This article was downloaded by: [University of North Texas]
On: 12 November 2014, At: 23:52
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uter20

Al Qaeda's London Branch: Patterns of Domestic and Transnational Network Integration

Eliane Tschaen Barbieri [a] & Jytte Klausen [a]
[a] Western Jihadism Research Project, Department of Politics , Brandeis University , Waltham , MA , USA
Published online: 22 May 2012.

To cite this article: Eliane Tschaen Barbieri & Jytte Klausen (2012) Al Qaeda's London Branch: Patterns of Domestic and Transnational Network Integration, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35:6, 411-431, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2012.675551

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2012.675551

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35:411–431, 2012
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online
DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2012.675551

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Al Qaeda's London Branch: Patterns of Domestic and Transnational Network Integration

ELIANE TSCHAEN BARBIERI
JYTTE KLAUSEN

Western Jihadism Research Project
Department of Politics
Brandeis University
Waltham, MA, USA

This article seeks to shed light on the ongoing debate about the extent of Al Qaeda's involvement in homegrown jihadist *conspiracies in the West. Focusing on the London-based* jihadist *movement in the 1998–2008 decade, the article uses network analysis to test the domestic and transnational integration of Western networks. The evidence stems from an extensive database of individuals involved in* jihadist *terrorist conspiracies in the West compiled by the authors. Results show that Al Qaeda developed a branch organization in the United Kingdom during that period. A sociogram of U.S.-based networks is indicative of a dispersed topography, and a comparison shows the British model may not be representative of Western networks overall.*

Downloaded by [University of North Texas] at 23:52 12 November 2014

In the early morning of 7 July 2005, four young men from Leeds strapped on backpacks, each carrying about ten pounds of explosives, and boarded a suburban train from Luton to King's Cross, London. They then dispersed, taking different trains on the underground network. A little over an hour later, three of the men detonated their backpacks and blew up the trains on which they were travelling. A fourth blew up a bus an hour later.[1] The four coordinated attacks killed fifty-six people, including the suicide bombers, and injured seven hundred. A second attack on London's Underground followed on 21 July. This time, the bombs malfunctioned and the five would-be suicide bombers were arrested. Eventually, forty people would be arrested in connection with the two cases. Al Qaeda later took responsibility in two suicide video recordings featuring the 7 July bombers and Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda's second in command.

Despite the videos and the discovery that several of the members of both bomb teams had attended training camps affiliated with Al Qaeda, a House of Commons inquiry into the planning of the 7 July attacks determined that the suicide bombers were self-financed by means of credit cards and loan fraud, and had mixed the bombs themselves. The

Received 29 November 2011; accepted 2 January 2012.
This article is part of the Western Jihadism Research Project. Support from the United Kingdom's Home Office, Palantir Technologies, and Brandeis University's Theodore and Jane Norman Fund for Faculty Research is gratefully acknowledged.
Address correspondence to Eliane Tschaen Barbieri, Brandeis University, 415 South Street, MS058, Waltham, MA 02454, USA. E-mail: etschaen@brandeis.edu

report concluded that "the extent of Al Qaeda involvement is unclear."[2] A parallel inquiry conducted by the Intelligence and Security Committee also discounted Al Qaeda's role.[3]

There were nevertheless strong indications to the contrary, and a vigorous debate ensued over Al Qaeda's role in perpetuating so-called homegrown terrorism.[4] As other conspiracies came to light, for the most part through preventive arrests, the controversy grew. Material seized during the 2 May 2011, raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan, showed, according to American intelligence officials, that bin Laden had been involved in directing "every recent major Al Qaeda attack" against the West and "played a huge role in the leadership" of Al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen, Iraq, and North Africa.[5]

This article aims to shed new light on the debate over Al Qaeda's role in homegrown Western *jihadist* conspiracies. Its particular focus is on conspiracies emanating from London, and it will probe the reality behind the city's frequent characterization as a "hotbed" of *jihadism*.[6] How cohesive were the radical milieus in London? How integrated were those milieus with the Al Qaeda leadership?

To be clear, the argument is not that all of the British militants were controlled by Al Qaeda, only that: (1) the militants in London exhibited extensive interconnectedness that facilitated coordination; (2) conduits linking the Al Qaeda leadership to local networks existed and direction was exercised; and (3) there were consistent and enduring patterns of transnational communication.

The argument draws on network analysis of nearly four hundred residents and citizens of the United Kingdom and about seventy non-resident Britons and foreigners involved in U.K.-based conspiracies in the decade 1998–2008. The database on which this study is based on is excerpted from a larger dataset collected by the authors consisting of nearly 2,500 Westerners designated as terrorists or supporters of Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda–related sanctioned groups. All data was collected by means of archival research from original-language public records and international sources.

1998 is the year of the first British arrests linked to Al Qaeda. In September of that year, seven men were arrested during "Operation Challenge" in London.[7] Three were wanted in the United States in connection with the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. 1998 also marked a turning point in Al Qaeda's strategy, when Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri issued a fatwa calling on all Muslims to take up arms against the "Zionist-Crusader allies." This, the second such *fatwa*, aimed to unify a splintered and weakened extremist Islamist movement under the leadership of Al Qaeda.[8] The analysis of the London networks ends in 2008 when arrests in the United Kingdom declined sharply, although the discussion of Al Qaeda's role in British *jihadism* is extended until bin Laden's death in May 2011.

During the period covered in this article Al Qaeda evolved from a coalition of exiled commanders and fighters with a safe haven in Afghanistan (1996–2001) to a global clandestine umbrella organization. Tactical and operational shifts occurred gradually over this period.

After outlining theoretical and methodological frameworks and sketching a history of the *jihadist* settlement in London, the article presents a network analysis of the domestic and international communication structures and sets of contacts that supported the emergence of an Al Qaeda branch organization in the United Kingdom.

Al Qaeda and Western *Jihadists*: Inspiration or Direction?

Radically different views on Al Qaeda's role in homegrown terrorism have been articulated in the scholarly literature. The debate centers on the question of whether

Downloaded by [University of North Texas] at 23:52 12 November 2014

Western-based *jihadists* were operationally autonomous self-starters, merely inspired by Al Qaeda's ideology and propaganda, or if, instead, militants were purposely directed by Al Qaeda leaders and part of an international command structure.

The former approach, promoted by Marc Sageman, contends that Western *jihadists* are alienated youths whose own negative experiences make them receptive to Al Qaeda's ideology and propaganda. Searching for comradeship, they join up with like-minded peers, mutually reinforcing their radicalization. Local, informally organized "bunches of guys" engineer conspiracies from the bottom up. They mimic each other but act without coordination and make up a diffuse, grass-roots social movement. Rather than part of a terrorist organization, they are the "leaderless jihad."[9]

The second approach argues in contrast that while Al Qaeda does not have the hierarchical structure and supervisory control that characterized past terrorist groups, it is inaccurate to limit Al Qaeda's involvement in Western homegrown *jihad* to a mere indirect, inspirational role.[10] Bruce Hoffman, for instance, contends that already in the late 1990s bin Laden and the Al Qaeda leadership made a strategic decision to engage in the West, and Al Qaeda more often than not exercised "top-down direction and guidance."[11]

If the homegrown *jihadists* of London, Stockholm, or New York are not the self-mobilized autonomous groups of the "bunches of guys" thesis but do not fit the image of a top-down transnational network managed by Al Qaeda cadres, the truth may lie somewhere in between Hoffman's and Sageman's models. John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, for example, view modern terrorist groups like Al Qaeda as "all-channel" networks, decentralized entities with extensive global communication structures that allow them to "coordinate across considerable distances." Such networks may not exercise formal vertical control but thanks to the density of their communication channels they are nevertheless integrated and able to coordinate actions in different theaters. They combine "central ideational, strategic, and operational coherence" with "tactical decentralization."[12]

The debate has not been resolved because neither model has been subjected to systematic empirical testing.[13] While each side has provided examples in support of its propositions, the lack of comprehensive individual-level data on participants in Western conspiracies has prevented more thorough testing. Social network analysis has been identified as a promising tool for the analysis of the organization and interactions of terrorists.[14] However, attempts to use social network analysis to map the domestic and international integration of Western conspiracies have faced problems assembling sufficiently detailed and accurate datasets about the domestic and transnational interpersonal relationships of *jihadists*.[15]

This study provides the data required for reliable social network analysis. By depicting the linkages between individuals in a network, and identifying who occupies positions of power, it allows for the testing of hypotheses about the role that Al Qaeda may have played in British conspiracies.

If the Hoffman thesis is correct, there should be a horizontal integration of the British-based conspiracies, since they are assumed to be part of the same global Al Qaeda movement. The social network analysis would then show dense linkages between domestic groups. By contrast, if British *jihadists* fit the picture of Sageman's diffuse "bunches of guys," there should be little or no integration between the various British conspiracies. The social network analysis would show small, detached groups.

If there is an active Al Qaeda involvement in British conspiracies, moreover, a vertical integration of the London conspiracies with the international Al Qaeda movement should be expected. This would be indicated by the presence of foreign Al Qaeda operatives in central positions in the social network analysis.

Downloaded by [University of North Texas] at 23:52 12 November 2014

A note of caution is necessary here. The prominent position of foreign operatives in the network would demonstrate Al Qaeda's structural involvement in British conspiracies and show that there was a strategic branching of the movement in the United Kingdom, but without examining the content of individual communications between British *jihadists* and foreign operatives, which is most often unavailable, it would be premature to imply a hierarchical directionality in Al Qaeda's involvement in British plots. If, however, London *jihadists* are entirely autonomous self-starters, and Al Qaeda is assumed to be restricted to an inspirational role, there should be few or no foreign Al Qaeda operatives in central positions in the network analysis.

Finally, if the Hoffman model is correct, participation in foreign training camps should be observed in most British domestic plots, since such participation is a means of linkage to international operatives and the Al Qaeda movement. However, if the Sageman model is correct, camp training abroad would be expected to have a marginal function in plots, with fewer individual *jihadists* traveling to camps and those who do planning the trips on their own, without financial or material international backing.

Downloaded by [University of North Texas] at 23:52 12 November 2014

Data Description and Methodology

Research has been continuous since 2006. All the information recorded in the database derives from two types of publicly available documents. Primary sources include court records, indictments, judgments, private and government reports, and semi-judicial proceedings in national agencies or international intergovernmental organizations (e.g., the UN Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267). Secondary sources include news articles and broadcasts, and books written by experts and scholars. Secondary documents are corroborated and cross-checked to verify the reliability of the information. Sources are consulted in the original languages. The research team is proficient in twelve languages, including Arabic.

The study of the relationship between homegrown *jihadism* and the global movement implies a country-specific focus. The challenge was therefore to design a system for data collection that utilized country-specific publicly available sources to capture the international dimensions of the movement. The locations of intended conspiracies (or deaths in the case of actualized attacks) determine the primary geographical classification of a particularly incident. A person is accordingly considered "U.K.-based" only if he or she is a British citizen living in the United Kingdom or was a long-term resident of the United Kingdom during that period, regardless of immigration status. A French citizen, Zacarias Moussaoui, for instance, is coded as "U.K.-based" because of long-term residence in the United Kingdom. He attended South Bank University from 1993 to 1995 and used the United Kingdom as his home-base while making multiple excursions to training locations in Chechnya, Pakistan, and Malaysia between 1996 and 2000. He was last placed in the United Kingdom on or about 9 December 2000.[16]

An individual is considered "U.K.-related" if he or she is a British citizen living outside the United Kingdom, or a foreign citizen who visited the United Kingdom or participated from abroad in a plot targeting the United Kingdom.[17] Osama bin Laden is an example of the latter. Bin Laden was not based in Britain but such was the frequency of travel and contact between British individuals and the *jihadist* camps that he nonetheless turns up as a central person in the U.K.-based network when social network analysis is applied to person-to-person contacts identified in the database.

Arrest events—or "plots"—include actualized or planned violent actions or supporting activities classified as terrorism-related. Arrest events are coded as "plots," which allows

Table 1
Database description. Year of first police contact (U.K.-based individuals only)

Year of first police contact	Number of arrests[a]
1998	23
1999	8
2000	5
2001	48
2002	32
2003	31
2004	40
2005	43
2006	58
2007	58
2008	22
Subtotal 1998–2008	368
2009	23
2010	22
2011 (Jan–May)	2
Total 1998–2011 (Jan–May)	414

[a]Re-arrests are not included.

Downloaded by [University of North Texas] at 23:52 12 November 2014

us to treat a range of conspiracies as cases and link individuals involved in multiple arrest events.

U.K.-based and U.K.-related individuals were involved in 117 plots between 1998 and May 2011. Sixty-five were British domestic plots, occurring in or targeting Britain. Fifty two were foreign plots, taking place abroad or targeting foreign countries. Among the domestic plots, 30 involved violent action such as bombings and assassinations, including four actualized plots, 23 foiled plots and three failed plots, while the other 35 involved support activities such as fund-raising, recruitment, and propaganda. Foreign plots were less evenly distributed, with 34 plots involving violent action and 18 focusing on support activities. Genuine "lone wolves"—terrorists who have self-radicalized and carried out an attack alone—are uncommon. Only a handful of Britons appeared to have no connections to other individuals or organizations in the database and potentially could be examples of what has become known as a "lone wolf."[18]

U.K.-based and U.K.-related individuals were involved in plots in over twenty countries comprising eight Western countries as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Morocco, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kenya, Tanzania, and Singapore. In addition to participating in those plots, U.K.-based and U.K.-related individuals also traveled to six insurgency destinations as foreign fighters: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Kashmir, Chechnya, and Somalia.

2001–2007 was the highpoint of homegrown terrorism in the United Kingdom. Then activity declined (see Table 1). In addition to the 368 U.K.-based individuals, 68 U.K.-related persons are included in part of the network analysis through 2008. (Extending the data pool through May 2011 adds 47 U.K.-based and 3 U.K.-related persons.)

Table 2
Current conviction status of U.K.-based individuals in database arrested between 1998 and 2008

Wanted/Fugitive	15
Released, no charge	62
Charged, then released	8
Acquitted[a]	32
Convicted, currently in jail	118
Served time and released	66
Deceased[b]	24
In jail awaiting trial	23
Convicted, sentence overturned on appeal	7
Never charged (includes control order detainees and foreign fighters)	13
Total	368

[a]Insufficient evidence or actions not considered instances of legally defined terrorism.
[b]Twenty-one individuals died in pursuit of terrorist acts; three died of other causes. Five died in connection with acts in the United Kingdom.

Downloaded by [University of North Texas] at 23:52 12 November 2014

The study uses coding for first police contact, which refers to the first verifiable contact between an individual and the British authorities, for the purpose of dating an individual's engagement with *jihadist* activity. Arrest statistics act as a proxy for measuring the ebb and flow of activism. (It is sometimes possible to infer from the record when radicalization occurred but in most cases there is no firm indication of how long an individual has engaged in illicit activity.) The concept includes several different types of contact, for example, arrest followed by conviction or by release and subsequent re-arrest, death in connection with a terrorist action (if no prior police contact occurred), and house arrest or extradition. There were 24 deaths, of which three were of natural causes and five were related to terrorist actions in the United Kingdom. The remaining deaths occurred abroad.

Also coded is information about arrest dates, charges and sentencing, demographic data, and relationship data intended to facilitate the analysis of communication structures. The status of the U.K.-based segment of the data pool (368 individuals) is listed in Table 2.

Nationality is defined simply as legal status. Residency is defined as an individual's last known country of long-term domicile. Up to five additional variables are coded for residency. Ethnicity is coded separately. Determining when a particular individual is part of a particular national network (a.k.a. the "British" network) is another matter, however. *Jihadist* networks are cross-national, and their supporters highly mobile. One instance of hyper-mobility is Salaheddin Benyaich, a Moroccan going by the nom-de-guerre Abu Mughen who was sentenced in Morocco for his participation in the Casablanca bombings (2003) and is wanted in Spain for his association with the 2004 Madrid train bombing. Benyaich traveled back and forth between six countries between the late 1990s and 2002, including the United Kingdom.[19]

Archival research is fallible. The coding of arrests and convictions was therefore benchmarked against official statistics to estimate how well the research approximates the actual number of arrests and prosecutions. Direct comparisons of the dataset against official

statistics for terrorism prosecutions are nonetheless difficult for a number of reasons. One is an end-of-year problem. U.K. statistics, for example, are broken down by the fiscal year while this study uses the calendar year. Another is that arrest statistics for terrorism related offenses are available only from 2001 and on, but this dataset starts in 1998. Some records are not publicly available due to the British practice of prohibiting press coverage of sensitive investigations.

Data selection was tailored to sociological, not forensic, analysis, and the authors deemed it important to include people who have been held on terrorism or terrorism-related charges even if eventually acquitted on terrorism charges but found guilty of other criminal activity—fraud or theft typically—related to arrest events and clearly designated as terrorism-related. Relationships take many forms ranging from long-term direct personal relations—such as being a driver for an Al Qaeda recruiter—to phone contact or e-mails and attendance at meetings or events. Participation in training camps is, for example, coded as an event. In addition, the study includes individuals wanted on international warrants or placed on lists of sanctioned individuals. As a result, the database should include a marginally higher number of people than those included in official statistics.

According to official statistics, on 30 September 2009, 132 persons were in prison for terrorist/extremist or related offenses or charges in Great Britain, of which 19 were classified as domestic extremists/separatists.[20] It can be deduced that 113 people were in prison as of September 2009 for international terrorism, the term used to designate Al Qaeda–related and inspired terrorism.[21] This study lists 118 people as convicted and incarcerated by year end. The discrepancy may arise from releases made during the year.

It should be noted also that the legal definition of terrorism and enforcement strategies changed in the period covered. Over the years, an increasing number of people—about two-thirds in 2008/09—were arrested in connection with terrorism investigations and first charged with terrorism offenses but were eventually charged with crimes other than terrorist attacks. These charges included forgery and counterfeiting, theft, the illegal possession of firearms, and identity fraud. In total, about ninety convictions on such charges occurred between 2001 and 2008. Allowing for differences in baseline cutoff points, the study's database closely matches the official figures for terrorism-related offenses in the period it is concerned with.

Al Qaeda in London: The Early Years

Bin Laden transformed Al Qaeda after 1996 by co-opting militant groups in North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, and building what Rohan Gunaratna described as "a network of networks."[22] In Europe and the United States, no such ready-made affiliates were available but veterans of those regional campaigns had settled in Europe, often as refugees. The formulation of a strategy to take the fight to the "far enemy," the United States and the West, unified the dispersed veterans.[23]

London in particular became a favored destination for Egyptian, Libyan, Arab, and North African *Salafists* and *jihadists* in the 1990s. A brief history is provided here, and readers are advised to consult one of the several excellent accounts of the history of Islamist extremism in London for additional background.[24] Al-Ansar, a propaganda sheet for the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), served to link North African extremists scattered across Northern Europe. The newsletter was edited by London cleric Abu Qatada and reportedly financed by Al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri's organization, the Islamic Jihad (EIJ). Al-Zawahiri and Qatada both belonged to Takfir Wal-Hijra, a *Salafist* sect.[25] In

Downloaded by [University of North Texas] at 23:52 12 November 2014

fact the real source was probably bin Laden, who according to French officials at that time also financed Takfir Wal-Hijra.[26]

Osama bin Laden reportedly visited London for a few months in 1994, and he may have made several other trips to the United Kingdom in the early 1990s.[27] Under his direction an "Advice and Reform Committee" was established, which received and distributed faxes from bin Laden, initially from the Sudan and after 1996 from Afghanistan. Khalid Al-Fawwaz, a Saudi, ran the office until he was arrested in 1998. He is currently fighting extradition to the United States in connection with his alleged role the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.[28]

In London, bin Laden's adherents mingled with legal and illegal exilees from North Africa. They supported the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and later, after 1992, paid joyful visits to the Taliban's Afghan Emirate. The civil war in Bosnia (1992–1995) became a catalyst for the recruitment of a new generation of militants, who got to know each other while serving with other volunteers in the *Mujahidin*, the foreign fighters' brigade. Fraternal sectarianism weakened the groups and eventually pushed émigrés into Osama bin Laden's camp. All of the *jihadist* groups that rallied under the Al Qaeda umbrella after bin Laden's 1996 and 1998 *fatwas* were represented in London.[29]

A new generation of native-born European adherents came to London—and after 1997 to the Finsbury Park Mosque specifically—in search of contacts who could send them on to training camps and the insurgencies in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan, and later Iraq. The networks of émigrés facilitated travel arrangements and funding for trainees, and sent them to their contacts operating safe houses in Afghanistan. These contacts then dispatched the aspiring *jihadist* to one of various training camps operated by the Algerians and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Some camps provided generic *jihad* training with weapons and explosives and others offered highly specialized training for select recruits, for example, in the handling of poisons or chemical and biological agents.[30]

A series of arrests involving mostly Algerians in 2002 and early 2003 in connection with illegal fund-raising, theft, and racketeering, as well as a plot to spread ricin in the London Underground, drew attention to the *jihadist* networks hosted by the Finsbury Park mosque. And it now became apparent that militants were prepared to attack their host country.[31]

Local Militancy Rises

Four sheikhs rose to prominence in London in the late 1990s and played significant roles in the diffusion of the *jihadist* movement from the original exilees to the new generations of Western Muslims: Abu Hamza al-Masri (Mustafa Kamel Mustafa), Haydar Abu Doha (Amar Makhlolif), Abu Qatada (Omar Uthman Abu Omar), and Omar Bakri Mohammad (Omar Bakri Fostock).[32] Doha has been described as a "facilitator" or "paymaster" for Al Qaeda, and is not known to have preached. Al-Masri and Bakri Mohammad both preached at the Finsbury Park Mosque. Qatada also provided religious instruction but was selective in his choice of acolytes.

A network of preachers, bookstores, and mosques existed beyond the four sheikhs and their organizations. Mustapha Setmarian Nasar, a Syrian who was an editor of the Al-Ansar newsletter, left London in 1997.[33] Abdullah al-Faisal, a Jamaican cleric who is said to have influenced Richard Reid, the so-called "shoe-bomber," and Germaine Lindsay, one of the 7 July bombers, was deported from the United Kingdom in 2007. Abu Izzadeen (a.k.a. Trevor Brooks), another Jamaican preacher and a convert, was sentenced to $4\frac{1}{2}$ years in prison in April 2008 for incitement to terrorism and fund-raising and was released in October 2010.

Downloaded by [University of North Texas] at 23:52 12 November 2014

Qatada, a Palestinian, preached at the Four Feathers Club near Baker Street and at the Brixton mosque, where he gave religious guidance to Richard Reid and Zacarias Moussaoui, among others. Qatada was co-editor of the Al-Ansar newsletter until ca. 1997.[34] He played a leading role as representative of Al Qaeda and of the GSPC in Europe. Qatada was sentenced to death in absentia in Jordan in 2000 for his role in the planned Millennium hotel bombings in that country. He has been under control orders in the United Kingdom and in and out of prison since 2001. He was remanded to prison in October 2008 after failing to comply with the conditions of his control order.[35] In December 2008, Qatada nonetheless found a way to give an interview for the Shmukh forum, a popular *jihadist* website.[36]

Doha, an Algerian, acted as another liaison with Al Qaeda and the training camps in Afghanistan. He was involved in a series of failed attacks scheduled around the turn of the century, known as the Millennium attacks, which were directed by Al Qaeda and planned by Khalil Sheikh Mohammad. Doha's associates included Ahmed Ressam, who planned to bomb the LA airport in December 1999, and another Algerian, Yacine Akhnouche, who was linked to the Strasbourg Christmas market bombing planned for December 2000 and an attack on the U.S. embassy in Rome planned for January 2001. Doha was arrested in Heathrow airport on his way to Saudi Arabia in February 2001 and has since been fighting extradition to the United States in connection with charges related to the LA airport plot.[37]

The Egyptian-born al-Masri became radicalized while studying civil engineering at Brighton Polytechnic. He went to Bosnia in 1995, where he affiliated himself with Algerian *mujahidin* associated with the GIA. He later formed his own group, Supporters of Sharia. Between 1997 and 2004, al-Masri used the Finsbury Park mosque as a base for fund-raising and recruitment. Transients, including a group of Algerians associated with Abu Doha, lived in the mosque's basement. Al-Masri was arrested in May 2004 and sentenced to seven years in prison in February 2006. He is currently awaiting extradition to the United States to stand trial on charges in connection with plans to set up a training camp in Oregon.

The Syrian-born Bakri Mohammad formed Al-Muhajiroun (The Emigrants) in 1983 in Saudi Arabia, but after Saudi authorities banned the organization three years later, he moved it to London. Al-Muhajiroun was estimated to have 5,000 supporters in the United Kingdom before Bakri Mohammad disbanded it in 2004. (Formal membership is estimated to have been only in the hundreds, due to the group's quasi-Leninist theory of organization and its fee-paying membership rule.) Bakri Mohammad was exiled to Lebanon in 2005 when the U.K. Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, revoked his residency permit. He was sentenced in absentia to life in prison there in November 2010 for training Al Qaeda operatives at a camp in northern Lebanon. He was arrested by Lebanese authorities shortly afterward, and is at present on bail pending a retrial.

A number of groups linked to al-Muhajiroun were banned in 2006. When Anjem Choudary, Bakri Mohammad's disciple, re-launched the "old" al-Muhajiroun in 2009, it too was proscribed. The two most recent incarnations, Islam4UK and Muslims Against Crusades, were banned in January 2010 and November 2011, respectively. Today what remains of the group has shrunk to less than a hundred members.[38]

Findings: Mapping the London Networks

Social network analysis has been frustratingly difficult to apply to real-life scenarios. Error terms cannot be meaningfully assessed in the absence of complete information about all the interactions associated with the network or, at minimum, clearly defined boundaries for

Downloaded by [University of North Texas] at 23:52 12 November 2014



Figure 1. Homegrown network: United Kingdom. First-degree and membership relationships of all U.K.-based individuals, 1998–2008. $N = 368$. Total number of relationships = 4,646.

the network studied. Skeptics point to the risk of making false inferences from incomplete data and have even concluded the technique is useless in the analysis of Al Qaeda.[39]

Keeping these caveats in mind, the study's records of first-degree contacts between individuals and organizational memberships was used to construct a sociogram of the London networks (shown in Figure 1). Interpersonal nodes are conduits for communication and for transaction flows of power and influence, resources, and information. Belonging to organizations is also a conduit for building connections and social capital. For this reason, so-called "entity nodes" are also coded. These comprise inter-personal relationships mediated by one or more of the following indicators: shared membership in a *jihadist* organization; joint attendance at a particular mosque, prayer group or other meeting place such as an Islamic bookstore; exchanges in an online forum; joint attendance in a domestic training camp; or participation in the same plot, cell, or law enforcement operation. Entities were coded only if such relationships were verifiable by means of confessions, judicial processes, or other documentary evidence.

A final caveat to keep in mind is that new trials and new arrests can bring fresh information and sometimes modify the pictures formed of past conspiracies. The margin of error decreases as cases are added. With nearly four hundred individuals and five thousand relationships coded, the overall inferences and conclusions of the study have proven robust even as new information has become available.

The interactions coded were in some cases deemed criminal by courts. Others cannot be determined as illicit. Attending the Finsbury Park Mosque, for example, was not per see illegal. Membership of Al-Muhajiroun became a criminal offense only after the group

Downloaded by [University of North Texas] at 23:52 12 November 2014

was proscribed. Evidence of membership of those organizations is therefore not a trigger for inclusion in the database. The Finsbury Park Mosque and al-Muhajiroun were constant features of the infrastructure of the networks that were analyzed. Adopting this coding decision significantly underestimates the number of actual contacts but enhances the reliability of the data restricting the coded relationship to activities that can be clearly assessed as in support of terrorism.

Palantir Technologies provided the authors access to its Java-based platform for analyzing, integrating, and visualizing data. The platform was used to code relationships between individuals and between individuals and organizations ("entities"). The resulting network information was then transposed to UCINET for the generation of social network statistics and to NetDraw for the generation of sociograms in black and white print format. Freeman's Degree Centrality Index was used as a basic metric of activity.

The overall result is consistent with the hypothesis that the U.K. militants formed an integrated and cohesive network. Ninety-two percent all the British militants whose first police contact dates to 1998 to 2008 were connected to the core network through first-degree contacts, either through direct relationships or by belonging to one of the organizations associated with the network. The 368 U.K.-based individuals included in the analysis shared 4,646 first-degree contacts, an average of twelve contacts per individual. The standard deviation is large, which indicates that the network consisted of leaders and followers. This confirms the visual impression provided by the chart of a dense network with four major hubs and several minor ones.

In sum, this is a unified and tightly integrated network. Nearly all nodes are connected through first-degree relationship to the major network. The dense central network is centered on four major hubs and two minor ones. Within the integrated network, the distribution of "social capital" as indicated by the flow of relationships and the individual accumulation of nodes is highly unequal. Some of the relationships depicted were brief or occurred only once during the years covered by the analysis. Others were long-standing. And while the authors are confident about the contacts and relationships coded, there may be many more they did not know about.

1. The sheikhs and their organizations: While each of the clerics had his own tactical niche in London's *jihadist* landscape, this research shows that they created a dense network of common contacts, substantiating the description of London as a *jihadist* center.

   The two main centers of militancy, Al-Muhajiroun and the Finsbury Park Mosque, constitute the largest clusters in the sociogram. Other mosques and militant bookstores also regularly hosted the clerics and circulated tapes and pamphlets of their *jihad*-exhortative sermons. In 1998–1999, for instance, al-Masri participated in a mosque tour that systematically stopped in towns around London with significant Muslim populations.[40] Some mosques in particular served as breeding grounds for recruitment, for example in Croydon, Luton, Walthamstow, Bradford, Leeds, and a few other places in the Midlands. A number of bookstores were also coded as meeting places in addition to mosques but none showed up as central to the overall network.

2. Detached and semi-detached groups: Twelve cells had no links to the core network and five were connected to the core by one relationship. Four individuals had no first-degree relationships.[41] The detached—or unaffiliated—cells could be evidence that the "leaderless jihad" thesis is in part correct, provided they are "self-starter" cells with little or no connection to well-known extremist hubs.[42]

Downloaded by [University of North Texas] at 23:52 12 November 2014

While there are indeed detached cells and individuals, they are for the most part products of the methodology used in the study. A background check showed that by relaxing the filters used to screen the data selection, seven out of the eleven apparently detached cells could in fact be related to the central network. They turned out to have forged alternative pathways of communication with one or more of the four hubs, in most cases via individuals who were disqualified from the present analysis either because their first arrest occurred outside the time frame (before 1998 or after 2008) or because they were not residents of the United Kingdom.

One of the unaffiliated clusters, for example, consists of three Tunisian residents of the United Kingdom, arrested in November 2007 as part of a European-wide operation against an Al Qaeda support network based in Milan, and suspected of providing financial and logistical support to affiliates in North Africa. While there is no evidence of interpersonal relationships with other U.K.-based individuals, the three men were nonetheless integrated into the Al Qaeda nebula through their direct contact with members of the Milan group.

The analysis models the evolution of the Britain-based networks into a tightly integrated community forming a cohesive militant counterculture, in which a handful of sheikhs and their organizations—most prominently the Finsbury Park mosque and al-Muhajiroun—played an important role as coordinators and meeting points.

A sociogram of the interpersonal relationships of U.S. *jihadists*, similarly based on the study's records of first-degree contacts between individuals and organizational memberships in the United States, revealed a starkly different picture (see Figure 2), indicating that the integration of the British conspiracies may be case-specific rather than a general



Figure 2. Homegrown network: United States. Degree and membership relationships of all U.S.-based individuals, 1998–2011. $N = 293$. Total number of relationships = 1,374.

Downloaded by [University of North Texas] at 23:52 12 November 2014

feature of Western *jihadist* organization. While London proved to be the center of a densely integrated *jihadist* community, rather than a diffuse collection of autonomous "bunches of guys," other Western networks such as the United States seem to have remained more dispersed.

It is important to note that U.S. *jihadists* shared a large number of contacts with actors outside the United States, which are not depicted in this domestic-focused sociogram. Nevertheless, the highly dispersed picture of the U.S. network illustrates the advent of a newer, more isolated cohort of *jihadists* relying on the Internet for contact and reflects the "suburbanization" of *jihad* in the United States, in sharp contrast with London's tight-knit community entrenched in a *jihadist* counterculture evolved from exilee groups. While the British networks were initiated in the 1990s and relied on an infrastructure already in place before 9/11, the U.S. networks grew mostly out of a post-9/11 environment where online contact was preferred over face-to-face meetings at mosques and bookstores. Only 39 percent of all U.S. militants included in the analysis were connected to the core network through first-degree contacts, and they shared just 1,374 such contacts, about five per individual. There were thirty cells with no links to the core network and thirty-eight individuals with no first-degree contacts at all.

Downloaded by [University of North Texas] at 23:52 12 November 2014

"Shortest Path" Analysis of the London-Based Networks

"Centrality"—being the go-to person in the network—is assumed to correlate with influence, although it is not an infallible measure of relative power. Different algorithms are used to measure centrality, each designed to capture specific attributes and types of network cooperation. In practical terms the analysis yielded a high correlation between the different metrics, although the rank-order varied dependent on the particular algorithm used. (A test showed a correlation of .95 between Degree Centrality and Betweenness Centrality scores.) One reason is that the commonly used centrality metrics are sensitive to size issues (e.g., the factual properties of the network).[43]

The centrality tests indicated a highly structured hierarchy of contacts and access. Critics may aver that the connections are entirely normal and legitimate aspects of legal political activism. In fact, this study's data is biased toward the registration of illicit behavior, as the sources for coding derive almost exclusively from successful prosecutions. It is plausible that a less hierarchical pattern would emerge from a database of, for example, surveillance records.

Betweenness Centrality, a commonly used centrality metric, weighs nodes by using a so-called "shortest path" algorithm, based on direct personal contacts rather than membership contacts through organizations and mosques. The metric measures how often a node is on the shortest path between another pair of nodes. Nodes with high scores can be viewed as most central to the network. The assumption is that being in the "middle" of a network is more valuable than being on the periphery, even if the sheer number of relationships is the same. Put plainly, social capital is contingent on having friends. Having friends who also have friends is best.

The centrality analysis was carried out in two steps, first applying a geographical screen and including only people living in or visiting the United Kingdom for extended periods between 1998 and 2011, and a second time expanding the social network analysis to include operators linked to British conspiracies but based outside the country. The second analysis encompassed a total of 485 persons and included international actors related to British conspiracies and Britons based abroad. The two-step test highlighted the role played by international Al Qaeda agents in the London networks. The rank order of

Table 3
Betweenness centrality, 1998–2011. U.K.-based and U.K.-related individuals ranked by shortest path personal relationships. No organizations. Ranked by number of unique nodes.

Rank	Name	Betweenness	NetBetweenness
1	Abu Hamza Al-Masri	24347.436	36.853
2	Omar Bakri Mohammad	7551.594	11.430
3	**Abu Qatada**	**7330.012**	**11.095**
4	**Abu Doha**	**5321.594**	**8.055**
5	**Rashid Rauf**	**3638.114**	**5.507**
6	Omar Khyam	3003.475	4.546
7	Mohammed Sidique Khan	2807.299	4.249
8	Abdula Ahmed Ali	2778.500	4.206
9	Hussain Osman	2614.006	3.957
10	Muktar Said Ibrahim	2434.096	3.684
11	Mohammed Hamid	2354.715	3.564
12	**Mohammed Junaid Babar**	**1966.231**	**2.976**
13	**Osama Bin Laden**	**1965.782**	**2.975**
14	**Rangzieb Ahmed**	**1759.861**	**2.664**
15	**Djamel Beghal**	**1738.778**	**2.632**
16	Junade Ferouze	1674.492	2.535
17	**Abbas Boutrab**	**1656.401**	**2.507**
18	Abu Izzadeen	1628.986	2.466
19	Younis Tsouli	1556.930	2.357
20	**Rabah Kadri**	**1504.564**	**2.277**

Boldface indicates international Al Qaeda operative identified as such in national court proceedings or international resolutions (UN sanctions committee), or self-identified as such. $N = 485$.

the U.K.-based militants was not significantly changed by the inclusion of U.K.-related international operators. (Only the results of the second step are displayed, see Table 3).

Tier One: The Sheikhs

The sheikhs not surprisingly turned up as pivotal nodes in the network. This finding can be interpreted to mean that their public functions coexisted with playing a role as a mediators of personal contacts and coordinators of illicit activities. In fact, three of the four sheikhs who attracted public attention as leading proponents of *jihadism* hold the three highest Betweenness Centrality scores among all U.K.-based individuals. One man, al-Masri, far outranked everyone else both in terms of personal connections and membership connections through his charismatic leadership of the Finsbury Park Mosque. The shortest path centrality analysis reveals that his public role as a preacher overlapped with a private role as a coordinator in the networks linking the London-based militants to the Al Qaeda organization.

Qatada, ranked third among U.K.-based individuals, preached to a limited circle of acolytes but his main role was to act as a recruiter and organizer for Al Qaeda in Europe. A Belgian court stated in connection with the convictions of two men accused of killing Shah Massoud that Qatada "appears as a watermark running through the whole of this case

Downloaded by [University of North Texas] at 23:52 12 November 2014

as being the mastermind, if not the commandant, of the movements propounding jihad in the West."[44] Doha, in twelfth place in the U.K.-based networks, was arrested in February 2001 and was placed under house arrest in July 2008. The sheikhs have been known to communicate with other members of the network despite imprisonment, but it has to be assumed that the bulk of Doha's contacts with other individuals subsequently convicted of terrorism were made prior to his arrest in 2001.

Another sheikh, Abu Izzadeen, also shows up among the top twenty best-connected men in the network. Izzadeen remains active today. He was released from prison in 2010 after serving three-and-a-half years for terrorist fund-raising and incitement to terrorism and was re-arrested in November 2011 under terrorist laws for failing to comply with a court order.[45]

If the assumption that the U.K.-based networks were integrated with the Al Qaeda command and control structure is correct, international Al Qaeda figures should move up in the ranks in the second step of the test because of their close connections to other centrally placed U.K.-based actors. After expanding the definition of the London networks to include U.K.-related individuals, the three sheikhs al-Masri, Bakri Mohammed and Qatada, still claim the highest scores for connectedness (Table 3). Doha, who played a role as a coordinator not only in Britain but also in a number of international plots, moved up to fourth rank in the international listing.

Downloaded by [University of North Texas] at 23:52 12 November 2014

Tier Two: The Homegrown Operators

The other individuals reaching the top twenty of well-connected Britons in the shortest path analysis are the deceased or convicted leaders of six significant homegrown plots: Crawley fertilizer plot ringleader Omar Khyam; 7 July bomber Mohammed Sidique Khan; 21 July bombers Hussain Osman and Mukhtar Said Ibrahim; Cumbria training camp organizer Mohammed Hamid; 2006 Transatlantic Aircraft plot ringleader Abdula Ahmed Ali; and Junade Ferouze, who was a co-conspirator in the 2004 "dirty bomb" plot targeting official buildings and public transportation in London and the United States.

Evidence of direct Al Qaeda involvement in the U.K.-based homegrown plots has gradually emerged during the trial of British defendants, with records of their attendance at Al Qaeda training camps and direct interaction with Al Qaeda handlers. At least one leading member of each of the most serious homegrown plots targeting the United Kingdom—the Crawley fertilizer plot, the 2004 "dirty bomb" plot, 7 July, 21 July, and the Transatlantic Aircraft plot—underwent bomb training in a Pakistani Al Qaeda camp. The latest evidence was released during the 7 July inquiry. Authorities now acknowledge that in the weeks before the 7 July bombings, ringleader Mohamed Sidique Khan received bombmaking advice in a series of phone calls initiated from public phones in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. Police admitted that the calls were "connected to some guidance or some means of communicating information concerned with the manufacture of the bombs and then ultimately their detonation."[46]

A "cyber-*jihadist*," Younes Tsouli, also appears in the top-twenty. He is often portrayed as a "loner" but was well connected in the network and not just via his computer. Tsouli, whose screen name was "irhabi007" (Terrorist 007) was the administrator of a password-protected *jihadist* website with 4,500 users until his arrest in October 2005.[47]

Even when international agents were included the leaders of British homegrown plots made the top-twenty list, but some British Al Qaeda coordinators moved up dramatically in the rankings.

Downloaded by [University of North Texas] at 23:52 12 November 2014

Al Qaeda's Representatives in London

Including Qatada and Doha, who have both been identified by courts as Al Qaeda members, nine of the twenty best connected men in the London network were either Al Qaeda leaders or operators known to have been assigned by Al Qaeda to carry out attacks in Europe. Osama bin Laden appears in thirteenth place despite becoming inaccessible to the British *jihadists* after his disappearance in December 2001. Bin Laden's personal associates in London were generally imprisoned or under house arrest by 2001. Others met him briefly during visits to Darunta, Khalden, or al-Farouq, the Al Qaeda–affiliated training camps in Afghanistan. Bin Laden's appearance in the centrality ranking underscores the important roles played by experienced militants and veterans from the training camps in homegrown terrorism, which peaked four to five years later.

Top-ranked is also Rashid Rauf, a British citizen and Al Qaeda coordinator who has been considered a "facilitator" or a "manager" of a number of British homegrown plots, including the Crawley, 7 July, 21 July, the 2006 transatlantic aircraft plots. It was determined that he met or communicated with several members of each plot. Some he mentored during their stays at a training camp in Pakistan.[48] He has also been linked to three plots believed to have been coordinated, targeting Manchester area nightclubs and shopping centers around Easter 2009, the New York City subway on the anniversary of 9/11 a few months later, and the U.S. embassy in Oslo in July 2010.[49] Rauf moved to Pakistan in 2002. His reported death in a drone attack in November 2008 is unconfirmed.

Further down the list are other central Al Qaeda coordinators who were also based in Pakistan. One is Mohammed Junaid Babar, who grew up in the United States and was a member of a U.S.-based cell of Al-Muhajiroun. Babar decided to go to Pakistan and join Al Qaeda after the 9/11 attacks. In 2004 he returned to the United States and pleaded guilty to charges of having supported terrorism against the United States. Babar provided crucial evidence against Khan and Khyam and other British *jihadists*. Rangzieb Ahmed is another British Al Qaeda coordinator allegedly connected to a number of U.K. homegrown plots. Ahmed lived in Pakistan until his arrest in 2006 and subsequent deportation to the United States. He was convicted of "directing terrorism as a member of al-Qaeda" and received a life sentence in December 2008.[50]

Three foreign Al Qaeda affiliates, who worked closely with Qatada, Doha, and Hamza, respectively, and at various points frequented the Finsbury Park mosque, also emerge as well-connected nodes in the London network. The men have been convicted in connection with a jet bomb plot and plots targeting Paris, Strasbourg, and London.[51]

In sum, the findings are incompatible with the assumption that the British militants were "leaderless." The four well-known sheikhs—Doha, Qatada, al-Masri, and Bakri Mohammad—assumed very different public roles but privately acted as leading coordinators in an integrated and hyper-mobile transnational community of multiple generations of *jihadists*. Finally, it is apparent that a thick network of personal relations and routinized communication structures linked the British network to Al Qaeda.

Conclusion

By using detailed individual-level data about the domestic and transnational relationships of Western *jihadists*, this study has sought to overcome the empirical shortcomings previously associated with the application of social network analysis to terrorist and other underground movements. The article used network analysis to identify the structural patterns of Western *jihadist* networks and to test two competing models about the role of Al

Qaeda in Western *jihadist* conspiracies. Although the models present conflicting views of the nature of Western networks, empirical tests reveal that they may in fact both be right. A network analysis of the study's data indicates that while neither model accurately describes Western *jihadism* as a whole, each model fits specific geographically and temporally bound segments of the networks.

Hoffman's Al Qaeda-centric model, which portrays Western militants as recruits of a domestically and transnationally organized Al Qaeda movement, matches the London-based networks of the 1998–2008 decade. The evidence shows that during that period London militants were integrated both horizontally with other local *jihadists* and vertically with the movement's foreign leadership. Homegrown conspiracies conducted by British youths thrived under the guidance of international cadres, stimulated by a preexisting infrastructure of mosques, bookstores, and informal connecting points. Old émigré and new homegrown generations of *jihadists* coalesced into a tight-knit community invigorated by a strong *jihadist* counterculture, giving rise to the derogatory epithet of "Londonistan."[52]

While the Hoffman model applies to the London-based networks, it cannot be generalized to describe the topography of *jihadist* networks across all Western countries during that decade, as the dispersed structure of U.S. networks shows. The existence of a London branch of Al Qaeda was the result of bin Laden's deep historical contacts in London dating back to the early 1990s, which sowed the seeds of the infrastructure on which the branch developed. Those contacts were mobilized after the 2001 closure of Al Qaeda's training camps in Afghanistan, which had been the organizational basis for building Al Qaeda into the vanguard of global *jihadism* since 1998. The London networks stepped in to fill the vacuum created by the expulsion from Afghanistan. Similar centers of experienced *jihadists* with contacts to the Al Qaeda leadership were present elsewhere in Europe (e.g., Milan, Frankfurt, and Barcelona), but they lacked depths and density in comparison. The central position of London was also enhanced because the proselytizers and operatives based there were able to draw on contacts elsewhere in Western Europe and were capable of acting as a magnet for recruitment and the transfer of volunteers to Al Qaeda affiliates in theaters of *jihadist* insurgencies.

Sageman's model, which depicts Western-based *jihadists* as operationally autonomous and diffuse clusters, may be applicable to the most recent developments. By 2008 the four British sheikhs and foreign Al Qaeda operatives active in London had been either arrested or exiled. Over the next few years, successive senior Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan were eliminated, culminating with the death of Osama bin Laden in May 2011. Naturally, the British networks adapted. There is little empirical support for Sageman's model during the years of the large-scale attacks against Western targets. Indeed, this research instead provides evidence in support of the fleeting disclosures by security officials about bin Laden's ability to exert control over the Al Qaeda movement from his hide-out in Pakistan.[53] However, the "leaderless jihad" thesis is probably true now that the central Al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan and its infrastructure in London have been disrupted.

During the 1998–2008 decade, direct inter-personal contacts yielded social capital, and allowed leaders to cement the clandestine *jihadist* networks in London. Trust was a critical resource for operational coordination. This research shows that the Internet, while present, remained a secondary source of coordination. Since 2008, the Internet-based virtual *jihadist* community has gradually replaced the social counterculture built around the *jihadist* centers of recruitment that previously dominated the British militant scene. Militants are increasingly converts, and more women have been joining up. Pervasive Internet-based recruitment, also characteristic of recent U.S.-based networks, has produced a social structure very different from that of the decade of "Londonistan." The shift to

Downloaded by [University of North Texas] at 23:52 12 November 2014

social media has de-territorialized the communication structures supporting recruitment for violent action. This development supports and encourages a diffusion of the *jihadist* movement.

Notes

1. United Kingdom, "Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," No. HC1087 2005-06, London: The Stationary Office (11 May 2006).

2. Ibid., 26.

3. United Kingdom Intelligence and Security Committee, "Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005," No. Cm 6785, London: The Stationary Office (11 May 2006).

4. The term "homegrown" covers acts of terrorism planned or carried out against Western states in the name of Al Qaeda or like-minded organizations by individuals born (or raised) in the West. Jerome P. Bjelopera and Mark A. Randol, "American Jihadist Terrorism: Combatting a Complex Threat," CRS Report for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (7 December 2010), p. 1.

5. Sebastian Rotella, "New Details in the bin Laden Docs: Portrait of a Fugitive Micro-Manager," *ProPublica*, 11 May 2011.

6. Robert S. Leiken, "Europe's Angry Muslims," *Foreign Policy* 84(4) (July/August 2005), pp. 120–135.

7. Warren Hoge, "Britain Arrests 7 Suspected of Links to Bin Laden," *New York Times*, 24 September 1998. The seven men were placed on Control Orders but not convicted. In 2005, they were added to the UN 1267 Committee's list of sanctioned individuals associated with Al Qaeda.

8. Osama Bin Laden et al., "Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders," *Al-Quds al-Arabi*, 23 February 1998, p. 3.

9. Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), pp. 69–70, 72–76, 84–88.

10. Assaf Moghadam, *The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), p. 138.

11. Bruce Hoffman, "The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters," *Foreign Affairs* 87(3) (May/June 2008), pp. 135, 138.

12. John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, "Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism," in Ian O. Lesser et al., eds., *Countering the New Terrorism* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), pp. 41, 45.

13. The database compiled by Sageman in support of the "bunch of guys" theory, for instance, included roughly five hundred *Jihadists* stemming from the circles around the 9/11 perpetrators and other *Jihadists* "who pose a threat to the United States." The sample represents only a narrow portion of the universe of cases of Western-based *Jihadists*, and it is unclear how the sample was selected. See Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad*, pp. 25–28.

14. Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin, eds., "Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together," RAND National Defense Research Institute Monograph (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009); Miles Kahler, "Collective Action and Clandestine Networks: The Case of Al Qaeda," in Miles Kahler, ed., *Networked Politics: Agency, Power, and Governance* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); Scott Helfstein, "Governance of Terror: New Institutionalism and the Evolution of Terrorist Organizations." *Public Administration Review* 69(4) (2009), pp. 727–739.

15. Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones, "Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why al-Qaida May Be Less Threatening Than Many Think," *International Security* 33(2) (Fall 2008), pp. 7–44.

16. United States Department of Justice, *United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui,* Indictment before the Eastern District of Virginia (December 2001), pt. 38.

17. Information on three types of individuals is recorded in the database: (1) Native-born Westerners (defined as citizens from a Western country or individuals who have legally or illegally

Downloaded by [University of North Texas] at 23:52 12 November 2014

resided in a Western country since childhood) who have died in *Jihadist* suicide actions, or have been killed by police, or have participated in insurgencies abroad, or have been convicted, or are currently standing or awaiting trial, or are wanted on charges related to terrorism connected to the global *Jihadist* movement; (2) Individuals subjected to house arrest or who have been subject to demands for extradition on such charges are also included; (3) Legal or illegal residents in a Western country prior to arrest or participation in a plot who have died in *Jihadist* suicide actions, or have been killed by police, or have participated in insurgencies abroad, or have been convicted, or are currently standing or awaiting trial, or are wanted on charges related to terrorism connected to the global *Jihadist* movement.

18. For a typology of different types of "lone terrorists," see Raffaello Pantucci, "A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists," *Developments in Radicalisation and Political Violence Paper Series* (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, March 2011). Definitions vary. The authors do not concur, for example, with Pantucci's description of Richard Reid, the so-called shoe bomber as a "lone wolf."

19. Madrid (Spain) Juzgado Centra de Instruccion #005, Sumario (Proc. Ordinario) 0000035/2001E (September 2003), p. 665.

20. United Kingdom Home Office, "Statistics on Terrorism Arrests" (2010). Available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/non-personal-data/counter-terrorism-data/terrorism-arrest-statistics?view=Standard&pubID=803746 (accessed 12 April 2011); United Kingdom Home Office, "Operation of Police Powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and Subsequent Legislation: Arrests, Outcomes and Stop & Searches," Quarterly Update to September 2010, Home Office Statistical Bulletin, London: Crown Copyright (2010), p. 5.

21. The official prison service statistics list three types of individuals in custody: terrorist-legislation or terrorism-related, historic, and domestic extremist/separatist terrorism. A survey of prisoners serving sentences related to terrorism charges includes individuals who may have converted while in prison. They could have been convicted of animal rights terrorism.

22. United States National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, "The Rise and Decline of Al Qaeda," Statement of Rohan Gunaratna at the Third Public Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9 July 2003.

23. Bruce Riedel, *The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology and Future* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), pp. 24–34.

24. Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005); Raffaello Pantucci, "The Tottenham Ayatollah and The Hook-Handed Cleric: An Examination of All Their Jihadi Children," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 33(3) (February 2010), pp. 226–245; Bruce Hoffman, "Radicalization and Subversion: Al Qaeda and the 7 July 2005 Bombings and the 2006 Airline Bombing Plot," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32 (2009), pp. 1100–1116.

25. Mary E. A. Buckley and Rick Fawn, eds., *Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan, and Beyond* (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 48.

26. Martin Bright et al., "The Secret War," *Guardian*, 30 September 2001.

27. Daniel McGrory, "The Day when Osama bin Laden Applied for Asylum—in Britain," *Sunday Times,* 29 September 2005.

28. United States Department of Justice, *United States of America v. Osama Bin Laden et al.*, S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (6 February 2001). See also Duncan Gardham, "US Most Wanted Terrorist Suspect in New Extradition Fight in Britain," *The Telegraph*, 12 February 2009.

29. The most significant were the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and, after 1998, the Salafist Group for Predication and Combat (GSPC), which allegedly was funded by Osama bin Laden as a tool for controlling the Algerian *Jihadist* veterans. The GSPC merged with Al Qaeda in October 2003 and changed its name to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2007. The name change reflected the integration of remnants of the Tunisian and the Algerian groups with the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group (GICM) and other North African factions. Anneli Botha, "Terrorism in the Maghreb: The Transnationalisation

Downloaded by [University of North Texas] at 23:52 12 November 2014

of Domestic Terrorism," Institute for Security Studies Monograph Series no. 144, Pretoria/Tshwane: Institute for Security Studies (2008), esp. pp. 36, 63–66.

30. Jean-Louis Bruguière, *Ce Que Je n'Ai Pas Pu Dire: Entretiens Avec Jean-Marie Pontaut* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2009), pp. 334–335, 337–342.

31. The trial posed significant difficulties. In the end, only one man, Kamal Bourgass, was convicted on charges of conspiring to create "a public nuisance" and a murder charge. Bourgass stabbed and killed a police officer during his arrest. Several of the men were subject to control orders and others deported.

32. The men are often referred to by their aliases (*kunya*) rather than their proper names (listed first). The titular "sheikh" is used for the older generation. "Al-Masri" simply means "the Egyptian," and "Abu" means "father of." It is a concern that readers recognize to whom the article is referring but the use of aliases is also problematic. A compromise is to drop the "Abu" and use the remained of the well-known aliases in place of the proper names.

33. Nasar was captured by the Pakistani security forces in Quetta in 2005 and transferred to U.S. custody. He is assumed to be imprisoned in Syria.

34. Qatada's role in connection with the various groups and the al-Ansar newsletter is described in a judgment made by a Special Immigration Appeals Commission on 26 February 2007. See United Kingdom Special Immigration Appeals Commission, *Omar Othman (a.k.a. Abu Qatada), Appellant, and Secretary of State for the Home Department, Respondent*, Appeal No: SC/15/2005 (26 February 2007).

35. James Slack, "Hate Preacher Abu Qatada's Bail Conditions Under Review After Meeting with Car Bomb Extremist," *The Daily Mail,* 30 August 2008.

36. For a transcript of the interview, see William McCants, "Q&A With Abu Qatada," *Jihadica*, 23 December 2008. Available at http://www.jihadica.com/qa-with-abu-qatada/ (accessed 18 November 2011).

37. United States Department of Justice, *United States v. Abu Doha*, Indictment before the Southern District of New York (27 August 2001).

38. Peter Neumann cited in Keith Weir and Estelle Shirbon, "Britain Bans Islamist Group at Centre of March Row," *Reuters,* 12 January 2010. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/12/us-britain-islamist-idUSTRE60B1SE20100112 (accessed 18 November 2011); Anonymous, interview by authors, London, 22 February 2010.

39. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler, and Alexander H. Montgomery, "Network Analysis for International Relations," *International Organization* 63 (Summer 2009), pp. 559–592.

40. Sean O'Neill and Daniel McGrory, *The Suicide Factory: Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque* (London: Harper Perennial, 2006), pp. 48–49, 58–59.

41. Nodes with no first-degree relationship, or orphan nodes, are not depicted on the chart.

42. Jonathan Kennedy and Gabriel Weitmann, "The Strength of Weak Terrorist Ties," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23 (2011), pp. 201–211.

43. Phillip Bonacich, Amalya Oliver, and Tom A. B. Snijders, "Controlling for Size in Centrality Scores," *Social Networks* 20 (1998), pp. 135–141.

44. See United Kingdom Administrative Court, *Secretary of State for the Home Department, Appellant, and E., Respondent,* Case No: PTA 5/2005 (21 February 2007), p. 28.

45. Murray Wardrop, "Islamic Hate Preacher Arrested on Terrorism Charge," *The Telegraph,* 3 November 2011.

46. "7/7 Inquests: 'Pakistan Calls to Bomber' in Days Before," *BBC News*, 2 February 2011. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12345809 (accessed 18 November 2011).

47. Gordon Corera, "Al-Qaeda's 007: The Extraordinary Story of the Solitary Computer Geek in a Shepherds Bush Bedsit Who Became the World's Most Wanted Cyber-Jihadist," *The Sunday Times,* 16 January 2008.

48. Duncan Gardham, "Rashid Rauf's Connections to Terror," *The Telegraph,* 8 September 2009.

Downloaded by [University of North Texas] at 23:52 12 November 2014

49. Raffaello Pantucci, "Rashid Rauf and the New York City Subway Bombing Plot," *Terrorism Monitor* 8(18) (7 May 2010); Duncan Gardham, "Alert over Wanted al-Qaeda Suspect who May Be Heading to Britain," *The Telegraph,* 20 August 2010.

50. United Kingdom Crown Prosecution Service, "First Conviction for Directing Terrorism as a Member of al-Qaeda," Crown Prosecution Service Press Release (18 December 2008); Duncan Gardham and Chris Irvine, "Key al-Qaeda Figure to Be Sentenced," *The Telegraph,* 18 December 2008.

51. Djamel Beghal, Rabah Kadri, and Abbas Boutrab.

52. Melanie Phillips popularized the term after the July 2005 attacks but it was used already a decade before by government officials from France and North Africa complaining about the willingness of the British courts and government officials to grant accused terrorists sanctuary. Melanie Phillips, *Londonistan: How Britain Is Creating a Terror State Within* (London: Gibson Square Books Ltd., 2006); "Farewell, Londonistan? Anti-terrorism Legislation is Driving Islamist Extremists out of Britain," *The Economist,* 31 January 2002; Elaine Sciolino and Don Van Natta, Jr., "For a Decade, London Thrived as a Busy Crossroads of Terror," *The New York Times*, 10 July 2005.

53. See, for instance, Mark Hosenball, "Bin Laden Was in on 2005 and 2006 London Plots," *Reuters*, 13 July 2011. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/13/us-binladen-idUSTRE76C0MQ20110713 (accessed 18 November 2011); Florian Flade, "Osama Bin Ladens Brief an die Deutsche Terrorzelle," *Die Welt*, 25 August 2011.

Downloaded by [University of North Texas] at 23:52 12 November 2014