

This article was downloaded by: [University of Saskatchewan Library]

On: 03 June 2012, At: 00:06

Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Terrorism and Political Violence

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftpv20>

Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism and Radicalism

Sophia Moskalenko^a & Clark McCauley^b

^a Department of Homeland Security, USA

^b Psychology Department, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, USA

Available online: 30 Mar 2009

To cite this article: Sophia Moskalenko & Clark McCauley (2009): Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism and Radicalism, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 21:2, 239-260

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546550902765508>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism and Radicalism

SOPHIA MOSKALENKO

Department of Homeland Security, USA

CLARK McCAULEY

Psychology Department, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania,
USA

In this paper we review and extend measures of political mobilization: the increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in support of inter-group conflict. Building on previous research, we introduce the Activism and Radicalism Intention Scales (ARIS). The Activism Intention Scale assesses readiness to participate in legal and non-violent political action, whereas the Radicalism Intention Scale assesses readiness to participate in illegal or violent political action. In ad-hoc samples of U.S. and Ukrainian undergraduates, and in an Internet panel survey representative of the U.S. population, Activism and Radicalism intentions formed two correlated but distinguishable dimensions. The popular “conveyor belt” metaphor of radicalization (implying that activism leads easily to radicalism and that most radicals emerge from activism) found only mixed support in our results. Discussion suggests the potential usefulness of the ARIS for learning about how individuals move from political attitudes and beliefs to political action, including political violence and terrorism.

Keywords activism, group identification, radicalism, terrorism

Terrorist attacks in Europe and in North America have brought new urgency to the study of political radicalization. From a social science perspective, the problem is to understand how psychologically normal individuals,¹ often born and educated in the country they attack, are moved to risk-taking and violence for a political cause. A literature burgeoning over decades has focused on the last step of this trajectory:

Sophia Moskalenko received her Ph.D. in Social Psychology from the University of Pennsylvania in 2004. She is a postdoctoral fellow at the Department of Homeland Security and a research fellow at the National Consortium for Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (NC-START). Clark McCauley is Professor of Psychology and a director of the Solomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict at Bryn Mawr College, and a co-director of the National Consortium for Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (NC-START).

This research was supported by the United States Department of Homeland Security through the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), grant number N00140510629. However, any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Address correspondence to Sophia Moskalenko, Department of Psychology, Bryn Mawr College 101 N. Merion Ave. Bryn Mawr, PA 19010, USA. E-mail: smoskale@gmail.com

the transition to terrorism.^{2,3} Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, however, increasing attention has been given to less extreme forms of activism that may precede involvement in political violence.⁴

A common perspective in seeking the more distal origins of terrorism is that the trajectory to terrorism is a dimension that begins in grievance and ends in violence. According to U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism, “terrorists seek to manipulate grievances in order to radicalize others by pulling them further and further into illegal activities. This is best represented as a ‘conveyor belt’ through which terrorists seek to convert alienated or aggrieved populations, convert them to extremist viewpoints, and turn them, by stages, into sympathizers, supporters, and, ultimately, members of terrorist networks.”⁵ The mass media^{6,7} and the U.S. intelligence community⁸ have also described political radicalization of jihadist terrorists as a “conveyor belt.”

This is a powerful metaphor. The implication of a “conveyor belt” to terrorism is that Muslim activist groups that focus on Muslim grievances, especially Muslim groups in Western countries that focus on Muslim grievances against Western governments, are proximate sources of terrorism. For example, Hizb ut-Tahrir emphasizes Muslim suffering at the hands of Western countries and publicly argues for the same future that Osama Bin Laden seeks: restoration of a global caliphate that encompasses all Muslims.⁹ From a conveyor-belt perspective, Hizb and other radical Muslim groups are dangerous contributors to violence; they require close surveillance and perhaps should be legally banned.

Another perspective, however, is that non-violent activist groups are competing for members against violent and terrorist groups that claim to represent the same cause. Thus Hizb ut-Tahrir, which agrees with the long-term goals of Al-Qaeda but not its violent means, may be more a competitor than a conveyor-belt for Al-Qaeda.¹⁰ Generally, in this view, “violence is not a quantitative degree of conflict but a qualitative form of conflict, with its own dynamics.”¹¹ This possibility suggests the importance of learning more about the relation between legal and illegal political action.

There is no doubt that some activists become terrorists. In the U.S., the Weather Underground emerged out of the 1960s anti-war movement, Students for a Democratic Society.¹² The existence of such cases does not, however, give much indication of how many peaceful activists move to terrorism, or how many terrorists were peaceful activists before moving to violence. So far as we are aware, there is little systematic evidence linking peaceful political action to political violence. Indeed a recent survey study that included members of U.S. activist groups found that intentions for legal activism were little related to intentions for illegal and violent political action.¹³

In this paper we aim to expand understanding of political mobilization by measuring readiness to engage in legal and non-violent political action (activism) as well as readiness to engage in illegal and violent political action (radicalism). That is, we aim to learn more about the link between activism and radicalism that is at issue in concerns about a conveyor belt to terrorism. It is important to note that radicalism is not the same as terrorism: terrorists are the subset of radicals who use violence against civilian targets. The relation between radicalism and terrorism is an important issue, but the likelihood of moving from violence against military or government targets to violence against civilians is not accessible in studies of mostly non-violent respondents. Thus, we here focus on the more easily tapped distinction between activism and radicalism, between legal and illegal political action.

We will test the validity of the conveyor belt metaphor by performing correlational analyses on measures of intended and past activism and radicalism. If the conveyor belt metaphor is accurate we expect to see a similar pattern of correlations between activism and radicalism and measures of group identification: stronger identification should be associated with higher levels of both activism and radicalism. Additionally, there should be a strong correlation between radical intention and past activism. On the other hand, a divergent pattern of correlations between group identification and activism and radicalism, and radical intentions unrelated to past activism, would indicate that radicalism and activism are motivated by different relationships with the group and are not simply different stages of the same psychological progression.

These issues are examined in three surveys that use new measures of political activism and radicalism based on measures first offered by Corning and Myers;¹⁴ results include initial evidence of discriminant validity for the new measures.

Conceptualizing Political Mobilization

We understand political mobilization as an increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and actions in support of intergroup conflict.¹⁵ This dimension is relevant for understanding not just those actively involved in conflict, but as well the much larger number who sympathize with or support the combatants. Activists of a social movement, soldiers of a national army, and perpetrators of terrorism—each of these groups can be seen as the apex of a much larger pyramid of sympathizers and supporters. To understand the behavior and persistence of the apex requires understanding the larger pyramid on which the apex depends for moral and material support, including new recruits.¹⁶

The conveyor-belt metaphor is part of a stage-theory interpretation of the pyramid model of radicalization. In this interpretation, the levels of the pyramid are discrete stages with different levels of political commitment: the base of sympathizers with a cause, a higher level of those who justify the actions of the radicals, still higher levels of action in support of the cause (including activists), and the radicals as an apex of illegal and violent political actors. Individuals are assumed to move toward radicalism through ascending stages of radicalization. The transition from activist to radical is then the transition to the apex, and it is activists—the stage below radicals—who make the transition.

We prefer an interpretation of the pyramid that is not a stage theory and does not require that each level of the pyramid is attained by passing through the level or levels below it. Among the mechanisms of radicalization so far identified are personal grievance, group grievance, and love.¹⁷ An inert sympathizer can be moved directly from the base of the pyramid to the apex by experiencing personal loss or affront, by identification with a new and vivid example of loss or affront to the cause, or simply by invitation from a loved one who is already radicalized. Thus we understand that an individual can move to the apex of radicalization from any level, even from a base of unpoliticized sympathizers. This understanding of the pyramid model leads us to suspect that there are many activists who never become radicals, and, more important, that there are many radicals without a history of activism.

Whether via gradual stages or saltation from the base, political mobilization in the pyramid model means increasing support for intergroup conflict. Non-state

groups that lose the support of their base must eventually give up or die out. For terrorist groups, in particular, loss of support often means fast desistance, as occurred in the case of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia.¹⁸

Although mobilization of beliefs and feelings is an important part of increasing support for conflict, mobilization of action is crucial, and in this paper we focus on readiness for political action. For obvious reasons it is difficult to observe radical behaviors directly. However, research in social psychology indicates that studying behavioral intentions can often provide a useful proxy for understanding the corresponding behaviors (see endnote 22 for limitations of the predictive power of intentions).¹⁹⁻²²

A close relationship between intentions and behaviors has been demonstrated in a variety of contexts, such as health-maintenance behaviors,²³ sexual behaviors,²⁴ driving,²⁵ and pro-environmental behaviors.^{26, 27} For example, Boldero²⁸ found that intentions to recycle newspapers significantly predicted actual paper recycling during a two-week observation period. Similarly, Black and Babrow²⁹ demonstrated that whether or not a male student was going to wear a condom at his next sexual encounter was well predicted by his stated intention to do so days or weeks in advance. Studying intentions for political action may be similarly helpful in understanding and predicting activist and radical behavior.

As the first step toward understanding intention for political action, we reviewed research in psychology and political science in search of measures that would assess intentions for action in support of a political cause. Particularly we sought a scale that focused on political action with a generality that could support translation for use in multiple countries and cultures.

Measuring Political Mobilization

Deaux, Reid, Martin & Bikman³⁰ measured readiness for collective action on behalf of one's ethnic group by using a scale adapted from Lalonde & Cameron.³¹ The 15-item scale includes questions about one's beliefs (e.g., "I think that my ethnic group members can better their social position if they organize and work together"), feelings (e.g., "I feel there should be a stronger representation of my ethnic group in the political sector"), and behavior (e.g., "I help organize events for my ethnic community"). Although radicalization of beliefs and feelings is often a factor in radicalization of behavior, combining all three in one scale weakens the scale's usefulness for understanding the transition from opinion to action. Additionally, none of the items in this scale addressed violent or illegal behaviors.

A number of scales measuring political activism have focused on a particular political interest or cause, and cannot easily be extended to other issues. For instance, a measure of collective action for women's rights³² would be inapplicable for measurement of radicalization for ethnic or religious causes (e.g., "If a man acts differently when I'm around because I'm a woman, I assure him that it is not necessary"). Similarly, a measure of political radicalism that targets gays and lesbians³³ is not easily translatable to other groups (e.g., "It is important for gay and lesbian people to fight for their rights to marry").

In a more general approach, Corning and Myers³⁴ developed a scale of intentions for political action that is adaptable to different political groups and causes. The Activism Orientation Scale asks about 35 forms of future political action (e.g., "How likely is it that you will engage in this activity in the future: Attend

an informational meeting of a political group?”). This scale was determined to have a two-factor structure, with legal behaviors loading on one factor (Legal Activism; e.g., “How likely is it that you will engage in this activity in the future: Donate money to a political candidate?”), and illegal behaviors loading on the second factor (Illegal Activism; e.g., “How likely is it that you will engage in this activity in the future: Engage in any political activity in which you fear for your personal safety?”).

A limitation of this scale, however, is that it is rooted in U.S. culture in ways that make it difficult to use in other countries. For example, “Keep track of the views of members of Congress regarding an issue important to you” is only relevant in a Western-style democracy, and “Display a poster or bumper sticker with a political message” is less relevant in parts of the world where few own cars. Additionally, the scale is long—35 items—and so is difficult to use in conjunction with other measures in survey research where number of items is limited. Thus, our review of the literature led us to develop a new scale measuring willingness to sacrifice for a group or cause. Our ten original items (see Table 2) range from less costly behaviors (volunteering time for an organization that fights for political rights of a group) to more risky or costly behaviors (breaking the law, assaulting members of police force). Following Corning and Myers,³⁵ we predicted that the ten items would show a two-component structure, one component roughly corresponding to Legal Activism (*Activism*), and the other to Illegal Activism (*Radicalism*).

The next section considers some possible correlates of political mobilization.

Mobilization and Group Identification

Group identification is caring about the outcomes of a group,³⁶ and identification with a group or cause implies positive feelings when the group or cause is advancing and succeeding, as well as negative feelings if the group or cause is losing or failing. Group identification has been identified as a significant force in determining a variety of behaviors, from consumer choices^{37,38} to decisions to go to war.^{39,40}

The strength of group identification can vary depending on circumstances of intergroup relations. For instance, when the group is threatened, as was the case with Americans in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, group identification increases.⁴¹ Paradoxically, identification with the group may also increase when the group is doing particularly well.⁴²

Individual circumstances can also affect group identification. When individual self-esteem is threatened,^{43,44} or when an individual is made to think about death,⁴⁵ or made to experience uncertainty in the face of an unfamiliar task,^{46,47} group identification is likely to increase. In view of the evidence linking group identification with threats to self-esteem, we included a self-esteem measure.

According to Social Movement theorists, group identification—the extent of common identity and unifying structure among the individuals—is related to mobilization of action in support of the group.^{48,49} In a classic contribution to Social Movement Theory, Gamson⁵⁰ argued that political mobilization is an extension of group identification, and is on the same continuum as voting and other lower-cost manifestations of group affiliation. In this view, the more identified one is with a group, the more one should be ready to make sacrifices for the group: “To reap the rewards of such identification requires commitment. The greater the sacrifice and effort involved, the greater is then investment of self, and, hence,

the greater the personal satisfaction (or disappointment) with the achievements of the collective actor.”⁵¹

As an individual can be a member of, and identify with, multiple groups at the same time, we were interested to explore the relation of activism and radicalism intentions to directions of group identification that would likely be salient for student respondents in our first study. To this end, Study 1 included one-item measures of strength of identification with five groups: country, ethnic group, religious group, university, and family.⁵²

Study 1

Methods

Participants

Students in a Social Psychology class (Fall 2005) recruited 140 fellow students who were U.S. citizens to complete a questionnaire entitled “Students’ lives in context” for a class research project. Participants were 140 students from Bryn Mawr College (104, 73%) and Haverford College (32, 23%); four participants did not identify their school. One hundred twenty-two of the participants (86%) were women, and 18 (13%) were men. Their ages ranged from 17 to 33, with a mean of 19.6 (SD = 1.78). One hundred and six participants (75%) were Caucasian, 11 (8%) were East Asian, 7 (5%) were African American and 9 (6%) were of mixed ethnicity. Forty-one participants (29%) were atheists; 34 (24%) were Protestant, 29 (20%) were Catholic, 10 (7%) were Jewish, and 25 (17%) were of other religions. Most participants (84, 60%) reported themselves to be Democrats, 14 (10%) were Republican, 11 (8%) were Independent, and the rest reported other political affiliations.

Questionnaire and Procedure

The questionnaire was explicitly anonymous and instructed participants “not to put down any identifying information.” Participants were solicited in cafeterias, libraries, and at the Campus Center at Bryn Mawr College; they completed the questionnaire while the student researcher was waiting, without skipping ahead or flipping through the pages. The student researcher discussed the ideas in the study with each participant on completion of the survey, and the results of the survey were analyzed and presented in class.

The questionnaire began with ratings of *Importance* of five different groups: *Country*, *Family*, *Ethnic group*, *Religious group*, and *College* (rated in this order from 1 = not at all important to 7 = extremely important with intermediate values not labeled). Then participants were asked to think of “the *Group You Feel Closest to*, such as religious group, ethnic group, or any other group that is important to you” and write the name of that group down in the space provided. They were instructed that the subsequent questions were about the group they just named. Following was a newly constructed 10-item *Activism-Radicalism Intentions Scale* (ARIS), with each item rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = *disagree completely* to 4 = *neutral* to 7 = *agree completely* (intermediate values not labeled). Then participants completed a one-item *Self-Esteem* measure.⁵³ Finally, participants answered demographic questions.

Results

The means and standard deviations of group importance ratings are reported in Table 1. Group importance ratings were highest for family, followed by college, country, ethnic group, and religious group.

The correlations among ratings of group importance and the scale of group identification with country were all positive and ranged from .23 (between importance of country and importance of university) to .02 (between importance of college and importance of religion). These correlations (not tabled but available from the authors) were similar to those reported in Moskalenko, McCauley, Rozin.⁵⁴

For the Activism-Radicalism Intention Scale (ARIS), participants were asked to write down the group that was most important to them. They listed a total of 21 groups; the most common choice was “women” (11 participants, 8%). Other groups included religious (Catholics, 6), ethnic (Taiwanese, 1), athletic (runners, 1), political (environmentally-conscious, 1) and academic (gifted students, 1). The range of group types was too wide to allow for a meaningful analysis by group.

Structure of Activism and Radicalism Intention Scale

Exploratory Principal Component Analysis using SPSS produced three components with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 (4.38, 1.71, and 1.01) which accounted for 44%, 17%, and 10% of the total variance, respectively. Oblimin rotation of two components produced interpretable dimensions (50% and 20% of the total variance) that correlated .36 (see Table 2). The first component showed high loadings for the items pertaining to legal and non-violent political activism (Activism), and the second component showed high loadings for the items pertaining to illegal and violent activism (Radicalism).

We constructed two corresponding scales, the *Activism Intention Scale (AIS)* and the *Radicalism Intention Scale (RIS)* by averaging across the four items loading highest on each factor. AIS ($M = 5.31$, $SD = 1.31$, alpha .86) correlated .42 with RIS ($M = 2.91$, $SD = 1.49$, alpha .83). Not surprisingly, the mean for AIS was significantly higher than the mean for RIS ($t(139) = 19.03$, $p < .01$). While 66% of participants expressed activist intentions (score of 5 or above on AIS with 4 = neutral), only 12% expressed radical intentions (score of 5 or above on RIS). Sixteen participants

Table 1. Mean (SD) of ratings of group importance for Studies 1 and 2

Importance of	Study 1	Study 2
Country	4.76 (1.65)	5.86 (1.19)
Family	6.59 (0.86)	6.80 (0.76)
Ethnicity	4.20 (1.85)	5.59 (1.30)
Religion	3.47 (2.36)	5.09 (1.61)
w/o Atheists	4.37 (1.96)	5.23 (1.40)
College	4.97 (2.36)	5.84 (1.16)
Party	N/A	3.19 (2.01)

Note. Ratings from 1 = not at all important to 7 = extremely important.

Table 2. Study 1 (Study 3) item loadings for Activism Intentions Scale (AIS) and Radicalism Intentions Scale (RIS)

	AIS	RIS
1. I would join/belong to an organization that fights for my group's political and legal rights	.84 (.89)	.00 (.00)
2. I would donate money to an organization that fights for my group's political and legal rights	.86 (.88)	.00 (.00)
3. I would volunteer my time working (i.e. write petitions, distribute flyers, recruit people, etc.) for an organization that fights for my group's political and legal rights	.90 (.88)	.00 (.00)
4. I would travel for one hour to join in a public rally, protest, or demonstration in support of my group	.76 (.81)	.15 (.38)
5. I would continue to support an organization that fights for my group's political and legal rights even if the organization sometimes breaks the law	-.24 (.44)	.67 (.73)
6. I would continue to support an organization that fights for my group's political and legal rights even if the organization sometimes resorts to violence	.00 (.00)	.85 (.82)
7. I would participate in a public protest against oppression of my group even if I thought the protest might turn violent	-.12 (.43)	.78 (.86)
8. I would attack police or security forces if I saw them beating members of my group	.21 (.00)	.83 (.88)
9. I would go to war to protect the rights of my group	.00	.48
10. I would retaliate against members of a group that had attacked my group, even if I couldn't be sure I was retaliating against the guilty party	.00	.39

Note. Bold items averaged in AIS and RIS scales.

scored 5 or above on both AIS and RIS (these 16 individuals represented 17% of those scoring 5 or above on AIS and 94% of those scoring 5 or above on RIS).

Predictors of Activism and Radicalism Intentions

Table III reports correlations between AIS and RIS and ratings of importance of five groups.

Rated importance of country correlated positively with AIS ($r(140) = .20$, $p = .02$); higher rating on importance of country was associated with greater willingness to participate in non-violent actions to benefit one's group, but country importance was not correlated with RIS ($r = -.10$, ns). Additionally, importance of ethnic group correlated positively with RIS ($r = .25$, $p < .01$), but was not significantly related to AIS ($r = .13$, ns). Ratings of importance of family, religion, and university showed no correlations with either AIS or RIS.

AIS and RIS were uncorrelated with self-esteem, *Age* or *Family Income*. *Gender* was related to AIS ($r(140) = -.20, p = .02$), such that women reported more intention than men to engage in legal and non-violent actions to promote their self-nominated group.

Study 1 Discussion

Study 1 introduced the Activism and Radicalism Intentions Scales (ARIS), a brief measure of intentions relating to political behavior. As expected, a two-component structure was uncovered, with the first component representing Activism (intentions to participate in legal non-violent acts on behalf of a group important to participants), and the second component representing Radicalism (intentions to participate in illegal/violent acts on behalf of the same group). Two corresponding four-item scales were constructed, Activism Intention Scale (AIS) and Radicalism Intention Scale (RIS), each with good alpha reliability.

AIS and RIS showed some evidence of discriminant validity in that they correlated differently with measures of importance of country and ethnic group. Thus, AIS but not RIS was positively correlated with importance of country, whereas RIS but not AIS was positively correlated with importance of ethnic group. These results were unpredicted but make some sense. U.S. citizens more strongly identified with country are more ready for political action that is normative for citizens: legal and non-violent protest activities. But citizens more strongly identified with an ethnic group can imagine the interests of this group running counter to the authority of the state and so may be more ready to undertake illegal and violent action in defense of ethnic comrades.

We observed slightly higher radicalism among women than among men in our student sample. However, given the small proportion of male participants (13%) and the possibly atypical political characteristics of female participants from an all-women's college, the gender difference in Study 1 cannot be taken seriously without replication.

Most generally, the results of Study 1 support the distinction between Activism and Radicalism as forms of political mobilization. Although significantly correlated, AIS and RIS are related to different directions of group identification (country vs. ethnicity).

Study 2

Study 2 had two aims. First, we wanted to try the AIS and RIS with participants outside the U.S. in order to test whether the new scales have the kind of cross-cultural applicability that was one of our original goals. We hoped to replicate the two-factor scale structure observed in Study 1, as well as the differential correlations between AIS and RIS and measures of group identification. Second, we wanted respondents to complete the ARIS scales with more than one target group in order to test whether Activism and Radicalism are general dispositions or specific to particular political groups or causes.

With these aims in mind, we designed a survey to be used with university students in Ukraine, where lifestyle and culture are sufficiently different from the U.S. or Western Europe to provide a meaningful test of scale generalizability. In addition, the legacy of the 2004 Ukrainian "Orange Revolution," accomplished to

a large degree by student activists, provides a student population with a recent history of political mobilization. The survey asked about Activism and Radicalism in relation to three groups: *Country*, *Ethnic Group*, and *Political Party*. Political party was included as a target because the “Orange Revolution” was a result of a presidential election widely perceived as unfair, and the subsequent conflict between a coalition of opposition political parties and the government made political party affiliation especially salient for Ukrainian students. We also included ratings of importance for the same five groups (country, ethnic group, family, religious group, and university) as in Study 1.

Methods

Participants

Participants were 146 students at Kiev Economic University and Kiev Polytechnic University. One hundred and seven (72%) of participants were women, and 39 (26%) were men. Their age ranged from 16 to 28, with a mean of 17.5 ($SD = 1.2$). All participants were Ukrainian citizens, and 143 (98%) were also ethnic Ukrainians (2 people reported their ethnicity as Russian, and 1 as Chinese). One hundred twelve of our participants (80%) said they were Orthodox Christian; 19 (14%) were Atheists; the remaining 9 (6%) reported mixed religious affiliations (e.g., Buddhist, Muslim, Pagan).

Procedure

Students were approached in hallways and cafeterias of Kiev Economic University and Kiev Polytechnic University in January 2005 and asked to complete an anonymous questionnaire about “the complexity of students’ social and public lives” in return for 15 Hryvnas (about three US Dollars). They were instructed to answer the questions in one sitting, in the order in which they were presented, without skipping ahead or taking a long break. Upon returning the questionnaire, participants were paid, and student researchers explained the goals of the study.

Questionnaire

The questionnaire was in Ukrainian (translated and back-translated from English by two independent interpreters who agreed on the final translation). Participants were first asked to write down their country of citizenship, ethnicity, and political party affiliation. Then they were asked to rate on a 7-point Likert scale (as in Study 1) the importance of six groups: *Country*, *Political Party*, *Family*, *Religion*, *Ethnicity*, and *University* (in this order).

Participants then completed the *AIS* and *RIS* (eight items total). Each item was asked three times: first, targeting country (e.g., “I would travel for one hour to join in a public rally, protest, or demonstration in support of my country”), then targeting ethnic group (e.g., “I would travel for one hour . . . in support of my ethnic group”), and finally targeting political party (e.g., “I would travel for one hour . . . in support of my political party”). Each three-questions block was separated from the next block by space so as to alert participants to the shift to a new question.

Owing to the highly homogenous ethnic make-up of our participants (98% percent reported themselves as ethnic Ukrainians), results for ARIS targeting country and for ARIS targeting ethnic group were very similar. AIS for country and for ethnic group were highly correlated ($r(144) = .82, p < .01$), as were RIS for

country and ethnic group ($r(144) = .84, p < .01$). What's more, AIS and RIS targeting country showed the same pattern of results with other measures as AIS and RIS targeting ethnic group. Given the redundancy of ethnicity and country for Ukrainian participants, we report here only the results for country. Finally, participants' responded to the single-item *Self-Esteem* measure⁵⁵ and demographic questions.

Results

Most participants (109; 76%) did not list a party with which they aligned themselves, although 59 of the 109 nevertheless proceeded to rate the importance of their political party as higher than 1 = *not at all important* or *not applicable*. Indeed 22 of the 109 rated importance of their political party above 4 on the 7-point scale. Our interpretation of this paradox is that, in the light of the recent political events, including the "Orange Revolution," some students felt uneasy or unsafe in reporting their political party affiliation. Those 37 participants who listed a party affiliation belonged to 15 different political parties, with the most often listed party (Block Ulia Timoshenko) listed by only 8 students.

Importance Ratings

The means and standard deviations of importance ratings of the six groups are reported in Table 1. Highest rated was importance of family, approaching the ceiling on the 7-point scale. Next highest rated was importance of country, followed by importance of university, ethnicity, and religion, and finally importance of political party. Correlations among importance ratings (not tabled, available from authors) were positive with one exception: importance of party correlated $-.16, p = .06$, with importance of family. Remaining correlations ranged from .04 between importance of religion and importance of country to .43 between importance of family and importance of the university.

AIS and RIS

Exploratory Principal Component Analysis with Oblimin Rotation was conducted for the eight ARIS items for both country and political party. Results were the same for both target groups and the same as in Study 1. Non-violent and legal behaviors loaded on the first component and violent and illegal behaviors loaded on the second (loadings were similar to those reported in Table 2 of Study 1). For country, the two components (eigenvalues 2.84 and 1.64) accounted for 35% and 20% of the total variance ($r = .23$). For political party, the two components (eigenvalues 4.26 and 1.29) accounted for 47% and 14% of the variance ($r = .46$). Thus four-item means of AIS and RIS were calculated for each participant for the two targets: country and political party.

With country as the target group, AIS ($M = 4.09, SD = 1.43, \alpha = .72$) correlated $.37 (p < .01)$ with RIS ($M = 2.87, SD = 1.32, \alpha = .70$). With political party as the target group, AIS ($M = 2.94, SD = 1.50, \alpha = .64$) correlated $.57 (p < .01)$ with RIS ($M = 2.49, SD = 1.33, \alpha = .60$).

The correlations among AIS and RIS scales targeting different groups were all positive and significant (N of correlations 141 – 146, $p < .05$): AIS country with AIS

party $r = .47$ and with RIS party $r = .28$; RIS country with AIS party $r = .47$ and with RIS party $r = .81$.

The notable result here is the .81 correlation between RIS for country and RIS for party. This correlation exceeds the level of the alpha reliabilities of these scales (.70 and .60) and indicates that students ready for illegal and violent political action for their country are also ready for such action for their political party. The corresponding correlation of .47, between AIS for country and AIS for party, is significantly smaller (Fisher's $Z = 5.25$, $p < .01$). Thus readiness for activism is discriminating, whereas readiness for radicalism is more general. Whether the generality of activism is better understood in terms of personality or in terms of political development will be considered in the discussion that follows.

As in Study 1, AIS averaged higher than RIS: for country, $t(145) = 9.62$, $p < .01$; for political party, $t(145) = 3.68$, $p < .01$. Thus, while 46 participants (31%) expressed activist intentions for country (score of 5 or above on AIS), only 12 (8%) expressed radical intentions for country (score of 5 or above on RIS). Similarly, 15 (10%) participants expressed activist intentions for party, but only 8 (5%) expressed radical intentions for party. Five participants scored 5 or above on both country AIS and country RIS (representing 11% of 46 with activist intentions and 42% of 12 with radical intentions). Five participants scored 5 or above on both party AIS and party RIS (representing 33% of 15 with activist intentions and 63% of 8 with radical intentions).

Correlates of AIS and RIS

Table 3 reports correlations between AIS and RIS and measures of group importance for six groups. Country AIS was positively correlated with importance of: country, party, religion, and ethnicity. As noted earlier, country, party, religion, and ethnicity are closely linked for Ukrainian students. Party AIS was positively correlated with importance of country and party. Country RIS and party RIS, as might be expected from their high correlation, showed the same pattern: both were associated only with importance of party. It is worth noting that the significant correlations in Table 3 all involved identification with politically salient groups;

Table 3. Study 1 and Study 2 correlations between Activism and Radicalism Intention Scales and rated importance of groups

Importance of	Study 1		Study 2			
	AIS chosen group ¹	RIS chosen group ¹	AIS Ukraine	RIS Ukraine	AIS party	RIS party
Country	.20*	-.10	.28**	.06	.22**	-.01
Family	-.12	-.07	-.09	-.03	-.11	-.07
Ethnicity	.13	.25**	.29**	.18*	.16	.15
Religion	.09	-.11	.22**	.06	.03	.02
College	.08	-.15	.05	-.11	.05	-.11
Party	NA	NA	.21**	.25**	.43**	.32**

Note. N of correlations: 141–146. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$. ¹See text.

importance of family and importance of university did not correlate with any AIS or RIS scale in either Study 1 or Study 2.

There was a consistent small positive correlation between self-esteem and RIS for both country ($r(142) = .17, p = .04$) and political party ($r(142) = .19, p = .02$). Self-esteem was not correlated with AIS targeting country ($r(142) = .02, ns$), but was positively correlated with AIS for party ($r(142) = .20, p = .02$).

Age was related to AIS for political party, so that younger participants reported more intention toward party activism ($r(144) = -.22, p = .01$). Neither age nor Gender related to any other scale.

Study 2 Discussion

Our first aim in Study 2 was to test the usefulness of the AIS and RIS with a non-U.S. population. This aim was accomplished insofar as Ukrainian participants had no difficulty answering the eight items that make up the AIS and RIS; there were few missing values in our data. More specifically, the two-factor structure of ARIS found in Study 1 with U.S. students was replicated in Study 2 with Ukrainian students for both target groups (country and political party). Study 2 also supported Study 1 in showing that AIS and RIS correlated differently with identification with country. As with the U.S. students, Ukrainian students who identify more with country are intending more legal and non-violent political action but not more illegal and violent action.

Our second aim was to have the same respondents complete AIS and RIS for different target groups to determine whether activism and radicalism are general personality orientations or specific to certain groups or political causes. We found, notably, that Ukrainian students distinguished activism for country and activism for party (correlation .47), but did not distinguish radicalism for country and party (correlation .81). One possible interpretation of this pattern is that there is some general personality disposition that makes an individual more or less ready for illegal and violent political action—no matter the group or cause. Eric Hoffer's⁵⁶ "true believer" might represent one instantiation of such a disposition.

A more nuanced interpretation, consistent with social psychology's emphasis on the power of the situation,⁵⁷ is that radicals are not born but made. In particular, individuals may be radicalized by state response to their own or others' actions for their cause.⁵⁸ In this interpretation, there may be a threshold for illegal and violent political action, which, once crossed, leaves an individual ready for radical action for any cause with which the individual identifies. Distinguishing these possibilities will require further research.

One interesting finding in Ukraine was with respect to importance of political party. This was the only identification measure that predicted both Activism and Radicalism for both party and country. A possible explanation is that political party membership is already a measure of activism because, unlike the ascribed values of citizenship, ethnicity, and, in many cases, religion, political party membership is freely chosen. Political party membership may also already be a measure of radicalism, as students giving high importance to political party may have recently participated in the "Orange Revolution." Their experience of illegal political behavior in the streets of Kiev, however small or accidental, could lead them to see themselves as activists and radicals for both country and party.

Study 3

In Study 3 our goal was to replicate the two-component structure of the ARIS that we observed in student samples in Studies 1 and 2 in a sample representative of U.S. adults. Additionally, we wanted to explore the relationship between the ARIS scales of intentions for future activism and radicalism, and history of past activist or radical behavior. In many samples, including samples from some foreign countries, asking about personal history of activism or radicalism is counter-productive, as it may leave people worried about researchers' motivation, and unlikely to answer truthfully. However, with American respondents who are not usually suspicious of social scientists we thought it might be possible to include questions about past activism and radicalism and thereby further test validity of ARIS.

Past behavior is generally predictive of future behavior of the same kind,⁵⁹ In particular, a history of consistent patterns of behavior may contribute to an action-specific self-concept, or "self-perception."⁶⁰ The more an act has been integrated into an individual's self-perception, the more likely the individual is to repeat this and related acts.⁶¹ Consistency pressures may also contribute to the relation between past and future behavior, as when someone suffering more to join a group then comes to like the group better.⁶²

The relation between past and future behavior need not be linear, however. Ferguson and Bibby,⁶³ for instance, found that the relationship between past blood donations and likelihood of future donations was an inverted parabola, such that the most frequent donors of the past were less likely to donate in the future than those with medium-frequency of past donations. Another qualification is that past behavior may be a better predictor for habitual and well-practiced acts, such as brushing teeth after each meal, than for rare and more deliberate ones, such as the acts of activism or radicalism that are the focus of this paper.⁶⁴

Thus, in Study 3 we included questions addressing past activist and radical behaviors in order to explore how past behavior relates to future intentions for activism and radicalism. In light of the empirical literature indicating complex relations between past behaviors and future intentions in other social domains, we expected moderate positive correlations between past activism and radicalism and future intentions for activist and radical intentions.

Methods

Participants

Participants were recruited by a professional polling company, Knowledge Networks. Using Random Digit Dialing (RDD), KN recruited individuals to take part in internet-based surveys from Time-sharing Experiments for Social Sciences (TESS; <http://www.experimentcentral.org>). In return those without a computer and/or without an internet connection received WebTV and free internet access; those with an active internet connection received cash-redeemable points.

Of the 596 solicited individuals, 72% agreed to participate in the internet survey in December 2006. The resulting 429 participants resided all across the United States, represented levels of education from less than high school (3%) to doctoral degree (2%), and came from a variety of ethnic categories (White 70%, Black Non-Hispanic 11%, Hispanic 12%, Other non-Hispanic 5%, and Mixed 2%). There

were 223 (52%) males and 206 (48%) females, ages ranging from 18 to 92 with a mean of 46 ($SD = 17$).

Questionnaire

The AIS and RIS questions were preceded by a section that asserted: “people care about many different kinds of groups, including the following: *Religious* (e.g. Catholics, Muslims); *Single-Issue* (e.g. environmental, human rights, abortion); *Economic* (e.g. union, farmers, unemployed); *Political* (e.g. Democrats, Republicans, Libertarian); *Ethnic/Racial* (e.g. African-Americans, Native Americans, Irish); and *Gender/Lifestyle* (e.g. Gay/Lesbian, women, Goths).” Respondents were then asked to write down the name of the particular group most important to them and instructed that “my group” in the next eight questions (AIS and RIS) referred to the group they just wrote down. The AIS and RIS questions were on a 4-point Likert scale, with 1 = *very unlikely*, 2 = *unlikely*, 3 = *likely*, and 4 = *very likely*.

Following AIS and RIS items were four items about history of *Past Activist* behavior and two items about history of *Past Radical* behaviors. These questions were based on the highest-loading items from Corning and Myers⁶⁵ Legal Activism and Illegal Activism Dimensions, adapted here to ask about past history rather than future intention (i.e., *attended a talk on a particular group's social or political concerns?*). Participants were asked “At any time in the past have you ever engaged in the activity described below (for ANY group or cause, not just the group you identified earlier),” with *no* coded 1 and *yes* coded 2. The last section of the questionnaire asked about demographic information.

Results

In response to the question about which group they care most about, 113 participants (26%) chose a religious group, 109 (25%) chose a single-issue group (e.g., environmental, human rights, abortion), 61 (14%) chose an economic group (e.g., union, farmers, unemployed), 48 (11%) did not have a group affiliation, 32 (8%) gave an inappropriate answer (e.g., “Medicare Drug Program” or “all of the above” or “not sure”), 23 (5%) chose a political group (e.g., Democrats, Republicans, Libertarians), 22 (5%) listed an ethnic/racial group, and 21 (5%) listed a gender/lifestyle group (e.g., gay/lesbian, women, Goths). Because Activism and Radicalism measures were targeted to the group each participant chose as most cared about, participants who either did not have a group preference ($N = 48$) or listed something that was not a group ($N = 32$) were dropped from the analyses (remaining $N = 349$).

Activism-Radicalism Scales

A Principal Component Analysis with Oblimin rotation on the eight items in the Activism-Radicalism Intention Scale uncovered two components with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 (4.00 and 1.84). The first component included the four items pertaining to activist intentions, and the second component included the four items pertaining to radical intentions (see Table 1). The two components correlated $r = .33$ ($p < .01$). The four-item Activism Intention Scale (AIS) had good reliability ($\alpha = .89$), as did the four-item Radicalism Intention Scale ($\alpha = .84$). Further analyses were conducted with averages of the four items within each scale (AIS

$M = 2.46$, $SD = .80$; $RIS M = 1.70$, $SD = .68$). As in Studies 1 and 2, AIS averaged higher than RIS, $t(348) = 21.77$, $p < .01$.

The correlation of AIS and RIS was .39. Thirty participants (7%) scored 3 ("Likely") or above on the RIS scale, and 137 (31%) scored 3 or above on the AIS. Twenty-two participants scored 3 or above on both AIS and RIS (representing 16% of 137 with activist intentions and 73% of 30 with radical intentions).

A Principal Component Analysis with Oblimin rotation was also conducted on the six questions about past activist and radical actions. Two components emerged with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 (2.77, 1.25) and these components correlated $r = .33$. The first component included the four items pertaining to past activist activity (Legal Activism); the second component included the two items pertaining to past radical activity (Illegal Activism), and one item from the first component (*organized a political event*). This item was dropped and PCA repeated, resulting in two components (eigenvalues 2.41 and 1.22), where the first component included only the three items pertaining to past activism, and the second component included only the two items pertaining to past radical activity. The two components correlated at $r = .28$. Scales were computed by averaging across items within each component (Past Activism $M = 1.33$, $SD = .38$, $\alpha = .78$; Past Radicalism $M = 1.04$, $SD = .17$, $\alpha = .67$).

Table 4 presents correlations among Past Activism, Past Radicalism, Activism Intention Scale (AIS), and Radical Intention Scale (RIS). Notice that, although Activist Intention is best predicted by Past Activism, the best predictor for Radical Intention is not Past Radicalism, but rather Activism Intention.

Almost half of all participants (209 or 49%) reported some history of activist behavior by saying "yes" to at least one of the four past activism items, whereas only 26 (6%) reported some history of radical behavior by saying "yes" to at least one of the two past radicalism items. Twenty-six participants reported some history of both activist and radical behavior (these participants represented 12% of the 209 who reported past activist behavior and 100% of those who reported past radical behavior). These responses indicate that, as we hoped, our participants were trustful of the anonymity of the survey and the integrity of the researchers, revealing information about past activism and radicalism that would be more difficult to solicit outside the U.S.

Demographics

Gender, *Age*, *Race* and household *Income* were not significantly related to either past or future, activism or radicalism. *Education* level was positively correlated with AIS ($r(347) = .18$, $p < .01$), and there was a trend for a similar correlation with Past

Table 4. Study 3 correlations among Past Activism and Past Radicalism Scales and Activism and Radicalism Intention Scales (AIS and RIS)

	Past Radicalism	AIS	RIS
Past Activism	.30**	.50**	.23**
Past Radicalism	—	.18**	.22**
AIS		—	.39**

Note. ** $p < .01$ N of correlations 429.

Activism ($r(349) = .09, p = .09$); those with higher education reported higher activist intentions and slightly more past activism. But education was not correlated with Past Radicalism ($r(349) = .07, ns$) or with RIS ($r(349) = -.07, ns$).

Study 3 Discussion

In Study 3 our respondents were representative of the U.S. adult population on a variety of demographic dimensions. Results showed the same two-component structure of ARIS seen in Studies 1 and 2 with student participants, with Activism and Radicalism Intentions loading on two distinct dimensions. A similar two-component structure was observed in the questions about past behaviors, with legal and illegal behaviors loading on different components.

As expected, past activism predicted intended activism ($r = .50$) and past radicalism predicted intended radicalism ($r = .22$). These correlations are consistent with research that links past behaviors with behavioral intentions in a number of social domains.^{66,67} In addition, past activism was related to past radicalism ($r = .30$) and activist intentions were related to radical intentions ($r = .39$). These correlations are consistent with the “conveyor belt” idea that links activism with radicalism, and so is the finding that 100% of panel respondents who report past radicalism also report past activism. Less consistent with the conveyor belt idea is the finding that only 12% of panel respondents who report past activism also report past radicalism.

General Discussion

This report introduces the Activism and Radicalism Intention Scales (ARIS) Compared with existing scales,^{68–71} ARIS is shorter and more easily applied to a broad variety of political identity groups in and outside of the U.S. For both U.S. and Ukrainian respondents, ARIS produced a two-component structure, with four items pertaining to non-violent and legal behaviors comprising the Activism Intention Scale (AIS), and four items pertaining to illegal and violent behaviors comprising the Radicalism Intention Scale (RIS).

The two subscales showed adequate alpha reliability and initial evidence of discriminant validity: for both U.S. and Ukrainian students, identification with country was positively related to Activism, but not to Radicalism. This result suggests that activist intentions may be an expression of high identification with country along with motivation to improve it. On the other hand, radical intentions may express loss of identification with country or loss of identification with the government currently leading the country.

As described in the introduction, there are two views of the relation between activism and radicalism. In one view, there is a single dimension of political action that runs from passivity to activism to radicalism. In this view, represented in the “conveyor belt” metaphor, individuals who are not succeeding with legal and non-violent political action will, if they care enough about their cause, escalate to illegal and violent political action. Thus the difference between activism and radicalism is only a difference in intensity of commitment.⁷²

In the second view, radicalism is more than an extreme form of activism. Rather radicalism is a different appraisal of the political situation, an appraisal that justifies or even requires political violence as the only possible path to political change. In the second view, activism and radicalism can be competing responses to a perceived need

for political change. Radicals may or may not want change more than activists, but radicals disagree with activists about how best to bring the desired change.

Our results in general support the second view and infirm the “conveyor belt” perspective. If radicalism differs from activism only in being a more extreme form of political commitment, then our eight items should have formed a single dimension. Instead results of principle component analyses in three studies show activism and radicalism to be distinguishable dimensions. The same studies show that AIS and RIS scales formed to represent these two dimensions are empirically distinguishable, with alphas ranging from .60 to .89 that are consistently higher than scale correlations ranging from .37 to .57.

Perhaps most revealing are the percentages of those with activist intentions who also have radical intentions, and the percentages of those with radical intentions who also have activist intentions.

In our three studies, consistently only a small minority of those with activist intentions have also radical intentions: 17% for U.S. students thinking about group they care most about, 11% for Ukrainian students thinking about country, 33% for Ukrainian students thinking about party; 16% for TESS-panel U.S. adults thinking about group they care most about. Thus one implication of the conveyor-belt metaphor appears to be seriously misleading. Only a fraction of those with activist intentions have radical intentions, suggesting that the transition from activism to radicalism is far from the ineluctable trajectory of a conveyor belt.

The evidence in relation to the other implication of the conveyor-belt metaphor is mixed. Those with radical intentions are indeed more likely to have also activist intentions: 94% for U.S. students, 42% for Ukrainian students thinking about country, 63% for Ukrainian students thinking about party, and 73% of U.S. adults in the TESS sample. Most extreme are the results for the TESS panel in relation to past behavior; 100% of respondents reporting past radical behavior also report past activist behavior. At the other extreme, however, only 42% of Ukrainian students with radical intentions for their country also have activist intentions for their country.

For Ukrainian patriots, there are evidently paths to radical intentions that do not include activist intentions. In contrast, U.S. respondents scoring high on Radicalism also score high on Activism, as might be expected if radicalism is an extreme form of activism. Further research will be required to test this idea, but we tentatively suggest that the degree to which radicals come out of legal and nonviolent activism may differ importantly in different times and places. In particular, it is possible that in repressive regimes where activism is persecuted with the same fervor as radicalism, the conveyor belt metaphor is an appropriate description of the common trajectory to radicalism and terrorism. This hypothesis cannot be verified with our samples from one democratic and one fledgling-democratic country.

Thus the Ukrainian results suggest a mild qualification of the conveyor belt metaphor. Popular as well as academic discourse⁷³⁻⁷⁵ frequently assumes that the path to political radicalism lies through political activism. In this “conveyor belt” model, all or most terrorists have graduated to radical violence from previous experience of non-violent activism. But the results for Ukrainian students suggest that individuals may come to radicalism without engaging in activism first.

The Ukrainian results are consistent at least with what is publicly known about the individuals implicated in the 7/7 terrorist attacks on the London underground. These individuals appear to have come to radicalization with at most a history of

brief and inconsequential associations with Muslim activist groups.⁷⁶ This pattern suggests that what contact the bombers had with activist organizations, such as Hizb-Ut-Tahrir, led them to realize that the activist agenda was incongruent with their own more radical motivations.

A more important qualification of the conveyor belt model has to do with its implication that the way from activism to radicalism is easy or even irresistible. Whoever gets onto the conveyor belt with activism is on the way to radicalism. About this implication, our data are completely consistent: as already noted, only a minority with activist intentions have radical intentions. TESS results for past behavior tell the same story: only a minority reporting past activism also report past radicalism (12%).

To the extent that the way from activism to radicalism is not easy and automatic, the conveyor belt must be an unhelpful metaphor. If only a small minority graduate from peaceful activism to violent radicalism, then suppressing groups with radical ideas can be counterproductive.^{77,78} The transition from activism to radicalism is often a response to perceived injustice inflicted by state security forces.⁷⁹ Banning a group that advocates radical ideas but has not engaged in illegal political action may be seen as injustice thereby increasing group identification, and moving more individuals from activism to radicalism.

Conclusion

The perpetrators of political violence, including terrorist violence, are the apex of a pyramid of sympathizers and supporters. The beliefs, feelings, and even the intentions of the pyramid can be tracked with public opinion polls. For example, a poll of U.K. Muslims⁸⁰ after the July 7, 2005, suicide bombings in the London Underground, asked, "Do you think any further attacks by British suicide bombers in the UK are justified or unjustified?" Five percent of respondents said "justified," that is, about 50,000 of the million adult U.K. Muslims thought the bombings were justified in defense of Islam. But thus far only a few hundreds of U.K. Muslims have been arrested for suspected terrorist activities. It is clear in this example that the great majority of those who justify political violence will never engage in political violence.

Thus we have undertaken direct assessment of intentions for political action, both non-violent legal action (Activism) and illegal and violent action (Radicalism). If deployed in repeated polls focusing on the same group or cause, ARIS may be able to track changes in activist and radical intent in the broad base of sympathizers and supporters where radicals seek forum, funding, and recruits. Change in readiness for action may then be useful as an index of success and failure in the war of ideas that aims to cut mass support for perpetrators of political violence.

Notes

1. John Horgan, *The Psychology of Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2005).
2. Clark McCauley and Mary Segal, "Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups," in Clyde Hendrick, ed., *Review of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 9 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1987), 231–256.
3. Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
4. Annette Linden and Bert Klandermans, "Stigmatization and repression of extreme-right activism in the Netherlands," *Mobilization: An International Journal* 11 (2006): 213–228.

5. U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism. Chapter 1: Strategic Assessment (2006). Accessed August 8, 2008 at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2007/c-rprt-terrorism_2006-01.htm
6. Michael Elliot, "They Had a Plan," *Time Magazine*, 12 August, 2002.
7. Zeyno Baran, *Hizb ut-Tahrir: Islam's Political Insurgency* (Washington, D.C.: The Nixon Center, DOI, December 2004).
8. National Intelligence Council, *National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland* (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007): 7.
9. Shiv Malik, "Hizb ut Tahrir and the conveyor belt of extremism—MIM archives Hizb ut Tahrir," *Militant Islam Monitor* (London, England: New Statesman, Ltd, 2005).
10. Manos Karagiannis and Clark McCauley, "Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami: Evaluating the Threat Posed by a Radical Islamic Group that Remains Nonviolent," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 2 (2006): 315–334.
11. Rogers Brubaker and David Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence," *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (1998): 426.
12. Ehud Sprinzak, "The process of delegitimation: Toward a linkage theory of political terrorism," in Clark McCauley, ed., *Terrorism and public policy* (London: Frank Cass, 1991), 50–68.
13. Alexandra F. Corning and Daniel J. Myers, "Individual orientation toward engagement in social action," *Political Psychology* 23 (2002): 703–729.
14. Ibid.
15. Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20 (2008): 415–433.
16. Clark McCauley, "Terrorism Research and Public Policy: An Overview," *Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence* 3 (1991): 126–144.
17. McCauley and Moskalenko (see note 15 above).
18. Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, *Asala: Irrational terror or political tool* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post/Westview Press, 1985).
19. Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen, *Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior: An introduction to theory and research* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975).
20. Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein, *Understanding attitudes and predicting social behavior* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1980).
21. Icek Ajzen, "From intentions to actions: A theory of planned behavior," in J. Kuhl & J. Beckmann, eds., *Action control: From cognition to behavior* (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1985), 11–39.
22. Paschal Sheeran, Sheina Orbell and David Trafimow, "Does the Temporal Stability of Behavioral Intentions Moderate Intention-Behavior and Past Behavior-Future Behavior Relations?" *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 25 (1999): 724–732.
23. David R. Black and Austin S. Babrow, "Identification of campaign recruitment strategies for a stepped smoking cessation intervention for a college campus," *Health Education Quarterly* 18 (1991): 235–247.
24. Jennifer Boldero, S. Moore and D. Rosenthal, "Intention, context, and safe sex: Australian adolescents' responses to aids," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 22 (1992): 1374–1396.
25. Deanne Parker, "Intention to commit driving violations: An application of the theory of planned behavior," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 77 (1992): 94–101.
26. Shu Fai Cheung, Darius K-S. Chan, and Zoe S.-Y. Wong, "Re-examining the theory of planned behavior in understanding wastepaper recycling," *Environment and Behavior* 31 (1999): 587–612.
27. Jennifer Boldero, "The prediction of household recycling of newspapers: The role of attitudes, intentions, and situational factors," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 25 (1995): 440–462.
28. Ibid.
29. Black and Babrow (see note 23 above).
30. Kay Deaux, Ann Reid, Daniella Martin, and Nida Bikmen, "Ideologies of diversity and inequality: predicting collective action in groups varying in ethnicity and immigrant status," *Political Psychology* 27 (2006): 123–146.

31. Richard N. Lalonde and James E. Cameron, "An intergroup perspective on immigrant acculturation with a focus on collective strategies," *International Journal of Psychology* 28 (1993): 57–74.
32. Mindy D. Foster and Kimberly Matheson, "Double relative deprivation: Combining the personal and political," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 21 (1995): 1167–1177.
33. Joe N. Rollins and Harry N. Hirsch, "Sexual Identities and Political Engagements: A Queer Survey," *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society* 10 (2003): 290–313.
34. Corning and Myers (see note 13 above).
35. Ibid.
36. Clark McCauley, "The psychology of group identification and the power of ethnic nationalism," in Daniel Chirot and Martin Seligman, eds., *Ethnopolitical warfare: causes, consequences, and possible solutions* (Washington, DC: APA Books, 2001), 343–362.
37. Robert J. Fisher and Kirk Wakefield, "Factors leading to group identification: A field study of winners and losers," *Psychology and Marketing* 15 (1998): 23–40.
38. Eithel M. Simpson, Thelma Snuggs, Tim Christiansen, and Kelli E. Simples, "Race, homophily, and purchase intentions and the Black consumer," *Psychology and Marketing* 17 (2000): 877–889.
39. Jameth Griffith, "Multilevel analysis of cohesion's relation to stress, well-being, identification, disintegration, and perceived combat readiness," *Military Psychology* 14 (2002): 217–239.
40. John Eighmey, "Why do youth enlist? Identification of underlying themes," *Armed Forces and Society*, 32 (2006): 307–328.
41. Sophia Moskalenko, Clark R. McCauley and Paul Rozin, "Group identification under conditions of threat: college students' attachment to country, family, ethnicity, religion and college before and after September 11, 2001," *Political Psychology* 2 (2006): 77–98.
42. Robert B. Cialdini, Alan Levy, Peter Herman, Lynn T. Koslowski, and Richard E. Petty, "Elastic shifts of opinion: Determinants of direction and durability," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 34 (1976): 663–672.
43. Robert B. Cialdini and Kenneth D. Richardson, "Two indirect tactics of image management: Basking and Blasting," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 39 (1980): 406–415.
44. Robert B. Cialdini and Maralou E. De Nicholas, "Self-presentation by association," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 57 (1989): 626–631.
45. Jeff Greenberg, Tom Pyszczynski, and Sheldon Solomon, "The Causes and Consequences of a Need for Self-Esteem: A Terror Management Theory," in Roy F. Baumeister, ed., *Public Self and Private Self* (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1986).
46. Barbara A. Mullin and Michael A. Hogg, "Dimensions of subjective uncertainty in social identification and minimal group discrimination," *British Journal of Social Psychology* 37 (1998): 345–365.
47. Michael A. Hogg and Barbara A. Mullin, "Joining Groups to Reduce Uncertainty: Subjective Uncertainty Reduction and Group Identification," in Dominic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg, eds., *Social Identity and Social Cognition* (Blackwell, 1999).
48. Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978).
49. Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
50. William A. Gamson, *The strategy of social protest* (Homewood, IL: Dorsey, 1975).
51. Ibid. (p. 58).
52. Moskalenko et al. (see note 41 above).
53. Richard W. Robins, Holly M. Hendin, and Kali H. Trzesniewski, "Measuring global self-esteem: Construct validation of a single-item measure and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 27 (2001): 151–161.
54. Moskalenko et al. (see note 41 above).
55. Robins et al. (see note 53 above).
56. Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer* (New York: Harper and Row, 1951).
57. John Sabini, *Social Psychology* (New York: Norton & Co, 1992).

58. Donatella Della Porta, *Social movements, political violence, and the state: A comparative analysis of Italy and Germany* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
59. Harry C. Triandis, *Interpersonal behavior* (Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1977).
60. Darryl J. Bem, "Self-perception theory," in Leon Berkowitz, ed., *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 6 (New York: Academic Press, 1972), 1–62.
61. Robert B. Cialdini and David A. Schroeder, "Increasing contributions by legitimizing paltry contributions," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 34 (1976): 599–604.
62. Elliott Aronson and Judson Mills, "The effect of severity of initiation on liking for a group," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 59 (1959): 177–181.
63. Eamonn Ferguson and Peter I. Bibby, "Predicting future blood donor returns: Past behavior, intentions, and observer effects," *Health Psychology* 21 (2002): 513–518.
64. Judith A. Ouellette and Wendy Wood, "Habit and intention in everyday life: The multiple processes by which past behavior predicts future behavior," *Psychological Bulletin* 124 (1998): 54–74.
65. Corning and Myers (see note 13 above).
66. Ouellette and Wood (see note 64 above).
67. Ferguson and Bibby (see note 63 above).
68. Corning and Myers (see note 13 above).
69. Deaux et al. (see note 30 above).
70. Foster and Matheson (see note 32 above).
71. Rollins and Hirsch (see note 33 above).
72. Gamson (see note 50 above).
73. Elliot (see note 6 above).
74. Baran (see note 7 above).
75. Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, "*From dawa to jihad - the various threats from radical Islam to the democratic legal order*," (translated from Dutch). Publications (2007). Retrieved 1/24/08 from <http://www.minbzk.nl/bzk2006uk/subjects/public-safety/publications?ActI>.
76. MI5 Security Service, "*Countering International Terrorism: Tackling Radicalization*," (2007). Retrieved 1/24/08 from <http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page31.html>.
77. Ronald A. Francisco, "After the Massacre: Mobilization in the Wake of Harsh Repression," *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 9 (2004): 107–126.
78. Karen Rasler, "Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution," *American Sociological Review* 61 (1996): 132–152.
79. Della Porta (see note 58 above).
80. ICM, "*Muslims Poll July 2005*" (2005). Retrieved March 5, 2006, from <http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/reviews/2005/Guardian%20%20muslims%20july05/Guardian%20Muslims%20jul05.asp>