


This article was downloaded by: [University of Connecticut]

On: 28 October 2014, At: 11:18

Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



## Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uter20>

### Analysis of Jihadi Terrorism Incidents in Western Europe, 2001-2010

Javier Jordan <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Department of Political Science , University of Granada , Granada , Spain

Published online: 23 Apr 2012.

To cite this article: Javier Jordan (2012) Analysis of Jihadi Terrorism Incidents in Western Europe, 2001-2010, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35:5, 382-404, DOI: [10.1080/1057610X.2012.666822](https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2012.666822)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2012.666822>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

## Research Note

# Analysis of *Jihadi* Terrorism Incidents in Western Europe, 2001–2010

JAVIER JORDAN

Department of Political Science  
University of Granada  
Granada, Spain

*This article offers a descriptive analysis of jihadi terrorist activity in Western Europe during the years 2001–2010. Following collection and classification, the information has been analyzed using the following variables: target countries, terrorist method used, stays in training camps, links to organizations, and degree of completion of the terrorist incidents.*

This article offers a descriptive analysis of *jihadi* terrorist activity during the last decade. For this purpose, a sample of 85 incidents has been used, including foiled conspiracies and actual attacks (failed or successful) perpetrated in Western Europe. The sample attempts to cover all incidents reported in the media and constitutes a very high percentage of the full study universe.

The research draws partly on Peter Nesser's *Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994–2007*, although adding new incidents.<sup>1</sup> Following collection and classification, the information was analyzed using the following variables: target countries, terrorist method used, stays in training camps, links to organizations, and degree of completion of the terrorist incidents.

### Classification of Incidents

Appendix 1 sets out the sample used, with the incidents ordered by date and by the country where the group was disrupted or the attack took place. Also indicated is the target, the method used, the location of the training camp used by cell members and the degree of completion of the incident (disrupted, failed, or executed).

Received 7 June 2011; accepted 20 November 2011.

The content of this article is part of the research project CSO2010-17849 “International Terrorism’s Organizational Structure: Analysis of its Evolution and Implications for the European Security” funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation.

Address correspondence to Javier Jordan, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Political Science and Sociology, University of Granada, Calle Rector Lopez Argueta, 418071-Granada, Spain. E-mail: jjordan@ugr.es

Depending on the extent of verification, incidents have been divided into two categories. Category 1 covers incidents where the attack was executed (regardless of whether it failed or succeeded) or where the terrorist conspiracy, having been disrupted in time by police, led to a conviction evidencing the seriousness of the plans and preparation of the attack. Category 2 covers incidents not matching the criteria for Category 1. Over half correspond to Category 1 (56 compared to 29), thus confirming the validity of the sample chosen.

The sample does not include acts of violence in retaliation for police actions. This category is not the same as terrorist plots, which by nature require various stages, from the planning to the actual execution. Retaliatory actions include the murder of detective Steven Oake by Kamel Bourgass during a police search of a house in Manchester in January 2003;<sup>2</sup> the death of a member of the special operations unit of the Spanish police in a suicide blast at a flat occupied by members of the group responsible for the Madrid bombings of 11 March 2004;<sup>3</sup> and the shoot-out between Hofstad members and Dutch police in November 2004, in which five officers were wounded.<sup>4</sup>

For their part, actions carried out by the same cell on different days have been classified as separate incidents. By way of example, the group behind the Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004 planted a device on the Madrid-Seville high-speed train several weeks later.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, the seven separate incidents involving members of Hofstad between 2003 and 2005, four incidents perpetrated by the Italian convert Domenico Quaranta<sup>6</sup> and two incidents attributed to the group, which planted two car bombs in London on the night of 28–29 June 2007 and then crashed a burning jeep into the terminal building at Glasgow Airport on 30 June.<sup>7</sup>

Lastly, incidents such as terrorist threats and alerts not resulting in the arrest of the alleged plotters have not been taken into account. However, it has been counted as an incident the so-called Europlot in the autumn of 2010, when terrorists apparently tried to recreate in Germany, France, and Britain a similar scenario to the Mumbai hostage-taking in November 2008. The reason for this is that a man allegedly linked to the plot was arrested in Afghanistan in July of 2010 (hence the date under which this is listed in Appendix 1 is July 2010) and in October a strike by drones in Pakistan killed three terrorists said to have been plotting to carry out the attacks.<sup>8</sup>

## Countries Targeted

Global *jihadi* terrorism in Western Europe is not materialized uniformly. A core group of countries can be discerned that are particularly affected by global terrorism, based on the number of conspiracies executed or disrupted within their borders and the number of individuals arrested for alleged terrorist links. These countries include, first and foremost, Britain, followed some distance behind by, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, Denmark, and Belgium.

Figure 1 is very revealing. It shows that the biggest impact of *jihadi* terrorism is seen in Britain, the target for the highest number of attacks, all but two of them belonging to Category 1. Among the hypotheses that could be put forward for this situation are the following: (1) an extensive Islamic community, thus increasing the likelihood of violent, *jihadi*-inspired radicalization; (2) at the same time, a substantial presence of individuals of Pakistani descent, many of them with permanent ties to their country of origin. Various *jihadi* groups operate in Pakistan, including Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Tehrik-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and even Al Qaeda Central, which is not only hostile toward the West but also possesses active logistics networks among Europe's Pakistani diaspora<sup>9</sup>; (3) for years Britain was relatively tolerant toward the presence and activities of global *jihadism* militants




Figure 1. Countries targeted by incidents.

and media personalities. This stance toughened after 9/11 and particularly after the July 2005 London bombings. By then, however, the seeds of radicalism had taken firm root and it is difficult to eradicate them in a short period of time<sup>10</sup>; (4) Britain is the main ally of the United States, a commitment manifested in its support and armed involvement in Afghanistan since 2001, as well as in the controversial war in Iraq in 2003. British backing for Washington has extended far beyond purely political gestures and has been materialized in the form of thousands of troops deployed in combat missions, which is why *jihadi* discourse singles out Britain (both the government and the civilian population) as an enemy of Islam; (5) lastly, as occurs in other countries, Britain's antiterrorist response (intelligence work, arrests and convictions) is interpreted by the radicals as persecution of Muslims.

A second point of note is the large number of plots against American interests in Europe, particularly those of a diplomatic or military nature, which is consistent with the anti-Americanism of *jihadi* terrorism propaganda and strategy.

Thirdly, a group of countries that are affected more or less to the same degree, in numerical terms, by terrorist activity can be distinguished: Italy, France, Germany, Spain, and Belgium. All five share common features: (1) a sizeable Muslim community, including a small but significant minority susceptible to violent radicalization; (2) continuous activity over many years by *jihadi* cells, which fosters the maintenance and reproduction of social networks that lend themselves to radicalism; (3) an antiterrorist response that, as in Britain, is

perceived as constituting hostility toward Muslims generally and the *mujahidin* specifically; (4) a military presence in Afghanistan and, in the case of Spain and Italy, government support for the war in Iraq in 2003 (even though Spain's support ended with the change of government in March 2004).

Also among the countries worst affected by terrorist incidents are the Netherlands and Denmark, who merit special mention. In the case of the former, six out of the eight incidents, including the assassination of film director Theo Van Gogh, involved members of the Hofstad group and were perpetrated in 2004–2005. Terrorist activity in the country is therefore confined largely to the history of this group. Denmark is a special case too in that, of the six incidents recorded, five are associated with the publication of cartoons on Mohammed during 2009 and 2010. Moreover, only one of the five involved a resident of Denmark. In the remaining cases the alleged terrorists travelled, or intended to travel, from other countries.

Lastly, a small sub-group of incidents targeting the interests of non-European countries whose governments are classified as enemies in *jihadi* discourse can be identified: Saudi Arabia, China, Iraq, Israel, and Russia. The incident involving Iraqi interests was the plot, broken up in December 2004, to kill Premier Ayad Allawi during a visit to Germany.<sup>11</sup> Two plots against Israeli interests can be added to the three against Jewish targets (synagogues and a Jewish museum).<sup>12</sup> However, despite the anti-Semitism and alleged importance of the liberation of Palestine in the global *jihadi* discourse, the very low number of conspiracies against Israeli interests in Europe is striking, particularly when compared to the dozens of planned and actual attacks carried out by Palestinian militants in Europe during the 1970s and first half of the 1980s.<sup>13</sup>

### Choice of Targets

A number of remarks are appropriate with regard to Figure 2, which gives the classification of incident targets. In the first place, the preference shown by this terrorism for indiscriminate and highly lethal strikes against soft targets is confirmed. This is the case of incidents falling under the general "Public" target category, together with those aimed at urban transport, trains, or religious buildings (synagogues/churches).

A category that is not normally associated with *jihadi* terrorism waged in the West but that occupies second place in the study sample are incidents targeting specific individuals, for the most part public figures. In most cases the attacks are in retaliation for alleged offense caused to Islam by the target: Theo Van Gogh, the Minister of Parliament (MP) of Somali origin Ayanna Hirsi Ali, and other prominent Dutch nationals targeted by Hoftsad;<sup>14</sup> the various cartoonists whose caricatures were considered offensive to Mohammed.<sup>15</sup> In this regard, the Mohammed caricature related plots have been listed as a separate category, which were aimed at specific individuals or the headquarters of the newspaper that published the cartoons.

A third aspect of note is the fixation with civil aviation targets, both airports and passenger aircraft. Although not new to *jihadi* terrorism, the choice of such targets may be inspired by the symbolism of 9/11, particularly in view of the international media impact of such attacks, bearing in mind that the victims tend to be from more than one country, and the damage caused to the national and international economy by air traffic disruption.

Other more symbolic targets are those of a diplomatic, military, or religious (Christian churches or synagogues) nature and the plots against state security installations or personnel




Figure 2. Targets chosen by terrorist incidents.


in certain European countries (police, intelligence services, the judiciary or the prison system).

### Terrorist Method

Approximately two thirds of the perpetrators of terrorist incidents used, or planned to use, explosives (see Figure 3). A long way behind—as the second choice of weapon—come firearms, a finding that coincides only partially with the results of broader studies on terrorists' weapon preferences, which indicate a higher proportion of firearms (29 percent in comparison to 9 percent in *jihadi* terror incidents in Western Europe).<sup>16</sup>

Within the category of explosives, homemade bombs occupy a prominent place. *Jihadis* trust that the instructions received in training camps, or even downloaded from the Internet, will equip them to build explosive devices using materials freely available on the market. In theory this is not a far-fetched aspiration, given that the London bombings of 7 July 2005 were carried out with devices of this type, as were highly lethal attacks by *jihadi* terrorists in other parts of the world, including Bali (2002), Casablanca, and the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta (both 2003). In most cases where open sources reveal the type used, the explosives have been triacetone triperoxide (TATP).

In other cases the terrorists acquired or intended to acquire industrial explosives, such as C4 or Goma 2, as in the March 2004 Madrid train bombings. However, in view of the difficulties in procuring this type of explosive and the risk of discovery during the transaction, the perpetrators of incidents tend to opt mainly for explosives they can make themselves.




**Figure 3.** Weapons chosen for terrorist incidents.

In second place, a long way behind, come firearms, as in the assassination of Theo Van Gogh in November 2004. The lack of preference for firearms in terrorist incidents in Europe can probably be accounted for by the high lethality and greater media and psychological impact of bombings. Although easier to plan and execute if the victim is defenceless or caught unawares, attacks with knives or guns tend to attract little attention from the international media unless the target is a highly symbolic one (such as Theo Van Gogh or Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard, who was attacked in January 2010) or the actual execution of the attack is particularly atrocious and capable of drawing media attention due to the outrage or morbid fascination generated: for example, the attempted abduction of a Muslim British soldier in Birmingham in 2007, who was to be beheaded him in front of a camera and the video posted on Internet.<sup>17</sup>

Thirdly come incidents involving the planned manufacture and use of toxic substances. In the cases of the so-called Chechen network in France in December 2002 and January 2004 and the Kamel Bourgas network in Britain in January 2003, the substance was ricin although in none of the incidents were the amounts significant or was the ricin processed properly.<sup>18</sup> In another case, the terrorists allegedly intended to use cyanide in a foiled plot against the U.S. embassy in Rome in January 2002.<sup>19</sup> A case where no information was published in the international media is that of an Iraqi arrested in Belgium in June 2003 for sending letters containing toxic substances to the Belgian prime minister, to the embassies of the United States, Britain, and Saudi Arabia, and to several companies.<sup>20</sup>

Lastly, there are two cases where plotters attempted to procure a rocket launcher (RPG) and a hand-held anti-aircraft missile (MANPAD) to bring down civilian aircraft during take-off or landing. The first plot was disrupted in Switzerland in May 2006 and the



**Figure 4.** Countries where terrorists attended a training camp or participated in *jihadi* insurgency.

second in Britain in November 2005. In neither case did the terrorists manage to obtain the weapon.<sup>21</sup>

### Time at Training Camps or *Jihad* Fronts Abroad

In 56 of the 85 cases analyzed (two thirds of the study sample), there is no evidence that group members spent time at a training camp or at *jihadi* insurgency locations outside Western Europe, where operational planning, weapons handling and explosive-making skills are supposedly taught. In 29 cases at least one group member spent time at a training camp (see Figure 4).

Central Asia is, by far, the region that emerges most frequently as a training camp or *jihadi* insurgency location. Furthermore, Pakistan is found to be more important in this respect than Afghanistan during the second half of the decade, although in some cases, such as the conspiracy disrupted in Belgium in December 2008, some members had also received training in Afghanistan and taken part in attacks on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops there.<sup>22</sup>

The groups where at least one member has been to the Caucasus (Chechnya or the Pankisi Gorges in Georgia) are of Maghrebi origin (particularly Algerian) even if some have been dubbed “Chechen networks” by the media.<sup>23</sup> Despite the existence of training and guerrilla warfare camps in Algeria and the Sahel, there is only one recorded incident where a member received instruction in a camp in the former country: the plot to blow up the Milan Underground and targets in Paris, which was broken up in Italy and Morocco in March 2006.<sup>24</sup>

The negligible importance of Iraq in this regard is striking. One of the fears of European security agencies was the arrival in Europe of a new generation of terrorists who were veterans of Iraqi insurgency. However, the only plot where there was evidence of a stay in the country was the failed attack in Stockholm in December 2010. In this case, however, it

was not a former insurgency fighter but an individual who was radicalized in Britain and traveled to Iraq to receive training by the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).<sup>25</sup>

### Links to *Jihadi* Organizations

It is interesting to analyze which proportion of cells involved in terrorist incidents maintained links with Al Qaeda or other *jihadi* organizations, and to consider the ties between the different groups.

This article distinguishes between linked and non-linked actors. The former category refers to cells that, according to police or judicial sources quoted in the media, are linked in some way to a broader organization. Given the large number of cases in the sample, in-depth study of the nature of these links is beyond the scope of this article. In some instances, it is clear that the individuals or cells were subordinate to the parent organization, receiving from the latter instructions, training and on occasions even the actual explosives. This is the case, for instance, of Richard Reid, who planned to blow up a transatlantic flight in December 2001.<sup>26</sup> The Reid plot was supposed to be replicated by Saajid Badat, although he backed out of the planned suicide bombing and broke off with Al Qaeda, even though he kept the explosives at his home. He was arrested in December 2003 in Britain and sentenced to 13 years in jail in 2005.<sup>27</sup>

In other cases it is more difficult to establish the nature of the relationship, as occurs with the various cells linked to the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), such as the “Chechen network” broken up by France in December 2002 and January 2004,<sup>28</sup> or the cell dismantled in Spain in November 2005.<sup>29</sup> Although the judicial investigation points clearly to a link, with the available information in open sources there is no way of knowing for certain which type of relationship existed.

The informal ties established between militants belonging to different groups and the inclusion of elements of global  *jihadism*  on the political agendas of organizations such as the GSPC, the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP), or Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) help account for the connections between a given cell and a number of different organizations. For example, the cell behind the Madrid bombings of March 2004 had links with GICM and Al Qaeda,<sup>30</sup> while the plotters who planned to bomb the Barcelona Underground in January 2008 had links to TTP and Al Qaeda.<sup>31</sup>

Turning to non-linked actors, the article distinguishes here between independent cells and lone wolves. Independent cells are groups of individuals who have no links to a higher organization, even though some members may have tenuous ties with colleagues from cells that do have links and may themselves have been part of an organization at some previous time. This latter case applies to some independent cells that include former members of the Islamic Armed Group (GIA) during the 1990s. Examples include the cell disrupted in France in October 2001, which allegedly plotted to strike during a football game between France and Algeria at the Stade de France or the cell broken up in Spain in October 2004, which planned to attack the National Criminal Court in Madrid.<sup>32</sup>

The lack of open source information can result occasionally in some cases considered here being classified as independent cells when, in fact, they have links to a higher organization. However, for reasons of clarity and rigor this article has opted to classify as independent cells all groups for which no reliable information concerning ties with other *jihadi* organizations is available.

The term “lone wolves” denotes individuals who, following radicalization, decide to carry out a terrorist attack on their own initiative. Occasionally these individuals suffer from social adjustment/psychiatric problems as, for example, in the cases of Andrew Ibrahim





Figure 5. Evolution of links to organizations.

and Nicky Reilly in Britain in April and May 2008, respectively.<sup>33</sup> Since these are acts of violence committed for political aims they are, by nature, acts of terrorism and are therefore taken into account in this study. In 41 cases there is evidence to suggest ties with a higher organization, whereas in 44 the available information points to independent cells (29) or individuals acting in isolation, so-called lone wolves (15 incidents).

As Figure 5 shows, whereas at the beginning of the decade *jihadi* terrorism is associated with groups linked to parent organizations, as of 2003 an increase is seen in the number of incidents perpetrated by independent groups or individuals (four of these in 2001 and 2002 were perpetrated by the same person, the Italian convert Domenico Quaranta). The increase has been more or less sustained since then, with such cases outnumbering in 2006 and 2007 incidents associated with more complex organizations. Although a detailed study would be warranted for each case, one hypothesis for the increased importance of independent groups is the mobilization triggered by the war in Iraq and the increased propaganda activity—especially audiovisual—promoted by the organization led by Abu Musab Al Zarqawi.<sup>34</sup> Other factors include the development of *jihadi* forums and the emergence of other very successful figures in radical environments, among them Anwar Al Awlaki.<sup>35</sup> It is interesting to note that, prior to 2005, there was only three “lone wolf” cases (one of them, Domenico Quaranta), compared to nine during the second half of the decade. Meanwhile, 12 incidents were perpetrated by independent cells in the first half of the decade (7 of these by the Hofstad Group) and 17 in the second.

The study sample also underlines the importance throughout the decade of cells having ties with broader organizations, a circumstance that points to a mixed or polymorphous scenario in terms of organizational structure.<sup>36</sup>

Also seen is an evolution in the affiliation of cells to the various *jihadi* organizations. During the first half of the decade, affiliation was restricted largely to Al Qaeda Central, to



**Figure 6.** Links between plots 2001–2005. Incidents are shown by target country and the date of the first arrest linked to the incident. In cases where the target country is unknown, the country of the arrest is given (see Appendix 1). (Color figure available online).

networks associated with Al Zarqawi in Iraq or to the Maghrebi GSPC or GICM networks. As of 2006, however, new organizations emerged on the European scene, among them Al Shabab, TTP, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), and LeT, thus evidencing the incorporation of globalist elements in the political agenda of these groups, as noted earlier.

Figures 6 and 7 help illustrate the complexity of the *jihadi* structures behind the incidents studied and the differences between the first and second half of the decade 2001–2010.

During the first half of the decade, 24 cases involved groups with links to higher organizations and, often, to other cells also intending to strike in Western Europe, and 18 cases involved non-linked cells and individuals. However, the picture changes in the second half of the decade. On the one hand it can be seen an increase in and greater country diversity of incidents perpetrated by cells and individuals with no specific or identified links to a *jihadi* organization (shown on the right of Figure 7). An increase is seen also in the number of organizations with which cells have links. Geographically, these organizations are no longer confined to the Maghreb, Iraq or Al Qaeda Central's refuge in Afghanistan/Pakistan, but also in Yemen and Somalia.



**Table 1**  
Degree of Completion

|           | Disrupted | Failed | Executed | Overall |
|-----------|-----------|--------|----------|---------|
| 2001–2005 | 31        | 8      | 3        | 42      |
| 2006–2010 | 32        | 11     | 0        | 43      |

likely to reach the final stages of the conspiracy. However, their lack of professionalism and the absence of expert support limit the efficacy of their actions.<sup>38</sup> Finally, as Table 3 shows, the most lethal attacks are clearly associated with linked cells.

### Closing Considerations

The pages above have combined descriptive analysis and data. This last section restates some of the main conclusions. Several of these are already known or are easy to surmise, although the contribution of the present article is that it provides support for them in the shape of a representative empirical study.

The first conclusion is that, although *jihadi* terrorism affects a small group of countries in particular—Britain foremost among them—in practice the threat extends to the rest of the countries of Western Europe, either because *jihadis* intend to strike against them or because they are used as a base from which to hatch terrorist plots against foreign interests or neighboring countries.

Concerning the choice of targets, *jihadi* terrorism uses to its advantage the fact that targets that are by nature “soft” are impossible to protect: locations requiring rapid and easy access, such as shopping malls, busy streets, urban transport, religious buildings, etc. Aware of their vulnerability and the psychological and media impact of such attacks, *jihadi* terrorism has focused largely on these targets. Indeed, the two most important attacks carried out in Europe (Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005) fall into this category.

As the article shows also, *jihadi* terrorism does not rule out more protected targets. A striking aspect is the terrorists’ obsession with civil aviation, which has not diminished despite the increased security. Quite the opposite: the establishment of barriers has been responded to with innovation and the seeking out of new vulnerabilities: explosives hidden in shoes, liquid explosives undetectable by controls, RPG or MANPAD attacks on planes landing or taking off; or simply a blazing car attack on an airport terminal building.

In terms of method, a clear preference is seen for explosives, particularly home-made. A political recommendation arising from this circumstance is the need for vigilance with respect to the sale and procurement of products that might be used to make bombs,

**Table 2**  
Percentage of completion according to category of actor

|                 | Disrupted | Failed | Executed |
|-----------------|-----------|--------|----------|
| Linked cell     | 82.9%     | 12.2%  | 4.9%     |
| Non-linked cell | 79.3%     | 17.3%  | 3.4%     |
| Lone wolf       | 40%       | 60%    | 0%       |

**Table 3**  
Number of casualties in executed terror incidents

|                 | Dead | Injured |
|-----------------|------|---------|
| Linked cell     | 243  | 2.628   |
| Non-linked cell | 1    | —       |

particularly if purchased in significant amounts. Similarly, it is worth monitoring the arrival in Europe of individuals whose time at a training camp has given them potential know-how in this field. The threat posed by such persons is significantly greater than that represented by the bombmaking instructions found in *Inspire* or other documents available on radical websites.<sup>39</sup>

Special attention is merited also by terrorist incidents perpetrated with knives or firearms. These are much easier to carry out if the individual is sufficiently cool-headed to get close to his victim for an attack, as occurred in the murder of Theo Van Gogh or, outside the time frame of this study, the attack on American military personnel in Frankfurt Airport in March 2011.<sup>40</sup> Until now, terrorists have tended to prefer more lethal attacks that generate greater media impact, despite the difficulties encountered in obtaining the explosives. To avoid a change in trend toward simpler attacks, it might be appropriate for the media to exert self-restraint when reporting such actions, should they occur.

The data concerning time spent in training camps show that this practice continues and Afghanistan/Pakistan remain an important scenario in the fight against terrorism beyond Western Europe's borders. It is highly likely that the evolution of terrorism in Europe will be influenced to a considerable degree by events in this region of the world in the coming years.

Lastly, the information on the organizational structures behind the incidents illustrates the plurality and complexity of said structures. The tendency noted in the second half of the decade indicates an increase in the number of groups acting on their own initiative, either as independent cells or as lone wolves, whose numbers have also increased considerably.

Nonetheless, the latter half of the decade demonstrates the continued importance of complex organizations.<sup>41</sup> Although in numerical terms they played a lesser role (24 incidents involving linked cells in 2001–2005, compared to 17 in 2006–2010), the number of major organizations associated with attacks doubled (four in the first half, eight in the second). This situation can be interpreted as reflecting a loss of capacity on the part of Al Qaeda Central and the North African organizations (GSPC and GICM),<sup>42</sup> although this has been offset by the emergence of new actors on the European scene who—acting independently or in joint operations with Al Qaeda Central—keep the terrorist threat alive.

## Notes

1. Petter Nesser, "Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994–2007: Planned, Prepared, and Executed Terrorist Attacks," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 31 (2008), pp. 924–946. Another interesting compilation of terror incidents in Europe can be found in Lorenzo Vidino, *Radicalization, Linkage, and Diversity. Current Trends in Terrorism in Europe* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2011), 12–13.

2. "Courage of Dead Policeman Praised," *BBC News*, 13 April 2005.

3. "Un policía muerto al inmolarse tres terroristas islámicos en Leganés," *El País*, 3 April 2004.

4. "Dutch Jail 'Terror Group' Muslims," *BBC News*, 10 March 2006.
5. "Descubierta una bomba del mismo explosivo del 11-M en las vías del AVE Madrid-Sevilla," *El País*, 3 April 2004.
6. "Arrestato presunto responsabile attentati Milano e Agrigento," *La Repubblica*, 17 July 2002; Lorenzo Vidino, *Al Qaeda in Europe. The New Battleground of International Jihad* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2006), p. 30.
7. Lorenzo Vidino, "The Hofstad Group: The New Face of Terrorist Networks in Europe," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 32 (2009), pp. 1–17; "Two Car Bombs Found in West End," *BBC News*, 29 June 2007; "Blazing Car Crashes into Airport," *BBC News*, 30 June 2007.
8. "Al-Qaida Said to be Planning European Hostage-Takings," *Der Spiegel*, 27 October 2010.
9. Pilar Pozo, *La Guerra de Af-Pakistán y el Uso de la Fuerza en las Relaciones Internacionales* (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2011).
10. Alison Pargeter, *The New Frontiers of Jihad. Radical Islam in Europe* (London: I.B Tauris, 2008), pp. 140–165.
11. "Iraqis Convicted of Allawi Assassination Plot," *Der Spiegel*, 15 July 2008.
12. "Germany Convicts Terror Plotters," *BBC News*, 26 October 2005; "Swiss foiled hit on Israeli Jet," *BBC News*, 8 June 2006; "Bhatti frifunnet for Terror," *Aftenposten*, 3 June 2008.
13. Bruce Hoffman, *Recent Trends in Palestinian Terrorism* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1984).
14. Vidino, "The Hofstad Group," pp. 1–17.
15. "Selbstmord nach versuchtem Angriff auf Chefredakteur der 'Welt,'" *Der Spiegel*, 5 May 2006; "'Jihad Jane' Pleads Guilty To Terror Plot," *Associated Press*, 1 February 2011; "Denmark Cartoon Trial: Kurt Westergaard Attacker Jailed," *BBC News*, 4 February 2011.
16. Brian A. Jackson and David R. Frelinger, "Rifling Through the Terrorists' Arsenal: Exploring Groups' Weapon Choices and Technology Strategies," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 31 (2008), pp. 583–604.
17. "Man Admits Plot to Behead Soldier," *BBC News*, 29 January 2008.
18. "French Terror Plot: 25 Convicted," *CNN*, 14 June 2006; "France Jails Islamists for Eiffel Tower Terror Plot," *The Independent*, 15 June 2006; "Killer Jailed over Poison Plot," *BBC News*, 13 April 2005.
19. "4 Arrested with Cyanide and Rome Water Supply Maps," *Associated Press*, 20 February 2002.
20. "Belgium Holds Iraqi over Toxic Letters," *BBC News*, 5 June 2003.
21. "Swiss 'Foiled Hit on Israeli Jet,'" *BBC News*, 8 June 2006; "Missile Plot Briton Sent to Jail," *BBC News*, 30 April 2007.
22. Paul Cruickshank, "The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA's Terrorist Pipeline," *CTC Sentinel* 2 (2009), pp. 4–8.
23. Andrew McGregor, "'The Chechen Network' on Trial: Terrorist Prosecutions in Paris," *North Caucasus Analysis*, Jamestown Foundation, 7 (2010).
24. "Une cellule terroris- te voulait détruire l'ambassade des États-Unis.," *Maroc Hebdo International*, 7–13 April 2006; Daniel Lav, "The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb: The Evolving Terrorist Presence in North Africa," *MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis Series* 332 (2007).
25. Magnus Ranstorp, "Terrorist Awakening in Sweden?" *CTC Sentinel* 4 (2011), pp. 1–5.
26. "The Bomb Plot; Unrepentant Shoe Bomber is Given a Life Sentence for Trying to Blow Up Jet," *New York Times*, 31 January 2003.
27. "Terror Suspect Admits Plane Plot," *BBC News*, 28 February 2005.
28. "France Jails Islamists for Eiffel Tower Terror Plot," *The Independent*, 15 June 2006; Vidino, *Al Qaeda in Europe*, pp. 173–179.
29. "El juez envía a prisión a cuatro de los 11 detenidos por financiar a un grupo islamista," *El País*, 29 March 2005.
30. Fernando Reinares, "The Madrid Bombings and Global Jihadism," *Survival* 52 (2010), pp. 83–104.

31. Fernando Reinares, "A New Composite Global Terrorism Threat to Western Societies from Pakistan? Making Sense of the January 2008 Suicide Bomb Plot in Barcelona," *Royal Institute Elcano Working Paper* 28 (2010).
32. Petter Nesser, "Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994–2007," p. 930; "El 'comando' del GIA que planeó atentar contra la Audiencia Nacional," *El País*, 27 February 2006.
33. "Bristol Man Guilty of Suicide Bomb Plot on Shopping Centre," *The Guardian*, 17 July 2009; "Nicky Reilly, Muslim Convert, Jailed for 18 Years for Exeter Bomb Attack," *The Times*, 31 January 2009.
34. Manuel R. Torres, Javier Jordán, and Nicola Horsburgh, "Analysis and Evolution of the Global Jihadist Movement Propaganda," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18 (2006), pp. 399–421.
35. Christopher Heffelfinger, "Anwar al-'Awlaqi: Profile of a Jihadi Radicalizer," *CTC Sentinel* 3 (2010), pp. 1–4.
36. Fernando Reinares, "Global Terrorism: A Polymorphous Phenomeno," *Royal Institute Elcano Analysis* 65 (2009).
37. "Woman Jailed for Life for Attack on MP Stephen Timms," *BBC News*, 3 November 2010.
38. Raffaello Pantucci, *A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorist* (London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2011).
39. Scott Helfstein and Dominick Wright, "Success, Lethality, and Cell Structure Across the Dimensions of Al Qaeda," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 34 (2011), pp. 367–382.
40. "Details Emerge in Frankfurt Airport Attack," *Stratfor*, 3 March 2011.
41. Bruce Hoffman, "The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs* 87 (2008), pp. 133–138; Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman, "Does Osama Still Call the Shots? Debating the Containment of al Qaeda's Leadership," *Foreign Affairs* 87 (2008), pp. 163–166.
42. Jean-Pierre Filiu, *Les Neufs Vies d'Al-Qaida* (Paris: Fayard, 2008).
43. Vidino, *Radicalization, Linkage, and Diversity*, pp. 12–13.

**Appendix 1**  
*Jihadi terrorism incidents in Western Europe, 2001–2010*

| Date            | Name                 | Countries targeted                | Target                 | Category | Accomplishment | Weapon               | Training camp | Organization  |
|-----------------|----------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------|----------|----------------|----------------------|---------------|---|
| 1 April 2001    | Ben Khemais cell     | Unknown (arrested in Italy)       | Unknown                | 2        | Disrupted      | Unknown              | Afghanistan   | Al Qaeda, GSPC  |
| 2 October 2001  | Djamel Beghal cell   | Belgium, France                   | Military, Diplomatic   | 1        | Disrupted      | Explosive            | Afghanistan   | Al Qaeda, GSPC  |
| 3 October 2001  | Stade de France      | France                            | Public place           | 2        | Disrupted      | Homemade Explosive   | —             | Independent cell  |
| 4 November 2001 | Domenico Quaranta    | Italy                             | Public place           | 1        | Failed         | Homemade Explosive   | —             | Lone wolf   |
| 5 December 2001 | Richard Reid         | Transatlantic flight, France, USA | Aviation               | 1        | Failed         | Industrial Explosive | Afghanistan   | Al Qaeda  |
| 6 February 2002 | U.S. Embassy in Rome | Italy, USA                        | Diplomatic             | 2        | Disrupted      | Poison               | —             | GSPC  |
| 7 February 2002 | Domenico Quaranta    | Italy                             | State security         | 1        | Failed         | Homemade Explosive   | —             | Lone wolf   |
| 8 February 2002 | Domenico Quaranta    | Italy                             | Religious              | 1        | Failed         | Homemade Explosive   | —             | Lone wolf   |
| 9 April 2002    | Al Tawhid            | Germany                           | Public place           | 1        | Disrupted      | Firearm              | Afghanistan   | Zarqawi organization (since 2004 AQ Iraq)                 |
| 10 May 2002     | Domenico Quaranta    | Italy                             | Urban transport system | 1        | Failed         | Homemade Explosive   | —             | Lone wolf   |
| 11 October 2002 | Cell based in Milan  | Belgium, Netherlands, USA         | Diplomatic             | 2        | Disrupted      | Unknown              | Afghanistan   | Al Qaeda, GSPC, Zarqawi organization (since 2004 AQ Iraq) |

*(Continued on next page)*

## Appendix 1 (Continued)

| Date             | Name                                    | Countries targeted                                     | Target                                   | Category | Accomplishment | Weapon                     | Training camp         | Organization  |
|------------------|---|--|--|----------|----------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|---|
| 12 December 2002 | "Chechen Network"                       | France, Russia   | Diplomatic, Public place, State security | 1        | Disrupted      | Homemade Explosive, Poison | Caucasus, Afghanistan | GSPC  |
| 13 January 2003  | Kamel Bourgass cell                     | United Kingdom   | Train system                             | 1        | Disrupted      | Poison                     | Afghanistan           | GSPC  |
| 14 January 2003  | Cell based in Rovigo                    | Italy  | Military                                 | 2        | Disrupted      | Industrial Explosives      | —                     | Independent cell  |
| 15 January 2003  | Pakistani cell in Naples                | Italy  | Military                                 | 2        | Disrupted      | Explosive                  | —                     | Independent cell  |
| 16 June 2003     | Letters laced with toxic powders        | Belgium, USA, UK, Saudi Arabia                         | Diplomatic                               | 1        | Failed         | Poison                     | —                     | Lone wolf   |
| 17 June 2003     | Christian Ganczarski cell               | France (Reunion Island)                                | Public place                             | 1        | Disrupted      | Explosive                  | Afghanistan           | Al Qaeda  |
| 18 October 2003  | Hofstad group                           | Portugal   | Individual                               | 2        | Disrupted      | Unknown                    | —                     | Independent cell  |
| 19 October 2003  | Milan underground and church in Cremona | Italy  | Urban transport system; Religious        | 1        | Disrupted      | Industrial Explosive       | —                     | Al Qaeda, GICM, Zarqawi organization (since 2004 AQ Iraq), Al Qaeda |
| 20 December 2003 | Sajid Badat                             | Transatlantic flight, USA (arrested in United Kingdom) | Aviation                                 | 1        | Disrupted      | Industrial Explosive       | Pakistan              | Al Qaeda  |
| 21 January 2004  | "Chechen Network"                       | Unknown (arrested in France)                           | Unknown                                  | 1        | Disrupted      | Poison                     | Caucasus, Afghanistan | GSPC  |
| 22 March 2004    | Madrid train bombings                   | Spain  | Train system                             | 1        | Executed       | Industrial Explosive       | —                     | Al Qaeda, GICM  |

|    |                |                                      |                             |                          |   |           |                      |          |                  |
|----|----------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|---|-----------|----------------------|----------|------------------|
| 23 | March 2004     | Operation Crevice                    | United Kingdom              | Public place             | 1 | Disrupted | Homemade Explosive   | Pakistan | Al Qaeda         |
| 24 | April 2004     | High speed train                     | Spain                       | Train system             | 1 | Failed    | Industrial Explosive | —        | Al Qaeda, GICM   |
| 25 | June 2004      | Cell based in Brussels and Antwerpen | Belgium                     | Unknown                  | 2 | Disrupted | Unknown              | —        | Al Qaeda, GICM   |
| 26 | June 2004      | Hofstad group                        | Netherlands                 | Aviation, State security | 2 | Disrupted | Homemade Explosive   | —        | Independent cell |
| 27 | August 2004    | Dhiren Barot cell                    | United Kingdom              | Public place             | 1 | Disrupted | Homemade Explosive   | Kashmir  | Al Qaeda         |
| 28 | September 2004 | Yehya Kadouri                        | Netherlands                 | Individual               | 1 | Disrupted | Homemade Explosive   | —        | Lone wolf        |
| 29 | October 2004   | Operation Nova                       | Spain                       | State security           | 2 | Disrupted | Industrial Explosive | —        | Independent cell |
| 30 | November 2004  | Theo Van Gogh's killing              | Netherlands                 | Individual               | 1 | Executed  | Firearm              | —        | Independent cell |
| 31 | November 2004  | Hofstad group                        | Netherlands                 | Individual               | 1 | Disrupted | Unknown              | —        | Independent cell |
| 32 | December 2004  | Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Alawi plot | Germany, Iraq               | Individual               | 1 | Disrupted | Unknown              | —        | Al Qaeda in Iraq |
| 33 | December 2004  | Operation Contera                    | Unknown (arrested in Spain) | Unknown                  | 2 | Disrupted | Industrial Explosive | —        | GICM             |
| 34 | June 2005      | Hofstad group                        | Netherlands                 | Individual               | 1 | Disrupted | Firearm              | —        | Independent cell |
| 35 | July 2005      | London bombings                      | United Kingdom              | Urban transport system   | 1 | Executed  | Homemade Explosive   | Pakistan | Al Qaeda         |
| 36 | July 2005      | London failed bombings               | United Kingdom              | Urban transport system   | 1 | Failed    | Homemade Explosive   | Pakistan | Al Qaeda         |

*(Continued on next page)*

## Appendix 1 (Continued)

| Date             | Name   | Countries targeted                       | Target  | Category | Accomplishment | Weapon               | Training camp         | Organization     |
|------------------|--|--|---|----------|----------------|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------|
| 37 July 2005     | Hofstad group                                    | Unknown (arrested in Netherlands)        | Unknown   | 2        | Disrupted      | Homemade Explosive   | —                     | Independent cell |
| 38 October 2005  | Hofstad group                                    | Netherlands                              | Individual, State security                                  | 1        | Disrupted      | Unknown              | —                     | Independent cell |
| 39 October 2005  | Glostrup case                                    | Unknown (arrested in Denmark and Bosnia) | Unknown   | 1        | Disrupted      | Explosive            | —                     | Independent cell |
| 40 November 2005 | Kazi Nurur Rahman                                | United Kingdom                           | Aviation  | 1        | Disrupted      | MANPAD, Firearm      | Pakistan              | Al Qaeda         |
| 41 November 2005 | Cell based in Naples and Brescia                 | Unknown (arrested in Italy)              | Public place  | 1        | Disrupted      | Homemade Explosive   | Afghanistan, Caucasus | GSPC             |
| 42 November 2005 | Operation Gamo                                   | Spain                                    | Public place  | 2        | Disrupted      | Industrial Explosive | —                     | GSPC             |
| 43 March 2006    | Mohamed Benhedi Msahel                           | France, Italy                            | Urban transport system, Religious, Aviation, State security | 1        | Disrupted      | Homemade Explosive   | Algeria               | Al Qaeda, GSPC   |
| 44 March 2006    | Amir Abdur Rehman Cheema                         | Germany                                  | Individual, Muhammad Cartoons related target                | 1        | Failed         | Blade weapon         | —                     | Lone wolf        |
| 45 May 2006      | Israeli El Al airplane                           | Switzerland, Israel                      | Aviation  | 2        | Disrupted      | RPG                  | —                     | GSPC             |
| 46 July 2006     | Two commuter trains between Dortmund and Koblenz | Germany                                  | Train system  | 1        | Failed         | Homemade Explosive   | —                     | Independent cell |

|    |                |                              |   |                                    |   |           |                       |          |                  |
|----|----------------|------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|---|-----------|-----------------------|----------|------------------|
| 47 | August 2006    | Transatlantic plot           | Transatlantic flights, USA (arrested in United Kingdom) | Aviation                           | 1 | Disrupted | Homemade Explosive    | Pakistan | Al Qaeda         |
| 48 | September 2006 | Vollsmose group              | Denmark   | Unknown                            | 1 | Disrupted | Homemade Explosive    | —        | Independent cell |
| 49 | September 2006 | Oslo plot                    | Norway, USA, Israel                                     | Diplomatic, Religious              | 1 | Disrupted | Firearm, Blade weapon | —        | Independent cell |
| 50 | December 2006  | Operation Duna               | Spain   | Public place                       | 2 | Disrupted | Explosive             | —        | Independent cell |
| 51 | January 2007   | Beheading of British soldier | United Kingdom  | Individual, Military               | 1 | Disrupted | Blade weapon          | —        | Independent cell |
| 52 | May 2007       | Kamel Bouchentouf            | USA, France, Luxembourg                                 | Public place, Diplomatic, Military | 1 | Disrupted | Homemade Explosive    | —        | GSPC/AQIM        |
| 53 | June 2007      | Doctors' plot                | United Kingdom  | Public place                       | 1 | Failed    | Homemade Explosive    | —        | Independent cell |
| 54 | June 2007      | Doctors' plot                | United Kingdom  | Aviation                           | 1 | Failed    | Homemade Explosive    | —        | Independent cell |
| 55 | July 2007      | Nicholas Roddis              | United Kingdom  | Unknown                            | 1 | Disrupted | Homemade Explosive    | —        | Lone wolf        |
| 56 | September 2007 | Glasvej case                 | Unknown (arrested in Denmark)                           | Unknown                            | 1 | Disrupted | Homemade Explosive    | Pakistan | Al Qaeda         |
| 57 | September 2007 | Sauerland plot               | Germany, USA  | Aviation, Military                 | 1 | Disrupted | Homemade Explosive    | Pakistan | IJU              |

*(Continued on next page)*

## Appendix 1 (Continued)

| Date              | Name   | Countries targeted                       | Target                       | Category | Accomplishment | Weapon                 | Training camp | Organization     |
|-------------------|--|--|------------------------------|----------|----------------|------------------------|---------------|------------------|
| 58 September 2007 | Individual arrested in La Junquera with car bomb                   | Spain                                    | Unknown                      | 1        | Disrupted      | Homemade Explosive     | —             | Lone wolf        |
| 59 December 2007  | Hassan Tabbakh   | United Kingdom                           | Unknown                      | 1        | Disrupted      | Homemade Explosive     | —             | Lone wolf        |
| 60 December 2007  | Prisonbreak to free the Tunisian Al Qaeda associate Nizar Trabelsi | Belgium                                  | State security               | 2        | Disrupted      | Explosive and firearms | —             | Independent cell |
| 61 January 2008   | Operation Cantata  | Spain                                    | Urban transport system       | 1        | Disrupted      | Homemade Explosive     | Pakistan      | TTP, Al Qaeda    |
| 62 April 2008     | Andrew Ibrahim   | United Kingdom                           | Public place                 | 1        | Disrupted      | Homemade Explosive     | —             | Lone wolf        |
| 63 May 2008       | Nicky Reilly   | United Kingdom                           | Public place                 | 1        | Failed         | Homemade Explosive     | —             | Lone wolf        |
| 64 August 2008    | Krenar Lusha   | United Kingdom                           | Unknown                      | 1        | Disrupted      | Homemade Explosive     | —             | Lone wolf        |
| 65 September 2008 | Jewel of Medina  | United Kingdom                           | Individual                   | 1        | Failed         | Firebomb               | —             | Independent cell |
| 66 December 2008  | Macherio plot  | Italy                                    | Public place, State security | 2        | Disrupted      | Homemade Explosive     | —             | Independent cell |
| 67 December 2008  | Rany Arnaud  | France                                   | State security               | 2        | Disrupted      | Homemade Explosive     | —             | Independent cell |
| 68 December 2008  | Malika El-Aroud cell   | Unknown (arrested in Belgium and France) | Unknown                      | 2        | Disrupted      | Explosive              | Pakistan      | Al Qaeda         |
| 69 April 2009     | Operation Pathway  | United Kingdom, USA, Norway              | Unknown                      | 2        | Disrupted      | Homemade Explosive     | Pakistan      | Al Qaeda         |
| 70 October 2009   | Santa Barbara bombing  | Italy                                    | Military                     | 1        | Failed         | Homemade Explosive     | —             | Independent cell |

|    |               |                          |  |  |   |           |                      |                       |                  |
|----|---------------|--------------------------|--|--|---|-----------|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------|
| 71 | October 2009  | Adnan V.                 | Germany                                | Unknown                                      | 2 | Disrupted | Homemade Explosive   | —                     | Independent cell |
| 72 | October 2009  | Adlène Hicheur           | France                                 | Military                                     | 2 | Disrupted | Unknown              | —                     | GSPC/AQMI        |
| 73 | October 2009  | Mickey Mouse Project     | Denmark                                | Muhammad Cartoons related target             | 2 | Disrupted | Unknown              | Pakistan              | Al Qaeda, LeT    |
| 74 | October 2009  | Jane Jihad cell          | Sweden                                 | Individual, Muhammad Cartoons related target | 2 | Disrupted | Unknown              | —                     | Independent cell |
| 75 | December 2009 | Amsterdam-Detroit Flight | Transatlantic flight, USA, Netherlands | Aviation                                     | 1 | Failed    | Industrial Explosive | Yemen                 | AQAP             |
| 76 | January 2010  | Mohamed Geele            | Denmark                                | Individual, Muhammad Cartoons related target | 1 | Disrupted | Blade weapon         | —                     | Al Shabab        |
| 77 | February 2010 | Rajib Karim              | United Kingdom                         | Aviation                                     | 1 | Disrupted | Unknown              | —                     | AQAP             |
| 78 | May 2010      | Roshonara Choudhry       | United Kingdom                         | Individual                                   | 1 | Failed    | Blade weapon         | —                     | Lone wolf        |
| 79 | July 2010     | Mikael Davud             | China, Denmark, Norway                 | Diplomatic, Muhammad Cartoons related target | 2 | Disrupted | Homemade Explosive   | Pakistan              | Al Qaeda         |
| 80 | July 2010     | Europlot                 | France, Germany, United Kingdom        | Public place                                 | 2 | Disrupted | Firearms             | Afghanistan, Pakistan | Al Qaeda         |

(Continued on next page)

## Appendix 1 (Continued)

| Date              | Name                     | Countries targeted | Target                           | Category | Accomplishment | Weapon             | Training camp | Organization                               |
|-------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|----------|----------------|--------------------|---------------|--|
| 81 September 2010 | Lors Doukaev             | Denmark            | Muhammad Cartoons related target | 1        | Failed         | Homemade Explosive |               | Lone wolf                                  |
| 82 November 2010  | Ansar Al Mujahideen cell | Belgium            | Unknown                          | 2        | Disrupted      | Unknown            | —             | Independent cell                           |
| 83 December 2010  | Taimour Abdulwahab       | Sweden             | Public place                     | 1        | Failed         | Homemade Explosive | Iraq          | Islamic State of Iraq (AQ Iraq)            |
| 84 December 2010  | Cardiff cell             | United Kingdom     | Unknown                          | 2        | Disrupted      | Homemade Explosive | —             | Unknown. Temporarily counted as non-linked |
| 85 December 2010  | Jyllands-Posten plot     | Denmark            | Muhammad Cartoons related target | 2        | Disrupted      | Firearm            | —             | Unknown. Temporarily counted as non-linked |

Following the criteria used by Vidino, the incident names used in this table are the names most commonly used in terrorism circles.<sup>43</sup> Some are derived from the plot's targets, some from associated counterterrorism operations, and some from the names of the plotters themselves, the attack location, or still other factors.