


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Democracy, commitment problems and managing ethnic violence: The case of India and Sri Lanka

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Democracy, Commitment Problems and Managing Ethnic Violence: The Case of India and Sri Lanka

MARTHA CRENSHAW

Based on a case study of the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka's ethnic war from 1987 to 1990, this article explores the conditions under which democracies can act as effective third parties to resolve civil violence. India's experience as guarantor of a peace settlement in Sri Lanka suggests that not only the intractability of civil conflicts but the power of domestic pressures shape intervention policies and outcomes. Decision-makers depend on the support of important domestic political elites – political parties, interest groups, press, and governmental bureaucracies – as well as the approval of the public who can reject them in periodic elections. In order to enforce peace settlements, third-party guarantors must have a firm sense of the belligerents' intentions and resources, sensitivity to the dynamics of the conflict, and freedom of action. At the same time, democratic leaders must consider the role of timing, the influence of internal bargaining, the importance of credible 'staying power', and personal reputation.

This article considers the relationship between democracy and effective third party intervention to resolve civil violence. What impact does a democratic form of government have on a state's capacity to act as an external mediator, peace-enforcer, or peace-builder in ethnic conflicts?

Recent research on civil war settlement stresses the problem of credible commitments.¹ Even if a negotiated compromise is reached that is acceptable in principle to both government and opposition, the combatants themselves are unable to guarantee that they will abide by its terms in the long run. Nor can they promise credibly *not to try to* exploit the other side during the transition period of demobilization, disarmament, and disengagement. Distrust between the former belligerents is too great and the incentives for defection from cooperation are too high. Thus an outside mediator or enforcer is

necessary to guarantee both security and the implementation of new power-sharing arrangements.

Successful mediation and peace enforcement require, first, that third party commitments be appropriately timed. As Zartman explains, the 'ripe moment' of a 'hurting stalemate', the window of opportunity when a settlement is possible, is both objective and subjective. It depends on both the military balance of power and the perceptions of all parties, who must feel that they have no option except reconciliation, even if it is considered second best.² The mediator must know when to expend political resources on negotiations, and a guarantor must know when the dynamics of the conflict permit the construction of a settlement that is worth supporting with military force.

A second requirement is 'staying power'. No commitment is credible unless the third party can see it through. Intervention will be ineffective if it ends prematurely.³ Outside guarantors must stay until a new government is consolidated, with a security force trained and equipped to maintain order. The guarantor thus needs adequate resources and motivation to stay the course, as well as the ability to estimate how long it will take to accomplish the task of reconstruction. This is a distinctly future-oriented requirement.

How well can a democracy be expected to perform this role? As Vertzberger argues, political capabilities are as important as military and economic resources.⁴ Accountability is the hallmark of democratic leadership, and the internal and external legitimacy of policy must always be at the forefront of decision-makers' attention. At the societal level, as the costs of intervention mount, the 'theatre of war' is extended to include the home front.⁵ Waterman also emphasizes that democratic leadership is based on an ability to form coalitions.⁶ Decision-makers depend on the support of important political elites in domestic politics – political parties, interest groups, press, or government bureaucracies – as well as the approval of the public who can reject them in periodic elections. Vertzberger adds that a democratic leader's freedom of decision is constrained by both the size of his or her parliamentary majority and the formal and informal rules and laws that set the limits of authority.⁷ In addition, interest group demands are channelled through bureaucracies, and the degree of openness and complexity of the political system will thus affect the regime's susceptibility to outside influence.

The formulation of policy involves internal political bargaining as well as assessment of external conditions and conceptions of foreign

policy goals. Third parties care about the terms of the settlement not just because they seek an end to the fighting, but also because they are concerned about their own reputations. A failed intervention is costly in terms of prestige as well as material resources. Furthermore, since external mediation is often required for negotiations to succeed, it is likely that the mediators will become the guarantors of the settlement they have helped arrange. This prior involvement increases their stakes.

These conditions impose constraints on the types of warfare democracies can practice and the type of outcome they can support.⁸ Vertzberger refers to 'moral, value-based, self-imposed limitations' combined with the problems of conducting war in a civilian environment.⁹ The peace keeper cannot take full advantage of military superiority. A recent collection of case studies focuses on the stages of 'getting in, staying in, and getting out'.¹⁰ The study concludes that the initial decision to intervene is more oriented toward strategic interests, while staying in and getting out are more sensitive to domestic pressures. The proposition that democracies seek to avoid casualties, both among their own troops and among the population of the targeted state, is also supported.¹¹ Furthermore, Downs suggests that democratic leaders are attracted to a strategy of 'gambling for resurrection': the withdrawal of military forces is unlikely to be accomplished by an administration in power at the time of deployment.¹² Once the military is committed, a leader's political future depends on success; it is better to stay on and gamble to win than to withdraw with a loss that will certainly end a public career. Vertzberger concurs: 'intervention decisions are often difficult to make, but once taken are equally or even more difficult to reverse.'¹³ In democracies, intervention decisions require heavy investments of time, internal bargaining and involvement of personal reputation. A democratic leader will be reluctant to reverse the decision even if the results are negative. Adjustment of policy comes at a high domestic cost.

Whether the prescription for a durable peace settlement is a new institutional structure based on negotiation and mutual acceptance of future power-sharing, or an imposed settlement based on the domination of one side by the other, remains an open question.¹⁴ If a compromise is necessary for long-term political stability, then the outside guarantor must encourage moderation over extremism on both sides of the conflict and engage elites and publics in the process of accommodation to a new order that will be perceived as legitimate.

However, Licklider, analyzing data from 91 post-1945 civil wars, found that in wars over identity issues, settlements based on military victories were more enduring than those based on negotiated compromises.¹⁵ Moreover, Betts claims that an intervening power will have to choose between peace and justice; if peace is what is wanted, the outside power should support the stronger side regardless of legitimacy.¹⁶

Nevertheless, democracies will not usually support a settlement that is undemocratic, although it might be more stable. This constraint involves normative conceptions by both elites and the public. Simply ending the conflict, perhaps by supporting one side's decisive victory over the other, will not suffice even if this solution saves the most lives and is the most stable over the long term. There may indeed be a tension between peace and justice, as Betts argues, but democracies may not be able to enforce a solution that is not perceived as morally right. For example, Peceny has suggested that American military interventions follow a pro-liberalization tendency in order to forge a domestic political consensus, not for security reasons.¹⁷ The public and Congress, especially liberal internationalists in the Democratic Party, will not support military action that is not intended to promote democracy. Claims based on establishing international security do not have the same appeal.

This does not mean intermediaries must be strictly neutral in the conflict. Recent work suggests that they need not be impartial; in fact, security may be enhanced if the third party favours the minority group in the conflict.¹⁸ Betts refers to impartiality as an 'Olympian presumption'.¹⁹ In fact, he argues that if the purpose of intervention is to make peace, not just preside over it, impartiality is likely to prolong the conflict.²⁰ Self-interest is to be expected, and patronage can be an important source of leverage over the combatants. Altruism is not required.

The case used to explore these issues is the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka's ethnic war, from 1987 to 1990. This analysis illustrates some of the difficulties that democracies may face as mediators and guarantors. Ironically, at this time India and Sri Lanka were the only two democracies in South Asia, and they became jointly embroiled in a protracted conflict over Tamil nationalism. India was also beset by separatist insurgencies at home, principally in Kashmir and the Punjab, and Sri Lanka faced a radical Sinhalese opposition movement. This analysis thus does not focus on the unique qualities of the Indian political system or the individual leadership styles of Prime Ministers

Indira and Rajiv Gandhi. It simplifies a series of complex events and omits discussion of competing explanations for Indian behaviour, such as strategic conceptions. Fortunately there are numerous accounts both of India's involvement and of the Sinhala-Tamil conflict.²¹

The timing of intervention

Consider first the timing of India's initiatives. Indian involvement began with covert assistance to Tamil rebels against the Sinhala-dominated government in Colombo.²² Discrimination against Tamils in Sri Lanka (a minority of about 18 per cent of a population of 18 million) had increased steadily since the 1950s, and as moderate demands for equality of access to political and economic resources were rebuffed, extremist groups gained the ascendancy. In 1983, deadly anti-Tamil riots in Sri Lanka, which the government of J. R. Jayewardene failed to control, provoked Indira Gandhi to furnish sanctuary, weapons and training to the various Tamil militant groups, including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). But the critical determinant of the Indian initiative was the effect of communal violence in Sri Lanka on political elites in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, whose support Mrs Gandhi needed. The Tamils in Sri Lanka are a minority within Sri Lanka, but if borders were reconfigured and the 60 million Tamil citizens of India were added to their number, Tamils would form a regional majority. Refugees from Sri Lanka were pouring into India. Cross-border sympathy and connections were running high, and Mrs Gandhi felt intense pressure from Tamil Nadu politicians who were already competing to help the 'boys'. Openly supporting a Tamil independence movement was out of the question for a multi-ethnic state already struggling with secessionist minorities, although Mrs Gandhi did send a special emissary to facilitate discussions between the Sri Lankan government and Tamil groups. Covert support for the Tamil opposition seemed the best way of controlling the extremists, gaining leverage over the Sri Lankan government, maintaining the loyalty of political allies who could keep the Congress (I) party in power, and forestalling eruptions of Tamil nationalism that might threaten the integrity of India.

J. N. Dixit, former Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka, refers to 'a perception that if India did not support the Tamil cause in Sri Lanka and if the Government of India tried to question the political and

emotional feelings of Tamil Nadu there would be a resurgence of Tamil separatism in India'.²³ His view is that if Mrs Gandhi had remained 'detached' or 'just formally correct' about events in Sri Lanka, she risked 'disenchantment' in Tamil Nadu. The 1983 riots precipitated her decision. So, for both domestic political ('Emotions were high in Tamil Nadu') and national security reasons, Mrs Gandhi had to respond.

In 1984, Mrs Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards, and her son Rajiv replaced her as party leader. A large sympathy vote gave the Congress Party an overwhelming majority in parliamentary elections. In his first year as Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was enormously popular, and he did not have to face new elections until 1989. He initially took a much more conciliatory approach to India's ethnic conflicts than his mother had done and, extending this attitude to Sri Lanka, in 1985 began a series of mediation efforts, bringing together the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil opposition, including the armed militant groups. Possibly the security of his political position allowed him to take some risks to try to resolve the Sri Lankan conflict. The general euphoria that accompanied his first year may also have made him over-confident: mediation proved to be extremely frustrating. Neither side would make concessions. Talks went on from the summer of 1985 through the summer and winter of 1986, with one proposal succeeding another. India replaced negotiators, offered new ideas, cajoled both sides, all to no avail. Rajiv Gandhi had little to show for his close personal involvement in the negotiations. Clearly the conflict was not 'ripe for resolution', whatever that might mean. By February of 1987 he suspended his efforts.

Elsewhere in Indian politics the honeymoon period was definitely over. The Congress Party lost a series of state elections. Gandhi's promises to reform the authoritarian structure of the party and to liberalize the economy remained empty. An accord he had brokered in the Punjab broke down. A major corruption scandal involved arms purchases from the Swedish company Bofors. A cabinet minister resigned to join the opposition. Gandhi was criticized for inexperience and inconsistency. Furthermore, elections were now less than two years away.

In Sri Lanka negotiations broke down, and the conflict escalated abruptly. Both sides appeared bent on a military solution. The LTTE, which had relocated from Madras to Jaffna, declared the independence of the northern Tamil province. Jayewardene responded with a combined military offensive and economic blockade designed to crush

Tamil aspirations for once and for all. As the Sri Lankan army advanced on Jaffna, leaving numerous civilian casualties through indiscriminate bombings and artillery fire, dismay and anguish grew in Tamil Nadu. More refugees fled the fighting in Sri Lanka and sought asylum in India (reportedly 150,000 by the end of 1987). Gandhi then initiated a sequence of military actions. In June the Indian air force launched an airlift of humanitarian supplies to the besieged residents of Jaffna, a largely symbolic gesture that nevertheless violated Sri Lankan sovereignty, demonstrated India's vast military superiority, and compelled the government to announce a cease-fire. In July, India signed a bilateral accord with the Sri Lankan government that provided for substantial devolution of power to Tamil interests, in return for which Sri Lanka was to refrain from becoming too friendly with powers perceived as hostile to Indian interests. Jayewardene promptly invited India to guarantee the mutual accord, and India agreed. On 30 July 1987, the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) was deployed to Sri Lanka. In Tamil Nadu, elsewhere in India and internationally, the action was praised. Gandhi was even proposed for the Nobel Peace Prize.

India's national interests may have dictated that India respond to this crisis on her southern border. However, as Manor suggests, the crisis did provide a convenient opportunity in terms of domestic politics.²⁴ Dixit emphatically disagrees:

The allegation that Rajiv Gandhi desired a diplomatic success to divert attention from domestic criticism which he was facing over Bofors and other issues is not valid from what I recall ... I never discerned any subconscious motivation or undercurrent of thought processes on the part of Rajiv Gandhi linking his involvement in the Sri Lankan situation with his domestic political predicament.²⁵

Dixit recognizes that Gandhi might not have been frank about his intentions, but he insists that Gandhi's advisers would have talked about domestic concerns had they been critical. Nevertheless K. M. de Silva argues that Gandhi signed the Accord for four reasons: he needed a political 'triumph' to offset recent electoral failures; he wanted to settle the conflict while the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, M. G. Ramachandran, was still alive to keep order in Tamil Nadu politics; he was tired of acting as a mediator and wanted to end the problem; and he wanted a settlement while President Jayewardene was still in power.²⁶

This account suggests that democracies are not free to choose the timing of their interventions. It is the effect of external crises on internal politics that drives decisions, not the international environment *per se*. Decision-makers must react to demands from constituents, which become particularly acute when cross-border ethnic identities are involved. Furthermore, it was not necessarily the central government's perception of crisis in Sri Lanka or a reaction to a general groundswell of public opinion across the country that dictated action. Dixit admits: 'The details of the Agreement were not publicised and discussed in detail by the media or Parliaments, either of Sri Lanka or of India. Had such discussions preceded the finalisation of the Agreement, it would never have come about ...'²⁷ Rather, it was pressure from influential local political elites. In Tamil Nadu concern was generated not only by ethnic identification but by political rivalry between two Tamil parties and the exigencies of India's federal and parliamentary system. Democratic states are thus prone to the 'process bias' that Sisk warns against: 'any yes will do'.²⁸ Furthermore, if third parties are motivated primarily by domestic political considerations, the difficulty judging the intentions of the adversaries in a conflict will be exacerbated, although it is essential to the timing of effective intervention.²⁹ At the least, even if democratic leaders are motivated more by national security interests than by domestic pressures, they are vulnerable to charges that they are creating a diversion.

Guaranteeing security during the transition

In principle, a key obligation of the third party in conflict resolution is to provide security during the transition period, so that the warring parties need not fear each other during a period of high mutual vulnerability and uncertainty about the future. This role involves enforcing the terms of a cease-fire so that the fighting stops, and it often involves facilitating the demobilization and disarmament of the combatants. Walter argues that credible security guarantees by third parties must fulfil three basic conditions: the outside enforcer must have an interest in doing it, be willing to use force, and be able to signal resolve.³⁰ However, she found that disarmament had a negative effect on security, because 'adversaries had no illusions about their former enemy's ability to hide or procure weapons if they so chose'.³¹ Letting the combatants keep some weapons made them more likely to implement the peace agreement. Although

disarmament has conventionally been a central part of peace enforcement operations, it is recognized as one of the most vexing elements because it is rarely consensual.³²

In official terms, the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord was simple, direct and optimistic. There was to be an immediate cease-fire. Shortly after, the Sri Lankan army stationed in the northern and eastern provinces was to withdraw to barracks. The Tamil militants (i.e. the LTTE, now clearly the dominant faction) were to surrender their arms in return for an amnesty. Indian troops, deployed at the request of President Jayewardene as soon as the Accord was signed, would supervise the cease-fire and receive the surrendered weapons. All this was expected to be accomplished within the week.

How well did the IPKF provide security? Although the Accord was not popular, the Sri Lankan army was not a problem. Paramilitary forces were disarmed. More than half the troops in the Jaffna peninsula were quickly shifted to fighting a Sinhalese insurgency in the south of the island; in fact, Indian aircraft helped ferry them down from the north to Colombo as they transferred in the IPKF. But the LTTE, after a few token surrenders of weapons, did not disarm. Within two months they had renounced the Accord entirely. The conflict was transformed into a war between the IPKF and the LTTE.

The first obstacle to effective enforcement was that the IPKF entered the fray with no clearly stated mission, inadequate intelligence (particularly about the LTTE's intentions and capabilities) and only a small number of military forces. Why? One reason was the haste with which the mission was organized, owing to lack of anticipation of the need to send troops. According to Dixit: 'There was hardly any time to give detailed briefings to Indian Commanders and army personnel, because New Delhi did not envisage any large-scale induction of its armed forces into Sri Lanka. They were rushed into Jaffna at a few hours' notice.'³³ The commander of the IPKF saw his responsibility as limited to maintaining law and order in the areas from which the Sri Lankan army had temporarily withdrawn, not enforcing the agreement.

There was also a mistaken expectation that although the LTTE was not a party to the peace Accord, and continued to insist on full Tamil independence, they would acquiesce. De Silva claims that the exclusion of the LTTE was at the insistence of the Sri Lankan government, with whom India agreed in order to ensure that her foreign policy concerns about Sri Lanka's pro-Western orientation were addressed.³⁴ Dixit argues

that LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran did not initially wish to sign the Accord, but then changed his mind. In any case, Indian policy-makers believed that the institutional arrangements proposed in the Accord offered Tamils the best deal yet, better than they ever could have achieved without Indian help. Up until that point the Sri Lankan government had refused to join the northern and eastern provinces because of the mixed population of the latter, but they now agreed to the concession. It was thought that India's superior military power as well as her affinity for the Tamil cause would give her leverage with the LTTE. However, if the LTTE did resist, victory was expected to be easy. India explicitly assured Sri Lanka that the LTTE would be disarmed by force if necessary. Dixit now concedes that Rajiv Gandhi was given bad advice by the military and intelligence agencies, as well as by Dixit himself.³⁵

The IPKF had been in the field for only two months when relations with the LTTE soured. The LTTE not only refused to disarm but proceeded to attack rival militant groups in an effort to dominate the Tamil population, a pattern of internecine rivalry established earlier when they were all headquartered in Madras. The LTTE also used terrorism to drive Sinhalese and Muslim civilians out of areas with mixed populations. They began to criticize the IPKF in public and to organize popular protests, including a hunger strike by a prominent LTTE leader. A group of LTTE militants taken prisoner by Sri Lankan authorities committed suicide. Then in early October the LTTE directly attacked Indian soldiers.

Apparently the commanding general of the army's Southern Command opposed a direct confrontation with the LTTE; his preference, he later said, was to cut off their supply routes. A strategy of attrition would take longer, but the alternative he predicted was a full-fledged insurgency with India taking the role of the government.³⁶ His advice, however, was overruled at the top, in his view. The decision was made at the cabinet level to launch a military offensive against the LTTE, despite the fact that the IPKF units in Sri Lanka were not up to strength and probably were not yet adequate to the task, in terms of training and specialization.³⁷ Indian policy-makers were unwilling to wait for full mobilization and acquisition of the necessary intelligence.

Muni, quoting the Indian press, states that the Defence Minister and the Chief of Army Staff worked out the offensive strategy during a visit to Colombo on 9 October because the LTTE had broken an agreement it had made with Dixit.³⁸ He adds that Jayewardene pressured Indian

leaders to take a firm stance, which was also what the LTTE wanted. Dixit agrees that it was the LTTE's renegeing on an agreement about power-sharing arrangements and their assault on Indian forces that prompted India to use force.³⁹ Top-level military and intelligence officials supported Rajiv Gandhi in deciding to 'neutralize' the LTTE, whatever the scale of the operation.

India then proceeded to do what it had warned the Sri Lankan government against: seize Jaffna, which took longer than anticipated because of faulty intelligence. The LTTE was larger, better-disciplined, better-informed and better-armed than anyone had suspected. As the LTTE melted away into the jungles to conduct a classic guerrilla and terrorist campaign, over the next two years India deployed more and more troops to contain the insurgency. Dixit estimates that by the end of 1987, India had four divisions and two independent brigades in Sri Lanka.⁴⁰ Military operations were constrained by the need to avoid civilian casualties and to gain the support of the Tamil population. This meant that the military not only had to defeat the LTTE, but engage in winning 'hearts and minds', a task for which they were ill equipped. There were unforeseen terrain and logistics problems. The Indian press began calling the conflict 'India's Vietnam'. Moreover, the government in New Delhi was unwilling or unable to close off the sanctuary of Tamil Nadu. Small boats found the shallow waters of the Palk Straits no impediment to transporting arms and ammunition. Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. G. Ramachandran, an avid supporter of the LTTE, died in December 1987, and the power struggle that followed exacerbated intra-elite competition for the Tamil nationalist constituency.

Nevertheless, as the IPKF acquired both experience and reinforcements, security was restored in some areas. In July, the government even cracked down on the LTTE in Tamil Nadu. This is not to say that the LTTE was destroyed, however. Muni describes confusion over whether the IPKF was ordered to destroy the LTTE as an organization and kill Prabhakaran or whether military action was meant to coerce the LTTE into accepting the Accord.⁴¹ Furthermore, while the military was taking casualties in order to defeat the LTTE, India's civilian intelligence agency (the Research and Analysis Wing, or RAW) continued to negotiate with them. Dixit concludes:

Rajiv Gandhi could be partially blamed for the contradiction which characterised Indian policies. Though he had to instruct the armed forces to confront the LTTE, once they reverted to

terrorism, there was perhaps an emotional and psychological inhibition on his part to take drastic action against the LTTE. He had an innate sympathy for the legitimate rights and aspirations of Tamils. It is perhaps because of this mind-set that he permitted representatives of our intelligence agencies to continue negotiations with the LTTE even as the Indian forces were engaged in military operations against them.⁴²

What led to these mistakes – the lack of preparation of the initial deployment, the misjudgment of the LTTE's intentions and capabilities, and the premature attempt to disarm and then 'neutralize' them? Was India's ambivalence about the military mission of the IPKF, in pursuit of what Dixit calls a 'two-track policy', a sensible carrot-and-stick approach, or simply confusion?

Possibly some of these disjunctures were owing to India's emphasis on civilian control of the military. Military leaders are often cautious about the use of force, especially in the absence of clear objectives, missions and rules of engagement. Most observers agree that the Indian military has a singular lack of influence over the policy-making process, a result of the distancing of the military from society generally.⁴³ Access to the political arena is through a civilian defence ministry. There is no equivalent to the American position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The services have no unifying institution; they operate under separate command with little coordination.

Decisions on Sri Lankan policy were made by a small group of close advisers to the Prime Minister, including the Army Chief of Staff. It does not appear, however, that the level of consultation went very deep into civilian or military bureaucracies. Lack of communication, coordination and intelligence led to a serious gap between policy ambitions and military capabilities. Military intelligence was weak. In fact, army intelligence officers were taken by surprise when the IPKF was deployed. Information about the LTTE came from the RAW, and the failures of that intelligence and well as RAW's relationship with the LTTE caused resentment. Lines of authority were not clear, and information and advice did not move up from operational levels of command. Dixit is particularly critical of the lack of coordination between RAW and the IPKF, which he sees as placing 'operational limitations' on the IPKF.⁴⁴ He sees bureaucratic politics dictating RAW's role in the conflict. Dixit reports that all his advisers, except RAW and Tamil Nadu political interests, supported Rajiv Gandhi's

firmness toward the LTTE.⁴⁵ He points out that Gandhi had to deal with 'recalcitrant Tamil political groups' who were prominent supporters of the LTTE and whose assistance to the LTTE could not be curtailed: 'It was of course physically impossible to control these activities in Tamil Nadu if local authorities, sections of its police force, and segments of their political leadership were not willing to conform to the overall policies of the Government of India.'⁴⁶ According to Dixit, Gandhi wanted to be firm with the LTTE, but he also had an 'equally greater' (*sic*) concern to avoid a hostile government in power in Tamil Nadu. Thus he allowed RAW to pursue back channel communications with both the LTTE and Jayewardene.

Why then the initial decision to disarm and then 'neutralize' the LTTE? Why not choose a strategy of attrition? Clearly Gandhi's aim was not to destroy the LTTE but to coerce them into compliance with the agreement. Certainly it was in Gandhi's interest to end the conflict quickly, since he was facing national elections at the end of 1989. The need to make it a quick rather than protracted intervention may have motivated him to ignore some of the military's warnings that the consequence of an offensive strategy would be the opposite (assuming that these warnings were communicated to him). He also had other advice that supported his inclination to order the IPKF to strike hard, and continued to offer the carrot of negotiations via RAW.

The conduct of the military operation was strongly affected by democratic norms and requirements as well as contradictions in policy that stemmed from domestic politics. The switch from seeing the LTTE as a potential ally to regarding the group as an enemy was disorienting. The IPKF tried to avoid civilian casualties, which meant no indiscriminate methods such as aerial bombing or heavy artillery. Scrutiny of military operations by the media heightened sensitivity to charges of atrocities and brutalities. Apparently the hasty induction of the IPKF had resulted in human rights abuses and indiscipline that were corrected as the scope of the engagement became clear to military commanders. But criticisms in the Indian and Sri Lankan press and among international human rights agencies made the Indian military defensive.⁴⁷ Dixit says that by the spring of 1988 Sri Lankan policy had lost public support, and military leaders were well aware of their isolation.⁴⁸

Enforcing power sharing arrangements

The Accord provided for a merger of Sri Lanka's northern and eastern provinces in a single administrative unit, which would have a Tamil majority with Muslim and Sinhalese minorities. An interim administrative council would be appointed, later to be replaced by an elected provincial council. The timetable shows how quickly India expected to restore order. Elections were planned for December 1987, less than a year after the Accord. After a year had passed, a popular referendum would determine the extent of support for the united province. The Accord, however, was weak on detail, and its implementation depended on the cooperation of the Sri Lankan government, which promised to amend the constitution to permit a devolution of power to the provinces. The LTTE was not a party to the Accord and rejected it within a few months. From the outset Jayewardene's official acceptance of the idea of a merger of the northern and eastern provinces with significant devolution of power was not supported even within his own government, much less by the Sinhalese public. His prime minister, Premadasa, and half of the cabinet did not support him.

Why then did Indian policy-makers think the Accord would work? They might reasonably have assumed that the presence of the IPKF would compel short-term acquiescence and that realization of the benefits of peace might dawn on both parties. India expected to exert leverage over the LTTE, and Jayewardene appeared to want the IPKF. Furthermore, the LTTE was not the only representative of Tamil opinion. Perhaps a moderate coalition would form in support of the settlement. But the fact that Indian decision-makers were worried about support for the new arrangements is demonstrated by the secrecy with which the final Accord was negotiated. Furthermore, moderates will not participate unless they are protected from the retaliation of the extremists. From the beginning moderate Tamils were at risk from the LTTE, and moderate Sinhalese were at risk from the radical Sinhalese terrorist organization that the Sri Lankan government had not managed to defeat, even when freed of its obligations in the north.

India started by proposing a bargain. The LTTE would be permitted to dominate the appointed interim council, and in return they promised to participate in elections for a permanent governing body. However, after a dispute over appointments to the council, the LTTE pulled out of the deal, which was one of the reasons the IPKF took the offensive

against them.⁴⁹ The LTTE then opposed holding elections, which created an unpleasant impasse.

Now the question was whether to hold the elections without the LTTE. Apparently, in June 1988, Gandhi convened several meetings to discuss the issue.⁵⁰ Jayewardene supported holding the elections. However, other Sri Lankan parties, ranging from Buddhist pro-Sinhalese factions to moderate Tamils, were opposed. Tamil leaders wanted to see a significant devolution of power to an interim administration first. They also questioned the voting lists supplied by the government and voiced apprehension about prospective terrorism from the LTTE. Within the Indian bureaucracy, RAW wanted to wait until the LTTE could be persuaded to come aboard. The head of the Intelligence Bureau (M. K. Narayanan) warned that the IPKF would have to conduct the elections and that the new provincial government would have to be supported by India. Other civilian officials also felt that devolution of power should precede elections, which should be administered by Sri Lankan civil authorities. Dixit, however, felt that since the LTTE was obdurate, India 'had no choice'. Gandhi apparently agreed.

Consequently the elections were held under IPKF administration in November 1988. (None of the 20,000 Sri Lankan officials asked to staff the polling booths would agree to do so, according to Dixit.⁵¹) As expected, the LTTE boycotted the elections, and Tamil parties friendly to India gained a majority. The turn-out in Jaffna, still loyal to the LTTE, was low, but voting was high in the eastern province, which was where the council was eventually located. However, even Dixit, who favoured holding the elections, admits that this aspect of the implementation of the Accord was 'tenuous' and that the 'prospects of this new Provincial Council settling to normal work were dim'.⁵² Any Tamil party that India supported or even that might win in Indian-sponsored elections was perceived as a tool of India, not a legitimate representative of the Tamils. Moderates were bound to be labelled as collaborators. And as is frequently the case, the new provincial council members had faults of their own such as inexperience and corruption. The result was a weak institution trying to operate under conditions of extreme insecurity and uncertainty about the future. Furthermore, Sri Lankan politicians were now preoccupied with the upcoming national parliamentary and presidential elections and did not act immediately to devolve power.

Perhaps the dilemma of the Tamil moderates could have been overcome through sustained peace-building efforts. However, General

Sardeshpande (head of the army in Jaffna, then at IPKF headquarters in Madras) claims that 'political and economic steps had not been commensurate with the military effort and had lagged far behind'.⁵³ He continues:

The NEPC's demands [the provincial council], difficulties and complexities rose by the day. No group of advisers came to guide or help them in their new experiment in the prevailing hostile environment. Nothing seemed to be moving anywhere—except the IPKF and LTTE detachments gunning for each other. [The council had] no powers, no resources, no politico-economic-organisational-secretarial support. It did not even enjoy popular support in vital areas ...⁵⁴

On the other hand, Dixit contends that one of India's main tasks was to provide security and credibility for the new Tamil government.⁵⁵ To this end, India continued to press Jayewardene to implement power-sharing arrangements and also asked him to create a Sri Lankan Tamil police force for the new province – which India would fund and train. In Dixit's view, the main obstacle to these plans was the assistance the LTTE continued to receive from 'different political circles in Tamil Nadu and even from a segment of the Tamil Nadu provincial police and security forces', a trend that New Delhi could only marginally control.⁵⁶ He claims that the LTTE now received intelligence, arms and even sanctuary from the Sri Lankan security forces, encouraged by Prime Minister Premadasa and other anti-India officials.

From this account it is clear that the new governing arrangements in Sri Lanka did not provide for genuine power-sharing, nor were they enforceable. India faced a complicated set of trade-offs. To gain Sri Lankan support for devolution, India had to disarm the LTTE. To justify the military offensive, India had to produce some concrete gains for the Tamils. 'Neutralizing' the LTTE without first securing an equitable power-sharing arrangement would alienate Tamils, but the Sinhalese were unlikely to make concessions until the LTTE was defeated, if then. Presumably the military offensive strengthened India's bargaining position on devolution in India's eyes.⁵⁷ There might be Tamil opposition to destroying the LTTE even if it resulted in a stable peace settlement with substantial devolution. Handing power in the new provincial council over to the LTTE without holding elections would be equally unjustifiable at home, even if the LTTE's rivals lacked

credibility in Sri Lanka. (However, initially India had been willing to guarantee LTTE control over the appointed interim council.) So India needed to pursue both peace and justice at the same time. Holding the provincial elections thus took on a symbolic significance for India that was out of proportion to the political gain in Sri Lanka.

One problematic and often neglected element in the peace-keeping and peace-building dilemma is *post-transition security*. Who is responsible for maintaining order after new power-sharing institutions are in place? Immediately after the provincial elections India began to train and equip a 'Tamil Volunteer Force', which subsequently became the 'Tamil National Army'. The Sri Lankan government was consulted, but the initiative seemed to have been primarily General Kalkat's.⁵⁸ The LTTE was deeply opposed, as was to be expected. But the Tamil population was also apprehensive about the 'volunteer force', and even about the provincial administration itself. The Sri Lankan government complained of Sinhalese discontent and acted as though India's moves were unilateral. The bottom line was that these forces were hastily recruited and trained, their conscription angered the Tamil population, and the Sri Lankan government undermined them.

Staying power

Outside guarantors of settlements must commit to staying long enough to see the transition through. If the election of a new administration is expected to herald a change of policy, then the dissatisfied combatants need only wait for elections, while making the intervention experience as unpleasant as possible.

The constraints that theories of foreign military intervention designate operated in Sri Lanka. One obstacle to staying is mounting casualties among the security forces. As the IPKF became embroiled in the fighting after October 1987, casualties mounted, eventually reaching around 1,500 deaths. Another source of domestic discontent was reports of atrocities by the Indian troops. From the autumn of 1988 on there was little support among the general Indian public or the media for Sri Lankan policy.

Ironically, the last straw came as a result of democratic elections in Sri Lanka. In December 1988, Premadasa replaced Jayewardene as President. His antagonism toward the IPKF had been obvious from the start, and he wasted no time in calling Dixit in to demand the ouster of

the IPKF and declare his intention of negotiating directly with the LTTE.⁵⁹ The February 1989, parliamentary elections then returned a majority for his party, which strengthened his sense of having an electoral mandate. Furthermore, the government was still involved in combating the Sinhalese insurgency in the south, one of whose demands was the ouster of the IPKF. On 2 June, Premadasa publicly demanded that India withdraw by the deadline of the second anniversary of the Accord, thus in two months. In a subsequent exchange of correspondence with Rajiv Gandhi in early July, which barely met the standards of diplomatic courtesy, he revealed that he had reached an agreement with the LTTE and that a cease-fire was eminent.

Gandhi promptly rejected the ultimatum. He argued that institutional arrangements for power-sharing had not yet been implemented (although elections to the provincial council had been held, the referendum on its future had not), that the LTTE was not disarmed, and that the Accord was a bilateral agreement that could not be unilaterally abrogated. He had already, however, agreed in principle to withdraw some units; the issue was whether to agree to a complete withdrawal by July. Gandhi was clearly angry at Premadasa's offensive tone and especially at his deliberate leaking of their correspondence to the press. In January, Gandhi had already warned Premadasa that 'India will not accept a situation where in public perception an impression may be created that the Indian army was abruptly expelled or withdrawn', and now Premadasa was doing exactly that.⁶⁰ Premadasa's original demand, for example, threatened to confine the IPKF to barracks; later Premadasa threatened to declare war on the IPKF (all of which provoked a stern warning from the IPKF commander, General Kalkat). Premadasa's response to Gandhi was that the IPKF was in Sri Lanka only at the invitation of the government, that it had failed in its mission of disarming the LTTE, and that the two objectives of the peace settlement – security guarantees and new power-sharing arrangements – were not linked. India, he said, had been asked only to provide the first, not the second. Devolution was Sri Lanka's business, and the LTTE's willingness to negotiate had now resolved the security problem. In fact, he continued, the presence of the IPKF only complicated the process of peace-making.

Regardless of the effect of withdrawal on the conflict or on Indo-Sri Lankan relations, the timing of Premadasa's announcement could not have been worse in the context of domestic politics. Even Dixit points

out that at this time, facing elections at the end of the year, Gandhi was 'enmeshed in domestic political controversies'.⁶¹ Lloyd Rudolph summarizes Gandhi's domestic difficulties. In January 1989, the Congress Party finished third in the Tamil Nadu state elections, although Gandhi had made 11 campaign trips to the state. This outcome was disastrous:

the party's and the prime minister's reputations were badly damaged by the gap between their aspirations and their performance ... After its defeat in Tamil Nadu, the Gandhi government was eager to find a way to stem the downward trend in its political fortunes.⁶²

In April he imposed President's Rule in the state of Karnataka, which critics saw as an unconstitutional move that presaged a return to the authoritarianism of his mother. The Congress party was demoralized and there were defections in other important states. He had already lost badly in a crucial election in Uttar Pradesh, India's largest state, with 16 per cent of the seats in the Lok Sabha. To make it worse, that election was a direct challenge from his national rival, V. P. Singh. There was also disarray at the top, with 13 cabinet reshuffles by the end of 1988. In desperation, in March Gandhi recalled to his cabinet one of his mother's aides, a move that was unpopular with his supporters as well as his opponents. *The situation in the Punjab was depressing; over 1,500 people were killed in 1988, including more than 1,000 civilians.* Just as he was exchanging acerbic letters with Premadasa, the old corruption scandals were revived. In July, most opposition members resigned from the Indian parliament to protest the government's handling of an official report on the matter, an action regarded as an attempt to make corruption a major issue in the upcoming parliamentary elections. The contest between the Congress party and the opposition occupied the centre of attention in national politics; if the opposition parties could unite it was expected that they could defeat Congress. Adding insult to injury, the newly elected leader in Tamil Nadu was a key player in the opposition.

Under these circumstances, as Rudolph puts it, domestic political imperatives made it difficult for either Premadasa or Gandhi to back down, yet if they persisted in confrontation it would be costly. 'For Rajiv, only five months away from a national election, a fiasco in Sri Lanka, where he had taken direct command of foreign policy, could

prove particularly costly.⁶³ Best, perhaps, to gamble on resurrection or at least hedge. At a minimum, he could not appear to bow meekly to an ultimatum.

India had been considering its options well before Premadasa's move. Dixit (who by this time had become Ambassador to Pakistan) thought that Gandhi had already decided on a gradual withdrawal, culminating in 1990, with the expectation that the IPKF would have finished its military operations and that Premadasa would have become disillusioned with the LTTE.⁶⁴ General Sardeshpande recounts that by May 1989, the IPKF's early sense of mission had given way to complacency and a 'tactical stand-off', a passivity he attributes to the awareness that the LTTE was still receiving support in Tamil Nadu.⁶⁵ In his view, the Indian government was pursuing a military offensive for its own sake, without any effort to support it with political and economic planning. In an assessment report filed in the spring of 1989, he predicted that it would take 10 years to bring some semblance of normality to Sri Lanka. He also noted that at the time he felt that the constraints of the military effort were not understood at the political level, perhaps because the army leadership was not making itself heard at the top. Apparently India's political leadership wanted to reduce troop levels and let the new provincial council and its 'Citizens Volunteer Force' maintain law and order. He reports that the view held at the top in New Delhi was that some elements of the IPKF should be kept in certain vital areas as 'points of pressure' while the rest of the force would withdraw.⁶⁶ Another body of opinion advocated staying in for the long haul, until there was stability, and a third favoured a complete and immediate withdrawal, letting the Tamils and the Sri Lankan government sort it out. The latter two views were more commonly held in the military.

Now India's hand was forced. Gandhi refused to comply with the 30 July deadline, but withdrawal would have to proceed, and it would have to be complete: there could be no 'pressure point' strategy. Thus Premadasa was informed that the IPKF would begin a phased withdrawal, with the aim of completion by the end of 1989 or early 1990. The consequences for the Tamil provincial government were disastrous. As soon as the IPKF began to withdraw, members of the 'Tamil National Army' either fled to India or fell victim to the LTTE. The chief minister of the provincial council eventually left for exile in India.

The Congress Party did not gain a sufficient majority in the December 1989 elections to be able to form a government. The new National Front government immediately agreed to the prompt withdrawal of the IPKF, promising a pull-out by March 1990. Election commentaries, interestingly enough, do not list the Sri Lankan quagmire as a cause of Gandhi's difficulties. Atul Kohli stated that: 'One should not look for dramatic failures of Rajiv Gandhi to explain Congress's defeat in the 1989 elections.'⁶⁷ He concludes that generally poor performance kept Gandhi from implementing any of the major goals that he had defined initially as his priorities. Short-term electoral pressures often led to policy failures in all areas. Sri Lanka was only one of India's many problems.

Conclusions

The requirements for successful intervention to secure peace settlements in ethnic conflicts are rigorous and complex. Commitment problems often impede effectiveness. To calculate the timing of their actions, third parties must possess excellent knowledge of the belligerents' intentions and resources, sensitivity to the dynamics of the conflict, and freedom of action. To provide security during a transition period, a third-party guarantor must be able to accept military casualties, avoid civilian casualties in the host country, prevent atrocities or human rights violations by the military, and use force against groups with whom their own populations or even armed forces may sympathize.

At the same time, the intervening power must limit the use of military force to secure compliance with the peace agreement. Victory is not the goal. If the use of force is to be legitimate, the enforcer also has to see that democratic institutions are established. The settlement has to involve genuine power-sharing. Justice cannot be sacrificed for peace. To justify disarming an opposition movement (especially a former client and especially if the fight is bloody), the third party guarantor has to produce a positive outcome. Thus the peace-maker must promote the formation of moderate coalitions on both sides of the conflict. Holding elections is typically the most visible symbol of new arrangements. Finally, an obvious requirement for both security and reform is that the guarantor has to stay the course despite frustrations and setbacks.

The obstacles to effective performance of this role are numerous. Militaries are rarely equipped to perform political and administrative functions, nor are they trained to fight without winning. 'Moderates' favoured by the outside power in a civil conflict will probably be perceived as collaborators. An outside presence in a conflict will provoke nationalist reactions. Cross-border ethnic affinities will complicate any peace-keeping effort. India's decisions in Sri Lanka were also affected by a series of particular factors: the determination and ruthless efficiency of the LTTE, India's acute vulnerability as a multi-ethnic state to secessionist demands, Rajiv Gandhi's inexperience and impetuosity, the isolation of the Indian military from civilian authority, the centralization of decision-making in a small circle of personal advisers to the Prime Minister, and India's desire for regional dominance and the exclusion of foreign powers.

Although this analysis has not compared vulnerability to domestic pressure in democratic regimes to that in authoritarian regimes, India's experience suggests that the sensitivity of democracies to domestic politics matters considerably to intervention policy. Even the decision to 'get in' was not purely strategic. India reacted not only to the trajectory of the conflict between the Sri Lankan government and Tamil militants, but to the impact of these developments on political alignments in Tamil Nadu. Rajiv Gandhi's need for success on the home front often coincided with his initiatives in Sri Lanka. Because of a particularistic sort of accountability to constituents in Tamil Nadu, the central government in New Delhi was unable to cut off material assistance to the LTTE or to pursue a consistent military strategy. While India felt compelled to try to coerce the LTTE into compromise, progress in establishing power-sharing institutions was essential in order to justify the policy. Gandhi adopted a 'two-track' policy that included negotiating with the LTTE via civilian intelligence agencies while conducting a military offensive. Because of a need for policy legitimacy, holding elections for a new Tamil provincial council became a crucial objective that in the end served no useful purpose. Staying on became increasingly costly, not only because of the obstinacy of the parties to the conflict in Sri Lanka but because of lack of public support at home. Gandhi resisted demands for immediate withdrawal, perhaps because he was 'gambling for resurrection'. It is impossible to conclude that the involvement in Sri Lanka was responsible for the electoral defeat of the Congress Party, given the

multiple problems he faced. However, Gandhi's successor campaigned against staying on and withdrew the IPKF immediately.

India's experience may not be unusual. Regional powers with ambitious aspirations are often the most likely third-party mediators and guarantors of peace settlements in ethnic conflicts in Africa and Asia. Many democracies have centralized and personalized decision-making processes. They are also likely to be multi-ethnic states faced with disintegrative forces. Leadership at the centre often depends on the support of local political elites, and decisions are the result of internal as well as external bargaining. Transnational ethnic affinities are increasingly common. Under these conditions, effective military intervention to resolve civil conflict is difficult to achieve.

NOTES

1. Barbara F. Walter, 'The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement', *International Organization* 51/3 (Summer 1997) pp.335-65; James D. Fearon, 'Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict' (unpublished paper, University of Chicago, 1996); and William I. Zartman (ed.), *Elusive Peace* (Washington: Brookings, 1995). See also Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder (eds), *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), especially Walter's 'Designing Transitions from Civil War', pp.38-69.
2. Zartman, *ibid.*, pp.343-4.
3. Walter (note 1) p.361. See also Sisk (note 14).
4. Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, 'National Capabilities and Foreign Military Intervention: A Policy-Relevant Theoretical Analysis', *International Interactions* 17/4 (1992) pp.361-6.
5. Vertzberger, *ibid.*, p.352.
6. Harvey Waterman, 'Political Order and the 'Settlement' of Civil Wars', in Roy Licklider (ed.), *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End* (New York: New York University Press, 1993) pp.292-302.
7. Vertzberger (note 4) p.361.
8. They also impose constraints on the ability to mediate: see Thomas Princen, *Intermediaries in International Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) pp.222-4.
9. Vertzberger (note 4) p.356.
10. Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson and Larry Berman (eds), *Foreign military intervention: the dynamics of protracted conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).
11. See particularly Charles A. Kupchan, 'Getting In: The Initial Stages of Military Intervention', and Eliot A. Cohen, 'Dynamics of Military Intervention', in Levite, Jentleson and Berman (eds) (note 10) pp.241-60 and 261-84, respectively.
12. George W. Downs, 'The Lessons of Disengagement', in Levite, Jentleson and Berman (eds), *ibid.*, pp.285-300.
13. Vertzberger (note 4) p.362.
14. Timothy D. Sisk, in *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace and Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1996) pp.77-86, argues for power-sharing. An outside guarantee might not be needed if the settlement were imposed on the defeated party by

- a clearly superior victor, but one can imagine tenuous balances of power where the winner cannot maintain a peace that has been imposed.
15. Roy Licklider, 'The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993', *American Political Science Review* 89/3 (September 1995) pp.681-90.
 16. Richard K. Betts, 'The Delusion of Impartial Intervention', *Foreign Affairs* 73/6 (November/December 1994) pp.31-2.
 17. Mark Peceny, 'Two Paths to the Promotion of Democracy during U.S. Military Interventions', *International Studies Quarterly* 39/3 (September 1995) pp.371-401.
 18. Walter (note 1) pp.361-2, and Zartman (note 1) pp.344-5. See also Princen (note 8).
 19. Betts (note 16) p.20.
 20. *Ibid.*, p.28.
 21. See e.g. Alan J. Bullion, *India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil Crisis 1976-1994: An International Perspective* (London: Pinter, 1995) and Mahnaz Ispahani, 'India's Role in Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict', in Levite, Jentleson and Berman (eds) (note 10) pp.209-40. See also Maya Chadda, *Ethnicity, Security, and Separatism in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997) and Dennis Austin, *Democracy and Violence in India and Sri Lanka* (Chatham House Paper, Royal Institute of International Affairs. London: Pinter Publishers, 1994).
 22. India also issued public statements of concern about the treatment of Tamils in Sri Lanka, but this involvement was minor compared to active intervention.
 23. J. N. Dixit, *Assignment Colombo* (Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1998) p.328.
 24. James Manor, 'Politics: Ambiguity, Disillusionment, and Ferment', in Marshall M. Bouton and Philip Oldenburg (eds), *India Briefing, 1988* (Boulder: Westview, 1988) pp.19-21.
 25. Dixit (note 23) pp.336-37.
 26. K. M. De Silva and S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe (eds), *Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflict* (London: Pinter, 1993) p.127.
 27. Dixit (note 23) pp.188-9.
 28. Donald Horowitz, a personal communication, quoted in Sisk (note 14) p.94.
 29. See Sisk (note 14) pp.113-14; also Zartman (note 1)
 30. Walter (1997) pp.340-41.
 31. *Ibid.*, p.362.
 32. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 'Managing Arms in Peace Process: The Issues', *Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project* (New York and Geneva, 1996). The controversy over implementation of the Good Friday accords in Northern Ireland owing to the IRA's reluctance to 'decommission' is a further example of the significance of disarmament.
 33. Dixit (note 23) p.194. He also adds: 'There is a theory bandied about that India had planned the sending of its armed forces to Sri Lanka months in advance of the negotiations and signing of the Agreement. This is not true.' See p.186.
 34. K. M. De Silva, *Regional Powers and Small State Security: India and Sri Lanka, 1977-90* (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Baltimore/The John Hopkins University Press, 1995) p.125.
 35. Dixit (note 23) pp.337-8.
 36. See Depinder Singh (Lt. Gen.), *The IPKF in Sri Lanka* (Noida (i.e. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, UP, India): Trishul Publications, 1991). Of course, in these later observations he had the benefit of hindsight.
 37. Stephen Peter Rosen, in *Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996) p.253, claims that the Indian military was not good at quick responses and that cooperation among units was difficult, which he attributes to social fragmentation rather than the democratic process.
 38. S. D. Muni, *Pangs of proximity: India and Sri Lanka's ethnic crisis* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993) pp.134-5.
 39. Dixit (note 23) p.212.
 40. *Ibid.*, p.218.
 41. Muni (note 38) p.142.

42. Dixit (note 23) p.339.
43. Stephen P. Cohen, 'The Military and Indian Democracy', in Atul Kohli (ed.), *India's Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Ragu G. C. Thomas, *Democracy, Security, and Development in India* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1996). See also Rosen (note 37).
44. Dixit (note 23) pp.233-4.
45. *Ibid.*, pp.227-8.
46. *Ibid.*, p.228.
47. For a discussion of this problem, see Muni (note 38) pp.144-5, and Dixit (note 23) p.252.
48. Dixit (note 23) pp.237 and 248.
49. It is interesting that one of the LTTE's complaints was Indian media criticism; Dixit promised to restrain the official media. *Ibid.*, pp.203 and 205.
50. *Ibid.*, pp.224ff.
51. *Ibid.*, p.253
52. *Ibid.*, p.254.
53. S. C. Sardeshpande (Lt. Gen.), *Assignment Jaffna* (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1992) p.89.
54. *Ibid.*
55. Dixit (note 23) pp.268-9.
56. *Ibid.*, p.269.
57. *Ibid.*, pp.221-2.
58. *Ibid.*, pp.282-5.
59. *Ibid.*, pp.277-8.
60. *Ibid.*, p.281.
61. *Ibid.*, p.290.
62. Lloyd I. Rudolph, 'The Faltering Novitiate: Rajiv at Home and Abroad in 1988', in Marshall M. Bouton and Philip Oldenburg (eds), *India Briefing, 1989* (Boulder: Westview, 1989) p.14.
63. *Ibid.*, p.25.
64. Dixit (note 23) p.290.
65. Sardeshpande (note 53) pp.88-91.
66. Muni (note 38, p.152) says that Gandhi and Jayewardene had already agreed on a phased withdrawal in December 1988, immediately after the elections to the provincial councils. However, he says, the Sri Lankan army asked for a slowdown. India's intention would scarcely have been encouraging to the new provincial government.
67. Atul Kohli, 'Epilogue: India's Democracy under Rajiv Gandhi, 1985-1989', in Atul Kohli (ed.), *India's Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) p.331.