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### The Collective Nature of Lone Wolf Terrorism: Anders Behring Breivik and the Anti-Islamic Social Movement

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# The Collective Nature of Lone Wolf Terrorism: Anders Behring Breivik and the Anti-Islamic Social Movement

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*Anders Behring Breivik, a lone wolf terrorist, killed 77 people in two terrorist attacks in Norway in 2011. This study uses framing theory from social movement studies to compare his Manifesto with the rhetoric of the anti-Islamic movement that inspired him. The anti-Islamic movement has a dual, and sometimes inconsistent, collective action framing. On the one hand, they portray Islam as an existential threat to the West and a warlike enemy; on the other, they promote peaceful and democratic opposition. The potential for radicalization is thus immanent. This case study reveals the importance of seeing lone wolf terrorists as acting from rhetoric embedded in larger social movements. It further demonstrates, in detail, the subtle and complex ways in which political narratives rejecting terrorism and political violence still end up inspiring such acts.*

**Keywords** anti-Islam, counter-jihad, lone wolves, social movements, terrorism

## Introduction

On July 22, 2011, Anders Behring Breivik committed two consecutive terrorist attacks in Norway. He first detonated a car bomb in the centre of Oslo, killing eight people. Subsequently, he drove to an island where the political organization Labour Youth had a summer camp, and shot dead 69 young people. Only hours prior to these attacks, the terrorist distributed a 1,518-page Manifesto via email in which he explained his acts.<sup>1</sup> The attacks were unprecedented in their extent and brutality for a country with little

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experience of political violence, a low crime rate and just under 35 murders a year on average.<sup>2</sup> Investigations by the police and the Norwegian Police Security Service have not yet confirmed that the terrorist is connected to any organized entity, as he claimed in the Manifesto, in police interrogations, and in court. Rather, Breivik seems to have all the characteristics of a lone wolf terrorist. The terrorist attacks were nevertheless inspired by well-known political rhetoric.

Lone wolf terrorism has a long history in Western countries.<sup>3</sup> In the wake of the terrorist attacks by Breivik in Norway in 2011 and by Mohammed Mehra in France in 2012, many have claimed that loners are the future of terrorism. Traditionally accounting for only 1.28% of terrorist incidents,<sup>4</sup> a popular conception is that they will increasingly replace traditional terrorist groups and networks.<sup>5</sup> The notion of lone wolves is replacing concepts such as leaderless resistance,<sup>6</sup> and is receiving increasing attention in the scholarly literature on terrorism.<sup>7</sup>

Lone wolf terrorists operate individually, do not belong to an organized group, and are difficult for authorities to detect. However, it is easy to misinterpret the notion of lone wolves, along with their lack of social networks, mental disorders,<sup>8</sup> and the tendency to “create their own ideologies.”<sup>9</sup> Most importantly, the lone wolf metaphor evokes images of ideologically and socially unaffiliated individuals, and directs the attention away from the social character of language and political narratives.<sup>10</sup> Scholars have previously noted the influence of rhetoric of far-right movements and Islamist extremism on lone wolf terrorists and our aim is to further study these connections.<sup>11</sup> It has been previously argued that terrorist groups can be considered transnational social movement organizations (SMOs), and social movement theory provides a useful conceptual framework to understand terrorism.<sup>12</sup> The tripartite framework of social movement theory includes political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and collective action framing.<sup>13</sup> Given the importance of ideological inspiration, framing theory is a particularly useful analytical tool for understanding the collective aspect of lone wolf terrorism.

In this study, we use framing theory to compare the rhetoric of Breivik’s Manifesto with that of the larger anti-Islamic movement in Norway. We examine a number of research questions: What is the collective action framing of the anti-Islamic movement in Norway? What is the collective action framing of Breivik’s Manifesto? What is the relationship between them? These questions lay the groundwork for a discussion of the relationship between lone wolf terrorism and the larger social movements that inspire it.

In his Manifesto, Breivik partly replicated earlier anti-Islamic and right-wing extremist ideology and political narratives and partly composed a new rationale for terrorism.<sup>14</sup> His collective action framing most noticeably overlaps with that of the larger anti-Islamic movement, but it stands out by advocating violent means. We argue that the case of the terrorist attacks in Norway demonstrates the importance of seeing the terrorism of loners as embedded in, and motivated by, the rhetoric of larger social movements.

### **Framing Theory and Terrorism**

Framing theory studies the rhetoric and language of social movements.<sup>15</sup> The term “frame,” borrowed from Goffman, describes “schemata of interpretation” used by individuals to attach meaning to events and occurrences.<sup>16</sup> The idea is that social movements need to engage in development and diffusion of inter-subjective meaning. In framing theory, the rhetoric of social movements is conceptualized as collective action frames. In Snow and Benford’s version,<sup>17</sup> collective action frames encompass a diagnosis and prognosis of a problem, and a call to action for its resolution.<sup>18</sup> Diagnostic

framing is concerned with problem identification (who is to blame?), prognostic framing with problem resolution (what can be done about it?), and motivational framing with a rationale for engaging in collective action, or some articulation of a motive.<sup>19</sup> As opposed to the clear-cut categories of diagnostic and prognostic framing, motivational framing crosses categories and is harder to define. It is nevertheless important, and coherence between these three aspects is vital to create a viable movement.

Framing theory in social movement studies offers a detailed and specific tool for comparing the rhetoric of different political actors.<sup>20</sup> The theoretical framework emphasizes actors' way of thinking, rationale, and motivation, and has previously been used to study Al Qaeda and racist nationalism in North America and Europe.<sup>21</sup> Framing theory does not exclude other factors such as individual psychology,<sup>22</sup> social factors, political opportunities,<sup>23</sup> or the existential attractions, excitement, and feelings of terrorists.<sup>24</sup> On the contrary, combined, these various aspects can contribute to a comprehensive understanding of contemporary terrorism.<sup>25</sup>

### **Social Context and the Anti-Islamic Movement**

In parallel with the developments in many European countries, mass immigration from non-Western countries to Norway began to increase in the 1970s.<sup>26</sup> The Norwegian population exceeded five million in 2012, of which 13.1% were first- or second-generation immigrants, and 6.0% from Africa or Asia (including Turkey). The largest single group of immigrants from these regions comes from Pakistan, closely followed by Somalia and Iraq, all of which have a Muslim majority population.<sup>27</sup> The most recent official estimates of the number of Muslims in Norway are between 100,000 and 185,000 people.<sup>28</sup>

Norway's population exhibits widespread scepticism towards immigration, especially from non-Western and Muslim countries. Forty percent of people believe that immigration constitutes a serious threat to Norwegian values, and 50% believe that Islamic values are generally or completely incompatible with Norwegian ones.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, 50% of people want to stop or severely restrict Muslim immigration.<sup>30</sup> Although these data should be interpreted with care, there is no doubt that many Norwegians consider Muslim "values" and immigration from Muslim countries to be problematic, and several organizations and political parties appeal to these opinions and segments of the population.

The wide variety of anti-Islamic actors in Norway can be seen as forming an anti-Islamic movement.<sup>31</sup> There are many similarities between this movement and those seen in other European countries, for example Denmark.<sup>32</sup> The various actors share an anti-Islamic identity and rhetoric, and have overlapping and close ties, but there are also important differences.<sup>33</sup> The second largest political party in Norway, the Progress Party,<sup>34</sup> is the most influential—but also the most diverse and ambiguous actor—in this scene.<sup>35</sup> One of the Progress Party's main issues has been limiting immigration, especially from non-Western and Muslim countries. The party has also frequently warned against the Islamization of Norwegian society. A small faction on the political right of the Christian Democratic Party on the west coast of Norway has voiced similar views. The importance of immigration in political campaigns increased during the past two parliamentary elections, and is now by far the most important issue for Progress Party voters.<sup>36</sup> However, the Progress Party also receives considerable support from its emphasis on lowering taxes, health care for the elderly, and issues of law and order.

Other and more central parts of the anti-Islamic movement include several minor and politically autonomous organizations, such as the independent think-tank Human Rights Service (HRS). There are also more radical organizations such as the Norwegian Defence League (NDL), a smaller and much less important Norwegian version of the English Defence League, and Stop Islamisation of Norway (SIAN), part of a transnational Stop Islamisation of Europe network represented in 18 European countries. Whereas the HRS is a relatively pragmatic actor appealing to a broad segment of the population, the NDL's and SIAN's rhetoric, form of protest, and organizational model have made them quite marginal political actors. The anti-Islamic movement in Norway also consists of several organizations and individuals primarily oriented towards running critical and controversial webpages.<sup>37</sup> *Document.no* and *Honestthinking.org*, for example, are highly critical of Islam, immigration, and multiculturalism.

The various organizations forming the anti-Islamic movement in Norway are on a continuum from populist to radical, terms not to be viewed as absolute, but rather as relative markers of differentiation.<sup>38</sup> Along this continuum, agents such as the Progress Party, the HRS, and *Document.no* are at the populist end of the scale, emphasizing the dichotomy of the people versus the elite, and warning against the "Islamization" of society.<sup>39</sup> Agents such as SIAN and the NDL, by contrast, are at the radical end, although "radical" in this context does not indicate overt support of violent measures.<sup>40</sup> Radical SMOs often support the so-called "Eurabia thesis".<sup>41</sup> This conspiracy theory claims that the political and cultural elites have entered into a secret partnership with the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists, and that this collusion has been in effect for decades. They also consistently denigrate political opponents as Marxists.

### Breivik and the Manifesto

Anders Behring Breivik was an avid consumer of information from several of these organizations, and had at different points in his life been associated with some of them. He had previously been a member and representative of the Progress Party, but at the time of the terrorist attacks, he rejected their politics and had no formal links to the party. Citing the blogger Fjordman, whose texts are an important part of the Manifesto, Breivik also uses statistics and background material from the HRS (p. 409 in the Manifesto). Moreover, Breivik describes *Document.no* and *Norge IDAG*, the newspaper of the rightist faction of the Christian Democratic Party, as the only true conservative "newspapers" in Norway, and he participated in a meeting hosted by *Document.no* and contributed many posts to the website. He endorsed the umbrella organization of SIAN and was a member of the NDL, but played no important role in the organization. Breivik seems to have tried to be a part of many of these organizations, but his radical views and unpleasant personality left him constantly on the periphery.<sup>42</sup>

Breivik's rationale for committing the terrorist acts was influenced by the broader anti-Islamic social movement. This is evident in his Manifesto, *2083—A European Declaration of Independence*, which is divided into three main parts, or "books:"

Book 1: *What you need to know, our falsified history and other forms of cultural Marxist/multiculturalist propaganda*

Book 2: *Europe Burning*

Book 3: *A Declaration of pre-emptive War.*

In the Manifesto, Breivik quotes, recounts, and reinterprets the rhetoric of an emerging anti-Islamic movement across Europe and the United States.<sup>43</sup> This transnational social movement is also the main inspiration for the anti-Islamic movement in Norway. His views were influenced by online information and interactions.<sup>44</sup> The most important inspirations for Breivik are Bat Ye'or,<sup>45</sup> Robert Spencer,<sup>46</sup> and the Norwegian blogger Fjordman, who gained prominence on the self-styled counter-Jihadi<sup>47</sup> website *Gates of Vienna*.<sup>48</sup> Breivik's Manifesto is written in English and comprises a collection of texts from a variety of sources. Some sections reproduce other authors' work, and others are plagiarized with only minor changes.<sup>49</sup> There are also sections in which he writes more independently, characterized by less elegant English, grammatical errors, and the frequent use of exclamation marks.

## Method

Data sources for this study are: (a) a wide selection of literature from the Norwegian anti-Islamic movement, (b) interviews with key actors in the Norwegian anti-Islamic movement, and (c) Breivik's Manifesto. The selected literature represents various organizations and individuals. We have followed this movement closely for two years, before, during, and after the terrorist attacks. The texts we have chosen are illustrative and not exhaustive, but they capture the general rhetoric of the movement prior to the terrorist attacks. We combine the studies of these texts with six interviews with members of prominent anti-Islamic organizations, all conducted by the first author in September and October 2010.<sup>50</sup> Finally, we have done an in-depth study of Breivik's Manifesto. The different data sources are analysed using Snow and Benford's concept of "collective action frames."<sup>51</sup> More specifically, we have identified and compared the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing of the anti-Islamic social movement with similar framing efforts in Breivik's Manifesto.

The Norwegian anti-Islamic social movement consists of a multitude of diverse actors. Describing their shared collective action framing is a simplification for analytical purposes. We have emphasized SMOs with a clear and consistent anti-Islamic rhetoric, but have also included the Progress Party, especially representatives and factions who have taken great interest in immigration. Large parts of Breivik's text are copied and rewritten from work by actors in the anti-Islamic movement, and there are thus many similarities. We still treat the text as indicative of Breivik's world-view and motives for the terrorist attacks. He collected the various texts and put considerable effort into rewriting them for inclusion in the Manifesto. Although Breivik's text is fragmented and represents a multitude of voices, it is nonetheless the work of a single "author." We may have made his Manifesto appear more coherent than it really is. Analysing it as political rhetoric is in many ways a rationalization of a sometimes disorganized and ambiguous text. Despite these difficulties, we hope to demonstrate that a comparison of the ideology and world-view of a terrorist and the more moderate social movement that inspired him can inform studies of political rhetoric and ideology, terrorism, and social movements.

## Collective Action Framing in the Norwegian Anti-Islamic Movement

### *Diagnosis: Islam as an Existential Threat*

To construct a common framework for action, the various actors must operate with a more or less unified understanding of what they define as problematic.<sup>52</sup> The anti-Islamic SMOs identify a plethora of problems, most of which they share. Their

diagnostic framing has two main elements. First, they argue that Islam and Islamism constitute a totalitarian threat and describe how immigration and multiculturalism undermine Western values and the welfare state. Second, they argue that the state and the cultural elite oppress both the movement and the people. The enemy, therefore, is both Muslims and the national elite.

Most SMOs in the anti-Islamic movement acknowledge the differences between secular, moderate, and fundamentalist Muslims. Nonetheless, all the SMOs adhere to one central and unifying tenet—that Islam is a political ideology or force, not simply a religion. They also describe how Islam and Muslim cultural norms are gaining a foothold in the Western world. Moreover, several of the SMOs describe the increased accommodation of Muslims as planned “sneak Islamization” or Islamization,<sup>53</sup> including the introduction of *halal* products, Sharia law, Muslim ghettos, honour killings, increased anti-Semitism, and gender segregation:

If this development is not turned around within a decade, and if Europe doesn't work out an immigration policy that is healthy and sustainable in terms of values, the continent is doomed. It will be Islamized, and will suffer everything that goes with that.<sup>54</sup>

The anti-Islamic movement's diagnosis is that non-Western immigration is undermining social cohesion, and will eventually lead to the dissolution of the welfare state.

One of the main schisms between the populist and radical elements within the movement can be found in the emphasis on the Eurabia thesis, or the conspiracy between Western elites, the Muslim Brotherhood, and leaders of Arab nations. Whereas the radical elements such as SIAN and the NDL fervently argue in favour of this view, the moderate elements distance themselves from this term. Many still argue that the Islamization is at the direct behest of—or due to the failings of—the globalist and multicultural elite in the political arena, academia, and mainstream media. Norway's Labour Party is often portrayed as a main opponent of traditional society and as responsible for its destruction.<sup>55</sup>

It's the Labour Party that has opened the borders in spite of the halt to immigration. It's the Labour Party that has given us thousands of new Norwegians from different cultures and bad cultures every year. The Labour Party is ensuring that people with a Norwegian cultural background are fleeing several parts of Oslo, leaving behind enclaves where Muslim single-mindedness, dogmatism, and intolerance grow ever stronger.<sup>56</sup>

The Labour Party and the elites are perceived to be betraying the people by oppressing and distorting the popular opposition to immigration, Islamization, and multiculturalism. In their view, this is done by brainwashing young people in the education system, and it is done because the elite believe both the people and the anti-Islamic SMOs to be racist.<sup>57</sup>

Another schism is evident in their use of statistics as part of their diagnostic framing. The radical SMOs rely on deceptive exaggerations, for instance that Muslims will be in the majority in Norway by the year 2060.<sup>58</sup> The moderate SMOs rely on official data and projections to a much larger degree, but they argue that these numbers are actively under-communicated by the “elite.”<sup>59</sup>

In summary, the anti-Islamic diagnosis is a poignant “injustice frame”<sup>60</sup> that paints a vast and dark picture of an hegemonic elite that actively conspires to undermine the Norwegian people. The elite and the left wing oppress both them and the populace, either proactively or tacitly in league with Islamic organizations and agents. A few even explicitly argue that the state actively incorporates Islamic organizations, granting them power.<sup>61</sup> The anti-Islamic movement sees multiculturalism as a dangerous project leading to the self-destruction of Western civilization. The various elements of diagnostic framing cement the two central dichotomies of the anti-Islamic SMO’s collective action framing: The *West* versus *Islam* and *the people* versus *the elite*. Through their rhetoric, they create an active delineation whereby they view themselves as being on the side of the people, against the elite, Islam, and Islamists.

### ***Prognosis: Non-Violent and Democratic Solutions***

In addition to the diagnosis, the construction of a collective action framework implies an articulation of possible solutions and strategies for coping with issues that agents view as problematic.<sup>62</sup> The various anti-Islamic SMOs propose a wide range of solutions and strategies to overcome what they view as multicultural dominance and Islamization of Norwegian society. For example, they advocate a complete halt to non-Western immigration, assimilation instead of multiculturalism, an extended emphasis on Christianity and liberal values, and public inquiries into and debate over the negative effects of immigration.

The call for a complete halt to or a drastic reduction in non-Western immigration contains an implicit assumption that Muslims are hard to integrate/assimilate, making every Muslim immigrant a potential threat to Western culture and values. Further, to counter what they see as a failed multicultural doctrine, the anti-Islamic movement argue that more emphasis should be given to Western and Norwegian values, including freedom of speech, gender equality, and tolerance of difference. To achieve this, they demand assimilation of immigrants and secularization of Islam.<sup>63</sup>

You can call it a values-based assimilation—assimilation in the manner that they accept the social contract. One has to accept the basic values our society is built upon. Freedom of speech, right? All the basic aspects. Gender equality, tolerance of difference. All these things that define *us*.<sup>64</sup>

The fear is that Islamic influences will lead to a degradation of Western democratic institutions, and there is an overarching tenet that Islam must be contained within the private sphere. Some propose a “democracy canon” as part of the solution, whereby democracy, secularism, equality, and freedom of speech are to be actively promoted in schools.<sup>65</sup> The more radical SMOs propose intervening directly in Muslim communities, to teach people about democracy.<sup>66</sup> Another important part of the prognostic framing is a move to discuss the problems of immigration and Islam in public, and to apply and discuss scientific analyses of the negative consequences of immigration.<sup>67</sup>

All solutions and political means suggested by the anti-Islamic movement in Norway are democratic and non-violent. Anti-Islamic actors, whether they belong to a party, a newspaper, or an independent think-tank, are highly focused on achieving effects through the political system. The editor of *Document.no*, for example, stated that:

My goal is that this should be a contribution to the democratic process. It has to be through legal channels, in a rational and articulated form. Otherwise, it will take extremely unhealthy directions. ... Unhealthy means that it isn't being articulated. We do live in a democracy after all, with a long tradition of solving problems in a non-violent manner.<sup>68</sup>

In their own view, they are a moderating force, reducing the prospects of a violent escalation of ethnic and religious conflict.<sup>69</sup> The rejection of violence is linked to their diagnostic framing of Norwegian and Western societies as civilized and rights-based, in contrast to the violent Islamists. There are, however, still some tensions and ambiguity in the collective action framing of the movement. The prognostic framing calls for the use of non-violent means, while, as we demonstrate below, the motivational framing sometimes uses the language of war.

### ***Motivational Framing: "Fight for What Is Yours!"***

Motivational framing is used to rationalize and legitimize opposition, and to mobilize people in support of a struggle.<sup>70</sup> It is an emphasis on the primacy of action and the importance of what is at stake. It also frequently involves appeals to emotion and "hot cognitions."<sup>71</sup> The anti-Islamic movement's motivational framing states that Islamization threatens liberal values such as democracy, freedom of speech, and even gender equality and gay rights. They further argue that passivity equals condoning a process by which society becomes Islamized. Their opposition is depicted as a defensive battle for freedom and democracy, and anti-Islamic actors frequently emphasize how much they are willing to sacrifice for these values:

If things are reversed, be it freedom of speech, the right to choose one's life partner, one's own choices, to govern one's own life—to be free!—that's a development I won't accept. I will fight against it with all of my "guts" [using the English term].<sup>72</sup>

The motivational framing is often reinforced with apocalyptic statements such as "our entire civilization is in peril if the developments we see now continue,"<sup>73</sup> and war metaphors such as "invasion," "struggle," "fights," and "traitor" occur frequently.<sup>74</sup> Some even draw parallels to the Second World War:

We want to defend our system, with our lives if necessary. We will do what our best men did between 1940 and '45. Not because we have a death wish, but because we want to protect our descendants and dear ones, to preserve the freedoms and the society we have. There is no doubt that lives will be lost ... that's already the case, 3000 victims in the US and so on. But there will be more of it, that much is obvious.<sup>75</sup>

The war metaphors are not meant literally, at least not by most actors, but they serve to highlight the severity of the current situation. In this way, they work as effective motivational framing. They are closely linked to the diagnostic framing, describing an existential fight between *us* and *them*, *freedom* and *submission*, and *good* and *evil*. Thus, while the non-violent prognostic framing finds support in parts of the diagnostic framing ("we are the non-violent, democratic ones"), the motivational framing draws upon other parts ("Islam is an existential threat to Western society and culture").

The anti-Islamic movement in Norway presents a rather coherent and salient world-view, or collective action framing. The differences between the prognostic and motivational framing, however, reveal some ambiguity and tensions between various parts of their rhetoric. Ambiguity is a powerful resource.<sup>76</sup> It gives the audience the opportunity to emphasize different parts of the collective action framing, and thus increases the scope for interpretation. It also gives the representatives of the movement the opportunity to tailor their rhetoric to different social and political contexts. In this way, ambiguity forges agreement and identity across political differences.<sup>77</sup> As we demonstrate below, however, it can also be quite problematic.

## Collective Action Framing in Breivik's Manifesto

### *Diagnosis: Islam as an Existential Threat*

Breivik draws on a wide array of sources and texts from prominent anti-Islamic agents and SMOs when describing the problem of Islam, immigration, and the current state of politics. In most respects, he shares their diagnosis: Islam and Islamism are an existential threat, immigration and multiculturalism undermine Western values, and the Islamization of Western society is enforced by a multicultural political elite out of touch with the concerns of ordinary people.

Large parts of Breivik's Manifesto describe Islam and Islamism, particularly the history of violence, conquest, and slavery. Islam is depicted as a brutal and oppressive political regime, as opposed to the enlightened and civilized West. In the same way as the more radical anti-Islamic SMOs, he uses a considerable portion of the document to describe historical events, compares Islam to fascism, and refers frequently to the Eurabia thesis.<sup>78</sup> Breivik also uses Christianity to construct a positive common identity, but the religion primarily serves as a cultural and historical underpinning (p. 39 in the Manifesto).<sup>79</sup> In the same way as the larger movement, he also describes Islamization (or "sneak Islamization") as an ominous process that begins with seemingly benign changes, such as the introduction of *halal* products, and then gradually expands:

Islamisation or the creation of Islamic no-go zones is under development from the first Muslim family moves into a neighbourhood. ... The process of Islamisation starts with the demands for halal-food (1%) and ends in genocide (at 50–80%), as several hundred historical examples have shown. You cannot reason with Islam. Islam consumes everything eventually unless it is stopped in a decisive manner. (p. 491)

Breivik's description of the process of Islamization is a widespread diagnosis in the anti-Islamic movement, but the use of the term genocide is radical. In this specific context, however, Breivik uses a wide definition—the undermining and eventual eradication of Western culture. This underlying fear is shared by many of the anti-Islamic SMOs. He also uses statistics and numbers to give the diagnosis credence. His use of fabricated numbers and exaggerations is more in line with the radical SMOs, although he goes further, for instance when he falsely constructs tables showing the number of thefts, murders, and rapes committed by Muslims in Western Europe (pp. 476–477, 651, 661, 774, 816). He forewarns that the process of Islamization will lead to radicalization and political polarization, wherein we will see the growth of "REAL 'resistance organisations' equivalent to the fictional

group called ‘PCCTS,’ ” or Knights Templar, to which he claimed to belong (p. 767).<sup>80</sup> He thus lays the blame for the emergence and actions of radical anti-Islamic groups at the feet of the elites.

The recurring emphasis on the role of the political and cultural elite is a feature shared by both the wider anti-Islamic diagnostic frame and Breivik’s Manifesto. Breivik describes the elite as oppressors bent on undermining Western civilization, white men, and Christianity in general by facilitating Islamization and Muslim immigration.<sup>81</sup> They are “globalist capitalists” with an economic motivation, and “suicidal humanists” and “cultural Marxists” with ideological motivation, lumped under a broad label of multiculturalism (p. 364). Journalists, in particular, but also academics, are part of the conspiratorial elite (p. 371).

Breivik argues that the elite attempts to conceal the size of the Muslim population from the people to challenge “monoculturalism.” He believes they must withhold this information, or risk having to justify “multiculturalism and the ongoing Islamic demographic warfare” (p. 564). He claims multiculturalism is further embodied through an indoctrination of political correctness—by imposing restrictive “speech codes” and “sensitivity training” (p. 23). This in turn leads to oppression and the erosion of what he perceives as “democracy” (p. 786).

Whereas the Norwegian anti-Islamic movement concentrates on Norway, Breivik is primarily concerned with the European political context. The European Union, which is one of the main antagonists in his framing, is often termed the “EUSSR”—European Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (pp. 733, 793). He paints a picture of a Europe soon to be overrun if the current trends continue:

The current cultural Marxist/multiculturalist elites, the New Totalitarians, are the most dangerous generation in Western history. Not only have they managed to destroy fundamental structures of European society. They are allowing millions of Muslims to colonise Europe. (p. 30)

In summary, Breivik’s diagnostic framing is largely similar to that of the radical parts of the anti-Islamic movement. This is not surprising, as he copied many parts of the Manifesto from literature originating in the larger movement. There are some important differences, however. He is generally more concerned with history and religion, he consistently uses stronger and more radical language, and his narrative tone is darker and more apocalyptic. The real difference between the movement and Breivik, though, is in the prognostic framing.

### ***Prognosis: Armed Resistance and Terrorism***


Breivik’s prognostic frame is twofold. There are *non-violent* solutions, quite similar to those of the larger social movement, mainly presented in the first half of the Manifesto, and *violent* solutions, such as military coups, assassinations, and the establishment of terror cells. The latter gradually takes precedence as the Manifesto progresses. Advocating armed resistance and terrorism fundamentally separate him from the larger anti-Islamic movement.

Breivik’s antidote to multiculturalism and Islamization is to re-establish a “confident” and “strong” Europe (p. 1126). This includes reverting to a “monocultural” ideology based on an idealized interpretation of the 1950s and subsequent eradication of any traces of Islam:

I believe Europe should strive for: A cultural conservative approach where monoculturalism, moral, the nuclear family, a free market, support for Israel and our Christian cousins of the east, law and order and Christendom itself must be central aspects (unlike now). Islam must be re-classified as a political ideology and the Quran and the Hadith banned as the genocidal political tools they are. (p. 650)

He argues that a certain proportion of Muslims poses little or no threat and has been secularized. He does not believe, however, that the “privatization” of Islam and secularization of Muslims is sufficient. To be assimilated, Muslims must adopt Christianity and Christian traditions—it is the only bulwark against a resurgence of Islam (p. 799).

Breivik also suggests several minor solutions, such as replacing certain subjects in university courses with a curriculum of his own choosing, teaching about Muslim atrocities, and removing “pro-promiscuity” material to strengthen the family nucleus (pp. 371, 373, 1175). Moreover, instead of formal education, he suggests “self-education” in the struggle for a new “monocultural” hegemony (pp. 14–15, 653). To recruit youth and mobilize supporters, he also designates the traditional extreme right as an opponent, to be avoided at all costs because of the associated stigma (pp. 651–652). Breivik promulgates the idea of developing “reputational shields,” building nationalistic, conservative parties, recruiting female spokespersons, and toning down rhetoric, to gain popular support (pp. 655, 1128).<sup>82</sup> As the Manifesto progresses, however, he more or less abandons these strategies and tactics, stating that democratic reform is impossible because of the entrenchment of the elites (pp. 736, 793). The vast size of the Manifesto suggests that Breivik began by supporting non-violent means and then came to reject these in favour of violent means, as part of a gradual process of radicalization. Assuming it was written consecutively during the last couple of years, it illustrates how he went from supporting democracy to advocating and preparing for violence and political terrorism. This is systematized and illustrated in Figure 1.<sup>83</sup>



**Figure 1.** Individual pages containing democratic (65 pages) and violent (196 pages) solutions throughout Breivik’s Manifesto (1518 pages). *N* = 261.

As indicated by the figure, there is a clear correlation between the progress of the Manifesto and the political solutions suggested. Nonviolent solutions are much more frequent in the first and second “book” in the Manifesto, while violent solutions increase in number within the interval of pages 601–700 in the final part of the second “book.” Violent solutions then increase rapidly and are completely dominant in the third “book.”

It is of course difficult to say when and why he was radicalized, but a combination of events in his personal life and political events may have solidified and compounded Breivik’s trajectory towards terrorism and political violence. The police investigations and psychiatric evaluations reveal that Breivik showed more signs of psychological disorder and became increasingly isolated in 2006, eventually moving back in with his mother. This was followed by a forced closing of his one-man financial company in 2008, which left him with no gains.<sup>84</sup> Breivik himself, however, emphasises political events such as the media’s underreporting of the riots in the French *banlieues* during 2009 (pp. 793–794) and the following “media blackout” that kept the Progress Party from winning the election the same year (pp. 796–798). During the trial he returned to this argument several times.

In the part of the Manifesto promoting political violence and terrorism, Breivik frames the conflict in which he is involved as an emancipatory one, and the European Union as undemocratic and totalitarian. To combat both multiculturalism and Islam, he emphasizes the need to establish a “European Resistance Movement,” fighting for the rights of ethnic Europeans and Western culture.<sup>85</sup> He argues that this movement should be modelled on the Native American fight against the United States, thereby aligning his framework with the struggle for independence of indigenous peoples around the world (pp. 658, 1097).

Breivik describes a scenario where violent resistance, warfare, and terrorism constitute the only realistic political strategy:

The only way we can then prevent Sharia law from being implemented as the only standard will be to suppress the Muslim majority through military force just like Turkey is doing now. ... This can only be accomplished by overthrowing the current Western European multiculturalist regimes by seizing power through armed resistance and a military coup when the time is right. This is the only way to safeguard democracy long term. Sure, it will be bloody. But if democracy, our homelands and people aren’t worth certain sacrifices then what is? (pp. 723–724)

Breivik’s prognostic framing is inspired by other revolutionary and terrorist groups such as the Red Army Faction and Al Qaeda (pp. 988, 1463, 1468). The jihadist narrative can, for example, be summarized as: (a) Islam is under general unjust attack by Western crusaders, (b) Jihadis are resisting this attack, (c) the actions they take are proportionally just and religiously sanctified, and (d) it is the duty of Muslims to support these actions.<sup>86</sup> What Breivik does is to exchange Islam for Christendom and crusaders for multiculturalists, and keep the rest of the jihadist frame. Both of these radical positions agree that there is a clash of civilizations,<sup>87</sup> and that their terrorism is self-defence.<sup>88</sup>

Breivik’s prognostic framing and solutions are fundamentally different from the collective action framing of the anti-Islamic social movement. His political means are terrorism and violence, whereas the political strategy of the anti-Islamic movement is

to counter Islamization by non-violent and democratic means. Nevertheless, Breivik's prognostic framing has some striking similarities to the rhetoric of the larger anti-Islamic movement. First, his solutions echo the apocalyptic diagnosis often heard in the anti-Islamic movement: "Islam is an existential threat to Western society and culture." Second, it turns the motivational and largely metaphorical framing of the more radical parts of the movement into a prognosis. In Breivik's Manifesto, the war metaphors of the movement become real.

### **Motivational Framing: Pathos and Emotions**

Parts of the Manifesto use strong emotional language, calling on people to make sacrifices and join the struggle. An important part of Breivik's motivational framing is a "rhetoric of change,"<sup>89</sup> or the overestimation of political opportunities and potential support. The following quote can serve as an example: "we have lost the democratical struggle to defend Europe from deliberate cultural annihilation. As more people realise this we will see an increasing number of Europeans joining our ranks to fight by our side" (p. 802). This rhetoric of change is sometimes combined with an emotional and almost religious call for action:

Many brothers and sisters have fallen already, the pioneers, the brave heroes, and the first to pick up their guns. We are the legacy of these first "unknown" pioneers. We did not want this but we are left no choice. Armed struggle is the only rational approach. We, the free indigenous peoples of Europe, hereby declare a pre-emptive war on all cultural Marxist/multiculturalist elites of Western Europe. (pp. 801–802)

In other parts the religious inspiration is more explicit:

The PCCTS, Knights Templars are Destroyers of Marxism and Defenders of Christendom. We are Crusaders, martyrs of the Church, selfless defenders of the weak and the blind. We are not only automatically granted access to heaven in light of our selfless acts; our good deeds and final sacrifice will be added to the divine storehouse of merit and will therefore help other less virtuous individuals. (p. 1346)

Breivik's motivational framing draws upon core aspects of both his diagnostic and prognostic frameworks. This call to arms has two main components: a highly emotional appeal and a rationale with religious overtones where it is the "duty" to "join the struggle," and follow the mantra of "Martyrdom before dhimmitude" (pp. 801, 818, 832). The word martyr is mentioned 200 times in the Manifesto and Breivik also draws, directly and indirectly, on Christian symbols and mediaeval history, such as the Crusades and the use of "Christian" rituals when preparing for combat (p. 1113).

In Breivik's Manifesto, democratic values play a secondary role to his emphasis on violence and martyrdom, and he fails to identify positively what is at the core of his struggle. This stands in contrast to the anti-Islamic movement, which firmly anchors its motivational framing and call to action in a plethora of widespread values, such as democracy, freedom of speech, gender equality, and gay rights. These values are part of the diagnostic framing, but when presented in an emotional language and with case illustrations they also function as motivational framing.

Breivik's narratives of Christian crusaders can also be seen in the radical anti-Islamic SMOs, but none of them takes it as far as depicting "martyrdom," "pre-emptive war," or "armed struggle." These attempts at motivational framing seem too ostentatious, fragmented, and self-centred to have any resonance, even among other radical anti-Islamic agents. Breivik's lack of resonance in the motivational framing may reflect his mental problems,<sup>90</sup> a state further illustrated by the fact that he never successfully managed to form or be part of an established organization.

## Conclusion

Only days after the terrorist attacks, the Norwegian Police Security Service described Breivik as a lone wolf.<sup>91</sup> This appellation sits well with the dominant academic understanding of lone wolf terrorism:<sup>92</sup> he operated individually, did not belong to an organized group, had few social networks (although he was active on the Internet), and even showed signs of mental problems. However, although perhaps accurately describing the acts themselves, the metaphor of lone wolves does not reflect a sufficient understanding of the social character of the language and political narrative involved in acts of lone wolf terrorism. Although Breivik operated alone, his ideology, world-view, and narratives emerged from a large, sometimes radical, and relatively new anti-Islamic social movement. It is thus impossible to understand the Norwegian terrorist attacks without seeing how their rationale was embedded in anti-Islamic rhetoric.<sup>93</sup>

The importance of social movement theory for studies of terrorism has been noted previously, but lone wolf terrorism has incorrectly been seen as the exception.<sup>94</sup> We argue that social movement theory in general, and framing theory in particular, can contribute to a more thorough understanding of lone wolf terrorism. In most respects, Breivik's diagnostic framing closely overlaps with that of the anti-Islamic movement. Both view Europe as undergoing a process of Islamization, and depict their struggle as one between the elite and the common people. This line of reasoning and the metaphors of war sometimes used in the motivational framing contain the seeds of an alternative and more apocalyptic world-view encouraging violent measures.<sup>95</sup>

Friedrich Nietzsche famously claimed that words are "the horizon of our knowledge" and we cannot "think outside language."<sup>96</sup> New ideologies and political narratives are produced by analogy, using familiar ideas and familiar words, and giving them new meaning. This is what Breivik did in his Manifesto. Using familiar narratives, he partly reproduced and partly constructed a new ideology for anti-Islamic terrorism. Although the larger anti-Islamic social movement has no responsibility for Breivik's terrorism, it may still be fruitful to analyse the role that its diagnostic and motivational framing, if not its prognosis, played in inspiring and justifying his terrorist acts.

Deceptions with statistics and conspiracy theories, for example, contribute to demonization and vilification. Furthermore, conspiracy theories often have a strongly anti-democratic character that delegitimizes belief in official channels and democratic participation. Us/them narratives that dehumanize the other make it easier to take life, and metaphors such as "civil war," "occupation," and "traitors" help justify the use of violence. Generally, a shift towards violent solutions is an inherent possibility in all forms of collective identity.<sup>97</sup> The potential for violent escalation, however, gains prominence when a collective identity is formed around the belief that it is beset by an existential threat, where culture and survival are at stake. The ambiguous anti-Islamic collective action framing is the wellspring of both violent and non-violent political means. The antagonistic diagnosis and the war metaphors in the motivational framing

are dangerous in two ways: It can inspire political violence, and it validates and reinforces Jihadist rhetoric about a war on Islam. Still, it is important to remember that very few in the anti-Islamic movement explicitly support violent solutions.

It should come as no surprise that a social movement consistently using the language of war and undermining the possibilities of democratic opposition by portraying a secret conspiracy of elites responsible for grave injustices and hundreds of thousands of victims inspires terrorism. This was the case with leftist terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s, and radical Islamism in the 1990s and 2000s. It can be the future of anti-Islamic rhetoric as well.

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### Notes

1. Anders B. Breivik, *2083—A European Declaration of Independence*, 2011, <http://unitednations.ispnw.org/archives/breivik-manifesto-2011.pdf>.

2. <https://www.politi.no/kripos/statistikk/drap/>.

3. Samuel Nunn, "Incidents of Terrorism in the United States 1997–2005," *The Geographical Review* 97 (2007): 89–111; Ramon Spaaij, "The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 33 (2010): 854–870; Peter J. Phillips, "Lone Wolf Terrorism," *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy* 17, no. 1 (2011): 1–29.

4. Spaaij, "The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism" (see note 3 above).

5. For example, Sajjan Gohel, Director for International Security at the Asia-Pacific Foundation, argues that it is the "next stage of terrorism in Europe" (<http://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/21/world/europe/lone-wolf-future-of-terrorists/index.html>) and Gilles de Kerchove, the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator, argues that there may be 400 lone wolves inspired by Al Qaeda in Europe alone (<http://eu-digest.blogspot.com/2012/03/eu-could-be-home-to-400-lone-wolf.html>).

6. Jeffrey Kaplan, "Leaderless Resistance," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 80–95; Chris Dishmann, "The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28, no. 3 (2005): 237–252.

7. Phillips, "Lone Wolf Terrorism" (see note 3 above); Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley, "The Psychology of Lone-wolf Terrorism," *Counseling Psychology Quarterly* 24, no. 2 (2011): 115–126; Steven M. Chermak, Joshua D. Freilich, and Joseph Simone Jr., "Surveying American State Police Agencies about Lone Wolves, Far-Right Criminality, and Far-Right and Islamic Jihadist Criminal Collaboration," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 33, no. 11 (2010): 1019–1041; Edwin Bakker and Beatrice de Graaf, *Lone Wolves: How to Prevent This Phenomenon?* (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, Expert Meeting Paper, 2010); Nunn, "Incidents of Terrorism in the United States 1997–2005" (see note 3 above).

8. Christopher Hewitt, *Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to Al Qaeda* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 80.

9. Spaaij also notes that they "combine personal frustrations and aversion with broader political, social, or religious aims in constructing their ideology" (see note 3 above), 866.

10. In outlining this relationship, others have used terms such as communities of belief and ideologies of validation; Jelle van Buuren, "The Multitude of Lone Wolf Terrorism," *Terrorism: An Electronic Journal and Knowledge Base* 1, no. 1 (2012): 1–23, 15; Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 11.

11. Raffaello Pantucci, *A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists* (London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2011); Ramon Spaaij, *Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention* (New York: Springer, 2011); Gerry Gable and Paul Jackson, "Lone Wolves: Myth or Reality," *Searchlight*, 2011.

12. David Leheny, "Terrorism, Social Movements, and International Security: How Al Qaeda Affects Southeast Asia," *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 6, no. 1 (2005): 1–23; Colin J. Beck, "The Contribution of Social Movement Theory to Understanding Terrorism," *Sociology Compass* 2, no. 5 (2008): 1565–1581; Randy Borum, "Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories," *Journal of Strategic Security* 4, no. 4 (2011): 7–36.

13. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

14. Norway has a history of right-wing extremism during the 1980s and 1990s; Tore Bjørgo, "Extreme Nationalism and Violent Discourses in Scandinavia: 'The Resistance,' 'Traitors,' and 'Foreign Invaders,'" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 7, no. 1 (1995): 182–220; Katrine Fangen, *En Bok om Nynazisme* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001). Bjørgo has noted many similarities between Breivik's views and these organizations and groups, and argues that Breivik's views and actions are consistent with right-wing violent ideology; Tore Bjørgo, "Højreekstreme voldsideologier og terroristisk rationalitet: Hvordan kan man forstå Behring Breiviks utsagn og handlinger?," *Social Kritik*, 131 (2012): 4–25, 6.

15. David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review* 51 (1986): 464–481; David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," in Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow, eds., *From Structure to Action: Comparing Movement Participants Across Cultures*, International Movement Research, vol. 1 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1988), 197–217; David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest," in Aldon D. Morris and Carol M. Mueller, eds., *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 133–155; William A. Gamson, "The Social Psychology of Collective Action," in Aldon D. Morris and Carol M. Mueller, eds., *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 53–76; William A. Gamson, "Constructing Social Protest," in Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans, eds., *Social Movements and Culture* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 85–106.

16. Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (New York: Harper Colophon, 1974); Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation" (see note 15 above).

17. Snow and Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest" (see note 15 above).

18. Daniel M. Cress and David A. Snow, "The Outcomes of Homeless Mobilization: The Influence of Organization, Disruption, Political Mediation, and Framing," *American Journal of Sociology* 105, no. 4 (2000): 1063–1104, 1071.

19. Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 611–639, 617.

20. We could have used other theoretical frameworks, such as that of Gamson, "The Social Psychology of Collective Action" and Gamson, "Constructing Social Protest," or we could have combined contrasting approaches of framing theory, such as that of Sveinung Sandberg, "Fighting Neo-liberalism with Neo-liberal Discourse: ATTAC Norway, Foucault and Collective Action Framing," *Social Movement Studies* 5, no. 3 (2006): 209–227, or even used wider-ranging rhetorical, narrative, or discursive frameworks.

21. Michael Page, Lara Challita, and Alistair Harris, "Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Framing Narratives and Prescriptions," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23, no. 2 (2011): 150–172; Stuart A. Wright, "Strategic Framing of Racial-Nationalism in North America and Europe: An Analysis of a Burgeoning Transnational Network," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21, no. 2 (2009): 189–210.

22. Jeff Victoroff, "The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 1 (2005): 3–42; Moskalenko and McCauley, "The Psychology of Lone-wolf Terrorism" (see note 7 above).

23. James A. Piazza, "Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 1 (2006): 159–177.

24. Simon Cottee and Keith Hayward, "Terrorist (E)motives: The Existential Attractions of Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 34 (2011): 963–986.

25. As others have noted, one should not imagine a singular pathway to terrorism, but several non-exclusionary ones. See for instance John Horgan, *The Psychology of Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2005).

26. Grete Brochmann and Knut Kjelstadli, *A History of Immigration: The Case of Norway 900–2000* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2008).

27. Statistics Norway (SSB), *Immigrants and Norwegians Born to Immigrant Parents*, 2012, [http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/02/01/10/innvbef\\_en/tab-2012-04-26-01-en.html](http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/02/01/10/innvbef_en/tab-2012-04-26-01-en.html).

28. Lars Østby, "Muslimsk flertall i Norge?," *Morgenbladet*, 2011, [http://morgenbladet.no/ideer/2011/muslimsk\\_flertall\\_i\\_norge](http://morgenbladet.no/ideer/2011/muslimsk_flertall_i_norge).

29. Directorate of Immigration and Diversity (IMDi) report, *Integreringsbarometeret 2010—Holdninger til innvandrere, innvandring og integrering* (Oslo: Author, 2011), <http://www.imdi.no/no/Kunnskapsbasen/Innholdstyper/Rapporter/2011/Integreringsbarometeret-2010/>. In the questionnaire, respondents were given the following statements and questions (translated by the authors): "To what extent does the following statement correspond to your views? Statement: Immigration constitutes a serious threat against a common set of values in Norway. Very well. Well. Poorly. Not at all." Question: "Do you think that the values of Islam are compatible with the basic values of Norwegian society? Yes, completely compatible. Yes, partly compatible. No, mainly incompatible. No, completely incompatible. Not sure."

30. Directorate of Immigration and Diversity (IMDi) report 4–2010, *Integreringsbarometeret 2009: Holdninger til innvandring, integrering og mangfold* (Oslo: Author, 2010), <http://www.imdi.no/Documents/Rapporter/Integreringsbarometeret2009.pdf>. Respondents were asked the following question: "To what extent does the following statement correspond to your views? Statement: Muslim immigration should be limited. Very well. Well. Poorly. Not at all."

31. Diani and Bison define social movements as "networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups, or associations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity"; Mario Diani and Ivano Bison, "Organizations, Coalitions, and Movements," *Theory and Society* 33, no. 3 (2004): 281–309, 282. The collective identity and the shared rhetoric are pivotal for a framing analysis. For a presentation of the network relations between the various Norwegian anti-Islamic SMOs see figure 6.4.1; <https://bora.uib.no/bitstream/handle/1956/4905/82634079.pdf?sequence=1>.

32. Mark Sedgwick, "Something Varied in the State of Denmark: Neo-nationalism, Anti-Islamic Activism and Street-level Thuggery," *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 14, no. 2 (2013): 208–233.

33. We use the term anti-Islamic and not anti-Islamism based on an analysis of the various actors' views of Islam as a political ideology. Their views indicate that they are negative towards Islam in general, and not only Islamism, as it is generally understood. Use of the term anti-Islamic can be problematized, as some of the more moderate elements convey a more nuanced view on Islam, wherein they state, for instance, that one's religiosity should be contained within the private sphere.

34. In the parliamentary elections of 2009, the Progress Party garnered 22.9% of the popular vote.

35. The Progress Party cannot be described solely as an anti-Islamic actor, precisely because it is a multi-issue political party. This is in line with Sedgwick's perspective on the Danish People's Party (see note 32 above) in his analysis of anti-Islamic activism in Denmark, where he distinguishes between the many varieties of anti-Islamic opposition.

36. Bernt Aardal, ed., *Det politiske landskap. En studie av stortingsvalget 2009* (Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2011), 119.

37. Although Breivik cites the anti-Islamic Norwegian blogger Fjordman frequently, Fjordman is not included in this analysis because he is mainly active on foreign websites and thus not part of what we define as the Norwegian anti-Islamic movement.

38. Mark Sedgwick, "The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 4 (2010): 479–494, notes that the use of the term radical can be problematic as it is used in a variety of ways and that without a specific description of one's use, it will remain unclear as to how the term is applied.

39. The Progress Party is typically placed in the populist right "party family"; see, for example, Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007); Elisabeth Ivarsson, "Immigration Policy and Party Organization: Explaining the Rise of the Populist Right in Western Europe" (PhD dissertation, Department of Politics and International Relations and Nuffield College, University of Oxford, 2005). However, Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, 48 defines the Progress Party as an outlier in the European context because of its lack of emphasis on nativism, among other reasons.

40. Radicalization does not necessarily lead to violence, and one should distinguish between violent and non-violent radicalization. See for instance Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan, eds., *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement* (London: Routledge, 2008); John Horgan, *Walking Away From Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements* (London: Routledge, 2009), 152; John and Kurt Braddock, "Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 1–25. For a discussion on the conceptual use of radicalization, see Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller, "The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24, no. 1 (2012): 1–21.

41. Bat Ye'or, *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis* (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2005).

42. The perception of Breivik as behaving unpleasantly and being an outsider is supported by different sources that either knew or had met him. For instance one participant at the website Document.no's meetings characterized Breivik as an "unpopular person" and a "lone island" that they distanced themselves from to the police, while a leader of the Norwegian Centre against Racism (ARS) also said she knew of him from monitoring online extremism and that "He has been viewed as a weirdo with clear ideologies—but without any backing"; [http://www.dagbladet.no/2012/04/09/nyheter/anders\\_behring\\_breivik/terrorangrepet/utenriks/islamkritikk/20667914/](http://www.dagbladet.no/2012/04/09/nyheter/anders_behring_breivik/terrorangrepet/utenriks/islamkritikk/20667914/); <http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/22-juli/artikkel.php?artid=10080682>.

43. Liz Fekete, "The Muslim Conspiracy Theory and the Oslo Massacre," *Race & Class* 53 (2012): 30–47, describes it not as a movement, but rather as a broad political spectrum ranging from online counter-jihadists to neoconservative and conservative commentators and politicians.

44. Mary Conway, *From al-Zarqawi to al-Awlaki: The Emergence of the Internet as a New Form of Violent Radical Milieu* (posted to ISODARCO website, 2012), [http://www.isodarco.it/courses/andalo12/doc/Zarqawi%20to%20Awlaki\\_V2.pdf](http://www.isodarco.it/courses/andalo12/doc/Zarqawi%20to%20Awlaki_V2.pdf); Toby Archer, "Breivik's Swamp: Was the Oslo Killer Radicalized by What He Read Online?," *Foreign Policy*, May/June (2011), [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/25/breivik\\_s\\_swamp?page=0,1](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/25/breivik_s_swamp?page=0,1).

45. Ye'or, *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis* (see note 41 above).

46. E.g., Robert Spencer, *The Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam (and the Crusades)* (Washington, DC: Regnery Press, 2005); Robert Spencer, *The Truth About Muhammad: Founder of the World's Most Intolerant Religion* (Washington, DC: Regnery Press, 2006).

47. We do not use the term *counter-jihadist*, even though this is how many belonging to the radical fringe describe themselves. Opposition to Islam, Muslim culture, and immigration is a broader phenomenon encompassing political parties and "mainstream" SMOs.

48. He cites Robert Spencer 64 times and Fjordman 111 times, incorporating several of Fjordman's texts primarily in the second part of the Manifesto.

49. For instance, in the beginning of the Manifesto, Breivik plagiarizes large parts of the writings by Ted Kaczynski, also known as the Unabomber.

50. Three of the interviews were with representatives of “mainstream” anti-Islamic organizations: the Progress Party, the HRS, and the *Document.no* website. The other three interviews were with representatives of fringe groups: the *Honestthinking.org* website, the organization SIAN, and Kristenfolket (The Christian People), which represents the rightist faction of the Christian Democratic Party.

51. Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements” (see note 19 above).

52. *Ibid.*, 617.

53. The term *snikislamisering* or “sneak Islamization” was propelled into the general debate when Siv Jensen, the leader of the Progress Party, began using it during the election campaign in 2009. Her use of this term was met with heavy criticism and sparked a long-running public debate. The Progress Party’s immigration spokesperson bragged about coining the term in our interview with him.

54. An interview with the spokesperson for the HRS on the American, conservative, anti-Islamic webpage *Frontpagemag.com*, whose contributors include Bernard Lewis and the Norwegian blogger called Fjordman: <http://frontpagemag.com/2011/05/02/is-europe-doomed/>

55. The HRS stands out in this regard as the sole SMO that does not explicitly single out the Labour Party.

56. Authors’ translation. This excerpt is from an article by the leader of the Progress Party in Oslo titled “Drøm fra Disneyland” (Dream from Disneyland), <http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikker/article3783373.ece>.

57. Interviews with the spokesperson for the Progress Party and the editor of the *Document.no* website.

58. See e.g., SIAN’s pamphlet; [http://www.sian.no/sites/default/files/file/brochure\\_1.pdf](http://www.sian.no/sites/default/files/file/brochure_1.pdf).

59. Such as in this demographic analysis on the website *Document.no*: <http://www.document.no/2012/11/demografiske-endringer-i-tidsrommet-2004-2012/>.

60. Gamson, “The Social Psychology of Collective Action” (see note 15 above).

61. Interviews with the spokesperson of the HRS (October 4, 2010) and the leader of SIAN (October 1, 2010).

62. Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements” (see note 19 above).

63. Interview with the spokesperson for the Progress Party (September 30, 2010).

64. *Ibid.*

65. The HRS is the SMO that most clearly advocates an emphasis on teaching about democracy in schools, for which it has argued in several articles, as well as in our interview with its representatives (October 4, 2010).

66. Interview with the leader of SIAN (October 1, 2010).

67. For this purpose, the HRS has published several reports on the rate of immigration and population growth based on datasets from Statistics Norway (SSB).

68. Interview with the editor of *Document.no* (September 29, 2010).

69. Interviews with the spokesperson for the Progress Party, the HRS, and editor of *Document.no*.

70. Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements” (see note 19 above), 619.

71. Gamson, “The Social Psychology of Collective Action” (see note 15 above).

72. Interview with the spokesperson of the Progress Party (September 30, 2010).

73. Interview with the leader of SIAN (October 1, 2010).

74. This vocabulary illustrates the many similarities between the anti-Islamic framing and the rhetoric of the anti-immigrant extremists in Norway and Denmark in the 80s and 90s; Bjørge, “Extreme Nationalism and Violent Discourses in Scandinavia” (see note 14 above).

75. Interview with the leader of the rightist faction of the Christian Democratic Party (September 21, 2010). The number 3000 refers to the victims of 9/11.

76. Francesca Polletta, Pang Ching Bobby Chen, Beth Gharrity Gardner, and Alice Motes, “The Sociology of Storytelling,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 37 (2011): 109–130.

77. Francesca Polletta and John Lee, "Is Telling Stories Good for Democracy? Rhetoric in Public Deliberation after 9/11," *American Sociological Review* 71 (2006): 699–723.

78. Ye'or, *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis* (see note 41 above).

79. In the rest of the analysis, references to Breivik's Manifesto are given only by page number.

80. PCCTS is the acronym for the organization to which Breivik claims to belong in the Manifesto (and also in police interrogations and during the trial), but in this particular quote he describes the organization as fictional (which it probably is).

81. Along the lines of the "oppression" of white, Christian men, Breivik also espouses clearly anti-feminist views, as documented by Stephen J. Walton, "Anti-feminism and Mysogyny in Breivik's 'Manifesto,'" *Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research* 21, no. 1 (2012): 4–11.

82. Reputational shield as a concept was first devised by the political scientist Elisabeth Ivarsflaten in her study of right-wing parties in Europe; Ivarsflaten, "Immigration Policy and Party Organization" (see note 39 above). The concept refers to how the only right-wing parties that have been able to succeed electorally are those that not only focus on immigration, but also include other political concerns such as law and order, economic liberalization, and welfare.

83. The key words identifying nonviolent solutions were: non-violent, political campaign, reputational shield, female spokesperson, rhetorical strategy, fact based argument, deconstruct, toning down rhetoric, strategic rhetoric, education, objective truth, educating Muslims, educating non-Muslims, school system, school agenda, correct rhetoric, secondary platform, Norwegian model, successful movement, mass movement, conservative movement, youth movement, Young Europeans, Christian European Renaissance movement, Cultural conservative student organization, cultural defence, distribute, student organization, common man, common sense, uncensored history, UN, inclusive, judging, ban Muslim, ban immigration, sociology, character assassination, newspaper, blog.

The key words identifying violent solutions were: assassination, civil-war, non-democratic, armed resistance, military action, military coup, military force, military power, traitor, European Resistance Movement, PCCT, Knights Templar, shock attack, deprive Muslim, arm themselves, punish, execute, guerilla, lynch, biological, mass destruction. All keywords were checked qualitatively to see if they indicated political solutions and only if they did were they included.

84. <http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/22-juli/tidslinjeabb/>.

85. Breivik envisages his Manifesto as an attempt to unify "1. Militant cultural conservatives, 2. militant 'right wing' liberals, militant Christian extremists, militant ethno-centrists and other groups" (p. 1117).

86. Christian Leuprecht, Todd Hataley, Sophia Moskalenko, and Clark McCauley, "Winning the Battle but Losing the War? Narrative and Counter-Narratives Strategy," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 3, no. 2 (2009): 25–35, 26.

87. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

88. In an op-ed piece in the *New York Times*, Thomas Hegghammer, a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment in Oslo, describes Breivik as a new kind of macro-nationalist, arguing that he has more in common with Al Qaeda than with traditional right-wing nationalism, [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/opinion/sunday/the-rise-of-the-macro-nationalists.html?\\_r=1&ref=andersbehringbreivik](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/opinion/sunday/the-rise-of-the-macro-nationalists.html?_r=1&ref=andersbehringbreivik).

89. William A. Gamson and David S. Meyer, "Framing Political Opportunity," in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 275–290.

90. The two pairs of psychiatrists in the trial diagnosed him either as being paranoid schizophrenic or as having a narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.

91. <http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/Skjerper-nettovervaking-av-hoyreekstreme-6284793.html>.

92. Hewitt, *Understanding Terrorism in America* (see note 8 above); Spaaij, "The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism" (see note 3 above).

93. On August 24, 2012, Breivik was found sane and sentenced to 21 years in prison, with the possibility of indefinite extension on a five-year basis. As opposed to the first court-appointed psychiatric evaluation, the court argued that although Breivik had mental problems, the terrorist attacks were a product of extremist right-wing and anti-Islamic ideology and an act of political violence. The verdict can be viewed in full online at <http://www.domstol.no/upload/DA/Internett/domstol.no/Aktuelt/2012/toslo-2011-188627-24.pdf>.

94. Beck, "The Contribution of Social Movement Theory" (see note 12 above), 12.

95. It is important not to overstate the similarities, beyond parts of the rhetoric, between Behring Breivik and other anti-Islamic actors. This study can nonetheless be seen as an effort to integrate and increase the dialogue between research on terrorism and other fields of social science, by broadening the scope beyond a singular focus on perpetrators of terrorism, as well as contributing to the interdisciplinary methodological conversation surrounding terrorism studies. For an analysis of the benefits an interdisciplinary perspective can bring, see Michael J. Boyle, "Progress and Pitfalls in the Study of Political Violence," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24, no. 4 (2012): 527–543, 529.

96. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power: In Science, Nature, Society and Art* (New York: Random House, 1968), 267, 283.

97. Chantal Mouffe, *On the Political* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005).