

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Regime Rhetoric and Protests: How Government Statements Can Repress

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the role that a regime's rhetoric—negatively framed public statements directed at domestic targets and audiences—plays in the suppression of protest. Although much work has examined how state repression affects mobilization, this has remained isolated from other repressive strategies. I argue that a regime's public statements serve as a non-violent alternative to state repression, that they can complement the use of force, and condition the consequences of state repression. This behavior serves to bolster the regime's public image and rally domestic support, while undermining the complaints of protesters. Relying on a monthly event data analysis, I test the expectation that increased levels of regime rhetoric leads to lower levels of mobilization. Findings indicate that while rhetoric and repression alone increase mobilization, a campaign of regime statements used in conjunction with repression leads to a decrease in protest activity.

KEYWORDS

Protest; repression; legitimation; human rights; propaganda

When Russia experienced its largest protest movement since the 1990s after the 2011 legislative elections, protest events were largely permitted to continue without large-scale physical interference from police or security forces. Notably, much of the regime's resistance to the protests took place in public discourse. State media and government officials engaged in a constant campaign criticizing the protesters. These organizations emphasized a lack of focus among participants, arguing that protester complaints could be dismissed because they did not offer any viable alternative to the current structure and behavior of government.[1]

Such behavior is also easily observed in the statements of Russian political leaders. Some were mildly critical; president Medvedev's simple statement of disagreement with the complaints of participants. Others alleged that the protests were orchestrated by foreign powers as part of a "Color Revolution" to destabilize Russia. Some statements contained overt insults about participants; referencing white ribbons that looked like "useless condoms pinned to their chests."[2]

These protests, although they continued into 2012 and 2013, ended without large scale uses of force by the government. In contrast to the Color Revolutions or Arab Spring, protesters were mostly unable to interrupt the power of the regime. Instead, the aftermath

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of the events resulted in a tightening of regime power and, later, an increase in public approval of the regime. While some of this failure has been attributed to factors such as weak civil society and inability to mobilize resources (for example, Greene 2014), what is essentially a propaganda campaign against the movement also contributed to the protesters' lack of success.[3]

When governments engage in directed criticism of opposition movements, belittling their complaints, or issue public statements attacking dissidents, does this help suppress protester activity? The relationship between a government's use of force and continued protest activity has been examined extensively—with mixed findings—as have the repressive strategies and institutions that exist to control opposition more generally. What is less clear is the effect a regime's rhetoric—its public statements—has on the incidence of protest movements. Motivated by the earlier observations about Russia, this paper argues that government actors can utilize negative public statements to suppress protests. These statements are the output of governments working to impede the mobilization efforts of protest movements.

By framing the government's current structure, behavior, and actors as necessary or beneficial and framing opposition actors as dangerous, mistakenly motivated, or illegitimate, negative rhetoric works to stop the spread of public support for those already in the streets. It relies on the ability of the state to build institutions that broadcast its message and the general ease with which government actors can obtain media and public attention to directly counteract the framing efforts typically carried out by social movements. A regime's negative rhetoric offers an alternate narrative and interpretation of the stated complaints of opposition actors. If this narrative is adopted by the public, or if rhetoric simply succeeds in creating uncertainty about events, then protest movements will find it more difficult to mobilize and retain support.

Instead of physically removing, harming, or restricting the actions or physical integrity of protesters, negative rhetoric reduces protest by undermining the perceived legitimacy of the movement. Regime statements take advantage of a government's easy access to, or control of, media and attention of the populace to suppress mobilization. Critical regime statements, applied during times of domestic unrest, reduce the need to rely on riskier repressive force.

After reviewing the previous research on the effects of state repression on protest mobilizations, I present an explanation of the expected effect of negative rhetoric on protests and its advantages relative to force. Then, I describe a generalized cross-national measurement of regime rhetoric and test several empirical models regarding the expected changes in protester behavior resulting from the uses of negative rhetoric and repression. I conclude with a discussion of findings that indicate rhetoric conditions state repression in reducing the number of protest events, and explore some avenues for future research implied by the results.

Protest mobilization and repression

Much research has focused on the causes of state repression, largely describing and testing the components of the opposition movement and the level of threat they engender in a regime.[4] As a result, the interactions between dissidents and regimes that lead to state

repression are relatively well explained. What is less clear is the result of state repression; whether the government's use of force hinders or promotes further mobilization.

The perception of threat has been linked to a number of behaviors by dissidents. While one large protest expressing dissent with government policy may be permitted, for example, as a means to provide information to the regime about public opinions, recurring events are more likely to be seen as a threat to the current governing elite. Naturally, the use of violence by opposition actors generates a strong perception of threat. Lastly, groups that make claims or represent ideas that are extreme relative to the beliefs and norms of elites or society at large tend to generate threat perception in the government.[5] These forms of threat perception do not need to represent a real threat to regime power, merely be seen as such. For example, extreme conspiratorial beliefs or the existence of a large youth population have been linked to perceptions of threat and increases in repression regardless of actual target behavior.[6]

Although it is recognized that state repression is not universally applied to every protest movement and that states make strategic choices in their response to protest, the effect of state repression on future protest activity is less well understood.[7] There are some arguments addressing the effectiveness of the use of force. Usually these explore the conditions where the costs of state repression are so high as to make it useless in ensuring political survival. These arguments look at authoritarian states that seek legitimacy through democratic institutions or behavior. Because of the need to maintain an image of democracy, such states are restrained from relying too heavily on force.[8] This restraint evolves from both the need to maintain some level of democratic openness, and the incorporation of some opposition into the government itself, sacrificing coercive ability for the co-optation of former opposition members into the government.[9]

However, even regimes that are constrained in their freedom to repress are not immune from later needing to use it. The sought-after stabilization that comes from semi-democratic institutionalization can increase the intensity of repression when it is employed. Alternatively, domestic opposition movements may see a commitment to openness as a signal of regime weakness and concession, and increase civil resistance.[10] In these cases, a regime trades its ability to brutally suppress dissidence with violence in exchange for more stable regular politics. Doing so severely weakens their ability to resort to violence when existing institutional arrangements are insufficient to defuse a challenge.

Although these constraints may reduce the use of repression during times of protest, they do little to illustrate the effects of a repressive event. Some research suggests that repression merely increases the likelihood of further and more intense protest by increasing in-group unity and becoming a symbol for future mobilization.[11] These findings are not consistent. Others indicate that repression demobilizes. As a result of this situation, very little is understood about how state repression changes the incentives, behavior, and duration of protest movements. Davenport and Inman argue that this is the result of considering protest repression in isolation, ignoring the other forms of dissident behavior and state responses (for a summary, see Davenport and Inman 2012).[12]

Recent work has begun to consider the characteristics of dissident groups outside those directly involved in a protest movement but also face state repression. This tends to follow the idea that opposition members and movements need to develop skills and techniques to resist repression, enabling them to restart or maintain group cohesion and activity during and after a repressive move by the state. For example, Finkel (2015) finds that groups who

have experienced selective repression are better able to resist the onset of sustained state violence, while Bell and Murdie (2016) argue that involvement in a civil war contributes to the ability to resist future state repression.[13] The group's ability to resist repression, and the skills it builds during periods of repression, clearly affect the ability of those groups to carry out resistance in the future.

In light of this new importance placed on past group experiences with repression, it is important to remember that the state also has this previous experience. Although violence is certainly more noticeable and concerning to those interested in human rights protection, it is far from the only tactic by which the state can suppress mobilized opponents. Following recent work on the effectiveness of state repression in the context of other dissident behaviors, I argue for the importance of considering alternative state behaviors when it comes to dealing with a protest. Dissidents are capable of adapting or building skills necessary to survive state repression and preserve mobilization. States should be just as able to adapt to changes in protest behavior, the costs of violence, and build skills to resist protester mobilization. These behaviors both prevent the state from needing to rely on force, with its uncertain consequences, but still give the regime some ability to contain the growth of protest movements and preserve political survival. Below, I develop an explanation for how certain government public statements can effectively suppress the progress of a protest movement.

The role of rhetoric in resisting protests

The theorized utility of rhetoric for the purpose of demobilization is its nonviolent nature and ability to interrupt the framing used to mobilize protesters. It generalizes based on insights from recent detailed case analyses of non-violent repression in the United States and descriptions of public statements made by governments during protest events in the Arab Spring and Russia.[14] Examinations of the United States focused on how state security institutions, namely the FBI, interacted with dissident groups in an attempt to disrupt and demobilize the organization. Out of the many specific tactics employed by these institutions, security organizations carried out activities meant to convince potential dissidents to avoid participation in the dissident group.

In the Arab Spring and Russian cases, governments responded to protester calls for change with condemnation, negative depictions of participants, and justification of past regime behavior. With these specific cases in mind, I argue that public statements by regime actors are more than words issued out of a need to publicly respond to protest activity. These are part of a general strategy available to governments that seek to frame and undermine the discourse and framing efforts of protesters. If successful, demobilization follows.

It has long been recognized that protest movements live and die based on their ability to get support from the wider public. Without new members joining over the course of an event, or at least offering their support to the efforts of those on the streets, protests cannot expect to put enough pressure on a government to change its behavior. In order to have an effect on political outcomes, protests need to structure their complaints and demands in a way that convinces the public to adopt the movement's stance as their own.[15] Examinations of this framing usually take place from the perspective of the protest movement. In challenging the entrenched power of the state, attention has rightfully focused on how these initially small opposition groups generate the support

necessary to spur wider support and mobilization to eventually force changes in regime structure of behavior.

The central idea behind the suppressive role of negative rhetoric is that it constitutes the state's efforts to appropriately frame itself, its activities, and whatever opposition movement it is facing in order to ensure regime survival. Such framing will express itself through public statements. Government actors, relying on some access to or ability to gain the attention of the public, will issue statements designed to undermine the position or arguments of the opposition.[16] Such framing is meant to counter that of protest movements in an effort to sway public support away from active protesters.

Because this behavior relies on public statements, the regime's image projection of itself and protesters can take place simultaneously. Specific case studies have already examined the content of such statements. Regime framing during the Arab Spring protests consisted of government actors and pro-regime media who described protesters as foreign conspirators, thugs, and destabilizing elements.[17] Similarly, public statements coming out of governments during the Ukrainian Orange Revolution and 2011–2012 election protests in Russia declared that participants were under the direction of and funded by the United States.[18]

Regarding itself, a regime's rhetoric will seek to frame the government's position and behavior as beneficial to the survival and prosperity of the state or nation. It can point to regime successes, invoke nationalism, blame foreign enemies, but all statements will focus on broadcasting ideas that the regime's structure and behavior are the best possible arrangement. For example, a regime may point to some improvement in economic conditions or reference a rival as an external threat as justification for the maintenance of the status quo against demands of protesters. In short, this side of rhetoric will justify the regime's continued existence or behavior in the face of calls from opposition for change.

Regarding opposition actors, the regime's rhetoric will focus on framing the protesters in a negative light. As seen in the earlier illustration of Russia's reaction, this may take the form of casting participants as extreme elements, advocating demands that are either unimportant or dangerous to the country, or national security threats themselves. It attempts to get the public to adopt the idea that protesters are acting for reasons that will not benefit the populace as a whole. For example, a government will portray a protest movement as acting under the influence of foreign actors in an attempt to prevent potential participants from identifying with the claims from protesters that they are working in the best interest of the country, preventing that group from attaining wider support. This framing effort will attempt to downplay protester grievances as unimportant, while casting the actors themselves as those who hold interests contrary to what is best for the country. In general, this aspect of the regime's rhetoric is to downplay and delegitimize protester complaints to prevent the adoption of the dissident's frame by members of the public, preventing future mobilization and thereby suppressing protest.

Negative rhetoric is expected to work through two related mechanisms; convincing the public that protests are illegitimate and generating noise within the public discourse space to interrupt a protest's ability to acquire support. Convincing works by changing the position of potential participants regarding the movement itself. Instead of adopting the protesters' view of their complaints and actions, the public adopts that of the government. For example, an individual or civil society organization may believe statements that protests are fomented

by an outside actor and decide to avoid supporting the events. As observed in China, skepticism of official information does not necessarily imply a total dismissal of that information by members of the public.[19] Coupled with the fact that government propaganda can persist and get adopted by the public even in the absence of totally state-controlled environments, a government campaign consisting of negative statements about protest movements is likely to be effective in reducing their chances of success.

Nor is this phenomenon relegated to non-democracies. The form of party structure, journalistic cultures, and elite perceptions of media as opposition have all been observed to affect a democratic leader's access to media attention.[20] In democracies, where we assume the presence of diverse sources of information and political perspective make it more difficult for governments to strictly control narrative, we still observe demobilization when governments negatively talk about opposition movements.[21] While a full exploration of democratic institutions and the use of negative rhetoric are beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note that differences in the structure of democracy shape the kinds of information diffused to the population. As a result, democratic leaders have room to shape their public statements toward some intended effect on public discourse.

If members of the public are not convinced by regime statements, the additional information and interpretations of events may still be enough to deter participation. Instead of causing the public to rethink events, negative rhetoric simply gives more for people to sift through. Evaluations of costs, benefit, reference of events to personal ideology, and likelihood of movement success must be made in a more cluttered environment. As a result, potential participants will make different judgements compared to a less noisy space. Alternatively, the competing arguments may cause some individuals to simply cease paying attention until the situation becomes clearer, granting the government more time to resist protests while lengthening the time movements must remain salient to gain support. This may be especially potent if the actual link between government members issuing statements and the organization broadcasting such information is not obvious.

Rather than being a side-effect of mobilization, such statements are intentional efforts by regime actors to suppress opposition movements and prevent the extension of public support to those in the streets. If a regime's rhetoric is an intentional reaction to protest, it should have some direct effect on protest mobilization. In addition, while these types of statements have long been observed in discussions about a government's reaction to protest movements, their examination as a generally available strategy for the sake of repression has yet to be examined.

Following evidence that forceful and violent repressive tactics are largely substitutable —exchanging torture for preemptive arrests, for example—I extend this idea to the use of negative rhetoric.[22] Instead of just substituting one violent tactic with another, regimes can combine violence with discourse and still suppress mobilization. To this end I assume governments will take full advantage of any existing state media organizations, links to private media, control of information, and ease in obtaining media attention granted to public figures in order to negatively frame protests and induce demobilization.

Rhetoric itself has two advantages over the use of force. First, it is less visible domestically. Instead of being seen overtly using violence against citizens, thus engendering sympathy, the government can use its considerable advantage in gaining public and media attention to convince potential participants that protesters are working against the best interests of the country. The government can rally support from pro-regime members,

while convincing non-participating opposition members that their allies in the streets do not share the same values or hold inappropriate grievances.

A rhetorical response that demobilizes protests is also likely to attract less international attention than the use of force. While images of police forces assaulting and arresting masses of protesters is likely to garner a large amount of attention from international actors, rhetoric is less visible, and less likely to inspire condemnations resulting from human rights violations. Regime statements may also interrupt the extension of international support for the protest movements themselves, if those statements successfully add enough "noise" to international interpretations of the protest events so as to delay or prevent the extension of support from international actors to the dissidents.

Lastly, by undermining the claims and legitimacy of protesters, negative rhetoric serves the purpose of making the argument against accommodating the dissenters. If they are successfully cast as illegitimate, incorrect, or dangerous to the rest of the public, then protesters are not worthy targets of government reform. If they are illegitimate and threatening to the stability of the population and country, then the government can dismiss claims or demands for accommodation as dangerous.

The content of these statements, and their advantages over the overt use of force, lead to an expectation that negative regime statements can successfully demobilize protests. Because protest movements rely on support from the rest of the population—or at least the tacit approval of their actions by non-participating individuals—I expect increases in the regime's use of rhetoric to decrease the observed number of protests.

***H1a**: Increasing levels of regime statements criticizing protesters will decrease protest.*

If rhetoric is a successful tool in suppressing mobilization, increases in this behavior should be associated with fewer protest events overall. In this situation, the government is carrying out efforts to get the general public to view the current participants of the protest as illegitimate. In this regard, critical statements replace the need for more violent repression as members of the public choose to remove their support for opposition or refrain from becoming involved in protest events.

Rather than criticizing the grievances and behavior of a movement's participants, negative rhetoric may coincide with government statements that imply the future use of force. Instead of convincing potential participants that the group in the streets is illegitimate or dangerous, these statements carry a direct threat of the participant experiencing repression. When the government broadcasts its intent to repress future protests, current and potential participants anticipate that future opposition will make protest costlier, ultimately decreasing mobilization.

***H1b**: Increased threats of repression will decrease protest.*

Alternatively, repression and rhetoric may not be entirely substitutable strategies. Although a regime may engage in the kind of rhetoric described above, part of its efforts may also be directed at framing how the rest of the country views its use of force against protesters, justifying why a particular group "deserves" a violent state response. It can convince prospective participants that showing up will cause them to be associated with an illegitimate group, finding themselves on the wrong side of the law, and facing physical sanctions. This way, a government can both downplay the complaints of protesters and

prevent an increase in sympathy if it is simultaneously using force against those protests. In this sense, rhetoric's effectiveness may be conditioned by repression.

In addition, regime rhetoric may change the way targets perceive their experience of state violence. An individual may be willing to face state repression if they are confident that the wider public will remain sympathetic to their cause. If the regime's framing efforts have been successful in swaying the public's perception of the opposition, however, that same individual may perceive that they will experience state violence for no useful purpose and without the hope of mobilizing wider support.

In the case of accommodation, negative rhetoric can go beyond generating the perception that not only are protesters unsupportable and deserving of repression on their own merits. Negative rhetoric can also make the case for why protesters are undeserving of accommodation of any kind. If the participants and their claims are illegitimate, and accommodation of such a group is dangerous, then the government can rely on negative rhetoric to make a case that repression is the only acceptable response. In conjunction, then, a regime's rhetoric used alongside repression can serve to increase the perceived costs of participation in the protest.

***H2a**: Regime statements used alongside repression will decrease protest.*

Lastly, it is possible that the suppressing effect of rhetoric is the result of increased perceptions of threat by the protesting population. Governments can mix direct threats of repression alongside negative statements. In this situation, it is the threat of future violence that deters participation in protest events rather than the framing efforts about those events. Current uses of force reinforce the threat of future force credibility, so prospective participants become aware that repression will continue while witnessing examples of exactly how that force gets used. Given all this information, the combination of repressive threats and the use of repression itself are expected to strongly reduce the incidence of protest movements.

***H2b**: Repressive threats used alongside repression will decrease protest.*

Hypotheses 2a and 2b argue that, rather than directly causing demobilization, negative rhetoric targeting protesters or threats of repression interact with some use of force to jointly reduce protest. While talk might be ignored by an angry populace, state propaganda disproven, and violence used to rally a backlash against the state, negative rhetoric allows the government to simultaneously influence public perceptions that targets are legitimate while punishing and deterring protest participants.

The following section describes the empirical, cross-national tests designed to examine whether rhetoric is a viable strategy for states seeking to non-violently repress opposition. Given the causes and consequences of repressive violence discussed above, I assume that a government wants to successfully suppress dissent while minimizing the risks of a backlash—in the form of lost political legitimacy and increased mobilization—that come from using violent state repression.

Research design

I rely on the *Integrated Crisis Early Warning System* (ICEWS) machine coded event data to test the proposed relationships between regime rhetoric, repression, and protests. The independent variables of interest—*rhetoric, threaten repression*, and *repression*—consist of event counts derived from the CAMEO codes used to record events in ICEWS.[23] These data record "who did what to whom" and include physical actions and verbal statements issued by actors across individual, domestic, and international levels. This makes them ideal in measuring the types and number of statements issued by regime actors targeted at domestic opposition actors and the expected changes in protest.

The structure of the data allows the measurement of types of political behavior based on the source actor, target actor, and type of activity performed. For example, it records whether a civilian group's politically-motivated protest against the government was peaceful. In turn, it distinguishes between a large number of possible citizen-directed government behaviors, easily allowing the separation of varying repressive activities. ICEWS has the added advantage of recording events across a wider range of countries and over a longer time period—using 300 international and national news sources in English, French, Spanish, and Portuguese—allowing for a general, cross-nationally focused examination of rhetoric, protest, and repression.[24] Given these advantages, and the need to test the effect of a government's activity on a form of civilian activity, these data are used to construct the variables used in the empirical tests.

The dependent variable, *protest*, consists of all politically motivated demonstrations recorded by the relevant CAMEO codes that are performed by domestic civilian actors targeted at the domestic government. This construction intentionally excludes riots and labor strikes, focusing on peaceful anti-government protest that demand regime, policy, or leadership changes. It is constructed as a count of all recorded protest events at the monthly level, measuring the number of distinct protest events a country experienced in a particular month. A monthly specification prevents over-aggregation that comes from a country-year analysis, essentially capturing increased variation in protest and regime behavior.[25]

The primary independent variable *rhetoric*, is a monthly count of all statements made by government actors that are directed toward domestic, civilian, targets. These statements only count as negative rhetoric when they are coded as those that "criticize or denounce" the target actor—a specific event code contained in the ICEWS data. A regime's rhetoric is designed to reduce the support that protests receive from the public. Since this requires directly addressing the opposition's complaints, or the current participants, measuring the events where government actors denounce domestic civilian counterparts will capture such behavior while avoiding the counting of other statements not carried out for this rhetorical purpose. Because public statements can be made across levels of government, this coding records all instances of critical statements from government actors at any level of government. This captures the negative statements made in direct reference to a domestic protest event or group.

In the context of a protest movement, a government's statements may not always be targeted at the framing efforts or the restriction of public support for the protest event. Regime actors can always publicly threaten the use of force in an effort to reduce the size or duration of the protests. In this case, the government is threatening the future use of force to encourage the cessation of opposition rather than attacking the reasons for

protesting themselves. Threats against civilians are inherently higher intensity than the denunciation of a civilian group or its actions. As a result, *threaten repression* counts as a separate variable in all instances in a country month where state actors issued a statement that threatened the use of force against a civilian actor. Like the event code used to count the number of denunciations made by the regime, *threaten repression* is a specific event code contained within the larger ICEWS data.

Because the use of negative rhetoric is theorized as a replacement for the use of force, it is necessary to account for the use of force and violence against protests. The *repression* variable consists of a monthly count of all ICEWS recorded events that involve a government actor using repressive force against a domestic protest. This variable is distinct from other forms of non-protest repression, such as mass arrests, killings, or torture because CAMEO explicitly distinguishes the use of force against a protest movement.[26]

To test Hypothesis 2 regarding the conditional effect of rhetoric and repression, additional independent variables containing the interaction of *rhetoric* and *repression* and *threaten repression*[27] and *repression* are created. In models containing the interaction of rhetoric or threats and repression, the constituent terms are left in the model. Interpretation of effects will be performed on the interaction term.[28]

Controls for repressive activities outside of protest repression are also necessary. First, these controls act as measures of human rights conditions within the country-month without relying on country-year aggregated indexes such as CIRI.[29] Second, this disaggregates possible repressive behaviors that take place independent of a protest event since ICEWS codes events like these during a protest as repression. This accounts for variation in the range of repressive behaviors available to a regime outside the use of protest repression; the activities it uses during normal times to control dissent. It is understood that regimes have a range of possible strategies for dealing with opposition, and that these strategies are substitutable.[30] Because rhetoric is a substitute for force, and repression can be carried out in an attempt to prevent mobilization before a protest begins—thus removing the need for protest repression—it is necessary to account for this range of alternative behaviors.

As a result, the variables: *arrests, assaults, deadly assaults*[31] *abductions, torture*, and *mass killings* consist of monthly counts of these events if they were carried out by government actors against domestic civilian actors. As with the construction of the rhetoric and protest variables, the exact CAMEO codes used to distinguish these events is described in Table A1 of the Appendix.

Two additional controls, *administrative sanctions* and *unspecified coercion*, are included to measure other state behaviors that may influence the observed count of protest. Administrative sanctions account for the suspension of a domestic civilian group's ability to participate in politics. While these restrictions may be deployed by a regime seeking to limit dissident involvement in formal politics, they also restrict the avenues for these groups to put formal pressure on the government, potentially leaving mobilization the only remaining option. In the interest of accounting for as much repression as possible, both targeted at protests and within the state in general, and to account for acts of coercion that may have been missed by the automated event coding, the unspecified coercion variable controls for those acts. They are declared by the source news reports as coercive, but where details about the kind of coercion were lacking and could not be distinguished when ICEWS data were generated. Although there is reason to be concerned

about multicollinearity as a result of a violent regime relying on all repressive behaviors, compared to a more open regime, variance inflation tests indicated that this issue was not present in the monthly count data.[32]

For all models, I use a monthly level of analysis from the years 2001–2014 across 196 countries. All variables are aggregated to the monthly level. The count nature of the dependent variable, *protest*, and a high level of dispersion typical of most count data requires the use of a negative binomial model. Additionally, the monthly specification of the model generates many zero counts. Approximately 86 percent of the observations for the count dependent variable are zero. This high proportion implies that a zero-inflated negative binomial model is necessary. I specify the inflation stage for the zero-inflated negative binomial, which estimates variables' influence on the likelihood of a country month experiencing zero protests, with only the variable for rhetoric. This will estimate the effect that rhetoric has on the likelihood of a protest starting, before estimating rhetoric's effect on the number of protests in the second stage. For all models, temporal dependence is controlled for with a lagged dependent variable.

Findings

Model 1, Table 1, presents the direct results from the zero-inflated model examining the count of protests at different levels of rhetoric. Given the monthly level of analysis, and the possibility of rhetoric's effects extending over a period of months, I lag the count of rhetoric by a month.[33]

There is mixed support for the expected demobilizing effect of a regime's rhetoric of Hypothesis 1a. Results from the inflation model indicate that increased levels of regime rhetoric decrease the probability that a given country-month will experience a protest. This implies that when no protests are already underway, rhetoric suppresses the onset of a protest. However, this negative relationship only exists before the onset of protests. In the second stage count model, contrary to expectations, a government's repressive public statements are significantly associated with a higher protest count. If protests are present, increases in negative government statements are associated with more protests.

Unsurprisingly, the use of repression increases the observed count of protests.[34] This is consistent with many approaches regarding the generalized effectiveness of protest repression.[35] Despite the use of force against the movement, states cannot expect that this will be sufficient to demobilize the protest. Instead, the use of violence against civilians may be perceived as inappropriate state behavior, used against the state to drive an increase in mobilization.

In a similar manner to the use of repression, the threat of force also has a significant and positive relationship with protest, although statistical confidence is weaker. Additionally, most of the non-protest oriented forms of repression are associated with increases in protest. The use of violence against civilians, from assaults to mass killing, largely increases the observed number of protests. Only higher levels of arrests, likely due to the detaining of those most likely to protest, decreases mobilization. Under this disaggregated consideration of human rights abuses and repression, only the increased use of torture has no relationship with the number of protests. Although the unspecified coercive acts count recorded from ICEWS's residual category is unrelated to the level of protest, the lack of information about what these acts are tells little about the variable's effect on protest mobilization.

Table 1. Conditional effects of rhetoric, threats, and repression on protest.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Variables	Direct Effects	Rhetoric Interaction	Threats Interaction	Both Interactions
Rhetoric*Repression	–	−0.019***	–	−0.019***
	–	(0.002)	–	(0.002)
Threaten*Repression	–	–	−0.109	−0.105
	–	–	(0.079)	(0.077)
Rhetoric	0.019***	0.026***	0.019***	0.026***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Rhetoric_{t-1}	0.010*	0.007	0.010*	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Repression	0.399***	0.559***	0.404***	0.563***
	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.033)
Repression_{t-1}	0.058**	0.049*	0.058**	0.049*
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Threaten Repression	0.221*	0.196	0.300**	0.271*
	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.142)	(0.141)
Arrests	−0.003***	−0.001**	−0.003***	−0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0010	(0.001)
Assaults	0.059***	0.075***	0.058***	0.074***
	(0.175)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Abductions	0.097***	0.010***	0.097***	0.100***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.097)	(0.028)
Administrative Sanctions	0.240***	0.233***	0.240***	0.232***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Deadly Assaults	0.083	0.080	0.083	0.081
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.058)
Torture	−0.012	−0.022	−0.012	−0.218
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Mass Killings	0.180***	0.179***	0.179***	0.179**
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Unspecified Coercion	0.029	0.021	0.029	0.021
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Protest_{t-1}	0.129***	0.136***	0.129***	0.136***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	−0.643	−0.714	−0.644	−0.715
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.038)
		Inflation Model		
Rhetoric	−1.599***	−1.633***	−1.598***	−1.632***
	(0.089)	(0.934)	(0.089)	(0.094)
Constant	1.347	1.297	1.347	1.297
	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.049)
N	27707	27707	27707	27707
Log-Likelihood	−15499.73	−15455.26	−15499.02	−15454.58

Significance levels: *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%

Model 2 presents results from a zero-inflated negative binomial estimation of the interaction of regime rhetoric and protest repression, while Model 3 contains only the interaction of threats and repression. Model 4 contains both interaction terms, and is used to generate the substantive effects presented in Figures 1 and 2. The results remain



Figure 1. Expected protests as regime rhetoric increases.

consistent across all models.[36] In all three models, repression and rhetoric condition each other to lead to a decrease in protests. However, the threat of repression despite its direct implication that a protest will experience force, has no statistically significant conditional effect on protest.

Overall, these results provide support for the conditional relationships between protest, a regime's rhetorical statements, and repression found in Hypothesis 2a. There is little support for H1a, H1b or H2b in these models. Higher levels of rhetoric make it less likely that a country will experience a protest. But, once protests have begun, protesters and regimes concurrently escalate their activity. Alone, rhetoric and repression appear to increase mobilization. However, the coexistence of rhetoric and repression—but not threats—leads to a decrease in protest. The use of force alongside the criticism of opposition actors are both required for a government's repressive behavior to be effective.

Directly (Model 1), rhetoric and repression both had positive influences on the level of protest. It is only when considered together that the expected negative relationship becomes apparent. To better illustrate the conditional effects, Figure 1 presents marginal effects across the ranges of rhetoric and repression where the relationship was statistically significant.

At low levels of rhetoric, where few public statements are made, and repression is used, there is an increase in mobilization. This effect reverses, holding the number of repressive



Figure 2. Expected protests as repression increases.

events constant, as rhetoric increases. In both of these cases (Figure 1a,b), rhetoric alone has a significant but substantively tiny effect on protest. At higher levels of rhetoric, Figure 1c, the simultaneous use of rhetoric and repression suppresses mobilization to almost zero, while rhetoric alone begins to increase protest. However, once a regime begins making larger numbers of statements while maintaining repression, protest begins to fall. Figure 2 presents the same findings from the perspective of the range of observed repressive acts.

Figure 2a illustrates that, across lower levels of repression and small amounts of negative regime statements, mobilization can be expected to increase. At a mid-range level, observations of repression (Figure 2b) rhetoric serves to remove the positive influence that repression has on protest. When the regime is engaging in large scale rhetorical campaigns (Figure 2c), a few repressed protests have a largely negative effect on protest.

From the perspective of the regime, given these results, using one of these strategies alone can, at best, have no effect on mobilization. At worst, it increases the amount of protests. Negative rhetoric must be used in sufficient quantities to justify the extant use of force, and to convince potential supporters of the opposition that protests are not worth their attention and participation. If the regime wants to successfully suppress mobilization, it must simultaneously repress and de-legitimize the protesters.

Discussion

This change in protest given the level of rhetoric across time resembles the "revolutionary spiral" of protest and repression described by Goldstone and Tilly (2001).[37] In addition, single-country case analyses, for example Greene's (2014) analysis of civil society in Moscow, have found that protesters and regimes can engage in escalating rhetorical battles that usually favor the ability of opposition to survive.[38] However, as optimistic as these cases are about the future of mobilization in these countries, the results presented here indicate a regime can suppress mobilization both before a protest begins—preventing mobilization—and can suppress protests once they are under way as long as the regime is able to engage in sufficient amounts of rhetoric while using some violence.

Although higher levels of rhetoric are associated with the observations that do not experience protests, this is not quite the same as demobilizing an already active protest. Rhetoric appears to prevent protest onset but, when used alone, the count model indicates that increases in rhetoric are associated with higher levels of protest. It is not unreasonable to expect rhetoric and protest to increase together. As a protest initially mobilizes, and begins its framing efforts, a regime will need to increase its public statements to address the crisis. Assuming some initial framing is successful and protest events spread with the early successes, there will be a corresponding increase in rhetoric. Despite the government's monopoly on information within the state (Edmond 2013), hardcore supporters or those proximate to the protest location may still be able to access information from the protests, but the loss of initiative by the state during this conflict appears to prevent negative rhetoric alone from suppressing an event in progress.

The access advantage of the state likely serves two benefits to the regime that enables the observed effect of negative rhetoric. First, the simple broadcasting of public statements to the populace can serve to delegitimize protester complaints in regions where no protests have yet mobilized, even if they have begun elsewhere. In that sense, the government can get its narrative out first, cast the protesters in the distant location as hostile or working against the best interests of the country, and prevent the spread of protester frames.

In the case of repression, this advantage allows a regime to carry out the use of force against a protest, and simultaneously justify why that behavior should not draw the ire of the rest of the population. With this strategy, a government can attempt to block the ability of a protest movement to use the violent behavior of the regime to garner increased support.

Interestingly, the stated threat of repression does not have a conditional effect on repression. This may be the result of threats acting as a weaker form of force that is still capable of being used by protesters to rally support, but will not do much to de-legitimize the movement. A government that overtly threatens to use force may still be perceived as violating the rights of its citizens, or attempting to suppress legitimate opposition if those threats do not coexist with some attacks against the legitimacy of the protest itself. In addition, the threat of force may simply serve as a warning to protesters that violence is coming. This allows the movement to prepare, either changing its tactics to better outlast state repression, increasing its domestic framing efforts, or seeking international attention in the hope of preventing repression.

Because threats may allow adaptation, and violence brings increased mobilization, these findings serve to emphasize the importance of a direct rhetorical attack by the regime against protest movements. Simply going after behavior without justification appears to harm the regime's chances of controlling opposition, so the government needs to either convince supporters that the reasons for the opposition are illegitimate. A government acting against a small, existentially dangerous, or illegitimate group will not look as violent as one that attacks people for simply having grievances. If the government is successful in its rhetorical efforts, it has been able to convince potential protesters that in addition to facing increased costs from protesting and that the group facing state violence is somehow not worthy of public sympathies. In this context, the state can simultaneously get away with violence, block—or at least delay—the negative consequences of that violence, and prevent its behavior from being used as a mobilizational tool against it by those already in the streets.

Conclusion

Addressing the conflicting findings of the literature regarding the effectiveness of state repression, and the need to better understand non-violent repressive mechanisms (Davenport 2007), this paper has sought to describe and measure the effects a regime's rhetorical statements have on mobilization.[39] These statements can address the regime's structure and behavior to prove the need for its continued survival, or directly attack the grievances and behavior of a protest movement to de-legitimize its framing efforts and prevent its attainment of wider public support. Because this tactic relies on public statements rather than attention grabbing violence, negative rhetoric is an important substitute for force, and the way that force is perceived by targets and bystanders.

In sum, a government's rhetoric has a mixed effect on protest. While it is associated with increased observations of protest directly, it suppresses mobilization when used in concert with force. Rather than acting as a pure substitute for the use of force, the presence of both rhetoric and repression appears necessary to suppress protests and prevent repression from increasing mobilization. With this in mind, there are several extensions to this project that would benefit research in this vein.

This is again illustrated by the example of Russia used in the introduction. When repression was finally used to get the remaining protesters from 2011 off the streets, there was a general lack of backlash from the wider Russian population. Indeed, the image of the regime from these events combined with increasing public attention to state media sources, led to an increase in public approval of the government after the 2014 events in Ukraine.[40]

Future research may benefit from disaggregating the temporal frame of the data used in these tests. Although a monthly framework allows for more variation in the event counts, it may still over-aggregate the rapid changes in protest activity and the regime's response. Many protest movements do not span the course of several months, so this analysis might have a bias for those bigger movements, like the Arab Spring, leading to regime failure, suppressing the effects of rhetorical statements. It is possible that, for shorter duration or smaller protests, the regime's rhetoric has a stronger effect; quickly setting public discourse against the efforts of a few committed dissidents. Because the ICEWS data are coded with

exact event dates, it should be possible to construct weekly event counts, although this comes at the cost of significantly increasing the number of zero counts within the data.

This time frame consideration may also be addressed by focusing on rhetoric's effects on mobilization during a protest movement itself. Before an event begins, rhetoric may succeed in preventing mobilization on its own as prospective protesters see themselves as isolated from other supporters. However, after a protest has begun, potential participants can reference the regime's statements against the calls to action and framing carried out by those on the streets. As a result, rhetoric's success alongside repression may be very different from its effects on protests after such an event has already begun.

Table A2 in the Appendix presents a robustness test of the models presented here that takes a first step at examining the possibility of different effects depending on the presence or absence of a pre-existing protest movement. It is constructed identically to Model 4, but limits the sample to only those country-months where at least one protest was observed. While the results do not differ from those presented in Table 1, future work will make use of dedicated dissident movement data—such as NAVCO—to better examine how rhetoric and repression affect mobilization during a protest event.[41]

Another future effort may benefit from the consideration of dyadic protest-government interactions. Although ICEWS codes actor to actor events, it does not easily record whether those events are reactions to future actions. For example, ICEWS detects when a protest against a government actor took place, but does not easily allow the determination of whether a specific act of government repression within the same country was directed at that event. Distinguishing between the types of domestic actor targeted, rather than general criticism of domestic civilian actors in the context of protest, will better measure the reasons for which a rhetorical statement is made while isolating those critical statements made solely for repressive purposes. In this context, it may be better to move from constructing counts out of the raw ICEWS recorded events to focus on their dyadic aggregation data—although this precludes an analysis beyond the monthly level.[42]

While this study focused on the interactions between negative rhetoric, repression, and protest, it did not examine the potential benefits of negative rhetoric in shaping how governments accommodate protesters. A government may issue negative rhetoric in order to diminish calls for accommodation by changing how those making claims are perceived by the general public—such as casting them as a national security threat. However, negative rhetoric may also be used as part of efforts to engender or take advantage of fractionalization within the protesting group, or to justify why a certain set of accommodations short of full concession are acceptable.

Future work should also interrogate the differences in the ways leaders can access media to carry their negative rhetoric. An authoritarian government that directly sanctions or outright controls media organizations will likely be able to shape the entire debate by simply overwhelming the While democratic leaders also have great access to media attention, they must compete in a more crowded environment.

Early evidence from robustness tests accounting for country-year variables such as regime type and media freedom indicate a complex relationship. Compared to autocracies, it appears that democratic governments are less likely to use negative rhetoric in general. On the other hand, open media environments lead to more reluctance to employ negative rhetoric, but a higher number of statements when it is used.[43] These early results indicate

that the different environments facing authoritarian and democratic leaders will change the amount—and content—of their negative rhetoric.

A final extension involves the role of the international community in the success of regime rhetoric. This analysis has focused entirely on the domestic side of the dissident-government interaction. If the regime is capable of blocking the acquisition of domestic support for a protest, it may be able to do the same for transnational actors. Protesters seek international support as protection from or leverage against the state, so regimes have an incentive to attempt to prevent this while seeking their own support from their international allies.[44] These factors, and events such as shaming, sanctions, and intervention, may drive the regime to seek a rhetorical response before risking force against protests in an attempt to maintain power without attracting too much attention. Additionally, states may seek to use their critical statements to interrupt the boomerang process associated with dissidents seeking international support. If rhetoric is successful and altering the way domestic populations interpret a protest movement, it may do the same for states.

Generally, the results indicate that a closer look at the interaction between, repression, protest, and how governments talk is warranted. The presence of repression conditions negative rhetoric's significant and negative relationship with protest, but these are likely not the only conditional effects that matter. Both subnational and international differences between these factors may alter the effect rhetoric and repression have on protest. These findings from the interacted model imply that, instead of being purely substitutable strategies, and regimes may need to engage in a whole range of behaviors simultaneously in order to successfully suppress mobilization.

This work contributes to the understanding of non-violent repression, the varied responses states have at their disposal to address an opposition movement, and begins to adjust the consideration of state repression in the context of other activities. Although several extensions will serve to strengthen this analysis, there is evidence for both a direct and conditional role of the non-violent repression of protest through the regime's use of its ability to make public statements.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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33. Additional lags of rhetoric and repression were tested, but were not statistically significant.
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Table A1. ICEWS expanded CAMEO codes used for variable construction.

Variable	ICEWS Code	Description
Rhetoric	111	Criticize or denounce
	112	Accuse
	113	Rally opposition against
	114	Complain officially
Protests	141	Demonstrate
	1411	Resignation of leadership
	1412	Demonstration, policy reform
	1413	Protest, political rights
	1414	Demonstrate, institution change
	144	Block passage
	1442	Block, policy change
	1443	Block, political rights
	1444	Block, institution change
Repression	175	Use repression – during protest
Threaten Repression	137	Threat to use force against dissidents
Arrests	173	Arrest, detain
Assaults	182	Physically assault
Deadly Assaults	1823	Kill by physical assault
Torture	1822	Torture
Coercion	170	Unspecified coercion
Administrative Sanction	171	Seize, damage property
	172	Impose administrative sanction
	1721	Restrict political freedom
	1722	Ban political party
	1723	Impose curfew
Abductions	181	Abduct, hijack, hostage
Mass Killings	202	Engage mass killing

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Appendix

Table A2. Effect of rhetoric and repression on protests during protest movements.

DV: Count of Protests	
Rhetoric*Repression	−0.005***
	(0.001)
Threaten*Repression	0.0002
	(0.037)
Rhetoric	0.019***
	(0.003)
$Rhetoric_{t-1}$	−0.009***
	(0.003)
Repression	0.225***
	(0.014)
$Repression_{t-1}$	−0.001
	(0.014)
Threaten Repression	0.07
	(0.088)
Arrests	−0.0001
	(0.0003)
Assaults	0.041***
	(0.009)
Abductions	0.037**
	(0.016)
Administrative Sanctions	0.109***
	(0.013)
Deadly Assaults	−0.002
	(0.030)
Torture	−0.010
	(0.018)
Mass Killings	0.070***
	(0.024)
Unspecified Coercive Acts	0.018
	(0.015)
$Protest_{t-1}$	0.054***
	(0.003)
Constant	0.605***
	(0.018)
N	27707

Significance levels: *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%

Table A3. Effect of lagged rhetoric and repression on protests.

DV: Count of Protests	Model 6	Model 7
Rhetoric*Repression$_{t-1}$	−0.017***	–
	(0.002)	–
Threaten*Repression$_{t-1}$	−0.198*	–
	(0.112)	–
Rhetoric$_{t-1}$*Repression$_{t-1}$	–	−0.013***
	–	(0.001)
Threaten$_{t-1}$*Repression$_{t-1}$	–	−0.171*
	–	(0.085)
Rhetoric	0.030***	–
	(0.005)	–
Rhetoric$_{t-1}$	−0.001	0.021***
	(0.005)	(0.004)
Repression$_{t-1}$	0.233***	0.203***
	(0.038)	(0.036)
Threaten Repression	0.329**	–
	(0.132)	–
Threaten Repression$_{t-1}$	–	0.252
	–	(0.154)
Arrests	−0.002***	−0.001*
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)
Assaults	0.139***	0.136***
	(0.018)	(0.017)
Abductions	0.090***	0.086***
	(0.028)	(0.028)
Administrative Sanctions	0.227***	0.234***
	(0.025)	(0.024)
Deadly Assaults	0.080	0.081
	(0.059)	(0.059)
Torture	−0.010	−0.009
	(0.035)	(0.035)
Mass Killings	0.197***	0.196***
	(0.067)	(0.066)
Unspecified Coercion	0.117***	0.127***
	(0.031)	(0.032)
Protest$_{t-1}$	0.143***	0.141***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	−0.618***	−0.562***
	(0.038)	(0.036)
Inflation Model		
Rhetoric	−1.590***	−1.554***
	(0.090)	(0.085)
Constant	1.338***	1.386***
	(0.048)	(0.046)
N	27707	23760
Log-Likelihood	−15648.21	−15664.77

Significance levels: *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%

Table A4. Effect of rhetoric on protests, threat control.

DV: Count of Protests	Model 8
Rhetoric*Repression	−0.019***
	(0.002)
Rhetoric	0.026***
	(0.005)
$Rhetoric_{t-1}$	−0.001
	(0.005)
$Repression_{t-1}$	0.049*
	(0.029)
Threaten Repression	0.196
	(0.126)
Arrests	−0.001**
	(0.0006)
Assaults	0.075***
	(0.017)
Abductions	0.010***
	(0.027)
Administrative Sanctions	0.233***
	(0.024)
Deadly Assaults	0.080
	(0.058)
Torture	−0.022
	(0.034)
Mass Killings	0.179***
	(0.067)
Unspecified Coercion	0.021
	(0.028)
$Protest_{t-1}$	0.136***
	(0.008)
Constant	−0.714***
	(0.038)
Inflation Model	
Rhetoric	−1.633***
	(0.094)
Constant	1.297***
	(0.049)
N	27,707
Log-Likelihood	−15,455.26

Significance levels: *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%

Table A5. Variance inflation factor results.

	VIF			
Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Rhetoric*Repression	–	1.80	–	2.38
Threaten*Repression	–	–	1.79	1.26
Rhetoric	5.53	5.57	5.53	5.57
Repression	1.19	1.49	1.21	1.51
Threaten Repression	1.01	1.01	1.20	1.20
Arrests	3.86	4.40	3.86	4.40
Assaults	1.93	1.97	1.93	1.97
Abductions	1.36	1.36	1.36	1.36
Administrative Sanctions	1.29	1.30	1.29	1.30
Deadly Assaults	1.11	1.11	1.11	1.11
Torture	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30
Mass Killings	1.02	1.02	1.05	1.05
Unspecified Coercive Acts	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20

Table A6. Rhetoric's effect on protest, controlling for regime type.

	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16
	Direct Effect		Rhetoric Interaction		Threats Interaction		Both Interactions	
Variables	Regime Inflate	Regime Count	Regime Inflate	Regime Count	Regime Inflate	Regime Count	Regime Inflate	Regime Count
Rhetoric*Repression	–	–	−0.019***	−0.019***	–	–	−0.019***	−0.019***
	–	–	(0.002)	(0.002)	–	–	(0.002)	(0.002)
Threaten*Repression	–	–	–	–	−0.108*	−0.111*	−0.104*	−0.107*
	–	–	–	–	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.077)
Rhetoric	0.019***	0.019***	0.026***	0.026***	0.019***	0.018***	0.026***	0.025***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
$Rhetoric_{t-1}$	0.008*	0.007*	0.005*	0.004*	0.008*	0.007*	0.005*	0.004*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Repression	0.398***	0.400***	0.554***	0.557***	0.402***	0.404***	0.559***	0.561***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.034)
$Repression_{t-1}$	0.057**	0.059**	0.047*	0.050**	0.057**	0.059**	0.047*	0.049**
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Threaten Repression	0.225**	0.232**	0.199*	0.206*	0.309**	0.317**	0.278**	0.287**
	(0.131)	(0.132)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.148)	(0.148)
Arrests	−0.002***	−0.002***	−0.001**	−0.001**	−0.002***	−0.002***	−0.001**	−0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Assaults	0.057***	0.059***	0.073***	0.076***	0.056***	0.059***	0.072***	0.075***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Abductions	0.092***	0.092***	0.094***	0.095***	0.092***	0.092***	0.095***	0.095***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Administrative Sanctions	0.246***	0.250***	0.238***	0.243***	0.246***	0.250***	0.238***	0.243***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Deadly Assaults	0.082*	0.086*	0.079*	0.083*	0.082*	0.086*	0.079*	0.083*
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.059)
Torture	−0.013	−0.012	−0.024*	−0.023	−0.013	−0.011	−0.024*	−0.022
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Mass Killings	0.196***	0.209***	0.195***	0.209***	0.196***	0.209***	0.195***	0.208***
	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.068)

Unspecified Coercion	0.036*	0.039*	0.028*	0.031*	0.036*	0.039*	0.029*	0.031*
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Regime Type	–	0.008**	–	0.008**	–	0.008**	–	0.008**
	–	(0.003)	–	(0.003)	–	(0.003)	–	(0.003)
$Protest_{t-1}$	0.127***	0.129***	0.134***	0.135***	0.127***	0.129***	0.134***	0.135***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	−0.645***	−0.769***	−0.715***	−0.848***	−0.646***	−0.771***	−0.715***	−0.850***
	(0.038)	(0.069)	(0.039)	(0.069)	(0.038)	(0.069)	(0.039)	(0.069)
Inflation Model								
Rhetoric	−1.463***	−1.465***	−1.495***	−1.498***	−1.462***	−1.465***	−1.495***	−1.498***
	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.095)	(0.096)
Regime Type	−0.022***	–	−0.023***	–	−0.022***	–	−0.023***	–
	(0.005)	–	(0.005)	–	(0.005)	–	(0.005)	–
Constant	1.476***	1.141***	1.432***	1.089***	1.475***	1.141***	1.431***	1.088***
	(0.091)	(0.052)	(0.092)	(0.053)	(0.091)	(0.052)	(0.092)	(0.053)
N	23,697	23,697	23,697	23,697	23,697	23,697	23,697	23,697

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.1, * p < 0.5

Table A7. Rhetoric's effect on protest, controlling for media freedom.

	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21	Model 22	Model 23	Model 24
	Direct Effect		Rhetoric Interaction		Threats Interaction		Both Interactions	
Variables	Media Inflate	Media Count	Media Inflate	Media Count	Media Inflate	Media Count	Media Inflate	Media Count
Rhetoric*Repression	–	–	−0.019***	−0.019***	–	–	−0.019***	−0.019***
	–	–	(0.002)	(0.002)	–	–	(0.002)	(0.002)
Threaten*Repression	–	–	–	–	−0.108*	−0.114*	−0.104*	−0.109*
	–	–	–	–	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.076)
Rhetoric	0.019***	0.020***	0.026***	0.027***	0.019***	0.019***	0.026***	0.026***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
$Rhetoric_{t-1}$	0.009**	0.012**	0.007*	0.009**	0.010**	0.012**	0.007*	0.009**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Repression	0.396***	0.393***	0.553***	0.550***	0.400***	0.397***	0.558***	0.554***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.033)
$Repression_{t-1}$	0.057**	0.053**	0.048**	0.044*	0.057**	0.053**	0.048**	0.043*
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Threaten Repression	0.224**	0.230**	0.199*	0.204*	0.302**	0.312**	0.274**	0.282**
	(0.126)	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.141)
Arrests	−0.002***	−0.002***	−0.001**	−0.001**	−0.002***	−0.002***	−0.001**	−0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Assaults	0.059***	0.053***	0.074***	0.070***	0.058***	0.052***	0.074***	0.069***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Abductions	0.095***	0.083***	0.098***	0.085***	0.096***	0.083***	0.099***	0.085***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Administrative Sanctions	0.239***	0.240***	0.231***	0.232***	0.239***	0.239***	0.231***	0.232***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Deadly Assaults	0.082*	0.071*	0.079*	0.068*	0.082*	0.072*	0.080*	0.068*
	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Torture	−0.014	−0.029*	−0.024*	−0.039*	−0.013	−0.029*	−0.023*	−0.038*
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Mass Killings	0.180***	0.175***	0.179***	0.175***	0.179***	0.175***	0.179***	0.174***
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)

Unspecified Coercion	0.028*	0.024*	0.020*	0.016	0.029*	0.024*	0.021*	0.016
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Media Freedom	–	−0.298***	–	−0.302***	–	−0.299***	–	−0.303***
	–	(0.043)	–	(0.043)	–	(0.043)	–	(0.043)
$Protest_{t-1}$	0.128***	0.126***	0.135***	0.132***	0.128***	0.126***	0.135***	0.132***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	−0.635***	−0.567***	−0.706***	−0.636***	−0.636***	−0.568***	−0.706***	−0.637***
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.039)
Inflation Model								
Rhetoric	−1.568***	−1.580***	−1.602***	−1.612***	−1.567***	−1.579***	−1.601***	−1.611***
	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Media Freedom	0.581***	–	0.586***	–	0.581***	–	0.586***	–
	(0.073)	–	(0.074)	–	(0.073)	–	(0.074)	–
Constant	1.177***	1.320***	1.126***	1.270***	1.176***	1.319***	1.125***	1.270***
	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.054)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.054)	(0.049)
N	27,297	27,297	27,297	27,297	27,297	27,297	27,297	27,297

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.1, * p < 0.5

Table A8. Rhetoric's effect on protest, controlling for GDP growth.

	Model 25	Model 26	Model 27	Model 28	Model 29	Model 30	Model 31	Model 32
	Direct Effect		Rhetoric Interaction		Threats Interaction		Both Interactions	
Variables	Growth Inflate	Growth Count	Growth Inflate	Growth Count	Growth Inflate	Growth Count	Growth Inflate	Growth Count
Rhetoric*Repression	–	–	−0.018***	−0.018***	–	–	−0.018***	−0.018***
	–	–	(0.002)	(0.002)	–	–	(0.002)	(0.002)
Threaten*Repression	–	–	–	–	−0.106*	−0.107*	−0.101*	−0.103*
	–	–	–	–	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Rhetoric	0.022***	0.022***	0.029***	0.029***	0.022***	0.022***	0.029***	0.029***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
$Rhetoric_{t-1}$	0.006*	0.007*	0.004*	0.004*	0.006*	0.007*	0.004*	0.004*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Repression	0.389***	0.387***	0.542***	0.541***	0.393***	0.391***	0.546***	0.546***
	(0.027)	−0.027	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.033)
$Repression_{t-1}$	0.054**	0.053**	0.045*	0.043*	0.054**	0.052**	0.044*	0.043*
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Threaten Repression	0.241**	0.244**	0.216**	0.220**	0.318**	0.323**	0.291**	0.296**
	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.140)
Arrests	−0.002***	−0.002***	−0.001**	−0.001**	−0.002***	−0.002***	−0.001**	−0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Assaults	0.058***	0.061***	0.074***	0.076***	0.058***	0.060***	0.073***	0.075***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Abductions	0.098***	0.101***	0.101***	0.104***	0.098***	0.101***	0.102***	0.104***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Administrative Sanctions	0.240***	0.245***	0.232***	0.237***	0.240***	0.245***	0.232***	0.237***
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Deadly Assaults	0.075*	0.076*	0.071*	0.072*	0.075*	0.076*	0.072*	0.072*
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Torture	−0.015	−0.012	−0.025*	−0.023	−0.014	−0.011	−0.024*	−0.022
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Mass Killings	0.188**	0.197**	0.192**	0.202**	0.187**	0.197**	0.192**	0.201**
	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.102)

Unspecified Coercion	0.030*	0.032*	0.022*	0.024*	0.030*	0.032*	0.022*	0.024*
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
GDP Growth	–	−0.010***	–	−0.010***	–	−0.010***	–	−0.010***
	–	(0.002)	–	(0.002)	–	(0.002)	–	(0.002)
$Protest_{t-1}$	0.120***	0.118***	0.126***	0.125***	0.120***	0.118***	0.126***	0.125***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	−0.622***	−0.592***	−0.693***	−0.663***	−0.623***	−0.592***	−0.693***	−0.663***
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Inflation Model								
Rhetoric	−1.565***	−1.578***	−1.597***	−1.611***	−1.565***	−1.577***	−1.597***	−1.610***
	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.091)	(0.093)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.091)	(0.093)
GDP Growth	0.013***	–	0.013***	–	0.013***	–	0.013***	–
	(0.005)	–	(0.005)	–	(0.005)	–	(0.005)	–
Constant	1.325***	1.370***	1.276***	1.320***	1.324***	1.369***	1.275***	1.320***
	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.049)
N	26,516	26,516	26,516	26,516	26,516	26,516	26,516	26,516

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.1, * p < 0.5

Table A9. Rhetoric's effects on protest, controlling for regime, media, and GDP growth.

	Model 33	Model 34	Model 35	Model 36	Model 37	Model 38	Model 39	Model 40
	Direct Effect		Rhetoric Interaction		Threats Interaction		Both Interactions	
Variables	Inflation	Count	Inflation	Count	Inflation	Count	Inflation	Count
Rhetoric*Repression	–	–	−0.018***	−0.018***	–	–	−0.018***	−0.018***
	–	–	(0.002)	(0.002)	–	–	(0.002)	(0.002)
Threaten*Repression	–	–	–	–	−0.106*	−0.124**	−0.101*	−0.118**
	–	–	–	–	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.072)
Rhetoric	0.022***	0.022***	0.029***	0.029***	0.022***	0.022***	0.029***	0.029***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
$Rhetoric_{t-1}$	0.004*	0.006*	0.002	0.004*	0.004*	0.006*	0.002	0.004*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Repression	0.385***	0.383***	0.534***	0.533***	0.390***	0.388***	0.538***	0.538***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.033)
$Repression_{t-1}$	0.052**	0.049**	0.043*	0.039*	0.052**	0.049**	0.042*	0.039*
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Threaten Repression	0.251**	0.288**	0.226**	0.262**	0.335**	0.381***	0.306**	0.352**
	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.146)
Arrests	−0.002***	−0.002***	−0.001**	−0.001**	−0.002***	−0.002***	−0.001**	−0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Assaults	0.056***	0.058***	0.071***	0.074***	0.055***	0.058***	0.071***	0.074***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Abductions	0.091***	0.074***	0.094***	0.076***	0.092***	0.074***	0.094***	0.077***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Administrative Sanctions	0.242***	0.261***	0.234***	0.253***	0.242***	0.261***	0.234***	0.253***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Deadly Assaults	0.072*	0.067*	0.068*	0.062*	0.072*	0.068*	0.068*	0.062*
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Torture	−0.016	−0.038*	−0.028*	−0.049*	−0.016	−0.037*	−0.027*	−0.048*
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Mass Killings	0.210**	0.212**	0.215**	0.219**	0.210**	0.212**	0.214**	0.219**
	(0.111)	(0.113)	(0.111)	(0.113)	(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.112)

Unspecified Coercion	0.039*	0.042*	0.031*	0.035*	0.039*	0.042*	0.031*	0.035*
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Regime Type	–	0.018***	–	0.019***	–	0.018***	–	0.019***
	–	(0.004)	–	(0.004)	–	(0.004)	–	(0.004)
Media Freedom	–	−0.462***	–	−0.472***	–	−0.463***	–	−0.474***
	–	(0.051)	–	(0.051)	–	(0.051)	–	(0.051)
GDP Growth	–	−0.016***	–	−0.016***	–	−0.016***	–	−0.016***
	–	(0.003)	–	(0.003)	–	(0.003)	–	(0.003)
$Protest_{t-1}$	0.116***	0.111***	0.122***	0.118***	0.116***	0.111***	0.122***	0.118***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	−0.609***	−0.743***	−0.679***	−0.823***	−0.610***	−0.745***	−0.680***	−0.825***
	(0.038)	(0.072)	(0.039)	(0.072)	(0.038)	(0.072)	(0.039)	(0.072)
Inflation Model								
Rhetoric	−1.387***	−1.442***	−1.416***	−1.472***	−1.387***	−1.441***	−1.415***	−1.472***
	(0.085)	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.094)	(0.085)	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.094)
Regime Type	−0.042***	–	−0.043***	–	−0.042***	–	−0.043***	–
	(0.006)	–	(0.007)	–	(0.006)	–	(0.007)	–
Media Freedom	0.854***	–	0.864***	–	0.854***	–	0.865***	–
	(0.093)	–	(0.095)	–	(0.093)	–	(0.095)	–
GDP Growth	0.020***	–	0.019***	–	0.020***	–	0.019***	–
	(0.005)	–	(0.005)	–	(0.005)	–	(0.005)	–
Constant	1.530***	1.156***	1.489***	1.103***	1.529***	1.156***	1.489***	1.103***
	(0.100)	(0.052)	(0.102)	(0.054)	(0.100)	(0.052)	(0.102)	(0.054)
N	22,904	22,904	22,904	22,904	22,904	22,904	22,904	22,904

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.1, * p < 0.5

Table A10. Rhetoric's effects on protest, controlling for conflict.

	Model 41	Model 42	Model 43	Model 44
Variables	Direct Effect	Rhetoric Interaction	Threats Interaction	Both Interactions
Rhetoric*Repression	–	−0.018***	–	−0.018***
	–	(0.002)	–	(0.002)
Threaten*Repression	–	–	−0.131**	−0.121*
	–	–	(0.078)	(0.076)
Rhetoric	0.020***	0.027***	0.020***	0.026***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
$Rhetoric_{t-1}$	0.008*	0.006*	0.008*	0.006*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Repression	0.406***	0.551***	0.410***	0.556***
	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.033)
$Repression_{t-1}$	0.050**	0.041*	0.050**	0.041*
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Threaten Repression	0.213**	0.187*	0.304**	0.272**
	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.141)	(0.140)
Arrests	−0.002***	−0.001**	−0.002***	−0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Assaults	0.052***	0.069***	0.051***	0.068***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Abductions	0.057**	0.060**	0.057**	0.060**
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Administrative Sanctions	0.220***	0.212***	0.220***	0.212***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Deadly Assaults	0.075*	0.070*	0.075*	0.071*
	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.057)
Torture	−0.029*	−0.038*	−0.028*	−0.037*
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Mass Killings	0.129**	0.129**	0.129**	0.129**
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Unspecified Coercion	0.006	−0.003	0.006	−0.003
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Conflict Participation	0.468***	0.470***	0.469***	0.470***
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
$Protest_{t-1}$	0.120***	0.127***	0.120***	0.127***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	−0.745***	−0.814***	−0.746***	−0.815***
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Inflation Model				
Rhetoric	−1.581***	−1.614***	−1.581***	−1.613***
	(0.091)	(0.095)	(0.091)	(0.095)
Constant	1.301***	1.252***	1.301***	1.251***
	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.050)
N	27,707	27,707	27,707	27,707

Standard errors in parentheses
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.5$

Table A11. Country-clustered estimations of rhetoric's effect on protest from Table 1.

	Model 45	Model 46	Model 47	Model 48
Variables	Direct Effects	Rhetoric Interaction	Threats Interaction	Both Interactions
Rhetoric*Repression	–	−0.019***	–	−0.019***
	–	(0.005)	–	(0.005)
Threaten*Repression	–	–	−0.109***	−0.105***
	–	–	(0.041)	(0.038)
Rhetoric	0.019**	0.026**	0.019**	0.026**
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)
$Rhetoric_{t-1}$	0.010*	0.007*	0.010*	0.007*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Repression	0.399***	0.559***	0.404***	0.563***
	(0.052)	(0.061)	(0.052)	(0.061)
$Repression_{t-1}$	0.058**	0.049**	0.058**	0.049**
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.024)
Threaten Repression	0.221**	0.196**	0.300***	0.271**
	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.106)	(0.107)
Arrests	−0.003***	−0.001**	−0.003***	−0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Assaults	0.059*	0.075**	0.058*	0.074**
	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.034)
Abductions	0.097***	0.100***	0.097***	0.100***
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Administrative Sanctions	0.240***	0.233***	0.240***	0.232***
	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.050)
Deadly Assaults	0.083**	0.080**	0.083**	0.081**
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.047)
Torture	−0.012	−0.022	−0.012	−0.022
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.035)
Mass Killings	0.180**	0.179**	0.179**	0.179***
	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.069)
Unspecified Coercion	0.029*	0.021*	0.029*	0.021*
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)
$Protest_{t-1}$	0.129***	0.136***	0.129***	0.136***
	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.028)
Constant	−0.643***	−0.714***	−0.644***	−0.715***
	(0.163)	(0.155)	(0.163)	(0.155)
Inflation Model				
Rhetoric	−1.599***	−1.633***	−1.598***	−1.632***
	(0.210)	(0.213)	(0.210)	(0.213)
Constant	1.347***	1.297***	1.347***	1.297***
	(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.182)
N	27,707	27,707	27,707	27,707

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.1, * p < 0.5

Table A12. Fixed effects negative binomial estimations of rhetoric's effect on protest.

	Model 49	Model 50	Model 51	Model 52
Variables	Direct Effects	Rhetoric Interaction	Threats Interaction	Both Interactions
Rhetoric*Repression	–	−0.007***	–	−0.007***
	–	(0.001)	–	(0.001)
Threaten*Repression	–	–	−0.020	−0.007
	–	–	(0.035)	(0.036)
Rhetoric	0.025***	0.029***	0.025***	0.029***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
$Rhetoric_{t-1}$	0.010***	0.005**	0.010***	0.006**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Repression	0.188***	0.227***	0.189***	0.227***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
$Repression_{t-1}$	0.087***	0.079***	0.086***	0.078***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Threaten Repression	0.353***	0.335***	0.380***	0.343***
	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.092)	(0.094)
Arrests	−0.002***	−0.001***	−0.002***	−0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Assaults	0.031***	0.040***	0.030***	0.040***
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Abductions	0.054***	0.061***	0.053***	0.061***
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Administrative Sanctions	0.105***	0.092***	0.105***	0.092***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Deadly Assaults	0.039*	0.026*	0.039*	0.026*
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Torture	0.001	0.026*	0.001	0.025*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Mass Killings	0.100***	0.101***	0.105***	0.103***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Unspecified Coercion	−0.067***	−0.040**	−0.068***	−0.040**
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.019)
$Protest_{t-1}$	0.011***	0.016***	0.011***	0.016***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	−1.388***	−1.408***	−1.388***	−1.408***
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
N	24,037	24,037	24,037	24,037
Groups	162	162	162	162

Standard errors in parentheses
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.5$

Table A13. Rhetoric's effects on protest, PTS robustness.

	Model 53	Model 54	Model 55	Model 56	Model 57	Model 58	Model 59	Model 60
	Direct Effect		Rhetoric Interaction		Threats Interaction		Both Interactions	
Variables	Abuse Inflation	Abuse Count	Abuse Inflation	Abuse Count	Abuse Inflation	Abuse Count	Abuse Inflation	Abuse Count
Rhetoric*Repression	–	–	−0.018***	−0.019***	–	–	−0.018***	−0.019***
	–	–	(0.002)	(0.002)	–	–	(0.002)	(0.002)
Threaten*Repression	–	–	–	–	−0.055	−0.067	−0.052	−0.060
	–	–	–	–	(0.116)	(0.109)	(0.117)	(0.110)
Rhetoric	0.026***	0.027***	0.035***	0.036***	0.026***	0.026***	0.035***	0.036***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
$Rhetoric_{t-1}$	0.008*	0.011**	0.009**	0.012**	0.008*	0.011**	0.009**	0.012**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Repression	0.429***	0.426***	0.582***	0.582***	0.431***	0.428***	0.584***	0.584***
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.038)
$Repression_{t-1}$	0.079**	0.071**	0.075**	0.066**	0.078**	0.071**	0.074**	0.066**
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Threaten Repression	0.133*	0.152*	0.101*	0.115*	0.177*	0.204*	0.142*	0.162*
	(0.135)	(0.137)	(0.135)	(0.137)	(0.166)	(0.164)	(0.166)	(0.164)
Human Rights Abuse	–	0.239***	–	0.241***	–	0.239***	–	0.241***
	–	(0.017)	–	(0.017)	–	(0.017)	–	(0.017)
$Protest_{t-1}$	0.138***	0.125***	0.144***	0.132***	0.138***	0.125***	0.144***	0.132***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Constant	−0.497***	−1.273***	−0.567***	−1.345***	−0.497***	−1.273***	−0.568***	−1.346***
	(0.039)	(0.065)	(0.039)	(0.065)	(0.039)	(0.065)	(0.039)	(0.065)
Inflation Model								
Rhetoric	−1.226***	−1.447***	−1.249***	−1.477***	−1.226***	−1.446***	−1.249***	−1.477***
	(0.082)	(0.101)	(0.086)	(0.106)	(0.082)	(0.101)	(0.086)	(0.106)
Human Rights Abuse	−0.397***	–	−0.400***	–	−0.397***	–	−0.400***	–
	(0.034)	–	(0.034)	–	(0.034)	–	(0.034)	–
Constant	2.217***	1.062***	2.173***	1.009***	2.217***	1.062***	2.173***	1.009***
	(0.099)	(0.054)	(0.101)	(0.056)	(0.099)	(0.054)	(0.101)	(0.056)
N	20,737	20,737	20,737	20,737	20,737	20,737	20,737	20,737

Standard errors in parentheses: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.5$

Table A14. Rhetoric's effects on protest, PTS nonviolence dummy.

	Model 61	Model 62	Model 63	Model 64	Model 65	Model 66	Model 67	Model 68
	Direct Effect		Rhetoric Interaction		Threats Interaction		Both Interactions	
Variables	Abuse Inflation	Abuse Count	Abuse Inflation	Abuse Count	Abuse Inflation	Abuse Count	Abuse Inflation	Abuse Count
Rhetoric*Repression	–	–	−0.018***	−0.019***	–	–	−0.019***	−0.019***
	–	–	(0.002)	(0.002)	–	–	(0.002)	(0.002)
Threaten*Repression	–	–	–	–	−0.124*	−0.126*	−0.133*	−0.135**
	–	–	–	–	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.081)
Rhetoric	0.025***	0.025***	0.035***	0.035***	0.025***	0.025***	0.035***	0.035***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
$Rhetoric_{t-1}$	0.009**	0.011**	0.009**	0.011**	0.009**	0.011**	0.009**	0.011**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Repression	0.419***	0.413***	0.592***	0.588***	0.424***	0.417***	0.597***	0.593***
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.034)
$Repression_{t-1}$	0.069**	0.065**	0.064**	0.060**	0.068**	0.065**	0.063**	0.059**
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Threaten Repression	0.229**	0.229**	0.200*	0.197*	0.317**	0.319**	0.293**	0.292**
	(0.126)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.143)	(0.143)
Nonviolent State	–	−0.444***	–	−0.456***	–	−0.444***	–	−0.456***
	–	(0.061)	–	(0.061)	–	(0.061)	–	(0.061)
$Protest_{t-1}$	0.136***	0.133***	0.144***	0.141***	0.136***	0.133***	0.144***	0.141***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	−0.532***	−0.499***	−0.612***	−0.577***	−0.533***	−0.499***	−0.613***	−0.578***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Inflation Model								
Rhetoric	−1.533***	−1.561***	−1.565***	−1.594***	−1.532***	−1.560***	−1.565***	−1.593***
	(0.082)	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.082)	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.088)
Nonviolent State	0.574***	–	0.574***	–	0.574***	–	0.574***	–
	(0.103)	–	(0.104)	–	(0.103)	–	(0.104)	–
Constant	1.336***	1.387***	1.280***	1.332***	1.335***	1.387***	1.280***	1.332***
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.048)
N	27,342	27,342	27,342	27,342	27,342	27,342	27,342	27,342

Standard errors in parentheses
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.5$