


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Al-Takfir wa'l Hijra: Unpacking an Enigma

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Al-Takfir wa'l Hijra: Unpacking an Enigma

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A considerable body of unchallenged literature describes al-Takfir wa'l Hijra and its followers—"takfiris"—as a contemporary and highly dangerous trend within the global jihadi movement. Various descriptions as a network, movement, or group, its members are portrayed monolithically as ultra-secretive, highly skilled militants who easily blend into Western societies and specialize in "quality" operations against Western targets. This article critically assesses these claims using analytical approaches grounded in social movement theory and Netwar, and data drawn from historical and Islamist sources.

Understanding complex trends within the mosaic of radical Islam through evidence-based research impacts not only academia but also counterterrorism operations and policies. This article demonstrates that the radical Egyptian Islamist¹ society known as al-Takfir wa'l Hijra (ATWH) presents a profound challenge to many Western analysts; its primary ideas, structures, and modes of operation are poorly understood and often misconstrued in the literature. Refining and challenging the conceptions of ATWH forms the heart of developing effective strategies to identify and combat this violent trend.

Since September 2001 a considerable body of unchallenged (primarily Western) literature paints a picture of ATWH and its followers, often called "*takfiris*," as a contemporary and highly dangerous trend² within the global *jihadi* movement.³ This view was expressed, for example, in the author's 2005 analysis of *jihadi* recruitment strategies, and in Tamara Makarenko's more comprehensive overview of ATWH in the same journal.⁴ Many analysts also claim that the late Shukri Mustafa's (d. 1978) organization has been resurrected since its apparent 1978 demise as an international entity—variously described as a network, movement, or group—complete with ultra-secretive, often highly skilled members (*takfiris*) who, as Andrew Campbell argues in the *National Observer*, "specialize in 'quality' large-scale terrorist operations."⁵ Others, such as *Wall Street Journal* analyst David Crawford and Tuft's Joshua Gleis, contend that *takfiris* maintain a strategy of immigration to the West in order to further *jihad* and share a "creed" enjoining ATWH members to indulge in vices forbidden in Islam, such as alcohol, in order to maintain operational cover.⁶ Another leading expert on Islamic militancy, Rohan Gunaratna, asserts that some of Al Qaeda's leadership and senior operatives are leaders of, or are linked to, ATWH—a view shared by other specialists, including Campbell and Gleis.⁷ In sum, there is a widely held contemporary view of an extant ATWH threat derived from the Egyptian sect, linked in some fashion to Al Qaeda, which fosters its own structures, ideologies, and operational doctrines.

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However, based on what is known about the ideas, structures, and methods of the historic ATWH, and after assessing the data on the contemporary movement, the aforementioned depiction of ATWH warrants ample skepticism. There is little empirical evidence cited by these authors to support their claims. Most arguments are highly theoretical, and in some cases, appear to be guesswork. Further, little primary source data from contemporary ATWH activists are cited and almost all references are circular, pointing to fellow analysts' work, best assumptions, or in the case of Jean-Louis Bruguière's commentary on ATWH, law enforcement sources that cannot be verified using social science methods.⁸ Either most of the current work on ATWH suffers from piecemeal research and poor analysis, or less likely, is informed by tightly held information accessible to only a few.

Does ATWH maintain a link to Al Qaeda's leaders and operatives, as claimed? Has Shukri Mustafa's exclusive narrative survived? What can be said authoritatively about ATWH's extant structures and their relationship to the Egyptian group? Do depictions of ATWH militants' operational methods and profiles as deviant, surreptitious, and highly skilled *jihadis* stand up to scrutiny and resonate with the historic ATWH? Is the ATWH portrayed in today's literature an organized successor to Shukri's group, a movement based on its discourse, or alternatively, a by-product of misunderstanding? Answering these questions is a small but significant step toward separating fact from fiction in the global "War on Terrorism," for which academic critics like Ian Lustick have called,⁹ and is also significant for analysts and policymakers seeking to better understand and counter patterns of *jihadi* activism.

Approach

In addressing these questions this article argues that, while some of the transcendent concepts promoted by the original ATWH endure, the ideologies, organizational structures, and doctrines as practiced by Mustafa's society during its Egyptian heyday have mutated beyond recognition. In order to organize the analysis, assess the validity of claims made concerning the ideological and behavioral characteristics of a current ATWH, and to inject the interdisciplinary focus necessary to contend with the research queries, concepts rooted in social movement theory and "Netwar"¹⁰ will inform the article's structure. These constructs will also serve as a useful qualitative metric to evaluate claims made regarding the viability of a present-day ATWH, whether as a social movement or a more structured albeit networked entity described in-depth by the Netwar model. After briefly exploring the ideas, structures, and methods of the Egyptian ATWH to establish a baseline for comparison with the current literature, the article examines claims made concerning contemporary embodiments of the original ATWH's narrative. It then challenges popular depictions of "current" ATWH structures and operational doctrines using data gleaned from a variety of Islamist publications (including Shukri Mustafa's writings); three of the most comprehensive historical accounts of the Egyptian ATWH, written by Johannes J. G. Jansen, Giles Kepel, and R. Hrair Dekmejian; data gathered from Saad Eddin Ibrahim's 1978–1979 interviews with imprisoned ATWH activists; and from limited interviews the author conducted in Western Europe in 2005–2006.¹¹ In all three levels of analysis, the article contends with numerous reports linking ATWH to Al Qaeda. In conclusion, the article addresses the issue of whether the ATWH depicted in today's literature is likely linked to the Egyptian sect, or is alternatively a separate, viable group or movement. The sources of potential analytical confusion are also discussed, as are further avenues for research and counterterrorism focus.

It should be reiterated that evaluating the literature on ATWH is difficult. As stated, there is very little reliable data on Shukri's group and no known authoritative work on its

post-Egypt evolution. Further, in the hundreds of media, academic, and Islamist sources consulted on ATWH, the author has not seen a single reference to a primary source document from today's ATWH, let alone one published in the same self-critical historic perspective of the Al Qaeda-linked Mustafa Setmariam Nasr, for example.¹² Moreover, in the void of data on the historical evolution of the post-Shukri group a voluminous and often wildly contradictory body of literature has grown. Sifting through this data and selecting the exemplary claims to discuss within the scope of a journal article is a subjective exercise. Many important claims and perspectives will unfortunately remain unexplored. Therefore, making categorical judgments about the existence, ideas, and behavior of a contemporary ATWH is not possible.

Besides filling a significant void in the literature on radical Islam, it is hoped that the following discussion will raise questions that stimulate deeper (especially field-based) research on how ATWH's structures, ideas, and behavior might have evolved over time to influence current *jihadi* contention. The dearth of rigorous analysis on this topic—possibly a result of few, if any, self-identified ATWH activists to interview, no known ATWH claims of responsibility for attacks, or simply preoccupation with other pressing developments in Islamic militancy—suggests that it should be of interest to scholars and security analysts alike.

Drawing From Social Movement Theory and “Netwar”

Social movement theories—ideas about how individuals enable and translate ideas into patterns of collective action that challenge the status quo—and Ronfeldt's and Arquilla's “Netwar”—a theory about how Information-Age activists organize and behave offensively and defensively—together provide a useful analytical framework to examine claims that the Egyptian ATWH remains a viable force within today's *jihadi* milieu, or conversely, presents a bona fide new threat. How can these theories help one to understand a contemporary ATWH better and/or assess the myriad claims made about it?

Roughly two perspectives on ATWH have emerged from the work of other analysts. Some analysts like Hayder Mili¹³ hold that today's ATWH fosters some of the qualities of Alberto Melucci's “networks of shared meaning.”¹⁴ In other words, they conceive of it as a social movement mobilized along a binding narrative “cord” that de-emphasizes the importance of resources or organizational hierarchies, much as Quintan Wiktorowicz conceived of the Salafi movement in Jordan.¹⁵ Hereafter the article will refer to this characterization of ATWH as a “movement,” implying a lack of formal organization, or conversely, a trend, as Mili describes. However, more structurally oriented analysts like Campbell¹⁶ persist in labeling ATWH a “group,” or similarly, attribute to it the qualities of more organized networks as defined by the resource mobilization school of social movement theory.¹⁷ This viewpoint generally holds that greater levels of network formalization, bureaucracy, and centralization facilitate and sustain collective action most effectively. In other words, activism is more likely to succeed where identifiable leaders are present, and (networked) chains of command are organized to distribute essential resources and, ultimately, meet strategic objectives. This article will categorize depictions of ATWH along these lines as a “network.”

Based on these contrasting assessments, one might conclude, for example, that if ATWH is a viable movement akin to Melucci's “networks of meaning” model, it will have a generally consistent and well-articulated ideology and operational doctrine,¹⁸ which its adherents promote and act on in dispersed cells with a high degree of autonomy. Given the many claims linking a current ATWH movement to the Shukri group, one could reasonably

expect there to be some degree of congruency between the narrative and operations of its Egyptian cadres and today's. Conversely, if it is a network (or group) there will also be consistent evidence that ATWH empowers its narrative through bureaucracies, key leaders (not just ideologues), defined chains of command, and so forth. In this case, if there are claims made with respect to its Egyptian lineage—and there are many—these defined structures should also reflect a direct relationship to the Egyptian group.

Both of these contrasting views of social movements coincide with Ronfeldt's and Arquilla's theory of Netwar, whether at its highly organized pole or its most disparate extreme. Netwar—effectively social movement theory for military and policy analysts, as it concerns why and how protagonists facilitate collective action using nontraditional organizational forms—is “an emerging mode of conflict in which the protagonists . . . use networked forms of organization, doctrine, strategy, and technology attuned to the information age.”¹⁹ Ronfeldt argues that networks and movements (the latter illustrated by his depiction of the Earth Liberation Front²⁰) “draw strength from what they can accomplish across five levels of theory and practice:

- Organizational level—its organizational design
- Narrative level—the story being told
- Doctrinal level—the collaborative strategies and methods
- Technological level—the information systems in use
- Social level—the personal ties that assure loyalty and trust”²¹

While formal networks emphasize more or less structured function and control of these levels to facilitate activism, and movements tend to evolve informally, filtering and promoting activism through existing and (often) culturally imbued systems (e.g., *wasta*—social connections—as Wiktorowicz observed²²), the sum of these levels of analysis “hold a network [or movement] together” in different ways.²³ Because the interest is in evaluating the literature's perspectives on how ATWH's ideology, structures, and operational doctrine facilitate its activism, to determine not only whether the claims stand up to analytical scrutiny but also whether they point to a contemporary, multifaceted movement or network, it makes sense to organize this effort using Netwar's levels of analyses in modified form.

As investigating ATWH's technological level is beyond the scope of this effort, it will be omitted here. Further, because there is overlap between the “organizational” and “social” levels, and because there is not enough information to properly evaluate specific organizational “shapes,” these will be combined in this assessment. Moreover, because highly doctrinaire strategies and tactics are ultimately put in motion by, and generally stem from actors aligned with similar motivational and behavioral frames, discussion of the doctrinal level should also feature a discussion of ATWH activists themselves.²⁴ Therefore, the following argument will be conducted along three levels:

- *The narrative level*—the story being told by ATWH, and its impact on activism.
- *The organizational level*—how ATWH is organized for activism, the identification of its leadership cadres, and who is working with whom on its behalf.
- *The doctrinal/operative level*—the strategic and tactical operational template favored by ATWH activists, and the profile of operatives who embody this template.

Al-Takfir wa'l Hijra: An Overview

Originally known to its members as *Gama'at al-Muslimeen* (“the Society of Muslims”) or *Gama'at al-Higra* (“the Group of Emigration”), *Gama'at al-Takfir wa'l Hijra*—the name

given to it by state-influenced media following run-ins with the Egyptian government in July 1977²⁵—was an extreme isolationist offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Literally meaning “the group which accused [other, nominal, Muslims] of unbelief and urged [true Muslims] to emigrate,” ATWH was developed in the early 1970s by Shukri Mustafa, a follower of Sayyid Qutb’s teachings.²⁶ While imprisoned following a regime crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, Mustafa took Qutb’s doctrines of *hijra* (emigration) and *hakimiyya* (God’s sovereignty) to their radical conclusions by explicitly incorporating (and substantially expanding on) an extreme reading of *takfir*, the accusation of apostasy. Its narrative, organizational, and doctrinal methods flowed from this all-encompassing exclusive worldview.

The Narrative of ATWH

Al-Takfir wa'l Hijra’s ideology of extreme *takfir* placed it literally on the fringes of Islam itself. Going beyond the teachings of Qutb and the practices of many extreme Islamist factions then and now, Mustafa pronounced *all* Muslims outside of ATWH unbelievers (*kufaar*)—a charge typically levied only against regimes.²⁷ As Johannes J. G. Jansen wrote, summarizing a passage of Mustafa’s work *Khilafa*, “Anyone who refused to become a member of [ATWH] or wanted to leave it was declaring himself an enemy of God, and was to be treated accordingly.”²⁸ Mustafa’s own description of the “apostasy” of the Azharite sheikh and former Minister of Islamic Endowments, Muhammad al-Dhahabi—and thus the “justification” for his murder by ATWH—further clarifies his views as to what makes one a disbeliever:

... he worked in the religious endowments department and was a minister and a director for the nobility of the [mosque]. . . . He also made an oath in swearing by other than the judgment of Allah in taking an oath upon entering the office of ministry.²⁹

Further, in an even starker divergence from other trends, Mustafa rejected all traditional Sunni scholarship, including the four *madhahib* (“schools”) of Sunni Islam. He claimed the schools were syncretistic innovations that ultimately led to the idolatry of the imams who interpreted the Qur’an for the masses, and in so doing, put themselves outside of Islam as they interposed themselves between God and the believers to fit the whims of a sovereign.³⁰ Like many in the contemporary Salafi movement,³¹ he argued that the Qur’an “had . . . been placed in a museum,” and called for ongoing individual interpretation (*ijtihad*) of the Qur’an and *Sunnah* (“path” or “way” of Muhammad) over blind subservience to the *ulema*. But as commentary by an erstwhile follower of Mustafa’s demonstrates, ATWH went a step further than the majority of those in even the most extreme Salafi factions:

We do not accept the words ascribed to the Apostle’s contemporaries, or the opinions of those versed in Islamic law, the *fuqaha*. We do not accept the opinions of the early jurists, or their consensus, or the other idols like [reasoning by] analogy. How can the words of mere humans be a source of divine guidance?³²

Anyone who believed that interpreting the Qur’an and *Sunnah* necessitated “the glosses” of any type of scholarship—let alone participated in the traditional religious or static structures, including worship at state-funded mosques—practiced idolatry.³³ In sum, Mustafa and his

followers viewed themselves as the *exclusive* inheritors of the prophetic tradition to the degree that they rejected 1,300 years of Islamic thought and practice.

Organization

Although reliable data on ATWH's organization, structure, and penultimate leaders is exceedingly difficult to find, most accounts suggest that Shukri exercised complete control over ATWH.³⁴ In fact, after passing a series of tests to demonstrate that they were actually Muslims,³⁵ the movement's estimated 4,000 adherents were required to vow complete allegiance (*ba'ya*) to Mustafa as the *mahdi*, the messianic "prince of the princes" (*amir al-'umara'*).³⁶ According to the imprisoned extremist, Abu Hamza al-Masri, whose work *Khawaarij and Jihaad* offers one of the few extensive Salafi critiques of Mustafa's group and its followers, Shukri played on this notion and told his followers that "no one could kill him and he would never die."³⁷ Interestingly, Abu Hamza also notes that it was precisely this image, shattered by Shukri's execution at the hands of the *kufaar* (unbelievers), which caused many of his followers to become disillusioned at his death and leave the group.³⁸

As further evidence of Mustafa's "great man" leadership style, he personally reserved the right to arrange divorces and marriages within his sect.³⁹ He also maintained the sovereignty to not only determine who was "in" and "out" of his group, but by default, who had apostatized from Islam and therefore deserved death.⁴⁰ Although it appears that he referenced the works of others⁴¹ to assist in constructing the ideological framework and methodology of ATWH's parallel community, Shukri held the sect together.⁴²

However, Shukri's authority should in no way be seen as the sole impetus behind the sect's activities. Ibrahim's fieldwork of the late 1970s suggests that the activism of the rank-and-file ATWH member was also driven by "their own internal conviction and exhilarating sense of mission" besides the "total commitment and iron-clad discipline" demanded of them by the leadership.⁴³ These characteristics were apparently reinforced by demands on the activists' to take part in group activities (e.g., "worship, studying, proselytizing, exercising"), which served in turn to further insulate them from society and generated a sense of "moral superiority" vis-à-vis those outside of ATWH.⁴⁴

In keeping with the theme of *hijra*, Mustafa sent "missionaries" abroad—primarily to Saudi Arabia and Yemen—to both spread ATWH's ideology and raise funds.⁴⁵ Again, very little data is available on these individuals or their activities. Primarily, Mustafa mandated that his followers form communal "pods" around low-rent districts in Cairo and places like Bani Swaif and al-Mina to build an *esprit de corps* and move the "true Muslims" from a state of weakness (*istida'af*) to power at the propitious time.⁴⁶ Unlike common conceptions of the group, they only lived in the grottos and mountains outside of Asyut briefly during the early years of the movement.⁴⁷ These communities help fund Shukri's society with odd jobs and small-scale ventures such as bakeries, bookstores, gardening, and so on.⁴⁸

Doctrinal Methodology

Unlike the more mainstream Islamist trends of the day, Mustafa required his followers to emulate Muhammad's emigration from Mecca to Medina by denouncing Egyptian society—even to the point of refusing to pray in public mosques given their connections to the state—and undertaking *hijra* (separation or emigration) into the locales mentioned earlier to form a parallel community.⁴⁹ Like the pre-Islamic epoch, they believed that Egypt was *jahiliyya*—pagan and ignorant—in its "idolatrous" system of governance; however, Shukri extended this term to include the whole of Egyptian society.⁵⁰ Therefore, physical

separation (*mufasala kamila*) to establish the first authentic Muslim community since the end of *al-Khulafa ur-Rashiduun* (the “rightly guided caliphs”) in 661 A.D. was mandatory. After a long period of his society’s education (*tarbiyya*) and expansion, Mustafa’s theory went, ATWH would then be ready to enter its phase of power (*tamakkun*)—the first step in establishing the global dominance of Islam (*hakimiyyat allah*)—but not before.⁵¹ This methodology was utterly contrary to the revolutionary infiltration-based strategies of the Egyptian *al-Jihad* factions, which followed the teachings of both Qutb and Muhammad Abdus Salam al-Farag and explicitly rejected Mustafa’s gradualist vision.

Following several antagonistic encounters with Egyptian law enforcement stemming from the group’s attempt to punish wayward members, ATWH was all but crushed by the regime and Mustafa and five other leaders executed in 1978.⁵² Most accounts suggest that the majority of the movement’s adherents and leaders were incarcerated, executed, joined more activist Egyptian *jihad* groups, became government agents, or simply reintegrated into their communities.⁵³ However, Ibrahim’s research dating from the late 1970s does note the survival of some ATWH cells and mentions that some of the second-tier leadership was imprisoned during his interviews, the implication being that some of these could have continued Shukri’s mission.⁵⁴ Further, Abu Hamza al-Masri claimed that what was left of ATWH (besides those who simply left the movement for the reasons mentioned) emigrated to Yemen, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, although “some of these . . . were actually repenting after long discussions in prison” and “were non-structured as a group” following their release.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, as Jansen observed, the sum of Mustafa’s bizarre, cult-like vision of how to establish the “true” Islamic state suggests that his ideas and gradualist methodologies would not and do not resonate strongly within radical Islam today.⁵⁶ Although most of Mustafa’s manuscripts remain exceedingly difficult to locate, and although the dynamics of Egypt’s domestic security practices prohibit the development of a crystalline picture of ATWH, the sum of the data suggests that its Egyptian structures were severely undermined and mainly dissolved with Mustapha’s death. The current literature reflects a different view.

Evaluating the Literature on ATWH

The following section evaluates the claims made in the literature regarding the ideology, structures, and operational doctrine of the contemporary ATWH. Because almost all claims have a historic component linking the present ATWH to the Egyptian group, the literature will be critiqued not only on the grounds of consistency and analytical rigor but also in light of what is known of the original ATWH. The earlier discussion of social movement theory and Netwar demonstrated the priority of employing these analytical levels as a qualitative metric to gauge whether one is in fact dealing with a viable ATWH movement or group, even if reaching a firm conclusion is beyond the scope of this work.

Contemporary Depictions of Al-Takfir wa'l Hijra's Ideology

Most analyses of the contemporary ATWH begin with an assessment of what makes its followers “the most dangerous people alive”:⁵⁷ its narrative. Although there are few systematic depictions of today’s ATWH ideology and few (if any) references to primary source documents, several key themes emerge from the bulk of the literature: ATWH and its current followers “live” for violent *jihad* against both Western adversaries and Muslim infidels; they have redefined Shukri’s understanding of the tenets of interacting with *jahiliyya* society; and they partake of both the worldview and leadership of Al Qaeda.

The following section explores whether these assessments are congruent with what is known of the Egyptian ATWH and examines the substance of these claims.

Militancy and the West

In one of the most extensive articles written on the contemporary ATWH, Tamara Makarenko observed, “Of the radical Islamist movements that have established a presence in Europe, Al-Takfir Wa al-Hijra . . . now presents perhaps the most pressing security (concern).”⁵⁸ Makaranko goes on to note the alleged involvement of *takfiris* in attacks and plots throughout Europe and North Africa.⁵⁹ Bruce Livesey observed that ATWH forms “the most extreme and violent strand in the Salafist jihadist movement.”⁶⁰ Both of these perspectives resonate with a 2004 *Wall Street Journal* article on ATWH, which states, “The virulent brand of Takfir Islam makes all-out jihad an obligation for all true believers . . .”⁶¹ In sum, the composite view of today’s ATWH reveals a fearsome, aggressive terrorist adversary bent on shedding the blood of both “apostates” and their Western backers.

These perspectives are at odds with the historical data concerning ATWH’s ideology of confrontation. Mustafa’s controversial statement in front of the Egyptian military tribunal bolsters this argument through an articulation of *istid’af*: “If the Jews or anyone else [invaded Egypt], our movement ought . . . to flee to a secure position. In general, our line is to flee before the external and internal enemy alike, and not to resist him.”⁶² Clearly what analysts describe as today’s ATWH espouses an altogether different perspective concerning at least the timing of militancy than it did during Shukri’s time. Moreover, it is also clear that the historic ATWH was more interested in excommunicating and challenging *jahiliyya* social and political structures than it was in fighting Western adversaries—a claim that runs counter to the media discourse concerning, for example, the 11 March 2004 Madrid bombers’ affiliation with ATWH.⁶³

New Interactions with Jahiliyya?

A number of recent reports indicate that “members” of ATWH espouse a “creed” that permits them to freely infiltrate and immerse themselves within *jahiliyya* societies prior to attacking them.⁶⁴ Although the specifics of this operational creed will be examined later, the general theme of integration with rather than fleeing *jahili* society must be called into question; it flies in the face of Mustapha’s theory of strengthening his society via *hijrah* and “rupture” (*al-uzla*) from *jahiliyya*.

Although highly unlikely given the extraordinarily doctrinaire construction of ATWH’s narrative, it is possible that the ideology of extant ATWH cells (assuming these exist) could bend to accommodate a program of infiltration to facilitate violence. However, if Shukri’s bedrock ideas endure, this extraordinary shift would occur only after a metamorphosis of their understanding of the “true” *ummah*’s (ATWH’s) marginalized condition. According to Shukri, “the circle of oppression and weakness (would be) broken” and ATWH would move from a phase of weakness to a “phase of power” (*tamakkun*) only after its parallel society “unmasked” and “invalidated” the *jahiliyya*’s symbols and institutions.⁶⁵ This meant rupture from and total disavowal of Egyptian society’s traditions and customs,⁶⁶ including state-sanctioned marriage and the Friday prayer, which were perceived as “illicit (for ATWH members) in a *jahiliyya* society.”⁶⁷ Some of the quantitative metrics Mustapha used to gauge the degeneration of his group’s power in Egypt included the number of judicial trials, arrests, and imprisonments its members suffered over a period of five years.⁶⁸ One should ask therefore whether the conditions for associating with *jahiliyya* society have changed

sufficiently to allow for not only ATWH's integration into but also purposed association with it for the purposes of attacking it. Given the overwhelming and well-documented pressure Western countries and notionally Islamic regimes have brought to bear on radical Islamic activists since 2001, a perception of an empowered ATWH would indicate ideological and methodological shifts so cataclysmic that the activists alleged to be ATWH members could no longer claim the narrative mantle of the Egyptian group.

Ideological Bedfellow of Al Qaeda?

Another allegation noted in the literature is that ATWH is aligned with Al Qaeda; it is also averred that the Al Qaeda figurehead Ayman al-Zawahiri is in fact a leader of ATWH.⁶⁹ However, research reveals an extraordinary gulf dividing Mustapha's thought from the *jihadi* ideology that predominates Al Qaeda, rendering these allegations questionable.

The foremost fissure separating Al Qaeda's worldview from ATWH's revolves around the doctrine of *takfir*. Whereas Shukri excommunicated *all* outside of ATWH, the messages of Osama bin Laden and al-Zawahiri are inherently broad (if Salafi-based) appeals to Sunni Muslims to target the interests of "Jews and Crusaders" wherever they are found; to defend "Muslim" lands; and to strike adversaries "near" (i.e., nominally Muslim regimes) and "far" (the United States and its allies).⁷⁰ Al Qaeda's classic definition of *takfir* (derived mainly from al-Faraj's and Qutb's theories⁷¹) is clearly aimed at the Arab regimes and their active supporters; rank-and-file members of Muslim societies are not categorized as apostates.⁷² According to the letter of al-Zawahiri to the late Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, Al Qaeda's erstwhile (and more extreme) factional leader in Iraq, they should not be targeted as a rule.⁷³ Al-Zawahiri's earlier call to cultivate the masses' love for "the *jihad* movement," clearly outlined in his *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner*—a sentiment at odds not only with al-Zarqawi's sadistic tack but also with the worldview of ATWH—further emphasizes this point.⁷⁴ Even one of the more radical—and according to West Point data, most influential⁷⁵—clerics of the Salafi-*jihadi* trend, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, al-Zarqawi's mentor, advised against the latter's attacks on women, children, Shi'a, and even Christian churches—all of which would have been emblems of *jahiliyya*'s pervasive reign in Shukri's epoch.⁷⁶

In terms of allegations linking al-Zawahiri to ATWH, the data suggests that these are unfounded, whether with respect to his Egyptian *jihadi* activities or current involvement with Al Qaeda. These claims ignore both the utterly different *modus operandi* of al-Jihad, al-Zawahiri's Egyptian group, as well as the significant ideological gulf separating the two organizations. In fact, during his interrogation following the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat, al-Zawahiri repudiated ATWH: "[Unlike ATWH] We agree with the majority of Muslims and the four imams [the *madhahib*, or "schools" of Sunni Islam]. We are different from the Takfir wal Hijra group, as we do not consider people infidels because of their sins."⁷⁷

Other prominent themes of Al Qaeda's discourse and related methodologies offer further indicators of its distance from ATWH's narrative. Al Qaeda prescribes forthright militancy and training to strengthen and refine the *ummah*'s "obligation" to fight *jihad*;⁷⁸ ATWH's ideology delayed militancy indefinitely in lieu of education, proselytization, and communal purification. Al Qaeda recognizes the four schools of Islam and the process of *taqlid*—both anathemas to Mustafa. Moreover, unlike ATWH, Al Qaeda's ideologues, while extreme in their militant doctrine, recognize that there is some room for debate within the Salafi-*jihadi* trend; they acknowledge the importance of a broad range of (mainly Salafi) scholars, even if there are limited doctrinal disputes and disagreements

over methodologies.⁷⁹ On the other hand, ATWH's Egyptian cadres would not even recognize the primacy of early Muslim jurists or Muhammad's contemporaries, let alone pray behind government-employed imams.⁸⁰ Indeed, many Salafi-*jihadis*—even including those aligned with Al Qaeda in Iraq⁸¹—recognize the ideology of ATWH as synonymous with the early *khawarij*⁸² and thus outside of the Salafi trend.⁸³

The outstanding differences separating Al Qaeda from ATWH are driven home by allegations that in 1998 ATWH clerics issued a *fatwa* (religious judgment) against bin Laden for supporting the Taliban, which at that time was communicating with the United Nations, thereby relegating both the Taliban and Al Qaeda to the status of *munafiq* (hypocrites) in the eyes of the *takfiris*.⁸⁴ Furthermore, it is alleged that ATWH elements attempted to kill bin Laden in Sudan in 1996.⁸⁵ Regardless of the veracity of these claims, the preponderance of data suggests that Al Qaeda and ATWH do not share the same narrative.

Al-Takfir w'al Hijra's Ambiguous Organizational Profile

The following section identifies and evaluates some of the predominant claims made by analysts concerning how today's ATWH is organized and led. This process will enable one to better understand the structural relationship (if any) between a current ATWH and the historical organization; it will also enable one to better evaluate whether today's ATWH is a multifaceted movement or network, as claimed.

Analysts describe the organization of the contemporary ATWH in variable and often contradictory ways, reflecting an indecision and tension throughout the literature. Indeed, some analysts attribute to it simultaneously (within the same publication) the characteristics of a narrative-based movement, a network, or even a unified group with generally little regard for the differences.⁸⁶ Several recurrent themes appear in the literature's depictions of its organization and leadership. First, many analysts (implicitly or explicitly) suggest that the present ATWH has members, much as the historic Egyptian group did.⁸⁷ Second, there is a related sense from some analysts (especially those who described a more structured entity) that ATWH has strategic planners consistent with what one might expect from a more formal network. There are also repeated claims that ATWH is linked to Al Qaeda's organizational leadership,⁸⁸ and many analysts also suggest that there is a symbiotic relationship between these two factions, especially in Europe—often described as ATWH's most significant operational sphere.⁸⁹ It appears that some of these claims arise from, or are embodied in, the evidence from the 2001 plot to bomb the U.S. airbase in Kleine Brogel, Belgium.

Membership in al-Takfir wa'l Hijrah?

Several prominent analysts' depictions of ATWH networks paint a picture of a structured network with leaders and members, especially in Europe. While the original Egyptian group had a definitive sense of membership, this depiction is problematic even if one ignores the questionable ideological correlations made between today's ATWH and Mustafa's faction. Indeed, it appears that many contemporary militants accused of being "members" of ATWH are also linked to Al Qaeda. This is problematic on several levels, whether one argues for the existence of a structured ATWH network or merely a narrative-based movement.

The pre-2002 activities of alleged ATWH "members" Djamel Beghal, Nizar Trabelsi, and Kamel Daoudi illustrate the problem of ATWH membership.⁹⁰ Their consideration of targets such as the U.S. Kleine Brogel airbase in Belgium and Trabelsi's supportive role in Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud's 9 September 2001 assassination strongly reflect Al Qaeda's ideology, attack methodologies, and target preferences, not to mention its

global and regional interests at the time: attacking Western adversaries while simultaneously shoring-up the Taliban.⁹¹ Not only do these activities fail to mesh with Mustafa's narrative and activism, but when coupled with Beghal's and Trabelsi's admittedly close relationships to the Al Qaeda-linked training coordinator, Abu Zubaydah—who, incidentally, was critical of “*takfiris*” in recent hearings⁹²—and even Osama bin Laden, plus the fact that they took direct orders from the same, the evidence suggests that these were Al Qaeda-inspired *jihadis*.⁹³ This relationship would have been untenable for original ATWH members, as would the form of activism it promoted. In this light, how can Beghal's particular claim that he was a “link” between three ATWH cells in Europe be explained?⁹⁴

First, it is possible that an entirely new clandestine network movement calling itself ATWH has adopted a few of the themes of Mustafa's binary worldview and name but has adopted a different methodology.⁹⁵ It is therefore plausible and consistent with the modern history of radical Islam (including Al Qaeda) that these individuals could affiliate with one network while simultaneously fighting under the command of another. A prominent example is al-Zawahiri's leadership in both a wing of al-Jihad and Al Qaeda. However, this group would be ATWH in name only, and there is little publicly available data to support this notion, and none from the group itself.

Alternatively, vestiges of the old Egyptian group could have survived and perpetuated a drastically altered ideology and modus operandi, even to the point of identifying entirely different adversaries and strategies.⁹⁶ However, as noted earlier, this would require a complete ideological and doctrinal about-face. Reuven Paz's unique research on individuals descended directly from the Egyptian ATWH—Islamists living in isolation in Gaza—supports the premise that this wholesale change is unlikely, or conversely, would make its adherents unrecognizable to the original ATWH.⁹⁷

Finally, it must also be remembered that *takfiris* allegedly attempted to kill bin Laden in Sudan and issued a 1998 *fatwa* against him owing to outstanding ideological differences.⁹⁸ If a new ATWH structure and membership has emerged, as Beghal claimed,⁹⁹ it is reasonable that these networks would also share this animosity toward bin Laden. Claims of membership in ATWH should therefore be viewed cautiously, and it is well worth considering that Beghal's confession was made during interrogation in the United Arab Emirates.¹⁰⁰

Al-Takfir wa'l Hijrah's Strategic Network Management?

Many analysts also claim that there are strategic planners behind the management of a contemporary ATWH.¹⁰¹ For example, it is sometimes recalled that Beghal affiliate Nacereddine Mettai claimed (based on a discussion he allegedly had with unidentified Dutch individuals known only as “Salim” and “Toufik”) that ATWH forged a three-way alliance between itself, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban in the late-1990s.¹⁰² Logically, this affiliation would mandate the presence of an individual leader like the late Mustafa, or alternatively, an authoritative *shura* (consultative) council capable of speaking on behalf of a group. However, this seems incongruous with what is known about ATWH in the open sources. Beyond the disconnected militants sometimes listed in the media as geographic *takfiri* leaders, such as Beghal, Bassam Ahmed Kanj (an “Afghan Arab” probably linked to Al Qaeda and the Lebanese Asbat al-Ansar who died in 2000¹⁰³), and Yusuf Fikiri (an apparent *emir* [leader] of the network behind the 2003 Casablanca bombing network¹⁰⁴), it seems that other, more connected strategic links would have been publicly revealed in the wake of extensive counterterrorism investigations post-9/11—that is, if a structured ATWH exists. Moreover, as noted, the existence of strategic, treaty-brokering leaders would also imply that analysis regarding ATWH's quarrel with bin Laden is baseless.¹⁰⁵ This is

unlikely; the ideological fissures separating historic *takfiri* thought and methods from Al Qaeda's would likely take more than a year or two to heal, especially in the pre-9/11 context. Supporting this analysis, some analysts have argued that another *takfiri fatwa* calling for bin Laden's death was issued in 1999.¹⁰⁶

A “*Takfiri*” Operational Doctrine and Militant Profile?

Western analysts have made many comparable claims concerning the supposedly unique operational doctrine and profiles of ATWH militants. These are encapsulated in a statement made by the respected former French counterterrorism magistrate, Jean-Louis Bruguière:

Takfir wal-Hijra is a sect . . . very, very, very radical. Very radical. And all the members are . . . undercover. They are not Islamic-looking, you know. They have no beards; they just have a tie. And sometimes it is very difficult to discover. They drink alcoholic beverages if necessary; yes, have a sandwich with pork inside—is no problem.¹⁰⁷

Besides emphasizing these characteristics, other analysts have noted a sophisticated and highly proficient “*takfiri*” operational profile, often citing some of the Madrid bombings suspects or 9/11 militants.¹⁰⁸ While the point is not to dispute evidence of select highly competent militants engaging in eccentric and even un-Islamic behavior¹⁰⁹ whether to facilitate terrorism or otherwise, to surmise that such behavior is enshrined in a distinct ATWH “creed” or is a common trademark of *takfiri* operations is questionable. These perspectives do not resonate with what is known of the historical ATWH and they are often based on inconsistent evidence and analysis.

Takfiri Super-Terrorists?

It is also claimed by some analysts that *takfiris* maintain high levels of training, education, and expertise, which enable them to maintain a high degree of secrecy and conduct particularly sophisticated attacks.¹¹⁰ As discussed, this view has little historic resonance with the Egyptian ATWH's methodology despite the fact that Ibrahim notes that some of the militants interviewed had a modicum of education.¹¹¹ Moreover, the research supporting these claims is generally inconsistent.

The literature often describes militants such as 9/11 ringleader Muhammad Atta and Beghal as examples of a “new breed of Islamic warrior”—veritable super-terrorists.¹¹² However, some of the same authors claim that a waxing threat to Europe comes from *takfiri* immigrants of North African lineage, radicalized by social anomie and embroiled in crime.¹¹³ In France and Germany these “types” of *takfiris* are noted to be involved with the logistical provision of *jihadi* networks and operations.¹¹⁴

However, depictions of *takfiris* as ultimate terrorists on one hand and low-level criminal supporters on the other do not align. The marginal profiles of accused *takfiris* Jamal Zougam (a Moroccan-born mobile phone salesman-turned-terrorist convicted in the Madrid train bombing trial), Richard Reid (the infamous “shoe-bomber”), and Muhammad Bouyeri (the murderer of Dutch social critic Theo van Gogh) contradict this über-terrorist image. Instead, it seems instead that analysts are merely describing the typically wide-ranging background of *jihadis* in Europe, pointing out what has long been known about terrorists, *jihadi* or otherwise: “ideal” militants are always the most intelligent, committed, and discreet. Given that *takfir* is an ideology-cum-attitude of excommunication that includes multiple levels

of applications found across the spectrum of Islamism—indeed, it would not be limited to ATWH—assembling a common profile of *takfiris* seems fruitless.

Experts in Deception?

Much of the literature (including the author's past work¹¹⁵) also states that *taqiyyah*—generally, purposed defensive concealment of faith or intentions to avoid harm¹¹⁶—is a pillar of ATWH's operational doctrine.¹¹⁷ Although it has not been possible to review all of the Egyptian faction's writings, the material that has been examined says nothing about this practice. Further, based on Shukri's noted interest in explaining his worldview during his trial, it is hard to imagine that he employed this practice.¹¹⁸ Moreover, considering that *taqiyyah* was also a doctrine developed substantially by the Shi'a and later expanded on by Ibn Kathir, a medieval Shafi'i scholar of the fourteenth century, its application by ATWH would be questionable for reasons already noted.¹¹⁹

From a different angle, one must question whether other militant Sunni factions also emphasize theologically inspired deception when among "infidels." Indeed, al-Zawahiri's work *Allegiance and Disavowal* makes it clear that a degree of defensive dissimulation is permitted.¹²⁰ Further, al-Maqdisi's *From the Fruits of Jihad* draws extensively from the prophetic model in a comprehensive discussion of permissible deception in warfare.¹²¹ Al Qaeda's training manuals also advise its cadres to avoid mosques, shave beards, and forgo other practices that connote piety to avoid detection in the West.¹²² Finally, in fieldwork conducted by the author in 2005–2006, a former British *jihadi* noted that those bent on attacking their Western nation of residence "believe that they live in Dar al-Harb (the zone of warfare)" and thus rationalize "shaving one's beard is an acceptable practice" before attacking.¹²³ However, the interviewee had no understanding of why this would be considered a "*takfiri*" practice. It is highly unlikely that *taqiyyah* is a uniquely *takfiri* inclination.

Legalizing the Prohibited?

Another frequent allegation found in the literature is that ATWH members have "'theologically' authorized themselves to break any and every Islamic rule to blend into Western society."¹²⁴ Cavorting with members of the opposite sex or drinking alcohol is described as a centerpiece of the *takfiri* operational creed,¹²⁵ ostensibly because Mustafa himself lacked religious training.¹²⁶ However, when juxtaposed against the historic data on ATWH, this view is problematic; in fact, the opposite appears true. A statement from Mustafa—cited by a fierce Islamist critic no less, Abu Hamza al-Masri, who would have had ample reason to embellish all of Mustafa's divergences from orthodox Sunni theology—bolsters this assertion. In critiquing the religious scholars linked to the Egyptian regime during his trial appearance, Shukri said:

They propagate sins and [argue] for *haraam* [the prohibited] to become *halaal* [permissible] in the name of Islam . . . making usury, adultery, ruling by other than the Shari'a of Allah, obscenities and even toxic drink [to become] *halaal* in the name of Islam. . . . With regards to *khamr* ["all types of intoxicants and things that cover the senses"] we have seen Shaikh Sa'd Jalaal allowing the people to drink beer. . . . With regard to *zina* ("unlawful sexual intercourse outside of marriage"), the [Egyptian] government has made it *halaal* through

its manmade laws. Many of the people who are even talking on behalf of Islam allow free mixing [of the genders], and I consider this the first essential introduction to *zina*.¹²⁷

Mustafa's words clearly indicate that he opposed alcohol consumption and liaising with the opposite sex. Until additional information surfaces to the contrary, allegations like these should be carefully scrutinized in light of the historic data.

Yet it is difficult (and unnecessary) to refute assertions that there *are* extremists who accuse other Muslims of apostasy—"generic" *takfiris*, whom present-day authors link to Shukri Mustafa's group—and occasionally, violate Islamic practices. Beyond Bruguière's statements, allegations that *jihadis* like Louia Sakka, for example, drink beer or have girlfriends cannot be dismissed. The former British militant interviewed by the author suggested that a comprehensive worldview of life in "Dar ul-Harb" (the domain of war, here meaning Europe) might lead some Islamists to believe that drinking alcohol was permitted along with the shaving of one's beard. This might explain un-Islamic behavior among militants in part. However, despite significant involvement with the Sunni extremist community in London, this individual knew nothing about allegations of sex and beer drinking among "*takfiri*" militants, and believed these to be exaggerations and/or explained by a poor grasp of Islamic law.¹²⁸

There are other possible explanations for this behavior. First, some individuals might be extending the doctrine of the "licit" (*fay'* or *ghaneema*), which identifies and governs the spoils taken from unbelievers in warfare, to include alcohol consumption. Abu Qatada al-Filistini, the imprisoned Palestinian-Jordanian Salafi extremist, flooded Europe with his *fatwas* and publications during the 1990s and is noted to have applied this doctrine to sanction plundering Muslims he deemed apostates as well all non-Muslims living in the West.¹²⁹ Another possibility is that these individuals believe that they will eventually die as a martyr (*shaheed*) and therefore their sins—including drinking, sex, and so on—will be absolved "with the first drop of their blood."¹³⁰

However, the author has seen no primary source data suggestive of an institutionalized "creed" that permits otherwise sinful acts, whether affiliated with ATWH or otherwise. Conversely, there *is* literature associated with Al Qaeda that decries Western claims that such a doctrine exists.¹³¹ Echoing "Ibrahim," Marc Sageman has indicated that jihadism *writ large* might stem from a deficiency in Islamic learning.¹³² The historical ATWH was committed to strength through rigid piety under the absolute leadership of Mustafa—hence their *hijrah*—so these allegations are doubly suspect.

Conclusions

The preceding pages argued that while some of the transcendent concepts promoted by the original ATWH endure, the ideologies, organizational structures, and doctrines as practiced by Mustafa's society during its Egyptian heyday have mutated beyond recognition. From the evidence presented, most of the current literature describing a contemporary ATWH's ideology, organizational structures, and "trademark" operational doctrine disregards the historic data while simultaneously linking Shukri's group to present-day terrorist cells; it is also inconsistent and often contradictory.

Other conclusions can be drawn from this assessment, which carry implications for both academia and Western counterterrorism communities:

1. **Based on this article's data and analysis, there appears to be neither a viable successor to the historic ATWH involved in militancy, nor a contemporary violent ATWH movement or group.** As discussed, social movements and "Netwar" protagonists—whether a movement or a network—both rely on a consistent narrative to facilitate, empower, and shape activism. A clear ATWH narrative is noticeably absent according to the aforementioned data. Further, groups maintain structures, bureaucracies, and clear-cut strategies—none of which are presented consistently in the literature on ATWH. Most of the claims to the contrary appear to come from circular information that is not based on primary source materials or other empirical evidence.¹³³ In fact, primary sources are almost totally absent from the current literature on ATWH, and there seems to be an excessive reliance on law enforcement or intelligence data unavailable to researchers. Jansen also argues that Egyptian media reporting of Mustafa's trial as well as the official government accounts—both of which likely influenced contemporary research on ATWH—is seriously flawed.¹³⁴ It is safe to assume that the contemporary picture of ATWH is skewed for these reasons.
2. **The terms "al-Takfir wa'l Hijrah" and "takfiri" have multiple connotations.** Structurally oriented Western analysts seem to understand ATWH and "takfiri" through one lens, whereas individuals from the Middle East and North Africa, for example, derive different meanings. The literature reveals that when the term *takfiri* is mentioned in regional (often pro-regime) media, it usually describes the most militant Salafis who advocate violence against regional Muslim governments, not necessarily ATWH.¹³⁵ Western analysts appear to conflate "takfiri" with ATWH—a faulty correlation given the substantial differences that separate Shukri's faction from the *takfir* doctrine of Al Qaeda, for example. Similarly, according to a former British *jihadi* interviewed by the author, his understanding of the term *takfiri* implied "fighting *jihad* in the UK" while simultaneously accusing "less devout" Muslims of "apostasy"—a perspective consistent with the understanding of *takfir* as an attitude and ideology unrelated to a specific movement or group.¹³⁶ Thus, some militants' confessions (like Beghal's) could simply be an admission that they hold to a *takfiri* worldview, which they felt might be better understood as ATWH, because this charge is often levied by Arab regimes at Islamist opposition they seek to de-legitimize.¹³⁷ Moreover, when one considers that there are multiple "levels" of *takfiri* activism, ranging from the Algerian Armed Islamic Group's (GIA) highly decentralized and sweeping version that advocates violence against large swathes of society, to that practiced by U.K.-based off-shoots of *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, who excommunicate and accost other Muslims with whom they have disagreements, and clamor for the downfall of Middle Eastern regimes while taking little action,¹³⁸ it is easy to see how such statements could be misconstrued by court reporters and analysts.
3. **Researchers would benefit from an extensive review of primary source data on the Egyptian ATWH.** It is clear that Shukri's group generated a voluminous amount of theological and doctrinal writings, none of which are known to be widely available to researchers. Comprehensive studies of this material would greatly inform research on a contemporary ATWH (if it exists) and would create a valuable mechanism for historical comparisons with the Egyptian group. Further, there is a need for field-based assessments to trace the historical evolution and influence of Shukri's faction, especially given the lack of primary source data. Reliable data on Egyptian-linked ATWH cadres who allegedly ventured into Afghanistan and Pakistan, and later, Algeria,¹³⁹ would generate a highly useful picture of how the original ATWH

ideology mutated over time. It would also likely pinpoint the main activists outside of Egypt (if any); decipher how ATWH movement or group structures might have developed, or conversely, atomized; reveal how the original ATWH is linked ideologically, structurally, or operationally to radical contention in the West today, if at all; and so on.

4. **Clarifying and/or refuting claims about ATWH's contention represents a small step in the battle to better understand how ideas impact jihadi operations.** Sageman, Wiktorowicz, and others have cogently argued that even at the tactical level, *jihadis'* fighting "styles" cannot be entirely disentangled from their ideologies and patterns of socialization.¹⁴⁰ *Jihadi* target selection, attack modes, and propaganda are all intimately linked to the attitudes, values, and beliefs that these actors develop within a social (or online) context. If, for example, the claims that ATWH militants were behind the Madrid attacks prove true, or if it is determined that Muhammad Atta was indeed a "member" of ATWH, the notion that deep assessments of an eccentric Islamist sect are merely academic exercises would (ideally) crumble.
5. **Takfiri jihadi movements will likely ebb and flow in strength and numbers.** As the Islamist literature reveals, their greatest enemy (besides education within the parameters of "orthodox" Sunni learning) seems to be the publication of their atrocities and ideas. Ironically, the Internet—the instrument that greatly enables the global *jihadi* movement—could become the greatest threat to factions such as Al Qaeda in Iraq. However, prolonged non-Muslim military involvement in "Muslim" lands will inevitably produce *takfiri* backlashes against nominally Muslim regimes who are perceived as supporting this involvement, or alternatively, are propped-up by non-Muslim forces.

Western conceptualizations of ATWH seem as decentralized and "imagined" as the global *jihadi* construct of the "true" *ummah*. The research and counterterrorism communities must gain a better understanding of how this most radical of Islamist trends developed historically and possibly manifests its thought and warfare in the West today. Conversely, counterterrorism professionals share a responsibility to combat extraordinary and under-researched claims that, in the end, only embolden the narrative and stature of terrorist adversaries.

Notes

1. Islamism is broadly defined here as multifaceted activism inherently concerned with challenging the political, religious, and/or social status quo in order to effect Islamic renewal. There are multiple currents within Islamism, including some that are inherently at odds with each other's strategies and methods for achieving reform. For instance, some currents of Islamism reject any form of politics and intra-system participation and believe that reform must happen through violent revolution. At the other end of the spectrum, some Islamists reject violence and only pursue a reformist or renewal agenda within given structures.

2. For example, see Jeffrey Cozzens, "Islamist Groups Develop New Recruiting Strategies," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 17(2) (February 2005), p. 24; Tamara Makarenko, "Takfiri Presence in Europe Grows," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 17(2) (February 2005), pp. 16–19; Hayder Mili, "Jihad Without Rules: The Evolution of al-Takfir wa al-Hijra," *Jamestown Terrorism Monitor* 4(13) (29 June 2006); Joshua L. Gleis, "National Security Implications of Al-Takfir Wal-Hijra," *al Nakhlah*, Article 3 (Spring 2005); and Andrew Campbell, "Taqiyyah: How Islamic Extremists Deceived the West," *National Observer*, no. 65 (Winter 2005), pp. 11–23; Michael Elliott, "Hate Club," *Time*, 12 November 2001; Keith Johnson and David Crawford, "New Breed of Islamic Warrior is Emerging," *The Wall Street Journal*, 29 March 2004; and Jean-Louis Bruguière, interview with PBS Frontline, 12

October 2004, available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/map/bruguiere.html> (accessed 1 February 2008).

3. The global *jihadi* trend is exemplified by the ideology and strategy of Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Al Qaeda seeks to undermine notionally Islamic regimes not only through direct confrontation, but also through striking states that support them. Like the global *jihadi* trend *writ large*, Al Qaeda's ultimate instrumental aim is to initially supplant these regimes with "emirates" governed by *Sharia* law; these would ultimately congeal into the caliphate, stretching across all of the lands originally influenced by early Islamic expansion. At the individual level, many *jihadis* within this trend view it as their individual obligation (*fard 'ayn*) to "defend Islam" wherever they are—that is, by engaging in high-risk, often violent activism—without respect to whether they reside in a "land of *jihad*" (e.g., Iraq or Afghanistan).

4. Cozzens, "Islamist Groups Develop New Recruiting Strategies" and Makarenko "Takfiri Presence in Europe Grows."

5. Campbell, "Taqiyyah," p. 14.

6. Johnson and Crawford, "New Breed of Islamic Warrior is Emerging" and Gleis, "National Security Implications of Al-Takfir Wal-Hijra."

7. For example, Rohan Gunaratna observed, "(Omar Mahmud Othman, a.k.a. 'Abu Qatada) and the majority of Al-Qaeda's ideological and operational leaders in Europe are Takfiris. Mohamed Atta was too." *El Pais*, "Islamist Sect Linked to Bombings Said to be on the Rise in Spain," 30 December 2005.

8. Bruguère, interview with PBS Frontline.

9. Ian S. Lustick, "Fractured Fairy Tale: The War on Terror and the Emperor's New Clothes," *Homeland Security Affairs* 3(1) (Feb. 2007), available at <http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=3.1.2> (accessed 8 April 2009). Lustick writes: "Know your enemy is the first rule of combat. The War on Terror conceals itself as our enemy by also concealing the true nature of al-Qaeda. . . . For if we were able to base our policies on the actual capabilities, intentions, weaknesses, and potential strengths of Muslim extremists of the al-Qaeda variety, we would assuredly be able to develop a mode of vigilance and a plan of attack that would be both sustainable and effective. With no theory of our enemy whatsoever, apart from imagining we are faced with an 'all azimuth,' constant, and utterly ruthless threat of attack . . . we find ourselves as if immersed in a pot of water atop a stove. Fearful that neighboring molecules might suddenly burst into steam we expend fruitless efforts scanning every molecule in sight, seeking ways to predict which one will burst into steam next in order to stop it before it does."

10. David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla, "Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the Future," *First Monday* 6(10) (October 2001), available at http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue6_10/ronfeldt/index.html (accessed 18 February 2008).

11. The author conducted six three-hour interviews with Islamist activists and former militants in the United Kingdom and Denmark in 2005–2006. Although ATWH was not the main topic of discussion, the author queried each interviewee about the contemporary ATWH. He asked whether it was indeed linked to Al Qaeda; what its primary operational characteristics were; whether there was a creed allowing its members to drink alcohol; and so on. The author makes no claim concerning the quantitative validity of the information, only that the interviewees' perspectives represent views from within radical and progressive Sunni Islamism and are therefore of value. Summaries of the interviews are in the author's possession.

12. For the authoritative source on Setmariam Nasr (a.k.a. "Abu Musa'b al-Suri"), see Brynjar Lia, *Architect of Global Jihad* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

13. For example, see Mili, "Jihad Without Rules."

14. Alberto Melucci, *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society*, ed. John Keane and Paul Mier (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989).

15. For more on narrative-based Islamic social movements, see Quintan Wiktorowicz's seminal study, "The Salafi Movement in Jordan," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 32 (2000), pp. 219–240. In a revealing (and for 2000, prescient) research piece that explores the critical differences between two modes of collective action, Wiktorowicz contrasted resource mobilization's dominant argument with the "networks of meaning" approach favored by the Jordanian Salafi movement of the 1990s.

16. For example, Campbell, "Taqiyyah."

17. For example, see William A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest* (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1975) as quoted in Wiktorowicz, "The Salafi Movement in Jordan," p. 220.

18. This article uses the term *operational doctrine* to define a common frame of non-absolute reference that generally guides militant action and underpins collaborative strategies and methods. For example, the use of suicide operations by Al Qaeda factions against infrastructure targets is a pillar of its operational doctrine.

19. David F. Ronfeldt, "Foreword: Netwar Observations," in Robert J. Bunker, ed., *Non-State Threats and Future Wars* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 1.

20. Ronfeldt and Arquilla, "Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the Future."

21. Ronfeldt, "Foreword: Netwar Observations."

22. Wiktorowicz, "The Salafi Movement in Jordan."

23. Ronfeldt and Arquilla, "Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the Future."

24. For more on framing, see Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Framing Jihad: Intramovement Framing Contests and Al-Qaeda's Struggle for Sacred Authority," *International Review of Social History*, no. 49 (2004), pp. 159–177.

25. Johannes J. G. Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 92.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

27. For more on the doctrine, see Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 29(3) (April–May 2006). *Takfir* is based largely on the "ten voiders" of Sheikh Ibn Abdul-Wahhab, which generally drew from the earlier work of the medieval Sheikh Ibn Taymiyyah. The violation of one of these "voiders" is cast as a violation of *tawhid*, God's complete sovereignty and "oneness," which therefore takes one outside of Islam.

28. Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism*, p. 91.

29. See limited translated excerpts from Mustafa's trial in Abu Hamza al-Masri, *Khawaarij and Jihaad* (no publisher given, 2000), in author's possession.

30. See Shukri Mustafa in *ibid.*; also, Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), pp. 79–80; also Shukri Mustafa, *Al-Nass al-Kamil li-Aqwal wa-I'tirafat Shukri Ahmad Mustafa Amir Gama'at Al-Takfir wa-'l-Higra, amam Mahkamat Amn al-Dawla al-'Askariyya al-Ulya* (1977), quoted in Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism*, p. 76. In a series of writings presented during his 1977 trial, which containing a "detailed refutation of Sunni Islam," Mustafa railed against the prevalent Sunni practice of imitating (*taqlid*) the learned scholars of the *madhahib* (including the Egyptian *ulema* [scholars] of the time) and argued that the all-important principal of communal consensus (*igma*) as divine inspiration (as developed by the medieval scholar of *hadith*, Ibn Maga) was not part of the Prophetic Tradition.

31. The Salafi movement is a multifaceted trend within Sunni Islam focused on defending God's "oneness" (*tawhid*) from innovation and syncretism in every facet of life through promoting a strict emulation of Muhammad and the first three generations of the Islamic community. There are a variety of competitive methods employed by Salafis to accomplish their objectives, ranging from extreme violence and *takfir* to assiduous piety and quiet "advice" to rulers. For more, see Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement."

32. 'Abd al-Rahman Abu al-Khayr, a one-time follower of Mustafa, quoted in Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism*, p. 80.

33. See Mustafa's words in Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, p. 79.

34. For example, see al-Masri, *Khawaarij and Jihaad*. Although Abu Hamza's work is not scientific and suffers from the subjectivity one would expect from a radical activist, to dismiss his perspectives gathered from "inside" the *jihadi* movement and consequently disregard the sizeable amount of data he collected on ATWH and the *takfiri* movement would be a mistake.

35. *Ibid.*

36. See David Zeidan, "Radical Islam in Egypt," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 3(3) (September 1999); also Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Militants," *MERIP Reports*, no. 103 (February 1982).

37. See al-Masri, *Khawaarij and Jihaad*.
38. Ibid.
39. Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, p. 87.
40. Ibid, pp. 87–89.
41. See Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism*, p. 78. Some of these authors, who wrote books specifically for ATWH (as noted by Mustafa during his trial) include Mahir 'Abd al-Aziz, 'Ala al-Din Ali Rida and Dr. R.S. Ahmad. According to Jansen, only portions of Ahmad's Arabic language *Kitab al-Khilafa* (London: Riad El-Rayyes Books Ltd, 1991) survive.
42. Al-Masri, *Khawaarij and Jihaad*. This view is also clearly apparent in Saad Ibrahim's interviews of ATWH activists in the late 1970s (see Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Militants," pp. 5–14).
43. Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Militants," p. 11.
44. Ibid, pp. 11–12.
45. Ibid; also see Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*.
46. See al-Masri, *Khawaarij and Jihaad*.
47. Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, p. 77.
48. Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Militants," footnote 8, p. 14.
49. Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, pp. 74–76. The doctrine of complete separation (*mu-fasala kamila*) from the *jahiliyya*, as opposed to spiritual separation, which was practiced by the *jama'a al-'uzla al-shu'uriyya* ("Spiritual Detachment Group"), was initiated largely by Sheikh 'Ali 'Abduh Isma'il. However, he later denounced *takfir* entirely, leaving Mustafa the "sole member" of this trend as of the summer of 1969.
50. R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam In Revolution* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995), pp. 84–102.
51. Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, p. 84. Interestingly, when asked whether his group would even fight Israelis were they to invade Egypt, he responded by saying, "In general our line is to flee before the external and internal enemy alike, and to resist him [in the group's present state of weakness]."
52. Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Militants," p. 14 (esp. footnotes 2 and 9).
53. See Zeidan, "Radical Islam in Egypt"; also Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Militants." Ibrahim writes, "Eventually all top leaders of al-Takfir as well as some 620 members of the group were arrested, of whom 465 were to stand trial before military court" (p. 14, footnote 3. Data from *Al-Ahram*, 21 July 1977).
54. Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Militants," p. 6.
55. Al-Masri, *Khawaarij and Jihaad*.
56. Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism*, p. 78. For these ideas—especially his gradualist as opposed to revolutionary program—Mustafa's methodology was explicitly denounced by the primary *jihadi* factions of his epoch, including al-Jihad, which through Ayman al-Zawahiri was deeply influential in eventually cementing Al Qaeda's strategy.
57. Antony Barnett, Martin Bright, and Ed Helmore, "London-Based Terror Chief Plotted Mayhem in Europe," *Observer*, 30 September 2001.
58. Makarenko, "Takfiri Presence in Europe Grows."
59. Ibid.
60. Bruce Livesey, "The Salafist Movement," 25 January 2005, available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/special/sala.html> (accessed 1 February 2008).
61. Johnson and Crawford, "New Breed of Islamic Warrior is Emerging."
62. Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, p. 84. Kepel even speculates that the murder of Dahabi—the primary incident leading to ATWH's disintegration—was a last-ditch effort to force the regime to publicize Shukri's manifesto.
63. *El Pais*, "Islamist Sect Linked to Bombings Said to be on the Rise in Spain."
64. For example, see Mili, "Jihad Without Rules"; Johnson and Crawford, "New Breed of Islamic Warrior is Emerging"; and Gleis, "National Security Implications of Al-Takfir Wal-Hijra."
65. Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, pp. 82–83.
66. See Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Militants."

67. Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, p. 82.

68. Ibid.

69. For instance, Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda* (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), p. 115 and Gleis, "National Security Implications of Al-Takfir Wal-Hijra." Gunaratna explicitly states: "Al-Zawahiri is also the leader of the Takfir Wal Hijrah"—an ironic allegation considering his comments on the previous page that the nascent Al Qaeda "decided upon (a strategy of) ideological infiltration of FIS, GIA, GSPC and Takfir Wal Hijra networks" (p. 114). Why would Al Qaeda need to pursue this strategy if al-Zawahiri was already their leader?

70. Perhaps the most paradigmatic Al Qaeda statement is Osama bin Laden's 1996 Declaration of War. See http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html (accessed 25 March 2008).

71. Dekmejian, *Islam In Revolution*, pp. 84–102. Qutb and Faraj largely applied *takfir* to "excommunicate" political systems, leaders, and regimes to legitimize immediate, violent revolution. By accusing them of apostasy, these sought to avoid charges of fomenting *fitna* (strife) within the Islamic community. Because these regimes were "un-Islamic," their extermination was justified. This conception of *takfir* has largely informed Al Qaeda's application of the doctrine, although its public statements generally mask this extreme ideology through a more pragmatic discourse.

72. See al-Zawahiri's 2005 letter to al-Zarqawi, available at http://www.dni.gov/letter_in_english.pdf (accessed 11 November 2005).

73. Ibid.

74. Ayman al-Zawahiri, *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner*, serialized in twelve parts by *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* (FBIS trans.), 2 December 2001 (downloaded 23 November 2004).

75. See William McCants, ed., *Militant Ideology Atlas* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006), available at <http://ctc.usma.edu/atlas/Atlas-ResearchCompendium.pdf>

76. See Yasir Abu-Hilalah's interview with Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television, 2105 GMT 5 July 2005 (English transcript in author's possession).

77. Ayman al-Zawahiri's interrogations by Egyptian authorities, 2 December 1981, p. 98, quoted in Montasser al-Zayat (Nimis, trans.), *The Road to Al-Qaeda* (London: Pluto Press, 2004), p. 45.

78. See Osama bin Laden's July 2003 speech, available at <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Area=sd&ID=SP53903> (accessed 20 March 2008).

79. This is clear, for example, in al-Zawahiri's 2005 letter to al-Zarqawi.

80. See 'Abd al-Rahman Abu al-Khayr in Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism*, p. 80.

81. "'Our Creed and Methodology' by the Legal Council of the Al-Qa'ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers" (FBIS trans.), 24 March 2005.

82. The term *khawaarij* is used pejoratively in the Islamic lexicon to describe dissenters and disruptive factions who threaten the integrity of the religion. It refers to the politically motivated factions who emerged in the seventh century A.D. to challenge the rule of the caliph on the grounds of impiety.

83. Al-Masri, *Khawaarij and Jihaad*.

84. See Jason Burke, *Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam* (London: IB Taurus, 2004), p. 184.

85. Ibid.

86. For example, see Mili, "Jihad Without Rules," available at [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx-ttnews\[tt-news\]=882](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx-ttnews[tt-news]=882) (accessed 8 April 2009). Mili wrote: "Takfir is first an ideology and then a group or groups who adhere more or less loosely to its founding principles, with the result that (ATWH) has now become a brand name. . . . Its members (have) been found in most Muslim countries as well as in Europe and North America. Apart from al-Qaeda and . . . Hezbollah, no other Islamist group has achieved the same internationalization across cultures."

87. For example, see Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, pp. 34, 105, 114–115; also Emerson Vermaat, "Bin Laden's Terror Networks in Europe," Mackenzie Institute Occasional Paper (no date), available at http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2002/2002_Bin_Ladens_Networks.html (accessed 31 March 2008).

88. For example, see Vermaat, "Bin Laden's Terror Networks in Europe."

89. Makarenko, "Takfiri Presence in Europe Grows."

90. See Peter Nesser, "Jihad in Europe—A survey of the Motivations for Sunni Islamist Terrorism in Post-Millennium Europe," Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, FFI/Rapport-2004/01146.

91. See Vermaat, "Bin Laden's Terror Networks in Europe."

92. See Department of Defense, "Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10016," pp. 9–10, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/transcript_ISN10016.pdf (accessed 1 April 2008). Although Abu Zubaydah's statements are the subject of much current controversy and could be deceptive, they do reflect Abdullah Azzam's classic theory of defensive *jihad*, not the *takfiri* narrative.

93. Nesser, "Jihad in Europe."

94. Ibid.

95. See Mili, "Jihad Without Rules; also Jean-Louis Bruguère, "Terrorism: Threat and Responses," Geneva Centre for Security Policy (no date), available at www.gcsp.ch/E/publications/Security_Challenges/Terrorism/Occ_Papers/31-Bruguere.pdf (accessed 1 April 2008). For instance, this contemporary manifestation could hold to Mustafa's interpretation of *jahiliyya*, but a combination of circumstances might have shifted its concept of the correct methodology to adopt.

96. For example, see Mili, "Jihad Without Rules" and al-Masri, *Khawaarij and Jihaad*.

97. Reuven Paz, "The Heritage of the Sunni Militant Groups," 4 January 2000, available at <http://212.150.54.123/articles/articlelet.cfm?articleid=415> (accessed 1 April 2008).

98. For more on a clash with *takfir*s in Sudan, see "Anonymous" (Michael Scheuer), *Through Our Enemies' Eyes* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, Inc., 2003), pp. 143–144.

99. Nesser, "Jihad in Europe," p. 45.

100. Ibid., p. 42.

101. Pascal Ceaux and Fabrice Lhomme, "The Trial of 24 Islamists Suspected of Membership in Takfir Starts in Paris," *Le Monde* (in French, Open Source Center trans.), 29 September 2001.

102. For example, Jean-Marc Leclerc, "Twenty-Four Islamic Fundamentalists Before Magistrate Court" (in French, Open Source Center trans.), 27 September 2001.

103. For a *jihadi*'s perspective on Kanj's group, see Abu Musa'b al-Suri's views, which are dissected in David Cook (Brachman and Heffelfinger, eds.), *Paradigmatic Jihadi Movements* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006).

104. See Jack Kalpakian, "Building the Human Bomb: The case of the 16 May 2003 Attacks in Casablanca," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 28 (2005), pp. 113–127.

105. "Anonymous" (Scheuer), *Through Our Enemies' Eyes*, pp. 143–144; also see Burke, *Al-Qaeda*, p. 184.

106. B. Raman, "Tricky Mush Does Another," South Asia Analysis Group Paper no. 811, available at <http://www.saag.org/papers9/paper811.html#top> (accessed 25 March 2008).

107. Bruguère, interview with PBS Frontline.

108. For example, Johnson and Crawford, "New Breed of Islamic Warrior is Emerging."

109. Karl Vick, "A Bomb-BUILDER, 'Out of the Shadows,'" *The Washington Post*, 20 February 2006, available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/19/AR2006021901336.pf.html> (accessed 2 April 2008). Louai Sakka, arrested in Turkey in 2005 for plotting attacks on an Israeli ship, was accused of "guzzling beer" and womanizing prior to his intended "martyrdom" operation.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Militants."

112. See Elliott, "Hate Club."

113. Gleis, "National Security Implications of Al-Takfir Wal-Hijra."

114. Makarenko, "Takfiri Presence in Europe Grows."

115. Cozzens, "Islamist Groups Develop New Recruiting Strategies," pp. 24–25.

116. For a *jihadi* understanding of the doctrine, see Ayman al-Zawahiri, *Allegiance and Disavowal* (in Arabic, Open Source Center trans.), 2002.

117. For example, see Campbell, "Taqiyyah," which has much to say about this practice.
118. See Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism*, p. 78.
119. See Ibn Kathir, *Tafsir Ibn Kathir*, available at <http://www.tafsir.com/default.asp?sid=3&tid=8052> (accessed 2 April 2008).
120. Al-Zawahiri, *Allegiance and Disavowal*.
121. Abu Muhammad Asim Al-Maqdisi, *From the Fruits of Jihad*, cited in At-Tibyan Publications, "Precaution, Secrecy and Concealment: Balancing Between Negligence and Paranoia," At-Tibyan Publications (downloaded by the author May 2006), available at www.geocities.com/rjecistine1/Makdisi—Precaution_Secrecy_and_Concealment.pdf (accessed March 2008).
122. For example, see the entire 180-page manual "Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants" (also known as the "Manchester (UK) Manual"), 2000, available at <http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/jihadmanual.html> (accessed 2 April 2008).
123. Author's interview with "Ibrahim," a former Salafi militant (London, UK, January 2006).
124. Mili, "Jihad Without Rules."
125. See, for example, Johnson and Crawford, "New Breed of Islamic Warrior is Emerging."
126. Mili, "Jihad Without Rules."
127. Shukri Mustafa, quoted in al-Masri, *Khawaarij and Jihaad*.
128. Author's conversation with "Ibrahim." Ibrahim claimed to have attended *jihadi* training camps in Wales and was allegedly acquainted with a number of *jihadis*, some of whom are now imprisoned (London, UK, January 2006).
129. See a partial translation of Abu Qatada al-Filistini's article in *Al-Ansar* no. 72, 24 November 1994, as cited in Shaykh AbdulMaalik ibn Ahmad ibn Mubaarak ar-Ramadane al-Jazaa'iree (al-Ashanti trans.), "The Savage Barbarism of Aboo Qataadah" (SalafiManhaj, 2007).
130. Abdullah Azzam, "Martyrs: The Building Block of Nations" (downloaded from the now defunct azzam.com), available at http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_martyrs.htm#1 (accessed January 2008).
131. See Muadh bin Abdullah Al-Madani, "The Nineteen Lions," Azzam Publications, 12 December 2002, available at <http://archive.muslimuzbekistan.com/eng/islam/2002/12/a14122002.html> (accessed March 2008).
132. Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), pp. 47–70.
133. Gleis, "National Security Implications of Al-Takfir Wal-Hijra" and Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda* are examples.
134. Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism*, pp. 80–82.
135. For example, see the interviews of former Saudi *jihadists*: "Program Plays Tapes of Saudi Youths on Past Experience with Al-Qa'ida," *Al-Arabiyyah* (FBIS trans.), 29 November 2005.
136. Author's interview with a former British *jihadi*, "Ibrahim" (London, UK, January 2006).
137. Author's e-mail correspondence with Dr. Azzam Tamimi (December 2005).
138. Ibid.
139. Al-Masri, *Khawaarij and Jihaad*.
140. Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terrorist Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 1; also Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Suicide Bombings: Do Beliefs Matter?" (September 2004), available at http://www.unc.edu/~kurzman/Soc3264/Wiktorowicz_EXPLAINING_SUICIDE_BOMBINGS.doc