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Mayhem, Myths, and Martyrdom: The Shi'a Conception of Jihad

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The article examines the perception of jihad in Shi'a Islam. It first provides an overview of the understanding of jihad in Islam at large, and then examines the reflections of four central Shi'a thinkers on jihad. More so than the traditional Sunni approach to this concept, the Shi'a understanding of jihad is heavily influenced by perceptions of historical suffering, placing an emphasis on injustice, tyrannical rule, indignity, humiliation, and resistance. In recent decades, Shi'a and Sunni notions of jihad have become more closely aligned, as Salafi-Jihadists, who increasingly monopolize the Sunni discourse on jihad, persistently frame jihad as a response to the oppression by Western "infidel" regimes and tyrannical "apostate" regimes in the Arab and Muslim world.

Keywords jihad, martyrdom, shiah-doctrines

The concept of *jihad* has generated a storm of interest in recent years, particularly in Western countries. While the concept of *jihad* and its meaning in Islam is often misunderstood, there is an even deeper lack of knowledge about how the Muslim Shi'a community approaches *jihad*. The purpose of this study is to examine the concept of *jihad* as it is understood by the Shi'a stream of Islam.

The first part of this article provides a general overview of the meaning of *jihad* in Islam at large, and shows that *jihad* is a complex concept with a variety of meanings—of which war is only one. The second part of the study addresses historical Shi'a grievances and related concepts since, as will be argued, they are directly connected to the way Shi'a thinkers relate to the concept of *jihad*. The third part analyzes doctrines of *jihad* that are specifically Shi'a in character, and shows that the Shi'a conception of *jihad* is as complex as *jihad* in Islam at large. The fourth part of the study discusses and examines the statements and speeches on *jihad* of four dominant Shi'a leaders. Three among them are Iranians, namely Ali Shariati, Ayatollah Taleqani, and Ayatollah Mutahhari, and have set the stage for the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The fourth is the spiritual leader of the Lebanese Shi'a Hizballah, Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, whose views resonate among the Shi'a not only in his own country, but also beyond the Lebanese borders.

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The study concludes that the Shi'a conception of *jihad* is heavily influenced by Shi'a perceptions of historical suffering. As a result, the theoreticians studied here tend to emphasize those grievances and myths that have had a particularly visible impact on Shi'a identity, including injustice, tyrannical rule, indignity, humiliation, and resistance.

The Multivalence of Jihad

A proper discussion of the Shi'a view of *jihad* requires an explanation of the meaning of *jihad*, a concept aptly referred to by Bruce Lawrence as a "multivalent category of reference within the Islamic symbol system."¹ Indeed, few concepts that have been used as prolifically as *jihad* have been so little understood.

The word *jihad* is Arabic and means "to strive" or "to exert oneself," and is rooted in the verb *jahada*.² *Jihad* involves a "determined effort,"³ directed at an aim that is in accordance with God's command and hence a praiseworthy undertaking for the sake of Islam and the Muslim community (*umma*) at large. Most importantly, *jihad* in its proper form, and in order to distinguish it from the wars of pre-Islamic Arabia, is *jihad fi sabil Allah*, i.e., *jihad* in the way of, or for the sake of, God. This attribute distinguishes this type of struggle from other struggles waged for personal ends such as glory or booty.⁴

The concept of *jihad* has always been highly dynamic and adaptive. In the early years of Islam, when the Prophet Muhammad was politically weak, the message of *jihad* was designed to propagate Islam against the prevailing forms of idolatry and paganism. More moderate descriptions of *jihad* emphasizing a passive endurance of persecution hence dominate the earlier Meccan verses of the Quran. After the migration (*hijra*) of Muhammad and his followers to Medina in the year 622, the Islamic community of believers was more consolidated and more concerned with defending its religious practices. During the subsequent Medinan period, the notion developed that the forcible prevention of religious practice is tantamount to a declaration of war. Therefore, the Medinan verses of the Quran tend to stress a *jihad* more inclined to ward off aggression, and at times permitting it.⁵

On the subject of *jihad*, the Quran thus offers apparently conflicting pronouncements, which take two general forms. The first is the peaceful form of a "struggle" against one's evil inclinations (sometimes referred to as the "greater *jihad*").⁶ The second is the more aggressive form of *jihad* of the sword, sometimes referred to as the "smaller *jihad*." The belief prevalent among many Muslims—especially Sufis—that the *jihad* against one's evil inclinations is "greater" than the "lesser" *jihad* of the sword is based upon a traditional saying attributed to the Prophet Muhammad (*hadith*) that appeared in various non-canonical compilations of *hadiths*, including the *sunan* of Ahmad ibn Al-Husseyin Al-Bayhaqi of the eleventh century. According to that tradition, Muhammad reportedly told homecoming Muslim warriors that they had returned from the lesser *jihad* of the struggle against unbelievers in order to embark on the greater *jihad*, which is the struggle against lust. Some scholars, however, have questioned the reliability of this *hadith*.⁷

The concept of *jihad* was broadened soon after the prophet's death in 632 and the ascension of his successor, Abu Bakr, as caliph. During Abu Bakr's reign, the pacts that his predecessor had reached with the tribes were abrogated as many tribes began revolting. Abu Bakr responded by launching wars against what he termed *rid-dah* (apostasy). The apostates were viewed as traitors to Islam and henceforth

included in the group of people against which *jihad* was to be waged. Under Abu Bakr's rule, *jihad* was further extended to include the struggle against rebellion by Muslims against the ruling Imam.⁸

The next centuries witnessed the rise and fall first of the Umayyad (661–750), and then of the Abbasid (750–1258) empire. During the rule of these two dynasties, the territory of Islam was greatly expanded to include parts of Europe, Africa, and Asia. This vast expansion gave rise to a new juristic concept—that of the division between the “House of Islam” (*dar al-Islam*)⁹ and the “House of War” (*dar al-harb*). Jurists during the early Abbasid period helped develop the conception of *jihad* as warfare in an attempt to clarify the nature of the *umma*, its leadership, and its relations with the non-Islamic world. These jurists envisioned *dar al-harb* as an area torn by perpetual conflict and a constant threat to the peace of the *dar al-Islam*. Although extended periods of truce would be permissible, war between these two abodes was understood to be the normal state, until such time that the *dar al-Islam* would prevail.¹⁰

The warfare could take two different forms. The first form was the idea of offensive *jihad*, which was possible only if the *umma* was united by a legitimate ruler. The offensive *jihad* was envisioned as a collective duty (*fard kifaya*), in which a group of Muslims would do the actual fighting on behalf of the entire community. The offensive *jihad* was designed to expand the territory of Islam, aiming to eventually bring “the whole earth under the sway of Islam and to extirpate unbelief.”¹¹

The second form was the defensive *jihad*, which set in when the community of Muslim believers was attacked by the *dar al-harb*. In that case, the defense of Islam made it an individual duty (*fard ayn*) for each and every Muslim to participate in the *jihad* in the immediate area of aggression.

In medieval times, as the power of the Abbasid caliphate declined and made way for more corrupt Muslim regimes such as the Mongols and the Mamluks, another issue came to the fore—the revolt against a Muslim ruler. In the fourteenth century, a jurist called Ibn Taymiyyah suggested that Muslims may revolt against nominally Muslim rulers if they failed to apply Islamic law (*sharia*). Ibn Taymiyya ruled *jihad* against the Mongols permissible because the latter did not rule in accordance with Islamic law. From the Fourteenth century onwards, *jihad* thus came to include the right to fight against Muslim rulers who strayed from the right path.¹²

The next watershed in the development of *jihad* came four centuries later, when European powers began to threaten Muslim dominance of the Middle East. Over the subsequent two centuries, Western powers would broaden their political control over this predominantly Muslim region. As a result of European colonialism, Muslim religious scholars faced the dual challenges of foreign control and decline in religiosity. The “impact of the West,” as Bernard Lewis memorably termed the arrival of European powers in the Middle East and its implications to the region,¹³ inspired a religious reformist movement in places like Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, North Africa, and India. In each of these places, scholars emerged who tackled the internal challenges of religious decay through *ijtihad* (reinterpretation) of the *sharia*. The external challenge itself was confronted by waging an active *jihad* against the European colonial powers. One of the most important figures involved in this process was Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. Afghani, and especially his spiritual disciples Muhammad Abdu and Rashid Rida, would help spark the Salafi movement—a broad, fundamentalist religious movement whose modern-day violent outliers, known as Salafi-Jihadists, include terrorist entities such as Al Qaeda.¹⁴

Since its emergence in the 1980s in the wake of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Salafi-Jihadism is the most visible—and most aggressive—contemporary movement championing the violent understanding of *jihad*. Modern-day Salafi-Jihadists elevate the importance of Jihad to the same level as the five ordinary “pillars of Islam,” namely the five daily prayers (*salat*), the pilgrimage to Mecca (*hajj*), alms-giving to the needy (*zakat*), the declaration of faith (*shahadah*), and the fast of Ramadan (*sawm*).

While a history of the development of Salafi-Jihadism far extends the scope of this article, it is worthwhile to briefly recount some of the key events and thinkers that influenced the emergence of Salafi-Jihadism—a movement whose modern origins lie in the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood. In Egypt, the debate over how to address the decline of Islam became acute in the 1920s, in the wake of the 1924 abolition of the Ottoman caliphate. These events helped pave the way for the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 by an Egyptian teacher, Hassan al-Bannah. The Muslim Brotherhood’s goal was the revival of Islam by creating an Islamic system that would be incompatible with the West and its institutions, as reflected in its credo: “God is our objective; the Quran is our constitution; the Prophet is our leader; Jihad is our way; and Death for the sake of God is the highest of our aspirations.” In India, a similar process was spearheaded by Abu al-Ala Maududi, a journalist bent on purifying Muslim society of Western influence and corrupt Muslim traditions alike. In 1941, he founded *Jamaat i-Islami*, a Salafi party that eventually became the dominant religious party in Pakistan.

Few thinkers were as crucial for the development of Salafi-Jihadism as the Egyptian Sayyed Qutb, who had emerged out of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb called upon true Muslims to engage in violent *jihad* as a method to create the genuine Muslim state, including against their own regimes. This, however, posed a problem of *fitna*—Muslim internecine fighting—which required Qutb to justify the use of violence against Muslims. To bypass the problem of *fitna*, Qutb argued that righteous Muslims were fighting not other Muslims, but instead infidels.¹⁵

Qutb believed that what had thwarted the success of the peaceful spread of Islam (*dawa*) were illegitimate and oppressive regimes like those in Egypt under Nasser. These regimes, he said, prevented their Muslim citizens from freely choosing Islam, and were thus heretical. Qutb referred to the Nasserite regime—and almost all other governments, for that matter—as a *jahili* regime, a morally corrupt entity. *Dawa* by itself, he argued, could not bring about God’s rule on earth because the *jahili* regimes would not give up their power. Hence, to remove this obstacle, a Muslim vanguard movement was needed that would engage in *jihad* by the sword.¹⁶

Among the most influential disciples of Qutb was Muhammad abd al-Salam Faraj (1954–1982), who led the Cairo branch of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and authored one of the most important books for the jihad movement, *The Neglected Duty*. Like Taymiyya, Faraj viewed *jihad* as central in Islam. *Jihad* was the “neglected duty,” and should be placed alongside the other pillars of the faith.¹⁷

While the traditional, reform-oriented Salafis did not believe in the use of violence as a tool to reform Islam, modern day Salafi-Jihadists do. The division between mainstream Salafis and Salafi-Jihadists manifests itself in several ways, the most important of which is over the issue of *jihad*. By and large, mainstream Salafis believe that *dawa*—the nonviolent call to Islam—should be given priority over *jihad*, whereas Salafi-Jihadists regard the *jihad* of the sword as a priority. Salafi-Jihadists accept that external *jihad* in Islam comes in two forms—an offensive and a defensive

one—and concur that an offensive *jihad* can only be waged under the leadership of a caliph. They also concur that the doctrine of defensive *jihad* requires that a holy war must be waged if an outside force invades Muslim territory. Salafi-Jihadists saw the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a clear act of war against Muslims that warranted a defensive *jihad*. According to the principle of *fard ayn*, it was incumbent upon each and every Muslim to come to the help of his coreligionist through *jihad*, since an attack on one Muslim territory is an attack on the entire *umma*. Beginning in the early 1980s, and continuing until today, Salafi-Jihadists would frame the concept of *jihad* as the result of a long history of perceived Western subjugation of Islam that includes the occupation of Muslim lands by “infidel” Western countries and “apostate” regimes in the Arab Middle East.

A second issue that differentiates Salafi-Jihadists from mainstream Salafis is the issue of *takfir*, a term that describes the labeling of fellow Muslims as infidels (*kufir*), thus justifying violence against them. A third issue that distinguishes Salafi-Jihadists from mainstream Salafists is the justification for targeting of civilians. Most Muslims, including non-violent Salafis, cite a number of Quaranic and *hadith* sources against the killing of civilians, although mainstream Salafis recognize that innocent civilians may be killed in the course of war, which is an acceptable consequence if the war is just. The fourth and last major distinction between Salafism and Salafi-Jihadism is the latter's permission of suicide attacks.¹⁸

Shi'a Grievances, Martyrdom, and the Occultation of the Twelfth Imam

Shi'ism, a word derived from *shi'a*, meaning “party” or “faction” in Arabic, was used to describe the “party of Ali.” Following the Prophet Muhammad's death in 632, Ali, the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law, had been repeatedly blocked from assuming the post of *caliph* (literally, successor), who was to succeed the prophet in leading the *umma*. When Ali was murdered in 661 by a Kharajite,¹⁹ his death was regarded as a shameful killing of the closest remaining male relative of Muhammad—someone who not only had been the first male convert to Islam, but who was also believed to possess many of the exceptional qualities of the prophet. Henceforth, the fate of Ali, who was betrayed by friends and foes alike, came to symbolize the inherent injustice in the life of the Shi'a.²⁰

The incident that proved most formative for the emergence of Shi'ism, however, was the martyrdom of Ali's son Hussein on a desolate plain in Karbala in today's Iraq in 680. The incident was sparked when Muslims based around Kufah, a stronghold of loyalists of Ali and his descendents, had urged Hussein to contend the accession to the caliphate of the new Umayyad leader, Yazid I, by virtue of Hussein's descent from the Prophet. Hussein heeded the request, and set out from Medina to Kufah to organize a revolt. Near Karbala, Hussein, a small band of followers, and the women and children from his household who had accompanied him, were confronted by Umayyad troops, besieged, and finally massacred on Ashura, the tenth day of the month of Muharram. Hussein is said to have died while carrying his son in his arms.

Ever since that fateful Ashura, the martyrdom of Hussein at Karbala has become a central component of Shi'a identity, and has bestowed an emotive notion of martyrdom upon Shi'a awareness. Yann Richard remarked that the martyrdom of Hussein—the only living grandson of the Prophet—“has become the prototype of every struggle for justice, every suffering. That is where the heart of Shi'ism lies,

in this agony which is at one and the same time a revolt and a sign of hope.”²¹ Similarly, Karen Armstrong notes that “Like the murder of Ali, the [Karbala] tragedy became a symbol for Shi’a Muslims of the chronic injustice that seems to pervade human life.”²² Navid Kermani elaborates on the effect that Hussein’s martyrdom had on the Shi’a. He notes the early Islamic anecdotes that described how as a child, Hussein played with his Prophet grandfather, and how he happily rode through Mecca on the shoulders of his father, Ali. He juxtaposes this benevolent and cheerful picture with Hussein’s brutal murder and the subsequent desecration of his body. He then describes the humiliating effect that the martyrdom had on the Shi’a:

The humiliation of the murdered son-in-law of the Prophet, perpetrated—out of all people—by the leader of the Umayyads, the most fervent opponents of the Prophet, constitutes more than a shame to those defeated [by the Umayyads]. It represents the restoration of the pre-Islamic rule of the nobility that Islam seemed to have done away with. The fact that, in the following year, Yazid ordered a three-day massacre in Medina, and a year later the destruction of the Kaba, completes the picture of the usurpation. . . To the Shi’a, the betrayal of everything that Muhammad represented by divine decree. . . is the original event upon which they interpret the entire subsequent and failed history of Islam, which has been stolen by the Sunnis—the Fall of Man as a historical event.²³

In Damascus, the capital of the Umayyad empire, where Yazid gloated over Hussein’s severed head, a number of shrines commemorate the battle of Karbala. Among the most well-known shrine is *Mashhad Ra’s al-Hussein*, the “Shrine of Hussein’s Head” located in the northeast corner of the Great Umayyad mosque. To this day, Shi’a pilgrims visit this and other shrines associated with the battle of Karbala.²⁴

The martyrdom of Hussein has played a profound role not only in shaping Shi’a identity at large, but also Shi’a perceptions of *jihad*. Another element in Shi’a doctrine that had a direct bearing on how Shi’as understand *jihad* is the occultation (*ghayba*) of the Twelfth Imam. According to the dominant Twelver (*Ithna-Ashari*) denomination within Shi’ism, there have been twelve Imams since Muhammad’s death—descendants of the prophet’s family who were the rightful worldly and spiritual heirs of Muhammad’s authority, and hence the true leaders of the Islamic *umma*. The Shi’a emphasize the persecution and eventual murder of these rightful Imams by the reigning caliphs, who thus deprived the Imams of their right to assume the caliphate. Unlike his eleven predecessors, however, the Twelfth Imam is believed to have been taken into occultation by God in 874 to thwart yet another murder of a rightful Imam. In 941, the last time that the “Hidden Imam” had been seen, he entered the Great Occultation. Shi’as believe that the Hidden Imam is alive and will eventually return as the *mahdi*, “the one guided by God”²⁵ who will usher in the End of Days “to fill the world with justice and equity.”²⁶ In Shi’ism, it is the Hidden Imam who holds true worldly authority, but in his absence it was the *ulama*, the learned ones, who took over this task until the occulted Imam’s return (*raja’a*).

The martyrdom of Hussein and the subsequent killings of all but one rightful Imam neatly fit the pattern of suffering and repression that has accompanied the

Shi'a since the seventh century. Ever since their emergence, the Shi'a have often been a minority persecuted by the Sunni rulers, though there were periods of Shi'a rule in the Middle East, notably the Fatimid Empire in Egypt (910–1174) and the Safavid empires in Iran (1501–1736). By and large, however, the Shi'a suffered persecution throughout their history, and were at best tolerated by the ruling Sunni establishment.²⁷

Over time, the Shi'a have channeled notions of their suffering into a feeling of enmity and revenge against the perceived source of their misery—the Sunni usurpers of the real Islam. Increasingly, the Shi'a developed the idea that Sunnis needed to be battled, and it is in this duality of suffering and resistance that modern Shi'a identity is properly understood. As Martin Kramer, for example, notes, “[Hussein] is no longer pitied; he is a hero to be emulated for his willingness to battle against all odds and offer his life as a martyr for the just cause.”²⁸ In a similar vein, Momen describes the “strange paradox in Shi'a Islam”—on the one hand, Imams are praised for enduring suffering; on the other hand, Hussein, the great hero of Shi'ism, is praised for standing up to tyranny and fighting in the face of overwhelming odds against him.²⁹

The Shi'a Conception of Jihad

The variance between Shi'a and Sunni perceptions of *jihad* should come as no surprise, given the historical differences between the two streams in their general doctrines and practices.³⁰ Nevertheless, the degree to which Shi'a and Sunni perceptions of *jihad* differ from one another is the substance of ongoing debate. Rudolph Peters and Majid Khadduri, for example, argue that the doctrines are very similar, the one crucial difference being that “Twelver Shiites hold that *jihad* can only be waged under the leadership of the rightful Imam.”³¹ In Shi'ism, the notion that *jihad*, at least in theory, requires the return of the rightful Imam crystallizes as the key doctrinal difference between Sunni and Shi'a views on *jihad*. Following the occultation of the Twelfth Imam in 873, Shi'a theory holds, no lawful expansionist *jihad* can be fought.³² The Imam is viewed as an infallible ruler who is the only one capable to judge when *jihad* should be declared, and when circumstances require that it will be limited.³³ In some cases, Shi'a thinkers have gone as far as adopting a stance of provisional pacifism in the absence of the Hidden Imam, as has the Shi'a missionary Seyyid Saeed Akhtar Rizvi.³⁴

Despite the fact that Shi'a theory puts expansionist *jihad* on hold, this theoretical notion of a time-out during the *ghayba* of the Twelfth Imam has not been strictly adhered to by all Shi'a thinkers and leaders. During the Qajar period of Iran, for instance, Sheikh Ja'far Kashif al-Ghita (1812–13) announced that during the occultation, the duty to defend Islam through *jihad* rests upon the *mujtahids*—those authorized to infer legal rulings from the Islamic school of law.³⁵

These seemingly contradictory arguments regarding *jihad* are rooted in the fact that the very question over authority during the Twelfth Imam's absence is still disputed. Mehdi Abedi and Gary Legenhausen elaborate on the different strands of opinion regarding rightful rule in the absence of the Hidden Imam. They explain that while some have deemed as illegitimate any attempt at replacing the Imam's authority by that of another entity, other Shi'a rulers, and especially the shahs during the Safavid Empire (1502–1779), have claimed to reign as the representatives of the Hidden Imam. In that, the shahs were buttressed by some members of the *ulama*,

the community of Islamic legal scholars.³⁶ It is important, however, to add that the *ulama* was far from united, either in its views on *jihad*, or regarding the question of who is the proper source of authority during the absence of the Twelfth Imam. The Akhbari school of Shi'a jurisprudence, for example, was known for its insistence that no state or religious body could legitimately act on the Imam's behalf.³⁷ Today, the dominant view among contemporary Shi'a scholars holds that "the responsibilities of the Imam may fall upon lesser souls during his absence."³⁸

In Shi'a Islam, the absence of the Imam also has a direct bearing on what the *jihad* is able to accomplish. Khadduri points out that due to the Imam's absence, combating evil is deemed impossible. The *jihad*, hence, is regarded as "unconsequential," he argues, lying "dormant," in a "state of suspension."³⁹ He contrasts this doctrine with the Sunni view on *jihad*, which aims at reconstituting Muslim power by means of *jihad*, rather than waiting for the Imam to return from his *ghayba* "in the capacity of a Mahdi, who will triumphantly combat evil and re-establish justice and righteousness."⁴⁰

Since the question over the rightful authority during the absence of the Twelfth Imam has never been settled, the question of whether it is legitimate to wage *jihad* in the Imam's absence has been similarly inconclusive. Moreover, *jihad* is the single most contentious issue in this regard, as Abedi and Legenhausen point out, adding that "some Shi'a writers even avoid using the term *jihad* for defensive war in the absence of the Imam and speak instead of "holy war of defense" (*harb difa'iyah muqaddasah*).⁴¹ As another example of the controversy over *jihad*, they cite the fact that during the Iran-Iraq war, Iranian leaders refrained from using the term *jihad* to describe the war, referring instead to the "Iraqi imposed war."⁴²

It should be recalled here that only expansionist, or "offensive" *jihad* is regarded by most Shi'a thinkers as unlawful as long as the Twelfth Imam is absent, and that a *jihad* in defense of the *umma* against an outside attack remains obligatory.⁴³ A central question that follows, then, is what precisely constitutes an attack on Islam? Abdulaziz Sachedina points out that one Shi'a interpretation of *jihad* dating back to early Islamic times permits the "*jihad* of the Sword" even against fellow Muslims "if the latter are engaged in spreading discord in the earth."⁴⁴

As far as participation in *jihad* is concerned, it is generally agreed that taking part in *jihad* is obligatory for all male Muslims whose physical condition permits them to do so. Yet, given the theoretical absence of *jihad*, this obligation has been put on hold. Nevertheless, the greater *jihad*, i.e., the struggle against one's baser instincts, is still obligatory.⁴⁵

Lawrence argues that the widely held belief that the Shi'a have put *jihad* "on hold" until the return of the Imam is misconceived, and he criticizes Peters and others who reduce the significance of Shi'a notions of *jihad* to this very issue.⁴⁶ He argues that in Shi'ism, *jihad* is constantly extolled, and can be waged not only by the Hidden Imam, but by a Shi'a cleric chosen by the Imam.⁴⁷ The potential enemies of Shi'a Muslims thus encompass not only non-Muslims, but "the entire hateful Sunni world, a world held responsible for all the harassment and persecution to which the Shi'a were subjected throughout the ages."⁴⁸

Exponents of the Shi'a Conception of Jihad

The first three Shi'a thinkers whose views on *jihad* will be explored in the following section helped pave the way for the Islamic Revolution of 1979. All three attracted

large audiences due to their charisma and the relevance of the content of their speeches to contemporary political life. The pamphlets and speeches by Ali Shariati, Ayatollah Sayyid Mahmud Taleqani, and Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari are central to understanding current Shi'a thought, the ideological underpinnings of revolutionary Iran, and in particular Shi'a perceptions of the concept of *jihad*.

The fourth Shi'a authority whose views on *jihad* will be reviewed is Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, spiritual leader of Lebanon's Hizballah. Fadlallah's statements vis-à-vis *jihad* are important because for roughly a quarter of a century, Hizballah has practiced, by its own admission, a *jihad* against its Israeli enemy. In addition, as one of the most influential clerics in Lebanon and the supreme *mujtahid* of its Shi'a community, his words resonate far beyond the borders of this small Levant state.

Ali Shariati

Dr. Ali Shariati (1933–1977), an Iranian sociologist born near Mashhad, is rightly regarded as among the most important spiritual heralds of the Islamic revolution. Teaching since the age of 18, Shariati pursued graduate studies at the Sorbonne in Paris, where he received his doctorate in sociology in 1964.⁴⁹ Arrested in Iran upon his return from Paris in 1964 and released the following year, Shariati began to teach at the University of Mashhad in 1965, combining Western research methodologies with Islamic thought. He was imprisoned again eight years later, in late 1973, and was held under harsh conditions for 18 months until he was released, following heavy domestic and international pressure.⁵⁰ Shariati aimed at advancing what for him were the two highest aims of Islam—freedom and equality—while confronting corruption among the ruling elite and what he regarded as the “turning away” from active Islam to the study of philosophy, jurisprudence and theosophy, and above all, “defeatist sufism.”⁵¹

By advocating an active Islam, Shariati called for the politicization of religion—or Islamism, to use a modern label. Shariati demanded that his listeners and readers pay the ultimate price for the betterment of their society. Recalling the heroism and *shahadat* (martyrdom) of Hussein, Shariati called upon Muslims to resist the corruption of society with their lives, i.e., to seek the “red death of martyrs” rather than to die the “black death” of the cowards.⁵²

In his speech “Jihad and Shahadat,”⁵³ Shariati begins by drawing a distinction between a *shahid* and a martyr. For Shariati, a martyr is someone who dies for God and his faith. He is a mortal, and his martyrdom entails the end of his life. The existence of the *shahid*, in contrast, does not end with his death. He is always alive and present. *Shahid* and martyr, hence, are each other's antonyms.⁵⁴

Shariati also distinguishes between *jihad* on the one hand, and *shahadat* on the other. He describes a *shahid* (literally, “witness”) as a person who “negates his whole existence” for a sacred ideal and goal. The ideal embodiment of the notion of the *shahid* is Hussein, the son of Ali, who sacrificed himself at the Battle of Karbala, and through this very act became sacredness himself.

Shariati identifies two kinds of *shahid* personified, on the one hand, by Hamzeh, the courageous uncle of the prophet who fell in the Battle of Uhud (627) and on the other hand by Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet. Hamzeh died a hero, going into battle “to achieve victory and defeat the enemy.” He became a *shahid* dying for the cause of his personal belief, and his act is an “individual *shahadat*.” Hussein,

meanwhile, “consciously welcomes death” by negating himself. He is not killed accidentally, but “rebels.” Hussein places himself in the battlefield, Shariati argues, “so that [the consequence] of his act might be widely spread and the cause for which he gives his life might be realized sooner. Husayn chooses *shahadat* as an end or as a means for the affirmation of what is being negated and mutilated by the political apparatus.” *Shahadat* means more than “to be killed,” and involves an issue that is being “covered up” (such as the truth, or an injustice), “and is about to leave the realm of memory. . .” Here, the role of the *shahid* becomes clear. “The *shahid* witnesses for this innocent, silent, and oppressed victim.”

Having used the examples of Hamzeh and Hussein, Shariati then juxtaposes *jihad* and *shahadat*. Hamzeh, he writes, is a *mujahid* (i.e., a person engaged in *jihad*) who was killed in the midst of *jihad*, whereas Hussein was a *shahid* even before he was killed. How so? Shariati argues that from the moment that Hussein refused to swear allegiance to Yazid before the governor of Medina, he consciously chose his own death, hence negated himself. “A *shahid*,” Shariati writes, “is a person who, from the beginning of his decision, chooses his own *shahadat*, even though, between his decision-making and his death, months or even years may pass.” The key difference is that while “Husayn has chosen *shahadat*. . . Hamzah has been chosen by *shahadat*.” While in the case of the death of Hussein, death is an “ideal,” the “destination,” and “an ideology,” in Hamzeh’s case death is “an accident” and a “tragedy.”

The *shahid*, by his death, chooses not to “flee the hard and uncomfortable environment.” He cannot defeat the enemy, but he can humiliate him. He exposes the aggression of the enemy, and thus “reminds the people of what has already been forgotten.” He thus rescues his people.

The *mujahid*, in contrast, is a sincere warrior who wants to defend and spread his belief, devastating “the enemy who blocks or endangers his path.” Hence, Shariati places *shahadat* above *jihad* in importance. *Shahadat* is “completion,” he writes elsewhere, a “lift. It itself is mid-way to the highest peak of humanity and it is a culture.”⁵⁵

For Shariati, then, *jihad* assumes a lower place when compared to *shahadat*. *Jihad* involves safeguarding one’s honor and life, especially at a time when the *umma* is in power. But when the *umma* is not in power, and instead finds itself “weakened,” with no means available to struggle, “they guarantee their lives, movement, faith, respect, honor, future and history with *shahadat*. *Shahadat* is an invitation to all generations, in all ages, if you cannot kill your oppressor, then die.”⁵⁶

Ayatollah Sayyid Mahmud Taleqani

Another prominent commentator on the concept of *jihad* in Shi’ism is the Iranian cleric Ayatollah Sayyid Mahmud Taleqani (1910–1979), a noted Shi’a *mujtahid* whose father had been politically active.⁵⁷ Taleqani’s numerous imprisonments by the Shah’s authorities—he spent a total of about fifteen years in prison⁵⁸—led him to forge contacts with leftist elements of Iran’s intelligentsia, with whom he came to share a common concern for the oppressed and the poor, and whose cause he championed in his pamphlets and speeches.⁵⁹ Taleqani began his political career in 1949 as a supporter of the Iranian nationalist Mohammed Mossadeq, and assumed a key role in the Iranian opposition after 1953.⁶⁰ Taleqani played a prominent role in the 1979 revolution, and occupied a seat in the constituent “Assembly

of Experts,” where he insisted on the inclusion of a Bill of Rights into the Iranian Constitution.⁶¹

Taleqani's most prominent speech regarding *jihad* is, like Shariati's, titled “*jihad* and *Shahadat*,”⁶² and was delivered shortly before June 1963, when the so-called “15th of Khordad” mass uprisings against the Shah's regime were brutally suppressed, and thousands of demonstrators lost their lives.⁶³ Taleqani opens his speech by saying that “God has created a power in man's instinct which is called “anger,” whose function he describes as safeguarding the right to live, dignity and nationality. He compares man's protection of these rights through anger to a rosebush that preserves “the freshness and beauty of its own roses” by her thorns. While anger is a natural feeling that cannot and should not be suppressed, anger must be guided by divine legislation in order not to become deviant. To guide this natural instinct of anger “onto the straight path,” Taleqani argues, “instead of war and killing, Islam has offered the concept of *jihad*.” *Jihad* must be *jihad fi sabil Allah*, i.e., *jihad* in the name, or for the sake, of God—the way of God being the “well-being and betterment of human society.” Only the *mujahid* who sets out on a war for the pleasure of God, and hence for the right intention (*niyyat*), can be rewarded, otherwise his death would not be considered martyrdom.

The polar opposite, the wrong way to struggle, is *taghut* (from *tughyan*—rebellion, outburst), Taleqani says. *Taghut* is a “selfish person,” one who “overflows from his rightful social limits.” *Jihad* and *taghut* form a dichotomy in as far as a struggle can only be one or the other, because if people are not guided by God, they will be “possessed by *taghut*.”

Taleqani then proceeds to categorize *jihad* into four types: The first type of *jihad* is that waged against foreigners for the sake of advancement of the true faith. This *jihad* must not be fought for the sake of spoils, the cleric warns, but rather to remove those obstacles which are placed before those who cannot see the truth.

The second type of *jihad* is the *jihad* to protect Islam and Islamic countries. “Man must defend his rights, to defend his dignity. This is the truth of *jihad*, and it is a necessary part of a true religion, which has laws,” he states.

A third type of *jihad* which Taleqani labels “internal *jihad*” does not have to do with overcoming one's baser instincts, but refers to the struggle against protected minorities (*dhimmi*) if they rebel against the Muslim law, and become hostile (*muharib*). They must then be fought until they “submit to truth and law, until they bow their heads down. . .”

Finally, a fourth *jihad* is that against the despots. Taleqani states that the Islamic sources command that “*jihad* cannot be for the sake of strengthening the government of a tyrant, sultan, or Imam. But it is recommended for us to fight alongside a just sultan and to defend him.” Hence, if a just ruler leads the Muslims, *jihad* is required on all Muslims. But much like the leader, the *mujahid* himself must be pure, or the *jihad* is not just. He must worship God, free himself from his material possessions, and “prostrate himself unto God.”

Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari

Another prominent Shi'a commentator on *jihad* is Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari (1920–1979), whose teachings have greatly influenced many Shi'a, including Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. According to Mahmoud Ayoub, Mutahhari was “more of a traditional mujtahid and scholar” who engaged himself in traditional and scholastic

theology, philosophy, and jurisprudence.⁶⁴ Mutahhari was arrested following the June 1963 (“15 of Khordad”) uprisings, and in 1964 began to serve as Ayatollah Khomeini’s confidant and representative in Iran during the latter’s exile. At Khomeini’s request, Mutahhari formed the Islamic Revolutionary Council (IRC) in January 1978, the body that subsequently drafted the constitution of revolutionary Iran and played a leading role in organizing the Islamic Republic’s forces.⁶⁵ Mutahhari was assassinated in May 1979 by members of *Furqan*, a small radical group of disenfranchised seminary students.⁶⁶

His pamphlet, entitled “Jihad: The Holy War of Islam and its Legitimacy in the Quran,” consists of four lectures.⁶⁷ Mutahhari offers a rather frank discussion of several aspects related to *jihad*, showing that he does not shy away from soul-searching about his own religion. For example, introducing the subject of the *jizyah* (the poll-tax required from a *dhimmi*), he provocatively asks whether *jizyah* is not tantamount to blackmail. “What kind of instruction is it? Is it not a law of violence and brute force?”

On the legitimacy of *jihad*, Mutahhari argues that a purely aggressive war—such as in pursuit of greed, territory, over-ambition, or as a result of a feeling of one’s own racial superiority over another group—is incorrect, even evil. In this case, when a war is waged for “lust for pre-eminence or superiority,” it is a war of aggression. However, if a war is undertaken in order to defend one’s land, property, freedom, or self-esteem, then war is legitimate, even “commended and necessary for human existence.” Failure to defend oneself in light of a war of aggression waged by another party on one’s own community would entail a surrender—and surrender, as Mutahhari makes clear, is different from peace. “Peace and surrender are as different from each other as chalk and cheese,” he writes. “The meaning of peace is honorable coexistence with others, but surrender is not honorable coexistence; it is coexistence that on one side is absolutely dishonorable. In fact, it is a coexistence that is absolutely dishonorable on both sides. On one side, the dishonor is aggression, and on the other side, it is the dishonor of surrender in the face of *zulm*, in the face of injustice and oppression.”

It is for this reason that Mutahhari, like Shariati, deplores the absence of the doctrine of *jihad* in Christianity, claiming that this is due to Christianity’s lack of substance. Islam, in contrast, “came to reform society and to form a nation and government. Its mandate is the reform of the whole world. Such a religion cannot be indifferent.” While Mutahhari agrees with Christianity that “Of course peace is good,” he holds that at times, religions themselves are faced with aggression, and “sometimes the reply must be given by force.” Alternatively, the religion will suffer humiliation and misery. “Such a submission in the face of force can never be called peace.”

Mutahhari believes that the doctrine of *jihad* permits Muslims to struggle not only in order to ward off aggression within their own state. Aggressions may be imposed upon groups outside of the state’s boundaries. “In such conditions Muslims cannot remain indifferently aloof.”

Jihad is also allowed, even obligatory, when another party is guilty of a “gross injustice towards another group of human beings,” and Muslims have the power to come to the aid of the latter—be they Muslims or non-Muslims, but especially when they are Muslims. In this case, the liberating Muslims need not even wait for the oppressed group to invite help from the outside.

The defense of humanity and human rights is, for Mutahhari, the most superior *jihad*. He believes that the “*jihad*” of the European countries, who rushed to the aid

of Algeria during its war with the French, was holier than the *jihad* that the Algerians themselves waged, "because Algerians were defending the cause of their own rights, while the cause of the others was more ethical and more sacred than that of the Algerians."

In his pamphlet, Mutahhari also addresses the question of unconditional and conditional verses relating to the question of *jihad*. Unconditional verses, he explains, are those verses in the Quran that provide instructions about fighting the unbelievers (*kufir*) while attaching no conditions. An example of such an unconditional verse is provided in the Quran in Sura (9:73): "O Prophet, Fight the kufar and hypocrites and be stern against them."⁶⁸ But Mutahhari warns against blind adherence to such unconditional verses, lest "we will come to believe that the Quran unconditionally tells us to fight the non-Muslims." Mutahhari alludes to the existence of "conditional" verses in the Quran that qualify the waging of war against non-Muslims. One such verse is found in Suratul-Baqarah (2:190), where the Quran says "And fight in the path of God with those who are fighting with you and do not transgress [or: aggress], God loves not those who transgress."⁶⁹ The meaning of this and similar conditional verses, according to Mutahhari, is that Muslims must fight those who are aggressing against them, and only them. The armed struggle should be directed at soldiers, at "men of war." "But with people who are not men of war, who are not soldiers, who are not in a state of combat, such as old men, old women—in fact all women, whether they are old or not—and children, we must not interfere and we must not do any of the other things that are counted as transgression," he writes. In his view, it would also be a transgression to destroy the natural and economic resources of the enemy, unless there is no other choice. "We must not cut down their trees (i.e., ruin their economic resources). We must not fill their canals. Such things we must not do. These are all transgressions." To make his point, Mutahhari also cites a scholastic rule espoused by the ulama according to which, when both an unconditional and a conditional command exist, the unconditional verse must be interpreted in its conditional sense.

Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah

Declarations and speeches by Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, spiritual leader of Hizballah and among the most influential clerics in Lebanon, provide additional insight into the notion of *jihad* as understood by Shi'a authorities. Unlike the three previous Shi'a thinkers, Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah played no role in the Islamic Revolution. As the spiritual leader of Hizballah and as chief *mujtahid* of the Shi'a community in Lebanon, however, the statements of Fadlallah carry much weight among the Shi'a both in and outside of Lebanon.

In an interview he gave to *TIME* Magazine in 1996, Fadlallah addressed the question of how a party that claims to follow the teachings of the Quran can justify the use of violence. The Sheikh explained that certain circumstances that involve the occupation of a country by outside forces, which undermines the freedom of a people and puts their fate at stake, leaves Hizballah with little choice but to "resist." Occupation then becomes "violence done to you. . . . We are not preachers of violence. *Jihad* in Islam is a defensive movement against those who impose violence."⁷⁰

Elsewhere, he elaborated on his definition of *jihad*, describing it as "a response to an actual or possible attack against Muslims."⁷¹ He added that "Islamic thought does not talk about the "offensive *jihad*" but rather about the "defensive *jihad*."

Fadlallah adds a tactical component to his somewhat malleable definition of *jihad*, arguing that the “*jihad*’s methods and means are determined according to the nature of the balances of power. It involves, in its first phase, the removal of fear from among the *umma*, who needs to build up its strength in order to ‘face the enemy.’”⁷² While the *jihad* does not need to be military—Fadlallah states that the *jihad* can be cultural, political, social or economic—Muslims nevertheless “resort to the military *jihad* when they are in a state of self-defense.”⁷³ While Fadlallah regards *jihad* as the “obligation of the whole *umma*,” he then states that “if a certain group participates, this group would represent the whole *umma*.” While he does not elaborate on this point, it can be assumed from his statements that Fadlallah believes that Hizballah represents the whole *umma* in its struggle against Israel.

When Islam is under attack, the military means permitted to “resist” this attack even include suicide operations, Fadlallah clarified in an interview with the *Daily Star*.⁷⁴ “Basically, it is *haram* (prohibited by religion) to kill oneself or others,” the sheikh contends, “but during *jihad*, which is a defensive or preventive war according to Islam, it is accepted and allowed, as *jihad* is considered an exceptional case.” “Allah,” he continues, “did not identify a certain procedure to fight the enemy and defend the rights of the nation.”⁷⁵

Analysis

The discussion of Shi’a theory on *jihad*, and particularly an analysis of the views expressed by the four Shi’a thinkers featured in this study, suggest that just as *jihad* is a multivalent concept in Islam at large, so does Shi’ism offer a range of interpretations of *jihad* within its doctrine. The Shi’a conception of *jihad*, therefore, is itself multivalent.

Shi’a and Sunni doctrines of *jihad* have much in common. Sunnis and Shi’a, for instance, are all obliged to defend their religion, lives, territory, and property. In contrast to Sunni doctrine, however, Shi’a doctrine demands that *jihad* be put on hold until such time that the Twelfth Imam returns from his *ghayba*, and this key difference to Sunni views of *jihad* is the most well-known, and arguably the most important difference between Sunni and Shi’a conceptions of *jihad*. In practice, however, not all Shi’a have internalized this doctrine as a binding law. As we have seen, Shi’a thinkers differ, first of all, in their opinions as to who is the rightful holder of authority during the Twelfth Imam’s absence, and hence who may wage a legitimate *jihad*. Three broad categories of opinions crystallize here: First is the opinion that no rightful replacement must be found as long as the Twelfth Imam is absent, and hence no *jihad* can be waged. A second category consists of those Shi’a leaders who have claimed that they themselves may reign as the representatives of the Hidden Imam, as have some shahs during the Safavid dynasty. A third category of Shi’a believes that a third party, such as certain *mujtahids* or the ulama, hold the responsibility to defend Islam through *jihad* until the Twelfth Imam will return. While these differences are unlikely to be settled in the near future, the dominant contemporary Shi’a opinion seems to belong to the third category.

The common denominator in the doctrines of all the four Shi’a leaders discussed above is that *jihad* is always legitimate when Islam itself, or Islamic values for that matter, are imperiled. The crucial question then becomes—and here the views may differ—what constitutes an outside attack, or a “defense of Islam” for that matter? At which point does Islam, or the values for which it stands, come under attack? It is

here, over the issue of the conditions that have to exist in order for *jihad* to be waged as a defense of Islam or Islamic values, that the consensus begins to crumble. Nevertheless, despite the lack of such an ironclad consensus, several themes are recurring in the speeches and statements analyzed above, and it can be argued that these themes form the core of the Shi'a conception of *jihad*. They all have in common the shared memory of real or perceived historical injustices inflicted upon the Shi'a community by an illegitimate rule.

The first theme is that *jihad* must be waged against tyrannical rule. As Bernard Lewis writes, "there is a pervasive feeling among the Shi'a that the established authority, the established ruler, is illegitimate and lacks the legitimacy which alone can come from God."⁷⁶ It is the humiliation suffered by the Shi'a community through centuries of isolation and oftentimes discrimination that have marred its perceptions of unrightful rule. The three Iranian thinkers discussed above have all experienced, firsthand, persecution by what they deemed an illegitimate monarchy that claimed to rule Iran by divine right, and they therefore best embody historical Shi'a grievances, the ultimate grievance being the martyrdom of Hussein at Karbala, which has become inseparable from both Shi'a doctrine and identity. The conclusions drawn by the Shi'a against the historical guilt of the illegitimate rulers are exemplified in Taleqani's call for a *jihad* against the *taghut*; Mutahhari's claims that *jihad* in defense of human rights is the most superior *jihad*, and should even be waged in non-Muslim countries; Shariati's pronouncements that a *jihad* waged in the defense of freedom is not only commendable, but "necessary for human existence;" and in Fadlallah's justification even of suicide operations—a concept strictly forbidden in Islam—in order to ward off an occupier who undermines "the freedom of a people."

A second theme is the sacred role of martyrdom (*shahadat*). The Shi'a *mujtahids* and thinkers discussed here extol martyrdom for the sake of God as the greatest service to God possible. Here again, the primary historical example for the Shi'a of a *shahid* is Hussein. Central to the idea of the martyrdom that he took upon himself is the "witnessing," or recording of the injustice that has taken place. "Witnessing," a central idea within *shahadat* from which the word also derives its name, helps the Shi'a community to remember its historical suffering. From a practical point of view, throughout the centuries it also helped the Shi'a to maintain a common historical bond and a communal unity that defied sporadic persecution by Sunni rule. "Witnessing," however, also serves the function of humiliating the enemy, as Shariati's speech makes abundantly clear. Shariati writes that through his martyrdom, the *shahid* "cannot defeat the enemy, but he can humiliate him." He exposes the aggression of the enemy, and thus "reminds the people of what has already been forgotten." The martyr clearly assumes the role of savior of his community, which due to its weakened state has no other means to resist—but eventually it wins through dying.

The ultimate defeat of the enemy through the death of the martyr ties in the third recurrent theme within the Shi'a doctrine in general, and its views on *jihad* in particular, namely the idea of resistance. Taleqani and Mutahhari's acknowledgement of the existence of personal anger, which they believe necessary to be expressed as long as they are in line with the commandment of God, are a case in point, and reflect the depth of anger in Shi'ism, and the idea of resistance that it helped foster in Shi'a identity and doctrine. Throughout Shi'a history, suffering and resistance may be said to have been two sides of the same coin. Given the magnitude of Shi'a perceptions of historical injustices, the responses chosen by the Shi'a community have not always involved passive acceptance of their fate, but have often been

accompanied by a call for a more active resistance to injustice which is mirrored in the pronouncements of the three Iranian thinkers, and certainly by Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah.

A fourth recurrent theme is the idea that *jihad* can legitimately be waged when the dignity of Muslims is at stake. "Man must defend his rights, to defend his dignity. This is the truth of *jihad*..." Taleqani states. Mutahhari legitimizes *jihad* in order to defend one's "self-esteem," and regards a "dishonorable peace" as tantamount to surrender. The need to uphold one's dignity is also reflected in Ali Shariati's description of a shahid who, by his death, chooses not to "flee the hard and uncomfortable environment."

Conclusion

The Occultation of the 12th Imam and the theoretical inability to wage war in the absence of the Hidden Imam is a Shi'a belief that is wholly absent from Sunni doctrine. Yet, by and large, as far as waging *jihad* is concerned, the Shi'a seem to be guided by rules similar to those guiding Sunni Muslims. In comparison to the traditional Sunni discourse surrounding *jihad*, however, Shi'a conceptions of *jihad* are strongly influenced by historical perceptions of Shi'a suffering at the hands of the Sunni Muslim majority. This explains the prominence in the Shi'a discourse of *jihad* of such issues as the battle against tyranny, the desire to achieve martyrdom, the value of resistance, and the importance of dignity.

This conception of *jihad* differed substantially from the traditional Sunni conception of *jihad* until the Fourteenth century, when Sunnis themselves were confronted with suffering and defeat at the hands of the Mongols and Mamluks. Henceforth, the struggle against tyranny and injustice penetrated Sunni views on *jihad* as well.

The doctrine espoused by Salafi-Jihadist ideology, which emerged in the 1980s in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, had led to an even closer alignment between Shi'a and Sunni notions of *jihad*. Contemporary Sunni discussions of *jihad*, which appear to be virtually monopolized by Salafi-Jihadist thinkers and strategists, reflect many of the themes traditionally enunciated by Shi'a *mujtaheds*. These include the resistance against injustice in the face of a perceived attack on Islam; the desire to achieve martyrdom; and the imperative to restore Muslim dignity in the face of oppression. Indeed, future studies examining the relationship between Salafi-Jihadist and Shi'a doctrines of *jihad* in more depth are likely to prove a fruitful area of research.

Notes

1. Bruce Lawrence, "Holy War (Jihad) in Islamic Religion and Nation-State Ideologies," in John Kelsay, and James Turner Johnson, eds., *Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 146.

2. Rudolph Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 1996), 1.

3. Mustansir Mir, "Jihad in Islam," in Hadia Dajani, Shakeel, and Ronald A. Messier, eds., *The Jihad and its Times* (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies, University of Michigan, 1991), 113.

4. See, for example, Mir (note 3), 114.
5. For examples of more passive Meccan verses, see Surahs (13:22 and 41:34–35 of the Quran. For Medinan verses permitting the violent defense against aggression, and active aggression, see Surahs (2:190; 4:75; 22:39; 2:217; 9:5; 2:191–93 and 216; and 9:29). Peters (note 2), 1. Peters points out that the Quran does not provide an unequivocal statement on whether Muslims are to fight the unbelievers only as a defense against aggression or under all circumstances. Supporting the view are a number of verses, including the following: “And fight in the way of God with those who fight you, but aggress not: God loves not the aggressors.” (K. 2:190). See Peters (note 2), 2. On the distinction between Meccan and Medinan verses, see also Noor Mohammad, “The Doctrine of Jihad: An Introduction,” *Journal of Law and Religion* 3, no. 2 (1985): 384–388.
6. See, for example, Mir (note 3), 113.
7. For a documentation of this hadith, see http://www.livingislam.org/n/dgjh_e.html.
8. Mohammad (note 5), 391.
9. Islam divides the world into two zones, the House of Islam (*dar al-Islam*) and the House of War (*dar al-harb*). Some jurists add to this categorization the House of Peace, or *dar as-sulh*.
10. James Turner Johnson, “Jihad and Just War,” *First Things* 124 (June/July 2002): 12.
11. See Peters (note 2), 2. Peters quotes one verse from the Quran stating “Fight them until there is no persecution (or: seduction) and the religion is God’s (entirely).” (K. 2:193 and 8:39).
12. Mohammad (note 5), 393.
13. Bernard Lewis, *Islam and the West* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
14. For more on Salafism, see Oliver Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search of a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). On Salafi-Jihadism, see Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), and Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, no.3 (April–May 2006). See also the writings of Reuven Paz, available at <http://www.e-prism.org/>
15. Sageman (note 14), 14.
16. *Ibid.*, 12.
17. Quintan Wiktorowicz, “A Genealogy of Radical Islam,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28, no.2 (March–April 2005), 79.
18. *Ibid.*
19. Kharajites were members of a sect in Islam that had seceded from the followers of Ali because of their belief that the Shi’a were exceedingly willing to compromise with Muawiya, then the governor of Damascus, who competed with Ali over the rightful succession of the caliphate.
20. Karen Armstrong, *Islam: A Short History* (New York: Random House, 2002), 35–36.
21. Yann Richard, *Shi’ite Islam: Polity, Ideology, and Creed* (Oxford, UK & Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1995), 29.
22. Armstrong (note 20), 43.
23. Navid Kermani, *Dynamit des Geistes: Martyrium, Islam und Nihilismus* (Göttingen, Germany: Wallstein Verlag, 2002), 12. [German, translated by author.]
24. David Pinault, *The Shi’ites: Ritual and Popular Piety in a Muslim Community* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 6.
25. See, for example, *Ibid.*
26. Richard (note 21), 41. It is worth noting that the concept of Mahdi also appears in the Sunni stream of Islam. See, for example, John O. Voll, “Wahhabism and Mahdism: Alternative Styles of Islamic Renewals,” *Arab Studies Quarterly* 4, nos. 1, 2 (1982): 110–126.
27. Martin Kramer, “Introduction,” in *Shi’ism, Resistance, and Revolution*, ed., Martin Kramer (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 2.
28. *Ibid.*, 7.
29. Moojan Momen, *An Introduction to Shi’i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi’ism* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), 236.
30. For discussions of Shi’i Islam, see for example Momen (note 29); Pinault (note 24); Richard (note 21); Roger M. Savory, “The Export of Ithna Ashari Shi’ism: Historical and Ideological Background,” in David, Menashri, ed., *The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim*

World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 13–39; and Ayatollah Ja'far Sobhani, *Doctrines of Shi'i Islam: A Compendium of Imami Beliefs and Practices*, in Reza, Shah-Kazemi, ed., transl. (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001). As regards particular Shi'i practices, particularly prior to the Iranian Revolution, prayer for example assumed a less significant role than in Sunnism due to the Occultation of the 12th Imam. In addition, some prayers (known as *du'a* or *munajat*) are designed specifically for Shi'a believers, and are used on special occasions or devotional reasons. See, for example, Momen (note 29), 181. Other general differences in practice include the importance in Shi'ism of visiting holy Shi'i shrines; the existence of temporary marriages (*muta*, or *sigha* in Farsi); religious dissimulation (*taqiyya*); stricter laws of divorce when compared to Sunnis; and a more accommodating attitude toward women, e.g. in regard to inheritance. Momen (note 29), 181–183.

31. Quoted from Peters (note 2), 4. See also Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), 66.

32. Abdulaziz Sachedina, for example, points out that in Shi'i Islam, waging an offensive *jihad* requires the permission of the Imam. Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina, "The Just Ruler (*al-sultan al-adil*)," in *Shi'ite Islam: The Comprehensive Authority of the Jurist in Imamite Jurisprudence* (New York: 1988), 105. Quoted in Roger M. Savory (note 30), 18, 37.

33. See, for example, Khadduri (note 31), 66–67.

34. Mehdi Abedi and Gary Legenhausen, eds., *Jihad and Shahadat: Struggle and Martyrdom in Islam* (Houston, TX: Institute for Research and Islamic Studies, IRIS, 1986), 19.

35. *Ibid.*, 17–18.

36. *Ibid.*, 17.

37. *Ibid.*

38. *Ibid.*, 19.

39. Khadduri (note 31), 67.

40. *Ibid.*

41. Abedi and Legenhausen (note 34), 19.

42. *Ibid.*

43. Compare Peters (note 2), 4; Mir (note 3), 122; and Momen (note 29), 180. See also the Shi'a thinkers discussed in the section on the "Exponents of the Shi'a Perception of *Jihad*."

44. Sachedina (note 32), 112 as quoted in Savory (note 30), 18.

45. Momen (note 29), 180.

46. Lawrence (note 1), 146

47. *Ibid.*, 147.

48. Here, Lawrence cites Etan Kohlberg, in Etan Kohlberg, "The Development of the Imami Shi'i Doctrine of Jihad," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* (ZDMG) 126 (1976):68. Quoted in *Ibid.*, 147.

49. "Biography," Website in the memory of Ali Shariati, available online at <http://www.shariati.com/>, last accessed 25 July 2006.

50. *Ibid.*

51. Mahmoud Ayoub, Foreword to Abedi and Legenhausen (note 34), vii-viii.

52. *Ibid.*, viii.

53. Ali Shariati, "*Jihad* and Shahadat: A Discussion of Shahid," Website of Ali Shariati, <http://www.shariati.com/jihadand.html>, last accessed 25 July 2006. All subsequent quotes in this section are taken from this undated speech, unless otherwise footnoted.

54. Ali Shariati, "A Discussion of Shahid," in Abedi and Legenhausen (note 34), 230.

55. Ali Shariati, "Shahadat," in Abedi and Legenhausen (note 34), 214.

56. *Ibid.*

57. "Ayatolla Taleqani," Website of IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting), available online at <http://www.irib.ir/Ouriran/mashahir/siasi/Talghani/html/en/page.htm>, last accessed 9 November 2003.

58. Abedi and Legenhausen (note 34), 30.

59. Ayoub (note 51), iv-v.

60. Mangol Bayat, "Mahmud Taleqani and the Iranian Revolution," in Kramer (note 27), 89–90.

61. Abedi and Legenhausen (note 34), 32.

62. Ayatollah Sayyid Mahmud Taleqani, "Beliefs and Practices: Jihad and Shahadat," Al Islam Website, <http://www.al-islam.org/beliefs/philosophy/jihadandshahadat.html>, last

accessed 25 July 2006. All subsequent quotes in this section are taken from this undated speech.

63. Abedi and Legenhausen (note 34), 31.

64. Ayoub (note 51), v.

65. Abedi and Legenhausen (note 34), 37.

66. Ibid.

67. Ayatollah Morteza Mutahhari, "Jihad: The Holy War of Islam and its Legitimacy in the Quran," Islamic Propagation Organization, 1985, Website of Salaam: Islamic Information Resources, <http://www.al-islam.org/short/jihad/>, last accessed 25 July 2006. All subsequent quotes in this section are taken from this source.

68. A similar unconditional verse is Quran, Sura (9:29): "And fight those who have not faith in God nor in the Hereafter and (who) forbid not what God and His Prophet have forbidden, and who are not committed to the religion of truth."

69. Mutahhari also cites Suratul Hajj (9:36) ("Fight with all the polytheists just as they fight with all of you") as an example of a conditional verse.

70. Lara Marlowe, "A Fiery Cleric's Defense of Jihad: Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah Speaks," *Time* 147, No. 3 (15 January 1996).

71. "East-West Record: News Analysis of the Middle East: Exclusive Interview: Sayyid Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah," undated interview, available online at http://www.eastwestrecord.com/Get_Articles.asp?ArticleID=222, last accessed October 12, 2003.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibrahim Mousawi, "Fadlallah explains religious basis for suicide attacks; Senior cleric sanctions 'self-sacrifice' operations," *Daily Star* (Beirut), 8 June 2002.

75. Ibid.

76. Bernard Lewis, "The Shi'a in Islamic History," in Kramer (note 27), 28.