became involved in the Kashmir conflict at the international level. The UN first was brought in by India in a complaint about Pakistan's aggressive actions over Kashmir that led to the 1947–48 war. In the developments of the following decade, Pakistan's alliance with the United States brought a cold war dimension to the conflict that forced India to collaborate with the Soviet Union. These domestic causes of ethnic strife led to the internationalization of the conflict, influencing states at the system-oriented, or international, level.

International factors influencing the Kashmir conflict have included the UN's involvement after 1948, Pakistan's alliance with the United States and involvement in U.S.-sponsored military organizations such as Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), India's establishment of close ties with the Soviet Union in response to cold war superpower rivalries and, for the last two decades, the increasing rise of Islamic ideologies and governments in the region.

The Kashmir situation was brought to the UN by India in 1948 with the hope that the UN would condemn Pakistan's aggression. After several debates, two resolutions were passed. The first, proposed by India, was to halt the ongoing war, the second, proposed by Pakistan, recommended a plebiscite for Kashmir. Both of these efforts by the UN to bring a solution to the conflict failed—Pakistan continued to occupy Free Kashmir and the promised plebiscite was never held. Since that time, India consistently has argued against the internationalization of the conflict and rejected further involvement by international organizations.

The second international source of change involved Pakistan's alliances. For example, Pakistan and the United States became allies, and Pakistan also joined SEATO and CENTO. Perceived as a cold war balance of power move, India declared that Pakistan's alliances, in particular with the United States, were a threat to its security. In response, Nehru declared that a plebiscite in Kashmir would be impossible, thereby reconfirming India's claim to Kashmir. Seen at the international level, India's policy toward Jammu and Kashmir was in response to a neighboring state's decisions on allies, even though there was no direct connection to the Kashmir dispute.

More recently, beginning with the 1980s, India has become increasingly vulnerable to the influence of Islam in the subcontinent and neighboring regions. The Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the rise of Muslim identity and resistance in the region have become important issues to consider for India in making foreign policy moves. There have been multiple consequences. Pakistan was the main conduit for the transfer of arms to mujahideen resistance against the Soviets and also became the headquarters for a fundamentalist Sunni group, *Hezb-e-Islami*, under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Especially with the global transformation in the 1990s, Pakistan's five-decade-long aim to have a plebiscite in Indian-occupied Kashmir has found increased international support. Considering the strategic Islamic crescent in the region that India faces, the Kashmir issue (and a more powerful rival Islamic ideology) have become even more important in shaping Indian foreign policy. Islamic mobilization in Kashmir, increasing violence in and near critical holy sites, and rising numbers of Hindu-Muslim riots in India should be analyzed in this framework as well.⁴³ India has also felt the fear of disintegration even more with the recent rise of Islam. And religion does not shape foreign policy of a nation only in one direction: external-to-subnational or foreign-to-domestic connections are as important as the subnational-to-external forces in making foreign policy. In the Indian example, besides the domestic ethno-religious influences on Indian foreign policy, systemic and regional changes related to the rise of Islam as an alternative ideology alter Indian perceptions and actions in international relations.

As this foreign policy approach helps explain, ethnic conflicts with domestic origins may have an influence over system-level alliances. This can occur because of the severity of a conflict, the potential for escalation, the structure of the system, and existing alliances. The result often entails further reaction among domestic components of the foreign policy making processes.

Part 3 of Table 1: Individual and Elite Factors

Indian bureaucratic and military elites have been strong supporters and protectors of the founding principles of national secularism in India. In this sense, considering the partition process and Kashmir's symbolism for secular India, Indian elites have had a strong commitment to the secular principle; as such they have been both the architects and implementers of India's foreign policy toward Pakistan. Their substantial influence has been seen in the hard line taken against Pakistan with reference to Kashmir and the development of a nuclear program.⁴⁴

Religious variances of the subcontinent shape considerably the way individual Indian leaders and elites approach Kashmir as both a domestic and a foreign policy issue. For example, the rather idealist secular nationalist approach typically ignored

how important communal and religious differences in India really are. The dream was that all ethnic and religious groups in India would choose a better life within the Indian nation, initially considered to be the best option in the region. Instead, after three decades of ethno-religious conflicts, the Indian elite changed their minds and policies. It has become recognized that domestic minority groups have been, and most likely will continue to be, a challenge to Indian unity. Added to this is the recognition that ethno-religious ties to peoples in neighboring countries at times has led to conflict at the interstate level. Two results are evident. Domestically, the Indian political elite has approached nation-building strategies in a more centrist manner. In addition, foreign policy toward regional powers, in particular Pakistan, has become increasingly more aggressive.

It is clear that, over time, individual leaders and elites have sought different solutions for similar problems. For Nehru, one of the founders of independent India, Kashmir rightfully belonged to India as a symbol of secular nationalism. In the first decade of the conflict, Nehru declared that a plebiscite was possible, yet he wanted to retain bilateral negotiations with Pakistan as an option. Although his policy had changed after Pakistan's alliance with the United States, it can be argued that he assumed a somewhat compromising posture.

However, in the late 1960s and early 1970s Indira Gandhi took a hard line against Pakistan. She centralized the federal system of India and took power away from local governments. In addition, she was one of the architects of India's policy toward Pakistan and Bangladesh and the 1971 war over Kashmir took place under her leadership. Indira Gandhi's decision to intervene militarily in Pakistan's civil war was a fundamental departure from the Nehruvian approach to international politics.⁴⁵ Therefore, it can be argued that she was more hawkish than Nehru in relations with Pakistan. Taking yet another foreign policy turn during the late 1970s and early 1980s, Rajiv Gandhi tried to increase cooperation and encourage negotiations about Kashmir with his Pakistani counterpart, Benazir Bhutto. Although it did not produce substantial results, Rajiv Gandhi's policies were an obvious change and created some hope for the future.

Within the framework of relational control with neighbors in the region, the transition from Nehruvian secular nationalism and pluralism to centralization of the Indian state led to a substantial decline in the autonomy of Kashmir to control religious and ethnic divisions peacefully. Both Indira and Rajiv Gandhi violated at least two fundamental principles of Indian political unity: they sought to replace the National Conference, the biggest regional party in Kashmir, and played "fast and loose" with the modern Indian state's commitment to secularism.⁴⁶ Taking a harder line against such a critical ethno-religious movement produced catastrophic results. In the short term they deepened alienation and encouraged separatism, terminating the political processes in Kashmir and Punjab and thus jeopardizing India's security in the region. In the long term these compromises weakened the union and helped to polarize India along ethno-religious lines. These developments led to the rise of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) that in turn increased violence in Kashmir and Punjab.

All these developments led to the weakening of the Indian state and concomitant loss of the relational control of India over its neighbors. The primary reason for this low point in Indian politics was the leaders' changing policies: "Mrs. Gandhi, not unlike the figures in a Greek tragedy, was driven to actions that led to her own demise. Rajiv too fell victim to a similar spate of ethnonational violence."⁴⁷

Part 3 of Table 1: Political and Governmental Factors

When secular nationalists came to power in India in 1947, they were committed to three principles: secularism, federalism, and democracy. For them, the empire-state of India was the same as the nation-state of India, and the newly independent India should resemble the ancient Indian multinational empire. However, the problems that they encountered in such a massive country were numerous, including communal divides, multiple sovereignties, and ethnic and linguistic divisions. In the 1980s, after forty years of ethnic conflicts, Indian public opinion was in favor of centralization and the politicians who pursued it. Growing frustration with ethnic and regional nationalism could no longer be contained in India. Frustration caused an increase in Hindu nationalism and, as a consequence, secular nationalists also had to take a centralist stance.⁴⁸

The important characteristic of Hindu nationalism is its religious nature. It is a kind of religious ethno-nationalism aimed at consolidating and reinforcing the Hindu *rashtra*, or Hindu nation. This movement, also called *Hindutva*, or Hindu nationalist ideology, argues that the Indian state is tinged with Indian religion and culture.⁴⁹ *Hindutva* suggests showing less tolerance to minorities, such as Muslims and Christians, that are not fully loyal to the Indian state or assimilated into Hindu society. *Hindutva* ideology has been actively involved in communal conflicts in India.

The main political organization of Hindu nationalism has been the BJP. Although *Hindutva* ideology has been present in Indian politics for a long time, the BJP could claim votes from it only in the 1990s. The last decade witnessed the rise of the BJP and Hindu nationalism and the decline of the Congress Party and secularism in India. Since the 1996 elections the BJP has become stronger and defeated the Congress Party in successive elections.⁵⁰ The BJP defended the centralization of the Indian state to unite India on the basis of the Indian majority. They suggested even a harder line against Pakistan and claimed the cultural scope of India stretches from Afghanistan to Sri Lanka. The extreme strand of Hindu nationalism is expansionist and statist in external affairs and prefers authoritarian control over domestic groups. The more moderate strand of Hindu nationalism is more ambivalent about India's borders. However, proponents support a tough and security-oriented foreign policy, with an uncompromising stance against Pakistan over Kashmir.⁵¹ However, after coming to power, Prime Minister Vajpayee, from the moderate wing of the BJP, has pursued the second option and has not closed all channels of communication with Pakistan on the Kashmir question. Other than continuing the nuclear program, Vajpayee pursued a moderate foreign policy. In particular, his visit to Pakistan in January 2004 was a groundbreaking incident for Indo-Pakistani relations. However, Vajpayee's own moderate stance in foreign policy does not mean all Hindu nationalists share his views.

Over time, Hindu nationalism has had a twofold effect on the Kashmir issue. First, centralization of the Indian polity has resulted in increased tensions in Kashmir. Second, Kashmiri politics themselves have become more vulnerable to centrist views. Both of these issues have exacerbated the relationship with Pakistan. For instance, Pakistan has accused India of ignoring human rights in Kashmir, including the right to self-determination. In one instance, corrupt local elections in 1989 resulted in political turbulence in Kashmir, leading to another serious crisis between India and Pakistan. Diplomatic measures by the foreign ministers dispelled the crisis short of war; however, tensions remained and increased toward the end of the decade.

Political and governmental factors have probably been among the most important factors determining India's foreign policy. Because of the historical legacy of the British empire and the partition process, what traditionally were domestic issues have had a direct and extensive influence over Kashmir and Pakistan, producing serious foreign policy consequences. The rise of both Hindu nationalism throughout India and Islam in areas such as Kashmir with significant Muslim populations have brought ethno-religious factors more to the forefront of Indian foreign policy with, for example, an Islamic Pakistan.

Part 3 of Table 1: Economic Factors

The literature on Kashmir does not consider the economic dimension as a significant source of the conflict.⁵² Kashmir simply has little substantial economic value for either India or Pakistan. The economic and demographic facts show that Jammu and Kashmir is not a privileged region of India. It accounts for 6.7 percent of India's landmass but less than 1 percent of its population, due chiefly to the mountainous topography and a low ratio of arable land. The primary economic sector is agriculture, employing 80 percent of the workforce, while small-scale manufacturing is second. Jammu and Kashmir is one of the poorest of Indian states according to most economic indicators (e.g., per capita income, food production, and power consumption). The literacy rate is well below the Indian average of 36 percent. The state's economy is stagnant and suffers seriously from infrastructure problems. The only growing sector is the public sector, thanks to patronage politics.⁵³

Kashmir simply has little substantial economic value for both India and Pakistan. The ethno-religious conflict and secessionist movement has, however, prompted increasing federal support for Kashmir, and an increasingly large burden for the Indian central government. Jammu and Kashmir largely depends on transfer payments from the central government, which account for almost half of the state government revenues (which are composed of 10 percent loans and 90 percent grants).⁵⁴

Of course, this is not to suggest that economic factors have no impact on the conflict. A general premise is accepted in ethnic conflict literature that poverty, combined with ancient hatreds or power imbalances between different ethnic and religious groups, may very well be a factor exacerbating ethno-religious violence. However, economic deprivation in Kashmir has no apparent critical influence on Indian or Pakistani foreign policies. It has almost no strategic economic importance, such as natural resources, nor a developed economy with an educated population. Overall, the economic factor has had little effect.

Part 3 of Table 1: Linkage Factors and Analogies

In terms of linkage factors, Pakistan's past behavior has constituted a substantial reference point for Indian policy makers. Considering Pakistan's aggression over five decades and its commitment to gaining territory from India, it should not be surprising that Pakistan's actions often are perceived as a threat to Indian territorial unity. A cursory review of Indo-Pakistani relations would reveal that Indian perceptions have been shaped by Pakistan, such as the latter's continued irredentist policy toward Kashmir. Analogies certainly affect Indian foreign policy. The experience of the original partition cautions Indian leaders, who wish to avoid another division of the Indian union. Similar linkages and analogies over time have been among the factors that have shaped India's foreign policy.

Part 3 of Table 1: Cultural Factors

Cultural factors have had a considerable impact upon the Kashmir conflict and foreign policy of India. Actually, cultural factors overlap when evaluating any of the other factors. Traditionally, cultural pluralism has been one of India's guiding principles, even though during the 1980s it was understood to be a growing impediment to political stability. Patterns of national identity constructed by India's founding elite have acted as an independent state regarding policies on Jammu and Kashmir. India has been strongly committed to the principle of secularism. Strengthening Hindu nationalism in the wake of Kashmiri turmoil and political turbulence has, in turn, influenced secular nationalists to take a harder line in Kashmir and against Pakistan.

Specific emphasis should be given to ethno-religious aspects of Indian culture. As mentioned above, the very foundation—or partition—of India and Pakistan was based on the religious identifications of the two main ethnic groups of the subcontinent: Hindu and Muslim. These two groups created the political organizations that facilitated the liberation from British rule between the two world wars. As British rule had begun to break down, differences between Hindus and Muslims became more pronounced. While Hindus proposed the unity of the entire subcontinent under a single government, the Muslim League defended the division of the empire along ethno-religious lines. The vitality of the religious dimension in understanding Indian domestic politics, foreign policy, and specific stances on Kashmir stems from the fact that, after all, India and Pakistan were created according to ethno-religious differences and conflicts. Unfortunately, ethno-religious politics, interstate conflicts, and subnational violence on the subcontinent are even more relevant today than in 1947.

It is not the intention here to suggest that there is a given relationship between differing religious groups and conflicts in a society. There are examples, such as China, in which we observe a less violent coexistence of various ethnic and religious groups. This kind of differentiation can, however, serve to identify some communities as not only separate, but adversarial. This attitude, known as communalism in India, has become a defining factor in the Kashmir conflict since 1989.⁵⁵

Over the past five decades, growing communalism in India, spurred on by domestic and external conflicts, has resulted in the rise of political parties with ethno-religious identifications. The Hindu national movement, represented primarily by the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) and the BJP, have risen while secular nationalist political parties (such as the Congress Party that founded Indian politics) have lost ground and at times have been forced to lead a minority government. In 1998, the Congress Party was supplanted when the BJP led a national coalition government. The Indian polity, tired after five decades of ethnic and religious strife and the rejection of Nehru-style secular nationalism, simply turned to a nationalism defined by the Hindu majority. As a result, policies toward Pakistan concerning Kashmir have become more rigid, more uncompromising, and more dangerous.

Culture, as both a domestic and an international factor and defined in a large part by religion, is critical to understanding Indian foreign policy, particularly as it pertains to Kashmir. Since the two main adversarial groups within Kashmir are defined primarily by religion, this factor sheds more light on the protracted conflict with Pakistan than secularists would care to admit.

Conclusion

The Kashmir problem is the symbol of the unresolved conflict of communal loyalties and secular politics. Pakistani governments, one after another, characterize it as “the unfinished business of partition” by which they mean that, in view of its Muslim majority, the state and certainly the valley should belong to Pakistan.⁵⁶

Religious dynamics are the products of historical legacies; they shape governmental and political structures, affect the policies of other nations, shape individual leaders and elites, and help us in understanding the cultural side of the foreign policy coin. Especially in the developing world, where the exercise of power often is legitimized on religious grounds, the masses mobilized with communal consciousness and power structures can easily be drawn together by ethnic and religious ties, including ethno-religious factors, thus strengthening explanations about politics and foreign policy.

The foreign policy approach presented here, based on a system-oriented approach, provides further understanding of the relationship between domestic factors and foreign policy as it concerns India and Kashmir. It helps to illustrate how, in the case of Kashmir, ethnic conflicts may become internationalized and determine a substantial part of a country's foreign relations. It helps to clarify domestic-level factors, such as religion, and international-level factors, such as Pakistan's foreign policy, and their combined effect on India's foreign policy.

A system-oriented approach can be used to better understand subnational and external relationships. Domestic, or state-level factors such as religious differences, have profoundly shaped the foreign policy patterns of India. Ethno-religious conflicts originating in Kashmir are as important, if not more so, than structural or international-level factors in explaining some foreign policy decisions. In this case, a domestic religious factor in India has served as the impetus for Pakistani and UN involvement, subsequently promoting a foreign policy response by India.

Since foreign policy cannot be analyzed successfully without paying special attention to domestic factors, the approach presented here provides a systematic way to study various domestic- and international-level factors and a variety of causal relationships among them. Using domestic factors and structures such as religion, culture, leaders, factors, and government (with specific reference to the ontological approach known as systemism), this study provides a robust example of a foreign policy approach that is able to clarify a more complete picture of international politics. Specifically, the emphasis on religion and the endeavor to understand how religious factors shape foreign policy decisions in different domains of polity and society gives a special strength to the approach.

Lastly, from a theoretical perspective, this study justifies the notion that realism as a dominant paradigm of international relations literature can be applied to the study of domestic and international structures. In other words, the foreign policy goals of states often have ethno-religious dynamics that play an important role in policy formation. This is not to claim that states do not consider security concerns as primary or that national interests are not defined by power-related issues. Rather, insight into what defines national interest (and how a state pursues it) is more complex than what traditional realism has argued. As is seen in the case of Kashmir, ethno-religious divides, historical legacies, and nation-building strategies have affected both the domestic and foreign policies of India.

Additional applications of the approach are recommended. Religion as a domestic factor resulting in the internationalization of a conflict can be the focus of concentration for a variety of comparative studies. Beyond the concentration on religion, other state-level factors can be placed under more intense study and analysis. As mentioned earlier, the precise effect that international-level factors, responding to initial state-level and subnational events, can have on a state's specific foreign policy processes would be a natural extension to this and other comparable studies.

Notes

1. Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, "Quantifying Religion: Toward Building More Affecting Ways of Measuring Religious Influence on State-Level Behavior," *Journal of Church and State* 45, no. 3 (2003): 559–588.
2. David Carment and Patrick James, "Third Party States in Ethnic Conflict: Identifying the Domestic Determinants of Intervention," in *Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation*, ed. Steven E. Lobell and Philip Mauceri (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 11–34.
3. Mario Bunge, *Finding Philosophy in Social Science* (Chelsea, MI: Yale University Press, 1996), 264.
4. Patrick James, "Systemism and International Relations: Toward a Reassessment of Realism," in *Millennial Reflections on International Studies*, ed. Michael Brecher and Frank Harvey (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 131–144.
5. Jonathan Fox, *Ethnoreligious Conflict in the Late Twentieth Century: A General Theory* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002).
6. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
7. David Carment and Patrick James, "Ethnic Conflict at the International Level," in *Wars in the Midst of Peace: The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict*, ed. David Carment and Patrick James (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 1–10.
8. David Carment, "The Ethnic Dimension in World Politics: Theory, Policy and Early Warning," *Third World Quarterly* 15, no. 4 (1994): 551–582.
9. David Carment, "The International Dimension of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, Indicators and Theory," *Journal of Peace Research* 30, no. 2 (1993): 139–150; David Carment and Patrick James, "Internal Constraints and Interstate Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Crisis-Based Assessment of Irredentism," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39, no. 1 (1995): 82–109.
10. 2003.
11. Debate exists about the demographics of Kashmir. The accuracy of census figures has been disputed. In addition, some question whether the original populations during the 1947 partition are more or less relevant than current percentages of religious groups as they pertain to Pakistan's irredentist claims or Kashmiri independence. Manus Midlarsky, "Systemic War in the Former Yugoslavia," in *Wars in the Midst of Peace: The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict*, ed. David Carment and Patrick James (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 61–81.
12. Manus Midlarsky, "Rulers and the Ruled: Patterned Inequality and the Onset of Mass Political Violence," *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2 (1988): 491–509; Manus Midlarsky, "Communal Strife and the Origins of World War 1," in *The Internationalization of Communal Strife*, ed. Manus Midlarsky (London: Routledge, 1992), 173–188.
13. Alexis Heraclides, "Secessionist Minorities and External Environment," *International Organization* 44, no. 3 (1990): 341–378.
14. Chaim Kaufman, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil War," in *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, ed. Michael Brown et al. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001).
15. Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security* 18, no. 4 (1994): 5–39.
16. Patrick J. McGowan and Howard B. Shapiro, *The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1973).
17. McGowan and Shapiro include religion within the cultural factor, considering it one of the three most important, along with ideology and race (*ibid.*, 45).

18. In state-level factors, establishment and societal components from the original approach are excluded. We believe the establishment factor is covered to a great extent in the “elites” factor as it represents the institutional features of foreign policy making. Similarly, societal factors from the original approach are not included because economic variables provide us with the necessary discussion of what societal factors are supposed to explain, in terms of economic inequalities and social modernization. On the other hand, the “analogies” factor in the state-level points is added to McGowan and Shapiro’s approach for the sake of consistency.

19. A key component of future study using this model would be to add inquiry into effects on the decision making process that result from the inclusion of external and international factors. In addition, there are sure to be both domestic and international influences from the foreign policies themselves, serving as feedback to the original state and sub-national situation, foreign policies of other states, and international elements. For the purposes of this initial study, the concentration is restricted to the initial foreign policy results.

20. The reader will note that the nuclear capabilities of these two states are mentioned only occasionally. It is our assumption that, in most instances, the effects of nuclear force structures would be similar on foreign policy considerations such as conflict escalation, regardless of the source of a crisis—religion, economics, political turmoil, and so forth. However, nuclear capability could be considered a point of inquiry as a domestic factor, with the intent of observing subsequent foreign policy processes and decisions. See Carolyn C. James, “Nuclear Arsenal Games: Coping with Proliferation in a World of Changing Rivalries,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 33, no. 4 (2000), 723–746.

21. Jonathan Fox and Carolyn C. James, “Regional Propensities for Religious Violence, American Public Perception and the Middle East,” (paper presented at the International Studies Association Midwest Conference, St. Louis, Missouri, 2002).

22. Maya Chadda, “From an Empire State to a Nation State: The Impact of Ethno-Religious Conflicts on India’s Foreign Policy,” in *Dilemmas of National Security and Cooperation in India and Pakistan*, ed. Hafeez Malik (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 207–229.

23. Andrew Scobell, “Flashpoint Asia: The Most Dangerous Place?” *Parameters* 31, no. 2 (2001), 129–133.

24. Sumit Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

25. Sumit Ganguly and Kanti Bajpai, “India and the Crisis in Kashmir,” *Asian Survey* 34, no. 5 (1994), 401–416.

26. Maya Chadda, *Ethnicity, Security and Separatism in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

27. *Ibid.*

28. *Ibid.*

29. Although the primary reason for this conflict was not Kashmir itself, India’s intervention was meant to weaken Pakistan in order to gain more concessions at the war’s conclusion, including concessions involving Kashmir.

30. Sumit Ganguly and Kanti Bajpai, “India and the Crisis.”

31. Mushtaqur Rahman, *Divided Kashmir: Old Problems, New Opportunities for India, Pakistan, and for the Kashmiri People* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996); Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay, “Nation, Identity and the Intervening Role of the State: A Study of the Secessionist Movement in Kashmir,” *Pacific Affairs* 69 (1996–97).

32. Sumit Ganguly and Kanti Bajpai, “India and the Crisis.”

33. Maya Chadda, *Ethnicity, Security and Separatism*, 71.

34. *Ibid.*

35. Islamonline News Site, “Pakistani Education Minister on U.S. Visit to Secularize Schooling,” <http://www.islamonline.net/english/news/2002-03/10/article24.shtml> (accessed March 2002).

36. Kshitij Prabha, *Terrorism: an Instrument of Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 2000).

37. In Sindh and Baluchistan—two southern provinces of Pakistan—local governments face problems with the central administration on issues such as sharing sovereignty and the

exercise of authority. Controversy still exists concerning whether or not it was fair and legal that the two provinces joined Pakistan during the partition.

38. Kshitij Prahba, *Terrorism*.

39. Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

40. Kail C. Ellis, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Alternative Policies" in *Dilemmas of National Security and Cooperation in India and Pakistan*, ed. Hafeez Malik (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

41. The News International, "Sheikh Issues Fatwa over Kashmir," May 30, 2002, http://news.pacificnews.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=434 (accessed April 2, 2005).

42. Maya Chadda, *Building Democracy in South Asia: India, Nepal, Pakistan* (Boulden, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000).

43. Maya Chadda, *Security and Separatism*.

44. Chadda, "From an Empire State." While India must consider China, in particular, in terms of nuclear balance or deterrence in the region, Pakistan's arsenal was created almost entirely in response to a perceived threat from India.

45. *Ibid.*

46. Maya Chadda, *Security and Separatism*.

47. *Ibid.*, 144.

48. Maya Chadda, "From an Empire State."

49. Mitsuhiro Kondo, "Hindu Nationalists and Their Critique of Monotheism: The Relationship between Nation, Religion and Violence," in *The Unfinished Agenda: Nation Building in South Asia*, ed. Mushirul Hasan and Nariaki Nakazato (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2001).

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51. Maya Chadda, *Building Democracy*.

52. Tremblay, "Intervening Role"; Rahman, *Divided Kashmir*; Ganguly, *Conflict unending*; Ganguly and Bajpai, "India and the crisis"; Chadda, "From an Empire State."

53. Tremblay, "Intervening Role"; Rahman, *Divided Kashmir*.

54. Tremblay, "Intervening Role".

55. Ainslie Embree, "Kashmir: Has Religion a Role in Making Peace?" in *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik*, ed. Douglas Johnston (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 33–75.

56. T. N. Madan, "Religion, Ethnicity and Nationalism in India," in *Religion, Ethnicity and Self Identity*, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appelby (Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England, 1997), 53–71.